elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1109070

201308

1201-1800

ATL.Airport

GA

0.0

Air Carrier

B717 (Formerly MD-95)

2.0

IFR

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Fatigue

1109070

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Even though the trip pairing should have allowed for more than enough rest; I wasn't able the get more than 7 hours total of restless sleep in those two nights. I found myself making mistakes that I never made before on that last leg; such as looking right at the pack switches and turning them off instead of the hydraulic switches. Scheduling sent an ACARS enroute to call after we landed and I sent one back calling in fatigued. Restless sleep on my part; not sure why.

B717 First Officer reports informing crew scheduling that he is too fatigued to take another flight at the end of his scheduled trip pairing.

1773796

202011

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2.0

VMC

10

Daylight

25000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Robinson R22

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Taxi

None

Class C ZZZ

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Part 91

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1230; Flight Crew Type 1230

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1773796

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

What happened: Aircraft Y was given a take off clearance for a runway that was occupied by a helicopter that had landed on the opposite end and was awaiting taxi instructions.What led to this: The helicopter was coming in from the east and requested to land on the western side of the airport. The active runways at the time were south to north (XXL and XXR). The Tower cleared the helicopter to land on the numbers of an inactive runway XY; which would keep the helicopter on the eastern side of the airport; away from the flow of fixed wing traffic. About 5 minutes elapsed between the time the helicopter landed and Aircraft Y flew over the helicopter.During that time I believe the Controller may have been distracted by pattern traffic; Aircraft Z arrival (this was a factor prior to the helicopter landing which resulted in the controller deciding to keep the helicopter on the eastern side of the airport); a change in Aircraft Y IFR clearance; and by a pilot of an airplane who mistakenly made a final approach to the wrong parallel runway.Starting from the point at which the helicopter lands; the following exchanges were heard.Aircraft A was cleared for touch and go #2 behind Aircraft Z for runway XXL.Aircraft B was cleared to Land runway XXR.A few seconds after Aircraft B acknowledged the landing clearance the tower issue a taxi instruction to the airborne Aircraft B 'hold short of runway XXR I am going to have a departure off runway XZ.'Aircraft B responded 'I am in the air.'The tower replied 'Disregard; Land and hold short of runway XZ; land and hold short of runway XZ.'Aircraft B responded that this was their intention and would be parking in an area that would not put them at risk of crossing into runway XZ.The tower approved a request to taxi back to parking after Aircraft B completed a 180 degree turn on the runway after landing.30 seconds later the tower controller said to Aircraft B; 'Disregard the land and hold short clearance. I won't have that departure. He will be holding in place; though.'The tower instructed Aircraft Y to line up and wait on runway XZ.The 737 had already landed on XXL and the tower cleared a Cessna for takeoff runway XXL.20 seconds later Aircraft B realized he was about to land on top of Aircraft A who had just been cleared for takeoff and asked the tower if he should go around. There was no response. Aircraft B hailed the tower again. I observed Aircraft B descend below 100 ft AGL before deciding to go around. 40 seconds elapsed between the 1st and 3rd time Aircraft B called the tower.The tower gave the departing Aircraft A; a mixed up call starting with 'line up and- cancel take off- cleared for takeoff runway XXL'The tower then gave Aircraft B instructions to remain in the upwind; he would give him a crosswind instruction to follow.Aircraft B apologized for lining up to land on the wrong runway.As soon as the frequency congestion allowed; knowing there was a jet on the opposite side of my runway; I made a call 'Tower; Helicopter (call-sign) holding position on the numbers of [Runway] XY ready to taxi to (name of ramp)'. The call was not acknowledged and 55 seconds later an amended departure clearance; combined with a takeoff clearance; was given to the waiting Aircraft Y. I did not hear the departure clearance and Aircraft Y began racing towards us. Ironically; I may have turned to my student and said to keep an eye on Aircraft Y. As it rushed overhead I made an aggressive maneuver off of the numbers and onto the closest available vacant spot beyond the runway safety area.Previous experiences at this airport have made it clear when a helicopter accepts a landing clearance to a spot; taxiway; intersection; or helipad; they are expected to remain there until given a clearance to taxi. Quite often the controllers will vector an arriving helicopter far around the approach or departure center lines of the active runways and restrict them to altitudes below 600 MSL instead of accommodating a flight path crossing the active runways at a higher safe altitude. Less often are we allowed to land as in the case above in a place safely away from the departing/arriving aircraft; and in a position where we can easily air taxi at a moment's notice. A helicopter is highly maneuverable and this aspect should be used to the utmost advantage when minimizing delays to arriving or departing airplanes. As mentioned earlier the helicopter's arrival was prior to Aircraft Z checking in with the tower. There was Aircraft A on a half-mile final to runway XXL ahead of Aircraft Z. With several miles of spacing between Aircraft Z and Aircraft A; the tower began to ask the helicopter to pass behind the landing Aircraft A. We accepted. The tower immediately reversed their decision due to Aircraft Z scheduled arrival and cleared us to land on the numbers of [Runway] XY with the restriction 'remain north of XX'. We accepted the clearance to land. It is very likely that a helicopter crossing the approach end of XXL shortly after the landing Aircraft A would have had little to no effect on any of the other present arriving or departing aircraft.

Helicopter pilot reported that after landing; another aircraft was cleared for takeoff from the opposite end of the same runway; resulting in the helicopter taking evasive action. Pilot reported that several other aircraft and confusing ATC radio communications were part of the overall situation.

1330909

201508

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-88

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

PFD

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1330909

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1330962.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

During cruise flight the Captain's Primary Flight Display (PFD) and attitude indicator tumbled. The autopilot and autothrottles disconnected. The Navigation Display (ND) indicated a map fail message. The heading on the RMI changed approximately 90 degrees in wings level flight. All navigational instruments were lost. The First Officers PFD attitude was still correct; therefore controls were handed over to myself; the First Officer. The Captain began running through the QRH procedures. The QRH directed us to attitude and heading fail; which we accomplished. However; this did not result in restoring a heading. We were navigating by the whiskey compass. We then proceeded to another QRH section IRS fault. This allowed us to input our compass heading. Afterward; the autopilot was useful for holding basic level flight. At this time; our only navigation information was VOR directions from the RMI. We called maintenance; our discussion with them was fruitless. Therefore; we coordinated a diversion with dispatch. [Requested priority handling] with ATC. [Coordinated] with the flight attendants; notified the passengers; and completed appropriate checklists for the diversion. We landed safely.In this case; it appears there was a mechanical discrepancy. Such failures happen from time to time and are not completely preventable.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

MD-88 Captain's primary flight display/attitude indicator; navigation display & RMI failed in cruise flight. Controls passed to First Officer. Crew complied with Quick Reference Handbook procedures followed by a safe landing at a diversion airport.

1321395

201512

1201-1800

ATL.Airport

GA

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON A80

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ATL

TRACON A80

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ATL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1321395

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1321399.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

ATC cleared us to descend to 3;000 ft and slow to 180 knots and fly heading 360. We reported the preceding Airbus in sight. ATC gave us heading 300 follow the Airbus for the visual approach to 27L. Right after establishing the 300 heading; we encountered heavy wake turbulence. The autopilot disconnected as the aircraft rolled through 50-60 degrees and the 'Bank Angle' aural sounded. I used full aileron control input to stop the roll and established a heading of about 315 degrees. In an effort to increase spacing from the Airbus and side step the wake; I maintained that heading. To increase the stall margin I called for flaps 30 and continuous ignition to be added. The First Officer complied and notified ATC we encountered wake turbulence. The speed slowed below 180 prior to DEPOT and was at about 160 1.5 - 2 miles prior to DEPOT. Wake turbulence nibbled at the aircraft several times after the first encounter and we were very focused on controlling the aircraft and taking action to mitigate further loss of control. Another Controller then chastised us for slowing early and [then] he demanded compliance in the future. Because we were focused on controlling the aircraft; we did not adequately articulate the need for us to deviate from the ATC instructions. The controller was not able to interpret our notification of encountering wake turbulence as our having a difficulty controlling the aircraft. Speak up quickly and precisely when an undesired state is encountered and to notify ATC that the flight is unable to continue on the clearance.

An error of mine (pilot monitoring) to not speak up to ATC and ask for a slower speed because of too close separation with the aircraft ahead that caused the dangerous wake turbulence encounter.

CRJ900 flight crew reported encountering significant wake turbulence in trail of an A320 on approach to ATL.

1141144

201401

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Snow

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

None

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Ground

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1141144

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Taxiway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Weather was bad (snow and very low visibility). Taxied Air Carrier X via Delta and Delta Two and cross Runway 23L. I forgot that Delta Two was closed because it wasn't plowed. Air Carrier X slid off the taxiway into the grass at Delta two. He didn't know if he was past the hold short lines; so we closed the runway. Had to get a tow to get him off the grass. I just forgot that Delta two was closed. It's a common taxiway that we use during the Air Carrier outbound push and I reverted to old habits.

Tower Controller described a taxiway excursion when an air carrier was cleared via a closed taxiway during snow and very low visibility conditions.

1062265

201301

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Windshear; 10

18000

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Direct; Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 950; Flight Crew Type 3.5

1062265

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

N

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing roll

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Weather

We left mid afternoon in a C-210 and wanted to get a few hours in before nightfall. The weather was VMC the entire trip although we did deviate to avoid some weather. After a 30 minute deviation I decided to turn around and land before we went into some marginal VFR weather. The nearest VMC airport was 10 miles south of us and was reporting winds slightly favoring Runway 36. I entered a left downwind for Runway 36 and saw that the wind sock indicated a gusting wind from the east. I crabbed the plane for a crosswind landing. We landed on the upwind side of runway for a crosswind landing. After landing I got hit by a large gust of wind from the east which pushed the airplane to the west side of runway. Although I increased right rudder and right aileron the left main wheel went off the runway into the mud. After that happened the airplane was non responsive I could not get it back onto the runway. I pulled the yoke all the way to my chest to keep pressure off the nose wheel and we were almost at a complete stop when the nose wheel hit a rut and we [nosed] over on the back side of plane. Most of the damage was done to the plane while trying to pull the airplane out of the mud. The prop did strike the dirt at idle speed. Other than that there was not a whole lot of damage.

After diverting from his VFR trip due to weather enroute; the pilot of a C210 lost control on landing in gusty crosswinds; exited the runway and got mired in mud causing the aircraft to nose over onto its back.

1635960

201904

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

1635960

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

1635969.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After level-off Captain did all-call and ask if we smelled any odd odors; especially around row 19 and wing area. All flight attendants did cabin check and reported no odor. Captain said there was a dirty sock smell in cockpit and to continue monitoring cabin for odors. On a further check; flight attendant in the mid cabin noticed the odor for a split second. Flight Attendant 3 said she smelled it briefly and had a metallic taste. Reported both to Captain; he advised there were fume event write-ups in log book. Notified deadheading crew members. After landing; I had the dirty sock smell at my forward jumpseat. Breathed it in making arrival announcement; the back of my throat [felt] raw with an acid taste. Eyes burned voice went in and out and was coughing. Notified Captain after passengers deplaned; and he said it had come back on landing in cockpit also.

The Captain phoned the aft galley after level off to check around row 19 for a dirty sock smell. We did smell it faintly. I did not smell it when at my jumpseat. We continued to monitor but did not smell any more the rest of the flight. The Captain said they had the dirty sock smell in the cockpit! #3 had a metal taste and headache. #1 had throat congestion and smelled the fume on landing! We were unable to check on the Captain and First Officer after landing because the mechanics came on board.

A321 flight attendants reported dirty socks odor in flight. Flight attendants reported experiencing health issues.

1234649

201501

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Daylight

Center ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb; Takeoff / Launch

Class A ZZZ; Class B ZZZ

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Workload

1234649

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Weather

Aircraft

During the takeoff roll; we received a caution message and the 'STAB TRIM' caution message. As we were above 80 KTS; and the above did not involve engine fire/failure; loss of directional control; or the aircraft's inability to fly; we continued the takeoff. The initial climb out proceeded normally; with the aircraft handling satisfactorily. I attempted to reset the stab trim with the switches; but to no avail. The First Officer (F/O) and I both tried our trip disconnect switches and made sure that the trim switches themselves were centered; still the stab trim would not engage. After running the QRH; the stab trim would still not engage. I called Maintenance (MTX) over the radio and advised them of the situation and was hoping they had some trick up their sleeves to make the trim engage...still to no avail. I then [advised] Center and requested a return to the departure airport. I called the Flight Attendant and advised her of the situation and gave her the TEST items. I also spoke to the passengers and advised them of what was wrong and of our intention to return. We completed the 'prior to landing' part of the QRH and executed a flap 20 landing on rwy 18C. After we taxied in; we off loaded the passengers and I spoke to Maintenance Control and to the Dispatch Supervisor; giving them the information they needed about our flight. We then swapped into another aircraft and continued on to our destination.In speaking to MTX on the telephone after we landed; they seemed to think; based on the diagnostic codes in the computer; that there was a short in the Stab Trim panel on the center console. In speaking to the mechanics who came out to repair the aircraft; they thought this was possible as dirt/debris/water/etc. from shoes drips onto and into the center console when people get in and out of the seats on the flight deck.

A CRJ-200 EICAS alerted STAB TRIM during takeoff but the crew continued. In flight; the Stabilizer Trim was found failed and would not reset so the flight returned to the departure airport for maintenance.

1739456

202004

1801-2400

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 ATC; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew

1739456

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

The callsign conflict was missed -- in my opinion -- as the result of two circumstances. First; I am still working on developing a workflow. Although I do have significant Dispatch experience; my coming up to speed in systems familiarization still has me with a handicap in reviewing potential conflict. Second; the workload for company employees as the result of significant cancellations; schedule adjustments; and non-scheduled flying as the direct result of the COVID-19 circumstances is requiring increased schedule activity. The resulting delays; reposition flights; extreme biohazard precautions within the offices and other company property...are all responsible for degrading the inherent stability otherwise found in well-established systems and in the best practice of dispatching. Communication -- while still required -- must be remote and minimized.Corrective action: It is my opinion the only course of action which would have prevented this occurrence is tighter communication. I do believe that if the ATC coordinators; Dispatch coordinators; and dispatchers were free to openly and routinely communicate as enjoyed in the past (absent COVID-19); and the situation were moot; we likely would not have had a callsign conflict. When balanced against the risk of closer socialization and systems still in place with ATC as risk mitigation; I do not believe that corrective action is warranted at this time and the systems in place today consistent with best practices and in the good interest of public health; worked as best as they could have.We were dispatching Flight ABC and received an ACARS from that aircraft notifying us that ATC had given them a new callsign -- Aircraft X 'ABCE' -- as the result of a callsign conflict. An identically numbered flight; ABC; no additional E; which was being operated by different Dispatcher was late inbound due to equipment delays. The callsign conflict was not apparent to us -- the dispatchers for this flight; nor was it recognized by the second flight's Dispatcher; ATC coordinators; or Dispatch coordinators. We acknowledged the new callsign; continued the flight as planned.

Dispatcher reported a similar callsign issue and cancellations attributed in part to COVID-19 pandemic related work environment.

1025832

201207

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1025832

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We were on a visual approach to Runway 27 and while slowing from 210 to 190; we selected flaps to one and then flaps to 5. We noticed the zipper was not lowering and then noticed the flaps were indicating up. We had no EICAS warning. We accelerated back to 210; and tried to cycle the flaps. Again; flaps did not indicate any movement and no ICAS warnings. Fuel was at about 7;400 LBS. We asked for radar vectors to the north to troubleshoot and set up for possible approach to [the longest runway]. At this time I noticed we had a status message SLAT/FLAP ELEC. Again; with no EICAS message; I opted to set up for an all flaps up landing. We ran the landing with all flaps up checklist in the QRH. Flew an uneventful flaps up monitored approach to landing without requiring further assistance. When clear of the runway; we checked the brake cooling chart in the QRH before taxiing back to park. [We] landed at 167 KTS at about 163;000 LBS with auto brakes 4.

B757-200 Captain reports failure of the flaps to move to the selected position during approach with no EICAS warnings; but with a status message indicating Slat/Flap Elec. A zero flap landing ensues at a landing weight of 163;000 LBS.

1424128

201702

BGGL.ARTCC

FO

Center BGGL

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct; Oceanic

X

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1424128

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Equipment / Tooling

At XB:15 message arrived from flight stating the following:Over ABERI… Switched satellite coms from satcom to satlink and want to check if we can still data communicate with you via iridium's satlink system. Please respond. XA:25.At XB:16 a response was sent to the crew. At XB:36 the crew sent the following message:So that took 1 hour… Thank you for the reply. Estimate ZZZZ at XH:00When timeline for when messages were received by dispatch; the crew responded that the message was sent from the plane at XA:25. Message follows:Correct. We sent the message at XA:25.

A Dispatcher reported a flight crew checked their communications to Dispatch via the Iridium SATLINK system while on a polar route over ABERI intersection. The crew's message took 50 minutes to arrive at Dispatch whereupon the Dispatcher immediately issued a reply to the aircraft. Twenty minutes after the Dispatcher sent the reply; the crew sent back confirmation that they had received the Dispatch reply.

1280858

201507

1201-1800

ORD.Airport

IL

16000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZAU

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR ESSPO 1

Class E ZAU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 216; Flight Crew Total 17834; Flight Crew Type 14145

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1280858

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 141; Flight Crew Total 9562; Flight Crew Type 8071

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1281168.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

The flight was originally scheduled to arrive to ORD on the WATSN 2 RNAV arrival. The descent; expected approach to Rwy 27R and taxi plan were thoroughly briefed prior to Top of Descent. Shortly after the DAIFE intersection on the arrival; we were told to expect to hold due to runway changes in progress at O'Hare. We were initially given a 360 degree right hand turn just prior to the WATSN intersection; and after completing the turn were told to expect the ESSPO 1 RNAV Arrival to Rwy 28C. The ATC controller gave us clearance direct ESSPO. As we were less than 30 miles from the intersection; FMC changes were made in a rapid fashion. Shortly after making the changes and attempting to brief as much as possible prior to descent; the ATC controller cleared the flight 'via the ESSPO 1 RNAV arrival'. The crew misinterpreted the clearance as 'descend via the ESSPO 1 RNAV arrival;' and the pilot flying consulted with the Monitoring Pilot to confirm the descent to cross ESSPO at 12;000 FT. The error by the crew was that the 12;000 FT altitude was only an 'expect' clearance and ATC had not cleared the flight to that altitude. The crew initiated a shallow descent to 12;000 FT and almost immediately noticed converging traffic from the west. The pilot flying pointed out the traffic to the monitoring pilot as a potential threat. The crew picked up the traffic visually as well and attempted to query ATC about it; but was unable to due to radio congestion. Shortly thereafter; ATC instructed the flight to level off at 16;000 ft. The crew received a momentary TCAS RA during level off at 16;000 ft; and remained approximately 1000 ft. altitude above the converging traffic. The remainder of the arrival and landing was uneventful.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

B737 flight crew reported an excursion from their cleared altitude when they misinterpreted a clearance to 'proceed via' the arrival as a clearance to 'descend via' the arrival.

1058307

201212

1201-1800

ZOA.ARTCC

CA

34000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZOA

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZOA

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1058307

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

At top of descent; we noted engine vibrations followed by ENG1 Comp Vane and then ENG Fail ECAMs. Accomplished ECAM actions; notified ATC; conducted appropriate QRH follow ups; briefed the flight attendants and Dispatch; and notified the passengers via PA. Landed at SFO with one engine inoperative.

An A321 flight crew shut down the left engine due to vibration and an ENG1 Comp Vane ECAM warning.

1212408

201410

1201-1800

LGA.Airport

NY

0.0

Daylight

Tower LGA

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

None

Tower LGA

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Facility LGA.Tower

Government

Ground

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1212408

Facility LGA.Tower

Government

Coordinator

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1212398.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

I was working Ground Control. The runway configuration at LGA was the localizer approach landing Runway 31; departing Runway 4. Traffic departing for BOS required coordination with N90 TMU for approval due to a large mile in trail restriction. Aircraft X called requesting taxi instructions for departure. I advised the pilot that his flight would be delayed and a release time was coordinated. After the pilot acknowledged the information; I taxied him onto Taxiway 'A'; 'G' and instructed him to hold short of Runway 4 at Taxiway 'G.' while Aircraft X was holding short of Runway 4 at 'G'; I checked the brite to see where the next arrival was on the final and then scanned out the window to see if Local had any departures in position or on takeoff roll.The closest arrival on the radar screen was on a 4 mile final and there were no aircraft established on takeoff roll or holding in position on Runway 4. I coordinated with the Local Controller to cross Runway 4 at Taxiway 'G'. The Local Controller verbally approved my request to cross Runway 4 at Taxiway 'G.' I instructed Aircraft X to cross Runway 4 at Taxiway 'G' then turn right onto Taxiway 'BB' and hold short of Taxiway 'E.' the pilot read back the taxi instructions and proceeded to cross Runway 4 as instructed. While watching Aircraft X cross the runway I heard the Local Controller issue taxi into position and hold (TIPH) instructions to a departure and then advise the pilot to be ready to 'go right out.' I saw Aircraft Y in position on Runway 4 and a regional jet taxiing into position and hold for Runway 4. I immediately told the Local Controller that I still had a runway crossing in progress at Taxiway 'G.' as soon as I observed Aircraft X complete the runway crossing; I coordinated with the Local Controller that I was 'clear of Runway 4.'I recommend the use of 'memory joggers' for the Local Controller. For example:1. Folding the strip of the aircraft holding in position in the up position.2. The Ground Controller physically placing their hand on the departure bay; in the way of the Local Controller; to prevent reading and/or movement of the strips lined up for departure.3. A 'runway crossing' strip placed in the departure bay until a crossing is complete.

Ground asked for and received a crossing from Local on the departure runway. Ground crossed Aircraft X. Before the crossing was complete Local cleared Aircraft Y for departure. I was trying to work out the location in the line-up for our BOS departure that had an Apreq time and did not notice the error until Ground Control brought it to my attention. At this point it seemed that Aircraft Y had just begun their departure roll and Aircraft X was clearing the runway. Although the Cab Coordinator has many responsibilities I must prioritize better and be more vigilant in my duties.

LGA controllers describe a runway incursion due to the Local Controller forgetting that he/she had approved a runway crossing downfield.

1324295

201601

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

25000.0

VMC

Dawn

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161; Flight Crew Type 17000

Troubleshooting; Other / Unknown

1324295

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

Cabin altitude about 10;500 ft. Warning horn and light. Donned oxygen masks and gained communication. Initiated emergency descent and [advised ATC]. Cleared to 10;000 ft. Accomplished Cabin Altitude Warning Checklist. Informed Flight Attendants and Passengers. Accomplished Emergency Descent Checklist. Contacted Dispatch and Duty Control for diversion and overweight landing. Debriefed First Officer and Flight Attendants after normal landing.

B737 Captain reported that the cabin altitude exceeded 10;000 feet while in climb at 25;000 feet; so he initiated an immediate descent and diverted to a nearby airport.

1429232

201703

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Dawn

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1429232

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors

After arriving in ZZZ and dealing with some taxiing issues; we eventually stopped the aircraft on a taxiway. We were marshaled to a stop in front of a tow tug by a ground crew. I stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. While sitting there; I made several attempts to contact the tow crew while they were hooking up to the aircraft. Nobody ever got on the headset or tried to give me hand signals to coordinate the tow. After a couple minutes I saw the Marshaller walking away from us. At the same time we felt the aircraft start lurching as the tug started trying to tow us. The driver made 3-4 attempts to start the tow. I tried again to contact them on the interphone while waving the Marshaller back to the plane. Using hand signals; I was finally able to determine they were ready for brake release. I released the parking brake and the tow started. After being towed straight ahead for 15-20 seconds we heard a loud banging noise and the aircraft lurched. I stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. No one ever made any attempt to communicate with us. After a couple minutes we saw the ground crew walking away from the aircraft. Over the next 20 minutes; I called call Ground control; maintenance; and the chief pilot. I had the FO call out the window to get anyone on the interphone to tell us what was happening. Eventually maintenance arrived and connected the interphone and told me that the tow crew did not connect the steering bypass pin and that after the tow bar broke free from the nose gear; the aircraft rolled over the tow bar. That is the point where I stopped and the nose gear was on top of the tow bar.

B767 Captain reported the towbar broke free and the nose gear rolled over the towbar. The ground crew did not connect the steering bypass pin.

1330261

201602

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1330261

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1330477.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

I was pilot flying. We were being vectored for an extended final approach. During one of the turns; I noticed that the engine 1 oil temperature was boxed red and was indicating around 130 degrees. I pointed it out to the Captain. The Captain ran the QRH for Engine High Oil Temperature. The first two items in the QRH say to reduce thrust on the affected engine; and to maintain the temp within limits. Thrust was initially pulled back some; but not to idle; and the temp continued to climb. Thrust was then pulled all the way to idle. The temp continued to climb. The QRH then goes on to say that if the limits cannot be maintained; a precautionary engine shutdown should be performed. With the oil temp continuing to climb with idle thrust; we agreed to shut down the engine. I saw the oil temp reach 144 degrees around the time the engine was shut down. The Captain performed the engine failure/precautionary engine shutdown procedure and the one engine inoperative approach and landing procedure. When the approach controller switched us over to tower; the Captain then [advised ATC]. We landed and cleared the runway; where emergency equipment was waiting for us. We then taxied to the gate and notified maintenance.A threat was having to perform multiple QRH procedures in a high workload environment; but due to the vectors and long final; there was adequate time to accomplish the necessary procedures. Another threat was having to perform a single engine landing since it is not something that occurs often.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-145 flight crew reported an inflight shutdown of the left engine when the engine oil overheated during the approach.

1730807

202002

1801-2400

S46.TRACON

WA

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON S46

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Descent; Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class E S46

Facility S46.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1730807

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Human Factors

Aircraft X was on a 240 heading when he reported the airport in sight. I cleared him for the Visual Approach and shipped him to the tower. The 240 heading aimed Aircraft X to about a 4 to 5 mile straight-in final. After shipping the aircraft to tower I noticed Aircraft X make a slight 5 to 10 degree turn away from the airport. Initially I wasn't concerned with the slight turn away from the airport; even though they're not supposed to turn away from the airport. I then noticed that Aircraft X turned to about a 200 heading; at that point I called tower on the shout line to ask what was going on. I asked if the pilot turned on his own or if the tower controller turned them out. The tower controller said he turned Aircraft X out for VFR traffic in their pattern. They turned out an IFR aircraft on a Visual Approach OUTSIDE of their airspace without as much as a heads up to us. The landing configuration put Aircraft X that they turned south into direct conflict of where south landing aircraft to an adjacent airport are normally at. The supervisor was informed and I asked them to call tower about this. They didn't call them nor did I see them make a report about it.Tower needs to accomplish the appropriate coordination before turning an IFR aircraft on a Visual Approach away from the airport especially when its in another controllers airspace. Nothing will happen to help here because from what I saw the supervisor didn't even call Tower nor did they make a report on the situation.

TRACON Controller reported the Tower Controller turned an aircraft that was still in the TRACON airspace without coordination.

1502406

201712

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

12000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ILS RWY XX

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 1174

Situational Awareness

1502406

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

On descent we had initially briefed and set up for an approach like we seem to do 99% of the time we land in ZZZ. Unfortunately we were cleared for and read back ILS RWY XX; and neither of us caught our error. The cockpit was busy at the time and we were in the process of trying to slow the aircraft per ATC instruction to 180 kts from 250; while staying on the vertical path (also an all-too-common occurrence in ZZZ). We were switched to a new frequency and continued for runway XY when the controller told us we had lined up on the wrong runway while we were near ZZZZZ intersection and to stop our descent at 7;000 ft and asked if we had runway XX in sight. We did and were subsequently cleared for a visual approach to XX.

B757 First Officer reported lining up for the wrong runway on final approach.

1117504

201309

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

IMC

Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

High

Pressurization System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

1117504

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Company Policy; Aircraft

Aircraft

While at cruising altitude; we began a rapid descent from 35;000 feet to 10;000 feet due to pressurization problems. All 3 flight attendants had been seated in our jumpseats due to earlier communication with our Captain who was concerned with bad weather. We were told to lock up our galleys and remain seated while we diverted. Once our galleys were quickly secured we sat in our jumpseats. We had a rush of cold air in the cabin followed by thick fog. All 3 flight attendants suffered ear pain; sinus pain; dizziness; light headedness; and stress. Passengers were screaming with ear pain; and many call buttons were pushed. We didn't prepare the cabin for an emergency landing; but remained seated as instructed by our Captain. After all passengers deplaned; the 'A' Flight Attendant called Scheduling for our crew to be replaced. After a very helpful Crew Scheduler put us on hold; and he brought a (base) Inflight Supervisor into the phone call. The Supervisor wanted to know if any of us would like medical help. We all said no because we believed our symptoms were due to our decompression and the hypoxia that we suffered and nothing more severe that would require medical assistance. We were asked if we had prepared for an emergency landing. We hadn't prepared due to our Captain wanting us to remain seated. The Supervisor then told us that we had 2 choices: call out sick on line or take leave with no pay. The 'A' Flight Attendant opted to call out sick on line as she felt she was unable to continue on the pairing. The 'B' and 'C' flight attendants opted to remain unsafely on the pairing to avoid being penalized by the company. A third option! If you experience a decompression and a diversion; it is unsafe to continue with your flight attendant duties. A Flight Attendant should be given an option to be pulled with pay and with no penalty.

A B737 had a rapid depressurization at FL350 which caused ear; sinus pain; and hypoxia to the flight attendants while the aircraft descended rapidly and diverted to an enroute airport.

1042102

201210

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1042102

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff Roll

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During taxi; ATC cleared us to taxi to Runway 31 for an intersection departure; it was noted that max thrust was necessary because of a small tailwind. During the application of takeoff thrust all engine parameters appeared normal at about 100 KTS. Left engine N1 decayed to approximately 94% plus or minus 1% with fluctuations; with 'command arc' displayed to the Thrust Rating Computer limit of approximately 102% N1; no adverse yaw noted. Takeoff was then aborted at approximately 120 KTS. Inspection of main landing gear was then conducted by Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighter crew. Aircraft was then taxied to gate without further incident. Gross weight at takeoff 295;000 [LBS] O.A.T. 12c.

At about 120 KTS on the takeoff roll; a B767-200 left engine N1 decayed to approximately 94% so the Captain rejected the takeoff and had the main gear inspected prior to proceeding to the gate.

1763184

202009

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

10

Daylight

10000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 560; Flight Crew Type 400

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1763184

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Trainee; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 45; Flight Crew Type 45

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1763179.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Horizontal 5

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors

My student on his second solo landed and veered off the runway about 5 feet during the attempt to do a touch and go. His approach was stable and landing was on centerline. There are a couple factors that I believe led to this runway excursion. First; I believe he rushed into taking off after landing; without taking the time to ensure the flaps were up and that the aircraft was still under control. Second; I believe he accidentally applied more left rudder than he had intended causing him to veer off to the left of the runway. After applying full power he began to veer to the left of the runway. He corrected for this by pulling back power and applying right rudder; but not fast enough to prevent momentarily veering off the runway.

Too much rudder control causing veer off the left of the runway. No damage or injuries.

C172 Student Pilot reported veering off runway during touch and go landing.

1765509

202010

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Crew Rest Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1765509

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

COVID safety guidelines still in place limiting crew rest facility to one FA per break. This is not safe; regardless of pandemic.1) Safety guidelines state that when fighting fires; there must be a minimum of X FAs present to fight the fire; gather needed equipment and communicate with the Flight Deck. This cannot be accomplished with only 1 FA allowed in crew rest facility per break period. If a fire were to break out; this could affect the safety of the flight itself. If the lone FA allowed to break in the crew rest facility were to have a sudden health issue; it would also be dangerous as he/she might not be able to alert the rest of the crew in time.2) Since being forced to take scheduled breaks in the cabin as a temporary change due to the pandemic myself and other FAs have suffered fatigue due to adverse conditions. In the cabin; we are subject to PA announcements; noise from passengers; foot traffic; and light coming into the cabin from open window shades.This flight had two families with infants and a toddler seated in the X zone; where our current alternative break seats are located. One family seated at row X and Y had technical issues with their video system and moved seats back and forth multiple times then back to original seats-creating noise and disturbance. Toddler constantly talked very loudly (as toddlers do) to her mother; grandmother and television shows throughout the flight.For these reasons; I myself took my scheduled contractual break in the crew rest facility (although I was not the most senior) and also allowed some FAs above the 1 currently allowed if others did not object. However; the FAs entered the crew rest facility one at a time and closed curtains immediately after themselves; kept masks on during their breaks and used alcohol or bleach wipes on areas they touched.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported concerns with crew rest facility restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

1850985

202110

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

5400.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Other Instrument Approach

Class B ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Confusion; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1850985

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

I was working arrivals to Runway XXR. Aircraft X initiated a go around short final. I issued them a turn to 240 and 9;000 feet as local center was departing and I wanted to give them room. Aircraft X read back the instruction but did not turn and leveled off about 5;400 feet. I instructed Aircraft X to turn further right heading 280 with no response. I issued multiple headings further and further to the northwest to avoid terrain and sometimes they would respond and sometimes they would not. I asked multiple times about their altitude and instructed them to climb however they flew level around 5;400 feet for about 5 miles. I was doing my best to turn them away from rapidly rising terrain as it became evident they weren't climbing; but may have still gone into a higher MVA southwest of the airport.I believe the flight crew was dealing with some type of malfunction or abnormality were talking to me was not their priority. In hindsight I could have issued a low altitude alert to try to alert the crew they need to turn and climb in a more timely manner.

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft went around; but then did not listen consistently to the Controllers instructions leading to a Minimum Vectoring Altitude violation.

1601691

201812

1201-1800

PHL.Airport

PA

5300.0

VMC

TRACON PHL

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class B PHL

Facility PHL.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1601691

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1601832.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Human Factors

This is the second pilot deviation I have been involved in in the exact same location and altitude in two months' time. Aircraft X had been cleared to maintain 6;000 and direct to BOJID to resume the BOJID2 Arrival STAR. The aircraft was observed descending through 5;300 between the waypoints BOJID and HIFAL. The flight crew misread; as had happened before; the 4;000 Expect altitude charted at FERUS and began their descent as if they were issued a 'descend via' instruction and as if the FERUS altitude was a requirement and not informational only. Remove all 'expect' altitudes and speeds from this STAR.

Due to short flight time I briefed the PHL arrival on the ground as part of the departure brief. In the briefings I briefed expected altitudes as expected altitude; and briefed that were loaded in the box. We De-iced in ZZZ and then took off. Prior to descent I re-briefed the arrival and the expected altitudes and that they were loaded into the box. On the arrival at BUNTS and at 8;000 feet; ATC vectored is off the arrival to a 030 heading. They then descended us to 6;000 and at 7;000 feet direct BOJID intersection to resume the arrival. We had previously briefed and loaded in the box all expect altitudes on the arrival including the expect 4;000 feet at FERUS. At BOJID we mistakenly started down to meet the 4;000 restriction at FERUS. Approaching 5;000 feet Approach told us to level at 5;000 and informed us of our mistake. Landed 27R with no further incidents. Our mistake was to think the altitude at FERUS was a hard altitude; and that we were cleared to descend via the arrival. A contributing factor to the incident is that KPHL is not an airport that neither I nor the copilot normally flies into. Human error treating an expected altitude like a hard altitude. Altitude awareness on expected altitudes.

PHL Controller and flight crew reported altitude deviation during descent on the BOJID2 STAR.

1583910

201810

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

None

Small Aircraft

Part 91

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Flight Crew Student

Air Traffic Control Military 5; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 20; Flight Crew Type 20

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1583910

Gate / Ramp / Line

Personal

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

1583932.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I started a lesson with a flight instructor with the intention of my first solo flight. We did some pattern work together with several trips in the pattern before I departed from the Instructor waiting area for my 3 solo takeoffs and landings. After the first lap in the pattern I taxied clear of the runway and back to the departure end of runway. I was waiting initially behind the hold short line at the approach end of Runway because of an aircraft on short final. After the aircraft completed its touch-and-go; I made the appropriate call and began crossing the hold short line onto runway. Immediately after taxiing onto runway; 2 aircraft on a downwind in the pattern called a go-around due to my aircraft being on runway; I immediately made the decision to taxi off the runway before lining up with center line or beginning a take-off roll. Even as I began taxiing looking for a left turn out; aircraft overhead were over-flying me and calling go-around. I made the radio call of my intentions to exit the runway shortly after I began a left turn to [exit the runway]. My taxi speed seemed to be a normal taxi speed; airspeed indicator was not alive and my left rudder pressure was constant however; it felt like my left wheel was skidding once 90 degrees from runway centerline; causing a more dramatic loop and loss of control. About 2 seconds into the left turn the aircraft turned sharply to the left 90 degrees; going off the runway and pivoting left again once on the dirt into a taxiway sign before coming to a complete stop. I shut off the engine immediately and notified over CTAF frequency of the current situation. I then shut off all electrical systems.I believe the cause of the entire situation was a lack of understanding of uncontrolled airports under high volume of aircraft operations. I also think I was over-saturated with tasks thinking about too many external factors leading to not judging the turn properly.

During the student pilot first solo flight; after doing 1 full stop taxi back takeoff/landing on runway; student pilot proceeds onto runway; then immediately hears a plane report needing to go around for plane on runway. The student pilot thinks he has made a mistake and he is in trouble; holding position on runway; watching multiple small planes go around overhead. Then he proceeded to taxi down runway and then exit; in order to return to his flight instructor standing along the taxiway. The plane turned hard to the left; before the runway exit; leaving the runway; turning 180 degrees to the left; and stopping on top of the runway exit sign. The student pilot shut down the engine immediately. He wasn't hurt at all; but there was damage to the propeller and underside of the left wing from hitting the runway exit sign.

Flight instructor and student pilot reported a loss of control and runway excursion when the solo pilot attempted to taxi clear of the runway.

1630272

201903

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Other Flying club

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Part 91

Training

Parked

N

Y

Inspection; Installation

Repair Facility

Other Flying club

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Inspector 12; Maintenance Lead Technician 11; Maintenance Technician 34

Distraction; Training / Qualification

1630272

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Human Factors

During engine installation; I failed to install cotter pin in throttle control attachment nut and bolt. During flight; vibration loosened the nut and it fell off allowing the bolt to also fall free and resulting in loss of connection of the throttle control at the fuel servo. The engine speed remained at 2100 RPM. The pilot aligned with the runway and used mixture to shut down the engine when reaching the runway was assured. A power off landing was performed and the aircraft was undamaged then towed to the maintenance area where I discovered what had occurred. We are in the process of modifying policies and procedures to prevent recurrences of this incident.

Maintenance Technician failed to install cotter pin on throttle control resulting in engine shutdown in flight.

1694529

201910

0.0

IMC

Rain

Poor Lighting

Night

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

1694529

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

Procedure

While moving [an] aircraft; the shear pin broke when the main gear struck the steel plates they rested on. Upon removing the tow bar; the push back began backing slowly to reposition and struck the cleaning van that had parked behind it. The aircraft beacons were on because we had not completed the move.

Ground Personnel reported shear pins breaking on tow bar; resulting in the aircraft striking a parked vehicle.

1342930

201603

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

CTAF ZZZ

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Nosewheel Steering

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 137; Flight Crew Total 476; Flight Crew Type 6

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1342930

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors

My first flight [with this student was] a night cross country into an unfamiliar airport and terrain. Flew to airport; overflew the airport to check windsock; and made a teardrop entry to enter the left downwind for Runway 22. Once landed; student started to use both left and right rudder and brakes; airplane became unstable I asked for flight controls; but students foot was still on rudder and brakes and plane ended up sharply veering to the left into the dirt on the side of the runway. Airplane ended up receiving prop damage and right wingtip plastic broke and nose wheel looked slightly bent.

A flight instructor reported that the student pilot did not apply appropriate nose wheel steering and braking during landing rollout; which resulted in a runway excursion and minor aircraft damage.

1833026

202108

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

14000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ; Class E ZZZ1

Oil Pressure Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 39; Flight Crew Total 2513; Flight Crew Type 2513

Troubleshooting

1833026

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

During climb out through 14;000 ft. we noticed an amber oil pressure low indication on #2 engine. I was the PF(Pilot Flying) so I took the radios while the Captain ran the Engine Low Oil Pressure checklist which then directed him to the Engine Failure or Shutdown Checklist. The oil pressure dropped rapidly to approximately 3 PSI and the oil quantity dropped to 0. The checklist directed us to shutdown the #2 engine. We [requested priority handling] and coordinated with ATC for vectors to air return via the ILS XXL to ZZZ. We completed all appropriate checklists and coordinated with Dispatch; the flight attendants; and gave a reassuring PA to the passengers. The approach and landing were uneventful. After exiting the runway we were met by emergency vehicles and inspected. No damage or abnormalities were noted so we returned to gate X. We elected to shutdown and get towed to the gate. Two maintenance ELB (Electronic Log Book) entries were made and the Captain coordinated with Dispatch and the Chief Pilot via phone.

B737 Pilot reported oil pressure problems with the number 2 engine; requested priority handling and returned to departure airport.

1437095

201703

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Mixed

10

Daylight

3000

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Vertical Stabilizer/Fin

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 12000

1437095

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

1437096.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related

Just before pushback one of our Ramp Agents came into the cockpit and showed me a picture of what he thought was a dent on the vertical stabilizer. I proceeded outside and checked to make sure there was a dent that I was looking at about three by two inches about 40 ft high (1.5 ft below the top of the vertical stabilizer). I called Dispatch and he passed me to Maintenance Control. I reported what was found. Maintenance Control informed me that there was a small dent already reported on that area. I told them this was not small and it looked like there was some damage to the aircraft. They told me to write it up and to call Contract Maintenance. Luckily we had two of our Mechanics at the Station. They came to the aircraft and were able to get close to the dent and take pictures. They called Maintenance and after conference with them they informed me that the checkup was going to take a few hours. I informed the gate agent and Dispatch and the flight was canceled. When and how the dent happened is totally unknown.

We swapped into this aircraft. I performed the walk around in moderate rain with overcast clouds. I did not note any defects. While taxiing to the Runway the Controller reported birds near the runway. We did not see any birds; and we reported that to ATC. We flew the first 15 to 30 minutes of the flight in rain. We had a normal landing at destination which was sunny with scattered clouds.While preparing to leave the gate for our return flight; a Ramp Worker came to the flight deck and reported that he noticed 'what appeared to be a hole at the top of the vertical stabilizer.' The Captain went outside to inspect the aircraft. He returned; and made a Maintenance writeup for what appeared to be a hole in the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer; approximately 1.5 ft from the top (about 40 ft above the ground). He called Maintenance Control with the writeup.Company Maintenance Techs happened to be present. They inspected the damage as best as they could; due to the height of the damage; and confirmed repair would be needed. The flight was canceled due to the required maintenance.

B737 flight crew reported they were informed of possible damage near the top of the vertical stabilizer. After maintenance examination; the aircraft was taken out of service.

1296266

201509

0001-0600

41000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Fractional

Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Autopilot

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1296266

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I wrote up Aircraft X for an autopilot disengaging in flight and stiff ailerons. We left RVSM airspace due to the autopilot malfunction. Ailerons resumed normal control forces descending into the 20's. As we had full controllability of the aircraft I view this as a non-reportable NTSB event.

G-200 Captain reported he wrote up the aircraft for the autopilot disengaging and 'stiff ailerons.'

1757303

202008

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

300.0

18.0

1500.0

VMC

10

Dusk

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

None

Class B ZZZ

AC Generator/Alternator

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 300

1757303

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Smelled something burning and alert sounded with low voltage annuciator. Took action by opening window; turning off non-essential electrical and ready to reach for fire estinguisher. Communicated with ATC letting them know about the burning smell and losing battery power. I asked for a climb and direct to ZZZ. Did not officially request priority handling but ATC asked if they should roll out the trucks. Not knowing the full nature of the issue I responded that it was probably a safe precaution in case a fire started. Landed safely with no issues. Postflight revealed that the alternator had seized and the burning smell was the melting of the alternator belt.

Pilot reported alternator failure that resulted in a precautionary landing.

1059553

201301

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Powerplant Lubrication System

X

Malfunctioning; Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1059553

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1059554.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

On route we noticed the left engine oil temperature had risen into the caution range with the corresponding oil quantity indicating zero gallons at which time I started the timer for the 20 minute limitation and called for the appropriate Non-normal checklist. I initiated a phone patch with Commercial Radio to flight operations informing them of our situation and that I was planning to divert to the nearest suitable airport. Having coordinated with Center I was cleared direct to the divert airport and started a descent. During this time the oil temperature had been in the caution range approximately 10 minutes but then reached the maximum temperature so I called for and we performed the Inflight Engine Shutdown checklist of the left engine. I informed Center that I had shutdown an engine and was now declaring an emergency and we started our preparations for a single engine approach which was completed without incident.

Report contains no additional information.

A B757 engine oil was detected in the Caution Range with no oil quantity remaining so after waiting ten minutes when the oil temperature reached maximum; the QRH completed; the engine was shutdown; an emergency declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport.

1575456

201809

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Failed; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1575456

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

During third segment climb from ZZZ; got an ECAM: 'F/CTL Flaps Lock' at 1+F. Immediately pushed nose over to level off to maintain VMC before punching into a cloud base; pulled speed at 190kts but AC continued to accelerate into overspeed since we were close to max speed for configuration when fault occurred. Situation was exacerbated by the fact that I attempted to level off quickly to avoid IMC while aircraft was accelerating to clean speed. FO thinks [auto-throttle] faulted but I think what he saw was [auto-throttle] off after I had pulled the thrust levers to idle. Advised FO to ask departure for return to field. ATC vectored us around thunderstorms on a long downwind in order to complete checklists. Gave FAs TEST info while FO set up box for [the] ILS. FO completed checklists and applied speed corrections from QRH and we landed without further incident; taxied to gate; apologized to passengers and entered fault and overspeed in log book while passengers disembarked. After advising Dispatcher that AC was out of service he transferred me to Maintenance Control. Notified Maintenance Control of write-ups in Logbook. I advised Maintenance Control that since this was the second time we got this fault today that I considered the AC unairworthy and refused to fly it without complete inspection. (Inspection was required anyway since I overspeed of flaps) I then took crew to lunch. Upon return; mechanics took me out and showed me that outboard trailing edge flap track was so badly worn and parts were missing that they were surprised that right flap remained on aircraft. Basically; only thing holding it on was actuator. Mechanics advised that it had been written up multiple times in previous days and the write ups cleared by simply resetting the computers and signing it off without conducting any kind of actual inspection of flaps.Should have been more vigilant by reading all previous write-ups rather than just checking to ensure there were no open write-ups subsequent to the last AWR per FOM Vol 1. This incident is proof of the failed idea that an AWR is only required every 8 or 10 days and that pilots are required to simply ensure that all subsequent write-ups are addressed/closed with SOME type of action in the corresponding MX action block. Pilots are NOT experts on airworthiness. Pilots should not be the only 'backstop' to ensure that this kind of situation does not occur. Clearly MX has no procedure/process in place to ensure that in cases when there are multiple write-ups of the same fault that they are investigated to determine if there is a real problem. If they claim they do have the proper processes in place; then this case suggests that they knowingly cleared write-ups and dispatched an unairworthy aircraft presumably to get it back to [destination] for maintenance. In doing so; knowingly put the lives of passengers and crew at risk.

A319 Captain reported that an ECAM message appeared 'F/CTL Flaps Lock' during climb.

1242368

201502

0601-1200

CMA.Airport

CA

0.0

10

Daylight

CLR

Tower CMA

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Other TEC Route

Class D CMA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 3696

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1242368

ATC Issue All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Taxi

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

When preparing for takeoff Camarillo Airport controllers expend very precious communications (radio) time (airwave availability) on unnecessary read backs and repeated read backs. This could cause; and has caused; in some instances; missed communications with aircraft that need to contact the control tower facility. This is especially critical when the Class D airspace is crowded with aircraft and aircraft operations. This could lead to confusion in the Class D airspace. I would like to suggest that all communications are kept 'Clear' and 'Terse' due to the crowded conditions at CMA airport. I have gotten complaints from other ATC facility personnel about operations at CMA and unnecessary radio communications. This seems to be a 'local' Camarillo issue and should be resolved with tower personnel immediately. I have personally experienced this issue with CMA ground and tower personnel in the past. I have; on occasion departed the Class D airspace while in the airport traffic pattern; because I have not been able to effectively break into the 'radio chatter' to make a position report. This is a safety issue and should not happen. Especially if a pilot is in the pattern.

Pilot reports of excessive chatter on CMA Tower frequencies.

1618110

201902

1801-2400

SJC.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Night

Ground SJC

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 16000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1618110

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors

Landed on 12R instructed to cross 12L at F. Ground ATC instructed; taxi Z to the gate. Upon crossing 12L I turned the wrong direction; stopped and had the FO call for new taxi instructions. Told ATC we made a wrong turn. ATC gave new instructions to taxi Z; E; D; Y to the gate. Upon completing the turn on Yankee; Ground gave us a number to call. I complied once at the gate. The Supervisor asked if I saw the NOTAM that taxiway between D and E on Zulu was closed. I said yes; however; was following ground ATC new taxi instructions. Since I received this clearance and there were no markers or lights indicating the taxiway was closed; I assumed it was now open. The ATIS with the NOTAM was 35 minutes old. The Supervisor said; 'Actually it is open for towed aircraft; but we don't like to advertise it.'In any event; if my aircraft did not belong on that 'Closed' taxiway; ATC should have never given me a clearance to taxi on it and there should have been some type of markings/lights indicating it was closed; especially at night.I made a wrong turn off the runway; should have studied the gates and referenced the taxiways. And when ATC's instructions where contrary to ATIS; NOTAM; we should have inquired.In any event; if my aircraft did not belong on that 'Closed' taxiway; ATC should have never given me a clearance to taxi on it and there should have been some type of markings/lights indicating it was closed; especially at night.

B737 Captain reported turning on the incorrect taxiway; then ATC issued another clearance which included taxiing on a closed portion of a taxiway.

1691832

201910

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Aircraft X

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 6

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1691832

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

On approach to ZZZ noted a very faint odor from the ventilation; commonly referred to as a 'dirty sock' odor or variation thereof. The odor manifested itself at a late phase of flight near and below 10;000 MSL so little was done to attempt to isolate the cause in-flight. My primary concern at that point was to simply land the aircraft given we were on downwind and the odor was very slight. The FO [First Officer] elected to don his O2 mask while I did not. In my estimation this was a very minimal fume event and in the 20 years I have been flying the A320 series of aircraft as a Captain I have experienced multiple odor/fume events in all phases of flight ranging from barely noteworthy to severe. After landing and during taxi we selected the left pack OFF and the odor dissipated; although I cannot say with certainty that the left pack was the source due to the numerous variables involved. Upon arrival at the gate the #1 FA [Flight Attendant] said that he had noticed the odor but my impression was he was not overly concerned. I do not recall the other FAs expressing concern at the time. I asked two deadheading [airline] pilots if they had perceived the odor and they replied they had not noticed anything out of the ordinary during the flight. The outbound flight crew was awaiting our arrival so I advised them of the faint odor and that in my personal experience I did not feel the event was significant enough to warrant a write-up at that point. I also advised them if they had any concerns operating the return flight to ZZZ1 I would make an immediate entry into the logbook and notify Maintenance Control. Based on the information provided they expressed no concern and advised that if they had any issues with odors/fumes while on APU or engine bleed they would advise MX [Maintenance]; file a fume report and make the necessary logbook entry. At that point we departed the aircraft/airport for the layover hotel. Cause: unknown; but the aircraft was unaffected until the last phase of descent at lower altitudes. Suggestions: fume events seem to have become an industry-wide issue; with claims ranging from headaches to neurological damage; debilitating illness as a result. Sensitivity to these odors/fumes also seems to vary widely between individuals. Unfortunately; it seems any aircraft utilizing traditional bleed air-driven packs are susceptible to odor/fume events; and the causes of odors/fumes are numerous and diverse. Elimination of these events will likely fall to the implementation of new technologies such as those present in the 787 aircraft. None of this is meant to cast aspersion on the effect of odor/fume events and rest assured I have no reservations in documenting noteworthy odor/fume events. However; the perceived severity of these events can be subjective. I reiterate that in my experience this event; while detectable; was transitory and minimal.

A319 Captain reported 'very faint dirty socks odor' on descent to landing.

1685371

201909

1201-1800

LAS.Airport

NV

0.0

Daylight

Tower LAS

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Landing; Taxi

Direct

Class B LAS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 446; Flight Crew Type 12500

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1685371

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

First Officer was flying a very demanding approach due to high crosswinds. After landing; I was taking control of the aircraft to make a high speed turnoff. Tower asked us what gate we were going to; as I was calling for 'flaps up' and slowing the aircraft on the high speed taxiway. At this time; we were issued instructions to turn right on Taxiway A and hold short of Taxiway A5. These instructions from Tower were being issued as we were completing our After Landing Flows. Since we were both busy; while the Tower was issuing these instructions; I was not able to write them down as I normally do. Once I got the aircraft slowed down on Taxiway A; I incorrectly thought I was supposed to HOLD SHORT of Runway 26R at Taxiway A5; when we were supposed to hold short of Taxiway A5 on Taxiway A; as the Tower Controller queried us why were not holding short of Taxiway A5. There was also a lot of activity on the Tower Control radio.

B737-800 Non Flying Captain reported a taxiway incursion and referenced the Tower's timing giving the taxi instructions.

1308069

201511

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

29000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Fuel Distribution System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Distraction; Workload

1308069

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1308073.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

[I] was Captain on [this] flight; approximately 90 minutes into the flight and level at FL 290 an ECAM warning message was generated. FUEL ACT XFR FAULT. After confirming it was not an immediate action or an ECAM exception and confirming a fault with the transfer of fuel from the additional center tanks I completed the ECAM procedure; which was unsuccessful. As directed by the procedure a descent was made to FL270 and another attempt was made to transfer fuel; with no success. ECAM procedure was then completed and QRH follow Up procedures were applied; which included FUEL ACT UNUSABLE (321) and ECAM supplemental. After calculating usable fuel on board; Dispatch and Maintenance Operation Center (MOC) were contacted. With insufficient fuel on board to continue to the destination; and adhering to the QRH directed maximum flight time of 2.5 hours; MOC requested; if possible; a diversion to [airport ZZZ]. Dispatch was given Fuel On Board (FOB) and usable FOB and concurred with MOC to divert to ZZZ. I requested ZZZ weather; new route; fuel burn and amended release. FAs and Passengers were advised of diversion; given arrival time and FAs were requested to prepare the cabin. Dispatch was advised of landing weight in ZZZ and I accomplished QRH overweight landing procedure; including confirming landing distance required. Flight Manual (FM) 1 was reviewed for diversion/overweight guidance. ATC [was advised] and normal landing was accomplished using longest available runway in ZZZ adhering to overweight landing procedures. Required Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) entries were made upon gate arrival. Flight continued to [original destination] after 90 minute delay at gate.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

An A321 ECAM alerted FUEL ACT XFR FAULT; but crew ECAM actions were unable to resolve the fault so with insufficient fuel to reach their filed destination; the flight diverted for maintenance.

1753910

202007

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

7000.0

VMC

30

Daylight

30000

Center ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

TRACON ZZZ

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 2609; Flight Crew Type 86

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1753910

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 500; Vertical 250

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

1. Prior to departure from ZZZ; I requested the ZZZ Ground Controller to set me up with VFR flight following to my destination. They responded by saying that they were unable; but to contact ATC once airborne. 2. I departed ZZZ at XA:25 local time. Tower requested I fly runway heading on departure.3. Around 7;000 feet MSL; the Tower requested I fly west to accommodate incoming traffic. Which I complied with.4. I wasn't completely due west yet; when ZZZ Tower advised that I was clear of their Airspace; to assume my own navigation; and to contact Center for flight following. I tried reaching Center twice without a response. Although Center could hear me; Center would not acknowledge my transmission. The reason I know they could hear me; is because I could hear them.5. All of a sudden I heard ATC request for Aircraft Y to exercise evasive action as they were headed straight for me. I had Aircraft Y on my screen with the help of ADSB; so I deviated south to avoid an incursion. 6. I finally got acknowledgment from ATC about 3 minutes after the event. 7. The Controller provided me with a squawk; then instructed me to write down a phone number. 8. I requested the controllers initials so as to document the parties involved; but he denied my request. 9. ATC then transferred me to another frequency. 10. Reason for possible collision: 1. Ground control at ZZZ unwillingness to set me up with flight following prior to departure. 2. ATC's delay/unwillingness to acknowledge my transmission. 3. Tower at ZZZ erroneous radar vectors that could have put me in a collision course with the oncoming Aircraft Y without ATC's knowledge. 4. Lack of communication between ZZZ Tower and Center. 11. To prevent future possible mid-air collisions; I would advise that Ground/Tower at ZZZ to be willing to set up VFR departing aircraft with flight following prior to departure on their clearance delivery frequency. If ATC is ready for departing traffic; they could advise aircraft before it is too late.

Pilot reported attempting to receive flight following from Center; and being involved in a NMAC.

1740639

202004

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Commercial Fixed Wing

Parked

High

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

1740639

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Company Policy

We anticipated a high load-factor on flight ZZZ-ZZZ1 as our pairing showed about XX bookings; so blocking all six rows may not be possible.We decided that if for no other reason than consistency for all FA crews; we would try to uphold the seating restrictions of 3 rows FWD and AFT. While I may feel fine personally allowing customers to sit in one additional row; and another FA two rows; some FAs may not feel comfortable allowing any leeway unless they had to.We had to redirect many customers back FWD because the Operations Agent refused to make a PA about the restrictions prior to boarding and the customers don't always pay attention to our PAs onboard.There were (understandably) a few frustrated customers; but we tried to explain the reasoning. We feel like there should be a bit more definition. It's very complicated when we don't have assigned seating and people just sit where their boarding pass tells them. If we block 6 rows total; that means we can't have more than X number of passengers on this type of aircraft (leaving an open middle seat between them); and with middle seats filled that brings us to a maximum of X number of passengers while still keeping our 6 rows.Can we possibly get some guidance on how to best handle this? I was trying to be consistent for every other FA's sake; so that customers understand what's expected. While I wouldn't tell a customer this; they have a choice in flying...and their travel should be limited to essential only. Plus; they don't all wear masks etc. Crews do not have a choice; we have to come to work and these restrictions are there to protect us. It puts us in a very uncomfortable position to have to manage our own safety in this way without any support or guidance.Hopefully this doesn't continue for much longer; but at the end of the day either our safety matters; or it doesn't. We can't expect Customers to do what we ourselves aren't even being consistent with and I shouldn't have to feel like the bad guy for protecting not only my own safety; but the safety of my crew.We need clarity. We need access to better signage (buckling seatbelts means nothing). We need OPS to make a PA about this when they announce we aren't doing service. We need to know it's ok to push back if we need to. Some Customers are used to doing as they please and right now there's not as much autonomy in their choices.

Flight Attendant reported concerns with COVID-19 guidelines on blocking or not blocking seats and making reference to Flight Attendant/passenger safety.

993427

201202

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

IMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

APU

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 13000

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

993427

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Legal placard of #1 Generator; APU operation required for back up generator per MEL. APU serviced prior to initial departure per logbook placard and an uneventful first leg was completed. On the next leg; about 45 minutes from destination the APU failed which resulted in a single electrical power source operation. The QRH directs a landing at the nearest suitable airport. I deemed ZZZ the nearest suitable for landing; declared an emergency for priority handling and landed. I commend my First Officer for his outstanding assistance during this event. In the future; I will consider day/night and weather considerations before accepting an aircraft with a deferred generator. There should be weather minima associated with the placarding of a generator to prevent this from occurring again.

When dispatched with one generator inoperative the flight crew of a B737-800 was forced to divert to their nearest suitable airport when the APU; required to be operative to provide a secondary electrical power source; failed enroute.

1682877

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class C ZZZ

Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1682877

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness

1682878.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

[During the flight]; we had a baggage smoke annunciation. We identified the annunciator and canceled the alarm. I called for the checklist and completed it. We [requested ATC assistance] and were cleared direct to the airport. We landed on Runway XX uneventfully. There was no smoke present upon landing and we were escorted to the ramp by fire vehicles. Once on the ramp we deplaned safely while fire crews examined the baggage compartments in both the nose and the tail. No smoke was found.

During descent we got a Baggage Smoke annunciator and master warning. Captain called for the QRC which we completed. We [advised ATC] and requested direct to the field. We also requested fire and rescue to meet us. The Captain briefed the passengers. We landed and were met by the fire trucks and crew. We determined there was no smoke or fire and then taxied to the FBO. The fire crew examined both baggage compartments and the cabin using a thermal cameras. No hot spots were detected. Passengers remained calm and thanked us afterward.

C525 flight crew reported a baggage compartment smoke warning; resulting in an unscheduled landing.

1824040

202107

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Night

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing; Taxi

Vectors

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 161995; Flight Crew Type 616

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1824040

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We took off out of ZZZ to ZZZ1 for a night ETOPS flight. Everything was normal. Although the crew was current; all hadn't flown much in the past XX months due to COVID. We briefed this fact and were aware that we would all have to be on our toes due to the fact that our flying skills were rusty.The flight was normal. We operated the flight very close to the flight plan.After a normal approach and smooth landing; we taxied to the gate. After shutting down the engines and performing the Parking Checklist; we were surprised to see an overweight landing message being printed. We had landed approximately 700 pounds overweight.We sent the appropriate overweight landing code and I called local maintenance to report the issue.

Air carrier Captain reported an overweight landing at destination airport caused by failure to monitor fuel burn during flight. Captain cited rusty pilot skills caused by COVID inactivity as a contributing factor.

1414296

201701

0001-0600

I90.TRACON

TX

2800.0

VMC

TRACON I90

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

Part 91

IFR

Personal

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Vectors

Class B HOU

Facility I90.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1414296

Facility I90.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1414777.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

I was relieving a controller off of Finals and getting ready to brief my trainee on the position she was about to get into. I put my presets up and I notice Aircraft X at 2800 feet inside of the 3000 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) abeam and north of the antennas. I told the trainee to wait a second and asked the relieved controller 'what's he doing again?' The answer was 'direct ELREN because he wanted the visual.' I called the Operations Manager (OM) over and asked had the rules changed for discontinuing vertical separation from an obstruction? He said 'no...I don't think so'. Aircraft X was at 2300 feet past the antennas. I asked if he had the airport in sight. He said yes; I have the airport in sight; however he was looking for runway 4. I cleared him for the Visual Approach runway 4 and switched him to the Tower. I asked my OM who listened to the audio if Aircraft X descended on his own. He was given a descend and maintain by the previous controller.Controllers should know the rules and not be lazy and giving in to what the pilot wants.

An aircraft [had] been vectored on left base to Runway 4 for Hobby airport. I descended the aircraft to 2000 feet in a 3000 feet MVA; the aircraft was clear of the obstruction on the north side more than 2 3/4 of a mile but the circle is 3 miles.I just need to bring my MVA maps on next time.

I90 Controllers reported that a PA28 aircraft was on a vector below the Minimum vectoring Altitude and less than three miles from the obstruction depicted on the radar display.

1683293

201909

1201-1800

KZAK.ARTCC

HI

34000.0

Turbulence

Daylight

Center KZAK

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A KZAK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 389

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1683293

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1683294.0

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Human Factors

There was forecast to be some turbulence along route. Around XA20 we discussed climbing because we were starting to get moderate chop and light turbulence. The Captain sent the CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communication) message and requested FL360 due to weather. While waiting for instructions; we noticed an aircraft behind us on TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) at FL360. I verbalized that the request will get denied due to traffic. At XA23 we got the message that said 'UNABLE REQUESTED ALTITUDE DUE TO TRAFFIC' all in caps like all ATC CPDLC messages. Below that line there was 'Climb and maintain FL350' in all lowercase. We saw the unable and accepted the message. The climb instructions were not observed and we maintained FL340. At XB15 we received a message to confirm altitude; you were cleared to climb and maintain FL350 about an hour ago. The Captain and I then went through all the log and found the missed clearance. We coordinated with ATC and determined we would stay at FL340. The confusion on my part came into effect because we [were] used to seeing instructions from ATC in all caps and the previous message below [was] in lower case. The message that cleared us to climb and maintain FL350 was not in the same format as other messages we received. The UNABLE CLIMB portion in all caps and then the climb and maintain in lower case led me to believe that was the previous message. I went back though all of our ATC messages and they all followed that same format with ATC in bold and our response in lower case.

At XA21 we entered an area of moderate turbulence; so we sent a CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communications) request to climb to FL360 due to weather. At XA23 we received a response in large lettering; 'UNABLE REQUESTED ALTITUDE DUE TO TRAFFIC;' followed by small lettering; 'climb to and maintain FL350.' We missed the clearance to climb to FL350 and maintained FL340. At XB15 we received a CPDLC message asking us to confirm altitude; stating we were cleared to FL350 about an hour ago. At XB16 we responded to inquiry; stating we saw unable FL360; do you want us at FL350 or can we stay at FL340. At XB22 [Center] responded; 'WE DID UNABLE FL360 BUT CLEARED YOU TO FL350 AT THAT TIME. You can stay at FL340.'I believe the difference in the size of the lettering on the XA23 CPDLC message led to the error of missing our clearance to FL350 along with the fact that we had not requested FL350. Nice of [Center] to do; but we missed it. I will not be reading any more CPDLC messages off the First Officer's FMC (Flight Management Computer). From now on I will select ATC on my FMC; review silently and confirm with the First Officer that we've seen the clearance in its entirety. Yes we acknowledge [Center's] XA23 message; but perhaps [Center] could have asked us to confirm altitude sooner?

B737 flight crew reported missing clearance from ATC to climb.

1245767

201503

0001-0600

CVG.Airport

KY

0.0

IMC

Snow

Dawn

1200

Tower CVG

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

None

Facility CVG.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Attendant

1245767

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Aircraft X landed runway 36c with an RVR of 1200. He was instructed to taxi via D; J and S to the ramp. The pilot read back the correct instructions. I then advised him to turn right on N off of S [as] if he was parking on the north ramp. He again read back the instructions correctly. Other aircraft were cleared to land and given instructions. Aircraft X then asked if he was cleared to cross runway 27. I repeated his taxi instructions and then realized he had missed his turn onto taxiway J. I then turned him on runway 27 and gave him instructions to the ramp. I knew vehicles were on the runway 27 doing sweeping. They were using 3 different call signs and I checked with my scratch pad to make sure of the 2 remaining call signs because 1 vehicle had exited. As I was getting ready to advise the vehicles one keyed up and said I had an aircraft on the runway. I advised he was using it to taxi to the ramp. A vehicle said he drove into the grass to clear the runway. Upon further review they stated he was taxiing very fast and estimated about 50mph. I advised the FLM of the situation.My recommendation would be that when multiple vehicles are on a runway give me just one call sign to communicate with. If one leaves and another call sign has to be used so be it. I spent too much time making sure my notes were correct instead of controlling the situation. When snow removal is in progress this is almost exclusively how it is done.

CVG Local Controller reports of a pilot missing his turn-out off the runway. Controller instructs pilot to taxi on parallel runway where sweepers were working. Before Controller could advise the vehicles; a Sweeper calls the Tower to alert him of an aircraft on the runway.

1573497

201808

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

340.0

8.0

4000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 9400; Flight Crew Type 1300

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1573497

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Horizontal 100; Vertical 500

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

While within the class B airspace; 10 miles North of ZZZ; we called the airport 'in sight' and were cleared for a visual approach to ZZZ runway XX. As we began our descent from 4;000 MSL; we noticed a target on TCAS 500 ft below our altitude approaching our path from the East. We stopped our descent while looking for the traffic. Then the [TCAS] commanded a climb as the aircraft neared our location. We began a climb as the aircraft passed below us. When TCAS stated clear of conflict; we continued our approach to ZZZ. I reported our conflict to ZZZ tower; and we were cleared to land on XX. VFR traffic below the Class B airspace combined with our clearance for a visual approach contributed to our conflict within 500 ft vertical. We never saw the other aircraft. [TRACON] was busy; but a warning that the aircraft was below us and converging on our track to the airport could have delayed our descent; and avoided the conflict.

Small Transport pilot reported a TCAS warning on initial approach.

1754250

202008

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

100.0

VMC

Dusk

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B747-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

N

Y

Repair; Inspection

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1754250

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

Contract maintenance noted a leaky hydraulic line on the right body gear and were replacing the line when I was conducting my preflight. I asked them about the repair and they said that they were finishing up. They signed the repair off and we pushed taxied and took off without incident until the first officer attempted to raise the landing gear. He could not get the lever past the off position and a 'GEAR TILT' caution message displayed on the EICAS. We informed ZZZ departure that we needed to work a landing gear issue; and requested to level off at 5;000 feet. I believe ZZZ TRACON [advised] an issue on our behalf; since thereafter they referred to us as an emergency aircraft. We completed the QRH for 'GEAR TILT' after advising departure of our issue; then consulted with our dispatcher and maintenance control via satphone; and determined that the best course of action would be to jettison fuel to below max landing weight and return to ZZZ. We calculated our maximum amount of fuel to be on board when landing by subtracting the zero fuel weight from the max landing weight. Since we were so close to the field we elected to jettison down to our max landing weight before returning to the field. We calculated 85.3 tons of fuel to be the maximum amount of fuel we could have on board considering a zero fuel weight of 210.4 tons and a max landing weight of 295.7 tons. We decided to be cautious and jettison down to 83.0 to ensure we were well below max landing weight. We ran the fuel jettison checklist in the QRH; and jettisoned fuel as per procedure. We were receiving radar vectors during this time. After our jettison was complete; we returned to ZZZ and conducted an ILS to Runway XXL landing without further incident. Bill contract maintenance when they make a mistake and cost the company money.

B747-400 First Officer reported an EICAS GEAR TILT message on takeoff; resulting in fuel jettison and an air turn back to a precautionary emergency landing.

1566584

201808

0.0

Daylight

Corporate

Embraer Phenom 100

Part 91

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Testing; Inspection

Pitot-Static System

X

Improperly Operated

Repair Facility

Corporate

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1566584

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Manuals; Procedure; Staffing; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft

Procedure

Prior Maintenance Planning had been done to schedule the aircraft as 'Out of Service' for Maintenance for Standby Pitot/Static probe restoration (cleaning); Standby Instrument Functional Check; & Transponder functional check. Work to be performed would be under our 145 repair station by a trained tech. Due to scheduling conflicts; it was determined earlier in the week that only one of the two techs certified to perform the work and allowed to work this aircraft via company policy would be on site to perform. Two other 145 certified techs; not able to work the aircraft due to company policy; were on site all day and able to provide advisement and inspection of work performed; one of which was present during the incident and first noticed the issue in real time. I had reviewed the work pack for the original intended scheduled maintenance earlier in the week to ensure familiarity and look for any potential pitfalls or denotation of tools/procedures required that we may have missed in the initial planning and creation of the work pack. I was advised by management to revise the work pack to include ADC functional checks and restoration of the primary pitot sources. The work pack would then reflect all Ch. 34 items on the 24 month inspection time limit in the 91.411 & 91.413. Prior to the revision; the 91.411 ADC Check and 91.413 transponder checks had been split by roughly 365 days due to equipment changes and re-certification in the past. Performing the ADC checks despite not being due would realign all of the 91.411 & 91.413 related tasks together to all come due at the same time in the future. I updated the work pack on our computerized labor system; task tracking; and billing system; revised the billing as advised; printed out the additional applicable Aircraft Maintenance Manual tasks that were being added and compiled them with the previously printed and organized work pack binder. I also reviewed the tasks to re-familiarize and search for pitfalls/any issues I may have ran into the next day. Between the work pack update as described above and phone calls regarding other aircraft on our certificate with Admin work needing to be handled; I found myself leaving work finally as noted above.The first half of the work day I accomplished both Pitot Probe Restoration tasks per IAW the AMM instruction despite numerous delays from possible aircraft hangar movement requirements; maintenance labor/work order program tech issues that had to be resolved by the provider company tech support; and tool fashioning requirements that I was not able to predict despite prior preparations. The pitot lines for Embraer have different securing features than typical corporate/GA AN-fitting style line connections. This was not seen in the manual references for the tasks being accomplished. After a very brief lunch; I started back on the aircraft; continuing to deal with delays related to retrieving AN fitting adapters and setup for a P/S test and transponder test immediately after. After a parts run to the local hydraulic store for an oddball fitting required for the Standby Pitot/Static probe adapter that we were unaware of prior to the day we did not have any more of; It was afternoon and I was finishing final setup and preparations. I followed the Embraer AMM for the EMB500; in reference to our S/N aircraft; and made noticed it did not call for pulling the pitot/static heater breakers as a safety precaution. From experience with other aircraft of multiple manufacturers when dealing with pitot/static related tasks; I pulled the all heater breakers in the cockpit of the aircraft to disable the system. Once I applied power; and allowed for stabilization of the Standby and both PFD's; I set the pitot/static test box to 1500 ft altitude and 100 knots airspeed with a 1500 ft/min vertical speed as a preliminary check before committing to higher altitude for a leak check of the full system. It was at about 1000 ft altitude on the test box; while I was in the cockpit monitoring the PFD's and standby readout to follow the pitot/static tester handheld readout; that my coworker/inspector for this event yelled from outside the aircraft that we had smoke. I jumped out to identify the source and we saw the pilot side Pitot Probe adapter starting to ooze out the inside plastics from the heat. [The technician] immediately jumped into the cockpit as I told the tester handheld to go to ground so we could disconnect without damaged the aircraft systems. The altitude came down quickly; I yelled for [the technician] to shut down the aircraft power and we grabbed rags to pull the pitot adapters off while the plastics were still liquid; we promptly cleaned off the molten contaminants so it would not dry on the probes. Note- the aircraft was weight on wheels and knew it was on the ground. After everything cooled we inspected the adapters and found they would need replacement insides that can be ordered as kits. We also found some contaminants on the pilot side pitot tube had seeped through the drain hole. I broke up the solidified contaminants and performed the Pitot Tube Restoration task again; verifying the pitot tube was serviceable. Upon discussing the incident with our Director of Maintenance not long after; we were informed that Embraer's will in fact turn on Pitot Heat if certain breakers in the cockpit are pulled. We later found at the top of the AMM task for the ADC Functional Check I was performing; that Embraer lists AAM Task 34-10-00-480-801-A/200 'Pitot/Static Tester Connection' in the references section; however; in the set up and order of operations I followed up until the part where instructed to take the aircraft to altitude with the test box; it does not mention to reference this task like it does other tasks for preparing a safe aircraft for the following maintenance. The task also does not explicitly mention or have any warnings regarding leaving any heater breakers closed/opening them. We acquired another set of adapters and leak checked the pitot system for both ADC's and the standby; with the Test Box; due to the connection lines being opened earlier in the day for the Pitot Restoration tasks and the system showed leak free and functional. At this point I was able to sign off the work performed and RTS the aircraft for it to make its departure the next morning without delay. We experienced no delay in flight operations; however; very likely could have missed the next day flight if we couldn't resource other pitot adapters that fit properly; or even if we have damaged the pitot tubes in some way that the AMM would advise replacement.Embraer [should consider an] update to the AMM Task 34-15-00-720-801-A to include the referenced Pitot/Static Tester - connection task in the setup steps before applying pitot/static pressures to the aircraft to ensure safe configuration. Many pull breakers as additional safeties when performing work just in case other systems fail. A 'WARNING' note would be helpful as well; stating that improper pitot/static heat breaker configuration could potentially cause damage to equipment/the aircraft/personnel. I believe this would be an important update to have for the task because I'm sure this is not the first time someone with a lack of experience personally; with Embraer aircraft; has made this mistake; to ensure safety. Also; on our department's end; we will have to shoot for more realistic time allotments for work; planning; and setups. Also ensuring the proper training for each airframe and available hands to work the project will come into play. Without my coworker being able to double as my inspector; despite company policy deeming he does not under normal circumstances work on this aircraft; this could have been much worse. With ever changing schedules and customer needs; we all strive to do the best we can; but we will have to do better with recognizing the limits of safe operation schedules.

EMB-500 Maintenance Technician reported the test connections melted on the pitot probes while testing the pitot/static system.

1470119

201708

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

15.0

8000.0

VMC

Turbulence; 10

Daylight

20000

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

SA-227 AC Metro III

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Vectors; Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 3400; Flight Crew Type 500

Workload

1470119

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft

When I entered the approach environment at ZZZ; Approach Control had me increase speed to 210 knots. I was then told to slow to 180 knots or less on the downwind segment. Shortly thereafter; I was given an altitude change (9000 feet to 8000 feet) and a 180 degree heading change. As I inputted all those into the altitude select and OBS; the airplane started the turn and began diving for the ground at a high rate. I disconnected the autopilot and began a recovery but not before I descended to around 7000 feet. During this time; the sink rate and pull up visual and aural warnings were going off.After landing and securing the aircraft; I called my mechanic and explained what happened. He said that when the plane was going 210 knots at that low altitude; the autopilot trimmed the airplane for that speed; which is trimmed pitched down significantly to maintain level attitude. When I slowed the plane to below 180 knots by reducing power and deploying 1/4 flaps; it further pitched the nose forward. So; when I commanded the 180 degree turn and descend; the airplane configuration along with the turbulence in the area at the time probably overloaded the autopilot servos; causing it to be unresponsive.I have never flown the plane at 210 knots in the approach environment in this airplane. I've been advised not to do that again due to the above situation possibly reoccurring.

SA-227 pilot reported entering speed changes; altitude descent; and 180 degree heading changes in rapid succession causing aircraft to nose dive and activate aural warnings.

1783713

202101

No Aircraft

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 10859; Flight Crew Type 1012

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1783713

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

I had the idea in my head from somewhere in my training about what medicals were due for what type of operation. And if you are not confronted with it you don't really look into it. You feel you know the answer. In the course of running my business I got a database to track currencies; compliance; inspections and flight and engine times. While I was loading the database and setting up alerts and warnings I noticed that I may have; in the past; been flying commercially on a third class for a couple of short periods. I am not sure since I do not have all my old medicals to check. And by the past I am talking about 4 to 5 years ago. Remembering exactly what happened is difficult. Because of this incident I am super vigilant now about medicals; although because of COVID; I had to use an extension on my last medical. My database now warns me when I am getting close to my medical due date. I have gotten the idea out of my head that I can let a second class turn into a third class.

Reporter reported possibly flying commercially with a third class physical several years ago.

1740640

202004

No Aircraft

Company

Air Carrier

Off Duty

Flight Attendant Current

1740640

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

Company Policy

New jumpseat relocation has a negative when it comes to safety and security concerns. Compromising our ability to communicate in an emergency and security situation by being away from the interphone and private conversations that occur on the jumpseat cause issues and does nothing to promote social distancing because we still work together and there is no way to avoid that aspect on the airplane.What's [the] purpose when you have to sit next to people and the whole row is not blocked anyways. It doesn't change anything and I am concerned this is throwing safety out the window. Safety demo and oxygen and life vest should be demonstrated regardless. In addition; we need to address oxygen masks with personal masks on their faces. This needs to be addressed immediately.

Flight Attendant reported concerns about safety and security issues relating to new COVID-19 jumpseat arrangements and social distancing guidelines.

1045012

201210

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Dawn

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Beech 1900

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Landing

Pressurization Control System

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

1045012

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure

Aircraft

The airplane had come out of maintenance and this was its first flight since being released. The mechanics had worked on the pressurization system as part of their scheduled maintenance. During our climb out we noticed that the cabin altitude was indicating below our departure airport elevation with the cabin at max differential. In cruise we observed normal indications. During descent; I set the pressurization correctly to [the airport elevation] and we observed a 1;000 FPM descent all the way during the descent with the cabin remaining at max differential and the cabin altitude went well below zero (approximately 3;000 feet below zero). On final we felt the pressure change and I tried to adjust the rate controller to stop the cabin descent. Since the altitude was way below sea level; I began dumping the cabin (small bursts while on final approach) in an attempt to equalize the pressure for [the airport]. Once we landed the cabin VSI indicated a climb pegged at 6;000 FPM and the pressure equalized. The cabin climbed approximately 9;000 feet in a second which caused extreme discomfort in our ears (we were screaming in agony rolling down the runway). At the gate several passengers complained about the pressurization system as they were deplaning. I instructed the First Officer to go to the new airplane since we were swapping and I contacted Maintenance regarding the pressurization. We had a non-reving pilot riding on board who suggested that we call in sick due to the large change in pressure citing possible issues associated with the decompression (similar to those that a diver might experience) and issues with our ears. When I arrived at the new airplane; I made my suggestion known to the First Officer and called us both in sick as a precaution. The company asked us to go to a doctor who told us not to fly for 24 hours as a precaution. This event concerned me in a few ways. First: the airplane had come out of maintenance that morning with work being done on the pressurization system. It was apparent to us once airborne that the pressurization system was not acting normally. The system did test properly on the ground during our run up checks. Second: there is no checklist guidance for an airplane that is slow to pressurize; or one that remains pressurized while on the descent. The only checklist guidance is for a cabin altitude high and a cabin differential high. In the case of this flight; neither occurred. The closest would have been cabin differential high but we had no annunciators for that and the gauge was showing max differential; not anything higher. When we noticed the cabin remaining at max differential on the descent and the cabin descending below sea level; it would have been nice to reference something telling us how to remedy the situation. Pressurization problems like this are becoming increasingly common on our fleet.

B1900 flight crew experienced a loss of the cabin pressurization controller and rapid pressure changes resulting in extreme ear discomfort. Flight crew noted a lack of checklist guidance for the problem they encountered.

1842274

202109

1201-1800

ORD.Airport

IL

350.0

2.0

7200.0

VMC

20

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ORD

UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Class B ORD

Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

General Seating Area

Personal

Passenger

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 729; Flight Crew Type 0

1842274

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 200; Vertical 300

Person Passenger

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related

I am a 20+ year CFII who was a passenger on [a] paid commercial flight from ZZZ to ORD. Just before our aircraft transitioned from a heading of approximately 120 heading to 090 just northwest of the KURKK intersection; I happened to be looking outside and saw an object pass by about 200 feet below and 250-300 ft away from our flight. The object was black and had red and green highlights. In the moment; my brain registered this as a drone with typically dim position lights. The encounter was understandably fast given our speed and I know my memory isn't going to provide much detail and may be biased; but we were dangerously close to something. I cannot rule out that it was a balloon; but it would have been the most rectangular balloon I'd ever seen. I also happened to have Foreflight open on my phone at that moment as I like to watch where we are in flight. About 10 seconds after seeing the object; I used Foreflight's option to mark a position and will gladly share screen shots and such if needed.Since my phone was in airplane mode and had a limited view of the GPS constellation; there is likely considerable error in that data. Still; where it shows on the map matches the location I saw out the window as I distinctly remember seeing the Twin Lakes Recreational Area in Palatine; IL. Our aircraft did not seem to make any course changes other than the move to 090. So; I don't know if the crew saw the object. Obviously; we landed without incident. I tried to connect with the crew to share my observation; but they were already out of the aircraft. One thing I noticed in this process... I had no idea how to make a report in the moment. Despite being a commercial CFII and 107 operator; I didn't know where to turn to be helpful. I'm sure there was a better; faster reporting option; but I had forgotten the best route. So; I'll add that to my list of things to review for my flight review next week. I hope this data is helpful in some way.

A seated passenger reported observing a UAS while on an air carrier flight on final approach to a Class B airport.

1097495

201306

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection

Emergency Floor Lighting

X

Design; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew

1097495

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

I worked as Purser on a flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1. While walking down the jet bridge the inbound crew informed the four of us flight attendants that we have a mechanical. They discovered a missing portion of the Emergency Lighting strip on the floor by Row-12 and wrote it up. They said that it is a 'No-Go' item. When I boarded the B757-200 airplane; I immediately went to Row-12 to see the missing lighting strip. It was plain to see that the strip was missing. My three flying partners all saw it as well and noted it's nothing we have ever seen before. Soon a Maintenance employee was on board examining the area. I walked up to him and started a discussion about the missing strip. He began to explain to me how the lighting strip is NOT missing; that merely the portion of carpet in that area is what's missing. I was quite surprised by his explanation and assertively shared my complete disagreement for his assessment. How; if the pilots were to turn on the emergency lighting that the missing portion would not light up at all; and that is not normal. To further prove my point I told him I was going to ask the pilots to turn on the lighting so he could see for himself. I then walked up to the cockpit and asked the Captain if they could turn on the emergency lights so he could walk back with me and also tell the Mechanic that the missing portion does in fact exist and that it is not normal. Captain then instructed the First Officer to turn on the lighting so he could walk back with me to see the missing lighting strip. When the emergency lights were on; the lighting strip went from a lit strip to dark carpet by Row-12 then to a lit strip again. I motioned to both the Mechanic and Captain how that is not 'normal' and it's a safety issue. The Mechanic dismissed my comment as he continued with his explanation to the Captain how the plane is DESIGNED this way. I was astounded. I assertively stated that the incoming crew knew this wasn't normal; which is why they wrote it up. I and my three flying partners have never seen a missing lighting strip before and knew it wasn't normal; and now I'm to believe that Boeing designed their 757s with a missing lighting strip by Row 12?! The Captain said if the Mechanic is okay with it; then he is too. I took a picture of the missing portion by Row-12 (and happened to get the Captains feet in the picture.) The Mechanic left the plane and came back about ten minutes later. When he returned he told me that he went to a nearby gate where another B757 [aircraft] was parked and examined Row-12 on that plane and how that plane also had the same missing strip by Row-12. He showed pictures of that planes missing strip as well. I responded by telling the Mechanic that simply because another plane has a missing strip that doesn't necessarily mean it's normal and doesn't need to be addressed and/or fixed. How again the inbound crew knew to report it; how the current crew knows it's not normal and how I'm not okay with it missing due to it being a safety issue. Although I don't have Captain's authority to make a final decision about it; yet I made it known my own level of discomfort with it as it's an obvious potential safety issue. If we had to evacuate upon landing in ZZZ1; that area [of the cabin floor] would not have lit up; especially since we landed late at night. To further my correct stance on this issue; we worked on another B757 the following day out of ZZZ1. The four of us flight attendants were quick to notice a fully intact lighting strip by Row-12 on this plane. We also happened to have the same cockpit crew Captain and First Officer. I told the Captain that this plane does have the lighting strip by Row-12; how the plane is not designed to have a missing portion of the strip and that it should have been fixed on our plane yesterday. I did not receive a receptive response.I cannot help but feel that our safety was not a priority on this flight. Either the Mechanic didn't want to fix the missing strip or he somehow knew that they didn't have a replacement to fix the strip which would have caused a significant delay or potential cancellation of my flight. Regardless; no excuse should be given for allowing this plane to fly the manner in which it did. I felt as though my opinion didn't matter; didn't count and wasn't professionally regarded with the priority it should have been given. If safety is our Air Carrier's number one corporate value; they fell very short with me and my crew and all the passengers on this flight. Worked First Class [section].

A Flight Attendant working as a Purser; describes her efforts to address cabin egress safety issues after being informed that a section of the cabin floor Emergency Lighting strip was missing on their outbound B757 aircraft.

1099029

201307

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B777-200

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation

Pilot Seat

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1099029

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals

Manuals

While working B777-200 today; I noticed the Captain's seat front rail stops were not correctly positioned; and when I checked the forward limit switch; it was broken off. After noticing the discrepancy; I placarded on MEL 25-1a; the Captain's seat power functions inoperative. As said before; it appears the figures and explanations on seat installation are not clear enough. Evening; ETOPS Pre-Departure Check (PDC).

Reporter stated he was working a PDC Check on a B777-200 aircraft. Revisions to the Maintenance Manual Seat Installation Procedures and Figures (Diagrams) will be made soon to clarify the correct installation position of the Front Rail Stop Limit switch. Because the limit switch (micro-switch) on the lower frame of the Captain's seat had been installed upside down; the micro-switch could not ride up on the ramp on the seat rail stop fitting to interrupt electric power to the seat motor. As a result; the limit switch on the seat frame was literally cut in half and allowed the seat motor to continue driving the seat forward to the rail end stops. The limit switch is not a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU); the seat has to be replaced.Reporter stated there are eight different ways to install the stops while the limit switch is only installed on the inboard side of the seat frame facing outboard. The Maintenance Manual is being misinterpreted due to the unclear procedures and drawings Maintenance has to use for the installation.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician noticed during a Pre-Departure Check on a B777-200 aircraft; the Captain's seat forward limit switch was broken off. The front rail stops were also not correctly positioned. Unclear procedures and drawings in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual allowed for misinterpretation of installation.

1287411

201508

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

18000.0

VMC

5

Night

5000

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Y

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 43; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 2000

1287411

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1287410.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Our aircraft was dispatched with MEL XA-XX-X-X ADP Controller - Auto Function. The MEL operational procedures directed us to turn ADP ON - on ground prior to takeoff; and inflight prior to flap extension. On climb out; through about 10;000 feet we turned the ADP OFF. Later in the climb; (around FL180); we received an EICAS msg C HYD SYS PRESS. We ran the QRH procedure for this message; which directed us to turn the ADP ON; and note whether SYS PRESS was restored or not. The msg remained; so the procedure then directed us to turn this pump off; along with the C1 and C2 electric pumps. This left us with the Center Hydraulic system inoperative; which would require an alternate flaps and gear extension at destination; and flaps 20 landing. We then contacted dispatch and [Maintenance Operations] to discuss our situation and options. The current weather and forecast at our destination was VFR. The extra time enroute would allow for a lower weight landing; using less runway. The runway at our destination was sufficient for our planned landing weight and configuration; so we elected to continue to our destination. Further along in the flight we noticed that the destination weather was reporting a 1;000 feet ceiling. Our dispatcher then issued an [Amended Release] listing the addition of an alternate with recomputed fuel burns and reserves. It later occurred to me that our dispatcher may not be aware that if we were to divert after an unsuccessful approach at destination; that we would have no way of raising our gear; therfore our fuel burn to our alternate would be higher. I then contacted dispatch and advised of this possibility; and was subsequently issued a second ARTR with a revised fuel burn to our alternate with the aircraft in a Gear Down configuration.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information].

B767-300 flight crew reported the Dispatcher may have overlooked an important planning factor when they were dispatched with an MEL for C Hyd Sys inoperative.

1275443

201507

0601-1200

LAX.Airport

CA

VMC

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Fractional

Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

STAR RIIVR2

Class E ZLA

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1275443

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1275444.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

At cruise; pilot flying (PF) loaded runway and approach he thought he would get. PF got up to use LAV. When he came back I sent for a new ATIS so I could check approach. When the ATIS came back I was confused about runways they were using it said 25L which we expected but it also said 19R and 19L. I said did LAX add new runways. Then we realized I had sent for LAS ATIS. Resent for right ATIS. This started us to get behind. We started to get busy with ATC instruction changing speeds and fixes. We were given direct GRAMM and couldn't find it on our flight plan so we typed it in and went direct. I reload arrival and picked PGS transition and GRAMM was there and then went direct to that GRAMM. I still needed to load approach and do approach checklist. We were given descend via and set lowest altitude. We were already past TOD and didn't notice it right away. When we realized we had passed TOD; PF clicked off autopilot to meet crossing restriction our speed got high we put out air brakes to help. I was trying to help so I never load approach. We were at RIIVR then and there was nothing in the box after that because when the PF had loaded the approach he didn't pick the RIIVR transition. While I was loading approach that is when we got off course. I finally got approach loaded with the RIIVR transition ATC noticed we were off course and we told him we were correcting. We got back on course and stable and landed safely. SoCal gave us a number to call when we got on the ground. We called when we got on ground and we explained what had happened and they seemed ok with that. They wanted us to know that we were off course.

We were flying a ferry flight from to KLAX. I was the SIC flying in the left seat. At cruise altitude I sent for the ATIS for LAX to get the landing runways so I could set up the RIIVR 2 ARIVAL. I entered the ILS 25L into the FMS and got up to use the lav. While I was away the non-flying sent for the ATIS for LAX as well but typed LAS by accident and received the weather for Las Vegas. During the arrival we started going over the weather and became confused with the information not realizing the error at first. I did notice the error and the non-flying pilot did send for the correct airport ATIS. This event got us behind and I started to rush to try to help us catch up. While rushing I told the non-flying pilot that I loaded the ILS to 25L already and to expect the visual. This is where the mistake happened. When I loaded the ILS to 25L I failed to load the river transaction. When we arrived at the RIIVR fix the fixes for the transition to the ILS were not there causing us to have a nav deviation. We did get back on the ILS when we notice the problem and landed without incident. We were asked to call SoCal where we were asked what happened. They seemed ok and understood our error.

Gulfstream crew was late setting up the arrival; approach; and landing runway in the FMC. As a result; aircraft was off course for a portion of the arrival.

1431596

201703

0001-0600

ZFW.ARTCC

TX

3000.0

Center ZFW

Medium Transport

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZFW

Facility ZFW.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1431596

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

D10 called to coordinate Aircraft X direct to GYI airport and I approved it. If they said he would be assigned 030 I missed it. The higher MVA is just across the facility boundary and aircraft had penetrated before I realized he wasn't climbing. I issued a climb immediately and the pilot reported he had ground and airport in sight.

ZFW Center Controller reported about an aircraft altitude at transfer that was below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1452198

201705

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

IFR

Parked

Elevator

Y

Improperly Operated

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Takeoff / Launch

Scheduled Maintenance

Work Cards

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness

1452198

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors

Human Factors

Aircraft X was due to leave ZZZ to reposition to storage. Aircraft X had issues so it was decided that Aircraft Y had to be released to take its place. I was tasked to release Aircraft Y to make that happen as soon as possible. I went through all paperwork and verified it was all present as well as complete. After releasing the aircraft; Aircraft Y was forced to abort its takeoff because the pilot was unable to rotate. Later mechanics found that speed tape that was applied to the elevator spring tabs per a storage Workcard X had been removed from the lower surface of the elevator but not the top causing the aborted takeoff. After the aborted takeoff Aircraft Y returned to the ramp area and by this time Aircraft X was fixed and it repositioned as originally planned. For several days there was no word what happened to Aircraft Y. [3 days later] I was again asked to release Aircraft X. That was when I saw the corrective action that stated speed tape had been removed and the removal from storage workcard had been issued.As I audited the paperwork all steps were stamped as completed. Workcard X final step for repetitive storage inspections is to reapply the speed tape to all flight controls. I have been back from workman's comp for a couple weeks and this being the first aircraft I have released from storage I should have read every step of the workcard. Which I did not; I only verified steps were stamped as complete. What this workcard does not ever mention is a follow up Workcard Y which has the steps to remove aircraft from storage. So Workcard X final step has a mechanic cause a discrepancy by applying the tape to flight controls but does not give any guidance to create a discrepancy or issue the removal from storage workcard before flight. Had there been such a step it would ensure the discrepancy caused by adding the speed tape would have been addressed. This gives the impression that work is complete when in reality by completing Workcard X you are making the plane unairworthy. Further; speed tape had been removed from all other flight controls and the bottom side of the elevator. So someone had been instructed to remove all tape applied to the aircraft for storage and for whatever reason did not remove the tape from the upper surface of the spring tabs. I went back to read the work cards in question to try to find out how the tape could have been missed when I had released the aircraft the first time.A step on the repetitive storage inspection Workcard X and the initial storage Workcard Z stating to ensure the removal from storage workcard has been issued to the aircraft would have made it impossible for this situation to occur. Also due to the fact that we rarely have planes in storage making the workcards mandatory would give a further level of protection.

DHC-8 Maintenance Technician reported an aircraft aborted takeoff due to lack of elevator control. Speed tape was discovered on the topside of the elevator spring tabs.

1006218

201204

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown

1006218

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Runway XXL had been closed for maintenance. The airport called to tell me that the runway was open and I amended the IDS to reflect the runway open. However; I forgot to change the runway to open on the ASDE-X. An A310 was inside 1 mile final and the ASDE-X alarmed for the closed runway. I quickly fixed the runway status on the ASDE-X to show it open; as it should be. The alert went away and I allowed the aircraft to land. I now know that I was required to send the aircraft around. There are already adequate procedures for updating the runway status. This has made me realize that I should start using the checklist. This would have been a good time to have some leeway with ASDE-X alerts.

After re-opening a closed runway; Tower Controller failed to note the runway as open on the ASDE-X programming and allowed an aircraft to land after an alarm was broadcasted. The reporter acknowledged his failure to use the checklist.

1038044

201209

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway XXL

Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 1300

Troubleshooting; Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

1038044

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Manuals; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

On downwind at least 18 miles out was being flashed by a very bright green laser aimed directly at the cockpit window. On approach with the laser blaring in our faces put the gear down to have a 2 line ECAM. AUTO BRKS on line 1 and NORM BRKS on line 2. Went missed approach at 10;000' and asked for delay vector while trying to relay the position of the laser to the tower and running the ECAM's. Went to the book and found the AUTO BRKS page which said to go to the adjusted landing distance table. Started looking for the NORM BRKS and never could find it in the book. Now running short on time and fuel with the laser still flashing us. Did not have time to call Dispatch or Maintenance and the landing distance says to add multiple failures together to get the correct required landing distance but nothing in the book for the NORM BRKS ECAM. We were WITHOUT guidance on an ECAM from our books. The only book reference was to adjust the landing distance as we have no auto brakes and no normal brakes and it had no guidance for the 2 failures. We are now test pilots. Decided to reset the Antiskid Switch even though there was no procedure calling for it! It worked and the ECAMs cleared off. After landing and talking with Maintenance it took another 20 minutes for them to figure out it was a failure of one of the BSCU computers. We had switched from the bad computer to the good computer by turning OFF and ON the antiskid switch with the gear up on the missed approach. The ECAM was misleading and totally worthless in helping to fix this issue as it said nothing about a BSCU failure. Lately however I have heard of numerous BSCU failures. The Captain had a picture of the number 1 and number 3 tires that he blew on landing with a failed BSCU. I had a total loss of nosewheel steering due to a failed BSCU that was not resettable in flight and had to have a tug at the runway to tow us to the gate just a couple weeks ago. The Mechanic said another 320 just blew some tires in landing a month ago on landing with a failed BSCU. The next day I called the Tower and delivered a street map with the exact streets where the laser was coming from so they stop the laser flasher. The Tower admitted that this was a common problem at this airport and even the Tower was lasered on a different occasion. Never before had anyone given the Tower a map with the street address so they were very happy and surprised because they were thinking it was in a different location.

The Reporter stated that his Company began a series of Airbus upgrades about a year ago which has lead to numerous aircraft systems malfunctions. The BSCU is one component which appears to be malfunctioning with some regularity and the checklist does not consistently correct the problems. One recent BSCU fault which the Reporter experienced at cruise altitude was not corrected after cycling the ANTI SKID AND N/W STRG switch but after landing with no nose wheel steering; setting the parking brake and cycling the switch; the fault was corrected. During the current event cycling the ANTI SKID AND N/W STRG switch with the gear up did work. So even though a BSCU fault was indicated no BSCU FAULT ECAM was given. The Reporter also adamantly discussed the eye discomfort he experienced after the laser illumination. He was amazed at the power and accuracy of the laser beam during the twenty minutes or so as the crew was trouble shooting the anti skid problem. His eye discomfort lasted about two weeks.

An A320 ECAM alerted AUTO BRKS and NORM BRKS when the gear was extended for landing but no corresponding NORM BRKS checklist was found so during the go around the crew cycled the ANTISKID switch as per the AUTO BRKS ECAM which switched to the alternate BSCU and removed the ECAM alerts. During this event the cockpit was illuminated by a green laser which appeared to have a lock on and which caused eye discomfort.

1021499

201207

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

None

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)

2.0

Part 135

None

Passenger

Final Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 70

Other / Unknown

1021499

Aircraft Y

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 117; Flight Crew Total 12016; Flight Crew Type 5551

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1023363.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Cleared for takeoff Runway 34 by Tower. As we took the runway we saw a shadow move across us from a Citation that was on short final and was forced to do a go around.

The aircraft I was in was approaching ZZZ and upon initial contact with the Tower I was prompted to cancel the IFR flight plan; which I did and was then immediately cleared to land. The Captain then commenced a visual approach to the runway. At approximately 200 FT AGL and about 1 mile or less from the airport; we both noticed a high-wing single engine aircraft taxi onto the runway and we briefed each other on the event; waiting for about 4 or 5 seconds to see if the aircraft was just crossing the runway but then the aircraft lined up on the runway as if getting ready to takeoff. We initiated a go-around. After we set the appropriate flap setting; started to climb and retracted the landing gear we were approximately midfield and I advised the Control Tower that we had gone around; assuming they already were aware of that and that we were just doing the appropriate action to announce that. The Tower's response was; 'Ok; is there a problem?' My response was. 'No; we don't have a problem just the plane that taxied in front of us just before we were about to land.' Their response was; 'Ok; make right traffic and cleared to land.' The Captain called the Tower on the phone after we were at the FBO and the passengers were situated and was told by the Controller that they had cleared the plane to takeoff and they thought that he was gone. I think that if the Tower had watched the other aircraft leave the runway before they focused their attention elsewhere; the incident could not have happened.

A Citation First Officer and a C172 Instructor describe an incident resulting in a go around for the Citation when the C172 taxis onto the runway for takeoff. The C172 had been cleared for takeoff; but apparently took some time to do so.

1771601

202011

1201-1800

CRW.Airport

WV

IMC

Tower CRW

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS RWY 23

Final Approach

Class C CRW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 137

Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

1771601

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

The Captain and I made a go around on our second attempt to landing. The first approach was discontinued due to RVR being reported below the minimums for the approach outside the final approach fix. Due to a glideslope anomaly on Runway 23. The glideslope a few hundred feet from reaching minimums made a quick movement towards half scale deflection down. The aircraft was on a constant rate of descent; airspeed and proper configuration; hand flown below 1700 feet per approach plate. At the point that I called runway in sight the Captain and I noticed that the aircraft was not going to touch down in the prescribed TDZ and accomplished the go around procedure. While being vectored for a 3rd attempt at landing; the Captain and I briefed that if the anomaly happened again; we would accomplished another go around. Before the 3rd approach; another flight was able to land on their first attempt. After requesting a PIREP from the crew; they said they were able to see the runway right at minimums. We were able to obtain visual reference with the runway right at minimums and complete a successful landing. In the hotel van with the other crew we asked them if they had issues with the glideslope and mentioned they did. They said it acted very similarly to our situation. It seems that this has been a recurring theme at CRW in the past as well. The cause of the second go-around was due to an inaccurate indication of the glideslope that put the crew in a situation where a landing would have been made outside of the TDZ. I think the FAA needs to take a deeper dive in what is causing glideslope anomalies for the ILS 23 into CRW. Especially coming into the winter months in mountainous areas where weather can deteriorate rapidly.

An Air Carrier First Officer reported having to initiate a go around on their second approach attempt due to the glideslope fluctuating. The pilot reports this is a recurring issue on this approach and other crews also reported the glideslope fluctuating.

1668365

201907

1201-1800

MHT.TRACON

NH

6000.0

VMC

TRACON MHT

Air Carrier

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

Passenger

Cruise

Class C MHT

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1668365

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling

Ambiguous

The GPS lost satellites at 6;000 feet about 10 miles from MHT.

Captain reported the loss of satellite signal during cruise.

1296800

201509

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Main Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 35

1296800

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

After landing the left gear mechanism broke causing the left gear to raise; the hull skidded on the runway; and the aircraft made a left 90 uncontrolled turn exiting the runway to the adjacent grass. Aircraft came to rest upright.There were no injuries; no fire; no fuel leakage and no structural damage done to the aircraft; no airport facilities (lights; markers) were struck nor damaged.First responders contacted maintenance personnel; and thru manual lifting; we lifted the aircraft; supported with wooden blocks; lowered the left gear; and secured in place with wooden blocks. This rendered the aircraft towable. (In fact; the aircraft could have been safely flown under this condition except for activating the electric gear reposition mechanism.)I speculate that the collapse of the gear mechanism was caused by normal 'wear and tear' from typical runway landing loads over the past two years; which lead to an undiscovered bowing of the actuator clevis (U Channel Part) and it's mounting bar which in turn lead to a deformity which prevented the gear; when lowered for runway landing; to be secured in the designed over-center and locked position. I would recommend this mechanism (behind both seats) to be visually inspected at least after every 20 runway (land) landings.

The pilot of an experimental amphibian aircraft described the failure of a landing gear mechanism that resulted in a left main landing gear collapse and subsequent runway excursion. He speculated the cause and suggested repetitive inspections of the mechanism.

1762721

202009

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

31700.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Air Data Computer

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Workload

1762721

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

1762720.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Due to weather and a supposed power outage at the airport; we were delayed approximately 1 hour from our scheduled departure time. This was the start of leg 2 for the day as we already operated out of ZZZ. There was another issue I will discuss after the conclusion of our [priority handling] event. [The] FO (First Officer) was pilot flying at the time. We took off out of ZZZ1 in very light rain throughout our departure. My FO stated it was barely enough rain to notice on the windshield. Light chop may have been experienced temporarily at most; but it was mostly smooth on climb out. We were cleared to flight level 31;000 where we stopped our descent. Shortly thereafter; while autopilot B was engaged; the autopilot started a significant descent all by itself. Unbeknownst to me and after speaking with my FO on the ground; the FO noticed his altimeter jumped from 31;000 ft. to 31;800 approximately. As soon as the autopilot started its descent; I took controls from the FO; disconnected the autopilot and leveled the airplane at 31;000 using my altimeter. I don't think we lost much altitude because I almost immediately disconnected the autopilot to arrest the pitch down moment. ATC shortly queried our altitude and we read back 31;000. ATC stated he saw us at approximately 31;700. About that time I looked over at the FO side and saw his altitude was the same as ATC verified 31700 ft. and looked at my display; which showed 31;000ft. ALT disagree was showing. At the same time; I noticed the FO airspeed was significantly slower than my airspeed and cross-checked the standby indicator - FO airspeed approximately 80 kt. slow. Airspeed disagree showed.At some point; I issued a pan pan pan. Standby airspeed and CA airspeed was the same and based on our thrust setting and altitude there was no doubt my FO's airspeed indicator was incorrect; 70-80 kt. too slow for our thrust and pitch setting. At that point; I determined; maybe incorrectly as I analyzed things on the ground; that since ATC had his altitude readout; I was basing our actual altitude on my FO's display and airspeed on my display. My reasoning is that 700-800 ft. high was safer than 700-800 ft. low; close to the ground; during approach and landing. Since I was now flying airspeed on my side and altitude on my FO's side; my altitude fluctuated up and down due to a gigantic 4 ft. scan instead of a normal 10 in. scan. Once I determined I could not hold altitude as expected; I asked for a block of altitude for airspace protection and was granted that clearance. The QRH for airspeed disagree was started; which led us to unreliable airspeed. We completed the checklist for unreliable airspeed and turned back towards ZZZ1. At some point after this realization I changed our pan pan to [requesting priority handling]. ATC apparently missed our [priority handling request] as he [provided priority handling] for us several minutes after I made the call myself. Upon realizing our altitude and airspeed unreliable; and ATC confirming ZZZ2 was VFR; I decided to turn back around another time to divert to ZZZ2 as it was a safer airport. Eventually; several altitude step downs were given to us for our descent into ZZZ2. QRH was completed and calls to Dispatch were then attempted.FO tried numerous times to contact company to relay our status and was unsuccessful. We attempted several calls on ZZZ3 Radio with no response. We asked ATC to call company and to contact us via ZZZ3 Radio; with no response from Dispatch. We then called on Guard to ask them to contact our Dispatch and let them know to contact us on ZZZ3 Radio; communication with Dispatch was never successful. With everything going on; I did not feel comfortable having my FO heads down sending an ACARS message...we were too busy.Descent checklist was soon completed and approach checklist was completed below 18;000. Holds were also accomplished to allow us time for checklists and getting weather info and setting up for the approach into ZZZ2 which were indicating 1100 ft. ceilings and better than required visibility. At some point in the descent; below 10;000 ft.; my FO realized the EEC were both in alternate mode and a discussion commenced. We discussed the thrust lever position and thrust changes that occurred in ALT mode but due to our [priority handling situation] and attempting to get the airplane on the ground safely; I forgot to have the FO run the QRH for the EEC alternate mode. Due to having no weather forecast and knowing weather was in the vicinity of ZZZ2 due to the hurricane remnants; my main concern was getting the aircraft on the ground safely in as close to VFR conditions as I could get.After landing; while discussing the events with my FO; we realized we probably should have made time to run this QRH procedure. I just didn't have the weather info in flight to make a call to continue holding to accomplish this checklist instead of landing. Landing VFR in my mind was a safer option than running this checklist and possibly losing VFR conditions due to hurricane remnants. The approach was set up and briefed and we commenced our approach. Checklists completed. CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) standing by for us. The approach and landing was uneventful.After landing we were given instructions to taxi down a taxiway; XX or XY; [which] I did not feel was safe for us to turn down [to] as it was too narrow for my comfort. I also had concern that the taxiway could support our weight and relayed to Ground Control that I would not be accepting that taxiway. We did a 180 on a closed runway as Ground gave us permission to do so and frankly; that was our only option due to where the aircraft was stopped on the taxiway.We then returned to [the FBO] and parked. [The] incident was written in [the] logbook with my initial impression on what happed; the caution messages we received and that I thought airspeed was good on my side only and altitude was good on the FO side only. Airplane was chocked and secured; no door seals were on the aircraft. We shut down; secured the airplane; and then did the supplementary procedure for powering the aircraft down. We then exited the aircraft and closed the door. We called for the FBO to remove the stairs from the airplane for security purposes. The stairs were then pulled back from the aircraft and we exited the Ramp into the FBO. [The] Chief Pilot; DOO; Dispatch and Maintenance Control [were] all notified via my personal phone. The earlier situation I referenced was a runway change at clearance for pushback. Since we had not started the engines or changed configuration; I had the FO change our assigned runway and then consulted the TLR (Thrust Lever Resolver) for new numbers. I showed the FO the TLR data and he verified correct data for runway change. I then read him the new data to input since we were pushing back. What I did not realize is that RTO1 had not been selected at that time; but all other number were entered. At some point during the takeoff; prior to 60 kt.; thrust was set; I noticed we had TO (Takeoff) selected instead of RTO1 based on the N1 setting. When I referenced our airspeed at this realization; we had already exceeded 80 kt. I think I made the 80 kt. call at 82 kt. I determined the safest outcome was to continue the takeoff based on our rejected takeoff parameters. I had in the back of my mind a 5 kt. difference in V1 between RTO1 and TO as I had looked earlier due to the weather in ZZZ1 at the time. This situation has led me to realize it is most likely a better habit to have the FO read off the TLR data and I enter the numbers myself in the FMC. This was something I just didn't catch as I was starting to get tired from sitting there for an extended time.[The cause was] airspeed and altitude [being] unreliable due to an unknown problem. After reflecting on what occurred; I believe none of the altitude or airspeed information on my FO's outboard display unit was correct. I erroneously believed that ATC's readout of our altitude confirmed my FO's altimeter was correct without realizing his entire system had likely failed; providing erroneous information to ATC. The weather from the hurricane was certainly a contributing factor as my main concern was getting the airplane on the ground safely and landing in VFR conditions.

Unreliable airspeed was the first issue. While flying level at FL310 it was my leg; and autopilot B was engaged. Suddenly; my altimeter shot up to FL317 and the autopilot initiated a descent. The Captain immediately took controls and disconnected the autopilot. As we were cross-checking and trying to gain an understanding of the state of the airplane; ATC queried our altitude because they showed us at FL317 instead of 310. Cross-checking revealed that the FO (First Officer) side was indeed showing FL317 while the CA (Captain) side showed FL310. Simultaneously; the FO-side airspeed showed an enormous slowing trend. Lastly; IAS and ALT disagree messages popped up on both the FO- and CA-sides.The Captain declared a pan pan pan at first then a bit later; [priority handling was requested]; but ATC apparently missed the call as he [requested priority handling] for us at a later time. The [priority handling] was reported [due to] unreliable airspeed and altimeter disagreement. I ran the checklist for IAS DISAGREE; which referred me to the UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED Checklist. In communicating with ATC; we determined that the standby and CA-side altitude did not agree with ATC; and the CA-side airspeed made the most sense when compared to the ATC reports. The difference was about 80 kt. between CA- and FO-side IAS. Also; the displayed GS was always within about 10 kt. of ATC's speed reports. At this point; the Captain was flying with reference to his airspeed and the FO's altitude.The Captain initially asked for a return to ZZZ1 and a block of altitude as he struggled fly with reference to both sides. Because there was still about a 700 ft. discrepancy between FO- and CA-side altimeters; it was decided to pick a field that had VFR landing conditions. The nearest such airfield was ZZZ2. As I continued with the checklist; we selected 'all on 1' on the ALT SOURCE switch. At that time; the 'disagree' messages went away; and the airspeed matched; but altimeters still did not agree. Upon reflection; I realize that the Captain had transitioned to the local altimeter setting below 18000; but I was still in the standard 29.92. Once I updated my altimeter setting; both altimeters matched. Now the only error message was 'source 2' because we had de-selected it. The checklist also directed to disable transponder altitude reporting. It occurred to us later that the transponder may have been providing ATC an erroneous altitude because it was coupled to the FO-side. At some point; unclear exactly when; we noticed the EEC switches were both showing ALTN with the corresponding ENG master caution. Once the UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED checklist was completed; we spent the rest of the flight trying to contact Dispatch about our [situation] and diversion; but at this point; we were unsuccessful as we were probably too low to communicate over ARINC frequencies. We were also busy setting up the approach into ZZZ2. We landed without incident.The second issue was departure with wrong takeoff thrust programmed. When we were finally ready to push and start engines; Ground Metering advised us on an updated ATIS and were told to expect Runway XXR departure. I reloaded the SID in the FMS with the updated runway and got a message that V speeds were erased. I went to the page to re-load the V speeds while the Captain referenced the TLR (Thrust Lever Resolver) for the new speeds for the new runway. As he referenced the TLR; he read aloud that we still had an R-TO-1 takeoff; same flaps; same weight; same N1 values; and same CG. He then read me the new V speeds which I loaded in the FMS. Since the engines hadn't started yet; we considered these items as part of the preflight brief and declined to do a runway change checklist. At some point; the Captain noticed that we were at full TO (Takeoff) thrust instead of R-TO-1 thrust. My low time on the aircraft prevented me from having the experience necessary to know that changing the runway not only deleted the V speeds; but also deleted the takeoff thrust settings. I should have verified all of the information was still correct as the Captain read it out.The cause of TO data error was task saturation. Weather conditions at ZZZ1: IFR / rain / 500 ft. CIG / winds gusting around 15 from the east. Outside factors [include] delay to cargo loading. Pushed an hour late. Updated ATIS 3 times while waiting to depart. All 3 said departing on Runway XY. Realizing the transponder was transmitting erroneous altitude information earlier would have greatly simplified matters. All performance data should have been reviewed in the FMC for the runway change.

B737-800 flight crew reported an uneventful diversion due to unreliable airspeed and altitude indications during cruise.

1183841

201406

0601-1200

BJC.Airport

CO

7200.0

CAVU

Daylight

CLR

Tower BJC

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

VOR / VORTAC BJC

Cruise

Class E ZDV

Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 735; Flight Crew Type 450

1183841

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 30

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

During a training flight for the purpose of NAVAID training; my post solo private pilot student; myself; a CFI; and a backseat observing Private Pilot License student were east of LMO at 7;100 feet. I had made two position reports on CTAF when the student pilot noticed a Canadian registered Mooney immediately ahead and to our left. I prompted the student to make an easterly descending turn as the plane overflew us by less than one wingspan width; and with our wingtips overlapping at approximately five knots over our airspeed (which is significantly slower than a Mooney's normal cruising speed.) Mid air impact was never imminent; but it was truly a 'near miss.' It was never apparent the [pilot of the] other aircraft saw our C172. The Mooney continued northbound.

A C172 with an instructor; student and a back seat student observer aboard suffered an NMAC with a Mooney traveling in the same general direction but closing slightly right to left as it passed over them and continued on its way.

1572597

201808

1201-1800

MIA.TRACON

FL

5000.0

TRACON MIA

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class C FLL

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

VFR

Climb

Facility MIA.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1572597

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Airspace Structure; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

Working the FLL Final; Aircraft X was at 5;000 feet tracking inbound the ILS for [Runway] 10R. A VFR target was observed coming off of the OPF/HWO area VFR climbing to the northwest; through both FLL finals. Aircraft X was issued the traffic and could not descend on the approach because the VFR was climbing unrestricted and uncontrolled. Aircraft X was then very high and unstable on the approach; creating an unsafe situation.FLL airport is the 19th busiest airport in the USA; and one of the top 3 fastest growing; averaging 8% growth each of the last 5 years. FLL has a basic Class C airspace surrounding it that is beyond out of date and unable to aid in the safety of its aircraft on the finals. Planes inbound to each of their parallel runways are not offered any sort of protection until within 5 miles of the field. [This] allows several dozen VFRs each day to climb; descend; and transition across each final; without ATC advisories creating a very dangerous; unsafe; and hazardous situation in the skies above. The FLL Class C is inadequate; and out of date; and needs a major airspace change around it; whether a bigger Charlie; or a full blown Class B before it's too late.

MIA TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict with an IFR arrival to FLL and a VFR aircraft.

1039017

201209

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

4000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

1039017

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Commercial

Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1038807.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

On takeoff; the First Officer called for gear up and I selected the gear handle to the up position. 6-10 seconds later; we received a Gear Disagree master warning with the other associated indications. We declared an emergency with Tower and switched over to Departure who gave us a level off altitude of 3;000 when we were already at 3;200 FT. We started to return to 3;000 when he cleared us up to 5;000. At 4;000; Departure told us to maintain 4;000 and the First Officer had to hit the ALT button; but captured the altitude. After running the QRH checklist; we received three green gear down indications and received vectors back towards the airport. I contacted Dispatch via ACARS; talked to the Flight Attendant and made a PA informing the passengers of our return. We made a normal approach and landing back at the airport. The aircraft's landing gear failed to fully retract resulting in the Gear Disagree warning and the resulting need to return to our departure airport. Also; we received several altitude assignments very close to the altitude we were already at.This is the second Gear Disagree failure I have had in less than a week. Both times I was asked by Maintenance if I cycled the gear at all before completing the QRH. I don't know if cycling the gear would have corrected the problem and while there is a step for cycling the gear if the Gear Disagree occurs with the handle in the down position; there is no such step in the QRH procedure for the Gear Disagree with the handle up. If cycling the gear could possibly correct the malfunction; then that step needs to be added to the QRH as our training clearly tells us to follow the QRH and not add our own procedures.

The threats experienced this afternoon were the combination of running an emergency procedure while being given instructions from ATC that required immediate action or immediate corrections.

A CRJ200's GEAR DISAGREE alerted after takeoff; so the Gear Disagree Checklist was completed; an emergency declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.

1213262

201410

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

MD-88

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Y

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation

Powerplant Fuel System

Pratt-Whitney

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician; Lead Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Lead Technician 11; Maintenance Technician 16

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1213262

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Technician 29

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1213810.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

While working with contract maintenance in ZZZ on a MEL deferral of the right engine fuel heat valve. All MEL procedures were complied with except for wiring the position indicator into place to secure the valve. On climb out; crew had high fuel and oil temperature. Crew was unable to control oil temperature and shut the right engine down. Aircraft off landed in ZZZ1. Landing was uneventful.

October 2014. I was called by Air Carrier X for contract maintenance on field at ZZZ. Discrepancy was listed as Right-Hand (R/H) fuel heat valve light stays illuminated. I spoke with Air Carrier X Maintenance Control Operations and was instructed to open the front lower cowling. Upon opening I could hear the fuel heat valve motor running continuously. I pulled the breakers for the motor and indicator. The motor stopped running and the indicator light went out. I positioned the valve to the closed position; all under specific instruction by the Maintenance Controller for Air Carrier X. I specifically asked if there were any further 'M' procedures for mel compliance and was told there were not. Apparently both the controller and myself missed the step of safety wiring or manually fixing the valve to the closed position. I closed the cowling; collared the effected Circuit Breakers (C/Bs) and filled out the log book and mel placard; again under direct instruction of Air Carrier X Maintenance Controller. The aircraft was dispatched and developed oil overheat problems as the fuel/oil heat valve vibrated to the open position. The aircraft diverted to ZZZ1 and landed safely. There was no damage to the aircraft or engine. There were no injuries.

Two Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) were informed that an MD-88 aircraft they had just performed an 'M' procedure for an MEL deferral of the Right Engine Fuel/Oil Heat Valve; had developed uncontrollable high fuel and oil temperatures on climbout; requiring an inflight engine shutdown. Valve had been physically positioned to the 'closed' position; but not safety wired and vibrated to the 'open' position after engine start-up.

1180720

201406

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Oxygen System/General

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Situational Awareness

1180720

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant

Taxi

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Company Policy; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Ambiguous

This is in relation to a crew bulletin. During taxi-out I realized both aft galley supplemental O2 drop mask doors were sealed shut with security tape. Having experience with this known safety issue I immediately contacted the Flight Attendant and Captain. We all three agreed I (Flight Attendant C) would simply break the security tape freeing both O2 door compartments so they would deploy if needed. Although I received full permission from the crew; this action is technically a maintenance procedure hence this report. Not having a procedure to verify active O2 compartments are in working order. Because we do not check this during preflight if there is something wrong it is either not discovered or found after we have departed the gate. I suggest we ensure Maintenance is NOT sealing these doors shut. Also; add a visual inspection of active O2 masks compartments to the list of flight attendant preflight checks. This would be a cross-check of Maintenance and would catch the issue before departure.

A B737 Flight Attendant discovered an aft galley supplemental oxygen mask panel locked with security tape during taxi and with the Captain's permission cut the tape before takeoff. No preflight procedure in place to check oxygen panel conditions.

1357272

201605

1801-2400

MMFR.ARTCC

FO

18000.0

IMC

Turbulence; Thunderstorm; Rain; Hail

Night

Center MMFR

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1357272

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1357275.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

Weather

Normal preflight was completed as well as a thorough brief of the departure; EO (Engine Out) SID; and threats for the departure. The main one being the high terrain in all quadrants. The Captain did an outstanding job of setting up and briefing all the appropriate items for the departure and known threats.Normal taxi and takeoff was made on runway 15. We performed an NADP (Noise Abatement Departure Procedure) departure as a precaution and to mitigate the high terrain and performance. As the airport briefing states; a min radius departure was performed and strict adherence to the assigned departure procedure. Because of airspace speed restrictions; and min radius turn requirements we remained configured with SLATS extended and a lower than normal speed.The departure is a quick 180 degree turn to the north. Once we were rolling out on the northwesterly heading; we were confronted with the radar indicating heavy precip directly off our nose and 5 miles or less. This was completely unanticipated. The cell indicated mostly red and took up the entire field of view at the 5 mile range. There was some scalloping and a possible area of less intensity to our right (Northeast). We request and received clearance to deviate and the Captain deviated to the area that looked less intense.Simultaneously; I selected INDENT/GCS (ground clutter suppression) on the radar and verified its tilt to about 5 deg up. I did this to try and isolate the weather from the high terrain. There was very little change; so we knew that this was true weather returns. Being constrained by the terrain; which up until this very instant was the highest threat that we were expecting. We were still in the climb at 250 kts (still less than 10;000 AGL) at around 16;000 ft. Almost right away we entered very heavy precip and what was thought to be an area of less intensity; changed to purple on the radar.The Captain turned back to the left to avoid the purple return; where we encountered extreme precip. This lasted less than 20-30 seconds at the most. Then the precip lessened considerably and in a few more seconds we popped out to nearly clear skies. At some point during this event we leveled at our assigned altitude of 18;000 ft; still maintaining 250 kts; with the landing lights extended (still below 10;000 AGL). We received a climb to I believe FL230 and at 18;500 ft; the landing lights were retracted and the rest of the flight was uneventful.When blocking in; I exited the airplane and the local maintenance person asked what had happened to the landing lights. That's when I saw that the landing lights were broken out. I immediately notified the Captain that we had some damage from what was probably hail. Since we did not have cell phone coverage and SAT phone is not installed we had to get back to the office to call the duty officer; while the maintenance personnel assessed the aircraft and changed the landing lights. The maintenance person's initial impression was that the damage was fairly minor and we would most likely continue the flight after they fixed the lights; called [maintenance control] and cleared the aircraft. So we went back to the aircraft and began a normal preflight and prep to continue. At some point the MX personnel told us that the pictures had been sent to [maintenance control] and that we were waiting to hear back from them.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew encountered unknown severe weather shortly after takeoff from MMTO resulting in possible hail damage.

1331081

201506

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1331081

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Human Factors

During my preflight I noticed that the longitudinal trim pointer tip was missing. The longitudinal and aileron trim pointer tips on the MD-80 are tritium-gas filled capsules. Tritium is a radioactive gas that emits electrons while it decays. Those electrons then excite the gas-filled capsule so that it glows as a self-powered gas even in the absence of any direct light source. It is designed that way so that the pilots would be able to trim the airplane in the event of a complete power failure in darkness. Well; the longitudinal trim pointer was missing and Maintenance (MX) signed off the logbook saying that according to McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin DC-9-27-311 the pointer tip was not required anymore. I accepted the airplane; however; having gotten bogus sign-offs before I promised myself to obtain that bulletin and see for myself. I did and unfortunately that service bulletin deals with modifications to the internal jack-screw mechanism there is not one word in the whole bulletin that would give anyone rise to believe that the pointer tips can be missing. I checked the maintenance manual. It actually says that if the pointers are damaged or broken then everybody would have to leave the cockpit as tritium gas is radioactive/toxic and hazmat procedures have to be followed.How do I know that the missing tip is not somewhere lying broken inside the center pedestal? The bulletin gives no relief to fly with missing pointer tips. Why did MX sign off the logbook with a reference that does not address the discrepancy? How are pilots supposed to safeguard against bogus sign-offs if we do not have access to the documentation that is being referenced? The pointer tips are not mentioned in our MEL book? Can I now assume that either they are installed or if missing the airplane is not airworthy? MX needs to be held accountable for their actions. Bogus sign-offs just to get the airplane off the gate is a no-no. I am extremely disappointed that this happened again.

MD-83 Captain reported a missing longitudinal trip pointer tip. The trim pointer tips are tritium-gas filled capsules. Reporter stated tritium gas is radioactive/toxic and hazmat procedures have to be followed if they are damaged.

1072523

201303

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3.0

2500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Initial Climb

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 1175; Flight Crew Type 250

1072523

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

On a northerly heading on the east side of a Class D airspace; I called the Tower requesting to transition the Class D airspace; the Tower then informed me of a Cessna 172 that had just departed [the airport] on an IFR flight plan. I was asked; and did; IDENT on 1200. And at that time; I did not have the aircraft in sight. The Tower instructed me to perform a right 360 degree turn to increase separation; which I did. Upon rolling out wings level; I then saw the 172 climbing at my 11:00; heading east; and I informed the Tower of this. To improve our separation; I descended a couple hundred feet and the C172 passed directly over me by; I estimate; 300 FT to 500 FT. At NO time did I feel in danger; because I clearly saw the other aircraft and was easily able to provide VFR separation; but I assume the TRACON facility; controlling the C172's departure; was concerned. I called the Tower and said 'I bet that looks real 'good' on the TRACON's radar screen'; and the Tower operator; with some exasperation; agreed. In hindsight; it would have been better had I been instructed to initially perform an immediate left turn; which would have put me well South of the climbing/departing aircraft. To repeat; I was never concerned about the incident or felt either aircraft was in jeopardy; but in hindsight; I believe an immediate LEFT turn; rather than the right 360; would have been a better solution.

The pilot of an experimental aircraft was operating in the vicinity of Class D airspace. When he contacted the Tower Controller to request transition through the airspace; he was advised of an IFR departure from that airport. When he could not acquire the aircraft visually; the Tower suggested a 360 degree turn for separation. When he completed that orbit; he observed the traffic; and descended. He estimated that the aircraft passed over him within 300-500 FT.

1711530

201912

0001-0600

CMH.Airport

OH

0.0

Daylight

Citation Latitude (C680A)

2.0

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Testing

APU Electrical

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

1711530

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Logbook Entry; Procedure

Procedure

While outside running the aircraft two APU starter generator wires were found to be disconnected. The wires that were disconnected were taped separately to the two larger terminal wires and labeled. After bringing the aircraft back into the hangar I connected the two disconnected terminal wires as they were labeled and taped and torqued them per the AMM.I found out when I returned to work that evening the wires were marked incorrectly so I had installed them incorrectly. We would normally install the wires how they are marked. As far as I was aware the operations check was written up separately.

Technician reported that APU generator wires were mismarked; resulting in incorrect installation.

1823704

202107

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

8000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

TRACON ZZZ

Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 7/8

1.0

IFR

Climb

None

Class E ZZZ

Government

Approach; Instructor; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

1823704

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was watching a trainee in Sector X. He was having issues giving a pop up IFR clearance to an aircraft. As he was trying to figure it out I saw Aircraft Y to the south west of the airport at 075 and Aircraft X was headed south bound climbing to 080. I initially thought it would not have been a factor; however; I then heard the trainee give the IFR clearance the wrong altitude and issued a climb into another sectors airspace; IFR. I went and corrected it to avoid a potential airspace violation or worse. As soon as I fixed that situation I saw that Aircraft Y had climbed to 080 and was headed right at Aircraft X. The trainee issued traffic to Aircraft Y and Aircraft Y said he the airbus (Aircraft X) in sight. Aircraft X then said that he was responding to an RA. The trainee then told Aircraft Y to descend for traffic. I keyed up and told Aircraft X to report complete with RA and that the traffic had Aircraft X in sight. Aircraft X said he was going to file a near midair.Aircraft Y should have been capped at a VFR altitude and coordination should have been made to keep Aircraft X climbing. Trainees should be competent at issuing an IFR clearance prior to a control position.

TRACON Controller reported an IFR pop up aircraft was given an IFR altitude resulting in an airborne conflict with an IFR departure.

1576964

201809

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1576964

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Environment - Non Weather Related

We had finished our push off of [the] gate and had been cleared to taxi. As we began our taxi [another aircraft] pushed off [a nearby] gate and overlapped our wing tip clearance requiring us to stop. Had we not stopped the two aircraft would have collided. Contacted [Airport Operations] after departure; advised we had a near miss and requested that they save the ramp video. After [the other aircraft] pushed onto [the] taxiway we proceeded without further incident.

B737-800 pilot reported that they had to stop the taxi to avoid a collision with another aircraft being pushed back from an adjacent gate.

1210436

201410

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

IMC

Fog; 0.5

Daylight

200

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Final Approach; Initial Approach

Direct; None

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24.7; Flight Crew Total 64.0; Flight Crew Type 64.0

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1210436

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

In-flight

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

I was on a schedule and needed to arrive by a certain time; however the weather was uncooperative. The problem was that I decided to continue VFR flight into LIFR conditions. I had the approach plate ready to go in case if the weather was not MVFR or VFR upon arrival. It was LIFR upon arrival; so I decided to execute the ILS approach procedure for Runway X at ZZZ. The landing was successful. In all honesty; I should not be alive. I am a VFR-only pilot with just 3.4 hours of simulated instrument time. However; I put to use all of my instrument training and flight simulator experience to shoot an ILS approach to minimums. I think it is very important to emphasize to VFR pilots how stupid of a decision it is to continue flight into IMC. Everyone thinks; 'It won't happen to me. I'll never make a decision that imprudent.' No. That is a lie. Everyone will make a mistake. People need to be educated well ahead of time what are the dangers of continued VFR flight into IMC. Additionally; VFR flight training needs to be changed to better suit an emergency in which a VFR pilot might have no choice but to execute an approach and not be afraid to call up ATC and ask for help.

A low time; non-instrument rated pilot survives penetration of IFR conditions and the successful execution of an ILS approach to minimums. He admits the error in his judgment and offers advice to the industry.

1034861

201209

0601-1200

CDC.Airport

UT

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF CDC

FBO

DA40 Diamond Star

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 20

Landing

CTAF CDC

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 520; Flight Crew Type 170

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1034861

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Horizontal 40

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing Roll

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

A student and I flew to Cedar City and were on a practice ILS approach for Runway 20. There was a small airliner a few miles ahead of us and a Bonanza behind us. We were all using Runway 20. We were in radio contact with both of these planes while on approach. As we were descending on the ILS we made radio calls ten; seven and three miles out. The event occurred after we touched down on Runway 20. As we were rolling down the runway; another aircraft landed or was taxiing on Runway 08 and came across our Runway 20. I was able to stop our aircraft once I noticed the other aircraft coming onto Runway 20. The other aircraft also stopped once it saw us. We were both at the intersection of Runways 20-02 and 08-26 and approximately forty feet apart. I waved the other aircraft through the intersection and then followed it to the ramp. Once there I spoke with the pilot and asked if he heard us on final. He said that he heard our 10 mile call but that was all. I asked which frequency he was on; he replied the CTAF 123.0; which we were using as well. I inquired if he and his passengers were okay; and expressed my relief that there was no accident. We then left and flew back to base.

A DA-40 pilot landed on Runway 20 at CDC and found another aircraft rolling out on Runway 08; entering the intersection ahead. The other aircraft was easily avoided and the event was discussed upon arrival at the ramp.

1200495

201408

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

25000.0

Mixed

50

Daylight

3000

Center ZZZ

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Microphone

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 1428; Flight Crew Type 42

Physiological - Other

1200495

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Without intent to violate the airspace rules I entered Class A airspace while on an IFR filed maintenance flight.As filed via internet; departed home base in a Turbine Legend; contacted Approach as I was climbing out and they could not locate my flight plan and passed me to Center. I was unable to reach Center but continued to try as I climbed to FL175 and held for some time while trying to contact Center on various frequencies including Approach. After sometime at FL175; I climbed to FL250 believing I should follow my 'as filed' route and profile. Was finally able to contact Approach and explain my situation. They asked me to take a northerly heading and descend to FL130 then recommended I land; fix the comm and check my Oxygen System as he felt I was exhibiting hypoxia. I realized I was experiencing hypoxia.Factor I consider contributed to this situation:1. Aircraft is relatively new to me.2. New oxygen masks with internal mic.3. Communications equipment problems.4. Inadvertently transposed [digits in] N number on filed flight plan.Factor Notes:1. Only 40 hours in type and performance level.2. May not have properly adjusted the mask to ensure proper O2 was being delivered and a flawed built in mic may have led to some of the comm issues.3. Aircraft is equipped with dated avionics that I plan to replace with an entirely new panel this winter.4. Center did locate the transposed flight plan and linked it to me.

Pilot of a single engine turbine powered aircraft reported climbing into Class A airspace without being able to pick up a filed IFR clearance before hand due to communications problems. Once communication was established the Controller issued a heading and a clearance to 13;000 FT and suggested that the reporter was exhibiting symptoms of hypoxia and should land. The reporter agreed and proceeded to land.

1344994

201604

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

1400.0

IMC

Cloudy; Turbulence

TRACON ZZZ

Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class E ZZZ

Turn/Bank Indicator

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial

1344994

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Weather; Aircraft

Aircraft

My takeoff clearance from the runway was runway heading and to climb and maintain 2;000 feet MSL. I complied with this assignment and soon after takeoff was instructed to contact Departure. After contacting Departure they instructed me to climb and maintain 3;000 feet MSL and to make a right turn heading 150 degrees. During the turn I noticed the turn coordinator was not showing a turn; it was showing wings level and all other instrument indications were normal.After noticing this malfunction of the flight instrument I decided to return to the airport. I made this request with ATC and received radar vectors for the RNAV approach. While receiving vectors I noticed the turn coordinator start to show turns; but was still very 'sluggish' and inaccurate. After shutting the engines down I also noticed that the red 'OFF' flag did not appear in the window of the turn coordinator as it usually does. No circuit breakers were popped.

Cessna pilot reported that shortly after departure the turn and bank indicator malfunctioned. Pilot elected to return to field in IMC conditions.

1715004

202001

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B777-200

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

Y

N

Y

N

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1715004

Aircraft X; Facility ZZZZ.ARTCC

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1714680.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Dispatch

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Human Factors; Logbook Entry

Human Factors

During preflight planning discovered this was the third airplane assigned to the flight. Arrived at the aircraft and discussed two MEL (Minimum Equipment List) items which we reviewed together and called Maintenance out to clarify an item. All four pilots handled and reviewed the logbook during this discussion. We all briefed the ETOPS (Extended Twin Operations) signoff and agreed it was done and in the book. The boarding was slightly delayed so there was no pressure to get things done quickly. After about two hours into cruise Dispatch sent a message asking if the ETOPS signoff was in the logbook. I checked it and found that there was indeed an entry and it was the correct date but saw that the departure station was ZZZZ. This means that the signoff was for the previous leg which was the day before. The day before; in the other hemisphere. We all were looking for an ETOPS date and we all saw what we expected to see. At that point we were not in ETOPS airspace and worked out a routing with Dispatch that avoided ETOPS airspace entirely and secured the clearances with ATC (Air Traffic Control). Shortly after Dispatch told us that the maintenance department wanted us to return the airplane to ZZZ. We asked to divert to minimize the delay to the passengers but were told to return to ZZZ. The return to ZZZ required and overweight landing at 485;000 lbs (max landing weight is 460;000 lbs); so ATC was advised. All checklists were complete and an uneventful landing was made.I think all pilots expected to see an ETOPS signoff dated [the same day] and that is exactly what we saw. We should have reviewed the entry more carefully. There was no reason as we were not rushing to depart; we just missed the fact that the last leg originated in the other hemisphere.I need to inspect the logbook entries more carefully and make sure I know where the previous leg originated; especially when a change of equipment is involved. I never suspected the date line issue would cause such a problem but it happened.

Flight departing ZZZ to ZZZZ. Aircraft changed tail number two times before departure. Logbook was reviewed by Flight Crew and Maintenance was called to the aircraft to clarify an MEL (Minimum Equipment List) item. Flight crew incorrectly verified ETOPS (Extended twin Operations) signoff in the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log). ETOPS was signed off on the correct date; however; the ETOPS was signed off in ZZZZ; not ZZZ.Lack of awareness that is was possible; although unusual; that an ETOPS could be signed off in ZZZZ and need an additional ETOPS sign off to go back to ZZZZ from ZZZ in the same day.I believe that awareness of this unusual event would prevent it from reoccurring.

B777-200 reported returning to departure airport after inadvertently departing without proper ETOPS sign-off in logbook.

1322532

201601

0001-0600

LIH.Airport

HI

0.0

Night

Center ZHN

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class E ZHN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1322532

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

On arrival into LIH the tower was closed. We listened to the ASOS and it reported that the visibility was missing. So we pulled up the weather via ACARS and it too was missing the visibility. I queried the Captain if we need a visibility report to land and he did not know. We were able to visually acquire the airport prior to the Instrument Approach Procedure (IAP) and did not have time to further research the question; so we both concluded that the safest course of action was to land. The next night on departure from LIH the ASOS was still reporting the visibility missing as well as the temperature missing. The Captain called dispatch and got the visibility and temperature. The visibility from the flight deck was unrestricted so we continued and took off. In flight I researched the situation further and believe we were in error in landing the first night and in taking off on the second night. [The Operations Manual] states that at an uncontrolled field an approved weather source is available and operational. [It also] states the required elements for a Surface Weather Report and includes visibility and temperature. [Another reference] gives the only approved weather source for LIH as the ASOS. I take full responsibility for not knowing this beforehand; but researching it took several hours and required me to gather knowledge from several different sources and is not something that could be figured out during the arrival segment of a flight. I believe this scenario should be more clearly spelled out somewhere in the [Operations Manual].

Air Carrier First Officer reported landing and departing LIH without weather information.

1664091

201907

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

No Aircraft

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

1664091

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

The company has accused me; as a union member of not being ethical; I am very concerned with being fined for writing up items in my scope and outside my scope if the situation arises. I am being asked to compromise my principles and not do my job which affects safety of flight and puts my livelihood and the life of innocent people in jeopardy. This is very real and I believe as a conscientious technician I am put in a very unfair position.

Maintenance Technician reports that air carrier is harassing him for writing up discrepancies.

1280187

201507

1801-2400

DCA.Airport

DC

0.0

VMC

Night

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 237; Flight Crew Type 8800

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1280187

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 255; Flight Crew Type 355

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1280513.0

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airport

Airport

Flight X departed XXX approximately 11 minutes late enroute to DCA. We landed approximately eight to ten minutes early on Runway 19. We exited the runway and began our taxi to Gate X. While taxiing to Gate X we called DCA Operations to let them know we were on the ground and to verify the gate; which was confirmed to be Gate X. We taxied into the alley and around to Gate X. There were no personnel to meet the aircraft and I taxied the aircraft onto the J-line and approximately halfway down. I did this because I believed another carrier was waiting on us so that they could push off Gate X. There was an aircraft on Gate X and X. We waited approximately one to two minutes for personnel to meet the aircraft; when one lady exited the Operations room she began to frantically look for wands; she had to go back into the building to get help; she exited the building with another person and they searched for wands and eventually found a pair of wands. They began to marshal the aircraft to the gate; we moved forward and began to taxi to the gate and were directed forward and to my left. We felt the aircraft nudge something and we thought we had run over a chock. The Marshaler continued to ask the aircraft to move forward; but the aircraft wouldn't move. Eventually they discovered that the aircraft's number one engine had struck a belt loader. The parking brake was set; tug hooked up; aircraft pushed back; tug moved and aircraft was towed to the gate. During this time I reminded the Passengers and Crew to remain in their seat with their seat belt on because we were not at the gate; I initially told the Passengers that we had a chock blocking our arrival to the gate because this is what I had thought had happened until I opened my window and looked out to see the tug. All Passengers and Crew exited the aircraft safely and without further incidence.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

The flight crew reported that while being marshaled into the gate area an engine made contact with a stationary belt loader. After the belt loader was removed to a safe position; the aircraft was connected to a tug and pulled forward to the gate. No injuries were reported.

1623189

201902

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Marginal

7

Daylight

2900

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Bonanza 35

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Direct

Normal Brake System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 686; Flight Crew Type 400

1623189

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Other On landing

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

Brakes failed on landing rollout. Brakes went to the floor when depressed. Aircraft rolled off the side of the runway (at runway end) into grassy area. No right rudder authority with brakes; used left rudder to avoid hitting runway end lights. No damage to airplane; or ground equipment.

Bonanza pilot reported brakes failure during landing rollout resulted in a runway excursion.

1288902

201508

1801-2400

2G2.Airport

OH

0.0

VMC

10

Dusk

CLR

CTAF 2G2

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1710; Flight Crew Type 1285

Distraction

1288902

Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

Struck a deer immediately after touching down in wheel landing mode. Deer crossed in front of aircraft from left side while executing a normal landing on runway 32 at Jefferson County Airpark (2G2). I was able to maintain complete control of aircraft during the event. Visible damage caused by strike includes prop; right gear fairings; under belly panels; venture; and transponder antenna. No personal injuries to me or passenger were sustained. There was no time afforded to take evasive action prior to strike without risking a groundloop and risking further damage and/or personal injury. The landing lights were on during the landing and 2 notches of flaps were used which is the normal mode of configuration. A clearing approach to landing was made immediately prior to the landing in question in order to attempt to clear the area of wildlife.

A pilot of a vintage single engine aircraft reported striking a deer during landing rollout. No injuries were reported to either the pilot or his passenger; however the aircraft did sustain visible damage to exterior components.

1222098

201411

0001-0600

PCT.TRACON

VA

TRACON PCT

Military

Military Transport

3.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Vectors

Class B DCA; Special Use P56A; P56B

Facility PCT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Other; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1222098

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Aircraft

Procedure

This is an ongoing situation involving VIP movements from ADW to P56A and P56B as well as movements to ADW. There are no set procedures in place. If the movement takes place during a slow traffic period; it's normally not too much of a problem. On this particular day; Aircraft X was departing ADW to P56B during our most busy 30 minute arrival push with very strong winds. Arrivals were stopped 3 minutes before Aircraft X lifted from ADW. This caused all the arrival controllers to spin numerous aircraft with limited altitudes available.When Aircraft X got near DCA they decided to turn eastbound towards RFK stadium for some unknown reason causing more problems. It's only a matter of time before one of these movements contributes to a major error or worse. The expense to the airlines should also be factored in as well. There are two routes that are normally used. One impacts traffic more than the other. We never know what route they are on and if we ask; we are told as previously coordinated. Nobody at PCT has this information and I'm not sure if the DCA tower has it or not. The route should be declassified for ATC eyes only; five minutes before lift-off. Also Aircraft X never takes the least impacting route; which should be considered if the traffic volume at DCA is high. A study should be done to assess the delays attributed to these movements. Also the addition of other routes should be looked into that may be used to decrease or maybe even eliminate delays at DCA. I've been told this issue has been raised before; but politically motivated entities have deterred improvements on our present way of doing things.

PCT Controller reports of confusion of routes when VIP flights depart the DCA airport.

1760539

202009

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties; Service

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1760539

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

Me and the C Flight Attendant were in the forward cabin just talking when a customer brought to the C Flight Attendant attention that a customer did not have his mask on. I personally did not interact with the customer. The C just turned around and said that he was sleeping and that was that. I made PA during the flight reminding passengers of our mask policy. I would make the PA if passengers were sleeping as a way to not single people out.Talk to all crew members so everyone is together on the mask policy so one person is not more easy going than the other and not making one flight attendant look bad for being scene as 'the mask police'.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with face mask policy.

996103

201202

1201-1800

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

32600.0

IMC

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZDC

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Class A ZDC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

996103

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Weather

When we departed we knew the weather was south of the New York area. Before departure we were told to expect at least 15 miles in-trail spacing. Immediately after departure we were given a series of S turns east and west and restricted to 17;000 FT and 250 KTS for an extended period of time due to weather south. As we were handed off to Washington Center we were given a climb to FL280 and also told to expect moderate chop in the climb. The Captain elected to keep the flight attendants seated. I also began cooling the cabin down. Approaching approximately 80 to 90 miles north of VILLS Intersection we detected a line of weather and knew we would need to deviate. We also were also experiencing continuous light to moderate chop at this time. We elected to go east even though this was the downwind side of the weather due to another area of heavy weather west of VILLS. We were given a climb to FL300 and by this time within 80 miles and were beginning to experience light to moderate turbulence. We were told that it would be a minute before we could turn but the Captain told them we needed an immediate turn do to the turbulence as we started to experience serious disruptions in pitch and roll. We began the turn to the south-east and ATC gave a further climb to FL320. As we were turning we entered an area of moderate to severe turbulence. The autopilot disengaged as it would not hold heading or altitude. I was pilot flying and was totally focused on aircraft pitch; power and keeping the right side up. This period of turbulence lasted 10 to 15 minutes. We experienced serious updrafts and downdrafts and over shot our altitude by approximately 600 FT. We informed ATC that it was impossible to maintain altitude in these conditions and were given further climb to FL340. At no time did we come within 40 miles of the heaviest depiction of weather of the radar. As a note the winds out of the southwest were around 145 KTS. We eventually leveled at ATC assigned FL350 for a period as we did not want to much higher as the ability to hold airspeed was a factor. We also did not want to descend back down to more turbulent air. We were still experiencing moderate turbulence as we were paralleling the track from VILLS to SBY. As we got south of SBY the turbulence abated to continuous light-moderate chop. We then were able to continue out climb to our filed altitude of 380. I would like to commend the Captain on his decisive coordination with ATC to get us away from the weather and helping me by giving continuous inputs on engine performance and backup on airspeed and aircraft performance. Also by seating the flight attendants early and having them stow the carts saved some serious injury. We were somewhat concerned that after we had reported this severe turbulence that ATC was still willing to allow aircraft to deviate into that area of turbulence. As we had no ACARS; we immediately reported this to Dispatch as soon as possible. We also entered this event in the logbook. At no time did we feel that aircraft load limitations were exceeded or structural integrity was compromised. Overall through teamwork and preemptive action we were able to avoid any injuries although we did have some very frightened but appreciative passengers.

A B737-800 encountered severe turbulence at FL350 near SBY.

1133703

201312

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Snow

Poor Lighting; Temperature - Extreme

Night

Air Carrier

Cessna 404 Titan

Part 135

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation; Repair

Pneumatic System

Cessna

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Lead Technician 2

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1133703

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Repairman; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Repairman 3

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Distraction

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1134268.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Pilot reported his left pneumatic pump was inoperative (Inop). Myself and another mechanic went to replace it. Used the Cessna Manual to get the part number and review the maintenance procedure for any special considerations. There was nothing unusual about the procedure. We were being called away to perform other Maintenance and 'tag-teamed' the operation. We had problems seating the nuts. We finally got it installed. The discrepancy was cleared and the plane departed. About 10 minutes out of ZZZ; the aircraft declared an emergency; shut down the Left engine due to low oil pressure; and landed at ZZZ1. Maintenance there found one of the nuts was loose on the pneumatic pump; causing an oil leak. They reseated the pump and the plane was released to service. As I looked back on it; I only remember tightening three of the nuts. I must have [forgotten] to tighten the fourth. It was dark; outside; temperatures were in the low teens and it was snowing. We were called away to help with other Maintenance issues. All these contributed to the incident. Since two of us were working together; we both thought the other tightened the fourth nut.

I was working the night shift on the Ramp at ZZZ. At about XA: 00am; a pilot reported that the pneumatic pump on left engine was inoperative. Another mechanic and I began to change the pump. This is a busy time; so we worked on it together; but got called off this job a couple of times to perform other tasks. We had problems seating the pump. It has four nuts; and they were a problem to get to. We eventually got the pump changed and cleared the discrepancy. The plane left ZZZ. About 20 minutes into its flight; an engine oil problem developed and the pilot had to shut the engine down and divert to ZZZ1. Our Maintenance personnel at ZZZ1 found one loose nut. I thought the other Mechanic X had secured the nuts. Obviously; he had not. There were several contributing factors: It was very cold and dark. We were working outside in the elements. We were interrupted during the repair. You have to be MORE careful when working with a second person! Communication is key.

A Lead Technician and Line Technician are informed that a Cessna C-404 aircraft they had replaced a left pneumatic pump on had declared an emergency; shut down the Left engine due to low oil pressure and diverted. Working outside in snow; cold; dark with very little lighting; heavy workload and lack of communication contributed to one bolt and nut not be properly tightened.

1694597

201909

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1694597

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Airport; Company Policy; Procedure

Company Policy

I had the Pilot not Flying select the Tower frequency which was loaded in the #2 radio; and [to] click the microphone to turn the lights back on. He didn't know how I knew how to do that. In reflection; I thought that perhaps it would be a good training lesson for others that don't have much GA flying experience. I think a distance learning lesson reviewing communication procedures and lighting control at uncontrolled airfields might be beneficial to us all. We don't see it very often and it's something we are seeing more as we expand our services to smaller airports. In the interest of identifying a possible hazard to our SMS system; I just wanted to bring this to light. I know others would benefit from learning from this event. In our case; my prior experience allowed me to anticipate it and have a plan. I hope we can pass this along and prepare others for the same situation or maybe introduce it.

A319 First Officer reported instructing Pilot not Flying on the procedure to activate runway lights.

1764691

202010

0601-1200

ZZZ.Tower

US

2.0

1500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

Personal

Citation I (C500)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Climb

Fuel Storage System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 100

1764691

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

[We] departed with an IFR plan from Runway 18. After liftoff handed off to Departure Control given clearance to heading 060 and climb to 5000 ft. Departure advised that Tower said we were trailing smoke from the right side of the aircraft. Concurrently; we got a fuel low pressure light for the right engine. We requested an immediate return to the tower frequency. [Tower] cleared us to an immediate left downwind Runway 18. Engine indications were normal. [We] executed the landing checklist and configured for possible single engine approach. The landing was uneventful. Upon rollout and abeam parking spot; Ground advised we were trailing fuel. [We] taxied to intersection Delta away from buildings; shutdown and evacuated aircraft. Fuel was beginning to pool under the wing; [so we] disconnected the battery and fire trucks and hazmat were notified. Total flight time was less than 5 minutes with an immediate return to nearest airfield.

CE-500 Captain reported a fuel leak which resulted in a return to departure airport.

1743609

202005

1801-2400

ZFW.ARTCC

TX

302.0

32.0

19000.0

20

Dusk

Center ZFW

Corporate

Gulfstream G280

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class A ZFW

Center ZFW

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Direct

Class A ZFW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 9500; Flight Crew Type 350

1743609

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Environment - Non Weather Related

While descending on the WESAT2 arrival into FTW; we encountered wake turbulence from a Boeing 767 that was approximately 20 miles in front of us and traveling in the same direction. Our aircraft banked to the left approximately 45 degrees and our autopilot disconnected. At this point I took over the controls and righted the aircraft while still fighting more of the turbulence. After a few seconds we were offered an offset from Fort Worth Center of which we accepted and made a right turn to put us more upwind. Soon after we were cleared direct to COWTN near FTW and we exited the event.

G280 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on descent into FTW 20 miles in trail of a B767 that resulted in an uncommanded 45 degree roll to the left.

1045333

201210

1201-1800

ZNY.ARTCC

NY

38000.0

Center ZNY

Corporate

Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Climb

Class A ZNY

Facility ZNY.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1045333

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Due to a hurricane approaching; rides in the local area were bad. An earlier report of severe turbulence at FL320 was reported approximately 45 minutes prior to me assuming the sector; so I made sure I issued advisories to all aircraft. My workload increased due to more time spent on the frequency. I received a call from Sector 10 asking if I noticed the routing on a Challenger. Initially I didn't know who they were talking about. He explained the aircraft was direct a fix I've never heard of. I told him I had no idea what he was talking about. After reviewing the situation I realized that the Challenger had a bad routing that was not corrected by TMU. The aircraft made a right turn much earlier than anticipated and entered Sector 73's airspace without any coordination from me. I do not know if Sector 10 caught the bad routing prior to him entering Sector 73's airspace. For years we have been complaining that TMU does a less than satisfactory job of catching bad routes out of New York Center. A study was done and concluded there was a problem. The report was given to one of the STMC's in TMU. A study was done by TMU and they determined there was such a minuscule number of bad routes no action would be needed.

ZNY Controller described an airspace incursion claiming that the TMU failed to correct a bad routing that led to the event.

1507315

201712

1201-1800

ORD.Airport

IL

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 8507

Confusion; Distraction

1507315

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

While parked at ORD the passengers were disembarking and I was seated in my seat when suddenly the control wheel violently slammed back into me and simultaneous the aircraft started to slide sideways. I immediately placed the electrical hydraulic systems on and within a second the control wheel moved forward; I was able to apply brake pressure to stop the sideways movement of the aircraft. I called ramp control and asked who was behind me. He stated it was a B777. I informed him what happened. I then got up after everything appeared to be stable and went to the main cabin door to make sure everybody was ok. To my surprise; the aircraft moved about 2 feet. There was a 2-foot gap between the jet bridge and the aircraft. We were lucky no passengers fell through as they were getting off. I then went downstairs to make sure there were no injuries on the ground. I talked to the lead ramp person and he said all okay; by then maintenance was there and inspected the aircraft. He stated all was fine.

B737 Captain reported that while deplaning the aircraft at the gate; there was an abrupt aircraft movement. This movement was attributed to a heavy Boeing 777 taxiing behind his aircraft. No injuries were reported.

1825372

202107

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

3000.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

APU Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 108; Flight Crew Total 1451; Flight Crew Type 1451

1825372

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 299

1825390.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

APU fire return to field. Boarding and pre-flight normal. Once the packs were turned on the cabin cooled down easily; but we were not able to get the flight deck under 80 degrees until after engine start. Taxi was also normal; from [the gate] onto Taxiway 1; Taxiway 2; and to RWY XXL. To fly the departure up to and maintain 3;000 ft. Takeoff normal (full thrust takeoff per Maintenance request on maintenance release). On the climb out approaching 3;000 ft; in LNAV; we hit ALT CAP (Altitude Capture); and PNF (myself) rolled the speed to 230 knots. Right at this moment the APU FIRE EICAS message displayed; and the Fire bell alert sounded. Captain took both flight controls and radios; put the auto pilot on and addressed ATC. [Advised ATC] and requested an immediate return to the field for landing. I ran the APU QRC paper checklist. Which reads; Pull the APU Fire handle and rotate to the stop for 1 second. I completed the QRC items; and then turned to the electronic checklist to complete the full APU FIRE checklist. Which stated 'Choose one: APU Fire warning light stays illuminated (which it did); land at nearest suitable airport'. Captain then handed flight controls and radios to me; so that he could consult with the Flight Attendants and the Company. After doing so he took back over the role of PF (Pilot Flying). Captain then made a turn with ATC instruction back toward field for a downwind to RWY XXL. Still level at 3;000 ft. ATC requested where the fire indication was. We set up for an ILS approach; with appropriate frequency and FMS arrival selection for XXL. We were then given a descent to 2;000 ft. by ATC as well as a turn to base leg. Captain began to slow to configure for landing. Using speedbrakes to slow the aircraft. On this turn in the descent with Flaps 1; while retracting speedbrakes; and the MCP (Mode Control Panel) speed in the window set to minimum flaps 1 speed; we had a momentary shaker activation; less than 1 second; and I immediately put out Flaps 5 and we continued to slow and configure from there. We were cleared to maintain 2;000 ft. until established; and cleared for the ILS approach. We continued to add flaps to 15; then 20. Gear down; flaps 25 and 30 without event. Landing data was requested for landing on XXL; overweight 235k lbs; Auto brakes 2 was set for sufficient stopping distance. Also performed a small dip low on GS for touchdown to use full runway length. We touched down with 200 fpm descent. Rolled to Taxiway 3. Exited runway at 60 kts. Continued onto Taxiway 2 to hold short of Taxiway 4. At this time the [it was] assessed that no heat was found in the tail or any other part of the aircraft. The flight attendants also assessed no smoke or heat in the cabin. The decision was then made to taxi to a gate expeditiously to deplane passengers and get maintenance on board. Taxied to the gate; shut down the left engine to allow the jet bridge to be attached to the airplane; then shut down the right engine once ground power was established.

APU Fire Indication after takeoff. Flight was the first segment on day one from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I was the flying pilot for this leg. Loading and boarding were normal with a mostly full flight. The cabin of the aircraft had been cooled nicely; but we were having a bit of a challenge cooling down the flight deck; with temperatures hovering in the high 80's. The ZZZ weather was 340/10; 10SM FEW 040 SCT080 BKN250 28/18 29.86. We pushed off the gate on time. [We taxied] to Runway XXL and contacted Tower. We accomplished the before takeoff checklist items and were cleared to takeoff Runway XXL on the ZZZ Departure. The maintenance release noted that a Max power takeoff was due; so we did so; at a TOG weight of 238;192 lbs and the flaps 5. During takeoff roll as we accelerated; water dripped out of the overhead panels which was interesting; we took off; cleaned up the gear and flaps as scheduled. Somewhere between 2;000 ft and 3;000 ft. in the climb in a left hand turn to heading 290; we had a Master Warning and an EICAS annunciation APU Fire. I continued to fly the aircraft; took the radios; and while the First Officer accomplished the APU Fire QRC. It is important to note that the fire light remained on and did not go out after running the QRC with no other indications of a fire. Also; it is important to note that the APU was shut down on the ground after engine start during the after-start checklist; and had been off for approximately 20 minutes. We ran the appropriate checklists; notified Dispatch and spoke with the flight attendants. The Purser was informed that we had an APU Fire indication and was asked if there were any fire indications in the aft cabin? They said they did not have smoke but noted a slight odor (possibly the fire extinguishing agent that was fired into the APU during the QRC). I told them to prepare the cabin quickly as we would be on the ground in 8 minutes. My FO (First Officer) and I spoke about the overweight landing; briefed the approach; and identified the ILS. We planned a flaps 30 ILS to Runway XXL at a weight of 235;000 lbs. as 235;000 lbs. was below our performance limit weight of 259.9; so a 30-flap landing was appropriate. Fortunately; we discussed the possibility of an overweight landing prior to takeoff; so we were already familiar with the requirements. Although we suspected an erroneous APU Fire warning; time was still a driving factor as the fire indication never went away. We maintained 250 kts for as long as possible then configured using flaps and speed brakes to slow the aircraft. We were configured with flaps 1 and were decelerating with the flaps tracking to 5 and the speed brakes out. We decelerated to flaps 5 maneuvering speed; and just as I started to retract the speed brakes for literally a split-second I heard a sound that was so brief I could not tell what it was. The FO told me that it was a split second of the shaker due to the boards being out at the flaps 5 maneuvering speed. We continued configuring with gear and flaps 30; accomplished the landing checklist. We flew the ILS to Runway XXL with the autopilot and auto throttles engaged until 500 ft when I disconnected the autopilot. I disengaged the auto throttles around 100 ft. I briefed that I would slightly duck under the glideslope with a planned touched down early in the landing zone.We touched down approximately 1;200 ft. down the runway with auto brakes 2 selected. The touchdown was extremely smooth with a VVI (Vertical Velocity Indicator) of less than 200 fpm. During the landing roll; we queried the Tower to see if they could see any smoke trailing the aircraft; and they said all looked normal. We rolled clear of the runway on Taxiway 3 and stopped on Taxiway 4 where the ground personnel looked us over. The ground personnel informed us that they could see no indications of a fire and that their thermal imaging scan showed no heat in the APU area. We ran through our after-landing flows and taxied to the gate. We shut downthe left engine so they could start deplaning the passengers. When ground power became available we secured the right engine and secured the aircraft. I proceeded into the cabin to chat with maintenance; passengers etc. Maintenance opened the APU area and said that they suspected a faulty fire loop; as there was no evidence of a fire. Maintenance later found that a faulty APU fire control panel was the cause of the warning. Also; the total flight time from wheels up to wheels down was 11 minutes. That is extremely fast when considering all the factors to evaluate. All in all; I feel that this was a well-executed event; and resulted in the safe return for passengers and crew.

B757 flight crew reported an APU fire warning after takeoff and returned to the departure airport.