elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1836764

202108

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

Parked

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Lead Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Ground Personnel

1836764

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

On [date] technicians painted Aircraft X right and left elevator top surface with a spray paint gun in an improperly ventilated area. The fumes were very strong and concentrated causing me to experience a headache and throat irritation. Aircraft paints can be cancer causing when inhaled; according to OSHA and the company's respirator training exposure and inhaling some of these toxic fumes may compromise our health. I approached the techs and told them to stop spraying and to open the hangar doors; they informed me that they had been authorized by Management. They also said that they were told to paint it during lunch. Nonetheless; management authorization or painting during lunch; does not reduce exposure to cancer causing fumes; specially in a non ventilated area. I spoke to the supervisor of line 3; and he said they had been authorized to do so by our local 'safety manager'. I then went to the shift manager and he said he would 'look into it'; in the meantime the fumes continued to accumulate in the hangar so that there was a mist in the bay where they were painting and beyond. After about an hour; they stopped spraying and opened the hangar doors. Incidents like this are not isolated. I've brought up to Management the dangers of buffing on fiberglass panels; cutting honeycomb; grinding on aluminum on the open hangar floor. It seems to me that our local Safety Manager does not care to emphasize the importance of following proper safety and health procedures.

Air Carrier maintenance technician reported a fume event in an improperly ventilated maintenance hanger during aircraft spray painting. Hanger doors were opened and painting ceased after notifying supervisor.

1098415

201306

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

40000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 209

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

1098415

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 228; Flight Crew Type 800

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1098396.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

Enroute at FL400. Received Number 1 Bleed Trip Off light approximately 100 NM west of where we had taking off from. Executed QRH procedures (light did not extinguish with trip reset button). We were now single pack operation. Continued to our filed destination with single pack. Pressurization OK. I was thinking about the single pack status and not feeling too comfortable with the fact I was one malfunction away from a possible emergency descent. Also; there would be some icing conditions possibly encountered enroute and I knew we were to 'avoid' icing conditions in that configuration. After about 10 minutes; I wondered if the Number1 Bleed Air would reset so we pressed the trip reset button. The light extinguished and we were two bleed source operation again and then brought the left pack on line again. Now; we had full capability if encountering icing. After another 10 minutes; the Number1 Bleed tripped off again. This time; QRH was used and we did not attempt any further resets. We arrived at our destination single pack with no icing encountered enroute. When we arrived; I explained to Maintenance what had transpired including the attempt to get the Number 1 bleed back on line. He seemed to appreciate that this was a verified more than one time event; asked I write all that in the logbook; which I did; and the aircraft was taken out of service. I wanted to do the right thing by telling Maintenance all my in-flight steps and; in doing so; realized I might be 'putting myself on report' by doing more than the QRH specifically authorized; hence this ASAP report. The QRH could be better amplified to tell us that we should not attempt a second reset of the system after waiting 10 minutes or so if it doesn't want us to do it. It is just too tempting given the situation we are put in with just single pack; long cruising requirements. I don't feel it is specifically (enough) prohibited; but better refinement could be warranted if in fact we should not be doing any extra resetting attempts.

[This Report contains no additional information]

A B737-700 Left Bleed tripped at FL400; but did not reset following the QRH. Ten minutes later a successful reset was accomplished but the bleed tripped again; so the flight continued single pack.

1416887

201701

1801-2400

SJC.Airport

CA

5.0

8000.0

IMC

Cloudy; 2

Night

800

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent; Initial Approach

STAR FRLON2

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1416887

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 8000

1417304.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Human Factors

Heavy weather and thunderstorms moving through the bay area. Winds were gusting on the surface and all Bay area airports were using non-standard runways. OAK closed while we were on arrival and aircraft were holding and diverting. The frequency was very congested. We were a couple of miles north of MNTNA intersection descending via the FRLON2 Arrival. A large cell was just past the MNTNA intersection and we asked Approach if we could maintain present heading for one to two miles for weather and then go direct MISSS. That request was approved. We finished the deviation and reported we were turning direct MISSS.The turn toward MISSS ended up being a fairly hard left turn. The Controller at one point asked if we were turning direct MISSS and we answered affirmative. He then said we weren't headed to MISSS and gave us a heading. The navigational display clearly showed we were headed to MISSS. After established on the heading we realized we hadn't been given an altitude after deviating off the arrival. We were at about 6500 feet with 5500 feet set in the altitude window. We asked what altitude we were cleared to and the Controller said 7000 feet. We said 'roger climbing back to 7000 feet;' and he said just maintain 6000 feet. He then gave us a frequency change and added that we were never headed toward MISSS. With all the frequency congestion and the high workload; we just shrugged; acknowledged the frequency and pressed. We never got an altitude clearance when cleared to deviate off the arrival; but we should have thought to ask.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew; while deviating around weather; was questioned by ATC if they were proceeding to the cleared waypoint. The crew was convinced they were but ATC still questioned their track.

1601488

201812

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

ATR 42

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1601488

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

During climb; had a pitch trim Asymmetry [message]; followed QRH. En-route crew discussed possible issues with control of aircraft with pitch trim being stuck in a nose up trim. [Advised ATC] and landed in ZZZ normal. Notified Maintenance. Possible changes to QRH for Pitch Trim failure should include notes about uncontrollably issues and possible needing to divert to another airport.

ATR-42 Captain reported a pitch trim issue during climb was resolved with QRH procedure; but crew was concerned about further controllability issues.

1609858

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

1609858

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

A 4th gear pin was discovered installed after takeoff in the nose gear. Performed return and landed uneventful. Pin was removed and flight resumed to destination. The aircraft had just returned from several days of maintenance. At some unknown point; someone installed a nose gear pin that had no ribbon or markings. Using standard gear pins with proper markings would have prevented this occurrence.

B737 Captain reported takeoff with an unknown nose gear pin resulted in a return to the departure airport.

1718455

202001

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

30000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR ZZZZZ 1

Class A ZZZ

Speedbrake/Spoiler

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 20100; Flight Crew Type 9085

1718455

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

We were descending on the ZZZZ 1 arrival into ZZZ. As we were descending the First Officer extended the speed brakes to help us get down. Upon retraction to about 50 percent stowed; the aircraft rolled right about 15 degrees. Then the autopilot rolled wings level. Once the speed brake was stowed to 25 percent it rolled again to the right 15 degrees and then it went wings level again. After the speed brakes were fully stowed; the aircraft rolled left 15 degrees and then back to wings level. After that we knew we had a spoiler problem and we decided we would not use the speed brakes for the remainder of the flight. After referencing the QRH and the manuals; we requested priority handling; we notified the flight attendants and we let the passengers know with a PA. We descended uneventfully with priority handling and landed with vehicles standing by. We taxied to the gate. We debriefed with maintenance and the flight operations.

B737 NG Captain reported experiencing several 15 degree rolls to the right due to a possible speedbrake/spoiler malfunction during arrival flight phase. The crew landed uneventfully without the use of speedbrakes.

1281063

201507

0001-0600

HNL.Airport

HI

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

35001

Ground HNL; Tower HNL

Corporate

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 12800; Flight Crew Type 2500

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1281063

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 875

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1281340.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Human Factors

After landing on RWY 8L at HNL we were taxiing to the East Ramp. Tower cleared us to cross RWY 4L and Hold Short of RWY 4R on Delta Taxiway. There are two Hold Short lines on Taxiway Delta between Rwy 4L and 4R which are in close proximity to one another. The two opposing Hold Short lines are different than at most airports with parallel runways adjacent to one another in that the Hold Short line are painted in reverse. At most airports (PDK taxiways between RWY 3L and RWY 3R; MDW taxiways between RWY 4L and RWY 4R; as an example) the aircraft would cross the first runway and proceed across the first painted Hold Short line to stop the aircraft prior to the second painted Hold Short line which is short of the second runway.At HNL on Taxiway Delta between runway 4L and 4R; the intent is for the aircraft stop short of the first painted Hold Short line rather than the second painted Hold Short line. Thus the painted Hold Short lines are reversed or non-standard compared to most airports. It's important to note that stopping short of the first painted Hold Short line in this particular situation leaves the tail of our sized aircraft to overhang the runway (4L in this case) the aircraft was instructed to cross. Having any portion of an aircraft overhanging a runway is not a normal practice given Tower's instructions were to; 'cross runway 4L...' In our confusion with this non-standard set of painted Hold Short lines on Taxiway Delta between Rwy 4L and 4R; we failed to notice the difference and crossed the first painted Hold Short line and held short of RWY 4R at the second painted Hold Short line which required a call to the tower. We contacted the Tower and the Tower stated that this happens a lot at this intersection. Given the Tower's comment it's odd that there are five Hot Spots on this airport; but Taxiway Delta between RWY 4L and RWY 4R is not one of them.Some takeaways to prevent this from occurring again at airport where the painted Hold Short lines are reversed:1) Tower Phraseology - Tower can easily prevent this from occurring again by either waiting to cross the aircraft at a point in time where the aircraft can cross both runways without Holding Short of the second runway or give the following instructions; 'Cross RWY 4L; but Hold Short of the first painted Hold Short lines on Taxiway Delta. Using standard phraseology with non-standard Hold Short markings sets the pilot up for failure unless the pilot is very vigilant.2) Pilots have to be vigilant; identify and confirm the painted Hold Short lines and understand their intent. It's important to note that unless an aircraft departed one of the neighboring Hawaiian Islands; the crew may be on the back side of a long duty day which diminishes a pilot's ability to recognize a non-standard situation similar to this one.As the Tower Controller stated; 'This happens a lot...' and if nothing changes it's probably going to happen again to a good crew that's trying to do the right thing.

[Our aircraft] was cleared to cross 4L at Delta and hold short of 4R at PHNL; aircraft nose crossed the first set of hold short lines which with put it in the runway incursion zone. After researching and talking to PHNL tower; I found this is a known hotspot and has the honor of having the top runway incursion of any airport because of this nonstandard situation. At other airports; an aircraft crosses a runway and the first set of hold short lines which are for the runway being crossed and the 2nd second set of lines are for the runway the aircraft is approaching. This is normal or standard; PHNL is the opposite and cause cockpit confusion. Although this is a known problem at PHNL; there are no hotspot markings for taxiway Delta on the taxi chart and tower / ground control doesn't advised the crews to hold short on the first set of lines when given clearance to cross 4L.Solution would be better markings on taxiways; hotspot notation added to taxi charts; and tower ground advises crews of the problem area when giving clearances the runways.

After landing at HNL a corporate jet crew was cleared to cross Runway 4L on Taxiway D; hold short of Runway 4R. However; confused they crossed the Runway 4R hold short line when the 4R hold line was approached before the opposite direction 4L hold line.

1281001

201507

0601-1200

GUC.Airport

CO

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF GUC

FBO

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

1.0

Part 91

Training

Landing

VHF

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Captain; Instructor

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1281001

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Weather; Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

While training a third party student I was making radio calls on CTAF at GUC. I had previously verified that the radio I was using (Comm 1) was operative. After several approaches (both to missed and to landings); during which I continued to make calls on CTAF; we ended up head to head on the runway with another airplane. Both aircraft were fully stopped while still a great distance from one another (probably more than 1000 feet). I made another call on CTAF and we taxied back to the FBO to find out what happened.We were informed that no one had heard our calls; so I went back out to the airplane in order to check the radios. I could not discern why Comm 1 was inoperative; so I wrote it up first and then called Maintenance. Maintenance Control asked the usual questions; including checking the volume and making sure the radio was on (both these things I had already checked); and then suggested I check the circuit breaker. The breaker was popped so I reset it as per Maintenance Control's directive and I cleared the write up according to the instruction of the Maintenance person I was talking to.Asking for frequent radio checks from the FBO are the only way I can think of to avoid this happening again. It was very hot (over 100 degrees F) in the cabin; despite having the temp control set to full cold. This might have had something to do with the circuit breaker popping.I am certain that for most of that training flight; we were hearing (and were heard on) CTAF. It was just right at the end when something happened.

Instructor pilot; practicing landings with a student and using CTAF procedures; finds himself nose to nose with another aircraft on the takeoff roll. After stopping with room to spare it is discovered that Comm1 had failed due to a tripped circuit breaker.

1091462

201305

1201-1800

SCT.TRACON

CA

10000.0

VMC

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

MD-82

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

TRACON SCT

Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

IFR

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1091462

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

N

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Ambiguous

On an unpressurized ferry flight [to] LAX at a cruise altitude of 10;000 feet; got a TA on an aircraft below us 12 o'clock and climbing. At approximately 4 miles ATC gave us a traffic advisory at the same time we got an RA with a CLIMB command. As we were climbing the First Officer spotted the aircraft coming right at us and said 'TURN LEFT.' I rolled into a 35-40 degree turn as the ATC Controller was advising a right turn which we could not comply with at that point. We observed we were climbing with the other aircraft with a constant 100 feet separation. The First Officer still watching the other aircraft said 'DESCEND - DESCEND.' As I was lowering the nose the other aircraft passed behind us at close range. We climbed to approximately 11;300 feet before descending to 10;000 feet and returning on course. It appears we (both aircraft) were nearing the border between two sectors because we were not on the same frequency. Seconds before our Controller had given us a frequency change; then said to stay with him and then gave us the traffic advisory as we were responding to the RA. It is not apparent to me that the other aircraft maneuvered to avoid us or even saw us. The other aircraft was a Cessna Citation.

An MD82 Captain on an unpressurized ferry flight encountered an opposite direction Citation and responded to TA and RA warnings as well as directives from the First Officer based on visual contact.

1780556

202101

1201-1800

GSP.Tower

SC

1800.0

Tower GSP

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class C GSP

Other unknown

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

VFR

Final Approach

None

Class C GSP

Government

Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 28

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1780556

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure

Aircraft X was on ILS approach to Runway 4 at GSP when a VFR aircraft inbound to GMU went across final under Aircraft X. Traffic was called. GMU [Tower] was called. Aircraft X was below the clouds and stated he would execute missed approach if there was a RA. The pilot seemed to stay above glide slope to avoid the RA. Both aircraft eventually got each other in sight and Aircraft X landed.This is a known safety problem. The closest proximity of 2 aircraft in this situation is zero lateral and less than 100 feet vertical if the GSP arrival is on the glideslope and the VFR is in the GMU Delta airspace. However; it should not be taken for granted that aircraft on instrument and visual approaches will be at or above glideslope altitude. Since the VFR is under the GSP arrival; which is usually a jet; there are also wake turbulence issues.The Charlie and Delta airspace design is flawed. The FAA is either unwilling or unable to redesign the airspace to provide for the safety of the flying public.From my experience; the VFR aircraft involved are always inbound to GMU from SC72 (Chandelle). It is probably less than half a dozen aircraft that occasionally do this. When they depart GMU; they are instructed to fly over VPLOW when GSP Runway 4 is in use. If they were instructed to fly over VPLOW when inbound to GMU; the problem would be resolved. GMU Tower can instruct aircraft to remain outside the Delta and instruct aircraft where to enter the Delta; so there is no reason this solution would not work. It could be agreed to; briefed and implemented in 24 hours.This situation develops quickly and there are no guarantees that the controllers will see it before the RA or collision alert. When it is seen; or when the alarms go off; what does FAA management want the controllers to do? Should we be breaking off the approach as a preventive measure?

GSP Tower Controller reported an airborne conflict over intersection VPLOW. Controller stated this is an ongoing issue between IFR and VFR aircraft near VPLOW intersection.

1483003

201709

0001-0600

BWI.Airport

MD

0.0

Tower BWI

Air Carrier

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

None

Ground BWI

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

IFR

Taxi

None

Facility BWI.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1483003

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working the Local Control position during a west operation. Traffic was very light with only a few departures for Runway 28 and a couple of arrivals for Runway 33L. Ground Control asked to cross Runway 28 at R1 with Aircraft Y behind my aircraft that was on departure roll. I approved Ground Control's request to cross. After my scan to make sure I had the required spacing for my next departure; I issued Aircraft X a departure clearance off of Runway 28. Right after the Aircraft X flight began takeoff roll; Ground Control alerted me of Aircraft Y flight crossing down the field. I immediately canceled Aircraft X takeoff clearance; and advised the aircraft to stop the roll due to traffic crossing midfield. Aircraft X stopped short of Taxiway Delta on Runway 28. The aircraft was then taxied clear of the runway and into a hold area to reconfigure. I did not use a memory aid for the crossing which would have aided in preventing this incident.My recommendation for myself would be to utilize the memory aids regardless of the traffic complexity. This is not a facility issue. Management recently stressed the importance of memory aids in our local read and initial binder.

Baltimore Local Controller reported approving an aircraft to cross a runway after the departing aircraft. Local then cleared an additional aircraft for takeoff before the aircraft had finished crossing downfield.

1335074

201602

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach; Climb

Class B ZZZ

Flap/Slat Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Workload; Troubleshooting

1335074

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft

Departing; we got a Leading Edge Transit light after flap retraction. We ran the QRH; contacted Dispatch; and advised them of the situation. After running the QRH; noting the speed and altitude restrictions; the light extinguished. With the concurrence of Dispatch; we decided we could go normal speed and continue to our destination; since there was no longer an indication of an abnormality. The rest of the cruise portion the flight was uneventful.As we made our initial descent; I began to have audio control panel issues. I was not able to hear the Captain over the intercom; and couldn't hear ATC on Comm 1 either. We turned up the speaker and communicated with each other without the use of intercom for the duration of the flight; although I was able to hear Comm 1 again after passing through about 4;000 feet AGL. However; communication via the intercom wasn't regained until reaching the ground. ATC told us to expect a visual approach. We were cleared for the visual and switched to Tower when they cleared us to switch to another runway and then cleared us to land. We went flaps 30; slowed to target speed (133 knots). At 1;400 feet AGL and 133 knots; we got the stick shaker and Airspeed Low aural warning. We did a go around; and in the process of cleaning up; we got the Leading Edge Transit light once again.On the go-around; the flight director and autopilot weren't available. Eventually on the base to final on our second approach; I regained the flight director; but didn't regain use of the autopilot. We again ran the QRH for Leading Edge Transit light and got vectors. ATC then changed the runway again as we were on base to final. While we were running the QRH; my FMS locked up while attempting to change the runway. Since it was visual; we just decided to acquire the runway visually and back it up quickly with the Localizer frequency. While on final; we configured for flaps 15; landing per the QRH; and discussed the possibility of again getting the stick shaker and that we would maintain target for VREF 15 + 15 (151 knots) until touchdown and continue the approach in the event we get another erroneous stick shaker. At 1;500 feet we again got a momentary stick shaker and continued the approach; as briefed. We also missed the Flap Inhibit switch on the QRH Checklist and got a Too Low Flaps warning. Realizing that this was a result of the Flap Inhibit switch not being switched; the Captain immediately selected Flap Inhibit and we continued the approach and landed. We were met by Maintenance at the gate and put the numerous issues (autopilot; ACP; Leading Edge light; erroneous stick shaker; FMS lock up) in the book.With the benefit of hindsight; there were many additive factors that led this to being a stressful situation. The task loading was significant for both Pilots; and I believe we could have brought ATC into the loop; which would have eased the task loading. The perception that we were being rushed and the communication difficulties led to us missing the Flap Inhibit switch.

Air crew experienced several minor mechanical issues with the biggest being an erroneous stick shaker activation during configuration to landing. Crew overcame the issues and landed normally.

1817205

202106

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

Tecnam P2012 Traveller

1.0

Part 135

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Pitot-Static System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1817205

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Takeoff was normal until rotation. Rotated at 75 knots; but didn't lift off until 100 knots. Verified flaps were at takeoff. Climb-out was at 100 knots. At around 400 feet AGL; started a turn and was scanning the instruments when the stall warning went off. The airspeed had dropped to 77 knots. almost instantly. I performed a stall recovery and proceeded to climb to 3;000 feet MSL. At cruise; I noticed all 3 airspeed indicators were showing different airspeeds and the altimeters were different as well. The true airspeed and ground speed were displaying higher than indicated. I pulled the ALT static air and pilot airspeed dropped about 15 knots; but I could not tell which reading was correct. I informed ZZZ Departure and returned for a visual landing. I verified my altitude with ATC and the pilot altitude was correct but the PFD2 was showing about 200 feet lower. On approach airspeed was showing 120 - 130 knots; but the pitch attitude was too high and the controls were mushy. Post-flight walkaround found pitot and static openings OK; but the static system drain lock open.

P2012 Traveller Captain reported performing an air turnback due to unreliable airspeed and altimeter functions caused by the open static system drain.

1583873

201810

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Taxi

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Air Taxi

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatch 2

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

1583873

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Dispatch

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing

Company Policy

I'm writing to bring attention to fatigue issues with FAR 135 [dispatchers]. I am a Dispatcher. Specifically; since there are no restrictions on the amount of hours a [dispatcher] can work; leadership at my company allows some [Dispatchers] to work extremely abnormal amounts of hours. Specifically; [Dispatchers] are allowed to work a double shift for several consecutive days. 'Double Shifts' are an average of 16 hours long and can go as long as 20; always with no formal breaks. Younger [Dispatchers] are signing up for this many hours for the Overtime Pay. However; this is leading to many mistakes that are relatively minor; for now. Missing radio calls from pilots in the air; not recognizing adverse weather conditions along a flight path until someone alerts the [Dispatchers]. Not recognizing when a pilot is in danger of going over duty and/or flight time limits; etc. Other [Dispatchers] working nearby are assisting in identifying and correcting these mistakes and lack of recognition from fatigued [Dispatchers]; but it is not in the context of a healthy CRM 'checks & balances' relationship nor positive teamwork.Due to staffing shortages; management appears to only be happy that all shifts are covered; and are not concerned about the overall cost and liability to all parties involved; especially our passengers. Certainly training and development can play a role in reducing these common mistakes. One only has to cite any number of fatigue studies done by the FAA to know that fatigue can make any of these small mistakes to become serious mistakes that could have grave consequences. After raising my concerns several times; and not wanting to face potential consequences of using my company's safety reporting system; I feel it prudent to report it here. Fatigue rules exist for Part 121 operations for a reason. Just because Part 135 operations involve fewer passengers; why safety should be allowed to be compromised. Safety systems work best when they are proactive; not when reacting to a worst-case event. I believe safety is being compromised by having zero duty time restrictions for [Dispatchers] at my [company].

Air taxi Dispatcher reported company Part 135 dispatchers are allowed to work very long hours and that fatigue has compromised safety.

1610157

201901

0.0

Air Carrier

No Aircraft

Other General Ramp

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

Other / Unknown

1610157

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel

General None Reported / Taken

Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Human Factors

Equipment / Tooling

There is a green fuel nuzzle connected to the gas fuel hose at the terminal fuel farm. All of the other gas nuzzle are black. The green ones indicates diesel. There are times when employees do not have their fuel farm key fob with them. They would pull to fuel farm and just ask someone to borrow their key fob or sometimes just tell the person to hand over the nuzzle when they are finish fueling their equipment; the green NON-STANDARD nuzzle can lead to serious equipment damage that can become costly to the company. For instance; let's say there is an employee there at the fuel farm utilizing the non-standard green nuzzle that is attached to the gas pump to refuel a gas powered piece of equipment. An unsuspecting fellow co-worker pulls up just when the person was about to finish gassing up his piece of equipment and to use the same fuel pump with the green nuzzle because he/she thinks it is diesel because that is the type of fuel their piece of equipment requires. This is piece of equipment can be an air start mobile cart or even a pushback tractor and on the equipment the cost can be substantial.

Air carrier ramp worker reported the use of a non-standard fueling nozzle could lead to introduction of the incorrect fuel to ground equipment.

1600724

201812

1201-1800

MSY.Airport

LA

400.0

IMC

009

Tower MSY

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B MSY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 10889

Distraction

1600724

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Workload

1600738.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

I was the Pilot Monitoring. During this approach in daylight; Pilot Flying disconnected the autopilot and descended at the final approach fix. The aircraft descended below MDA [Minimum Descent Altitude] (400 feet MSL) and Pilot Monitoring informed of the altitude and Pilot Flying adjusted pitch and power to return to MDA. At the same time; we received an aural 'obstacle' and we were in the clear with the airport in sight and executed a normal landing. Instrument cross-check. As the Pilot Monitoring; paying more attention to the descent to MDA as opposed to cross checking the approach chart too much.

I was Pilot Flying [a] daylight approach. I disconnected autopilot and manually flew approach. We descended below MDA [Minimum Descent Altitude] 400 feet MSL. Pilot Monitoring called below MDA and I corrected back up toward MDA with aural obstacle warning; and seconds later; we broke out in clear for visual landing. I disconnected autopilot because of aircraft wobble on localizer and should have kept autopilot on.

MD-83 flight crew reported descending below the MDA while hand flying an ILS approach to MSY airport.

1329881

201602

1201-1800

ZMA.ARTCC

FL

2000.0

IMC

Daylight

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1329881

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather; Human Factors; Airport

Weather

During a flight from to MYAM (to pick up passengers at MYAM); we were forced to climb in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) without ATC contact.At approximately XA:30 we were flying GPS direct to MYAM and Nassau Approach (121.00) cleared us to descend from 9;000 feet to 2;000 feet. They were experiencing radar shortages at the time and asked us to report 7;000 feet and 6;000 feet which we did. While in the descent I asked Nassau Approach what our missed approach instructions were. Nassau's response was 'cancel IFR on Nassau Radio: 128.00.' I reiterated that I needed instructions if we did not have the airport in sight (MYAM is VFR only and has no approaches) and Nassau Approach came back with the same response: 'cancel on 128.00.' Passing through approximately 3;000 ft and in IMC and rain; I again asked Nassau again what our missed instructions might be if we didn't not see the airport. We got no response. We leveled at 2;000 feet MSL; about the same time we overflew MYAM airport and could not get the field in sight. I decided to remain on my assigned heading and altitude and asked Nassau Approach for missed instructions but heard no response. We continued on our heading (280) and altitude (2;000 feet) for another ten miles (now over open water) making three more attempts to contact Nassau Approach; to which we had no success. I next contacted Nassau Radio on 128.00 and advised them that I did not get the airport in sight and was trying to reach approach. Nassau Radio responded that she understood and wanted to know our intentions. I asked for a turn back to the airport and remain at 2;000 feet as the clouds appeared to be lifting. Nassau Radio responded that heading and altitude where my discretion and keep her advised. We then turned back due East; GPS direct to MYAM making advisory calls on both Nassau Radio and UNICOM. However; 5 miles east of the airport; the ceilings came down and we overflew the airport again in IMC and light rain. Passing the MYAM airport; I called Nassau Radio again and asked them for instructions to climb and for a heading. We received no response. I then called Nassau Approach requesting instructions and also received no response. I tried both frequencies again twice while also making position reports on UNICOM and could hear no response from anyone. We were now over open water and still in IMC conditions; flying East-bound at 2;000 feet; I elected to climb to the last known VFR conditions (7;000 feet) on the eastbound heading and attempt to get back into contact with ATC. In the climb; we made calls to Nassau on 121.00 (the last frequency we had contact with them) at 1;000 foot intervals reading altitude and heading without receiving any response. Finally at 7;000 feet; and now above the overcast layer and in good VMC conditions; Nassau Approach responded to our call; asking if we were looking for an IFR clearance. I responded that I could not get MYAM in sight and needed vectors as I was still IFR. Nassau switched us over to Miami Center without issuing any heading or altitude instructions. Once in contact with Miami Center; we were re-established in radar contact and were given a heading and told to maintain 7;000 feet. The rest of the flight was uneventful. After getting holding instructions over the airport and delaying for about 30 minutes; we made a successful approach resulting in a VFR landing.

Air carrier flight crew experienced IMC conditions at a VFR only airport. ATC coordination was problematical.

1791669

202103

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

11700.0

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

1791669

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

1791670.0

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

During ZZZZZX arrival into ZZZ descended to 12;000 at ZZZZZ. Prematurely started descending to ZZZZZ1 (11;000) before reaching ZZZZZ2. ATC deleted speeds; was a little preoccupied checking speed; making sure I did not have a speed deviation. First flight in almost three months.I need better situational awareness.

ZZZZZX Arrival; After we leveled off at 12;000 feet at ZZZZZ; the FO set next altitude of 11;000 feet for ZZZZZ1 with confirmation. Approach Control notified us of a new ATIS. During our level off at 12;000 feet I copied the new ATIS. I looked up at the PFD and noticed we had vacated 12;000 feet prior to ZZZZZ2; and shortly after crossed ZZZZZ2.[Suggest a] digital ATIS.

Air carrier flight crew reported not making a crossing restriction during arrival.

1782162

202101

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Extra 200/300 Series

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Rudder Pedal

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 980; Flight Crew Type 200

1782162

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors

Suffice it to say that after touching down on a good 3-point landing with full control of the aircraft; on the rollout my left sneaker briefly got stuck on the left rudder pedal and then it started to lose the footing as I did the left-right; left-right continuous tapping that is required to control a tailwheel on the ground. So; with the tapping that is required in a tailwheel; with each tap after getting stuck; the left foot came more and more off the pedal; but I had to keep tapping to control the aircraft. While I slowed the aircraft down a lot; when my foot finally popped off the rudder pedal; the plane did about a ¼ loop to the left and the left landing gear snapped (as it is supposed to do when it receives excess side stress) and the left aileron scraped the runway. There was no real other damage [to the aircraft]; or to the runway; or any other aircraft. There were no injuries at all. As soon as the plane stopped; I turned the master and mags (magnetos) off and rotated the fuel lever into the off position.

Tailwheel pilot reported that during landing rollout their shoe became stuck on the rudder pedal and eventually slipped off resulting in a partial group loop.

1000666

201203

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-100

2.0

Part 121

Takeoff / Launch

Spoiler System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Commercial

1000666

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Aircraft

We taxied into position for takeoff. After advancing the power levers for takeoff the inboard and outboard roll spoiler caution lights illuminated. We advised ATC and taxied off the runway and called Dispatch.

DHC100 First Officer reports inboard and outboard roll spoiler caution lights as the power levers are advanced for takeoff. Flight returns to the gate.

1591440

201811

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1591440

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Procedure

We arrived on time into ZZZ. While being towed into parking; I felt that we were too close to the fence on my side. (Right). I advised the Captain to stop the pull. He immediately told the ground crew to stop the pull. They advised him that they had a wing walker and we were clear. They continued to pull the aircraft. I felt very sure that this was unsafe and for a second time announced; stop the pull; we are not going to clear the fence. The Captain once again stopped the ground crew immediately. This time a large group of people walked to the right side of the airplane and spent several minutes looking at the clearance. I could see that we had almost hit the fence pole; but until seeing the pics that a ground crew took; I didn't realize that we drove over the pole. Missing it by approximately 12 inches. The wing tip was about 2 feet past the pole.ZZZ was not ready for a 777 to arrive. We were pulled into the wrong spot that was designed for a 767. We found out later that our spot was changed due to a 747 coming at the last minute. The ground crew over rode the Captain's authority and assured us that we were clear.Better training for the ground crew involved. That spot is not suitable for a 777. Although I was very assertive; next time I will refuse to allow the airplane to put in jeopardy with me in the seat. I felt as a crew; we handled the situation well; but I also felt that we were not totally in charge of the push crew. Next time I feel I don't have a safe distance; I will contact the Chief Pilot for further guidance.

B777 First Officer reported tow crew pulling aircraft into a gate not approved for B777 aircraft.

1104311

201307

1201-1800

SFO.Airport

CA

VMC

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

1104311

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 21100; Flight Crew Type 9800

Workload; Distraction

1104317.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

In preparation for our flight; I noticed our planned takeoff weight was roughly 164;500 lbs. Knowing that planned weight was near our maximum takeoff weight; I requested performance numbers for Runway 28L and Runway 1R at an assumed weight of 166;000 lbs. The performance numbers came back for Flex takeoff setting of Flaps 1 for 28L and a Flex takeoff setting of Flaps 3 for Runway 1R. The Captain and I discussed the benefits of both runways and the decision was made to disregard the Runway 28L numbers. With that; a Flex takeoff with Flap 3 for 1R was entered into the FMGC. While taxing and knowing we were to fly the Porte departure from the 1's; the Captain asked me to retrieve the performance numbers for Runway 1L. While waiting for the Takeoff data; the Captain and I both shared our skepticism about the aircraft performance abilities for 1L. We were both surprised to see that Flaps 3 performance numbers came up for 1L with the Final Weight data of roughly 164;000 lbs. We were even more surprised to see that TOGA thrust was not necessary. So I proceeded to the box and made the appropriate changes to the runway. Switched from 1R to 1L; entered the V speeds for Flaps 3 at 1L; entered the Flex temperature for 1L and somewhere in there I mistakenly changed the current flap setting of 3 to the erroneous setting of 1. No adjustment to the actual flaps was necessary due to Flaps 3 was planned for Runway 1R. Shortly there after we commenced with the Before Takeoff Checklist. With his hand on the Flap handle Captain questioned the flap setting. I glanced down behind the flap handle where the Takeoff data was located and inadvertently confirmed Flaps 1. I can only assume I failed to look at the appropriate runway data. We proceeded to Line Up and Wait on runway 1L. The Captain transferred the controls over to me. Once cleared for takeoff; I applied the power appropriately considering the weight of the aircraft and the length of the runway. Acceleration felt normal. The 'V1' and 'Rotate' call out came prior to crossing Runway 28L which; on reflection; did stand out as I began a slower than normal rotation. In the Second Segment Climb the aircraft accelerated as well as I expected for a heavy A320. Crossing the acceleration altitude I lowered the nose; saw a positive green trend arrow; brought throttles back to Climb and called for flaps 1. That is the moment I realized I failed to keep situation awareness on the ground and that led to an Undesired Aircraft State. We were very fortunate that we did not experience an engine failure after V1.

Why did we takeoff in an undesired aircraft state? Not because the First Officer made a mistake; but because at no time did I double check the takeoff data for 1L with my own eyes nor did I confirm that the data was properly loaded into the FMC. I had simply watched the data being loaded thinking that I was verifying it at the same time. Complacency on my part certainly played a major role in my actions. In retrospect; I recognize that although virtually every single pilot on the Airbus has many years of experience on it; mistakes will still occur. We need to be cognizant of complacency; remember our SOPs; and be always vigilant in order to back each other up thus ensuring the double checking and crosschecking required for the safe operation of our aircraft.

An A320 departed SFO Runway 1L with Flaps 1; Flex power near maximum gross takeoff weight and they realized after takeoff that the slow climb and acceleration were the result of not having selected Flaps 3.

1170425

201404

1201-1800

ZTL.ARTCC

GA

14000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZTL

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZTL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1170425

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

Aircraft dispatched [from] CLT filed at FL380. Aircraft was step climbed from CLT in 1;000 foot increments since leaving CLT. About halfway through the flight; we were still at approximately 14;000 feet just north of Savannah; Georgia. ATC issued us a heading off course for a climb. I believe they cleared us to FL230 and asked us to expedite our climb. We were already cruising at an ATC assigned speed at the time of 280 knots. I set FL230 in the altitude alert window and pulled 'OPEN CLIMB.' I spun the airspeed down to 250 knots to expedite the climb. At approximately 15;400 feet; ATC asked us to level off at 16;000 feet. I reset the altitude alert window to 16;000 feet; unfortunately the aircraft was now climbing in excess of 3;000 feet per minute. The autopilot captured the altitude (ALT*) at approximately 15;800 feet. The autopilot was unable to level the aircraft at 16;000 feet and the aircraft overshot the altitude. I intervened and attempted to vertical speed the aircraft back to the 16;000 feet altitude. We hit a max altitude overshoot of approximately 16;500 feet. I did not disconnect the autopilot and manually force a level off because the aircraft was halfway through the flight and flight attendants were in the aisles with carts serving the passengers. If I had intervened and manually pushed the aircraft over to maintain the 16;000 feet altitude; it would have imposed serious negative 'G' force on the aircraft and caused serious injury to the crew and passengers. We received no TA alert or RA during the event. It was a late and unexpected level off call from ATC after requesting an expedited climb. The incident appears to be a controller operational error. The Controller may have been frustrated by his inability to get us to our cruise altitude because of the amount of traffic during our flight. I am at a loss as to why he directed us off course for a climb on a heading that apparently put us in conflict with other traffic. After the incident was over; we did notice traffic at 17;000 feet; but was not close enough to cause a 'TA' or 'RA' on TCAS. The new generation of aircraft are designed to be flown on automation and react according to their design specifications which may differ from the expectations of air traffic controllers. I have noticed this many times during descents when asked to expedite descents. Most aircraft are now descending at their optimum descent point which is idle power. There is little or no capability for pilots to expedite when asked to go down and slowdown at the same time. I don't have the answer to this problem other than to say that human error is a fact of life and if we continue trying to jam more work (aircraft or spacing) into an already overcrowded environment which provides little or no room for human error; we will continue to see operational errors increase.

Pilot reports of going above newly assigned altitude because the Controller was late in assigning the new altitude. For safety reasons the pilot didn't want to give the passengers or attendants a G force ride attempting to manually over-ride the aircraft.

1777197

202012

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

10000.0

IMC

Icing; Snow; 4

Daylight

400

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Beech 1900

Part 135

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 500

Confusion; Distraction; Workload

1777197

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Just a little confusion on my part. I was cleared direct to the FAF for the approach. The crossing altitude was high. I was cleared for the approach; being cleared direct to the fix; I was a little confused as to whether I should execute the procedure turn; because of the direction I was coming from. When I went to query the controller to confirm this; he became saturated with radio calls from other aircraft. I began the turn to intercept; got established on the inbound course; began descending to intercept; but was far too high on the glide slope; to safely get stabilized while inside the FAF. The controller gave me the hand off to tower. Knowing I was going to have to execute a steep descent to intercept the glide slope; I made the decision to level off and begin the missed approach. When I contacted tower; I notified them I was going missed; they instructed me to fly the published missed and contact Center. I reestablished contact with center; flew the published missed; and got the plane set-up for my next approach. What I could have done different. Exercised my PIC (Pilot in Command) authority and executed the procedure turn based off the angle I was approaching the final approach course from; and my high crossing altitude and communicate with ATC earlier and more assertively about my concerns. How the system can be improved. Provide clear guidance in the AIM; Instrument Flying Handbook; and Instrument Procedures Hand book; about when to execute a procedure turn when cleared direct a fix. Depending on the angle you are going to intercept the course and where the fix is located on the approach one may or may not necessitate a procedure turn to get established. When cleared to a fix are you technically on a vector because you are going from a point in space direct to a fix? Are you essentially flying a self-assigned heading via GPS to that point? This is a bit of a gray area that could use some clarification. On GPS approaches this is fairly clear; especially on approaches that are constructed within a Terminal Arrival Area (TAA). On GPS approaches without a TAA and non GPS approaches; this can be a little confusing.

BE1900 Captain reported being unsure if they should complete a procedure turn for an approach.

1014699

201205

1801-2400

ORD.Airport

IL

0.0

Tower ORD

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Landing

Tower ORD

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Landing

Facility ORD.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1014699

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Air Carrier X was [on] landing roll. Thought they were going to make turn off onto Runway 22R. Aircraft never turned off the runway. Was distracted by other aircraft checking in. Thought I had enough space for second arrival. When I looked out window saw second arrival touching down. No alarms for runway occupied were sounded. [Need to] verify aircraft makes turn off on runway.

Tower Controller failed to note that a landing aircraft missed the assigned runway turn off; allowing a second aircraft to land without appropriate separation.

1564107

201807

HUF.TRACON

IN

3000.0

Daylight

TRACON HUF

Beechjet 400

2.0

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class E HUF

Facility HUF.TRACON

Government

Instructor; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1564107

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Human Factors

I was training a Developmental on arrival radar. Aircraft X inbound to LWV; a satellite airport just outside of our airspace that we sometimes work approaches into. Aircraft was descended to 030 and they requested direct the final approach fix for the RNAV 9 approach to set up for the visual. Developmental first gave the wrong fix to the wrong approach and cleared the aircraft for the RNAV 18. After pilots second request they were given direct the final approach fix. When the aircraft was observed crossing the fix and turning toward the airport the developmental advised them to report the airport in sight; to which they replied they were established on the approach and would call the airport in sight. I questioned the Developmental on the pilot advising they were established on an approach they were not cleared for. Our radar coverage is not good in that area and we lost the track on the aircraft occasionally; but on the next good hit the aircraft was observed at about 020; when the last assigned altitude was 030. I told the Developmental about the altitude discrepancy and at about that time the aircraft reported the airport in sight and cancelled IFR. There was confusion on both sides with the aircraft proceeding to the final approach fix; advising they were established on an approach they were not cleared for; spotty radar coverage and the Developmental not knowing what to do. Also with it being a high performance aircraft all of this happened pretty quickly and before proper instructions could be given the aircraft cancelled IFR and was switched to advisory as they were within 2-3 miles of the airport. Immediately question the pilot when they advised they were established on the approach.

HUF controller reported a BE40 was issued the wrong approach; sent to the wrong fixes; and descended below the MVA while providing training.

1699531

201911

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

4000.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Cowling/Nacelle Fasteners; Latches

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 363; Flight Crew Type 10500

1699531

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1699986.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We took off out of ZZZ1 and at approximately 4;000 feet and I saw what appeared to be a bird fly past the FO's (First Officer's) windscreen. It was immediately followed by a loud impact noise. The smell of an animal through an engine entered the aircraft. Additionally a change in air noise happened. Almost like a panel was open. A check of the engines indicated that they were both operating normally; and I also checked the pressurization which was also normal. The FO and I quickly agreed that we should level off; which ATC granted. We told them we had hit a bird and would probably be returning to ZZZ1 or maybe ZZZ. At that time the FA (Flight Attendants) called about the smell and that we had hit something on the number two engine. They indicated that there was a hole or dent in the thing that goes around the engine. I asked if everyone was alright and they said 'yes'. I told them I would get back to them with more information. When I returned; the FO indicated that ATC had requested priority handling for us. We then agreed to stay in the area while we got a plan in order. We believed (based on our aircraft being approximately 8000 lbs over max landing weight; and the possibility that there could be some issues with the leading edge devices); we decided ZZZ was where we wanted to go to. I called ZZZ1 Operations and had them have Dispatch call us on frequency. Once on with us; we told him our plan and he agreed and said he would get things coordinated at ZZZ. With the FO flying; I ran the Diversion Checklist; and also got landing information for ZZZ. ATC planned for us to land on Runway XXR. We briefed the approach and talked about it again to make sure we had done everything; and were not missing anything. I also read the overweight landing information from the AOM out loud. When all checklists and notifications were complete (and on the approach) we transferred controls so that I could land the aircraft. After landing; we cleared the runway; shut down the number 2 engine; and had airport rescue inspect the aircraft for any smoke or liquids coming from the aircraft. They said all was normal. We the completed the performance [calculation for] brake cooling and found that no special restrictions were needed and we could cool at the gate. We taxied to the gate and deplaned all the Passengers into the terminal.

On climbout after takeoff from Runway XXC at ZZZ1; we had a bird strike the Number 2 engine. Realizing there was aircraft damage; we ran all appropriate checklists; and diverted to ZZZ; due to the extra runway length and our overweight condition. Upon landing at ZZZ we were inspected by the Fire Department and ran brake cooling data. Both were normal. We then taxied to the gate and shut down the aircraft.

B737-700 flight crew reported a diversion and landing after a bird strike to the right engine.

1678786

201908

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

VMC

Air Taxi

Learjet 60

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class C ZZZ

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 80

1678786

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

Shortly after takeoff; while accelerating through approximately 180 KIAS; the primary electrical stabilizer pitch trim failed to respond to pitch down trim commands. This condition applied to commands from both the Captain's and Copilot's primary pitch trim switches. The decision was made to return to ZZZ. Landing and taxi was made without further incident.

A Learjet 60 Captain reported the trim stabilizer failed to respond after takeoff resulting in a return to departure airport.

1714574

201912

1801-2400

SMF.Airport

CA

0.0

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Hydraulic Lines; Connectors; Fittings

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue

1714574

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

I had a long; challenging day. One contributing factor was a van departure at XA:10 for a XA:50 check in. Typically; the van would depart at XA:30; but they had us go earlier due to shuttle availability. Additionally; this trip and preceding trips had various irregularities such as schedule changes and lengthy mechanical delays. This particular day was quite challenging. Our day was getting close to max FDP prior to the last leg. During my walk-around prior to the last leg; I observed what appeared to be hydraulic fluid near one of the brake calipers. Maintenance notified. The Maintenance Technician pumped the brakes; cleaned the area; and signed the logbook. I did not feel comfortable with this and spoke with the Duty Officer; Maintenance Technician; and Flight Operations Director. I explained that I experienced an identical problem in the past where the test was conducted (seemingly successfully); but on the next flight; brake fluid sprayed out and the caliper had to be replaced. It took a lot of discussion and explanation before I felt safe accepting the aircraft. By that time; I was fatigued from an intense day. I elected to report fatigued. At XL:48; we were provided rest until XX:15.

E175 Captain reported calling in fatigued after a long challenging day involving maintenance delays.

1797758

202103

1801-2400

NCT.TRACON

CA

12.0

5700.0

Night

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Situational Awareness

1797758

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1797763.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

On a visual approach to Runway 16L to the RNO airport we received a EGPWS Pull Up Warning. The warning came as I was telling the First Officer who was the Pilot Flying that he looked low. The First Officer disengaged the autopilot and began an aggressive climb. We rejoined the glidepath and landed. I believe I had expectation bias that he would recognize that we were getting low. The truth is we were momentarily in the red and thanks to the aircraft warning we made a recovery.

During descent into RNO landing [Runway] 16L on downwind; the Controller cleared us for the visual to after another aircraft that was on final. Slightly past abeam that aircraft and at 9;000 ft. MSL; I squared the turn to base and began a descent and then angled the turn to final and select LNAV. We intercepted final and as we rolled out still descending and I noticed; as did the PM; that we were low. As I was arresting the descent and rolling out; an EGPWS took place. We initiated an escape maneuver with an aggressive climb and corrected and climbed up onto the approach path.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving an EGPWS terrain warning on a visual approach to RNO.

1629936

201903

1201-1800

CZYZ.ARTCC

ON

38000.0

VMC

Center CZYZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 117; Flight Crew Type 139

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1629936

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 94; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 11743

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1629915.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Cleveland Center asked if we wanted a fix further down our route. We requested BERYS or RUBYY. Cleveland Center cleared us to BERYS or what we believed was BERYS. We changed frequencies and checked on with Toronto Center. Toronto confirmed we were direct BERYS. Several minutes later he confirmed again direct BERYS and spelled if phonetically this time. He spelled BEERI. We advised we were cleared to what we believed was BERYS. The Controller told us to proceed direct BEERI.

We thought we were cleared direct to BERYS intersection. That's what we read back. Toronto later asked us if we were going direct BERRI. Apparently; that's where we were originally cleared. These two intersections are very close together and it's very hard over a VHF radio to distinguish one from another.

B767 flight crew reported a track heading deviation due to similar sounding fix names BEERI and BERYS.

1038292

201209

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

6000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B727-200

2.0

Part 121

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Lubrication Oil

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1038292

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

On initial climb-out passing approximately 6;000 MSL; oil quantity on Number 1 Engine was decreasing through 2.0 gallons. QRH procedures were followed and an air turn-back ensued. Oil quantity continued to zero gallons; and engine was wind-milled until approximately 6 mile final when oil pressure went below parameters and QRH directed an engine shutdown. Declared emergency and landed uneventfully with one engine out.

B727-200 First Officer stated the aircraft lost oil quantity on number one engine during initial climb and turned back to departure airport. Crew declared an emergency; shut down affected engine and landed uneventfully.

1348729

201604

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

18000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Galley Furnishing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 11221; Flight Crew Type 2095

Situational Awareness

1348729

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 3851; Flight Crew Type 156

1349292.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

On the climb out of ZZZZ the FA's called and said there was a burning smell in the back of the AC. They also reported seeing smoke. The Captain asked the other IRO to go back and assess the situation. Approximately 5 minutes later he calls the flight deck and said there was a burning smell but he suspected it was an oven and was not concerned. The captain asked me to go back and see what I thought. When I got to the back of the jet I could smell a burning smell as well. I did not see any smoke but the FA's said they did and used the [urgent] words with me. They were concerned; did not feel safe and wanted to return. I called the captain on the interphone and told him what I had observed; smelled as well as what the FA's had voiced to me as far as their concern. He said we would troubleshoot and continue on. When I told the FA's this they were not happy and started calling the Captain and again telling him they were concerned; did not feel safe; and wanted to return. He told them the same thing that he told me.When I returned to the flight deck I asked the Captain what he thought about returning to ZZZZ. He told me he could 'find nothing wrong with his airplane.' At this point I was not comfortable continuing on a 13 hour ETOPS flight with an unknown burning smell in the back of the airplane. The decision was then made to contact Maintenance Control and get their opinion on the next course of action. They suspected what we did that it could be a galley oven malfunction but could not be 100% sure that was the problem. They agreed that the safest course of action would be to return. At this point the decision was made to return. Next; we began the diversion process and ran all appropriate checklists and followed all diversion procedures. We were going to land overweight so we had to also jettison approximately 100;000 lbs of fuel. We had a problem with the auto fuel balance system and ran the appropriate checklist for that as well. We ended up making it back safely with no injuries or substantial damage to the airplane. The mechanics suspected it was a heating element malfunction in the aft galley oven but had not concluded that with 100% certainty when we left the airplane and headed back to our hotel.

During this flight I was the flying pilot (FP). During departure for an ETOPS flight; while transitioning from climb to cruise; the cabin called the flight deck to report an electrical issue with an oven in the aft galley. The report from the flight attendant was that when the oven #7 was switched on there was a malfunction; FAIL was on the status message on the face of the oven and there was an 'electrical smell' in the galley. The flight attendant reported seeing a brief moment of smoke. The purser responded to the area and removed power to oven #7 by pulling the CB. There was a brief activation of the smoke warning system with a tone and flashing lights. An IRO was sent by the captain to assist the flight attendants in evaluating the issue. With the full flight crew and purser; a sat phone call was initiated with dispatch and Maintenance Control. All information listed above was discussed. The purser also reported that 5 of the flight attendants did not feel comfortable to continue and felt there was a continued safety issue because of the 'ozone smell' in the galley area. Maintenance Control recommended a return. The captain; using great CRM; listened to everyone's concerns and thoughts; along with dispatch and Maintenance Control made the decision to return. Because the aircraft was overweight for landing; a full jettison was accomplished: for a total of 100;000 pounds jettisoned and the flight returned to the departure airport where a normal approach and landing was accomplished. Fire equipment followed aircraft once on the ground during taxi and reported no abnormalities.

B787 First Officers were informed by the cabin crew that there was smoke and fumes in the aft galley apparently from a failed oven. The oven was switched off and the circuit breaker was pulled; but the flight attendants wanted to return to the departure airport. However; the Captain believed the problem was solved. Maintenance Control was contacted and after some deliberation the flight returned to the departure airport.

1234876

201501

1801-2400

ZDV.ARTCC

CO

11000.0

Night

Center ZDV

Military

Fighter

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Tactical

Cruise

Class E ZDV

Center ZDV

Military

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Tactical

Cruise

Class A ZDV

Facility ZDV.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 19

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1234876

Facility ZDV.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 25

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1234880.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Procedure

I opened/split out Sector 36/68 to help with frequency congestion. Earlier; Aircraft Y was cleared into IR126; but I wasn't made aware of it. I was made aware of Aircraft X and was given the exit time and requested altitude to coordinate with ZLA7. When I called ZLA7 to coordinate Aircraft X's exit time; they alerted me to Aircraft Y and its exit time; and the possible conflict. I had no track or information on my scope or EDST about Aircraft Y and verified they weren't mistaken on the time. I found out subsequently that Aircraft Y was cleared into IR126 a couple of controllers back; and the data block was dropped when ZLA7 did not take the handoff/transfer of the data block. While speaking to ZLA7 I asked of the known or estimated position of Aircraft Y. They didn't know and had to assume it was an overdue aircraft. Shortly thereafter Aircraft Y's beacon showed up in ZLA7's airspace right about the time and place it should've been; which was approximately 25 miles in front of Aircraft X's estimated position. I attempted to contact Aircraft X on all of my available frequencies to no avail. ZLA7 got ahold of Aircraft Y and climbed them above the IR126 altitudes. In the 19 years I've worked this airspace; and the countless times I've worked aircraft into IR126; I've never seen this occur. Turns out it was a possible pilot deviation (and being treated as such) because the scheduling agency made Aircraft X aware of Aircraft Y and the delay necessary to properly separate; only to have Aircraft X apparently circumvent that delay by entering at an alternate entry point further downstream along IR126. With the combining; changing of controllers and then de-combining of 36 (from 12); it might've added to the confusion. While exit time was coordinated; the data block of Aircraft Y's position was dropped; which is not uncommon with this procedure. I would suggest; and have always practiced; that the data block remain; be put in COAST status so it follows along with where the aircraft should be. I've found that even though it's a very long time with no radar; when the aircraft finally appears on radar (usually at the ZLA/ZDV boundary) the COAST track is very close to the actual aircraft. Somehow Aircraft Y's info fell out of the EDST; either by the previous controller or in the opening of sector 36. Had it been there; especially with the exit time in the scratchpad (which is a very common practice) the controller who cleared Aircraft X would've questioned the timing and if MARSA (Military Assumes Responsibility for Separation) was possible. We assume; rightly; that the scheduling authority will not put two aircraft into an IR route in conflict like this; which they did attempt; only to be overridden by the pilots; apparently. While the pilot is not required to monitor our frequency; they usually monitor guard. We used to have the ability to bring up VHF guard from Abajo Peak which has a possibility of reaching aircraft at low level in IR126. That ability to select it from the sector has been taken away; it probably shouldn't have. VHF guard would not have worked with Aircraft X possibly; but it would've with Aircraft Y.

As I was accepting the sector from the controller I was relieving; I was aware of Aircraft Y in IR-126. The relieving controller said he would pass the exit estimate to LA Center before leaving. I tracked the flight after they entered the IR route until the target dropped from radar. I initiated a coast track which worked for a while; but then it started free tracking. I moved the data block close to the ZLA boundary and initiated a handoff; which they ignored. After a while; I dropped the data block and continued working.A while later I received a handoff on Aircraft X from Albuquerque Center going into IR-126A. I cleared the aircraft into IR-126A after receiving the exit estimate and requested altitude upon exit. At that moment my sector was getting split off and I verbally coordinated with the receiving controller the estimates that he would need to pass to LA Center. When he passed the information; LA center asked about Aircraft Y. It is my understanding that the military schedules the entrance and exits of their military aircraft in the IR routes. Since the entrance is in one Center and the exit is in another Center; how would we ever know it the preceding aircraft has exited or not?

ZDV controllers report of an unsafe situation where they uncertain where two aircraft were since one aircraft was in the COAST mode. Controllers could not find the aircraft until it exited restricted airspace.

1661155

201907

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Taxi

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1661155

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel

Other During Gate Arrival

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Aircraft taxied into gate (Marshalled by Employee XX) and Employee XX gave stop signal. Captain stopped aircraft. Employee XY approached nose landing gear to chock. Placed rear tire chock and Captain powered up engine uncommanded. Aircraft moved forward 2-3 feet. Employee XX jumped back from MLG (Main Landing Gear) chocking to avoid injury. Employee XY rolled away from aircraft to avoid injury. Employee XX still held same stop command.Once aircraft stopped for second time; Employee XX and Employee XY approached aircraft to chock after additional all clear given by Employee XX. Employee XY and Employee XX (separately) spoke to flight crew and questioned why move aircraft [the] 2nd time. Captain explained he's been doing this for 26 years and knows what to do. Again I asked why moved when given stop signal.He stated 'I thought he needed me to come forward because he was only holding the x or really v with one hand. It looked like a v to me instead of an x.'I asked him specifically if he was even remotely unclear about the command being given; why presume and just move the aircraft? He said he knew what the command was... He said 'I thought' multiple times. He said he thought that we wanted him to move forward. We don't do 'I thought'. If unclear; do not move the aircraft and wait for a clear concise command. He would neither agree nor disagree. We both maintained respectfulness throughout; but it was obvious to me he felt no fault or misjudgment.

Flight crew ignored ground personnel commands to stop aircraft.

1036994

201209

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 3000

1036994

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 1500

1037004.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After landing taxi in to gate noticed oil pressure gauge right engine read 40 PSI and decreasing; status message; 'engine oil pressure' generator for right engine then shed; 'engine generator' EICAS appeared; 'right engine shutdown' EICAS appeared. With engine fuel control switch was in the run position; positive fuel flow to the engine; approximately 4;000 LBS of fuel in the right main tank. Right engine EGT started to rise from approximately 450C; to 507C and rising when I commanded the fuel control switch right engine to stop. Parked the aircraft; did shutdown checklist; called Maintenance; made appropriate write up. [I] stayed to debrief Maintenance on my observations and actions. On leaving the aircraft I went down to see the right engine and noticed an 8-10 [inch] diameter puddle of fluid on the ramp and what appeared to be oil dripping from the cowling.

Upon taxing into gate after landing; right engine oil pressure and right engine bleed off light came on EICAS. Oil pressure continued to drop but engine did have N1; EGT; N2 and FF positive indications. This continued for about 30 seconds and we shutdown the right engine fuel control switch.

Upon taxi into the gate Air Carrier flight crew note EICAS indications that the right engine is shutting down although the fuel control switch is still on with fuel flow indicated with EGT rising and N2 decreasing. The engine is secured with the fuel control switch and Maintenance is informed.

1057061

201212

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Window Ice/Rain System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1057061

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

As we sat with the parking brake set awaiting our gate; the lower windshield metal heat strip on the Captain's side had a bright spark that sent flames throughout the inside of the laminated glass in the windshield; instantly sending spider cracks throughout the entire windshield. The flames lasted around 1 to 2 seconds before extinguishing on their own. We immediately deselected windshield heat; and I asked our jumpseater to obtain the fire extinguisher and hold it ready. We ultimately agreed that CFR assistance was not necessary; but we placed appropriate frequencies in standby in case we needed to call for immediate assistance. After a brief discussion with Maintenance we agreed the problem was contained and since I was able to see out the windshield to we taxied to the gate without further event.

As they awaited their gate after arrival the flight crew of an ERJ-170 experienced a shorted windshield heat event that blazed momentarily and spider webbed the Captain's windshield.

1205167

201409

1201-1800

DAL.Airport

TX

1.0

500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower DAL

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Direct

Class B DAL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 105; Flight Crew Type 105

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1205167

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

While approaching DAL; I was asked by regional approach which runway I wanted to land on. I requested 13R then believe I corrected and asked for 13L because it was near the FBO. I was told to contact tower and continue my own navigation toward the runway. I contacted tower and was cleared to land even though I was still a little way out. I believe I read back the clearance as 13L. There was one departing aircraft in front of me; but no other aircraft on final. I crossed the final approach path of 13R and turned final onto 13L. At that point the controller realized I was on 13L; gave me a clearance on 13L; which I thought I already had; and I proceeded to land on 13L. After exiting the runway the controller informed me that it didn't create a problem this time because there wasn't traffic; but I had landed on the wrong runway. I apologized; stated I thought I had requested and been cleared for 13L; but volunteered that it must have been my mistake. He was very courteous and I tried to be the same. I certainly didn't want to complicate his job in any way! Because the active runway at my departing airport was runway 35; I anticipated the winds would be similar and I would land on 31R at DAL. That was the approach I visualized; so when I was vectored in for landing on the opposite runway; I think I may have been somewhat disoriented. This may have been a contributing factor in my initial request of 13R; then change to 13L and the ensuing miscommunication between the tower controller and myself. It appeared aircraft were also being vectored in to runway 31. An Airline jet had crossed right in front of me west to east; and then turned for an approach to 31; and I could see it for most of my approach. Regional approach was vectoring me on an easterly heading when I was already east of the airport. These factors contributed to my anticipation of being vectored in for 31R. It wasn't until I was close to the airport that I was told to turn left on a heading that brought me basically on a right downwind to 13R. Had I been vectored West of the airport; I think it would have realized which approach I was being set up on and been less confused by the runway reversal. Not that the approach control did anything wrong; it was just slightly confusing.

A C172 pilot was confused approaching DAL when the landing direction was not as expected. Runway 13R was requested and clearance granted when the pilot actually intended and lined up for 13L. Tower revised clearance to land on Runway 13L on short final.

1269067

201506

0001-0600

ZID.ARTCC

IN

14000.0

Thunderstorm

Center ZID

Air Carrier

B767-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC; VOR / VORTAC TTH

Cruise

Direct; STAR CEGRM

Class E ZID

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1269067

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1269066.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Aircraft EECs and Autothrottles were inoperative and deferred.During arrival into the CVG area on the SARGO3 arrival; we were given holding instructions at the JKUKA intersection due to thunderstorms in the vicinity of the airport. We were in the hold at 14;000 FT and clean maneuvering speed in the clean configuration. The autopilot was engaged in LNAV and ALT HOLD and I was maintaining the speed manually. At a point during an inbound leg; ATC told us that CVG was accepting arrivals on the CEGRM3 arrival and asked us if we'd like to proceed via TTH-CEGRM and then the CEGRM arrival; or whether we'd like to continue holding; hoping that the SARGO arrival would open up. We briefly discussed the options while looking into the location of TTH and the CEGRM arrival in relation to the thunderstorms and our current position. We decided to accept the suggested clearance about the time the aircraft began its right turn for the outbound leg of the holding pattern. ATC then cleared us to deviate as necessary and then cleared direct TTH. We entered direct TTH into the FMC but did not activate it immediately. It was located at about our 5 o'clock position; so I decided to continue the right turn past the outbound holding pattern leg using heading select until I had a better idea of where the thunderstorms were in relation to our newly selected course. It was during this turn that the stick shaker activated for 2 or 3 seconds. I saw an airspeed of approximately 165 KIAS and immediately advanced the throttles to initiate the recovery. The engines were already spooled up and responded immediately and the airspeed increased rapidly.The engine power had been stabilized to hold clean maneuvering speed while in the hold; but in hindsight; I realized that by continuing the right turn using heading select; the bank had steepened some and thereby caused the airspeed to decay. We had become distracted by all that was going on and didn't notice the airspeed decreasing. I should have left the autopilot on LNAV; since the power was already stabilized to hold the speed at the shallower bank commanded by LNAV; and adjusted my course as necessary once I was able to see the radar display after the turn was completed. I also should not have allowed myself to become so distracted that the airspeed dropped out of my scan.The remainder of the flight was normal without further incident.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767-200 flight crew reported the autothrottles were deferred INOP and that they got a stall warning in a turn when the speed dropped.

1705109

201911

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

14000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb

Class A ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 83; Flight Crew Total 16229

1705109

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Total 6585; Flight Crew Type 1743

1705089.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On departure and climb out passing through 14000 ft.; crew observed a constantly high engine oil temperature indication; followed by an ECL (Electronic Checklist) annunciated procedure. We followed the ECL procedures and [requested priority handling] back to ZZZ. After communicating with Dispatch of our intentions; requesting overweight landing performance and manually reviewing aircraft landing performance; we communicated with our FAs (Flight Attendant) and passengers of our intentions. We performed on overweight landing on Runway XXL at ZZZ and taxied to the gate without further incidents.

On climb out around 15;000 feet we received an EICAS alert for 'left engine high oil temperature.' We noted the oil temperature was boxed and it was high. We ran the checklist which led us to reducing the thrust on the left engine to idle. It remained there for the duration of the flight. While the Captain flew; I took care of checklists; radios; automation; FMC tasks; ACARS tasks; ATC; and performance data in FM; as well as requesting from Dispatch. The Captain did brief FAs (Flight Attendants) and make a PA.We discussed landing overweight as I noted we would be about 32;000 lbs. over. We felt that given our performance data; and weather; not dumping fuel would be okay in this case. We [requested priority handling] and headed back towards ZZZ. With the engine at idle; the oil temperature was no longer boxed amber. The Captain did a tremendous job handling and prioritizing tasks while flying. At no time did I feel overloaded as we worked systematically through the issue as best we could. We had an otherwise normal landing; the brakes did not get above '2.5 - 3' and we taxied to the gate where we were met by [Company] and Maintenance for support.As an aside; I self-assessed and while I felt comfortable to do another 'normal flight' I was unsure of how I would I feel about doing another flight that may have another irregular issue to handle. I communicated this to [Company]; and was removed off the flight to deadhead to my next destination. I struggled making this choice initially; but reflecting back; it was the right move for me. Also; when talking to ATC it was a little difficult to communicate our 'state.' I wanted to let them know we were essentially on one engine; but the other engine wasn't in a fuel cut off state. So I did the best I could to communicate that while keeping it simple and clear. After we got to the gate; I mistakenly sent [the] electronic logbook entry as 'high engine oil pressure' by accident. It should have stated 'high engine oil temperature.' I sent another logbook entry in to correct this mistake. The Captain informed me he had only been on the airplane for about 5 months; and it was our first leg together. He did a great job managing the situation very calmly and in a very organized fashion.

B777 flight crew reported 'High Oil Temperature No. 1' EICAS annunciation during initial climb.

1033013

201208

0001-0600

LEMD.Airport

FO

8000.0

VMC

TRACON LEMD

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors; STAR BARDI 1C

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Situational Awareness

1033013

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Human Factors

We were cleared for the BARDI 1C Arrival to LEMD. We followed the charted altitude assignments; but continued on the lateral path of the arrival past BUREX Intersection. Unlike other arrivals--such as at EGLL--the clearance limit is clearly printed on the chart. We did not catch the fine print by the intersection indicating it was the clearance limit. We were given vectors back around to eventually fly the 33L approach.

On arrival to LEMD via the BARDI 1C STAR; an air carrier flight crew failed to comply with the 'Clearance Limit' notation at BUREX and its associated warning advising flights to '...not leave the clearance limit without ATC clearance.' The reporter cited the 'fine print' utilized to advise of the limit as a contributing factor.

1071427

201303

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

5.0

2600.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Aerobatic

1.0

Part 91

None

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Landing

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Reciprocating Engine Assembly

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 11500; Flight Crew Type 620

1071427

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I was ferrying an MXS for repairs. I had made two fuel stops and was on my final leg cruising at 8;500 FT MSL when the engine failed catastrophically. I had enough altitude to glide over [a suitable airport]. I was busy shutting the engine down and turning off switches when I entered an overhead pattern and began spiraling down. I did not have time to look up a frequency and I had shut off the avionics at that point anyway. So I visually cleared the area as best I could. Saw no conflicts and selected a runway into the wind. I landed on a runway which had barriers on the surface. I dodged those and rolled to a stop just past the intersection of the primary runway. I did not contact Tower due to my emergency status. I did not land on the primary runway as I was guessing that any jet traffic would prefer that one. I contacted the Tower via telephone and they did not request any other information.

MXS pilot experiences a catastrophic engine failure at 8;500 FT and is able to glide to a suitable airport and land on a closed runway. There was insufficient time to contact the Tower via radio prior to landing.

1425100

201702

1801-2400

ZLC.ARTCC

UT

12000.0

Center ZLC

Air Taxi

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class E ZLC

Center ZLC

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

IFR

Descent

Class E ZLC

Facility ZLC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1425100

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Weather; Airport; Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

Aircraft X was level at 12000 feet direct TOXEE waypoint. An unknown aircraft less than 6 miles in front of and slower than Aircraft X was also direct TOXEE issued a descent to 13000 feet. I observed unknown aircraft descend below 13000 feet and alerted the Radar Controller. Conflict alert went off and the Radar Controller attempted to expedite the unknown aircraft to 11000 feet. I observed a closest proximity of 4.9 miles. Very complex traffic with bad weather. Due to heavy traffic volume and bad weather the traffic began to overwhelm the Radar Controller's and my ability to give control instructions due to frequency congestion both air to air and air to ground.This happens every year. KSUN is a popular destination. The airport and airspace is dangerous during these times. It is a matter of time; not chance; that aircraft collide with either terrain or each other. KSUN should set a maximum operations a day and hour limitation. During times where approaches are conducted arrivals should be spaced a minimum of 10 minutes apart or in VMC 5 minutes. To prevent collision of opposite direction aircraft; arrivals should only be allowed during the first half of the hour; departures the second half. This may seem like overkill but this is not a suggestion it is a must. Lives are at risk and it is not taken seriously by anyone other than the controllers.

A Center Controller reported an unknown aircraft descended into the sector with less than the required 5 miles lateral separation.

1813523

202106

0601-1200

290.0

17.0

4000.0

VMC

10

4000

Personal

Small Aircraft

Part 91

None

Training

Cruise

None

Class E ZZZ

UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

None

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft / UAS

Number of UAS 1

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1040; Flight Crew Type 50

Distraction

1813523

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Horizontal 20

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Aircraft and Drone in-flight near miss. Drone appeared off my left wing moving behind aircraft heading south east Drone heading north west

Pilot reported a near miss with a UAS.

1601074

201812

0.0

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

1601074

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Ground Personnel

Routine Inspection

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Found large puddles of Glycol with runoff on [two] gates. Estimated 20+ on ground for each gate. This; in addition to the environmental hazard; creates slippery conditions on the gate for ground crews. If the frost was heavy enough to require this amount of fluid to remove; it should have been done at the De-ice Pads. If this was a training issue; then it should be followed up on.

Ground Agent reported large amounts of Glycol [Hazmat class 6 Toxic liquid] in gate/ramp area.

1852884

202111

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Scheduled Maintenance

Installation; Inspection; Repair; Work Cards; Testing

Rudder Control System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1852884

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

During the normal flight control check procedures after engine start for an MRO (Maintenance Repair Overhaul) FCF (Functional Check Flight) refly; the rudder pedals did not move and were locked in the neutral position. The First Officer also attempted to cycle the rudder pedals with the same locked in neutral results. We contacted the ground crew via radio to ensure the nose gear steering bypass pin was removed and steering bypass lever in normal steering position. The ground crew confirmed the nose gear steering bypass pin was removed and lever in the normal steering position. We performed an after landing checklist; performed shutdown and shutdown checklist. A maintenance representative opened the forward E&E door to inspect the flight control assembly area under the flight deck and found a rudder lockout/rig pin still installed then subsequently removed. I elected to have the aircraft towed back to the hangar to address how the rudder pedal rig pin was not removed after maintenance repair and needed confidence prior to future ops.Established maintenance procedures were not followed. [Suggest] ZZZ MRO Rig Pin Kit to better inventory parts.

B777 Captain reported rudder pedals were locked in position and would not move. Captain requested Maintenance inspect rudder pedal linkage and a rig pin was discovered still installed in the forward electronics and equipment bay.

1580581

201809

0601-1200

MDW.Airport

IL

6000.0

IMC

8

Daylight

1000

TRACON C90

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class E C90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 402

Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure

1580581

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 490; Flight Crew Type 3400

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1580546.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Just prior to push we received Revision 2 which included a reroute for weather near MDW. Enroute was uneventful. Prior to descent; the Captain set up and briefed the arrival and approach from the current ATIS as the RNAV RNP 13C. Weather continued to change at MDW and we kept getting the updated ATIS; which still said we were landing 13C. Just prior to STKNY; Approach changed our approach to expect the RNAV Y 22L. The Captain quickly loaded the approach and I made sure to get the new landing numbers and ATIS. Then Approach put us on vectors; which disrupted the new brief of points and they were not briefed after. Approach turned us early and gave us direct to SAILZ. The Captain had a hard time getting it to take; so I brought SAILZ to the top of the page and executed it; letting the Captain know LNAV was available. Upon executing it; I began to think we should be slowing and configuring. I took a quick glance at the box and saw SAILZ and KEEEL were the next two points. I did not verify the final two points because at that point I was more focused on configuration and reading back our clearance for the approach. I believe confirmation bias led me to believe the rest of the approach was correct because our Jepps only have a Y and X RNAV Approach to 22L and I knew SAILZ and KEEEL were only on the Y. We finished configuring and broke out about 1000 feet. At that time we saw the runway but were coming in at a slight angle which seemed strange. The Captain safely landed the aircraft and we cleared the runway at Y2. Ground then cleared us to taxi Y; K; and T and cross 31L and C to park. We thought it was weird we were only cleared to cross two. The Captain taxied and I went heads down because I was trying to figure out why we came in at an angle on final. Our course was correct. Then Ground said we missed our turn and gave us Y; T to park. I looked up to see we missed our turn. This was bad on my part because I should have waited until the parking brake was set at the gate before going heads down. I took myself out of the game for taxi and we missed our turn. This could have led to a runway incursion under different circumstances. After we were at the gate; I looked in the Arrivals page to see what went wrong and noticed there was an RNAV Z in addition to the Y and X Approaches to 22L. The only difference is the last two points and it has an inbound course of 238 versus 228 on the Y. This should have been caught by the Captain and me sooner but I would also recommend the Z Approach be removed from our database until it is in our Jepps. After the approach change; the points should have been briefed and checked to be correct; this would have likely prevented our missed taxiway as well. Remove the RNP Z 22L from the database until it is approved and in our Jepps. Briefing discipline would have prevented the approach error; and focusing on taxi instead of going heads down would have helped by having two pilots clearing and ensuring the correct taxi route was followed.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737-700 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred on approach to MDW after mistakenly loading the wrong RNAV approach.

1609377

201901

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

wind gusts; 10

Daylight

1500

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Cardinal 177/177RG

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

None

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1667; Flight Crew Type 1542

Situational Awareness

1609377

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors; Weather

Weather

Requested landing runway with least crosswind angle. During landing; just after touchdown; encountered 70 degree crosswind gust. Aircraft yawed to left; I applied strong nose down pitch and maintained full right rudder. Aircraft tail and left wing lifted; left main wheel lifted off runway; nose wheel fairing scraped for approximately 50 feet on runway surface. After a few seconds; regained directional control and aircraft settled flat on runway. Inspected aircraft. No damage other than scrape on nose fairing. Attempted to obtain ATIS runway report before departing; but could not find phone number. Runway condition seemed less than reported 3 condition. I should have been more mentally prepared to handle cross wind gust; including immediate go around decision.

C177 pilot reported a loss of control during landing after encountering a significant crosswind.

1097775

201306

1201-1800

ZGSZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZGSZ

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Landing; Taxi

Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1097775

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication

Chart Or Publication

Landing Rollout at ZGSZ Runway 16 almost turned off at NOTAMed closed Taxiway E6. Closed Taxiway E6 was identified and briefed however during landing rollout I started to turn off on E6 but was warned by ATC at about same time that we discovered error. Aircraft never entered closed taxiway as we corrected and exited Runway 16 via E7. What led to confusion: 1. High work load post landing (First Officer was flying) 2. Commercial Chart EFB moving map display selected but aircraft position indication not present. 3. Poor taxiway signage; turnoff sign for E7 (next taxiway) is located very close to Taxiway E6. 4. No barriers or other indicators at closed taxiway. 5. Light weight landing with subsequent short rollout. EFB moving map correctly indicated E6 closed but aircraft position was not present. Question: is the aircraft Present Position (PP) indication designed to appear at a certain ground speed? Had the position indicator been present; I would have instantly noted current position and not have been confused by E7 sign. In the future I will not clear runway until EFB moving map PP indication is available to confirm my actual position. I will also attempt to pick a reference point to indicate desired runway exit route other than rely on signage. Especially in China.

An Air Carrier pilot noted that his EFB moving map own ship symbol was not visible after landing and so he nearly exited ZGSZ Runway 15 at Taxiway E6 which was closed. Poor E6 signage location also caused confusion because the sign is near Taxiway E7.

1461308

201706

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

Dusk

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1461308

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Manuals

On this particular flight; the acquired landing speeds from our approved takeoff and landing data booklet fell into the white band of the low speed awareness tape. While I don't recall the specific speeds; both Vap and Vref fell into the aforementioned part of our airspeed tape. After noticing the discrepancy; I referenced speeds for a higher weight category; which gave us speeds that were adequate with reference to the low speed awareness tape. I subsequently referenced our new MIN FIELD length based on the weight category I chose to get the adjusted speeds. We landed without further event.Concern:While not ALWAYS the case; the speeds that we currently utilize for approach and landing are sometimes out of sync with regard to regulatory compliance and company manuals. To be more specific; the Vap and Vref speeds are consistently falling into the low speed awareness tape; which raises threats to a level which; is unacceptable given the low-speed characteristics of our swept wing. Before we get specific with our recommendation; my understanding of the issue is based on the following:- Vap: Per the AOM (Aircraft Operations Manual) - The speed at which the approach must be trending towards at 1;000 feet above TDZE; and stabilized at no later than 500 feet above TDZE. This speed is defined as Vref + 5 knots; or Vref + wind correction (whichever is greater).- Vref: Per the AOM - The landing speed without any corrections. It is the final landing approach speed with the airplane configured for landing; and the airplane must be stabilized at this speed when crossing the runway threshold at 50 feet.- E-145 low speed awareness tape (white band): 1.23Vs (high end) to 1.13 Vs (low end).Regulatory Highlights:- Per FAR section 25.125 (which part 121 operators must abide by); the following is stated '...In non-icing conditions; Vref must be no less than 1.23 Vsr0...' Vsr0 is the reference stall speed in the landing configuration; which; oddly enough; coincides with the top of the white arc on the E145's low speed awareness tape. Said another way; based on these facts; we should never be bugging speeds that fall within any color band on the low speed awareness tape.Without reporting this issue; it is my fear that some of our crews will be put in a potentially dangerous situation by flying speeds that are too slow during the approach and landing phase of flight.Recommendations:- Contact Embraer and request clarification regarding best operator practices should acquire landing speeds fall into the low speed awareness tape.- Based on Embraers recommendation; develop a procedure for flight crews to follow should their acquired speeds not be compliant.- Contact other E145 operators to see what approved methods they have for dealing with this type of issue.Side notes:- See how the adjusted landing speeds we get from either Embraer affect the MIN FIELD length required.

EMB-145 Captain reported the acquired landing speeds from the approved takeoff and landing data booklet fell into the white band of the low speed awareness tape.

1081901

201304

31000.0

IMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Elevator

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

1081901

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

While cruising at 31;000 FT the autopilot started oscillating above and below the altitude by a couple hundred feet. Then the autopilot failed. The Captain took control and flew the airplane and noticed that the elevator was not very effective. We descended out of RVSM airspace to comply with the regulations. We decided that it was a jammed elevator and did the memory item and QRH procedures for the event. Upon pulling the elevator disconnect we found that the Captain's side was still jammed but the First Officer side was free. We were at this point descending; so we determined it would be best to declare an emergency with Approach Control and land as scheduled.

EMB-145LR flight crew reported a jammed elevator in cruise flight at FL310. They declared an emergency and per the procedure pulled the elevator disconnect and freed the First Officer's elevator; allowing them to continue to a normal landing.

1363673

201606

1801-2400

SBGL.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Night

Ground SBGL

Air Carrier

B777-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Confusion

1363673

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Confusion

1363678.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Airport

Ambiguous

During taxi out on ramp we attempted to follow ground controls instructions. However the taxiways have recently been renamed. Additionally the Jepp 10-9 has the old info and 10-9B has the new taxiway info. Ground control appeared to be working off old taxiway info. Assigned us L1 exit. Captain stopped aircraft to verify exit and ground sent follow me [vehicle] out to assist turn back to new L2 (old L1).Issue Pilot alert message warning of Jepp chart needs to be updated. Contact Jepp to alert them of need for update.

Taxi out from Apron 3 Rio de Janeiro (SBGL). Taxi instructions were Y2-L1-N-Q (confirmed twice). ATIS stated Apron 1 taxi limited to CAT C aircraft with wingspan less than 33 meters. From Apron 3 we taxied via Y (no other taxi line). From Apron 2 we taxied via Y (Y2 did not allow wingtip clearance). We stopped short of Apron 1 since the Y taxi line disappeared; leaving only Y1/Y2 (which did not allow adequate wingtip clearance). A red line island in between Y1 and Y2 is where the old Y taxiway used to be. We stopped and asked ground for instructions. We were told to 'continue straight ahead' then later told to 'stop; and hold position'. A Follow-Me truck was assigned to lead us out of the Apron area. We executed a 180 degree turn (impossible if we had been a [larger aircraft]) and were led out via an unmarked taxiway that is either L-1 (Jepps 10-9) or L-2 (Jepps 10-9B) to taxiway K; where the rest of the taxi was uneventful. Jepps 10-9; 10-9B; and taxiway markings all conflict. The Ground ATC gave instructions inconsistent with ATIS; Jepps charts; and taxiway markings. The old L1 taxiway marker is blacked out--the taxiways are effectively UNMARKED for entry into the Apron areas. Jepps Taxi chart 10-9B is effective 26 MAY 16. L-1 is the old EE at the north end of Apron 1. Jepps Airport chart 10-9 is effective 24 OCT 14 and EE; L-1; L-2; and L-3 all are different than the current 10-9B. Taxiway markings do not match either chart; and are completely blacked out in some places; leaving the field effectively unmarked.

B777 flight crew reported being unable to comply with taxi instructions at Rio De Janeiro Airport (SBGL) because the airport taxiway depiction; provided on the current Jeppesen charts; did not agree with the actual signage on the field. A 'follow me' vehicle was required to assist the crew with the taxi clearance.

1078940

201304

0601-1200

VNY.Airport

CA

163.0

4.0

1700.0

Marginal

9

3000

Tower VNY

Air Taxi

Learjet 35

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

SID NUAL8

Class D VNY

Compass (HSI/ETC)

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 187; Flight Crew Total 15050; Flight Crew Type 2046

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

1078940

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

[We were] departing VNY on the NUAL8 departure. The SID states to cross 2.2 DME south of the VNY VOR at or below 1;700 MSL. The departure description states NOT to join the radial to the southeast off of FIM VOR unless advised by ATC. We departed Runway 16L at VNY with a clearance to climb to 4;000. We assumed that would be AFTER passing the 2.2 DME fix. While level at 1;700; we became alarmed at the rising terrain south of our position; but I watched as the DME slowly clicked off to 2.2. It just didn't 'look right'. We were finally handed off to SoCal who immediately had us climb to 6;000 MSL and asked if we were assigned runway heading by VNY Tower. We replied yes although we were not actually given those words; nor were we told to join the radial off of FIM. SoCal also gave us an altitude alert and terrain advisory. The First Officer and I continued our climb and were vectored on course. We knew again that something just didn't 'look right'. It was at that time I noticed the knob on the lower left corner of the Captain's HSI with a display in the upper left corner of the HSI. It is a 3 position knob labeled distance; TTG (time to go); and speed. It was in the TTG position. What I had been looking at was time from VNY VOR not the DME! The First Officer had flown the Part 91 leg into VNY from the left seat (company procedure) and prefers to keep this knob in the TTG position for descent planning. I failed to notice/move the knob back to the DME position when I resumed the left seat. I also should have cross checked the DME display in front of the First Officer position on this jet during climbout.This is the second time I have missed a fix/turn/altitude on a SID because of the knob position. I have only myself to blame. I must be more disciplined in my preflight setup of the cockpit. However; I feel the SID we were flying also has some inherent dangers. If departing into low IFR conditions; it would be possible to fly into terrain while adhering to the mandatory at or below 1;700 MSL restriction while waiting for the display to read 2.2 with the knob in the TTG position; especially if there was a slow handoff between VNY Tower and SoCal. If you are not supposed to turn southeast until ATC advises and you are to cross at or below 1;700 MSL; it is just a setup for disaster! Luckily we had good VFR conditions and a clear view of the terrain.

LR35 Captain is confused by the NUAL8 departure from Runway 16R at VNY and an HSI that is not set to show DME. The aircraft is maintained on runway heading at 1;700 FT well past the 2.2 DME; alarming himself and the Controller involved.

1766874

202010

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent; Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Time Pressure

1766874

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

Day 1; leg 1 of a 4 day trip from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I was the pilot monitoring on this leg. Had not flown much in the last few weeks. Captain was PF. We flew to ZZZ1 at a pretty low altitude; I believe it was 14;000 feet cruise altitude. After starting the descent; we did not realize we had passed 10;000 feet so quickly; and noticed our speed was beyond 250 knots. The Captain immediately slowed the descent rate and airspeed; in order to return to 250 knots.We were distracted. We were on the first leg of the trip; had woken up pretty early; and the fact that we cruised at such a low altitude were possibly all factors. We did not pay enough attention in the descent.I should have kept better monitoring skills during the descent and avoided distractions.

Air Carrier First Officer reported a speed deviation below 10;000 feet during descent.

1458996

201706

1201-1800

ZLA.ARTCC

CA

25000.0

Center ZLA

Military

Fighting Falcon F16

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Tactical

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZLA

Center ZLA

Air Carrier

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZLA

Facility ZLA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute; Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10.0

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1458996

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Procedure; Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Staffing

Airspace Structure

Shortly after receiving the Controller in Charge (CIC) position I noticed conflict alert activating at a Sector. I used the 'See All' scope to observe the sector. I noticed Aircraft X in conflict with an arrival that was descending. The controller at the sector had put a heading in the data block; so I thought he was taking care of the situation adequately. However; the aircraft did appear to get less than 6 miles away from each other. I immediately paged the two people who were on break the longest; and called the watch desk to inform them of the possible loss of separation. Three main factors contributed to this situation. Increased complexity and volume at the sector due to Optimization of Airspace and Procedures (OAPM). Although some of the routes help procedurally separate traffic; the new sectors have halved the previous sector's area; while increasing the vertical boundaries; effectively making the airspace 4 times more complex. I suggest an immediate reversion to the previous sector designs to prevent this from happening again. The new routes will still work in the old sectors.Staffing has been critically low for a long time. Lack of funds for overtime; management's unwillingness to negotiate a fatigue mitigating schedule; and training without the bodies needed are all contributing sub-factors. We need to hire more people; pay the extra money to train them; and create schedules that employees like; to reduce leave usage. If there had been a Radar Assist available; this situation probably would not have happened.The previous CIC had not properly staffed the area for the level of traffic we were experiencing. Although most controllers are willing to work through a busy push by themselves; this was a perfect example of why they shouldn't have to. The previous CIC is recently signed off as a CIC; but management has not provided the proper list of CIC seniority since he was certified. Rather than comply with Article 18; Section 8 g. of the CBA; management put this employee at the top of the CIC list. This means he has been CIC almost every time he is in the area. Although he my be a competent CIC; this has unfairly taken away the opportunity for others to be CIC. I believe it has also encouraged complacency; which I believe was a factor in this situation. Management should be adhering to the CBA.

ZLA ARTCC Controller reported a loss of separation between a flight of military aircraft and an arriving descending air carrier aircraft.

1301224

201510

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

800.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 138; Flight Crew Type 964

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Workload

1301224

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 217; Flight Crew Total 13104; Flight Crew Type 2296

Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure; Confusion

1301226.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Taxi; In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft; Procedure; Weather

Weather

On approach to Runway XXL; the airport was experiencing high and gusty winds; last called 220/22G33; we configured at the final approach fix at setting flaps 30 with accompanying green light at approximately 1;200 feet AGL. Autothrottles and autopilot were engaged. Passing through 1;000 feet; we got a good gust wind/airspeed increase to approximately 178-180 KIAS. This must have activated the flap blowback feature and it pushed the flaps back to approximately 26 degrees. At that point; I took the aircraft and disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles. I did not notice the flaps had been pushed back and continued to fly the approach. Passing through 200 feet we received the too low terrain warning. I verbally confirmed visual with the First Officer and continued the approach. Upon receiving the aural warning a third time at approximately 50 feet; First Officer noted the abnormal flap setting. The airplane was easily controllable and I had already started to flare; so I landed with 26 degrees final flap setting and taxied uneventfully from the landing runway to the gate. During taxi; we reset the flaps to 25 and then 30 degrees and the flaps worked normally; without issue.

Airspeed correction due to steady state headwind plus gust was 19 KTS. Approach target speed approximately 164 KIAS (flap 30 approach/flap 30 speed 175 placard). Airspeed on approach was observed during FO crosscheck consistently above target but within stable criteria. At approximately 100-200 feet AGL GPWS 'too low' warning sounded. FO crosscheck analysis picked up flap setting at 30 degrees/25 degrees on indicator. Aircraft was approaching threshold stable on normal glide path. FO incorrectly verbalized 'flaps asymmetry' as the words 'trailing edge flap disagree' did not come to my mouth at the time. Captain elected to continue to land as we were now initiating flare.Following landing crew discussed potential that as airspeed was near flap placard limit it was possible that a gust resulted in activation of flap load limiter following full extension on approach resulting in flap blowback to 25 degrees. Clearing runway Captain had FO set flaps up one notch back to 30 which alleviated condition in accordance with trailing edge flap disagree checklist.

A B737 encountered 19 knot gusts on short final which caused a flap blow up from 30 to 25. The EGPWS TOO LOW alert sounded but the First Officer thought flap asymmetry. After landing the flaps were cycled with normal results.

1254153

201504

Night

Helicopter

Hangar / Base

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Commercial

1254153

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Flight Crew

Routine Inspection

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Manuals

Human Factors

In the course of creating comparative weight and balance spreadsheets to determine the effect of the SX-5 on center of gravity (CG); I noticed that the CG of the aircraft moved aft when the SX-5 nightsun was deducted. This was obviously erroneous so I examined the weight and balance certifications and noticed that the arm was incorrectly entered as 19 instead of 190; leading to an incorrect moment. This resulted in our base flying an aircraft with incorrect W&B calculations since it has arrived. This error was undetectable in the normal course of pilot or lead pilot duties. This was a failure of Quality Assurance (QA) to execute their job properly.

Helicopter pilot reports discovering that the weight and balance charts for his company helicopter; are using an incorrect moment arm for the search light mounted on tail of the helicopter.

1204144

201409

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

41000.0

Mixed

0.125

Night

100

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

ACARS

X

Malfunctioning; Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1204144

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Weather; Procedure; Company Policy

Ambiguous

Left with planned arrival of 5.7 and no alternate listed or additional fuel added. Forecast was no lower than six SM for time of arrival. First Officer received oral ATIS for arrival calling 1/2 mile in fog (no digital ATIS). Sent ACARS message to Dispatch for amended Release and alternate airport. First Officer was doing work for weather; checks; and performance; formulated own plan for ZZZ1 as alternate and checked ZZZ2 as well. Through 18;000 FT got message from Dispatch; 'If you want to change to ZZZ1; it is 2000-pound burn and ZZZ1 weather.' Sent ACARS to Dispatch; 'change from what?' Descent for CAT III approach RVR 700 to 1400. Formulated a plan for one approach and if missed; direct ZZZ1; which was VFR and we could see it 40 miles away. Landed RVR about 1200. On rollout; received chime and additional information message from Dispatch. 5.4 at the gate in XXX. Upon phone calls to Dispatch was told he had sent an amendment for ZZZ2 as alternate with burn and initials to us 50 miles west of ZZZ3. I said we didn't get it. He said he had sent it and had documentation to that effect. Also that not getting an ACARS MSG happens all the time to everyone. Dispatcher also said he was willing to 'take the hit on this one.' Have positive TWO-WAY communication. Maybe response required for Release change similar to diversion plan. Or; since this thing happens all the time to everyone; if no response send message until you get one.

After updating destination weather which unexpectedly decreased to CAT III; the B737-800 crew requested an alternate but the ACARS with the release was not received until after landing at the filed destination.

997331

201203

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Nose Gear

X

Design; Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Radar 6; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 200

Other / Unknown; Training / Qualification

997331

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

My student and I were doing pattern work in an Alarus. We had done 8 touch-and-go's without incident. On the 9th; which was to be a full stop; we touched down mains first; the nose wheel came down; struck the runway and the nose gear fork broke off the strut. The landing wasn't soft; but it wasn't really hard either. We rolled a little ways down the runway and then the nose came down on the strut post; which supported the airplane; but the clearance remaining allowed the prop to strike the surface. I believe the problem arose from metal fatigue between the nose gear strut and the fork. There have been similar reports that I've seen of this event occurring.

An Alarus instructor experiences a nose gear fork failure during landing. The fork with its wheel departed the aircraft allowing the the propeller to contact the ground.

1502268

201712

1201-1800

PTS.Airport

KS

0.0

VMC

10

Dusk

CLR

CTAF PTS

Government

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Landing

Direct; Visual Approach

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Other unknown

Other Unknown

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Government

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1502268

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 500

N

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

While landing at PTS on runway 34 during the roll out; another airplane; while either taking off or landing on runway 22 was observed to our right on the runway approximately 700 ft from us travelling in a Southwest direction. The airplane pitched up and banked to his left to go behind us. There was no radio broadcast heard from the other airplane or lights observed on the airplane. I was the Second-in-command (Pilot Not Flying) and not required by FAR. The following used information extracted from the G1000 data logging files for time; distance and frequency change information. We were on an IFR flight plan direct route to PTS.We had been monitoring the PTS AWOS and the XM weather for Pittsburg as being clear with calm winds; altimeter setting was 30.08.We began a VNAV computed descent to PTS runway 34. When descending through 10;000 ft; the 'Descending 10;000 ft' checklist was completed which included turning on the Pulse Recognition Lights. The Nav; Beacons and Strobe lights were already on.14 miles South of Pittsburg; I switched COM2 to the PTS CTAF and keyed up the runway lighting. The REIL and VASI for runway 34 became immediately visible. It's my recollection I made a position report at that time to Pittsburg Airport and traffic on Com2. I continued to monitor the PTS CTAF and Kansas City Center frequencies as we proceeded toward the airport. PF (Pilot Flying) monitored Kansas City Center.10 miles south of the airport; Kansas City Center gave us an airport position report at which time I reported the airport in sight for the visual approach and cancelled IFR in concurrence with the PF. Kansas City Center acknowledged the cancellation and advised that he had no radar observed traffic between us and the airport. At 9.6 miles; I changed Com1 to the PTS CTAF and broadcast a position report to 'Pittsburg airport and traffic' and noted one 'White Diamond' TCAS target on the MFD several miles North of the airport that was well North of the Airport when we landed. At 7 miles out; I activated the final approach leg as the active leg. The PF intercepted and flew the final approach course. When near the final approach fix; the Landing Gear was extended; and the Taxi and Landing lights were turned on. It's my recollection I continued to broadcast position reports at about 5; 3 and 1 mile as we continued final approach to runway 34 via the RNAV 34 LPV approach procedure. There were no radio broadcasts on the PTS CTAF from any source while monitoring. Inside of one mile; I scanned the airport for other traffic and particularly along runway 34 for wildlife. I announced to the PF that I did not see deer or anything and he concurred. The 'White Diamond' target previously noted was still north of the airport. There were no other TCAS targets observed in the vicinity.As we continued over the threshold and the PF began his flare to landing nearing the fixed distance markers; we received a generic visual yellow 'TAFFIC ALERT' box on our Primary Flight Displays. I do not recall hearing an aural alert. A 'Traffic Alert' is not uncommon on or near an airport and often occurs when a pilot turns his transponder on while operating on the surface of the airport or preparing to take-off. We scanned for traffic and after touchdown; just prior to the intersection of runway 34/22; I observed Aircraft Y which appeared to be accelerating for take-off from runway 22. Both PF and PNF (Pilot Not Flying) observed the aircraft pitch up and bank to the left over the runway 22 VASI lights as we cleared the intersection. There was no radio transmission heard from Aircraft Y at any time nor was any lights observed on the aircraft. We were much closer to the intersection and much faster than Aircraft Y so it was obvious the best course of action for us was to clear the intersection without delay or braking. It is my opinion that if the other pilot saw us when I first saw him; he could have stopped before getting to the intersection.Once we had cleared the intersection on rollout; I made several blind calls to the 'Aircraft Y at Pittsburg' with no answer. After a brief period; while back taxiing on runway 34 to the terminal; the pilot in Aircraft Y made a call and advised he had just landed at Pittsburg and did not hear our calls until he switched to his other radio. Aircraft Y was parked on the terminal ramp when we got to the ramp. A brief conversation with the pilot indicated that he thought one of his radio may have failed and didn't hear us until he switched radios. I also advised him that we did not see any lights on his plane. As we were starting up for departure; we observed him checking his lights which they appeared to work. Though Aircraft Y's pilot comment that he had just landed; it was my impression he may have landed on the remaining runway after we passed through the intersection after he made a takeoff attempt. The fact there was no traffic target on TCAS when we were approaching the airport and a 'TRAFFIC ALERT' while we were landing would be consistent with his transponder being turned on as he took the runway for take-off. He also appeared to be accelerating when I first saw the airplane. The natural lighting condition at the time was transitional from sunset to dusk where objects; particularly unlit; contrasted with background may be difficult to see. The run-up pad for runway 22 sets to the South of the end of the runway with a large group of trees about 50 ft from the edge of the pad. For the time of year; there still appeared to be significant foliage on the trees. Also; an airplane; particularly a mostly white airplane; sitting on the white painted area at the end of the runway would be difficult to see. A post flight inspection of the lights on our aircraft was completed to confirm proper operation. The Landing; Taxi; Navigation; Strobe and wing-tip Pulse Recognition lights were all operating properly. The frontal lighting consists of 2 bright LED landing lights; 1 bright LED taxi light; 2 bright LED navigation lights on each wing tip; 1 white top of tail flashing beacon light; 1 white belly flashing beacon light; 1 bright white flashing strobe on each wing tip and tail and 1 white pulsing recognition light on each wing tip.All proper communication frequency selections and distances were confirmed by reviewing the Data Logs of the G1000 avionics system installed in our aircraft. Calm winds at an uncontrolled airport with multiple runways was a contributing factor.

GA pilot reported a ground conflict at an intersecting runway during rollout.

1756705

202008

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Off Duty

Flight Attendant Current

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

1756705

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Flight Attendant

Other passenger boarding area

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I was deadheading today ZZZ-ZZZ1 and was waiting to board with other deadheaders. The Captain joined us wearing this unorthodox face covering. It's a sheer veil that does not appear to conform with any of the most basic requirements for a face covering: it's open at the bottom and is sheer enough to see through (so small particles from breathing can escape) and does not offer any protections for those around the individual. It does not appear to do anything to arrest the spread of COVID-19. I didn't feel comfortable speaking with the Captain about the mask in the boarding area; since I don't know the individual personally.We all need to be on the same page in order to assure the traveling public that it's safe to fly with us.

Flight Attendant reported the Captain's face mask probably did not conform to policy and in the FA's opinion did little to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

1020820

201207

1801-2400

LAX.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower LAX

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

None

Facility LAX.Tower

Government

Ground

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1020820

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X was holding on Taxiway 1 for an outbound Airbus in taxi lane XX. Aircraft X taxied to his gate without waiting for the outbound aircraft as instructed. I made numerous attempts to get Aircraft X to stop; but he had left the frequency to talk with the Company Ramp Tower. I could have had aircraft pushing off gates YY or ZZ. I could have had any number of aircraft taxiing on Taxiway 2. Though this did not happen; it does not diminish the potential for an accident in the future if these types of actions occur again. After the Tower spoke with the Company Ramp they said they did not tell Aircraft X to taxi; but they did answer affirmative when the pilot of Aircraft X asked if the Airbus in XX was waiting for them. Recommendation; these scenarios play out almost daily at LAX. The ramp towers at LAX lost their usefulness after 9/11. Soon LAX will be burdened with another position; Ground Control 3; at our critically; short-staffed facility. To provide a modicum of work for this new position; all LAX ramp towers need to close and service must be returned to the tower before someone gets hurt.

LAX Controller voiced concern regarding a ground conflict resulting from the handling provided by 'Ramp Control;' The reporter suggested Ramp Controller operations be terminated for safety concerns.

1258656

201504

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

200.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

FBO

Helicopter

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class G ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Total 3800; Flight Crew Type 450

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1258656

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 200; Vertical 250

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

On an instruction flight in a helicopter; my student was on the controls on final approach at 300 feet AGL to Taxiway B parallel Runway 35; a fixed wing aircraft executed a practice power-off 180 to Runway 35 (Taxiway B is to the west of Runway 35; the aircraft would be crossing our flight path to make it to Runway 35). Upon hearing his radio call; the other aircraft was at my 10 o'clock and descending into my flight path. I then took controls from my student; descended to 100 feet AGL while making a left turn to the west to avoid the path of the aircraft. I made a radio call to the other aircraft; 'I guess I'll get out of your way; helicopter Y is short final Bravo parallel 35.' I told the pilot of the other aircraft over the radio; 'You need to listen for us; I made a base and final radio call.' He replied; 'I'm sorry; I thought you were further on the approach.' While a midair was avoided in a controlled manner; it could have be a potential accident had I not taken evasive action to descend below the other aircraft's flight path as he was turning a tight base to final.To avoid these situations:Closer attention to position of traffic in the pattern; specifically helicopters on final as they land on Taxiway B parallel Runway 35 to avoid the flow of fixed wing traffic.Visual contact of the helicopter traffic should be made or radio contact with the helicopter to confirm the position of helicopter traffic prior to executing practice power-off 180 landings to Runway 35. Flying in the right pattern for Runway 35 while helicopters are in the pattern will greatly reduce the potential of overflight/mid-air collision.

A helicopter instructor took control of the aircraft to take evasive action during a near miss with a fixed wing aircraft whose pilot was performing an emergency return training maneuver.

1012321

201205

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 21300; Flight Crew Type 3200

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1012321

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 1600

Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1012331.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Dispatch

In-flight; Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Procedure

Ambiguous

Just prior to push another air carrier's pilot came into the cockpit asking for a jumpseat ride. She had a jumpseat authorization form; but it had the wrong name on it. We called Operations and asked about the jumpseater and the wrong name etc.; and were told that it was OK; she was entered in the system; and it will show up on the final weight manifest which it did. Her company ID and pilot credentials were OK. All the cabin seats were full. We were informed later in the flight that the jumpseater should not have been allowed jumpseat access.

We took another carrier's pilot jumpseater at gate. She came into cockpit about 3 minutes prior to pushback. We verified her airline ID; her pilot's license and medical certificate. We then noticed her jumpseat form had the wrong name on it. So we called it into operations. They verified they had her correct name in the computer; that she was C.A.S.S. certified and by her showing up on our weight manifest; we had proper documentation and were good to leave. Approximately 1 1/2 hours into flight we received an ACARS message that she should not have been given access to jumpseat. This information is incorrect. We verified everything. The pilot had been cleared by gate agent; by boarding agent; by operations and then we were told she was OK specifically by ZZZ Operations. I believe this is strictly a problem of our carrier's new computer reservation system. The gate agents are having so many problems that we often can't even board our own employees. I want to stress that we verified this pilot extensively and even personally know her from her commuting from ZZZ.

A jumpseating air carrier pilot was C.A.S.S. verified; as were the pilot's credentials; but after departure the flight crew was told via ACARS that the jumpseater should not have been given access because her name was not correct on the jumpseat form.

1714599

201912

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Snow; 2

Airliner 99

Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

1714599

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Weather; Aircraft

Aircraft

With the Weather at 2 SM (Statue Miles) and snowing; as part of my pre-takeoff brief I acknowledged the low visibility and set the ILS Runway XXR frequencies in Nav1 and Nav2. Takeoff roll began and rotation went as normal; around 700 ft. AGL I started to notice a hot smell. Climbing out of about 1500-2000 ft. AGL. It was at this time I stared to see smoke coming out of the fuel gauges; I reacted by turning off the Master Light switch on the overhead panel. And then I ran the checklist for smoke in the cockpit. I [Requested Priority Handling] and requested the ILS Runway XXR which was given to me. I received vectors to the final approach course and came back and landed Runway XXR without any additional incident. Noticed a smell shortly after takeoff; and then saw smoke.Looked to be little water that got behind the fuel gauge. Turning off the electric load to the fuel gauges; and running the checklist.Preventing water from getting in the crew door as much as possible.

Pilot flying C-99 Aircraft encountered smoke in the cockpit after takeoff.

1511490

201712

VMC

Daylight

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Direct

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1511490

Aircraft Y

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1511574.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

Other Post Flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors

Human Factors

Some non-pilot friends were flown into a backcountry private airstrip; which we have permission from the owner to use and land. I routinely fly formation in the air and on the water daily. The non-pilot friends wanted to see a simulated water assisted landing; which I have trained for and done many times before. The pre-brief contained the information that all observers were to remain on the field so they were 500 feet from the aircraft at all times as per 91.119. I made sure the river was clear by flying up-river and completed the maneuver without incident. [A few] days later the observers posted a video on [online] which enraged a rafter group on the internet. To be clear; the rafters were not at the site during the maneuver. Due to the radical comments by the rafters I realized they were going to call the FAA and do everything in their power to get me in trouble. I am both extremely proficient with my plane and have a high regard for the rules. I watched the video very closely and noticed that the observers did not stay where I wanted them to stay; and potentially were closer than 500 feet from the aircraft during the touch and go simulated water assist landing. While 91.119 does not come into play in a landing or takeoff I realize this maneuver is not a clear cut takeoff or landing. I only became aware of this after watching the video; during the maneuver neither of us noticed people close to the bank of the river; and if I would have; I would have knocked off the maneuver immediately. My personal corrective action is going to potentially be to not do this type of maneuver for non-pilots; or to stress harder that there are rules for a reason and if I break them I can have action taken against me.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Two pilots reported they may have inadvertently flown less than 500 feet over a populated area.

1633253

201904

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

1633253

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action; General Evacuated

Aircraft

I noticed a very strong fishy smell when I walked into airplane. I didn't think anything of it because airplanes always seem to have a funky smell; especially near the lavatories. We boarded the airplane. Since I was the C; I was prepping the galley and watching the aft doors because catering came while we were boarding. The B said passengers were commenting on smells; but I couldn't smell anything in the aft galley area. The next thing I know there was an announcement from pilots saying we were deplaning because of the odor. We deplaned; and when I went up front I didn't notice the smell. Only once we were in the jetway for a while and reentered the plane could I smell it again. I don't have a good sense of smell; but again; it smelled like rotten fish. I need to be more in tune with smells and notice these things before boarding. I honestly just thought it was the forward lavatory when I walked into plane.

A320 Flight Attendant reported strong fish smell during preflight. Subsequently; Captain ordered passengers to deplane.

1302961

201510

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

12500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Air Conditioning Distribution System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 186.1; Flight Crew Total 6426.1; Flight Crew Type 382.0

Confusion; Distraction; Workload

1302961

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was scheduled to operate [a] flight to SFO. I arrived at the flight planning area at approximately sunrise. I proceeded to upload and review all applicable flight papers and weather information. By all appearances; it would be an uneventful flight with adequate fuel and no significant weather other than chance of light chop first hour of flight and possible morning cloudiness in SFO. I signed the release and headed toward the gate for the departure. Upon gate arrival; I was cleared out to the jetway and entered the cockpit after introducing myself to the two forward flight attendants. The First Officer; whom I have worked with before; offered a friendly greeting as I stored my bags/equipment. I then briefed with the Lead Flight Attendant (FA) on standard items concerning the flight. After settling in; I asked the First Officer if he had reviewed the flight information and if he had any issues or concerns. He indicated it all looked good to him. I continued with my cockpit setup; to include verification of all installed FMC data. Approximately 20 mins prior to scheduled departure I started the APU as it appeared CS was winding down the boarding process. I transferred electrical to the APU; and after a minute or two; called for the packs to be turned on. Shortly thereafter; I initiated the preflight briefing; concluding with the Preflight Checklist. At departure time; the final door was closed; the Lead FA indicated cabin ready and closed the cockpit door. To this point; no weights had been received; although we had obtained preliminary T/O data for 28. I called for the Before Pushback Checklist and it was completed. The push crew advised that they were ready for push and I asked the First Officer to request push clearance. We received push clearance; I released the brakes; and advised the push crew of the same. At this time; the push crew announced that a late bag had just arrived; and if it was ok to put it on. I advised them to load the bag. After 20 seconds or so; he indicated ready to continue push again and we completed the push process normally. We completed after start flows and After Start Checklist. Taxi to B South was our clearance from Ramp Control. We advised Ground Metering of our position and were instructed to monitor Ground Control. We received clearance to taxi to 28. Shortly after approaching the left turn onto B; Ground Control added follow the air carrier aircraft turning onto B. We acknowledged; and assumed that aircraft would be leading us on our cleared route. To our surprise; the aircraft continued on A10 to T. We queried ATC as to what we were to do and they replied just follow the aircraft. We complied. At this point; we received final weights and printed them out. We did not however receive a 'load' prompt to input the weights data into FMC. We were approximately number 5 for takeoff. The First Officer then requested final weights again. We received weights again; but still no 'load' prompt. The First Officer then proceeded to manually install final weight data and request take off data. We received take off data and installed data manually as we did not receive 'accept' prompt. Now number 2 for departure; we discussed the need for additional time from ATC as we were not ready for departure. We were cleared to the 28 hold pad and to expect full length 28 and to advise ready. At this point we requested takeoff data for full length and proceeded to hold pad. Once in the pad; I made an announcement that we were experiencing a slight delay do to awaiting performance information. The First Officer called dispatch and asked him to resend all pertinent weight and take off data for full length 28 in hopes of getting both the necessary prompts to upload the data automatically. Again we received the relevant data; but still no prompts. We manually reinstalled data; but had no trim setting. The First Officer then called dispatch and obtained the calculated trim setting. Once installed; we felt ready for departure; completed Before Take Off checklist and advised ATC ready. We were in the pad for approximately 10 minutes. We were cleared for takeoff approximately 38 minutes after pushback. The First Officer was the pilot flying. Within 2 or 3 minutes; on initial climb out; we started receiving a stream of multiple data uplinks including performance; winds; and takeoff. I proceeded to 'load' and 'execute' or 'accept' each uplink. This action had a pronounced effect on VNAV and LNAV. The First Officer continued to hand fly using LVL CHG and HDG. Passing 9;000 feet; we were cleared to 15;000 feet; normal speed after 10;000 ft. Approximately 5 minutes after takeoff; passing 12;500 feet; we heard the Cabin Altitude Warning horn and illuminated light. I glanced up at the cabin altimeter and noticed the cabin was indeed at approximately 10;000 ft. As the First officer was starting to level off; we proceeded to extract and don the oxygen masks. I alerted ATC that we were experiencing a cabin altitude issue and requested descent back to 10;000 ft. He cleared us to 10;000 feet and asked if we were declaring an emergency. I acknowledged not at this time; but would evaluate after some investigation and advise. Another glance at the pressurization panel indicated a nominal cabin descent and approximately 1 PSID. I then looked at the air conditioning panel. To my horror; I observed the No. 1 and No. 2 bleed switches in the 'off' position. I pointed to them and confirmed with the First Officer that they should be 'on'; to which he agreed. I positioned them to 'on'. By this time we were leveling at 10;000 ft. The Cabin Altitude Warning horn and associated light went off. Oxygen masks were removed. The Cabin was descending appropriately and the PSID was building commensurately. We assessed the current situation and mutually agreed that this episode had been self-induced; that the cabin altitude was now under automatic control; and that the FMC and MCP functions were all normal. It was decided to continue; so we advised ATC we were ready to continue climb. We were re-cleared to 15;000 feet and proceeded on to SFO with no further anomalies. Since this event occurred; the First Officer and I have had ample time to consider and discuss the likely reasons for missing such an obvious and potentially dangerous omission. Topics including early showtime/departure; distraction from a myriad of taxi out and initial climb issues; and lack of checklist discipline were all mentioned. Personally; not having worked for almost 2 weeks prior to this flight; I might not have been as sharp as I could have been. Perhaps a combination of all these concepts contributed to this event. It reminds us to be ever vigilant and stay focused on the task at hand.

A B737NG crew departed with the engine bleed switches OFF. Climbing through 12;500 feet the Cabin Altitude Warning horn sounded. The crew quickly identified the bleeds off condition; the corrected the error; continued the climb and proceeded to their destination.

1227201

201412

0601-1200

SKBO.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower SKBO

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aero Charts

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Other; Party2 Flight Crew

1227201

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

N

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication

URGENT: the Dec 2014 SKBO Special Engine Failure procedure page incorrectly displays the same procedure text for 13 L/R as for 31 L/R in the 'PROCEED TOWARD' box. The graphic map is correct.

Air carrier Captain advised the latest revision of the SKBO tailored Special Engine Failure on Takeoff aero chart includes the same textual description for runways 13L&R and 31L&R; although the graphic depictions are different and correct.

1420057

201701

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

500.0

VMC

Windshear; 100

Daylight

25000

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Final Approach

None

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 13

Fatigue; Training / Qualification

1420057

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

On a personal pleasure flight; flying low (500-1000 AGL) over extremely remote terrain (well more than 500 ft from an person; vessel; vehicle or structure) and careful not to operate in a careless or reckless manner; I descended low towards an open area; simulating an approach to landing. I misjudged my height and the wind conditions and unintentionally hit the surface. The wheels grabbed and I began to decelerate. In spite of adding power slowly the plane continued to decelerate. Finally in spite of being at full power; the plane continued to decelerate. It was unable to regain flight; so I committed to landing; by now at a very slow speed. The rollout was flat and smooth; but upon hitting a muddy area; the plane nosed over out of control. Damage was limited to the propeller and spinner; which struck the ground; [and] the engine cowling. Other than the plane; no object was damaged. No person was injured. I was able to push the Light-Sport plane to a nearby road where it was towed away.Contributing Factors:Airplane: A Light-Sport plane is more vulnerable to gusts and has less power.Attitude: In retrospect; had I added full power immediately; I may have been able to regain flight. Probably the overconfident macho attitude 'I can handle it' contributed the incident.Conditions: Trees; hills; and the open area probably produced gusts and directional changes in the wind.Different planes: I had just recently flown my Cessna T210 16 hours during the week; and I may have instinctively treated the Light Sport as if I were still in the T210 regarding the slow adding of power so as to not over-boost the turbo.Corrective Actions: Emphasis on transition both from light to heavier aircraft and the reverse from heavier to lighter.Human Performance Considerations:Macho attitudeGreater familiarity and comfort - training the body to respond in another airplane than the one being flown.Fatigue: The non-reportable incident occurred after a long week of travelling.

Avid Mk IV pilot reported inadvertently touching down in a muddy area during a simulated landing which resulted in a slow speed nose-over.

1021639

201207

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

US

2500.0

CLR

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Climb

PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer

X

Design

Company

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

1021639

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy

Company Policy

New computer performance data system is either flawed or being misapplied by our flight operations group. For example: for today's takeoff from Munich Runway 26R; the old system (FMS provided) would have been V1; VR and V2 speeds of 151; 154 and 158 KTS. The sys provided speeds are 164; 166 and 169 KTS. Thus; with the old system; you continue the takeoff with speed once at or above 151 KTS but; with the new system; you continue the takeoff with speed at or above 164 KTS. Thus; B777 pilots may ABORT their takeoff at HIGHER speeds (164 KTS vs 151 KTS) with this new system; which is closer to the Vmbe [Maximum Brake Energy] speed as well as closer to the far end of the runway. However; sufficient runway remains to successfully abort. Conclusion - Our Carrier prefers to have the aircraft ON THE GROUND. Since all the Emergency Vehicles are on the GROUND; that makes sense. With the imprecisely defined wet runway data; the crew is directed to CONTINUE the takeoff when V1 is the equivalent of Vmcg [Minimum Control speed Ground]. This is reportedly due to controllability concerns with an engine loss. Conclusion - our Carrier prefers that an aircraft be AIRBORNE; committing to taking off at the LOWEST possible V1 speed IF there is a chance of a slippery runway. However; an ABORT would be highly desirable for any number of serious mechanical problems; even with an engine loss. Even an engine FIRE does not necessarily mean a loss of thrust on the engine. In any emergency near Vmcg; reducing the thrust to idle eliminates directional control concerns anyway if they were to exist at all. That is why the Captain's hand is ON the THROTTLES until committed to taking off. Under normal conditions; the new system produces a HIGHER V1 speed while the ill-defined wet runway rule produces a LESS SAFE operation with a MINIMUM V1 speed. The risk exposure is indefensible. The wet runway procedure eliminates; actually prohibits; an ABORT at the speeds just above Vmcg. Instead; an extended takeoff roll is required unnecessarily; with or without asymmetric thrust concerns. A takeoff can be in doubt for many reasons besides an engine loss. Continuing the takeoff requires any number of additional procedures related to the malfunction; as well as dumping fuel; navigating; conducting an approach in a degraded condition. The training center's analysis; defending their position; stated that it gave the pilot 'more time to practice' a long takeoff run with asymmetric thrust. Continuing the takeoff [for steering practice] is the equivalent of choosing the furthest exit in a burning building to get practice dodging falling debris. That does not justify this solution for a once in a lifetime emergency. The FAA's own Takeoff Safety pamphlet states a widebody crew could expect one of these events every 30 years. Our own airline has a much better batting average. The fact that the new program can assign a wide range of speeds for V1; from Vmcg to Vmbe; means that our own organization has set this illogical policy. If you cannot trust a crew to abort a takeoff just above Vmcg; why would you have confidence in them completing a series of far more difficult procedures and checklists which result in greater safety risks; greater fuel costs; and greater demands on maintenance? Changing the slippery runway low V1 speed policy should be closely examined by pilots other than the pilots who made that determination.

A B777 Captain believes his airline is improperly utilizing aircraft takeoff performance data particularly with respect to takeoffs from a slippery runway.

1110986

201308

1801-2400

ZBW.ARTCC

NH

VMC

Center ZBW

Air Carrier

Dash 8-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZBW

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

1110986

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1110987.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

On climbout we were given two left turns and we were now heading towards ALB. Departure then gave us direct to HANAA and a frequency change to BOS Center. The aircraft turned 180 degrees because we had HANNA programmed into the FMS instead of HANAA. When we realized the mistake; BOS Center asked where we were going; we replied that we had put the wrong HANAA in; Center jokingly replied 'go direct ALB; there is only one of those.' We then turned direct to ALB and continued the flight.When verifying the flight plan; be sure to check the total mileage in the FMS; check the spelling letter by letter of each fix. HANAA and HANNA are so similar; we both missed the Data Entry error.

No additional information was provided in the secondary narrative.

When cleared direct to HANAA waypoint the flight crew of a Dash 8 entered HANNA from their legs page; not realizing it had been misspelled in their filed route. The start of a 180 degree turn alerted them to the error and they were recleared direct to a local VOR.

1279100

201507

1201-1800

P80.TRACON

OR

2500.0

Daylight

TRACON P80

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class C PDX

TRACON P80

Small Aircraft

1.0

VFR

Cruise

None

Class C PDX

Facility P80.TRACON

Government

Approach; Instructor

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

1279100

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

Staffing

I was monitoring the North sector and waiting for the training team in North to give a briefing to me and my trainee. At the same time Final was being split off from North and they would be briefed at the same time. The trainer and trainee were obviously very busy and engaged with the traffic complexities while working North and Final combined. This caused an unnecessary situation when Final should have been already opened. The trainee working North cleared [Aircraft X] for an ILS approach to RWY28L (maintain 025 until established) even though a VFR callup was going to cross [Aircraft X`s] path in the next 5 miles at 025. The trainer who was busy watching many other situations in the North sector took over and turned Aircraft X to a 250 heading; cancelling his approach clearance; and tried turning the VFR aircraft; who didn`t respond; but it was not looking good. The two aircraft passed within a mile of each other. There has been a big push at P80 to combine sectors because of staffing; meetings; lack of awareness of traffic; and it is making for an unsafe environment for the flying public. #1 ATM [Air Traffic Manager] is new and on the fast track to bigger things. ATM has spent very little time understanding the TRACON environment and this disconnect roles down hill. The FLM's [Front Line Managers] are frustrated and not staying engaged with the traffic flows. Safety has to be our first priority and I don`t feel it is. FLM's are criticized for calling overtime or keeping sectors opened. It was only by the grace of God and 'the big sky' theory that someone didn't die today.

P80 Controller reports of an airborne conflict that was saved by the instructor. The reporter also states that the positions were combined and caused an unnecessary situation when the final position should have been open.

1287607

201508

0001-0600

ACK.Airport

MA

0.0

Tower ACK

Beechjet 400

1.0

Takeoff / Launch

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Flying

1287607

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Right engine did not make N1 takeoff power. It needed to make 98.5 but only provided 97.9 and the N1 number started to roll back during takeoff roll. An abort takeoff was executed; all procedures and checklists were followed. ATC was notified and we taxied back to [parking]; Called maintenance and reported issue.

A BE-400XP First Officer reported rejecting the takeoff when the right engine failed to produce calculated takeoff thrust.

1751701

202007

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Apprentice

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1751701

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Human Factors

Aircraft X was placed in short term storage on [date]. The step in Job Card XX to disconnect the main batteries was accomplished/stamped off; but not documented in the AML as required. The same day; 2hrs later; Job Card XY was issued to take Aircraft X out of short term storage. The step to reconnect the aircraft batteries was accomplished/stamped off; but once again it wasn't documented in the AML as required. Both groups of technicians failed to show compliance to document in the AML these steps. Paperwork audit found the discrepancy and it has been rectified on AML XX; to show it had been accomplished. A message has also been sent to records to show correct date work was complied with. Miscommunication between technicians assigned both job cards. Technicians need to verify work accomplished on job cards before submitting finalized package. Better communication between technicians assigned to the tasks.

Technician reported problems with job cards not being signed off correctly.

1446873

201705

1201-1800

PCT.TRACON

VA

4000.0

VMC

TRACON PCT

Military

Fighting Falcon F16

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class E PCT

TRACON PCT

Military

Fighting Falcon F16

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Cruise

Vectors

Class E PCT

Facility PCT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.0

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1446873

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Manuals

A formation flight requested breakup. I issued a beacon code to the second aircraft; issued holding instructions as requested 4000 feet and approved Aircraft X go to initial as requested. I instructed Aircraft X 'when able descend to 2500 feet'. I was informed I had an operational error because I didn't tell Aircraft Y to instruct Aircraft X to descend to 2500 feet when able. FAA 7110.65W paragraph 2-1-13 Note 1 states' Separation responsibility between aircraft within the formation during transition to individual control rests with the pilots concerned until approved separation has been approved.'A memorandum interprets this to mean we can only issue control instructions through the lead aircraft. How can this interpretation be construed from this note? It clearly states that separation responsibility rests with the pilots does it not? To add this extra requirement when it's obviously not the intent of this note is ridiculous. It's apparent that [the memorandum] is intending to complicate and infer a simple interpretation. This facility has had numerous operational errors attributed to this incorrect memorandum. Redact this memorandum and apply this note as it's obviously intended. Military flights know they are responsible for their separation until another form of separation is attained.

A TRACON Controller reported providing instructions for a military formation flight break up in accordance with FAA H 7110.65 but did not relay instructions through the flight lead.

1261091

201505

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

34000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1261091

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload

1261186.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Gate Agent / CSR

In-flight; Taxi; Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Company Policy

After the plane had pushed back from the gate; operations in the departure station called the coordinator and informed him that the load report they had given the captain was incorrect; that the bag count as actually 66 bags and not 64 bags. The captain was immediately notified via ACARS of the miscount and it was believed the issue was resolved. A few minutes later; departure station operations calls the coordinator again; this time saying the cargo load was incorrect; that it was 1;806 lbs. more than reported on the load report. Coordinator asks what the correct load is; and they said it was actually 4;046 lbs. At this time I go to message the Captain again to tell him not to take off and realized the plane was already airborne. I inform the captain that the load report is off by at least 1;800 lbs. and tell him to contact me via Radio so we can go over his numbers to calculate the actual Center of Gravity (CG) of the aircraft. While I am verbally discussing with the Captain about the initial load report; trying to calculate the new CG and verifying if the aircraft is handling within limits; we both questioned the new reported cargo weight as it exceeds the aft bin limit. The Captain informed me that he had tried several times before takeoff to verify the final load report with the rampers and ops in the departure station. Another Dispatcher contacts the departure station operations and verifies the amount to be 4;046 lbs. Since this both exceeds the max limit of the cargo hold and therefore prevents an accurate CG of being calculated; and since the CG will move farther aft as the fuel in the wings gets lower; the coordinator and myself felt the flight was no longer safe and I messaged the Captain to divert to a nearby airport since it was the nearest suitable airport. The Captain asked me to verify I wanted him to divert now and I replied yes; that station ops was already informed and provided him with weather and ops freq. As the flight diverted; I calculated the actual payload on the aircraft and provided it to the Captain. Although the cargo been exceeded max weight; the aircraft did not land over max landing weight. The pilot landed without incident. The divert station ops verified the bags to have been 62 bags and 4 heavy bags totaling 70 bags with the cargo being 2;668 lbs.I suggest better communication between operations and flight crew. Operations could have radioed the flight crew immediately as going through dispatch about a significant error caused a delay in relaying the information to the pilots.

This event started prior to closing the door. The ramp personnel asked the First Officer during his walk around if we could accommodate a load of freight weighing a total of approximately 2;000 lbs. He instructed them to wait on loading until he could confirm the load could be safely accommodated. When he returned to the ramp; the cargo was already loaded in the aft compartment and he was told it was actually only approximately 1;000 lbs. When we received the Cargo Load Report; it indicated total load of 59 standard and 5 heavy bags in forward cargo and 1;071 lbs. freight loaded in aft cargo compartment. We ran the reported load and received an ACARS report stating to move 4 passengers from section 'C' to section 'A' to adjust Center of Gravity (CG) index within limits. We did this; ran new load with passengers moved and received good takeoff performance numbers. After closing the door; the tug driver said they'd made a mistake and that we should add 1 standard bag to forward compartment and the actual weight in rear cargo was 2;208 lbs. I asked twice to clarify these numbers since his English was poor and I wasn't satisfied with his confidence in his count. We ran new numbers anyway; and adjusted once again the passengers per the ACARS instruction. All at the same time; after already being instructed to push the aircraft 'tail west' and telling the tug driver twice to stop the push; he pushed aircraft tail east. We disconnected with the approval of ramp and I decided to call ops before moving to confirm the load numbers. After a few minutes; I was told by someone claiming to be the Ramp Manager via ops frequency; that the second numbers I had received were in fact accurate. So we taxied out. Just prior to reaching the runway; we received message from dispatch stating to once again add 2 bags to the forward cargo. We did this received numbers; and we're cleared for takeoff. The takeoff seemed normal. After being airborne for what I think was approximately 30 minutes; Dispatch informed us that; yet again; the departure station ops called and stated the load actually being 4049lbs in rear cargo. This was obviously an exceedance to the cargo compartments weight limitations. At this point I contacted dispatch via Atlanta Radio and discussed the prior events and had them run performance with new numbers. They informed me that the CG was outside limits. They called departure station ops again to confirm the weight; and then instructed me that the 4049lbs was accurate and we should divert to a nearby airport. I concurred. We began this process; I [notified ATC] and instructed [them] of our intent; briefed FA's and Passengers and descended into the divert airport. I updated the ZFW in computer and realized I could burn enough gas off to prevent overweight landing; so I did. We touched down at approximately 74;000 lbs. Landing was uneventful. Arriving at the gate we had ramp personnel remove and weigh all cargo from rear compartment and also verify the contents of the forward compartment as well. The actual contents of both compartments were: 62 standard/4 heavy forward and 3;592 lbs. in the rear compartment. I made a write up in the aircraft mx logbook for the weight exceedance in the rear cargo and did not reload any of the rear cargo. We departed with only the bags in the forward compartment without any further complications.Ramp personnel should have received more training. Don't think they're aware of the dangers of overloading an aircraft.

An ERJ-175 Captain questioned operations before takeoff about the weight and balance accuracy and was given a revision. Inflight Dispatch advised the crew of an error and later diverted them because the load was off at least 1;800 lbs. The cargo compartment weight limitations were exceeded.

1294780

201509

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Bonanza 35

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Final Approach

Class E ZZZ

Powerplant Fuel Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 50

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

1294780

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

We departed and climbed to approx. 3000 ft. and orbited the runway for 3-4 patterns at that time we began to climb to 5000 ft.; after several orbits we began a downwind to base turn and I observed the Manifold pressure indicator decreasing. I made an immediate turn to the runway and adjusted the throttle. The manifold pressure gauge did not react to throttle inputs. At that time I setup for best glide and changed from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. At some time in the guide it appeared to me that we would be high; so I extended the gear. Prior to the approach end of [the runway] is a set of train tracks and a set telephone wires. As we got closer to the airport I was not sure I was going make the runway. I had a field to my left so I choose to put the aircraft down in the field. I made a turn to align with the borrows in the field and extended flaps. After touchdown the engine was observed to still be running; I again adjusted the throttle with no observed change in engine operation. The cowl panel was removed and the throttle cable linkage was observed to be loose. The linkage was reinstalled and an engine run-up was performed. All parameters appeared to be normal. I performed a test taxi and then parked the aircraft in the corner of the field for Inspection.

A Beechcraft M35 pilot lost manifold pressure while descending and turning downwind to base leg. He immediately turned toward the runway while noticing that the manifold pressure gauge did not respond to throttle inputs and landed in a field near the airport. Upon inspection; the throttle cable linkage was observed to be loose.

1809599

202105

0601-1200

SJU.TRACON

PR

258.0

11.0

2500.0

VMC

Haze; 5

Daylight

5000

TRACON SJU

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach; Initial Approach

Class C SJU

Autopilot

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

1809599

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Approach control cleared us direct to WESEN for ILS [Runway] 08 [approach] at SJU. Captain was Pilot Flying; First Officer was Pilot Monitoring. This was the second leg of the night for this three day pairing of a long duty day. Level at 3;000 ft. (pilot selected) then cleared descent to 2;500 ft. (pilot selected) accomplished in vertical speed. Aircraft pilot selected speed was 180 kts. Controller assigned heading 110 to intercept and then cleared us for ILS [Runway] 08 approach. Approach/Land was armed and 'Land Armed' was displayed on PFD. The localizer remained identified and aircraft turned to intercept inbound course. Glide slope was above. Halfway through the intercept; the aircraft made an abrupt pitch-up followed by a thrust increase. This was very unusual as I have never experienced or seen an aircraft climb to capture a glide slope. While this was happening the aircraft exited approach/land mode and reverted to heading mode and solid bow tie altitude (2;500 ft.) All FMAs were 'white'. During the automation the aircraft pitched up and altitude was approximately 3;000 ft. in an attempt to capture the glide slope. The FO made a quick analysis and quick calls to the pilot flying while I was simultaneously disconnecting the autopilot and manually retarding the throttles to correct this anomaly. The aircraft was stabilized and a hand flown ILS was accomplished without autopilot assistance. This aircraft was scheduled for an 'auto land' for currency requirements and subsequently not accomplished. The First Officer monitoring that was accomplished and the verbal inputs from the FO were timely and appropriate; solid CRM. A note in our company aircrew briefing guide notes: Safety Alert Runway 08 Intermittent Glideslope Weak or intermittent glideslope signals have been reported when using ILS Runway 08. Exercise caution and intercept glideslope at the altitude depicted on the approach chart to guard against following a false glide slope signal. If the crew experiences any anomalies while conducting the approach; report the incident to tower and file an event report.

Air carrier Captain reported an unreliable glideslope signal at SJU Airport.

1661543

201907

1801-2400

SCT.TRACON

CA

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Vectors

Class B SAN

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class B SAN

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Approach; Instructor

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Distraction; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1661543

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Y

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

This was my first OJTI session on the arrival sector. The developmental issued Aircraft X a heading toward the final; but did not instruct the aircraft to join (vector angle too large). The aircraft began slowing as Aircraft Y was coming up behind. The developmental recognized the blow through of the final and issued a LA (low altitude) alert and a turn back west. We were focusing on Aircraft X and getting him out of the MVA that we didn't notice right away Aircraft Y overtaking; but still with vertical separation. I eventually had Aircraft Y maintain Visual Separation with Aircraft X; but I don't know exactly at what point that occurred. There were other IFR conflicts that we were focusing on and traffic was getting busier. I failed to listen actively and assumed Aircraft X was going to join the final. I should have stopped Aircraft Y at 4;000; but was too concerned about Aircraft X and the MVA. I realize that in this sector; control from the OJTI must be maintained constantly or things get out of hand quickly - not like other sectors where there's room to correct actions.

SCT Controller reported a loss of separation and a MVA violation.

1147864

201402

1201-1800

MCI.Airport

MO

0.0

IMC

1

Dusk

1000

Ground MCI

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 248; Flight Crew Type 16000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1147864

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airport

We landed on 1L in MCI. Weather was 1;000 FT ceiling and one mile with snow. I took aircraft after landing rollout and taxied clear of runway. Ground first gave taxi instructions; 'B; M' to gate and asked about braking conditions on taxiway and runway. We thought runway and taxiways were good. As we approached Taxiway M; Ground said we could use Taxiway M1. I turned onto M1 since it was a shorter distance to our gate and wouldn't require as many sharp turns on the snowy taxiways. The taxiways had some snow on them; but the yellow center lines were visible and the blue taxiway lights were highly visible as it was starting to get dark.While approaching the gate the aircraft pulled [yawed] right four or five feet. We were still on the taxiway and we were trying to figure out what happened and whether we should proceed. We then noticed that the Number 2 engine had shutdown. We notified Ground that we would need a tow and contacted Company Ops. We shut down the other engine and let the passengers know it was going to be a few minutes to get to the gate. After Ops and Company Maintenance arrived; we saw that the right main gear and engine were in a snow drift and arranged for air stairs and busses to take the passengers to the terminal.Airport Ops needs to ensure that the taxiways are better cleared. The snow had been cleared from the centerline of M1 but had been pushed into a three to four foot drift on the taxiway; not off the taxiway. With the light snow covering and the darkening conditions; the snow drift was not visible from the cockpit.

While taxiing to the gate on darkening; snow covered and slippery MCI taxiways the flight crew of a B737NG failed to note that plowed snow was built up three or four feet on the taxiway itself. The right main gear and engine impacted the snow drift and they shut down the jet and removed the passengers by bus.

1198468

201408

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Fractional

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

2.0

Part 135

Passenger

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Work Cards

Emergency Brake System

Dassault

X

Hangar / Base

Fractional

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party2 Maintenance

1198468

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Other During Maintenance

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Human Factors

Myself and Technician Y were working on a Cessna CE560E aircraft inspection. We performed the task which checks the Emergency Braking System. One of the final steps is to disconnect the [Emergency Brake] line and blow it out with alcohol to make sure that if there's any fluid (Skydrol); that it's cleaned out. When removing the Right-Hand (R/H) side; the 'B' nut was partially seized and the line broke while being removed. I capped the line on the aircraft side and took the broken line and placed it on the table by my Lead Mechanic. I told him that the line broke and that it needed [to be] written-up and a new line ordered. It has been three weeks since all of this happened; so I don't know what his exact reaction was as far as a thumbs ups; an O.K.; or even just a nod; but I do know that I was under the impression that he heard me and understood. I then turned around and went back to cleaning up after the [Inspection] Checks we had accomplished. Apparently the Lead Mechanic didn't hear me; or misunderstood because the line was not ordered and was not written up and from my understanding it was found on the Post Maintenance Checklist this past weekend. The broken line was the one that connects directly to the Brake Assembly and going from their Removal and Replacement here is the Part Number (P/N) 6527365-16 and it's found in the Cessna CE-560 Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 32-41-00; Figure 04a; Item # 2. Not sure what could be done differently other than double checking all of the write-ups and parts when your Lead finishes for the day...but not sure that's 100 % possible. This is the first time I have had to fill out one of these reports.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician was informed that a broken Emergency Brake System line he had removed and capped off was not replaced on their Cessna CE-560E aircraft. The brake line was discovered missing during a Post Maintenance Check.

1831997

202108

0.0

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Gate / Ramp / Line

Observer

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1831997

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Ramp

N

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

A [ramp employee] driving a cargo loader cut in front of a 787 marshaling in at gate XX at XA20 on Date; the right wing walker did have his stop signal but the aircraft could not stopped. The [ramp employee] barely made it to the right side of aircraft with out any incidents.

Ramp Agent reported observing a cargo loader cut in front of a taxiing Dreamliner as it was being marshalled into the gate. The Observer further stated that it was impossible to stop the Dreamliner and the cargo loader was able to get out of the way.

1090178

201305

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

28000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-82

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1090178

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

N

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Weather; Aircraft

Aircraft

We had descended from FL320 to FL280 due to turbulence. Upon reaching FL280 an acrid odor briefly presented in cockpit. Shortly thereafter the flight attendants reported an odor in the cabin and advised the passengers were very concerned. We turned off galley power and recirc fans and increased cabin altitude to dissipate the odor; which seemed to help temporarily as the attendants reported that they were not sure if the odor was gone or not. We then decided to divert to a nearby airport and so advised ATC and company operations. While proceeding direct to the airport in the descent the cabin reported the odor was recurring. Maintained as high airspeed as possible consistent with ride conditions to reduce enroute time and deviated from SOP to get the jet on the ground in minimum time. Landed overweight but softly in the touchdown zone.

An MD-82 flight crew declared an emergency diverted to a nearby airport and landed overweight but uneventfully when acrid odors permeated the cockpit and passenger cabin.

1266251

201505

1801-2400

TOL.TRACON

OH

4000.0

Daylight

TRACON TOL

Military

Fighter

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Tactical

Descent

Visual Approach

Class C TOL

Facility TOL.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1266251

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

My Supervisor who was working as arrival data and had the shift took a call from the tower controller. The tower controller informed him that an inbound flight of military aircraft needed to do a hung ordinance procedure due to a practice bomb possibly stuck on the plane. The supervisor then informed me that the Aircraft wanted to do a 'practice hung ordinance procedure.' It turns out that the supervisor misinterprited what the tower controller was saying and gave me incorrect information. I was treating it as a practice procedure and was going to work it into the rest of my pattern traffic based on what the supervisor told me. Soon after I started the flight split up and vectors to accommodate the aircrafts request I was told by the flight lead that they [had a situation] due to the hung ordinance. I asked to confirm that this was an exercise and that they wanted to do a practice procedure. At that time I was told that the hung ordinance was a practice bomb not that they wanted a practice procedure. I had to scramble to turn aircraft out of the way to accommodate the priority and to turn Aircraft X away form populated areas. This would not have been needed had I been given the correct information from the supervisor. The supervisors lack of knowledge and inattention to detail contributed to making the situation much harder and unsafe than it needed to be. I am unsure how to rectify this.

TOL TRACON Controller reports of being told about a practice hung ordinance requested procedure. Controller later finds out it was not a practice; but the aircraft had actual hung ordinance and had possibly flown over populated areas.

1192462

201408

DEN.Airport

CO

1000.0

VMC

Tower DEN

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B DEN

Altimeter

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1192462

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Our night flight to Denver was uneventful with several weather deviations enroute and during descent. We were cleared to descend via the CREDE2 Arrival into DEN. Passing thru FL180 the Descent Checklist was completed and the current altimeter was read off from the ATIS sheet. Descent profile was flown and all speed and altitude restrictions were met; with no ATC inquiry. Speed restrictions were later removed by Approach Control. Weather was CAVU. Downwind at assigned altitude of 11;000 FT; a slow down was directed and instructions were issued to us for a vector to intercept [Runway] 16R; and a visual approach. A normal approach was underway with glideslope and PAPI eyeball intercept; way outside the FAF. The aircraft was fully configured early and above 2;000 FT AGL. All systems normal. All displays on PFD and ND screens normal. On speed and on glideslope profile; +/- 1/2 dot glideslope. At 1;000 FT AGL the First Officer read the appropriate checklist and noticed abnormal LDG MEMO text. Before he could say anything; our ND screens went full RED and EGPWS went off with full TERRAIN warning. An immediate go-around was initiated. When the dust settled; heading out and downwind; we were given an updated altimeter setting; headings and altitude for another approach; and a runway change to [Runway] 16L .We quickly discussed what happened; completed appropriate checklists; housekeeping; and set up a game plan for another approach. We had no immediate clue as to why we got an EGPWS Terrain warning at 1;000 FT over flat land on approach; stabilized and on glideslope.The First Officer did observe; just before the EGPWS activated; that the screen showed only green Seat Belt; No Smoking; and also Ground Spoilers Armed. This was an incorrect display for the situation. Given VFR situational awareness; confusion and lack of problematic terrain; EGPWS was disabled for the next approach and all went well. I then called and discussed this event with an ATC Supervisor; Dispatch; Duty Manager; and Maintenance Control. Learning point: When we received an updated altimeter setting after the go-around; we were surprised to see our current setting low and incorrect; causing us to be slightly high in reality. It appears that the wrong airport ATIS printout was reviewed and announced when setting the Baro Altimeters. Given that; the altimeter discrepancy was never enough for ATC to question any altitude discrepancies. With continuing debrief and consultation with the training department and our Airbus Techs; it is possible that our incorrect altimeter setting was the reason for the EGPWS Terrain Warning and landing memo issue at 1;000 FT. Otherwise a possible map shift or system fault. Further sleuthing will continue. Reconfirmation of the correct airport ATIS being read during high workload descents is now a given; as is in normal operations.

A319 Captain experiences an EGPWS warning at 1;000 FT AGL during night visual approach to Runway 16R at DEN. A go-around is initiated and the flight returns for another approach with the EGPWS deactivated. An altimeter setting error is discovered during the next approach causing the aircraft to be higher than actual; but the impact of this error on the EGPWS is not clear.

1345699

201604

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

Company

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Other Load Planner

Other / Unknown

1345699

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Work Refused

Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

ZZZ cargo entered 2 items containing flammable liquids onto the DG Load Control Plan form. Item X indicated a net weight of 25lbs with a remark line 33lbs flammable liquid. The load planner questioned the accuracy of the 2 items and held the items off when it became clear that ZZZ cargo was not sure of the weights of both the container and the flammable liquid.

A Load Planner stopped two dangerous goods items containing flammable liquid from being loaded onto an aircraft because of inaccurate weights of the containers and liquids.

1803821

202104

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation; Inspection; Work Cards

Emergency Equipment

Improperly Operated

Hangar / Base

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

1803821

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

1801864.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure

Procedure

Pilot write up of missing 2nd fire extinguisher not installed to aircraft first class bin for having the new interior mod. Contacted Maintenance Control Technician had given me an eco number of [X] for new mod should got a separate engineering authorization for extinguisher only.

One fire extinguisher was missing in the forward over head bin this was to be installed IAW a mod to the aircraft but was never installed see mic # [X] Unknown if the ECO (Engineering Change Order) was completed and how long the fire extinguisher was missing.I think the ECO for the plane was not completed.

Mechanics reported missing portable fire extinguisher after aircraft had undergone an interior modification; requiring an Engineering Authorization to account for the missing required safety equipment.

1173250

201405

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

N

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Installation; Inspection; Repair; Work Cards

Horizontal Stabilizer

Boeing

X

Malfunctioning

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Inspector

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1173250

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Technician 23

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1173253.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance