elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

995961

201202

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dusk

Air Taxi

Helicopter

Part 135

Ambulance

Parked

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Work Cards

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Contracted Service

Maintenance Inspection Authority

Maintenance Inspector 20

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

995961

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Company Policy

After performing maintenance on a helicopter Air Ambulance; I noticed an outbreak of a skin rash on my arms. Consequently; this was found to be caused by a shop issue. But; I inquired to the flight crew as to what cleaning agents are used to disinfect the interior after a patient transfer flight. The crew member responded by stating; they do not have any supplied cleaning agents and seldom will wipe down the medical interior. If they do; they will use the window cleaner or aircraft exterior cleaning soap.This practice puts the Maintenance personnel at risk for contamination. After researching general guidelines and several state requirements for Air Ambulance Operations; all were strongly in agreement as to post flight decontamination. Not so much from the actual patient; but the medical equipment such as gurneys; bags; attendants' shoes/garments as possible sources for biological contamination. Our Part 135 Manual states it is the medical team's responsibility to decontaminate the aircraft after use; but the team is usually busy with off-loading the patient while the aircraft remains running. The aircraft will depart with no medical interior cleaning performed. Recommendations: the cleaning should be part of the post flight operation and written into the operations specifications as such.

A Maintenance employee reported that the company's Air Ambulance Operations staff do not disinfect cabin interiors or medical equipment on their helicopters after each patient transfer; even though the requirement is in their Part 135 Manual. That practice puts Maintenance personnel at risk for contamination while working the aircraft.

1015699

201206

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

700.0

Marginal

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 135

Ambulance

Cruise

VFR Route

Class E ZZZ

Autopilot

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

1015699

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Weather

Weather

During a night time IFR flight in VFR conditions autopilot # 1 stopped working; at the destination hospital deferred and MEL'd the autopilot. Aircraft restricted to VFR only. In cruise flight returning with patient I received weather of 1;300 FT on the AWOS at ZZZ1 and clear at ZZZ2. The weather between the two facilities appeared lower. At 700 AGL the flight became inadvertent IMC. I started a climb; declared an emergency with Approach. Approach gave radar vectors to the ILS 12R at ZZZ1. It appeared no other traffic was around at this hour of the morning. I flew the approach comfortably using the autopilot that was now working but MEL'd. Broke out from the approach and flew VFR to the hospital with out incident. I declared an emergency due to the aircraft was restricted to VFR; and inadvertent IMC. Don't fly the aircraft with a MEL'd autopilot. I don't know what I could have done differently with the weather. All indications were 1;300 FT and clear. Forecast was for 1;500 FT broken. I followed company procedures for deteriorating weather.

BHT-430 pilot inadvertantly entered IMC on a VFR approach and declared an emergency due to the fact that the helicopter was restricted to VFR flight because of an autopilot malfunction. While on an ILS approach coordinated by ATC; pilot broke out into VMC and landed VFR.

1018286

201206

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

37000.0

CLR

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic Syst Reservoir Tank

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Human-Machine Interface

1018286

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Approximately two hours after takeoff at FL370 we experienced a HYD G RSVR LO ECAM shortly followed by a FWS SDAC1 FAULT ECAM. Duties were delegated and the ECAM procedures were accomplished in reference to the Flight Manual. Dispatch was contacted via voice patch and Maintenance Control was also notified by Dispatch. A review of the situation was done; including en route and destination weather forecasts. Due to the forecast of thunderstorms and gusty winds at the forecast time of arrival and after; Dispatch informed us that holding times were starting to be issued. The decision to divert was made. The weather and the possibility of windshear and/or a go around and subsequent chance of divert with landing gear extended were driving factors. Dispatch took care of coordinating the equipment (tow in) on the ground and the notification of the station of our inbound status. An emergency was declared in order to facilitate handling and ensure a runway into the gusty wind would be available. The flight attendants were briefed and passengers informed of the situation. Upon arrival; the landing gear was gravity extended successfully; all pertinent checklists accomplished and uneventful landing made. As a note; the hydraulics were in the normal range on preflight. When the landing gear was gravity extended; the Green hydraulic level went to well over-serviced. The mechanics who met the aircraft at the gate also noted the reservoir was over serviced.

An A319 had a HYD G RSVR LO ECAM shortly followed by a FWS SDAC1 FAULT ECAM. Forecast weather at the destination led to a divert to a suitable alternate. After landing; the Green system reservoir was found to be over serviced.

1631167

201903

0601-1200

JNX.Airport

NC

3500.0

Daylight

CTAF JNX

Personal

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach; Direct

Class E JNX

CTAF JNX

Other flight school

Diamond Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Class E JNX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 320; Flight Crew Type 175

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1631167

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 75

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Airport

Human Factors

Departed VFR flight to JNX [at] 3;500 [feet]. Contacted RDU Approach for flight following to JNX. RDU cleared me to JNX with no reported traffic. Authorized change to local frequency at JNX. Local frequency as published is 122.80. Received weather report via local AWOS. Wind 150 at 3. Selected RWY 21 for landing. Made numerous calls on local frequency advising of intentions. ADSB In indicated no traffic in the area. Was concerned that I did not hear anyone. Double checked frequencies to make sure I was on correct frequency both by checking frequency listed in Garmin 750 frequency listing and on charts books. All listed same frequency. Proceeded with landing sequence. Just before touchdown; I saw Aircraft Y on runway headed toward me; either landing or departing on RWY 3. Pretty sure he was in a takeoff roll; but not sure. We both avoid each other by veering to the right. Both planes were at that point in taxi mode passing about 50 feet apart in opposite directions. Both planes taxi to ramp; and pilots both met to find out what happened. I asked the other pilot if he heard my calls and he said no. He asked what frequency I was on and told him. He reported that frequency had been changed 'a few weeks ago;' he asked if I had listened to weather and I told him yes and he said there was a recording at the end of the report that advise pilots of the change. I went back and listened to the report and in fact it is there at the end. There is; however; about a 2 second gap when the weather report ends and the notice comes on. As normal; I had changed back to my comm radio to continue landing. Wind that day was always favoring RWY 21 for departures and takeoffs and I saw no traffic and Raleigh saw no traffic; but still proceeded with caution.Raleigh did not report any frequency change at my arrival airport and reported no traffic when they released me. Not sure what their process is when these sorts of changes are made. I recognize it is up to me to make sure I have the data. At same time; I used every resource I had on board to confirm frequency. This is not an airport that I visit often.Suggestion to JNX staff or controlling agency that they put the frequency change notice at the beginning of the weather report rather than the end. Things happen so fast; any delay could be missed; which I did in fact miss this.

General Aviation pilot reported a near miss with an opposite direction aircraft when attempting to land.

1590245

201810

0601-1200

DWH.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Fog; 5

Daylight

Tower DWH

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Taxi

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1450; Flight Crew Type 835

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1590245

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Human Factors; Weather

Airport

On arrival at the airport; our aircraft [was] not in ready position as requested. Were told by line personnel prop planes often moved to make way for jets. Fog not in forecast; delayed VFR departure to make appointment. When conditions became VFR; we thought we could depart VFR and started engines and requested taxi clearance. Ground said airport still IFR. Requested IFR clearance to VFR on top and were advised they were unable to request IFR clearance. Ground said I could call Unicom on 122.95 or 'our company' to request IFR. Shut down engines and called FSS on cell phone from airplane. After going through their automated menu; the Briefer said there was another number to call to file IFR. Called the second number and gave info and were told clearance should be printing out at DWH in a few seconds. Called Ground on portable radio and were told clearance request was not done correctly.Ground then advised airport about to go VFR and asked if we wanted to depart VFR. Started engines and did run-up on ramp. Requested taxi clearance and flight following with Ground and were told to taxi to Runway 17R via Charlie. Requested directions and understood we were to go right past the Falcon parked on the ramp. I do not recall hearing any hold short instructions. Proceeded perhaps 100' past the Falcon and encountered an intersection and noted the sign on the left indicated we were on Charlie. To our right was what appeared to be a closed taxiway with X's. Continued to taxi and turned right on what I thought was Runway 17L being used as a taxiway. After taxiing about 300 feet on what turned out to be Runway 17R; I was called by Ground Control and told to contact the Tower; which I did. I exited the runway at taxiway Alpha and stopped to await further instructions. The Tower told us they were required to submit a possible pilot deviation and that I might receive a call from the FSDO. We were then cleared for takeoff and flew home.I allowed a series of frustrating events to affect my situational awareness. I have determined that when I become aware that events are affecting my judgement or performance; I will exit the airplane and take a break. And I will verify taxi instructions on the airport diagram before moving the airplane. If I am even the least bit uncertain of my clearance; I will call for progressive taxi instructions. I just completed the AOPA Runway Safety course and have changed my preflight routine to consider ground operations to be as important as those in the air. The signage at DWH is inadequate. There should also be mandatory hold short instructions in all taxi clearances for Runway 17R at Charlie.

GA pilot reported a runway incursion due to disorientation from confusing signage and markings at DWH.

1772144

202011

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

110.0

VMC

Clear; 10

Daylight

Personal

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

1.0

Other 107

None

Personal

Cruise

None

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Other UAV ground pilot

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Situational Awareness

1772144

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors

I began the drone flight to inspect the subject property roof thinking I had the automated FAA authorization to fly in the Class D ZZZ airspace. After realizing that I had not written down the authorization on my work order I immediately discontinued the flight and landed the drone. I then tried to obtain the automated approval through the Airmap application. Per the Airmap application; approvals up to 400 feet could be obtained; however; the application stated that the approval was not available on an automated basis at that time. Flight was discontinued. The max height the drone climbed to was 110 feet without approval for a period less than a couple of minutes. Pilot error was not obtaining approval before flight. The pilot thought the approval was already obtained which was the reason the drone flight was started. Future corrective action is to include the approval verification in the preflight checklist.

UAV pilot reported pilot error in not obtaining authorization for the flight.

1630809

201903

1801-2400

LAX.Airport

CA

3000.0

VMC

10

Night

25000

TRACON SCT

Air Taxi

Learjet 55

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Climb

SID ORCKA2 RNAV

Class B LAX

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B LAX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 400

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1630809

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 840; Flight Crew Type 150

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1630813.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Horizontal 5000

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were cleared for takeoff on 25R at LAX behind [a B737-800] as soon as he rotated. I knew we would be off before his takeoff point. I did not know he was going to the same fix as us; DOCKR. We were climbing to 3;000 feet to DOCKER; doing 250 knots when we encountered moderate to severe turbulence. We were then trying to turn left to 236 degrees per ORCKA2 Departure. I was trying to maintain control of aircraft; jockeying the throttles forward/back trying not to go over 5;000 feet. I was flying on my instruments when I saw aircraft tail lights out of my left peripheral vision and saw the 737 that took off in front of us about a mile from us. At that moment; the Controller said do you have the aircraft in sight at 11 o'clock and 1 1/2 mile? We replied affirmative. He said maintain visual on that aircraft. We had caught up to him. While maintaining visual with him and thinking about what to do next; the Controller said maintain 250 knots. So I looked back inside and saw that we were in a left bank; because I was flying visual on him out over the ocean (no reference visually). I corrected my heading by turning right 10 degrees when the Controller hurriedly said fly 240 degrees. Then Controller said climb to 12;000 feet.At this point; we were decompressing from the [wake turbulence] and a little distracted by the event. We were in the climb when Controller said 'Left turn 020'. We read back '020.' Controller said 'Left turn.' We said 'Left turn 080.' He did not correct us. Shortly after the Controller said; 'When able; direct KLIPR'. We read back 'When able direct KLIPR.' We were still bothered by what happened; while [programming] direct KLIPR. Before we were able to turn direct KLIPR; the Controller started asking us about what we did coming off the runway and about going to DOCKR and afterwards; what heading we were flying; etc. We were then talking about what happened between each other. We tried to answer him in this conversation understanding that this is being all recorded and inadvertently did not turn to KLIPR. Then he spoke hard to us for not going direct KLIPR and told us we had a possible pilot deviation.We should have not been cleared for takeoff that close to an aircraft slower than us going to the same fix. We did not know we were going to the same fix. Then the Departure Controller allowed us to get too close to that aircraft; we were flying on instruments. The controller started a conversation on the frequency about the event as if it was our fault; and asked us about what we did 2 minutes ago; and we; knowing that it was being recorded; had to discuss it before replying; while we were to be navigating. He distracted us from making that turn and navigating.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Learjet 55 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred following a wake turbulence encounter in trail of a B737-800 departing LAX.

1662900

201907

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

5000

Tower ZZZ

Other Pipeline Patrol

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Other Pipeline Patrol

Cruise

Other Visual pipeline route

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Helicopter

1.0

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Contracted Service

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1662900

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 500; Vertical 300

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We were conducting a visual inspection of a pipeline Right-of-Way (ROW) from the Class B surface area into [a] Class D environment. After establishing communications with Tower and being cleared on our transition through the airspace; my right-seat observer requested we circle to re-capture data in our computer-based patrol software at the southernmost extent of the Class D. I informed Tower I needed to circle to evaluate a sighting; and this was approved. We made a single circle; captured the data we needed; and continued on our way; roughly due north. As we approached the field (our pipeline route is inside the airport fence for a short distance) Tower advised us to let him know when we were back northbound due to inbound traffic. Realizing that he was not expecting us to be close to the field; I stated we were already northbound; began a climb and asked Tower if we needed to circle. At this time the Controller called helicopter traffic close to us about the same time as our traffic advisory system alerted us to the traffic. As we were already in a climb; we had between 200-300 feet vertical separation and the traffic advised Tower they had us in sight. The Tower advised the helicopter to maintain visual separation. We never got closer than 4-500 feet horizontally before passing the traffic but it was obvious that both I and the Controller had misunderstood each other's intentions and ended up with a traffic conflict. The helicopter pilot was obviously vigilant and had us in sight before we saw him. We continued our patrol without further conflict or incident. Upon reflection; I should have been clear with the Controller and stated that we needed to make a single circle and then would continue our patrol. This would have allowed him to plan for the inbound rotorcraft and avoided the conflict altogether.

C172 pilot reported an NMAC with a helicopter during his pipeline patrol.

1684375

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

210.0

6.0

500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class G ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Part 91

Cruise

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 266; Flight Crew Type 160

Situational Awareness

1684375

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Horizontal 50; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Approaching ZZZ while en route on a cross country flight; I experienced a near miss with a red and white low wing plane. I was flying at 500 AGL 6 miles south west of the field I decided to climb a bit and turn left to keep some distance between my flight path and the airport area. I lifted the nose and began climbing. After a brief climb (perhaps 100 feet) I saw some birds and leveled off; simultaneously increasing my left turn rate to continue further from the airport area. As I leveled off I saw the other plane for the first time. He was directly in front of and slightly below my flight path. I made an aggressive turn to the right while gaining as much altitude as I could. I'm not sure he ever saw me as his flight path never changed. I confirmed clearance from him and returned to my left turn and continued my flight as planned. I was monitoring CTAF during this whole time; but did not make any radio calls myself. There were no radio calls during this time that I received. My plane is not equipped with ADS-B. I believe we both may have assumed there was no traffic in the area thus neither of us made calls over CTAF. Next time I will either give more room for deviating around an airport or make a radio call with my intended path. I also didn't spend all that much time scanning for traffic below me since I was at 500 AGL myself. Clearly this is a lack of situational awareness on my part and will be a focused point of improvement moving forward.

C172 pilot reported a NMAC with traffic while avoiding birds around a non-towered airport.

1724357

202002

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

12

Daylight

12000

Corporate

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

None

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 575; Flight Crew Type 575

1724357

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Horizontal 1000; Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure

On takeoff Runway XX ZZZ incoming aircraft announced 3 mile final Runway XX; incoming aircraft was spotted and I announced I had the incoming traffic in sight and had time to take off before he arrived. On starting my takeoff roll the incoming plane was closer than I thought and he passed over head turning out to the south and initiated a go around.

Pilot reported misjudging the distance of an approaching aircraft and took the runway for takeoff; causing the other aircraft to initiate a go around.

1043789

201210

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1043789

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1044045.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

On arrival at our aircraft we found out that the right GPS was placarded inoperative. As per MEL; we could fly with one GPS inoperative. We also had MAP display failures on both pilot displays. Numerous calls were made to Maintenance Control; Dispatch and Maintenance to find out if the MAP malfunction was a result of the GPS being placarded inoperative. There was never a consensus on why there was a MAP display malfunction. Without Maintenance ever arriving at the aircraft the MAP function on both displays started working. Again we called Dispatch and Maintenance and concluded that we were good to takeoff. On takeoff both flight directors disappeared. We turned the flight director switches off and then on and were able to regain our flight directors. The First Officer was unable to engage the autopilot on either side and was having to hand-fly the aircraft. Passing thru 15;000 FT; we noticed a smell in the cockpit like something was burning. At the same time the flight attendants called up that they smelled something like it was burning. (They had not turned on the ovens or the coffee makers when we got the smell). Not knowing where the smell was coming from we decided to declare an emergency and return to the airport. We accomplished the 'Smoke; Fire or Fumes' QRH checklist. The flight attendants turned off the power ports and wifi and immediately searched the cabin to look for what might be causing the smell. The smell subsided as rapidly as it came without any indication of where it came from. During the return to the airport the First Officer was getting what we determined to be unreliable inputs from the flight directors. Because of declaring an emergency we requested that ARFF trucks meet us on landing and check us over before taxiing. The landing was an uneventful normal landing. Excellent job by all crewmembers and should be commended for their expertise and job well done. Crew coordination between the cabin crew and flight crew was outstanding.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

A B737-800 with the right GPS inoperative during preflight then had both MAP displays indicate failed. Unable to get maintenance and after the MAPs returned to normal; the flight departed only to declare an emergency and return to land because of an electrical burning smell.

1100283

201306

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Flight Attendant Airline Total 45

Safety Related Duties

Fatigue

1100283

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Attendant

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Company Policy

Human Factors

I was on reserve in June. On June XX I got a 2 day trip; 4 legs a day totaling 15:40. Two days later I got another 4 leg trip totaling 8:54. So in 3 days I did 12 legs totaling 24:34. I was exhausted after the [first] 2 day trip and was tempted to call in 'Fatigue'; but I didn't. Instead I went to my Supervisor and complained about all the awful trips we are given in ZZZ. After the 2 day; 4 legs each day trip; by the end of the 8th leg; I was Number 1 and could barely make the announcements without tripping over my words. I found myself accidently breaking a few wine glasses. I was very tired. After the next 4 leg turn; I was exhausted. I drove home and fell asleep at the wheel 4 times. I woke up heading for the center divider on the highway. It scared me awake; but then I ended up doing it again 3 more times before I made it home; thankful to be alive. In 45 years I have never flown such horrible trips; and my experience has been that no one seems to care. I have seen flight attendant's sleeping with their mouths open during the flights. Flight attendant's are constantly complaining about the 4 leg flights; and the 'Trans Cons and a half.' They are saying they think [the company] is trying to kill us. On international; if I flew 22 hours in 3 days; I would get a long layover and crew rest on each flight.

Senior Flight Attendant laments company scheduling practices at her base that result in extreme fatigue.

1222361

201412

0601-1200

BJC.Tower

CO

8000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower BJC

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Final Approach

Class D BJC

TRACON D01

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Final Approach

Class B DEN

Facility BJC.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.1

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1222361

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

I had Aircraft X in a VFR pattern with right closed traffic. Aircraft Y was inbound from the southeast IFR. I initially saw a copter on the arrival list and believed the helicopter would arrive first; but then discovered it looked like the approach controller was keeping the jet traffic fast and was going to make Aircraft Y first. My plan then was to have Aircraft Y number 1 for Runway 30L and keep Aircraft X on Runway 30R. Aircraft Y was not switched prior 6 miles of the airport; as the LOA specifies. I quickly decided I was not comfortable with the traffic situation at all (Aircraft Y was really high and fast on final and not talking to me) and instructed Aircraft X to remain on the downwind for the traffic. Aircraft Y was in my airspace descending out of 8;000 feet; if I recall; I was finally able to reach Aircraft Y near a 3 mile final; around 7;800 feet. The pilot checked on and advised he wanted at least one 360 for descent. I instructed Aircraft Y to fly runway heading; and later confirmed he should climb to 8;000 feet. I asked the CIC to coordinate missed approach instructions; and was advised to assign him turn right heading 020. Once Aircraft Y was turning to the heading; I switched him back to departure for resequencing (a helicopter was east of the airport being vectored for an approach). After being sequenced for another approach; Aircraft Y landed without further incident. I'm not sure why the approach controller decided to try to keep Aircraft Y high and fast with the IFR helicopter traffic rather close to the final ahead; unfortunately; it seemed the pilot had virtually no other option than a go-around for maneuvers to descend back to the final. This was a situation where it was critical that I had communication/control at the proper point (6-15NM from the airport) so that I could call traffic and sequence the two turbojets. (The CIC also filed a report for the event). I understand that there are times the approach controller determines they cannot switch an aircraft by the 6 mile point (traffic conflict; pilot can't see the airport for the visual approach; etc.); but these situations either need to be coordinated immediately or an alternative course of action should be taken to prevent penetration of our Class D airspace. In the end; I was very glad that I did not hesitate to follow my instincts and took a conservative approach to control the aircraft I was talking to; by not allowing the Aircraft X to turn final until I was able to communicate and control the other inbound. I was also quite appreciative to have a CIC who was actively engaged in monitoring my complex operation and ensuring I was not becoming too overloaded. Since I determined I was too busy scanning and issuing control instructions to also safely do landline coordination; he was able to immediately assist me by asking the approach controller to switch the inbound traffic and then quickly coordinate missed approach instructions for me to resolve the conflict safely.In hindsight; another alternative may have been to try to coordinate getting the approach controller to clear the arriving aircraft to the other runway. However; I'm not sure if either one of us would have had the time to effectively coordinate this due to both our respective traffic situations. Once the traffic decreased later; the approach controller called on the line to apologize for Aircraft Y getting switched so late. I advised him that I simply had a lot of other traffic I was working when I wanted to talk to Aircraft Y; but in the end; everything was fine (I try to maintain a positive relationship between our tower and the approach controllers whenever possible).

BJC Local Controller describes a conflict with two arrival aircraft that he resolves by keeping one of the aircraft on an extended downwind.

1746311

202006

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

1746311

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Service

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1746319.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

Passenger in Seat XX I asked to put his seatbelt on and please put his mouth covering back on when doing compliance. When in the air the pilots took the seatbelt light off and made to PA. The passenger got up and went to the bathroom in the back of the plane FA-A went to check on first class and when I was up front the pilots called and asked if there was someone smoking in the bathroom. FA-B was on the phone and the passenger had just came out of the bathroom and FA-B ask if he was smoking and he said he was vaping. And there was not fire in the bathroom FA-B checked The bathroom thoroughly. FA-B is talked to the passenger. Pilots called and asked the FAs to tell the passengers to stay on the plane so the Captain can talk to him FA-B told the passengers and also to keep his mask on. Later the man sitting [in Seat XY] came to the back and told FAs that the passenger in XX was not wearing his mask so FA-B took one of the blue masks and gave it to him. The passenger in XX Remain seated when deplaning the captain went and spoke with him.Recommend no vaping placards in the restrooms.

While in the air passenger in Seat XX went to the lavatory in the aft lavatory. While in the lavatory I was in the aft galley and heard the alarm go off. I was about to knock on the door when he stepped out of the lavatory where I stopped him. I asked him if he was smoking on the plane which he responded that he had; I had told him that it was a $XX;000 fine and a federal offense; I asked him if it was a vape and he replied that it was. When the Captain called and had asked what happened. I told him that the passenger had smoked/vaped and that he was being compliant and honest. The passenger went to his seat and I checked the bathroom to make sure there was no cigarette or anything in the trash and toilet. The bathroom didn't smell so I have reason to believe it was a vape. The Captain called again and told me that he wanted to speak to the passenger after the flight; so I went up to him to his seat and told him after the flight was done he needed to stay on board so the Captain could speak to him. I had to also remind him he needed to wear his mask while during flight. FA A had told him before he needed to wear his mask as well. During the flight after the situation a passenger came to me and FA A and told us that he wasn't wearing his mask so I got one of our masks and went up to him and politely asked that he wear his mask during the whole flight and if his kept falling down I will provide him with one and handed it to him. After all passengers deplaned he stayed on board and the CA talked to him.Maybe in the lavatory have it say no smoking/vaping. And maybe add to safety card and the consequences of what could happen if you do.

Air carrier flight attendants reported that a passenger was vaping in the lavatory and was not wearing a personal protective mask during the flight.

1677738

201908

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1677738

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1678198.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Dispatch; Person Other Person

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

Blocked out of ZZZ 53 minutes late due to late inbound aircraft. Another MD11 was loading up beside us (Aircraft Y); also bound for ZZZ1. The flight was normal; until I received an ACARS message from our Dispatcher that there was undeclared hazardous material onboard in position 3L. I immediately made a SAT phone call to Dispatcher. He said they did not know anything other than it was Class 9. He had spoken to the Duty Officer. My excellent (and probationary) First Officer quickly brought up the relevant section of the FOM; 10.25; under 'DG Manifest Modification.' After consulting with the Dispatcher and the First Office; I decided that; since there were no physical signs such as smells or smoke that would call for a divert; and that there was no other Hazmat onboard that may create a separation issue; we would continue to ZZZ1 if the Duty Officer concurred. We would modify the DG Manifest in-flight. I notified the Dispatcher of this. He informed me later that the Duty Officer concurred with the decision to continue. In an abundance of caution we donned the CO2 detectors; as we were not sure what Class 9 Hazmat we were carrying. [We] received another ACARS. We were informed that the Hazmat was some sort of 'safety devices.' We were in contact frequently with the Dispatcher to see if there was any new information; but there was not. Landed uneventfully in ZZZ1.

At cruise we received an ACARS message from [Dispatch] that the ramp in ZZZ had notified [Dispatch] there was an unmanifested IDG 342 kg Class 9 Hazmat in position 3L. Captain SAT phoned [Dispatch] to talk about what was going on. ZZZ didn't know exactly what it was but it was Class 9 'safety equipment'. Talking it over with [Dispatch]; Duty Officer; and ourselves we elected to continue. We were able to update the DG manifest to reflect 'class 9 safety equipment.' We sent subsequent messages trying to find more information about the unmanifested cargo but [Dispatch] was unable to get ahold of ZZZ to further identify the cargo. We were able to put as much information as we could on the updated manifest. As a precaution we pulled out the CO2 detectors in case dry ice was involved. The rest of the flight went without incident and we were instructed to file ASAP and FSR reports. We also have photos of all the documents in case those are in need of further review. We were able to comply with FOM page 10-13 regarding updating a DG manifest after block out. ZZZ Ramp did not list the IDG located in position 3L on the DG manifest. The DG manifest reflected no dangerous goods on board.

MD-11 flight crew reported ACARS notification of unmanifested Dangerous Goods on board. At departure; received no Dangerous Goods required documentation.

1568916

201808

1201-1800

BMI.Airport

IL

1800.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower BMI

Air Carrier

Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class D BMI

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1568916

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

I was the First Officer and Pilot Flying for the visual approach to Runway 20 at BMI. We were cleared for the visual and I descended with the glideslope as a backup. Several miles out on the approach; the aircraft looked low and I immediately clicked off the autopilot and corrected the airplane's approach path. As I corrected the aircraft's flightpath; ATC called and said they had received an altitude low warning on our aircraft. We acknowledged and continued the approach and landed safely. The Captain informed ATC that the glideslope was giving incorrect information and ATC informed us that the glideslope was out of service. At this point we realized that the NOTAM for an inactive glideslope was still active and we had briefed that the NOTAM would not affect our approach. This event was caused by a misinterpretation of NOTAMs on the release. This event could have been avoided by thoroughly briefing the NOTAMs as a crew and not relying on a system that was out of service.

CRJ First Officer reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on approach to BMI. They realized they were following a glide slope that was NOTAMed out of service.

1750718

202007

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

No Aircraft

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.0

1750718

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

I believe an unsafe situation exists at ZZZ ARTCC. Management has had supervisors in the building daily even though the COVID-19 pandemic continues. One of the supervisors tested positive and had interaction with controllers and been in the same working and break areas. We have since had a Controller test positive. I believe much of our risk could have been mitigated with better restrictions on who was and was not allowed to enter the building. I understand it's not entirely possible to eliminate all risks but I feel more thought and care should have gone into the way plans were laid out.Stop having ANYONE non essential to the operation enter the building. Including the highest levels of management. Especially if their work could be done from home.

Center Controller reported a Supervisor who had tested positive for COVID-19 had interacted with controllers. Controller suggested allowing only essential workers in the building.

1783158

202101

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Unscheduled Maintenance

APU Pneumatic System & Ducting

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

1783158

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

1783159.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We were cruising at FL370 when we received the EICAS message 'BLEED APU LEAK' even though the APU was not running. We ran the QRH but the message did not go away so we descended to FL310 and shut off the cross bleed; and bleed 1 per the QRH. We were in cruise for nearly 20 minutes when I noticed white smoke coming from under the CA (Captain) display units. Just as I saw the smoke; I smelled it. The CA had also seen and smelled smoke and we both commented on it at the same time. The CA used the EMER call button to contact the FAs (Flight Attendants). Both FAs immediately commented on the smoke smell when they answered. We told them we were [advising ATC] and hung up. Both of us donned our O2 masks right away and I radioed Center. The CA was flying and started an [expedited] decent. I saw ZZZ was only about 20 miles south west of our position. We told ATC to show that as our destination. As I was ACARS'ing dispatch; we received a frequency change so I dropped the message in the free text box without sending it to put in the frequency and then input the destination to get pointed in the correct direction. By the time I got back to it; Dispatch had messaged us saying that company in ZZZ was expecting us and to not worry about replying. Coming through 10;000 ft.; I pulled the mask away from my face to see if the smoke smell was still strong. It was not; so we decided to take the masks off and continued in. In an attempt to slow up further and increase our rate of descent; we dropped the gear at 250 kts. and the warning tape came up. We over sped the gear by maybe 2 kts. for less than a couple seconds. Once on the ground; we asked the FA's if there was still smoke in the back. They said there was a faint smell and no visible smoke. We made the decision not to evacuate and parked at a gate. The entire event lasted 13 minutes from starting the descent to landing.

While at in cruise at FL370; we received the ICAS message Bleed APU Leak. We completed the QRH procedure all the way through. We had descended to FL310 and remained there for just under 15 minutes when we noticed smoke in the cockpit. The smoke was gray-ish/white-ish in color and was accompanied by a very pungent smell. The FO (First Officer) and myself very quickly put on our oxygen masks and I pushed the cabin emergency call button. The FA's (Flight Attendants) both confirmed the smell but did not see any smoke. Later; the FA's told me they were looking for smoke moments before we called them and after we called them; and several passengers started to ask the FA about the smell. With oxygen masks on; communication established; and smoke in the air; we notified ATC of our need to descend. It was during us trying to coordinate a plan with the FA and the FO that I realized the microphone in the oxygen mask was working intermittently. The created an addition challenge with communicating with the crew. We communicated with ATC our intentions to divert. Just a few short moments later we received an ACARS message from dispatch that they noticed we were diverting. We did not respond as we still had a little smoke in the cockpit and where focused on getting down and on the ground. After a fast descent; and around 10;000 ft. I lifted my mask off to see if I could still smell the smoke. I could not and because my mask microphone was working intermittently; we opted to remove our masks to facilitate better communication during the landing phase of flight. Passing through 10;000 ft. we lowered the gear so we could continue our rapid descent. In our haste to keep the descent going it appeared that we went above 250 kts. with the gear extended by 1-2 kts. for 1-2 seconds. We continue the rest of the flight without any more issues. After landing I confirmed with the FA that they did not see any smoke or smell anything. It was at this point that we decided to taxi to the gate.

EMB-175 flight crew reported smoke in the cockpit and cabin that resulted in a diversion.

1787286

202101

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

11000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1787286

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

Climbing out of ZZZ around 11;000 feet or so we received an aural warning and master warning light. Noticed the #2 engine oil pressure gauge fluctuating wildly from normal pressure down to the red line and back and forth. Emergency checklist had us reduce power to idle and condition levers to start feather. Pushed the alt feather switch and engine did not feather. NP was above requirements to shut the engine down so we left it operating in accordance with the checklist. I notified ATC before that with the assumption we would have to shut it down. We completed the checklist with the condition levers to max and the engine still producing power and I held a conservative airspeed around 180 kts all the way down the approach. I flew the visual approach to [Runway] XXL without incident and taxied to the gate. After turning the aircraft over to Maintenance we received a new plane and flew our last leg safety getting our passengers to their destination. The emergency checklist directed us to not shutdown the engine and we diverted back to ZZZ since we were only about 30 miles out. The oil pressure gauge continued to wildly fluctuate with the aural chime all the way back to Seattle. After parking and deplaning; Maintenance notified me the engine was covered in oil. Once we landed; Maintenance informed us the engine was leaking oil and when they opened the nacelle they discovered oil covering the engine was covered in oil. One of my senior flight attendants remarked she liked the fact I made the announcement to the passengers and let them know that emergency vehicles would be meeting the aircraft and following us to the gate.

Dash-8 captain reported experiencing an engine oil leak on climb-out.

1462122

201707

0601-1200

VNY.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground VNY; Tower VNY

Corporate

Helicopter

2.0

Part 91

None

Utility / Infrastructure

Takeoff / Launch

Ground VNY; Tower VNY

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1462122

Facility VNY.Tower

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1461681.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

We contacted VNY ground to leave the ramp and taxi to 16L for a southwest departure. Ground cleared us to 'taxi via Taxiway B and D for 16L cleared for takeoff'. We held short at D and had to ask for frequency change to Tower. Ground advised 'contact Tower 119.0'. I contacted Tower with request for takeoff 16L for a southwest departure. Tower said '16L cleared for takeoff'. I repeated back to Tower what I had heard with no response. We continued out onto 16L. As we began takeoff Tower came on the radio advising 'Cessna hold short helicopter is entering runway hold short' then quickly advised 'helicopter entering runway the clearance was not for you it was for the Cessna holding short at Taxiway C'. Tower then advised us to call the Tower after arrival and shutdown. After departing the airspace copilot had told me that a similar situation had occurred the day prior with a different Captain where ground had cleared them for takeoff on 16L. This had not been an issue due to no other aircraft involvement in the situation. We contacted tower after we had returned; they took down my information and said I would be contacted if there was any other questions. Later we were departing again from VNY for relocation of the aircraft. We contacted ground again and asked to taxi for departure. Ground came back over the ground frequency and said 'taxi to 16L via taxi way B; 16L cleared for takeoff' we repeated back and then proceeded to D and held short. Ground control came back and said '16L cleared for takeoff' we said to ground 'confirm 16L cleared for takeoff'? Ground replied with 'yes 16L cleared for takeoff'. We then replied 'we are still on ground do you want us to change frequencies to Tower'? Ground control said 'yes switch to Tower 119.0'. We switched to 119.0 and confirmed that we were still cleared for takeoff. Tower replied with '16L cleared for takeoff make left downwind departure to leave the area'.What has caused the most confusion for me and my copilot are.1. Ground clearance had been saying '16L cleared for takeoff'2. Copilot had a problem due to Tower not keeping a consistent Tower frequency switching from fixed wing frequencies and rotor wing frequencies. 3. The last time I had been to the area we were able to depart direct from our location with a large aircraft and now with large aircraft we are required to ground taxi from the east side of the airport.

Helicopter mistook a takeoff departure clearance for a Cessna and departed Runway 16 Left.I was working CIC and halfway monitoring the local control positions. The Ground controller taxied Helicopter to Runway 16 Left (intersection Delta) as our procedures dictate. I and the Ground Controller were talking about this helicopter and how big it was and how its roterwash is dangerous to especially small aircraft; etc. etc.I hear the Local controller cross Runway 16 Right with a small Cessna to hold short of Runway 16 Left. My personal thought was why is the Local intentionally putting a C172 that close to a large Helicopter (approx. 900 FT). I heard the Local controller clear someone for takeoff and 'a' readback. There was some overlap with another aircraft on frequency. I'm watching this unfold as the Helicopter takes to Runway 16 Left at delta and depart. The Local Controller starts complaining about 'what is this guy doing'. The Ground and Helo Positions reached out to the [helicopter] with no response. This is when it occured to me that the readback was from Helicopter and not the Cessna who had not moved from the hold short position. I shouted to the Local controller that the Helicopter was on his frequency. The Local Controller called [the helicopter] and the pilot responded. The Local Controller then rudely chastised the pilot.A point that I would like to make now is the poor response of the Local Controller to the situation. Generally we assume the helicopters are ready to depart as soon as they start their 300 ft taxi clearance to the runway. I confirmed after that 'YES' the Local saw the helo at the runway. The Local was attempting to depart the Cessna before the Helo on Runway 16 Left. It was slow motion and as Helo started to taxi onto Runway 16 Left it could have been stopped with a minor runway incursion. I saw that Cessna (that was cleared for Takeoff) wasn't moving. Also the local controller complained (off Freq) about this pilot. This situation with better listening and observations could have prevented it.Let the Helicopter Position work the Helicopters. The Helo Position can coordinate the use of the runway if needed.Keep procedures as simple as possible and normal as to what the pilots would expect.

Helicopter pilot and two Controllers reported a runway incursion at VNY airport. Communication issues were cited as contributing factors.

1663000

201907

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

1663000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Ground Personnel

Routine Inspection

General Police / Security Involved

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Bag arrived with battery attached. Customer was called to [Baggage Office] and advised of hazard. According to customer; departure airport checked bag at gate.

Ramp Personnel reported bag unloaded from baggage cargo with batteries attached.

1564471

201807

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

20.0

2000.0

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Light Sport Aircraft

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 850

Situational Awareness

1564471

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Horizontal 200; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Human Factors

While practicing maneuvers at approximately 2;000 feet while on Flight Following; [TRACON] advised us that an aircraft was moving at 130 knots behind us and that we should turn immediately to the South. We did so. The other aircraft then followed us in the left turn. We continued to try to evade them by turning tighter and lowering our altitude. The other aircraft continued to follow us. I was extremely concerned they were trying to hit us intentionally. I asked [TRACON] if we could be cleared into Class B airspace because we could not get away from them. They denied our request. I asked the controller if they were talking to the other aircraft; he said they were not. I asked if I could get any information about the aircraft; the controller said; since the aircraft was squawking VFR; they had no information on the aircraft. I later asked the controller if there was anything we could do to report the incident and he said there was not.When we returned to [our home airport] I heard [another pilot] reporting inbound from the area we were just in. I suspected it might be him. When he landed I approached the pilot of Aircraft Y. He immediately asked if we were just in [the area] doing circles. I asked if that was him following us in the turns. He said it was. I told him that it was extremely dangerous and that he scared my student and I a lot.

LSA pilot reported that he was unable to avoid another aircraft following his aircraft.

1756714

202008

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

1756714

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Company Policy

Today upon checking in for my last flight for the day in ZZZ; I was told by the gate agents that [seats] XX and XY are available for passengers if needed. I didn't understand exactly why; so I spoke to Person X and she verified this.Essentially; the company is putting revenue above Flight Attendant safety. I find this to be unacceptable for obvious reasons. The health and safety of colleagues of the company are of the utmost importance as the company always says.The seat in XX has a view panel that is required to be open for taxi; takeoff; landing and turbulence. The Purser has to sit in the jumpseat facing all passengers with that view panel open. This is not safe for the Flight Attendant sitting directly in their jumpseat at XZ. Also the last seat in the rear of the aircraft on the aisle should not be available if needed; but rather blocked.Yes; the policy is that the mask is to be placed over the nose and mouth and that no vented masks are acceptable on board. It is also stated that if a passenger doesn't comply; to provide the customer(s) with the company's policy for masks. I would then file a report and inform the appropriate parties; including the Flight Deck. This doesn't negate the safety issue at hand of the passenger in XX not complying or when they are eating and/or drinking. I would appreciate a prompt review of the following as now my health could be in jeopardy.

Flight Attendant reported that allowing passengers to sit in seats that are directly opposite flight attendant jumpseats could jeopardize flight attendant health.

1584220

201810

1201-1800

N90.TRACON

NY

6500.0

VMC

30

Daylight

TRACON N90

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 400

Situational Awareness

1584220

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Horizontal 200; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Flight conducted VFR GPS Direct to [destination] with VFR Advisories along entire route. Drone sighted on right side side of aircraft at designated location and seen by both passenger and pilot. Drone was a black quadcopter. Sighting reported to NY approach. Flight condition was VFR on top above a solid overcast at 3500 FT.

Cessna 182 pilot reported airborne conflict with UAV.

1699404

201911

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Overhead Bins; Latches

X

Design

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

1699404

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

I was called to pre-board the flight. While doing my emergency equipment checks I noticed that it was nearly impossible to remove the First Aid Kit from the forward overhead bin aircraft right. Since adding the music player below this bin has been compressed and the AED and First Aid Kit now barely fit. There is noticeable wear and tear to the top of the AED from being scrapped against the hinge; and the First Aid Kit will not come out unless you nudge it into the middle between the hinges. This could be very unsafe in an emergency situation if Flight Attendant's cannot get out lifesaving equipment.Change the shape of the first aid kit or move them to another location that allows Flight Attendant to easily access them in emergency situations.

Flight Attendant reported that the tight fit of the First Aid Kit and the AED make them difficult to remove from the overhead bin.

991208

201201

0601-1200

BBG.Airport

MO

186.0

3.0

2500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Tower BBG

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D BBG

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 275; Flight Crew Type 175

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

991208

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

I was flying to PLK and the trip was uneventful until my approach to land. I had a current chart and downloaded info for PLK and BBG. I used an older Garman 295 which was out of date; but with a current chart and downloaded information (reference only) I thought I would be fine. As I got close and had airport insight approximately 5 miles out I called PLK Tower with my position and intent. No answer; no problem 122.7. I called an extended left base then noticed my GPS reading I was at the airport. But I wasn't there yet; I had a mile or so to go (nothing clicked yet). I called base to final. I was looking for other traffic during this time and saw none. I called final; and then saw the runway markings. PLK is a 12-30 I saw 14-32 (click). Then I saw a green light from the Tower. Nearing the threshold I landed. [I] taxied up to a young man that gave me a phone number to call. So I did; and after a polite but firm ass chewing/lesson [Tower] let me fly back to PLK. I landed at BBG having never seen PLK; which I flew right over. BBG is a newer airport which did not show up on my GPS. Note to self even flying VFR have an updated GPS and pay attention when approaching controlled airspace. That is about it; the rest of the trip went fine.

PA28 pilot reports mistaking BBG for PLK due to using an older Garmin 295 without a current data base. BBG is a newer airport and Tower controled.

1350645

201604

1201-1800

L72.Airport

CA

19.0

8500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

TRACON E10

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

GPS

Cruise

Direct

Class E E10; Special Use R2524

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 3700; Flight Crew Type 800

Situational Awareness

1350645

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I am an experienced pilot in Europe but a new pilot in the U.S.; so I try to get the best from the flight planning tools in the U.S. but everything is not always as clear to me than it would be for old American pilots. I was on a VFR flight from HND; to MHV. Before my flight I checked on the FAA website (sua.faa.gov) the activity status of all special status area on my route. Seeing that R2502N was hot; I decided to avoid it by the north. On the same website; R2524 was not shown as active. So I decided to plan my route through it. From departure at HND I requested flight following; as I always do; to ensure I don't do any navigation mistake and to have help in case I need it. I updated the FAA website inflight and R2524 was still cold. I was on flight following with Joshua app; the dedicated ATC center for R2524; radar identified with a specific squawk code. With no specific request on my side; Joshua cleared me through R2524 'at or above 12000 ft' which I didn't really understand as I was flying at 8500ft and; in my mind; the area was inactive. I should have asked why; but I didn't. Just before entering the area; the ATC asked me to take a heading 340. I thought it was for airplane avoidance; and I followed the heading for some time. After a few minutes; I asked to resume navigation; which ATC approved. So I resumed my navigation direct to MHV; which made me enter the R2524 area. Then the ATC told me I was inside an active restricted area - this is when I realized my error!I talked to the center supervisor on the phone later; and explained the situation. He agreed that the area was not active on the website; but explained me that it was not meaning it was not active 'for real' and that I should have asked ATC about it. I apologized about that and I hope I haven't caused any trouble for other airplanes training in the area. On my side; it's a good lesson for next time; as my flight instructor told me: always ask ATC even when FAA website says it's OK; and always assume restricted areas are hot unless ATC says otherwise!

C172 pilot was advised by ATC he was in a hot restricted area that was shown cold during his preflight.

1345738

201604

0601-1200

RIC.Airport

VA

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground RIC

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Situational Awareness

1345738

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Y

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors

Airport

Three minutes after landing in Richmond; VA; while taxiing to our assigned Gate; we shut down Engine 2; and continued to single-engine taxi; per Company Policy. As we approached the gate the First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) and I (Pilot Flying); confirmed that all ground equipment was outside the footprint of the ramp area for the gate. We approached at a taxi speed of approximately 5 knots; while being directed by the Marshaller; with a wing walker on the left and a wing walker on the right. At approximately 5 to 10 feet prior to reaching the parking position; the aircraft main tires met with a significant change in the ramp surface level where the ramp surface changes from asphalt to a concrete pad. In other words; there seemed to be a significant 'lip' from the edge of the asphalt to the edge of the concrete parking pad used for parking aircraft. When the aircraft main tires reached this point of transition from the asphalt to the concrete at a speed of approximately 5 knots or less; the aircraft stopped its forward progress and began to move backwards; whereupon the aircraft brakes were applied; and the aircraft stopped. At this point; the aircraft was not yet at the correct parking position. The Marshaller continued to direct us to move forward and thrust was increased on Engine 1 to attempt to move forward across the 'lip' between the asphalt ramp and concrete pad. With only Engine 1 operating; we were not able to move the aircraft forward to the correct parking position without using more than the maximum breakaway thrust of 40% N1. An announcement was made to the passengers and instructions given to remain seated with seat belts fastened until Engine 2 was restarted and the aircraft was properly positioned at the gate. With the aircraft stopped and the parking brake set; we signaled to the Marshaller that we were starting Engine 2. After starting Engine 2; the Marshaller began to direct us to the proper parking position. With both engines running; maximum breakaway thrust on both engines (and possibly more) was needed to move the aircraft across the 'lip' between the asphalt portion of the ramp area and the concrete parking pad to the proper parking position as directed by the Marshall[er]. The event occurred due to a taxi speed not adequate to allow the aircraft to transition from the asphalt portion of the ramp to the concrete portion of the ramp used as the parking pad. Following this event; after speaking with a Company Customer Service Representative in Richmond; it was learned that repair work to the ramp area in question had been performed on more than one occasion; due to similar events occurring with other aircraft parking at Gate. It is evident that this may be an ongoing issue and concern; at least at this particular gate in Richmond. In addition; this flight segment to Richmond departed late due to an earlier flight we operated in arriving over one hour late. While sensing a need to get the customers to the gate after landing in Richmond; because the flight departed late and arrived in Richmond late (i.e. 'rush to comply'); excessive thrust was used in an attempt to get the aircraft to the parking position and avoid any further delay.Following this event; after careful review and consideration; I am concerned that the course of action taken by me (Pilot Flying) was not in the best interest of safety; especially with regard to the protection of Company personnel and equipment. While being directed by the marshaller toward the parking position; and while attempting to taxi across the 'lip' between the asphalt portion of the ramp and the concrete parking pad using maximum breakaway thrust (and possibly an exceedance of maximum breakaway thrust) first with one engine operating; and then with both engines operating; serious injury to ramp personnel; FOD damage to the aircraft engines; and damage to ground equipment in front and behind the aircraft; could have occurred. Thankfully; no personnel were injured; no FOD damage occurred in either engine; nor was there any damage to ground equipment in front of or behind the aircraft.In the future; the primary suggestion to myself; or anyone else; to avoid a reoccurrence of this event; or any similar event; is as follows: When an amount of thrust equal to maximum breakaway thrust is not sufficient to move the aircraft into the proper parking position:1. Do not exceed maximum breakaway thrust in an attempt to reach the parking position.2. Set the parking brake.3. Coordinate with Operations/Ground Crew to be towed to the parking position.4. If required by Company or Local Policy/Procedure; or if requested by Operations or the Ground Crew; shut engine(s) down prior to towing.

A319 Captain reported a 'lip' approaching his gate as the asphalt ramp transitions to the concrete parking pad. The crew is single engine taxing and is unable to cross the 'lip'. The second engine is started and 40% N1 is required to cross the 'lip'. The reporter believes that he may have jeopardized safety by using this must thrust in the gate area in order to move the aircraft to the correct position.

1714863

202001

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3.0

6000.0

IMC

10

Night

2000

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ; Class C ZZZ

Electrical Wiring & Connectors

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 365; Flight Crew Type 16000

1714863

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 366; Flight Crew Type 3000

Physiological - Other

1714884.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Taxi; In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

The First Officer noticed smoke coming from the flight counter on his yoke. We [advised ATC] and returned.

Just prior to takeoff; both the Captain and I noticed a smell that we associated with the air conditioning system. The smell was faint prior to takeoff. After takeoff and selecting the flaps up; the smell became increasingly strong and changed to a burning plastic smell. I placed my hand on the upper half of the control wheel to initiate a turn towards a heading of 280. The flight counter (upper left) felt very hot to the touch; enough so that I couldn't touch that portion of the control wheel. I turned on my reading light and engaged the autopilot and saw smoke emanating from the flight counter. I informed the Captain and we immediately dawned masks and established Crew comm. We informed Departure of our [situation] and intention to return. Control was transferred to the Captain and I began running the smoke and fumes checklist. ATC initially vectored us to one runway then changed to a different runway which led to a 360 turn to better establish ourselves to land and configure. Captain gave me control back of the airplane; landed; and taxied to the gate uneventful after Ground EMS cleared us.

Flight crew reported burning smell and smoke emanating from the yoke on departure and returned to land.

1351762

201604

0601-1200

AEX.Airport

LA

2000.0

Tower AEX

Air Carrier

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D AEX

Tower AEX

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

Class D AEX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1351762

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

New hire First Officer was flying visual approach Runway 14 AEX. Prior to clearance for the approach; we were given direct to CROVE (outer marker). We were level at 2;000 feet MSL; and after receiving approach clearance and reporting left base to Tower; the First Officer widened out a little to a modified downwind/base to give himself more room. The Tower had requested us to advise turning final. I believe we were at 180 knots; not certain; but flaps were at 8 degrees. During the widened base turn; I noticed a cyan TCAS target 200 feet below; which quickly turned amber (with 'traffic' TA); then showed our altitude and became a TCAS 'climb' RA. I announced that I had the controls; disengaged the autopilot; and began the RA compliance. During the bedlam; the First Officer never heard my call for the controls; and was still on the controls with me. Our hands actually bumped on the thrust levers and we were both pulling back on the yoke complying with the RA. The 'climb' aural went to an 'increase climb' and at some point I heard the Tower Controller say something undiscernible. At this point; the VSI was out of the red; the First Officer had positive control of the aircraft; and I informed the Tower that we were complying with a TCAS RA. Tower informed us he was not talking to anyone in our area; and asked to advise when done complying with the RA. He also said at some point; 'no need to advise turning final'. We were 'clear of conflict' around 3;000 feet MSL; stabilized around 3;300; made the turn back toward the Runway 14 final; and continued the visual approach to an uneventful landing. I never saw the intruder aircraft; but the First Officer did; and stated in our debrief that it was a [small low wing aircraft]. The First Officer estimated 500 to 700 foot separation; although I have no reference to validate his estimate. Nonetheless; I would certainly consider this a 'near miss'.

Captain reported an NMAC with a light aircraft on approach to AEX.

1249169

201503

1201-1800

PHX.Airport

AZ

20.0

4300.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower LUK

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Climb

Direct

Class B PHX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 12

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1249169

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Climbing westbound controller cleared me through Special Air Traffic Area (SATR). Controller clears me to maintain VFR at or below 5;000. The phraseology basically seemed like it was a clearance into Class 'B' airspace but to remain below 5000 Class 'B' was from 4000 to 9000. I would assume the Luke controller pointed me out to Phoenix approach that owns that section of class 'B' airspace. It seemed that everything was fine with my altitude with Luke approach. No one said anything and it was a nonevent but I still think the controller should make it more clear about the clearance into the class 'B' airspace.

Pilot reports of not being sure if he was cleared into PHX Class Bravo airspace by controller.

1143655

201401

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

33000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Fuel Crossfeed

X

Design; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1143655

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

During climbout; an imbalance in the main fuel tanks was discovered. There was around 2;000 LBS in the center tanks and the main tanks were full at departure. The tanks were now showing around 700 LBS less fuel in the left main tank and decreasing while the right main tank showed an ever so slight decrease. Simultaneously; we sent an ACARS to Dispatch about the situation and consulted the QRH. We felt the most likely culprit was the fuel crossfeed valve and used the Crossfeed Selector Inop Checklist; which directed us to check the circuit breaker. It was found to be tripped. The next step was to check that sufficient fuel was available to both engines. We determined there was not enough fuel to complete the original 2.5-hours flight. At that time; there was still no word from Dispatch so we used commercial radio to establish contact. While we waited to hear from the Dispatcher; we decided to divert to a much closer Station and advised ATC of our intentions and also advised the Dispatcher as well when we made contact. Passengers were informed and the rest of the flight was uneventful. We landed with an imbalance of approximately 2;600 LBS.

The reporter stated that the center fuel tank quantity was about 2;000 LBS on takeoff so the pumps were off in accordance with the minimum 5;000 LBS quantity for pumps on during takeoff. During climb; the intent was to open the center tank crossfeed and activate the pumps; but when the reporter looked at the fuel quantity and saw the imbalance; the QRH was referenced. What was confusing about the system indications was that all pumps and valves appeared to be in the correct position with no lights on; including the Fuel Crossfeed blue light out. They were also confused why right tank fuel pumps did not feed direct tank to engine since the pumps appeared to be operational. The only abnormality was the tripped crossfeed circuit breaker. The crew choose not to turn fuel boost pumps off while troubleshooting for fear or flaming an engine out and instead diverted and were assigned a different aircraft for the remained of that trip.Maintenance later stated that the crossfeed cannon plug connector was cleaned; valve operation verified and the aircraft released. One possible explanation for the fuel usage was the crossfeed valve failed either open or partially open and the left wing tank fuel pumps providing a higher output than the right tank; and therefore feeding both engines. The question remained if the crossfeed valved was in a position other than closed when the reporter was ready to commence crossfeed; why was the blue crossfeed light not ON.

A B737-700 crew discovered a fuel imbalance during climbout caused by a fuel crossfeed fault with a circuit breaker tripped so; while completing the QRH; the crew diverted to landed with a 2;600 LBS imbalance as the left main tank was depleting.

1302907

201510

1201-1800

IAD.Airport

VA

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification

1302907

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

We had just landed at IAD on 1L and received instructions from ground control to taxi via U W4 and hold short of 1C. While on taxiway U; the Captain began taxiing at a high rate of speed. The aircraft accelerated quickly while I was completing my after landing flow; but I noticed that we had a ground speed of 65kts and an indicated airspeed of 70kts. I told the Captain that he was at 65kts and he said 'ya'; but did pull the power back and allowed the airplane to coast and slow down. After holding short of 1C; tower told us to cross with no delay. As I was reading back the instructions; we received a red master warning with an associated CAS message and aural warning for No Takeoff due to nearly having full power on our one running engine. After all the passengers had deplaned; I asked one of the flight attendants if she could tell if we were taxiing too fast. She emphatically replied yes. Taxiing at a high rate of speed has been consistent with this Captain today.I could have used the brakes on my side to slow the airplane down or kept it from speeding up so much. I could have noticed how fast the airplane was taxiing sooner and spoken up as soon as the airplane exceeded the safe taxi speed.

EMB-175 First Officer reported his Captain has a habit of taxiing at an inappropriately high rate of speed.

1304492

201510

1801-2400

IAH.Tower

TX

0.0

Night

Tower IAH

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch

None

Class B IAH

Tower IAH

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class B IAH

Facility IAH.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.8

Situational Awareness

1304492

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

Landing and departing Runway 9. Aircraft X a B763 was instructed to line up and wait on Runway 9 and issued traffic of Aircraft Y a B739 on a 4 mile final. Aircraft Y was issued traffic a heavy Boeing 767 departing prior to his arrival and caution wake turbulence. As soon as the previous departure had lifted off of the runway Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff and assigned runway heading. Aircraft X was again issued traffic now on a 2.5 mile final. Aircraft X did not begin take off roll in a quick manner and was starting rotation as Aircraft Y crossed the landing threshold. Aircraft Y appeared to get some wake turbulence and lifted back up from approx. 200 AGL and stated he was going around. I immediately issued a turn 20 degrees to the right and a climb to 2;000 feet to get Aircraft Y out of the wake and coordinated verbally with local West to stay on a 110 degree heading until proper IFR separation behind a heavy jet allowed me to turn North. Aircraft Y was then issued a turn to 360 degrees and a climb to 3;000 feet and handed off to the next controller to be re-vectored back to final. Discussed the operation with the supervisor. Each aircrew is different and not all air crews can make a 2.5 mile departure window. I will no longer line up and wait any [company name removed] heavy jets with traffic on less than a 5 mile final.

IAH Tower Controller reported of an aircraft going around due to wake from the preceding departure. Controller turned go-around traffic to avoid more of the wake. Controller realized that there should have been a larger hole to depart the heavy.

1426247

201702

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

40

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

PA-18/19 Super Cub

1.0

Part 91

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 8400; Flight Crew Type 80

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1426247

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Other landing roll

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

Aircraft X landed in a three-point attitude; straight; on center line; on speed. Student had gone around on his first attempt rather than try to recover from a minor bounce. Go-around was gracefully executed. Student was calm and in control. After aircraft touched down on the second attempt; stick was held full aft and roll-out seemed normal. Aircraft then swerved to the right; seemed to correct back left; then swerved hard right. The left wingtip contacted the ground as the aircraft continued into a snowbank at the edge of the runway. The right gear leg contacted the snow bank and the aircraft nosed over onto its back. Neither pilot was injured; both exited the aircraft through the door; and the aircraft was shut down; fuel shut off.I did not detect the student applying excessive control inputs; I did not feel him fighting me on the controls; but my efforts to straighten the aircraft had no effect on the ensuing ground loop. Power was not applied nor could either of us recall going for the brakes. There were no tire marks on the runway; nor were there any flat spots on the tires. There were no apparent failures noted in the tail wheel assembly.This was my second instructional flight that day in the same aircraft. We had light east winds right down the runway (AWOS had reported wind 060 at 4kts- we were landing on runway XY). No issues or problems were encountered on the first flight. Both students are relatively low-time tail wheel pilots so I was actively involved with all maneuvers and close to if not on the controls at all times. I have [many] hours of tail wheel time; fly in a lot of wind; and have never experienced a ground loop before. I have no idea why we lost control and I could not keep us on the runway.

Instructor Pilot reported a loss of directional control on landing roll and; despite the Instructor's efforts; the aircraft departed the runway and flipped onto its back.

1665976

201907

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

37000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

FMS/FMC

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 208; Flight Crew Total 14976

1665976

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft

At cruise; both FMCs failed with no annunciators except for momentary VTK annunciator on Captain's instruments. FMC prompt disappeared from both CDUs. A few seconds later; aircraft went into CWS for roll and auto throttles attempted to go to full idle. Crew began to execute checklist and troubleshoot the problem. Because aircraft went into CWS for roll; and heading select would not function; aircraft drifted slightly off course as crew analyzed the various failures. ATC noticed and asked us where we were going. I informed ATC of our failures. He gave us a heading to correct. Three minutes later all systems self-restored and we continued without further anomalies. Captain made a [logbook] entry. ATC was advised immediately of our restored systems and that we needed no further assistance. Captain was about to inform ATC of our system failure when ATC noticed our slight course deviation.

B737NG Captain reported a track error occurred following loss of both FMCs in cruise flight. A few minutes later; all systems returning to normal with no action taken by the crew.

1228357

201412

1201-1800

RIL.Airport

CO

30.0

20000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZDV

Personal

Premier 1

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Descent

Class A ZDV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 5300; Flight Crew Type 1100

1228357

Conflict NMAC

Vertical 400

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Ambiguous

I was descending into RIL for landing and received a traffic alert. The aircraft was below me and got to within 400 ft. vertical. I stopped the descent and turned right. A few seconds after that; Denver Center controller told me to turn to heading 060; which I was almost to that heading on my own. The RA never activated.

PRM1 pilot reported an NMAC on descent into RIL.

1204309

201409

0601-1200

DTW.Airport

MI

Daylight

Tower DTW

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B DTW

Tower DTW

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Landing

Class B DTW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1204309

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Procedure

We were vectored onto final approach for a visual approach to [Runway] 22R at DTW. We joined the localizer 3 miles behind an MD 80 ahead of us. We were at the marker; just completed our Before Landing Check when we encountered two noticeable wake turbulence events. The aircraft remained on autopilot for the duration of the sequence of the wake turbulence encounters. After the second wake encounter; our plane entered one sudden and severe downward push. There was roll movement. Maximum bank angle was approximately 25 degrees during the sequence of events before and after the wake encounter; we were in smooth air. I called ATC and told them we encountered wake turbulence. The autopilot was disconnected and the aircraft was hand flown and we initiated a go-around. ATC caused this by too close spacing. Also the light tail wind at altitude was a major contribution.

CRJ-200 Captain reported wake turbulence encounter in trail of an MD80 on approach to DTW that resulted in a 25-degree roll and a 'sudden downward push'.

1072738

201303

1201-1800

MYNN.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

15

Daylight

5000

/

Ground MYNN

PA-30 Twin Comanche

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Taxi

Other Taxiway

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 64; Flight Crew Total 7675; Flight Crew Type 4750

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1072738

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Human Factors; Airport

Human Factors

Leaving FBO we were told to follow a Challenger on Taxiway L. Missed the hold short line due to concentration on separation from Challenger; and followed that aircraft past the line (Challenger had apparently switched to Local and received immediate takeoff clearance. Noticing the Challenger application of takeoff power; I knew immediately what had occurred. I attempted to call ground to ask if I should backtrack or switch to Tower and go; but the frequency was busy. As I prepared to turn and proceed back; ground called and reported what we already knew; and stated we were to make the 180; which we did. Contributing to my error were a few things: first; I concentrated on the instruction to follow the Challenger; and paid inadequate attention to the hold short line. Also; on returning to the hold short line; I noticed the line was not prominent; and probably should be repainted. Also; the runway marker is somewhat distant from the taxiway; and I applied plenty of tunnel vision in order to miss it until late in the game. The [vegetation at this intersection is not maintained] as it would be at a stateside controlled airport; with vegetation providing some distraction. Finally; the runway is narrow and appeared to be a taxiway (I have safe taxi; but same apparently is not supported at MYNN). In the end; the error was mine (my crewman didn't help much either) and was largely due to my overemphasizing the order to 'follow the Challenger'. On most recent prior trip to MYNN; our departure included following L to its end; then turning to use runway full length). This may have been still in my mind; contributing to the chain of events resulting in my lapse of judgment here.

PA30 pilot reports a runway incursion at MYNN after being instructed to follow the Challenger to Runway 30. The Challenger switches to the Tower and is cleared for takeoff without stopping and the reporter; still on Ground; follows it onto the runway. The hold short line is reported to be faint and the runway signs are well off the taxiway.

1786676

202102

DEN.Airport

CO

8000.0

VMC

TRACON D01

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 35

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B DEN; Class E D01

Aircraft X

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 7714; Flight Crew Type 3785

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1786676

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Descending via the NIIXX 2 arrival for the ILS Runway 35R in CAVOK conditions. Around the BSTON Intersection we were given a westerly to northwesterly radar vector and cleared to descend and maintain 10;000. As we got closer to the final approach course (somewhere between DEANE and DRUMM) we were cleared to descend and maintain 8;000 and cleared direct to the FRONZ Intersection (FAF for the ILS). The Controller asked if we had 35R in sight; after a pause; we had the runway in sight and advised ATC. We were then cleared for the visual approach to 35R. The FAF altitude at FRONZ is 7;000 so that is what we set in the MCP while descending through approximately 8;800 in FLCH. We had just gotten the '2;500' call from the Radio Altimeter and made our call outs. As we descended through 8;000 I noticed the Radio Altitude around 1;800 and descending. A quick look at JeppFD PRO showed our aircraft position just south and east of the DRUMM Intersection. I called out the altitude and the fact that we need to go back up to 8;000 (our last cleared altitude prior to the approach clearance) until we are north of DRUMM. I reset the MCP to 8;000 and verbalized that we need to climb back up. The Captain selected a V/S climb back to 8;000. We joined the approach course and followed the G/S and landed without incident.ATC never mentioned anything to us about violating airspace or going below the DEN Class B. Though it is nice to get directs; etc. However; I believe the direct to FRONZ clearance; if not really familiar with the DEN Class B; can set crews up to possibly violate airspace and even lead to an unstable approach.Once parked at the gate with all checklists complete; we debriefed and there certainly was some confusion as to exactly where we were when we descended below 8;000. We had a jump seat observer who thought we might have been a little low as he has a lot of General Aviation experience in the DEN area.

Air carrier First Officer reported an altitude deviation that may have put them below the Class B airspace during a visual approach to DEN airport.

1592994

201811

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

38000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 196; Flight Crew Total 5610; Flight Crew Type 1263

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1592994

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Operating Aircraft X to ZZZ; ATC informed us that our filed altitude would result in a significant delay and asked if we could accept FL360 or FL380. We requested either altitude; and ATC assigned us FL380. The CA (Captain) instructed me to accept it in order to avoid turbulence reported at lower altitudes; even though the IRO (International Relief Officer) and I both mentioned it was close to our MAX Altitude. After takeoff the IRO suggested we request FL370; but due to heavy workload and ATC radio traffic we were unable to attempt the request. Soon after the IRO departed the cockpit for his break; ATC assigned us to cross 10 SE of ZZZZZ at FL380 and report level. The CA (PF) (Pilot Flying) selected VS in order to meet the restriction; which caused our airspeed to begin decreasing. It continued to decrease at which point I called out airspeed to bring his attention to the situation and he reduced the VS but not enough to reverse the trend and the airspeed continued to decrease to just above the yellow arc prior to level off. I again stated our airspeed is too low and he again made a small correction but it still did not reverse the trend. We leveled off at FL380; and I reported level; and was immediately handed off. As I began accomplishing those tasks; I was distracted from the aircraft state and by the time I scanned the instruments again we had slowed well into the yellow arc in level flight and continued to decelerate. I stated you need to reduce the pitch and the CA selected a slight descent to rectify the situation as I set the altitude a couple hundred feet lower; but the aircraft continued to slow to just above the red arc. The CA disengaged the autopilot; added full power; reduced the pitch further; and turned off the tracks. I selected FL350; [notified] ATC; requested an offset and a lower altitude. The aircraft began to accelerate as we descended to FL350. After the aircraft accelerated to normal speed; we [let ATC know things were rectified] and continued to ZZZ without further incident.

B777 First Officer reported an airspeed decay in cruise due to excessive weight for the selected flight level.

1663956

201907

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Total 10000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1663956

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Landed on XX and exited runway. Tower said P W to the ramp and so I taxied forward. First Officer switched to Ground frequency and I saw the 777 on Papa Taxiway coming toward us not slowing down so I put on brakes. At same time I heard [the] Controller tell us to stop two times which I already had done. The wingtip of the 777 missed our windshield by about 20 ft.I think that area is deadly because of tower giving taxi instructions to landing aircraft & then handing them off to Ground Control who has already given the foreign flights taxi instructions many minutes earlier from the international terminal and relying on dumb luck that the aircraft exiting the runways don't taxi in front of the foreign carriers on Papa of whom English may not be a primary language and are not listening to the Tower anyway. Also ZZZ is a training airport for ATC.ZZZ Ground control should automatically give the carriers coming out of the international terminal going to [Runway] XY or XX taxi instructions to taxi via P hold short of U. This will enable conscious positive control of this problematic intersection area and allow aircraft exiting Runway XX or crossing XX to taxi clear of the runway without conflicts with large international aircraft outbound.

A319 flight crew reported a ground conflict with a 777 during taxi to gate.

1673032

201908

1801-2400

PHL.Airport

PA

2000.0

VMC

Night

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS PHL

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B PHL

ILS/VOR

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 7800

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1673032

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Cleared for the visual approach to 9R at PHL airport. The weather was night VMC with unrestricted visibility and light winds. I was the Flying Pilot with the autopilot engaged. We were at 2;000 ft. AGL approaching the 9R LOC and GS; I selected approach mode; called for the gear down and flaps to 15. The Captain (Pilot Monitoring) verified the speed (below 200) and selected the flaps to 15. The airplane turned to final; captured the LOC and GS. The airplane started a descent on G/S. Without warning the GS indication deflected instantly to full down. With the autopilot engaged; the airplane abruptly pitched nose down as it attempted to track the errant GS indication. I quickly disconnected the autopilot and arrested the sink rate; leveling at 1;100 ft. AGL. The aural warning of 'sink rate' activated. Once leveled at 1;100 ft. with the autopilot disconnected; the Before Landing Checklist was completed. I flew manually level to intercept the glide path to a landing (followed the VASI). Meanwhile the Approach Controller told us he had received a low altitude alert and instructed us to contact the Tower. Once the Captain contacted the Tower; we were cleared to land on Runway 9R. At 1;000 ft. AGL the airplane was fully configured; on speed and before landing checklist completed. I continued the visual approach to a normal landing. Both the Captain and I could not figure out why this event occurred. What makes the glide slope to all of the sudden dive to the bottom of the display?? Either there was a system malfunction; or a truck or airplane drove or taxied across the ILS critical area. (Our assumption).

B-737 First Officer reported experiencing glide-slope signal errors resulting in a low altitude alert.

1503415

201712

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

36000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A330

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 15000

Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction

1503415

Aircraft X

Crew Rest Area

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1503098.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Initiating cruise climb from FL360 to FL380 engine number one had two compressor stalls. Initial action was to initiate track departure with a turn to the right. Initiated ECAM actions and brought engine to idle. Engine then appeared to operate normally so thrust was restored. Consulted [Operations] and Maintenance on the SAT phone and their advice was to continue as long as the engine operated normally. N3 vibration exceeded the advisory level so thrust on the number one engine was reduced to keep vibration within limits. Flight continued normally. Crew [advised] Approach on initial contact. On an approximately 8 mile base the number one engine failed. Crew ran the ECAM and continued the visual approach to a normal landing. Taxied to gate with no further assistance required.CauseNumber one engine stall; vibration and subsequent failure.

I was at my rest station half asleep when I heard a loud thud followed about 15 seconds later by another. I could then hear through the bunk wall ECAM signals etc. A flight attendant started banging on the bunk room door. I quickly got ready and reentered the cockpit. The crew told me they had received an altitude change clearance from FL360 to FL380 and as soon as they selected climb mode that's when the left (#1) engine suffered the stalls. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance via SATCOM and decided that by manually modulating the engine; we could keep the vibrations (which had been up as high as 7.0) down to 3.9. We continued to ZZZ. Upon contact with approach we [advised them of the situation]; mainly as a precaution. We were placed on a 6 mile left base to Runway XXL. As the FO (doing a magnificent job) brought the power above idle; the left engine failed. We did a quick QRH procedure; went in; and landed uneventfully.

A330 flight crew reported engine stall during cruise climb that resulted in an engine failure during initial approach.

1734119

202003

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

240.0

6.0

2000.0

Night

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 850; Flight Crew Type 800

1734119

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Aircraft

We transitioned back to our home airport via a transition through Class C. A couple minutes after; [Tower] transitioned us to Approach for flight following we switched our fuel tanks. We followed procedures and switched tanks by turning on the fuel pump; checking fuel pressure; switching the fuel selector; checking pressure; then turning the pump off.A few seconds after the pump was switched off we had an immediate loss of power. Tried to remedy by reversing the process; pump on; switch tanks while pitching for best glide. No restart and engine continued to lose all power. Tried a flow and checked anything that may lead to a fuel starvation issue. In the pitch black I found a well lighted area that was relatively free of ground traffic. It was a warehouse trucking lot. Was able to maneuver the aircraft between stacked shipping containers as to not hit them. Cleared the wing by 5-10 ft. and performed a normal landing. Came to a stop and contacted Approach to let them know I was safe. No damage to the aircraft; no souls were harmed. [Notified ATC of the problem] roughly 1;000 ft. AGL. Cause is yet to be found; but I suspect something in the fuel line or contaminants in the fuel that reached the carburetor.

PA-28 Instructor Pilot reported safely landing in a parking lot following engine failure related to a fuel issue.

1425474

201702

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Training / Qualification

1425474

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Other takeoff roll

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

On many of my training and line flights; probably more than 50%; I observe pilots delaying takeoff rotation for more than 3 seconds after Pilot Monitoring (PM) calls for rotation. This late rotation leads to the aircraft departing the runway significantly farther down the runway than planned; and at times this leads to less than optimal crossing height at the departure end of the runway. During debriefing I hear the following: 'we were scared to death in training about tail strikes; the simulator doesn't really approximate what the airplane really does; I'm using a constant back pressure on the yoke; so it should work; right?; I was told never takeoff with more than about 5.5 degrees pitch on a 900ER'; etc. A review of the [Manual] confirms that there is minimal practical guidance on the details of a proper takeoff rotation; including specific guidance on 900ER versus 800 or 700; or F1 on hot day with high assumed temp/low takeoff power (below climb thrust setting) for example. I believe this lack of proper standardized training from training and standards departments including lack of agreed upon written material on this important maneuver is resulting in our crews making it to the line with an incomplete level of competence on the proper takeoff on the 737NG. When I have brought up the issue of deep reduced takeoffs; I've been told by standards that we do this in order to extend engine life. When I suggest that a climb thrust power takeoff is still a reduced thrust takeoff; I'm met with blank stares. I have also been surprised by the lack of crosstalk among LCAs during standards meetings on having an open; collegial discussion on how best to train this maneuver. Again; I attribute this to certain personalities within management that are not entirely open to open dialog or questioning of the status quo. I believe the above problems are compromising our safety margins during the takeoff phase of flight. If this is not corrected it is only a matter of time before we will have an airplane fail to reach minimum takeoff height at the end of the runway; leading to an accident with potentially catastrophic consequences.

B737NG Check Airman reported observing a high rate of delayed rotation during takeoff; which he feels is due to inadequate training.

1599196

201812

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

Fractional

Challenger 350

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Cruise

Integrated Audio System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1599196

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1599202.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Taxi

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were assigned to a new aircraft that had just completed maintenance for an inoperative push to talk switch on the right side yoke. Prior to arriving at the airport we received a release from maintenance notification from the company. We immediately reviewed the maintenance electronic logbook to verify that it was indeed closed and that no other open write ups existed. Upon arrival at the aircraft we reviewed the paper logbook. The first page was the PTT (Push-to-Talk) write up that contained the proper corrective action and sign offs. I went to the left seat and did the preflight and flight planning while [my FO (First Officer)] cleaned and organized the cabin. All communications were done from the left during this period. When preparing to taxi; [my FO] tried 3 times to reach ground using the right PTT and could not reach them. We were behind several large buildings and hangers and just assumed it was blocking communications. I chose to do the comms from the left until take off. After takeoff we realized that the right PTT was still inoperative. When we reached cruise we located [the correct MEL] that would apply to the condition of the inoperative PTT switch and agreed to continue and write it up at the next stop. Soon after we received a message to divert without a reason. I executed the divert while [my FO] called the company for an explanation. We were told that we were flying an AOG aircraft. After landing we called the company again and were told that the technician that worked on the plane called the company after we took off and told them that he may have installed the PTT switch upside down. I went to the cockpit and tried the PTT in the opposite direction and it did transmit properly. We wrote up the plane again for the PTT switch being installed backwards.In the past we used the #2; or bottom radio for communications. Often in ZZZ we would have to switch to the #1; or top radio in order to establish communications in that area of the ramp. The action switched the comms from the right to the left radio. That past action affected my judgment when I chose to use the left PTT to communicate; thinking I was fixing the problem that I had dealt with before. There was no way for us to know what was going on behind the scenes as we prepared to take off. All the documents and notifications we received confirmed to us that the plane was airworthy.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CL-350 flight crew reported a malfunctioning push to talk switch after maintenance had released it as repaired.

1606415

201812

0.0

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Testing

DC Battery

X

Improperly Operated

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Other

1606415

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors

Human Factors

Aircraft X arrived with an ELB (Electronic Logbook) report regarding the left engine hydraulic pressure. The corrective action required engine operation to test the hydraulic pump. After setting up the cockpit in accordance with the maintenance manual and receiving clearance from the techs on the ground I was in the process of motoring the left engine when someone barged into the flight deck from behind me; reached over my head; operated some switches on the overhead panel; exited the plane and drove away from the aircraft. After he left I realized he had turned off the main battery causing the APU to shut down aborting the engine motor procedure. I realized the person who interfered was an [outside] vendor and summoned him back to the aircraft. When he returned he told me that he turned the battery off because he was told to 'return the cockpit to the way he found it'. He did not follow any checklist and had no idea what happens when the battery is turned off and seemed to be unfamiliar with the cockpit. He was oblivious to the severity of what he had done and seemed to be unaware of his surroundings regarding the maintenance operation being performed. It was obvious that he should have recognized the maintenance operation being performed at the time of his interference.It would be disturbing to me to find that the company allows inexperienced; untrained and unqualified vendors to operate systems in the flight deck on [company] aircraft. Besides the obvious safety concerns this also may be a security threat.

Air carrier maintenance technician reported an outside vendor entered the flight deck and reconfigured the aircraft systems without communicating to maintenance; causing the maintenance procedure to be aborted.

1694184

201910

0001-0600

ZDV.ARTCC

CO

35000.0

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZDV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 20275

1694184

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Weather

Just south of ALS. In cruise at FL350; .78 Mach; we encountered mild mountain wave and requested a lower altitude. Cleared to FL290; we began the descent; but had descended only about 200 ft. when the aircraft started climbing rapidly. VVI reached 1;600 fpm up. Mach went from .78 to .815; airspeed went into the red by 5 kts.; over speed warning actuated. Max altitude was about FL355. Then it turned around; and resumed the descent to FL290. We notified Denver Center about the mountain wave and the altitude deviation. Notified Dispatch about the strong mountain wave. Notified Maintenance about the over speed. Interestingly; the entire event was in smooth air. Flight Attendants and passengers never knew anything had happened. No rough ride; just a very smooth roller coaster. My first clue was the VVI going from down to up. My comment; 'Why are we climbing?'

A321 Captain reported a mountain wave encounter that caused an altitude deviation and an overspeed condition.

1260176

201505

0001-0600

CZQX.ARTCC

NF

35000.0

VMC

Center CZQX

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Oceanic

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 118; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 180

1260176

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

While in level; smooth; night cruising flight; felt something similar to crossing a wake vortice but we were not near any other traffic. Observed right engine EPR and N1 were lower than left engines indications. Engine was under self-recovery when we observed engine thrust loss/reduction. While discussing the occurrence we received 3 or 4 calls from the cabin report observation of bright flash of light and flames from right engine. Completed engine thrust loss and engine failure checklists. Called dispatch on SATCOM. Conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance Control; reviewed options. Reviewed data from Boeing's computer and maintenance screens per advice of Maintenance Control Engine Controller and Engine Engineer; aircraft and all systems normal; continued to destination. Briefed relief crew prior to entering break period. Reviewed options. Remainder of flight uneventful.

In cruise flight crew noticed power loss on right engine and completed the appropriate checklist. All aircraft systems were operating normally. After conferring with Dispatch and Maintenance Control; crew continued to destination.

1100846

201307

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3500.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-400 and 400 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1100846

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was providing training on an uninvolved position at the time of the incident. I witnessed Arrival Sector X turn a B767 from downwind to base about 10 miles too early and made no attempt to fix the situation he created. He was worried about getting too close to [Runway] 9R arrivals that were descending from above but didn't think about staying away from the low side Arrival Sector Y Controller's airplane (a B757). We were just briefed regarding the ability to use lower altitudes with coordination with other positions. I heard Arrival Sector Y say to him something to the effect of 'what are you doing; I've got an airplane there'. The Arrival Sector X Controller just sat there and watched it all happen. I asked the Arrival Sector Y Controller if he asked to use 4;000 FT on his side; He replied 'no; he couldn't have cared less that he had a deal with my airplane'. My estimate between the B767 and B757 was 500 vertical; 2.25 laterally with no divergence. The Arrival Sector X Controller is one of the weaker controllers here; and even though I work with him less than 5 hours a month; it seems I always see things like this go unchecked; violating the SOP; common sense; and most of all SAFETY. I don't know why he does these things. I would suggest skill enhancement training for the Arrival Sector X Controller throughout the operation. I am concerned when he is here.

TRACON Controller voiced concern regarding the actions of a fellow Controller that resulted in a loss of separation event.

997801

201203

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

32000.0

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

ACARS

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

997801

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Workload

997802.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling

Ambiguous

We felt a buffet and found airspeed well into the barber pole. First Officer flying; I retarded the thrust levers to reduce speed. Our initial evaluation was we'd entered a mountain wave (165 KTS of wind at altitude); but the indicated speeds didn't make any sense. We started checking for other causes; pitot heat; etc. and found the flaps selected and indicating one (speed approximately 270 KIAS and at FL320). I retracted the flaps at approximately 235 KIAS; hand flew the airplane to check for roll or vibration and found all indications normal. We continued to our destination and landed without further event. We also limited descent speed as a precaution. What I believe happened: I was beginning to type a wind report to Dispatch when the autopilot trimmed the airplane. The trim wheel bumped my arm and I must have made contact with the flap handle enough to knock it out of the detent (reaching around the thrust levers and flaps to reach the keyboard). Approximately two or three minutes later the event occurred. If I bumped the flaps it was the result of being bumped by the trim wheel; and I had no idea anything had transpired. Just plain stupid bad luck; but it seems to me something that could be repeated and everyone should be aware of the possibility. Sure didn't know I touched the flap handle and they didn't come out immediately.

I would go so far as to say that I have seen every Captain I have flown with use this or similar move to send ACARS messages in the 400. It should be noted that newer airplanes do not have this potential problem because there is a menu button on both sides.

As a B737 Captain was entering ACARS data at FL320 he inadvertently moved the flap handle which caused airframe vibrations and a flap overspeed. When they recognized the error power was reduced and the flaps raised.

1506910

201712

1201-1800

ZLA.ARTCC

CA

Center ZLA

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

VFR Route

Class E ZLA

Facility ZLA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1506910

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

A Cessna 172 checked on to my frequency and I gave him the altimeter as usual. No issues noted. About 5-10 miles later I hear a call. The Cessna 172 [advised he was diverting]. He said he was going to Searchlight Airport. I gave him the airport location; etc. At this sector; we have two different radio sites so at that low altitude we have to switch between radio sites. It was VERY difficult to deliver information to the aircraft; or other aircraft because someone else would cut me off; or vice-versa from the other radio site. I repeatedly made blanket statements of 'all aircraft stand-by' to try to deliver information or get information from the aircraft in distress but was unsuccessful to aircraft on the opposite side of my airspace because of the poor radio coverage. Although we have coped with this for a while; it's during emergencies that it becomes evident that we need good reliable radios with adequate coverage. I recommend we have better radio coverage so that all aircraft can hear each other regardless of position.

A Center Controller reported they had difficulty communicating with an aircraft that lost an engine and was diverting due to poor radio coverage at low altitudes in their sector.

1111000

201308

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Elevator Trim System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Dispatch

1111000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

Late in our descent we got 'STAB TRIM' and 'MACH TRIM' status messages. I tried to re-engage the stabilizer trim and it immediately disengaged. I asked the First Officer/pilot flying to also work the radios while I ran the QRH checklist. As I neared the end of the 'MACH TRIM' QRH procedure we got an 'AP TRIM' message. I noticed the stab trim numbers decreasing so I took the controls and disconnected the autopilot. The plane was flying with very nose-down trim (I think it read 2.2 when I disconnected the autopilot). I told the First Officer to run the stab trim runaway immediate action items. I had begun the descent at this point and had declared an emergency. We were close to our destination so I planned to land there. ATC gave us direct to the airport; I made a PA and talked to the Flight Attendant while in the descent. The First Officer completed the QRH procedure and we were within five minutes of landing when ATC said that the airport was detecting windshear on the approaches. Shortly after that ATC said that the alert had cleared (or something to that affect) so we continued. On about a 5 mile final ATC said they were getting windshear detections again and that an Airbus that just landed reported a gain of 25 KTS. I called for the go-around and asked for a left turn away from what was starting to look like a rain shaft over the airport. ATC asked our intentions and I decided to divert to and land at another area airport. The malfunction and the weather were big threats. The plane took some work but was controllable and I don't think we deviated from our ATC cleared routes/altitudes. I made a few mistakes. I am not sure that I called for the correct checklist. I saw the stabilizer trim moving and when I disconnected the autopilot and felt how out of trim the plane was my first reaction was a runaway. In retrospect we might have looked at the QRH procedure for 'AP TRIM' first. I felt very busy throughout the whole mess and I never sent the Dispatcher a message saying we were diverting. I didn't forget; it was a conscious decision but looking back now I question it. When we got on the ground I got very busy trying to catch the Dispatcher up; coordinate a gate; accommodate the passengers and take care of my crew that it took me a long time to talk to Maintenance. The Maintenance Controller was obviously upset with me about being called so late in the process. When I spoke to the Dispatcher early on I asked if Maintenance knew what was going on and she had said that they were sitting right next to her and that the ball was already rolling. I intended to call them with specifics later but subconsciously I thought of them as 'notified'. I didn't call until a Scheduler reminded me to. That was a big mistake; I should have called them immediately.

A CRJ-200 flight crew experienced stab/autopilot/mach trim pitch axis anomalies while on descent to their destination. Windshear and weather ultimately precluded their emergency landing at their destination and they diverted to another area airport not yet so affected. The heavy workload thus encountered precluded a timely contact with Maintenance.

1816163

202106

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Coalescer Bag

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Physiological - Other

1816163

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

The five of us crew members boarded Aircraft X at ZZZ just as soon as the inbound flight fully deplaned. The inbound flight crew left the APU and APU Bleed ON. Upon stepping aboard and entering the Flight Deck (FD); I noticed an odor that wasn't quite normal. As I was setting up; one of the flight attendants (FAs) called me to the back to check on something. She was standing approximately halfway between first class and the emergency exit row; and as I walked towards her the odor became readily noticeable and more intense. I recognized it as an odor I haven't smelt in many years; that of burning oil coming through the APU driven pack. She asked; 'do you smell that?' which confirmed my thought. I said I certainly did and that we were not going to take this aircraft. She said 'it's that old dirty sock smell' referring to a common term used many years ago (6-8?) pertaining to a period when there were many bad and noxious odors on the Airbus 320 fleet. I told her I agreed and explained it was likely APU oil that was getting into the air conditioning system. I took a few steps further aft and noticed the odor intensified the further back I went. I believe she went to the back of the aircraft to tell another FA as I made my way to the FD to turn the APU Bleed OFF. I briefly explained the situation to the FA in the fwd galley; and told her we were not taking this aircraft. After turning the APU Bleed OFF; I called Maintenance and informed them of the situation. I grabbed the AML and my iPad and headed out to the jetway to fill out the forms. All 3 FAs were now in the jetway and my FO (First Officer) was outside doing his walk-around; preflight inspection. I advised the cleaning crew they should also exit the aircraft; though 2 of them remained aboard as they wanted to finish as they were almost done. The odor dissipated within a few minutes of turning the bleed OFF. I then called my Dispatcher and advised her of the situation; explaining the noxious odor we just experienced; and that some of us already had noticeable symptoms. Per the first items of the online Smoke/Odor/Fume Report in [the] checklist; I asked how everyone was feeling. The 3 FAs and myself had throat irritation; a foul taste in our mouths; and varying degrees of a headache. Mine was slight at that time; hardly worth noting as I began filling out the S/O/F form. My FO had been outside; therefore had minimal exposure and no ill affects. The 4 of them then went up to wait in the terminal while I remained in the jetway to fill out the S/O/F form and AML. A few minutes later; an FA came down to inform me that another FA was feeling light headed and nauseous and that they were contacting their Inflight Coordinator to seek medical assistance. A few minutes later; my FO came down to inform me that FA was now looking faint and had vomited. I gave him the number to Med-Air to give to the FAs. After completing the S/O/F report and making an AML entry; I put the AML back in the FD; shutdown the aircraft and left; intending to go with my FO to another gate (D3?) for a replacement aircraft to complete the flight to ZZZ1. As I was walking up the jetway my symptoms intensified; particularly the headache; and upon entering the terminal it was strongly suggested I have my condition assessed. I called the Chief Pilots [office] to confer and advise them of the situation; then I went with the FAs to [the] hospital. The 4 of us each had POC Blood Gas; arterial tests done; and were monitored. We were discharged shortly after midnight. I contacted an FA to see how she and the rest of the FAs were doing. She reported a new symptom of watery eyes; still with sore throat and headache. Another FA still had a dull headache; and the one who vomited was still not feeling well. The first FA contacted me again later in the day for an update stating no change with her; the other one was now down to a dull headache; and the one suffering the worst now reports body aches. My own symptoms have improved but not yet gone away; still with a mild throat irritation; a nasty taste in my mouth; and almost negligible headache. I have been on the A320 fleet for overall XX years and have experienced many of these events; particularly during that long ago time period when there was a rash of these incidents; many before the cause was determined or rectified. I was rather surprised at how quickly and intensely the symptoms came on during this event. This was by far the most intense experience I've had. As mentioned above; I haven't experienced this in many years. It is my understanding that maintenance procedures had been put in place to prevent these from occurring. I recently read a bulletin message regarding recent events occurring and a new operational procedure to remedy the situation. I am curious as to what may have changed to cause the recent events; as it seemed to me this had been under control. If it is a design flaw it must be fixed. If it is a procedural matter; we must figure out what works for the health and safety of our passengers; and particularly the crew who have potential exposure many times per work day.

A319 Captain reported a fume event during preflight that resulted in physiological symptoms in flight and cabin crew members.

1791816

202103

1201-1800

EUG.TRACON

OR

VMC

Daylight

TRACON EUG

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class E ZSE

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

VFR

Personal

Initial Climb

Class E ZSE

Facility EUG.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1791816

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Airport

Aircraft X checked in from 40 miles north of the airport requesting opposite direction arrival Runway 14. I coordinated with Medford Tower and they denied it due to an aircraft with a controlled departure time even though the departure would not have been a factor. I told Aircraft X unable and they requested the RNAV 32 Approach via SAMIE so I cleared them for the approach via SAMIE at or above 10;000 feet. As Aircraft X was following the course a VFR tag popped up near the approach path about 11 miles south of the airport (they appeared to depart from an uncontrolled airport that is directly in the approach path) so I issued traffic multiple times and gave Aircraft X an altitude restriction for traffic but when Aircraft X got closer to the unidentified target the target climbed and turned at the Aircraft X resulting in a TCAS RA at which point the Aircraft X climbed and eventually requested an altitude to maintain and wanted lower for a Visual Approach. Due to terrain I was unable to descend them low enough and had to issue vectors around for the ILS 14 Approach which the aircraft conducted and landed safely. I then had another arrival requesting the RNAV 32 Approach and the unidentified target was still a factor.The RNAV 32 Approach flies directly over an uncontrolled airport that is frequently used by VFR aircraft and also follows a very busy VFR area over a highway that aircraft not on flight following use for navigation. This approach is inherently dangerous due to the number of aircraft that fly along it's path without communication with Approach Control and because it flies through a valley between mountainous terrain giving ATC few options to avoid conflict with aircraft that can't be seen by our radar until reaching above 4;000 feet. I recommend that Medford airport should be allowed to advertise Runway 14 arrivals with Runway 32 departures. Whoever decided that we can't advertise that needs to come have a look at the arrival/departure procedures available at Medford and give an actual answer as to why? Runway 32 arrivals are much more dangerous to aircraft than Runway 14 due to mountainous terrain; and Runway 14 departures are far more dangerous when also arriving Runway 14 because the departure procedure for Runway 14 turns aircraft around directly in the face of aircraft arriving runway 14 creating an opposite direction conflict with FAR less control and restriction than we would have with a 14 arrival and 32 departure. Opposite Direction Operations requires a 10 mile cutoff where the opposite direction conflict created by a Runway14 arrival with a Runway 14 departure does not allow us to turn aircraft until a much higher altitude resulting in risky behavior. Runway 32 even has a departure procedure that provides safe divergence from opposite direction arrivals called the EAGLE 6 Departure. Until someone actually comes to the facility and understands the dangers of not being able to advertise Runway 14 arrivals with Runway 32 departures there will be many more close close calls that could have been safely prevented. It is an easy fix with amazing benefits for controllers; pilots; and preventing air carrier delays.

EUG TRACON Controller reported an unidentified VFR aircraft climbed into confliction with an Air Carrier on an RNAV Approach causing the Air carrier to respond to a TCAS/RA. The reporter states this is a recurring traffic situation in their airspace

1418104

201701

0601-1200

ZME.ARTCC

TN

VMC

Daylight

Center ZME

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC; VOR / VORTAC BWG

Cruise

Class A ZME

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction

1418104

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

1418105.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

We were given holding instructions to hold NW on the 320 radial of the BWG VOR. Setup and the initial turn was with the inbound course set to 320 (holding SE of the BWG VOR). When we realized that our clearance was to hold on the other side of BWG; we told ATC we needed to turn back to BWG and re-enter holding.We were pretty busy at this time because [of] a system malfunction. Entering a random holding pattern (and not the published database hold) is an infrequent event in our daily operations. We were also probably pretty tired at this point. We probably could have taken the time to discuss the hold among all three crew members to make sure we all agreed on the holding pattern. We may have also asked ATC for clarification if there was any confusion about the clearance.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported entering a holding pattern on the unprotected side of the hold clearance.

998938

201203

1201-1800

TEB.Airport

NJ

5000.0

VMC

15

Daylight

20000

TRACON N90

Air Taxi

Challenger 300

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

VOR / VORTAC TEB

Initial Approach

Direct

Class E N90

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

VFR

Class E N90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 10700; Flight Crew Type 80

998938

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Horizontal 2000; Vertical 0

Automation Aircraft RA

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

New York Approach Control cleared us to turn to the initial approach fix for the VOR Runway 24 approach in TEB as well as a descent to 4;000 FT. The crew started the left turn and descent towards the fix; mid way through the turn the Controller advised the crew of 'unverified VFR' traffic at twelve to one o'clock. Within a few seconds of the ATC warning; the aircraft TCAS sounded the initial traffic advisory. The crew began leveling the aircraft's descent however the VFR target keep climbing and turning towards us. Seconds after the initial advisory the TCAS sounded a RA climb command. The crew applied max thrust and began a RA climb to 5;400 FT. During this time the crew informed ATC of the RA and associated climb. The Controller then issued a descent clearance to 3;000 FT. The crew again informed ATC of the RA climb and then complied with the ATC clearance to 3;000 FT. A visual approach was completed to Runway 24 in TEB without further incident. It is the opinion of the crew that the problem was caused by the VFR flight climbing into busy airspace used by countless aircraft in the New York area without first making contact with ATC. The problem was further compounded by the controller on duty issuing a late traffic advisory. It is clear that the Controller had lost his situational awareness. This resulted in two aircraft on the same frequency responding to RA's in separate events within a few seconds of each other.

CL30 Captain experiences a TCAS RA while being vectored for a visual approach at TEB. ATC had reported the traffic just prior to the TA. An evasive climb is initiated until clear of conflict. A separate TCAS event was heard on the same frequency prior to switching; indicating to the reporter that the Controller was not paying attention.

1006690

201204

1201-1800

BWI.Airport

MD

0.0

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

Parked

FMS/FMC

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1006690

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Procedure

Ambiguous

We were filed via the SWANN3 departure; DQO transition. As is commonly the case; BWI was departing on Runway 28. I selected Runway 28 and the SWANN3 departure; DQO transition in the MCDU but noticed that it was entered into the MCDU flight plan as merely Runway 28; a discontinuity; and then DQO and the rest of our filed route. However; the SWANN3 departure for JETS requires a left turn to a heading of 150 degrees at the BAL 3 DME. The A319 is generally considered to be a turbojet; so that is how the departure should be coded in the navigation database. Instead; the departure is coded for the PROPS departure; which is just to fly runway heading. We worked around it by entering the BAL/285/3 fix as the first fix after the runway; and then flew the departure in HDG mode; using the PDB01 place/bearing/distance pseudo-waypoint as a marker to remind us to make the turn. We also entered BAL as in the RAD NAV page; and monitored the DME on the ND to identify exactly when to turn. The reason I'm making this report is because if a pilot trusts the navigation database to be correctly coded (as it usually is) and fails to review the paper or EFB version of the departure; he or she will be unaware of the incorrect coding; and is likely to continue straight ahead past the three DME point; potentially infringing on the restricted airspace off the departure end of the runway (as often happens to those flying the TERPZ departure; HAFNR transition; who fail to select the transition correctly). This is 'a violation waiting to happen'. I presume an error was made in the coding of the navigation database; where the engineer doing the coding incorrectly entered the PROP departure instructions rather than the JET instructions.

An A319 First Officer discovered that the SWANN3 departure from Runway 28 at BWI does not include the turn to 150 degrees at three DME when inserted into the MCDU.

1175938

201405

0601-1200

ORD.Airport

IL

4000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON C90

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

SID ORD8

Class B ORD

Altitude Hold/Capture

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Distraction; Confusion

1175938

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

At the gate we set the wrong altitude for our departure clearance. It should have been 5;000. 4;000 was set for our initial altitude and neither myself or the First Officer caught the error. No excuse. We simply made a mistake. After takeoff the First Officer checked in with Departure and told him we were climbing to 4;000. The Departure Controller read back our clearance to 4;000. When we leveled off at 4;000; the Controller asked who gave us that clearance and we replied it was entered in error. He cleared us to climb to 5;000. Our time at 4;000 was minimal (less than 30 seconds).

A B737 departed on the ORD8 and leveled at 4;000 FT instead of 5;000 FT because the neither pilot realized 4;000 FT was set as the initial level off altitude when it really was a crossing restriction.

1092921

201306

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

VMC

Thunderstorm

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Other / Unknown

1092921

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface

1092923.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Ambiguous

After a divert from Beijing then an alternate closing; we proceeded to the next suitable airport. Initially we were assigned to Runway 15 and after Tower offered Runway 33; we switched to the VOR Runway 33 approach. Fully configured at the FAF; the aircraft pitched over seemingly more than normal; but due to fatigue I did not notice the VSI. I was however; monitoring the altitude. I was not aware of the descent rate or that the aircraft had descended below MDA. We had sighted the runway off to our right and a turn was made to intercept final aways out. We had briefed a PAPI and saw we were below a normal glide path and I diverted my attention to monitoring altitude to make sure at that point no further descent was allowed. I assumed that the MDA was still set in the window and another cockpit crew member said the MDA of 650 was still in the window upon landing.

On arriving to a foreign airport we found the airport weather was good but the arrival corridor had heavy showers and it appeared to have thunderstorms along the way. Our alternate weather was good and we flew over it on our only attempt to see if we could go around the weather. From this flyover; we could see that the heavy weather was well northwest of the alternate. Prior to starting the arrival; we chose to set a BINGO 2K [divert fuel] higher than our R plus A [reserve plus alternate]. We ended up choosing to divert prior to reaching this fuel amount. We said we wished to divert to our alternate and every time we were told we could NOT go there and for us to state intentions. After many attempts; we chose ZZZZ which had good weather. ZZZZ was landing south; but from our arrival direction; landing north was closer. Prior to arriving at ZZZZ we declared an emergency. I was preparing for the ILS landing south when the Controller offered the VOR landing north. Since this was closer; I accepted. We set the VOR in the FMC; checked the iPad and confirmed an altitude of 600 plus 50 for MDA 650 RNAV approach. The aircraft was quickly configured; LNAV; VNAV; MDA (DA); and airspeed were all set. The PFD confirmed LNAV and VNAV PATH were engaged. We NEVER saw the DIAMOND on the Nav Display but the autopilot was engaged and at the FAF the aircraft pitched over but at a higher rate than I expected. Weather was good enough to make easy ground contact visually and we were still above the adjusted MDA. When I saw the approach lights and PAPI; I had to make an adjustment for runway alignment and leveled off as I saw that I was low. After a brief altitude adjustment; I saw RED over WHITE and continued to a landing. We landed and taxied off the runway.

Air Carrier flight crew reports diverting to a second alternate after their filed alternate and original destination are denied by ATC due to weather. During the non-precision approach the aircraft descends below MDA prior to arriving at the normal glide path. An emergency is declared during the diversion due to fuel and the aircraft lands with seven thousand pounds.

1361059

201606

0601-1200

ZME.ARTCC

TN

28000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Descent

STAR BLUZZ1

Class B MEM

Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Descent

Class B MEM

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1361059

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1361052.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

Descending on the BLUZZ1 RNAV arrival approx 10MN West of AXXEL encountered Wake Turbulence (Wing Tip) off a Widebody Transport ahead of us on the arrival. Aircraft rolled 20 deg right then 40 degs left; autopilot disconnected itself. Manually lowered nose recovered wings level and expedited descent to exit vorticies. Winds were 260/50 at altitude pretty much on the nose. Our Aircraft weighed approx 305K. Visually appeared other Aircraft was 10-15 miles ahead on the approach. Appeared to be a one-off incident. [In many] years of flying arrivals [I] have never seen a wake turbulence incident of this magnitude; all factors and rules seemed to have been complied with but still experienced vorticies and Aircraft upset. [Suggest] Greater spacing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

Widebody transport flight crew reported the aircraft rolled up to 40 degrees after encountering wake turbulence on arrival to MEM in trail of another wide body aircraft.

1214366

201410

1201-1800

MCO.Airport

FL

10200.0

VMC

CLR

TRACON F11

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class E F11

Personal

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

1.0

Class E F11

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Training / Qualification

1214366

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

After takeoff; and just north of the ORL VOR; we were given a turn to 270 degrees and a climb to and maintain 8000 feet. We leveled off at 8000 feet and stayed there for a minute or so. We had to wait until we were clear of [another] aircraft to climb higher.After we were clear; we were given a clearance to climb to 16000 feet. After passing 10000 feet; I performed my flow. I monitored to FMA; and saw that the climb speed increased from 250 knots to something around 290 knots. As we were accelerating; we hit a patch of rough air. I elected to select 250 knots for a temporary climb speed to climb a little quicker into smoother air.Just as I pulled the speed selector to command the flight guidance to maintain 250 knots; something caught my eye. Orlando approach requested we switch to Jacksonville Center frequency at the same time. As the First Officer began to read back the instructions; the same thing caught his eye; also. He stopped mid sentence.What we saw was a small remote controlled red aircraft with white and blue markings. I was fortunate to have pulled for open climb at 250 knots; because if I had let the aircraft accelerate; we may have been on an intersecting flight path. As it was; we only had 2-3 seconds to respond; but did not have to respond aggressively. We passed above the remote aircraft by 100-200 feet.All of this happened 17-18 northwest of MCO at approximately 10;200-10;500 feet MSL.We immediately informed Orlando Departure Control of what happened. He took the report; and then re instructed us to contact Jacksonville Center. We did; and the rest of the flight was uneventful.[I believe] all remote control aircraft owners need to register their aircraft so that a regulation book can be given to the owner of the craft.The remote controlled vehicle should be subject to the same rules as any other aircraft. If it flies into a B; C; or above 10000 feet in E airspace; it must have a transponder. There should also be a maximum distance and altitude a remote controlled vehicle can fly from its operator. Two miles high is too far for an operator to safely maneuver his craft safely.And finally; a written exam should be given to any operator of a class of remote controlled aircraft that can fly high enough; or fast enough to come into conflict with a traditional aircraft. If the test is not taken; or if it failed; the operator should be prohibited from flying his craft until the test is taken and passed.

An A320 flight crew had a close encounter with a UAV they identified as a red; white and blue model aircraft operating above 10;000 FT; within the confines of and at or above the MCO Class B.

1769897

202011

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Y

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1769897

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1770261.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Engine Fail/RTO (Rejected Takeoff) I was PF (Pilot Flying) holding short. After receiving a TO (takeoff) clearance from Tower; I taxied onto and began aligning with centerline. I advanced thrust levers to 1.05 EPR and slightly more before advancing TLs (throttle levers) to FLEX TO setting. As both engines spooled up and simultaneously the aircraft lurched hard to the left of the centerline; I noted an ECAS message accompanied with a ding. In Box 1 of EWD I saw ENG 1 Overspeed and immediately after I noted ENG 1 Fail. I rejected the TO and called 'My aircraft' bringing the aircraft to a stop on the runway. I immediately made a PA to remain seated; while assessing what condition the engine was in. My FO (First Officer) immediately made a call to ATC and had already retrieved the QRC. Together while determining what condition the engine was in; the FADEC started to attempt a relight and I decided to command my FO to select off on the Engine 1 master switch. Afterwards we completed the ECAM. With the engine shutdown and no indication of fire or severe damage I cleared the runway. After clearing the runway and brake set my FO reported the engine failure to the Tower Controller and I briefed the FAs (Flight Attendants). With the engine secure; no fire or severe damage; and a low speed RTO in my judgement I did not request ARF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting). After notifying the company and getting a gate we interrupted the flight and returned. At gate arrival my FO contacted Maintenance and I made a logbook entry. I would like to recognize FO for his proficiency and calm reaction to the event. Also my FAs remained calm and professional which I believe reassured our customers that their pilots had an unusual event fully under control. We made an aircraft swap and continued the flight [losing] not one passenger. Mechanical failure.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A319 flight crew experience an engine failure at beginning of takeoff roll; resulted in a low speed rejected takeoff.

1611578

201901

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Mixed

Snow; 1

Daylight

600

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 109; Flight Crew Type 14339

1611578

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1611959.0

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi; In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Evacuated

Airport; Human Factors; Weather

Weather

While on IOE (Initial Operating Experience); first landing attempt with Company; the First Officer made a normal and successful IFR ILS Approach and landing. The RCC (Runway Condition Code) received was 6-DRY GOOD; and weather reported winds 040/9; Vis 1 NM -FZDZSN BR; 600 overcast; temp -5/-7 and landing XXR/L. During the approach; Tower directed the flight to depart at the end of the runway. Discussion included the type of approach and confirming the RCC for the runway via ACARS. After landing; handoff of the aircraft was completed and while taxiing less than 20 knots (est.) and approaching the departure end of Runway XXR; brakes were applied with no effect including control input using the tiller. Prior to pavement departure; the nose wheel was centered and the aircraft came to rest right of the overrun in the grass. Notifying Ground Control of the situation; coordination proceeded for rescue though both the Tower and Company Ops. The FAs (Flight Attendants) and [all] Passengers were notified of the situation; remaining in their seats until further information was available. Dispatch and Chief Pilot were contacted. Engines were shut down following APU start; and with Maintenance concurrence; the CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) circuit breakers were pulled and documented in the logbook.With outstanding support from Rescue; deplaning began using the Captain side rear entrance after deicing a path; [in groups of passengers] at a time due to shuttle size. Five shuttles were eventually used for the transportation making round trip runs. The aircraft shutdown checklist was accomplished and the Crew left last; after inspecting the aircraft for remaining passenger items. No injuries reported during the event. One oversight was not completing the logbook oil and fuel entry prior to leaving the aircraft.

[We] flew to ZZZ and was on time. After landing (executed by the First Officer); the aircraft slowed as expected with normal speedbrake extension and thrust reverser deployment. At approximately 60 knots; transfer of control was performed from the FO (First Officer) to the Captain. Just prior to an expected turn off at either Runway XY or Taxiway X; instructions from Tower were received to 'taxi to the end'. By that point; aircraft had slowed and had to complete a long taxi to the end of the runway. Approaching the end of the runway; the Captain began the turn to Taxiway Y; but the aircraft did not respond to brake or tiller inputs and slid into the grass at the intersection of Runway XXR and Taxiway Y. Of note is the fact that braking action at the airport had been reported by ATIS as 6. The runway appeared to have good braking until the very end.The only thing that could have prevented this was for airfield management to report possible icing conditions on other parts of the airfield.

B737 flight crew reported a runway excursion while exiting the runway in poor weather with runway condition erroneously reported to them as 6-dry.

1021456

201207

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

8500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

30000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Commander 114/A/B/TC

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Class D ZZZ

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11.5; Flight Crew Total 983; Flight Crew Type 983

1021456

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

[I] had a landing gear extension problem. No green or in transit light. Asked ATC to see if gear was down and they advised low pass and I complied. ATC said they could not see gear down. I departed the pattern to work on the issue. Despite efforts to lower gear no green lights or in transit light would come on. [I] used my emergency landing gear checklist and gear extended per the checklist. Heard the gear thumps and had 2 green for the mains. [I] slowed the airplane per checklist and around 85 KTS felt and heard nose gear drop. Had 3 green. On final called ATC and asked for visual on the gear. Was advised all three were down. Landed as slow as possible and it was a normal landing.After discussing the problem with maintenance personnel and knowing the gear issue was isolated by the circuit breaker I placarded the gear lever and the circuit breaker in case I got distracted during takeoff or landing and flew the airplane with the wheels down direct to my airport and landed normally.

When the normal landing gear extension system failed the pilot of a Commander 114 utilized the emergency extension procedure; was rewarded with three green lights; and landed safely.

1755316

202008

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Type 9000

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1755316

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

I removed my mask/facial covering upon boarding an empty aircraft and stowed my personal belongings in the cockpit. The B Flight Attendant asked why I wasn't wearing a mask in the cabin. (Again; the aircraft was empty; except for the six-person crew.) I stated it was not required when not in view of customers. She said it was. I checked my manual updates and sure enough she was correct. I notified the Flight Attendant that I had seen the [update]. Flight departed on time and landed safely in ZZZ.

Air carrier Captain self reported not following the latest update regarding face mask policy.

1238293

201502

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

CTAF ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1238293

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

After pushback we had completed the after start checklist; I had just turned on the taxi light; along with the runway turnoff lights and called for 'Flaps 25'. As I was pushing the throttles up to move the jet for taxi and the jet was just starting to move; I noticed the tug that was used for pushback approaching the jet a high rate of speed. My first officer also noticed and I stopped the jet. Apparently the pushback crew was concerned that they had left the access panel open and they were coming back to verify that it was closed. Unfortunately we were in the process of taxiing for takeoff and were not expecting them to approach the jet while we were moving. This could have resulted in a serious accident had we both not been as vigilant as we were. We learned that operations had been trying to contact us so that the ramp crew could come out and verify that the access panel was closed; but due to non-tower operations we had one radio selected to ZZZ and the other radio selected to CTAF so we weren't monitoring company frequency as we normally would. In my opinion this event was caused solely by the ramp crew rushing to push us back so that they could go home. I've recently observed a pattern of unsafe activity by ramp personnel at this station. Last week we were approximately 40 minutes late pushing due to a late inbound airplane. During pushback the ramp crew was absolutely reckless in their pushback and they pushed us back at a very high rate of speed. I asked them to slow down but they continued a fast push and I was afraid they were going to jackknife the pushback tug at the end of they push they turned the jet so quickly with the tug just prior to the termination of the push back. This pattern of behavior is going to result in a serious; if not fatal accident if something is not done to slow these guys down and emphasize safe push backs. This issue was immediately brought to the attention of [station] operations right after it took place and I also notified my supervisor of the unsafe operation as well.

A B737 Captain reported improper and unsafe ground handling by ramp personnel.

1070886

201302

1801-2400

ZDV.ARTCC

CO

10500.0

10

Night

CLR

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Other Following Highway

Compass (HSI/ETC)

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 270; Flight Crew Type 240

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1070886

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted

Procedure; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

A friend and I were flying from [departure airport] to [destination] for a bite to eat and then returning to [departure airport]. We are both very familiar with the Denver area and have done all of our training in the Denver area. Enroute to [destination] we noticed the magnetic compass had become frozen and was no longer moving freely. [Disregarding] its effects on the flight; we proceeded on course. We arrived at [destination] in the dark and had no problems finding the airport. We became rushed to get back to [departure airport] as it was late; 2200 local. When departing from [destination] towards Las Vegas we thought we found and intercepted Interstate I25 and turned to what we thought to be North. We decided that using I25 all the way to the Denver area would be easier for navigation.We tracked I25 and passed what we thought was Raton; Trinidad; and Pueblo; but when we got to Colorado Springs the shape and route of the highway did not seem familiar. The local airport seemed unfamiliar and this is when I decided we were lost. I plugged in VORs and tried to reach Denver Center and COS Approach; none of which responded. We were now three hours into the flight and running low on fuel (aircraft only had 4 hours of fuel); so I decided to squawk 7600 and land at the unfamiliar airport. Tower gave us a green light. After landing we learned we were...in Texas; and that we may have passed through other airports' airspace unknowingly. The causes to the loss of situational awareness are: using only roads for navigation (not backing up with Navaids); lack of flight planning; flight into mountainous and unfamiliar areas at night; the loss of the magnetic compass and not fixing the magnetic compass. To prevent or correct this situation we should not have conducted the flight without more planning; should have utilized ATC when the compass failed; should have fixed the compass; should have been more vigilante when using roads as navigation (make sure its the right road using NAVAIDS or clear land features). The main cause of this incident is the pilots' laziness to perform safe operations combined with the failure and lack of equipment in the aircraft (which the pilot should have prepared for and taken into consideration.)

Two C172 pilots attempted to return to their departure airport in the Denver area at night with an inoperative magnetic compass. Following a highway which they thought was headed north; they land in Texas with low fuel.

1003588

201204

0601-1200

MDT.Airport

PA

50.0

9000.0

10

Daylight

TRACON MDT

Personal

MU-2B 60 Marquise

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Climb

Direct

Class E MDT

Transponder

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 3950; Flight Crew Type 300

Other / Unknown

1003588

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

Transponder went off line after entering the IFR flight/system. Lost transponder 100% and was told to descend to 8;000 FT for a 'Tower to Tower' clearance. Clearance for us was FL220 and I queried why we could not go on at altitude. Harrisburg Controller said New York Center would not accept and required us thereafter to descend to 8;000 FT (from 9;000 FT) for remainder of the trip. I felt this would impede the trip and cancelled IFR at that point. Transponder remained intermittent for the remainder of the flight. We preceded VFR; with intermittent transponder on 1200 for remainder of trip. We remained clear of Airspace B; C; and D (including overflight); as well as special use airspace for remainder of trip with our intermittent transponder. Note that we have it now at an avionics shop for repair. I feel that; with an intermittent transponder and our being available as a primary target on an IFR flight plan; we should have been allowed to proceed on our IFR flight at altitude; with reporting of altitudes and distances as required by ATC for the route. Requiring turbine flights to go low because ATC does not want the extra workload could be a possible safety concern with fuel; speed of aircraft in low airspace; etc.

IFR MU2 with failed transponder was refused ATC service by ZNY at FL220; the pilot questioning ATC services.

1002251

201203

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Main Gear Tire

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

1002251

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Upon rotation; [we heard a] massive loud vibration that continued for awhile. Captain looks at me and says; 'That was probably a blown tire. We kept the gear down but completed after takeoff checklist and contacted Departure. Departure greeted us with a new altitude clearance and vector to the west. Captain informed them of the blown tire and requested vectors for flyby and return. We ran the QRH for blown tire; changed destination; sent ACARS message to Dispatch. On the flyby; Tower informed us the right inboard main was the blown tire. We informed them we would like to burn some fuel to lighten up. Further information received from ground operations inspecting the runway; led us to believe that we may have blown both right mains as well as had a brake lockup. We decided to call Maintenance with this information to see if they could offer any further guidance but were unable to reach them at 4;000 MSL. Dispatch informed us that SELCAL frequency was unmonitored so we requested a climb to contact Maintenance Control. Captain and I both agreed we wanted light; slow; and small amount of fuel for landing and agreed upon 1;000 LBS. After conversing with Maintenance; Tower; and ARF personnel; we commenced the final approach. Captain and I both agreed he should make the landing. Landing was executed perfectly and smoothly. Upon stopping the aircraft; we made sure the ARF personnel were at the plane; and evacuated with them helping the passengers off the aircraft. We; the crew; were the last off the plane. There was only one minor injury; that we only found out about later from the Flight Attendant. One lady slightly twisted her ankle while leaving the aircraft.

EMB145 First Officer describes a blown tire event at rotation and the subsequent return to their departure airport.

1743473

202005

1801-2400

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Y

N

Aircraft Logbook(s)

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1743473

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1743474.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

After we had secured the aircraft at the gate in ZZZZ; I realized that maintenance stickers had not been written up in the logbook on the ground in ZZZZ1. This was a result of several disruptions that took place on the ground in ZZZZ1. Upon shutdown in ZZZZ1; very quickly the cockpit was swarmed by several people. Loadmaster; Maintenance and local quarantine authorities all congregated in the cockpit area. It was conveyed that before anything could take place on the aircraft until the entire flight crew had cleared the local inspection protocol. This entailed all flight crews leaving the aircraft for a temperature and document check on the outside aircraft steps. In order to get the process of unloading and loading going we all left the cockpit area. Before leaving the cockpit we briefed maintenance on the stickers and the required inspections needed. We were all under the impression that maintenance would complete the inspection and complete the logbook as required. After we had completed the quarantine inspection and reentered the cockpit; we observed the mechanics discussing the stickers. I incorrectly assumed that they had been entered into the logbook as we had received the maintenance release. As I was entering the stickers in the logbook in ZZZZ I realized that ZZZZ1 maintenance had not entered them in the logbook.In the future I will not allow any external influences take priority before all my duties are complete. Also I will start enforcing the no cockpit entering until I have completed all my post flight duties. A suggestion would be to pass the responsibility of writing up the stickers to maintenance as it is a maintenance function. The flight crew is saddled with enough work.

Upon completing our second flight of the day into ZZZZ and completing the logbook we realized that we had failed to transfer two DMIs (Deferred Maintenance Item) from the first flight to the second. I believe there were several factors that allowed us to miss these items in ZZZZ1. As soon as we had pulled into the chocks in ZZZZ1 ground crew were immediately accessing the flight deck explaining their procedures and informing us that we needed to fill out COVID-19 paperwork; get our passports; and exit the aircraft to meet local customs authorities who wanted to take our temperatures; and take our pictures while holding up our passports. We complied with this and exited the aircraft to follow their procedures. The local authorities then disappeared with our passports and we were sent back to the flight deck. The mechanics also took the logbook off the flight deck while they were doing their work. This created just enough of an interruption and out of the ordinary procedures to distract us from ensuring the logbook was completed properly.I don't feel the flight crews have any business exiting the aircraft in Country X. Even if we have a fever; what are the authorities going to do; forcibly detain and quarantine us for a through flight? Regardless of the distraction; I should have done a better job of making sure all DMIs were transferred to the next flight. I had volunteered to complete the logbook for the Captain and should have ensured it was done correctly. In the future I will always ensure all deferred items are properly transferred.

Air carrier flight crew reported that deferred maintenance items were not properly documented due to multiple distractions in the flight deck; including international COVID-19 screening protocols.

1432259

201703

1801-2400

ZSE.ARTCC

WA

37000.0

Mixed

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Window Ice/Rain System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 7800; Flight Crew Type 300

1432259

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 60

1432260.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We were at our cruise altitude of FL370. That's when we noticed little brown lights coming from where the glare shield meets the windshield. As we were trying to determine what the problem was; a fire coming under the panel or where it was coming from. We started diverting and while the Captain was on the satcom that's when the windshield exploded and shattered. We decided to keep diverting because we did not know the structural integrity of the window.

A short time after leveling off at cruise; the first officer saw a light flickering on the left side of aircraft where the top of the instrument panel meets the windshield. We discussed the potential fire hazard and possibilities of where it was coming from. Initially we thought it might be coming from behind [the] instrument panel. It looked like three or four embers glowing; there was no arcing on windshield. Thinking it was a potential fire hazard; we decided to divert and called dispatch on satcom to coordinate and utilize their help to determine suitable airport for proximity and weather. During discussion with dispatcher; the left forward windshield shattered. Because we were not sure if there would be further complications such as pressurization problems or more damage; we continued divert. I turned off windshield heat on left side. The dispatcher sent a new release shortly after we started our diversion. During descent I transferred control of aircraft to the first officer since my view was obstructed. ATC asked if we needed further assistance and I let them know we did not at that time and that we were making a precautionary divert due to shattered windshield. Once windshield shattered; there was no further concern about potential fire hazard. The embers that were glowing disappeared. There was no smoke or fire indication.

B767-300 flight crew reported a failure of the Captain's windshield preceded by an apparent window heat malfunction. The crew diverted to the nearest suitable airport for landing.

1198953

201408

1801-2400

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

41000.0

IMC

Rain; Thunderstorm

Night

Center ZDC

Corporate

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZDC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 7700; Flight Crew Type 1900

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1198953

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Weather

After reaching FL410 in attempt to avoid building convective activity; ATC instructed to descend and maintain FL340. Response was unable for weather. Controller asked if we were refusing to descend. I responded; 'No; Ma'am; we are unable descend due to weather for 25 miles.' There was a line of weather with tops indicating near FL500. We were on a 15 degree right vector to avoid weather and a descent in any direction would have been an unsafe decision. The weather was actively building and FL410 was not on top. We made the right decision to plan to maintain altitude rather than descend into convective activity. The Controller was not helpful whatsoever. This is a common route flown by our company and we understand ATC LOAs; however safety was compromised by this particular Controller's response to our situation. Many other aircraft were deviating and I don't believe she realized the extent of the relatively small; yet extensive line of thunderstorms and lightning on the Ohio-West Virginia border; likely west of her Center's airspace.

A corporate jet crew at FL410 in weather with cloud tops near FL500 declined to descend into the weather for safety reasons and in accordance with ATC LOA's.

1824682

202107

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

6

Daylight

25000

Ground ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

Training

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 68; Flight Crew Type 68

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1824682

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

N

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I was making a normal approach to Runway XXR on a solo flight. Winds were about 220 @ 6 mph at the time. After I had turned to base; ATC inquired if I had turned to base. I informed ATC that I had turned to base and at that point immediately needed to turn to final. ATC asked the plane at taxiway to hold position. Glide slope was normal. I was on centerline and airspeed was 85 mph. Final approach continued normally and as I crossed threshold; I reduced throttle to idle. The airplane landed firmly but did not bounce. When the nose wheel came down; I perceived a violent shaking of the nose wheel. The airplane began heading to the right side of the runway and I attempted to correct as normal. However; my corrections started a series of oscillations that grew in amplitude. The airplane was now headed in to the grass safety area after taxiway and I let the plane continue on its track for fear of flipping the plane. The airplane went into and out of the drainage ditch and came to a stop about 2-3 yards from taxiway X. I believe that one of the contributing factors to the event was task overload. This was my second solo flight and the additional load of ATC's inquiry; the follow on instructions to the other plane near my intended runway; and my focus toward the other aircraft may have used more attention than intended. I believe also that a greater emphasis overall on safe after landing roll would be good. In the FAA 'Airplane Flying Handbook'; after landing roll safety is addressed but does not receive the emphasis it deserves.

Student pilot reported loss of control after landing resulting in the aircraft departing the runway. The Student stated that distractions; while on final approach; were a primary cause for the loss of control.

1355886

201605

1201-1800

CLT.Airport

NC

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1355886

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

There were thunderstorms building south of Charlotte; and I noted with the first officer that we would look closely at the fuel and weather for the return trip. The airline procedure is to put extra fuel for enroute weather issues in the 'hold' line on the flight release. The airline also keeps very careful track of historic fuel usage. This process is referred to as the historical fuel requirement (HFR). It is designed to account for everyday issues; such as ATC required early descents and long final approaches at hub airports. Certain weather or runway parameters at the destination should trigger an increase in the HFR. This HFR is normally less than the minimum extra fuel (MEF) that we carry anyway; but HFR could well exceed MEF during a weather event. In a recent training class; we were told that the dispatcher consults a database during the planning process; and the HFR will change based on the average weather and air traffic conditions through the day. The example in the handout shows a route from Augusta to Charlotte. There is no way to tell the actual HFR numbers just by looking at the flight release; and I usually wouldn't need to know anyway. But if I did need to know; I would have to ask the dispatcher.In reviewing the weather and fuel plan; I noted the following:1. No hold fuel; or any other indication that the dispatcher had planned the flight taking enroute weather into account; and;2. An unusable alternate; given that the weather would be between me and said alternate; assuming that I started from a missed approach at the destination. At a minimum; using this alternate would have required additional fuel to go around the weather.I called the dispatcher; and asked why there was no fuel on the hold line for enroute delays. Further; what was the actual HFR required for the flight? Was our HFR at the 90th percentile (the everyday value); or the 99th (required in this case due to forecast thunderstorms at the destination)? My thinking was that if the HFR for this route at this time of day was very low; then the 1000 pound MEF could well suffice; provided I still had that fuel on the airplane at takeoff. (More on that later. It is a glaring flaw in this whole HFR system). On the other hand; if the HFR was; say; 800 pounds; then I would not have enough for my historic use on the route plus the anticipated enroute track around the weather.Imagine my disappointment when the dispatcher had no idea what I was talking about. He said that he had seen a memo on the subject; or maybe something during training; but hadn't understood it at all. He certainly didn't routinely consult any database. 'How much extra fuel did I want?' he asked. I started to dig in my heels; asking 'you first;' how much he thought I might need in terms of an enroute delay; not to mention actually getting to the alternate he had selected; and I really needed an answer about the 99th percentile fuel. However; I quickly decided that the dispatcher was utterly unequipped to take charge of the situation. Causing a significant delay to make a point was not going to make me very popular with my passengers or my boss; and the weather was building in the meantime. Getting the flight under way quickly and with adequate fuel was the best thing I could do. I asked for a new flight release showing an extra 1000 lbs on the hold line. I also briefed my F/O that we would not burn into our 1000 pound MEF by any significant amount prior to takeoff. Further; we would not attempt to go to the alternate on the release in the event of a diversion. There were several places that were both closer and had good weather enroute. We completed the flight without incident; and deviated for weather by perhaps 20-30 miles. That small weather deviation was luck; not skill. The weather was mostly off our left on the arrival; and did not directly affect the airport. Flights on other arrivals did have to hold; or got rerouted onto our arrival path.There appears to bea gap in dispatcher training and their day-to-day application of the historic fuel program. Also; each dispatcher has a monthly meeting with their supervisor; where their fuel stats are reviewed. (This was also mentioned in a training session by a consultant hired by mainline). Dispatchers are graded by the number of times they put extra fuel on a flight; among other things. A lower number is better. I think that this need to justify oneself later does not lead to a willingness to put extra fuel on now. It's easier to wait for captains to insist; and then put it off on them.Suggestions1. The required fuel value from the departure to destination and alternate must be realistic considering enroute weather conditions between those points; and account for any historic overburn.2. When HFR 99th is used; there should be a remark on the release. As the PIC; I would then be able to easily crosscheck whether this rule was followed.3. Obviously; the HFR process shown to pilots during training isn't how it really works. This should be fixed in dispatch; or we should provide pilots with factual information in training.We have an impressive database that appears to be unused in practice; and dispatchers who don't understand the most basic questions about how they planned the flight. Add a grading system that rewards overthinking; and you compound the problem. Also; this entire HFR process; for this flight and every flight; is flawed. We measure gate-to-gate; which means that the HFR includes ground delays; and even includes a taxi-in delay after arrival. This fuel is put in 'tanker;' which means it is not required to be on board at takeoff. 121.639 requires adequate fuel to be on board the airplane at takeoff (not at pushback; but at TAKEOFF); including fuel to the alternate. 121.647 further refines this process. We could put HFR above the line and require that amount for takeoff; and put the rest of the MEF on the tanker line. Maybe there is another way to do it. But knowing via our database that a given flight will overburn by x amount on average and not requiring that extra on the airplane at takeoff is; in my belief; negligent. We shouldn't do it; and FAA shouldn't allow it. Our statement that the HFR process does not determine where during the flight the over burn occurred; or why; amounts to willful ignorance. It does not excuse us from the regulation. Understanding the system; I will never commence a takeoff in one of our airplanes at the minimum legal fuel without knowing that the HFR value for that flight is zero.

CRJ-900 Captain reported he was unhappy with the Dispatcher's lack of knowledge with the company method for determining an appropriate fuel load.

1572548

201808

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

32000.0

Mixed

10

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Descent

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Elevator Trim System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Enroute; First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 62; Flight Crew Total 3468; Flight Crew Type 312

Workload; Troubleshooting

1572548

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

Upon starting descent from FL390 the amber boxed autopilot out of trim box appeared on both PFD's. After reviewing the abnormal checklist; the captain disconnected the autopilot and the aircraft made an uncommanded pitch up; which was arrested with manual control wheel pressure. Next; in the course of running the abnormal checklist the Captain discovered the pitch trim wheel was frozen and unable to be moved up or down with manual or electric trim. The Captain was able to maintain positive control of the aircraft using heavy forward pressure on the control wheel except for the brief moment when the autopilot was disconnected and we did not deviate from ATC instructions. Therefore; an emergency was not declared at the time.Upon reaching warmer air; around 11;000 MSL; the pitch trim freed up. A normal descent and landing at our destination airport followed.

CE-525 First Officer reported the pitch trim wheel was frozen at the top of descent.

1057271

201212

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

34000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-900

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

1057271

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1057272.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

At FL340; with autopilot autothrottle on; and Left Center Pump off/cross feed open 700 LBS in center tank we experienced Number 2 Engine rollback and autothrottles disengage. Recognized engine failure and Captain assumed control of aircraft. Declared emergency with Center and began drift down descent to FL290. Executed Engine Fail Checklist from QRH. Started APU. Attempted engine in flight start; which failed. Noticed spar valve was not opening and no indication of fuel flow on start attempt. Attempted second start attempt at FL220 with same result. Secured engine per checklist. Notified cabin crew to perform emergency briefing for divert into [a nearby airport]; maintained FL200. Decided nearest suitable airport to be ZZZ based on longer runway; better breaking action report; lower landing weight; better familiarity. Obtained weather and performance numbers from Dispatch for [the divert airport]; all within flaps 15 limits. Planned and briefed flaps 15 landing and executed Single Engine Descent checklist. Notified passengers of divert. Executed Single Engine Approach checklist and again obtained current weather and breaking action reports; still within limits. Executed Single Engine Landing checklist for RNAV approach autobrake max. Landed overweight by approximately 1;500 LBS breaking action good. Clear of runway requested exterior inspection from emergency response personnel; who reported no abnormalities. Taxied to gate.

LNAV/VNAV engaged with autopilot/autothrottle engaged. The Number 2 Engine flamed out and rolled back. This caused a slight yawing motion and the AT disengaged. No fuel flow or EGT was indicated. The engine was wind milling with no vibration noted. I was the pilot not flying; and recognized the failure first as my First Officer had his dinner on his lap. I took control of the aircraft; applied rudder to control yaw and switched the autopilot to my side. I remained in control/pilot flying until arrival at divert airport. An in flight emergency was declared with Center; and lower altitude was obtained for drift down. The Engine Failure and Shutdown Checklist was started; and we did attempt an inflight start with no fuel flow or EGT indicated. We also noticed the Spar Valve remained in the closed position after the start lever was raised to idle. We were still outside the in-flight start envelope. We then contacted Dispatch and filled them in on the details and received weather and braking action reports for [two nearby airports]. Analyzing this information; we decided to proceed to ZZZ/Re-Dispatch as the weather was about the same (VFR); but the breaking action reports was better; runway longer; lower weight due fuel burn; more familiar with Airport; and a bigger fire/rescue infrastructure in place. We were cleared direct [a nearby] VOR to maintain at or above 14;000 FT by Center. By now; drift down stabilized at FL200; and we ran the above mentioned checklist again as we were within the in-flight start envelope with the same results. Cabin crew was notified about our situation and plan and was told to prepare the cabin and do another safety briefing. A cabin PA was also completed at this time to complement/explain the additional flight attendant briefing and the planned landing in ZZZ. At that time we had about 35 minutes to landing. Decent Checklist was completed; the RNAV Flaps 15/autobrake maximum was briefed as well as the expected (737-900 flaps 15) over-weight landing at 145.5K. Approach Checklist was completed per QRH. We were cleared for the requested approach and landed without incident. Updated weather and performance was provided by Dispatch. The runway environment was in sight at the FAF with some very light snow. Braking action was good. After exiting the runway; we asked the Fire/Rescue Crew to check our brakes due to the maximum braking effort with no adverse findings. Another PA was completed explaining the event in more detail while this was being completed. Taxi to gate without incident.

B737NG flight crew experiences an engine failure at FL340. Indications are that the spar fuel valve has closed uncommanded. Attempts to restart the engine during descent are unsuccessful and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.

1000939

201203

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

32000.0

Mixed

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 359

Training / Qualification; Workload

1000939

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 279; Flight Crew Type 4500

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Workload

1000950.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Climbing out at approximately 32;000 FT; a very loud bang was heard from the #1 engine. The #1 engine instruments all displayed engine failure. We declared an emergency; asked for a descent and vectors back to the departure airport; and made an uneventful visual approach. The 59 minute flight felt like 10 minutes and we made every effort to cover all the bases. The event went smoothly after careful and gentle communications with the Passengers and Flight Attendants. The Flight Attendant did a marvelous job; and as Captain; I am running the event over and over; certainly there are details we could have done better. All in all; it was gratifying to see our training kick in and support the decisions and actions that had to be made.

We heard a loud bang and immediately noticed that the number one engine readings were abnormal. Most notably; the EGT gauge was showing an over temperature and a red indication. We made one attempt to restart the engine using a Crossbleed start descending through 17;000 feet. This was unsuccessful. We completed the Engine Failure; One Engine Inoperative Approach and Landing checklists and landed.

A B737-700's number one engine failed in flight at 32;000 FT; an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.

1180102

201406

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

4000.0

IMC

Cloudy; Fog

TRACON ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170.31; Flight Crew Total 22620; Flight Crew Type 10584.17

1180102

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft; Airport; Weather

Airport

The flight had been uneventful and we were descending for the ILS Z 04R into ZZZZ. As we passed approximately 6;000 feet for 4;000 feet; Approach Control told us that an aircraft had just executed a missed approach into ZZZZ. A couple of minutes later he said a second aircraft had executed a missed approach as well. We asked for the reasons for the missed approaches and an update on the weather. The second aircraft gave us an update saying the weather was below 100 feet and he had never had a visual on the runway. Approach then said the weather had dropped to below 100 feet ceiling and asked for our intentions. We told him we needed to hold and were cleared to hold at XXXXX as published. We entered the hold and checked our alternate on the flight plan which was ZZZZ1 and knew that wouldn't work. We checked the weather again at destination and it was still reporting 700 broken but Approach Control was saying that it was actually still below 100 feet. We discussed our divert options and initially came up with ZZZZ2; ZZZZ3; and ZZZZ4. Our fuel was now at 7.1 and we decided that we didn't feel we had the gas to attempt the approach at destination and then divert without going emergency fuel so we opted to divert to ZZZZ4 due to being the most familiar with it; it would have company personnel; long runways with Cat II and III approaches if the weather went bad there as well. It and ZZZZ2 were about equal distances away. We informed Approach Control of our intentions and he told us he would coordinate it. We began setting up the FMS and the Relief Pilot was sending the Dispatcher our intentions. We initially were cleared to climb to FL170 and turn to XXX (VOR). From there we were cleared to XXY (VOR) and the ILS 16R approach into ZZZZ3. Approximately 30 miles from XXX we received an ACARS from the Dispatcher that ZZZZ3 was not listed as a 757 alternate. Our fuel was now 5.8 as we were still climbing through approximately 14;000 feet to FL210. Our FMS showed us landing in ZZZZ3 with about 3.8 in fuel and with the additional distance now to ZZZZ2 or ZZZZ4 we opted to continue to ZZZZ3. I had made a bad assumption that because ZZZZ3 was a major airport we flew into with 767 that the 757 was OK as well. We hadn't checked the divert airport chart and had now backed ourselves into a corner where we felt it would be more unsafe to switch diverts than to proceed. The approach and landing into ZZZZ3 were briefed and flown without problems (actual landing fuel was 4.5); and we were taxied to a remote pad to be refueled and redispatched. That's when we learned one of the reasons ZZZZ3 is not a 757 alternate is the company does not have the numbers for a 757 dispatch from there. We ended up causing a lot of extra work for the Dispatcher and the ground crew in ZZZZ3 who did an excellent job in working through all the problems keeping the passengers informed of what we and they were doing; and the Dispatcher who was working everything from his end.

A B757 flight crew diverted from ZZZZ to ZZZZ3 due to weather and fuel remaining. While enroute they learned their diversion airport was not an approved alternate although it was for company B767's. Due to fuel remaining they continued and landed under the Captain's command authority.

1791572

202102

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

6.0

1500.0

VMC

20

Daylight

3000

Personal

J3 Cub

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Cruise

None

Class E ZZZ

Carburetor

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1990; Flight Crew Type 350

1791572

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

While training a student pilot in ground reference maneuvers and lazy eights; we suffered a complete loss of power. engine restart procedures were executed and were unsuccessful. Our area of operation is in a humid coastal area. We are well versed in the use of carb heat and many times it is on for most of the flight. It was on continually this day. The area that we use for this training has many good hay meadows and pastures to complete a forced landing. Our landing was very good and we were able to land our Piper j3 with no damage or injuries whatsoever. We used less than 1/2 of the field to execute the forced landing.After the landing and securing the aircraft it was noticed that we had several areas below the carburetor where fuel was continually dripping out of the airbox in substantial amounts. We assumed the carb float was stuck and flooded the engine out.After disassembly of the Stromberg carburetor in the shop we found a good amount of small gray beads and flakes in the float bowl that could be easily crushed into a powder. one of these beads was lodged in the carburetor main fuel jet cutting off the fuel flow to the carburetor venturi. In maintenance during the [previous] annual the carburetor fuel bowl plug was removed and the fuel that was captured was visually inspected for contaminates. There were none. during an inspection of the disassembled carburetor after the forced landing it was found that this drain is not the lowest point in the fuel bowl and the only way to really be sure that all of these contaminates are out is to disassemble the carburetor. We also checked the carb fuel screen and it was clean. The gascolator had a small amount of what appeared to be rust and aluminum flakes in it but not enough to cause any issue. We purchased a lead test kit and tested the gray particles from the float bowl. They were found to be lead. We have been running nothing but locally sourced 100LL fuel for the past year. This event seemed to be a big enough deal that it was worth sharing to possibly prevent others from suffering a forced landing due to a similar issue.

J3 Instructor reported that contaminated fuel resulted in a loss of engine power followed by a forced landing.

1121605

201310

0001-0600

RIC.Airport

VA

0.0

Night

Ground RIC

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Physiological - Other

1121605

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Human Factors

Airport

The taxi lights in RIC were upgraded to LED lights at some point over the last 3-4 years. The problem is; these lights aren't able to dim. When it is pitch black outside; it is very annoying and difficult to taxi with extremely bright taxi lights. The green taxi centerline lights are the worst. I have asked the Controller numerous times if they could dim them and have always been told that they are either not able to dim or they are already on the dimmest setting. I remember reading the FAA's Airplane Flying Handbook as a private pilot and it explained the need to let your eyes adapt to darkness and the keep them adapted. The bright taxi lights are an unnecessary hazard. While they might not directly cause an accident they are more than capable of being another link in the accident chain. Is there any way that these lights can be dimmed?

EMB-135 Captain reports RIC has LED taxiway lights which are too bright; creating a hazard; and Controllers are reportedly unable to dim.

1746742

202006

1801-2400

TEB.Airport

NJ

Tower TEB

Citation Excel (C560XL)

2.0

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 19

Final Approach; Landing

Direct

Class D TEB

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Class D TEB

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload

1746742

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 1300; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

On 3 mile final to Runway 19 at TEB I saw a drone approximately 200 feet below us and 1/4 mile in front. We passed over drone without deviating from localizer or glideslope. Reported drone immediately to Tower. He responded that this is second sighting in 2 days. Drone was a twin rotor dark colored aircraft about 2-3 feet in length. It was in straight line with Runway 19 approach course. It appeared to be hovering then moved toward us on a 015 heading.

CE-560XL Captain reported a NMAC with a UAV while on final approach.

1687683

201909

1201-1800

34000.0

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1687683

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Y

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

While in cruise at FL340; ARTCC advised us that we were 5-6 miles off course. Upon hearing this; I noticed the FMA showing we were in HDG mode. ARTCC cleared us to turn back left and rejoin QXXX and we did. No other issues were noted. I was Pilot Monitoring for the flight and allowed myself to not be watching the FMA for a bit of time after level off at cruise altitude. I was looking at fuel calculations since ZZZ had weather all morning and was expecting to be slowed and possibly hold in route. I was noticing some discrepancy in my calculations based on fuel flow numbers and was looking into that. My MFD was on MFD advance (not FMS plan map) and my attention was diverted from monitoring the aircraft. I had chosen to do this once cruise flight was reached. The autopilot was on; and FMS was the active lateral mode. At some point; HDG mode became active. I hadn't noticed this selected and there was no reason for it to be selected as we had been on our FMS course and were not assigned a heading. I honestly do not know how HDG mode became the active mode. Alas; I was too distracted with fuel calculations and should have been watching the FMA closer.Even when busy with other items; in the future I will not turn my attention away from the FMA for so long.

CRJ-900 Captain reported becoming distracted while performing a fuel calculation; resulting in a navigation error.

1675534

201908

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

33000.0

Air Carrier

B747-400

Part 121

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

AC Generation

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

1675534

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

At about one hour into our flight; I had begun my rest in the bunk when I heard a bang similar to someone dropping something in the cockpit additionally the light in the crew rest momentarily went out and back on. The Captain alerted me; and I return to the cockpit to find numerous EICAS messages. The other FO [First Officer] was flying without autopilot or auto throttle. The Captain and I evaluated the messages and began to work the QRH for those messages. We discovered that the AC Number 3 and Number 4 DIST circuit breaker (35 amp) had tripped we did not reset. After completion of the QRH items we made the decision to return to ZZZZ. The other FO and I swap seats and I resumed duties as pilot flying. The flight was then vectored to a holding point to dump fuel to achieve our landing weight. We landed at ZZZZ without further incident. Crew executed good CRM and no recommendations could prevent in the future.

B747-400 First Officer reported an AC electrical system malfunction which resulted in a return to the departure airport.

1164309

201404

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Turbulence; 10

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 44; Flight Crew Total 4690; Flight Crew Type 3318

Physiological - Other

1164309

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing roll

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Weather; Human Factors

Weather

While landing on Runway 3; after touchdown which was normal; I encountered a sudden; unexpected gust of wind that swerved the aircraft to the left before I had a chance to correct with right rudder. ATIS was calling wind at 300/12; although the surface winds had been gusty all morning. The aircraft went left off the runway and came to a sudden stop in the farm field mud.The aircraft sustained damage to the prop and; as a result of the strike; required an engine teardown and inspection. I was alone and unhurt and there was no property damage. Contributing cause might have been my low blood sugar causing my slow reaction to using opposite rudder; I had had a light breakfast that morning; but had been waiting all day as maintenance work was being performed.

During the landing rollout an unexpected gust of wind struck the reporter's C210 pulling it to the left and off the runway resulting in a prop strike.

1633055

201904

1201-1800

DEN.Airport

CO

10000.0

VMC

TRACON D01

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class B DEN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 122; Flight Crew Type 1653

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1633055

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

We were cleared to descend via the PURRL2 RNAV STAR into DEN and were told to expect Runway 35R. As the pilot monitoring; I set 9;000 feet in the altitude window and the pilot flying engaged the managed descent mode and we started our descent. Just prior to crossing the waypoint DANDD; the pilot flying was entering data into the secondary flight plan in the hopes that we would be approved to land on Runway 35L. He accidentally activated the secondary flight plan which dumped the PURRL2 STAR and the airplane failed to make the required turn at DANDD. Also; because the altitude window still had 9;000 feet the airplane continued to descend. The pilot flying is very new to the Airbus (still a high minutes Captain) and he struggled to identify what had just happened. He was attempting to re-load the arrival into the FMC when I noticed what was going on and asked him what happened. He replied that he didn't know what happened but I could see that the RNAV arrival was no longer loaded in the FMC and that the airplane was no longer flying the PURRL2 as we had been cleared. I took over FMC programming duties as the Captain placed the airplane in heading mode in an effort to return us to the course but ATC called us stating that we were 2 miles north of course. By this time; the PURRL2 Arrival had been successfully re-loaded into the FMC but we failed to identify that the airplane was still descending below the constraint on the arrival. Once again; ATC called to state that we were below the required altitude and they vectored us off of the arrival giving us a heading and altitude to fly. The entire deviation lasted approximately two minutes but enough time to fail to make a required turn and fail to level off at the correct altitude. The remainder of the arrival to Runway 35R was uneventful.

A320 First Officer reported track and altitude deviations occurred on the PURRL2 RNAV arrival into DEN when the FMC was accidentally mis-programmed.

1343751

201603

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

1343751

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors

I received an ACARS from the Captain that stated: 'FUEL IS 14.5/27.1/14.6.'. He then called to state that he received a final weight and balance with wrong fuel numbers. He stated that when he receives a weight and balance with correct fuel numbers he will depart. I phoned the Ramp and told them that I received an ACARS with corrected fuel numbers. I also asked him if he had verified fuel numbers. He stated that the Ramp Agent was at the aircraft now. I then tried to clarify by asking 'So you sent a final weight and balance without verifying fuel numbers?' He responded that the Ramp Agent was on her way to the aircraft. I checked the ACARS playback and saw that a final was sent with incorrect fuel numbers of 14.6/24.1/14.6.

B757 Dispatcher reported a weight and balance miscommunication concerning fuel.

1050507

201211

1201-1800

NCT.TRACON

CA

Night

TRACON NCT

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

IFR

Vectors

Class E NCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Training / Qualification; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

1050507

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

I believe the main cause of the problem was I lost control of the aircraft when I was following vector heading direction. I was completely in the cloud for 10 to 15 minutes. I got disoriented and the plane was descending and I was able to recover from the unusual altitude when I see the lights from the city at about 3;000 feet. Luckily; NORCAL Approach was able to amend me with VFR. I requested to head to Embassy Suite VFR check point to avoid from busy SJC airspace. Controller was kind enough to accommodate my request. Finally; I landed airplane safely.

C172 pilot reports becoming disoriented in IMC and being assisted by NCT with vectors to a safe landing.

1712884

201912

1201-1800

ORD.Airport

IL

0.0

VMC

10

Ground ORD

Air Carrier

Light Transport

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

1712884

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

On taxi-in at ORD; just east of gate there was a vehicle crossing Taxiway B and A. We were taxiing north on Taxiway B. Upon reaching this vehicle crossing; there was a tow truck proceeding across Taxiway B. Air carrier tug; Vehicle #X was behind the tow truck and it appeared they were not going to stop. I advised the Captain of the approaching vehicle; he proceeded to come to a complete stop. The driver of the vehicle looked directly at us; but continued across the taxiway. Had the Captain not stopped the aircraft; a collision would have occurred. ORD Ground Control was advised of the encounter.I believe the tug operator saw the tow-truck proceeding across the taxi-way and followed in suit. Ground vehicle operators are looking for very large aircraft; not small aircraft like ours at ORD. This particular vehicle crossing has proven to be very dangerous.

Light Transport Captain reported a ground conflict with a vehicle during taxi-in at ORD airport.

1682306

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2100.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 91

Training

Climb

Spark Plug

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Situational Awareness

1682306

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

With two students on board flying a cross country flight the following events occurred. While climbing though 2;000 feet on a 050 assigned heading with Departure we encountered a repeated momentary loss in power. The engine would stumble and run rough then surge back to full power. The first two times the power loss was momentary; not more than one second. The following 3 or 4 occurred with less time between the power loss events and lasted for a second or two and getting longer for each occurrence. All the engine instrumentation was in the green; the mixture was full in; fuel cutoff full in; fuel valve on both and mags on both. I took the flight controls and tried to radio departure to request a return to the field. After the second request was unanswered I turned to a 180 heading and reduced the power to maintain altitude. I was unable to get my request to the controller due to frequency congestion after four attempts. At this point I went back to the tower frequency without departure's approval. I requested an immediate return to the field on runway XX; I was northeast of the field at this point at 2100 feet within gliding distance. The tower instructed me to continue 180 heading and maintain altitude. I maintained separation from the traffic I saw in the pattern below us. As we passed abeam mid field we heard the go-around calls for both a [twin-engine GA aircraft] landing on XX and a business jet landing XY (intersecting runways). The two planes approached midfield at about the same time and same altitude. We witnessed the business jet make a significant turn to the right and immediate climb as they approached the intersection of the runways to avoid the [GA plane]. We continued south and tower called out regional jet traffic ahead and about 1000 feet below. We were instructed to follow the regional jet traffic cleared to land XY. The approach to the runway was uneventful. We were very high but with full flaps and a full forward slip through the descent I was able to land. Member of management asked if I would take the plane around the pattern to further troubleshoot the issue; I declined and requested to have the engine looked at before further flight.The repeated power loss caused the heading deviation in order to return to the field. The frequency change to tower without departure's approval was due to frequency congestion and being unable to reach the controller when needed. I chose a heading and altitude that would keep our flight within gliding distance and not conflict with traffic in the pattern. The conflicting aircraft over the field more than 1500 feet below our flight was due to poor sequencing and spacing by the controllers.Issue turned out to be a fouled plug. Lesson learned to lean the mixture even during climb if engine power issue occurs.

Cessna pilot reported rough-running engine after takeoff due to fouled spark plug.

1347851

201604

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

50.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Autoland

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1347851

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure

Ambiguous

Aircraft had MEL requiring an autoland [function check]. We set up and attempted to perform the autoland [function check]. Weather was VMC; we informed tower that we would be conducting an autoland and he said; 'okay'. When we were about to flare; the controller (or more likely the ground controller) taxied an aircraft through the critical area on taxiway Yankee. This caused the localizer to become erratic and we had to disconnect the autopilot before it put us in the dirt. I called tower on the phone to advise them of their mistake; I am not sure action will be taken on their end.This situation was caused by ATC error. ATC should have advised us that they were 'unable to protect the ILS critical area.' We should not have to do [function checks] exactly because of these types of situations. Controllers are not familiar with our procedures and because of [a new pilot training] program; we have significantly increased the amount of [function checks] required in VMC conditions. I suggest trying to get rid of this [function check] requirement for the airline.

An EMB-190 Captain reported requesting an autoland from the Tower in VMC in order to return the system to service after maintenance. The response is OK. During the flare; Ground Control taxis an aircraft through the localizer requiring the Captain to take over manually.

1776575

202012

0001-0600

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

Air Carrier

B777-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Dispatch

1776575

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Dispatch

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

Human Factors

ZZZZ hub failed to notify us (Dispatch ZZZ) of Dry Ice being loaded in aft belly of aircraft. Required fuel over burn not included on release as a result.Failure of the ZZZZ hub to notify Dispatch ZZZ of Dry Ice being carried in forward or aft belly of a 777.

Air Carrier Dispatcher [at main base] reported Hub Dispatch neglected to provide Dry Ice cargo information to main Dispatch resulting in no 'over burn fuel' on Flight Release..

1696254

201910

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Ground ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B777-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Ground ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Heavy Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1696254

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Y

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Airport; Human Factors

Procedure

After we received taxi Inst from ZZZZ ground to taxi X to Y to XXL hold point we proceeded as instructed. We stopped at the intersection of X and Y because a Aircraft Y was holding on Y. I stopped shorter than I normally do because I didn't want to be sitting in his Number 1 engine wake while sitting still. We had brakes parked. My First Officer looked to his right and commented that an aircraft was approaching from the right on Taxiway Y. After a few seconds he said he's coming fairly fast and it didn't look as if he was slowing. We both realized at the same time he was going to continue and not stop. I flashed my R turnoff lights then my taxi lights to alert him of our close relationship. He never slowed. My First Officer made two 'aircraft stop' transmissions with no reaction. Looking at his wingtip approaching our cockpit I made the comment 'hang on guys' and his wingtip passed within 10 feet. of our windscreen. We told ATC of what happened. She came back and said; 'sorry for [the] inconvenience.' I have never been so mad and scared in my over 30 years here at [Company]. There are no holding lines or holding instructions given to us. We were cleared to the runway. Either Ground Control or Aircraft Y made a horrible mistake; potentially ending our lives by driving their wingtip through our cockpit.I think either ATC gave two clearances to both of us Aircraft X and Aircraft Y; or Aircraft Y had an ATC taxi violation. Regardless Aircraft Y either ignored our lights flashing and radio calls or was not looking outside past the center line of the taxiway. I have no clue to his thought process.If a Tower Frequency change was given to Aircraft Y prior to our intersection; that policy MUST stop. If he could have heard us tell him to stop it would have prevented a possible collision. If he heard us and ignored us; God help us all.

B777 flight crew reported ATC instructions caused a critical ground conflict with another aircraft.

1078144

201304

36000.0

IMC

3

Daylight

40000

Air Carrier

B737-500

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 260; Flight Crew Type 8000

Physiological - Other

1078144

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Type 4000

1078133.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

While in cruise at FL360 the Cabin Altitude Warning horn sounded as cabin altitude climbed through 10;000 feet. We accomplished the applicable checklists but were unable to control the cabin pressure. We initiated an emergency descent and told the flight attendants to sit down and expect the oxygen masks to deploy; which they did automatically at approximately 15;000 feet cabin altitude. We declared an emergency and descended to 10;000 feet. We then considered diverting to MSY; which was 120 NM behind us but the reported weather was +TSRA; so we decided to continue to our planned destination. We had plenty of fuel for the lower altitude. We landed at our original destination and were met by EMTs at the gate.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information]

A B737-500 flight crew suffered a pressurization failure; initiated an emergency descent and; when level at 10;000 feet with adequate fuel reserves; elected to continue to their destination rather than divert.

1701692

201911

1201-1800

TNCM.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower TNCM

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Turbine Engine

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 20000

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1701692

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

We have planned for a 27K MAX BUMP bleeds off take-off on Runway 28. My copilot and I have done this several times in the last 30 days while not together but both very experienced with the procedures and the airport. We followed the procedures to the letter and fully briefed the take-off. After being cleared for take-off and lining up with the runway I advanced the throttles to 40%. After they were established at 40%; I hit TOGA. Just as the aircraft started rolling it suddenly surged to the right and at the same time the co-pilot called out the #2 engine not accelerating. By then the #1 was at full 27K 103.1 N1. I was able to retard both engines and was able to keep the aircraft on the runway. We taxied back to the gate and called for Maintenance to come out and inspect the tires and write up the #2 engine slow to accelerate after 40% power setting. The inspection showed no damage or wear on the tires and no faults on EEC or any other systems.We talked with TECH in ZZZ and they said that this has occurred several times on the 737 and was usually the cause of having one engine that is new and the other engine having a lot of time on it. The older engine is 'looser' and may not accelerate like a new engine but when 2 older engines are matched up they accelerate at the same rate so you don't notice the acceleration rate. He said that was the case with our aircraft. Our #1 engine was just installed 2 months ago. Our #2 engine was the original engine installed NEW recently. The #1 engine has 253 cycles; the #2 engine has 12;588 cycles and is 10 years old compared to a brand new aircraft. I was told by the Technician that they just watched a video on this subject and in the video it recommends after the power is set to 40% to leave it there for 20 seconds prior to hitting TOGA. I told him that is not something we were told about or trained to do.I believe that as our aircraft are getting older and engines are getting changed with high cycles; we should be tracking this combination and have a procedure in effect such as the 20 seconds at 40% N1 prior to TOGA especially when high N1 is required such as 27K BUMP; to avoid what could have been a more serious outcome had this crew not acted so quickly and communicated so quickly regarding the #2 engine not accelerating after TOGA.

B737 Captain reported a rejected takeoff after #2 engine would not accelerate to match #1 engine.

1183120

201406

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

5.0

2400.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Corporate

Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Other Test

Initial Climb

Vectors

Powerplant Fuel Control Unit

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 71.0; Flight Crew Total 2335.8; Flight Crew Type 261.2

1183120

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Shortly after takeoff (approximately 1800 feet AGL; 2400 MSL; 145 KIAS) the aircraft's #1 engine malfunctioned resulting in zero torque. The crew declared an emergency; secured the engine per the QRH and returned. After landing; the crew turned off the runway and shut down on taxiway W-5. Airfield emergency crews responded and secured the aircraft for shutdown. Afterwards; ground crew towed the aircraft to the ramp. The torque motor in the #1 Engine Hydro Mechanical Unit (HMU) malfunctioned as diagnosed through high power ground engine runs. This failure was not realized by the crew inflight due to the nominal operation of the engine with Engine Control Unit (ECU) selector in TOP (Takeoff Power). Once the ECU selector was switched from TOP to NORM (as per the QRH (pilot checklist) during after takeoff checks); the Enrichment Solenoid was de energized resulting in low fuel flow to the #1 engine. The low fuel flow caused a power reduction and a command to reduce torque to maintain 900 RPM. The torque was reduced to zero resulting in the crew executing the Engine Failure QRH procedures. Replacing the #1 HMU remedied the problem. This condition is serious and affects operators using this combination of PW120/121 / HMU's everywhere. There were no indications of impending failure prior to moving the ECU selector from TOP to NORM. This situation is dangerous because you have to create the dangerous situation before you know anything is wrong. A safety message should go to all affected operators immediately. Possible workarounds (not verified). If upon selecting ECU selector-NORM; if a loss of power is detected; go back to ECU-TOP and land as soon as possible. Also disabling the affected ECU by selecting ECU-Manual may reestablish sufficient fuel flow through mechanical linkages.

The reporter states that the power loss occurred five to ten seconds after the ECU was switched from TOP to NORM and it was not obvious that the switch had caused the power loss. He believes that placing the switch back to TOP would have restored normal engine power and allowed a two engine landing. He flies multiple aircraft types for a maintenance facility and is not as familiar with the DHC8 as an airline crew would be and believes that the QRH and the flight training company should provide some guidance on this subject.

DHC8-100 Captain experiences a power loss after takeoff shortly after the ECU is switched from TOP to NORM. The engine is shut down in accordance with QRH procedures and the flight returns to the departure airport.

1702661

201911

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Poor Lighting

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 356

Situational Awareness

1702661

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

We were taxiing out for takeoff on Taxiway Alpha for Runway XX. It was early morning and still dark. ATC cleared us for takeoff just prior to the Alpha southwest holding pad. When I turned on all exterior lights for takeoff; I noticed Aircraft X in the holding pad ahead of us. The First Officer didn't notice the aircraft until I told him. Aircraft X was parked parallel to Taxiway Alpha. I don't think Aircraft X had on it's beacon. I immediately stopped the aircraft due to the proximity of aircraft. Had I continued to taxi I could not insure our wingtip would clear Aircraft X's wingtip. Had Aircraft X parked perpendicular to Alpha; proximity clearance probably would not have been an issue. I told ATC I couldn't insure proximity clearance with Aircraft X if I continued to taxi. ATC then cancelled our takeoff clearance and then cleared Aircraft X for takeoff which kept us properly separated. This is a possible ground collision threat. I never saw Aircraft X until I turned on all my exterior lights; even though I was taxiing slow and had on my taxi light. Fortunately I received my takeoff clearance prior to the Alpha holding pad and turned on my exterior lights earlier than normal. Threats include no lighting on the holding pad. There is also a road and intersection beyond the holding pad with a lot of red; green and white lights which makes exterior aircraft lighting less noticeable. We were also finishing our Before Takeoff Checklist which keeps our attention inside the flight deck.

Flight Crew reported that as they taxied up to the holding pad in nighttime conditions; they did not see another parked aircraft with no exterior lights until in close proximity; and had to immediately stop taxiing.

1825959

202107

0001-0600

EVV.Airport

IN

VMC

Tower EVV

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS RWY 22

Landing

Visual Approach

Class C EVV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1825959

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 1200

Situational Awareness; Fatigue

1825960.0

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We were doing a late night flight to Evansville on the visual approach for Runway 22 and the FO (First Officer) (Pilot Flying) drifted below the glide slope as he went to full visual not cross referencing a glide slope. I told him he was sinking below it and about that time we received the glide slope warning as he was correcting. Pilot Monitoring stated the Pilot Flying was too low and below the glide slope while shortly after the glide slope GPWS went off.I believe the cause of this was improper scan of the Pilot Flying while transitioning to the visual part of the approach and also it being late at night and being tired on the last leg of the day.The Pilot Flying climbed the airplane back on to glide slope and proceeded with the visual approach and a good landing.Keep a continuous scan in and out of the cockpit while on a visual approach; especially when there are no PAPIs.

While hand flying the approach around 500 ft. to Runway 22 in Evansville; I allowed the aircraft to drift below glide slope. The Captain; who was PM (Pilot Monitoring) noticed and informed me I was getting low. I also received a 'glide slope' aural warning. I quickly corrected pitch and power to get back on glide slope and landed without any further issues. The Captain informed me I was getting low; and the 'glide slope' GPWS aural alert. I believe the cause was my insufficient scan of the flight instruments; as well as transitioning from the glide slope to scan the runway environment. Since it was nighttime; and since Runway 22 in Evansville has no VASI or PAPI; I believe my sight picture was incorrect; and I judged the aircraft to be higher than it was. I corrected pitch and power and returned to the glide slope for a normal landing. I believe I can do a better job of scanning the flight and navigation instruments while on approach; especially to an airport with no VASI or PAPI.

Air carrier flight crew reported the pilot flying drifted below the glideslope on visual approach resulting in a GPWS alert and evasive action.

1437983

201704

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1500.0

VMC

Windshear; 10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

Global 5000 (Bombardier)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 5800; Flight Crew Type 2850

Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1437983

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

The crew and the aircraft were repositioning after a [trans-Pacific overnight] flight. On arrival the crew was informed they were required to position the aircraft to [another airport]. The weather at [destination] was VMC with no ceiling and excellent visibility with little or no wind. We were given and accepted a visual. Approaching from the northwest we positioned for a left base and configured appropriately; rolling out on final at approximately 1500 ft fully configured with speed reducing as per a normal approach on the visual glide path (one red; one white). Once established on final the crew were distracted by a Cessna given clearance for departure. It was after this that the crew were alerted to an amber windshear annunciation on the primary flight display. As the PIC and the [flying] pilot I elected to continue the visual approach instead of executing an immediate go-around for the windshear. The windshear lasted 15 seconds approximately with minimal airspeed deviation of +/-5 kts.In effort to regain the visual glide path from above after the event a single audible 'sink rate' from the terrain warning system was heard. The aircraft regained the visual glide path at 500 ft and a normal on speed landing ensued. Given the fact the crew had left [departure airport the previous day] and crossed multiple time zones in two days; quality of judgement had been seriously impaired. In hindsight the crew should have stayed in [original destination] and repositioned the aircraft [later]. This would have ensured the crew were well rested and improved judgement and decision making.

Global 5000 Captain reported continuing an approach after receiving a windshear alert. Fatigue following a long duty day of international operations affected his judgment.