elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1040693

201210

0001-0600

NCT.TRACON

CA

1200.0

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B777-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SFO

Facility NCT.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1040693

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure

I was working B777-300ER on a south downwind for Runway 28L to pair with B757-200 on a straight in to Runway 28R. B757-200 was being controlled by another Controller. I turned base leg and the other Controller advised that he had me in sight and was maintaining visual separation. I was concerned with B777-300ER's ability to speak and comprehend long control instructions and was therefore issuing short control instructions to ensure safety. I verified that B777-300ER had B757-200 in sight and then turned final. At this time; neither aircraft was clearly leading the other; so I verified that B777-300ER had airport in sight. After confirming this; I cleared B777-300ER for a visual approach Runway 28L. I then slowed B777-300ER to 160 knots to ensure they would stay behind the B757-200 as planned with the other Controller. Around a 13 mile file B777-300ER was only slightly behind B757-200 so I told them 'Speed is your discretion to stay behind B757-200.' Both aircraft were then shipped to Tower frequency. Around a 3 mile file I noticed that B777-300ER was increasing speed; climbing; and passing the B757-200 because Tower was sending them around. I later found out that the Tower sent the B777-300ER around because of a 'potential overtake.' Recommendation; it's hard to say exactly what the 'event' is and what caused it. I'm reporting this because I was advised that this was a deal when in fact it is the same as every other side-by operation we run. The only exception was that I forgot to tell B777-300ER to 'follow' and instead instructed him '...stay behind.' We have been under tremendous pressure from management not to have go-arounds; especially with foreign air carriers flying heavy aircraft. What I believe lead to me forgetting to issue 'follow' was the fact that I was making short control instructions because of the language barrier. Instead of turning and clearing and telling to follow and giving a speed control; I broke one transmission into many and forgot about the 'follow.' I was also working other aircraft and this could have distracted me as well. I have realized that my error is in my phraseology and I will now instruct aircraft 'Speed is their discretion to follow preceding traffic' rather than 'stay behind.' Since this simple synonym is what prevents an everyday side-by approach from becoming a 'major safety incident' it was paramount that I make this change. It was not indicated to me at what point the preceding aircraft cannot maintain visual separation with the paired aircraft. To my knowledge; if the pilot cannot maintain visual separation; he/she must let ATC know ASAP. In this situation; I have not heard whether or not B757-200 ever said they could not maintain visual separation from B777-300ER. This is something that all controllers should see in writing. It would certainly cut down on frequency congestion when obtaining visual separation with multiple aircraft and possibly help establish rules for conducting visual approaches to multiple runways.

NCT Controller described a go-around event issued by SFO when a B777-300ER for Runway 28L was determined to be overtaking a B757-200 assigned Runway 28R. The reporter's phraseology was not in accordance with directives.

1017894

201206

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Testing; Work Cards

Aircraft Logbook(s)

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 178; Flight Crew Type 7500

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1017894

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 121; Flight Crew Type 5600

1017205.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

MEL; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Logbook Entry; Aircraft

Logbook Entry

[We] picked up aircraft in ZZZ; second leg of the day; third day of the pairing. While reviewing the logbook during Preflight Inspection; I noticed two very extensive and detailed defect write-ups in the logbook (one was carried over to an additional page by Maintenance). Both [write-ups] described a recurring problem on back-to-back flights seven days prior. The issue was an Indicated Airspeed 'IAS Disagree light' illuminating while climbing through the mid to high FL300s. Crew response was identical for both; but the Maintenance Actions; particularly for the second write-up; caught my eye. The issue appeared to be an open Maintenance Action write-up on the second occurrence; logbook page XXX48.The first incident; logbook page XXX46; described the problem on a leg to ZZZ1. The second incident; page XXX47; dated same occurred as aircraft was flown to ZZZ2; the next leg. Maintenance Action for this occurrence read; 'Removed and Replaced (R/R) Pitot Air Data Module (ADM) per Maintenance Manual (M/M). Operational checks normal. R/R by Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) X. The third page; XXX48; as the aircraft over-nighted in ZZZ3; included a very extensive and thorough maintenance write-up. It described the AMT's troubleshooting efforts; isolating the cause to a # 2 Display Electronics Unit (DEU). The conclusion of the action stated; 'Probably still exists. Needs #2 DEU. See log page XXX47 for Corrective Action.' The previous page cleared the write-up as 'Ops check normal.' The next page; XXX49; re-certified the aircraft for CAT III operations. Subsequent to these write-ups; an Airworthiness Release was signed; clearing the aircraft for further use. Our Corrective Action; after consulting with Dispatch; Maintenance Control; the Chief Pilot on call; and Maintenance Supervisor was to have Contract Maintenance at perform a bite check on the #2 DEU; clearing the aircraft with 'no faults noted.' See page XXX23. The aircraft flew without incident for two more legs. During consultation with Maintenance Control; it was revealed that the trailing portion of the write-up in question; 'Probably still exists...' [Log page XXX48] had not been fully transferred into the computerized data system; the first [time] Maintenance Control had heard this was when I read it to them. Obviously; this looks like a 'perfect storm' of oversight; miscommunication; and a lack of attention to detail. However; questions of accuracy arise in transmission of write-ups from logbook to the computerized Maintenance Data System. What cross-checking of data does an Airworthiness Release or recertification to CAT III require; and references to 'offline' work/corrections not entered into the logbook. I hope this helps to solidify our Aircraft Maintenance and logbook communication processes. Issues include: logbook write-up not resolved 1) Too extensive write-ups (too much information; important information lost) 2) Not enough crosschecking of information in maintenance write-ups 3) Airworthiness Releases- are all write-ups checked before signing off? 4) Inaccurate transfer of information from logbook to Maintenance Control. Is there a character limitation on transfers? 5) Off line work (not in logbook) will not stand the muster of an FAA review of logbook 6) What does a CAT III recertification mean? What is really checked prior to recertification? 7) Who is reading the Corrective Actions before signing off the aircraft?

During aircraft Preflight logbook review; logbook page XXX48 in the Corrective Action section appeared to have an unresolved open maintenance item. Company Mechanic performed Maintenance Action on a previous logbook page defect; and under the Corrective Action section; indicated that the broken part was removed and reinstalled because no parts were available and the defect problem still existed. It was written in the Corrective Actions box; 'Leaked checked First Officer's Pitot probe lines (and cleaned); slaved in First Officer's Air Data Module and ADIRU for troubleshooting; did not fix. Found problem to be #2 DEU. Confirmed by swapping and Pitot Static Check. No part available at this time. Returned DEU to original positions. Problem still exists. Needs #2 DEU. See logbook page XXX47 for Corrective Action.' Under logbook page XXX47; the Corrective Action box; Mechanic wrote; 'R/R Pitot Air Data Module (ADM) per Maintenance Manual (M/M); Operational Checks normal.' There was no mention of the #2 DEU being replaced. Further; logbook review indicated maintenance recertified aircraft to CAT-3 operations; logbook page XXX49. Furthermore; an airworthiness sign-off was accomplished in ZZZ2. Per Company FOM; an Airworthiness Release indicates all write-ups prior to the Release have been properly deferred or cleared. Through coordination with Dispatch; Maintenance Control; Maintenance Supervisor; and Chief Pilot on call; the ZZZ1 aircraft was considered to be safe and legal for departure. To be safe; the flight crew requested Maintenance document in the logbook and confirmed in the Corrective Action section; that the #2 DEU was functioning normally and safe for departure- logbook XXX23. Maintenance needs to use Logbook Corrective Action boxes to actually document corrective actions [accomplished]; not to document unresolved maintenance history because of shift changes or any other reason; logbook discrepancy issues.

Two pilots performing a preflight logbook review; report about a 'perfect storm' of Maintenance oversight; miscommunication; lack of attention to detail; an unresolved open maintenance item; and improper use of Logbook Corrective Action sign-off boxes on their B737-700 aircraft; involving a malfunctioning # 2 Display Electronic Unit (DEU).

1172069

201405

1201-1800

OKC.Airport

OK

0.0

Daylight

Tower OKC

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 298

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1172069

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 248; Flight Crew Type 8000

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1172078.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Airport; Procedure

Procedure

After pushback and engine start from the gate at OKC; I called Ground Control for taxi and they asked me if we wanted Runway 31 for departure. I looked at the Captain and we both agreed since it's a shorter taxi. I recall mentioning to the Captain that 'I guess they opened Runway 31;' since it was reported closed on the ATIS. I accepted the offer and we were issued a taxi clearance to Runway 31. Once clear of the ramp; I pulled out the OPC to recalculate for the new runway. Shortly thereafter; at the runway; I switched to Tower frequency and we were cleared for takeoff for Runway 31. I don't know why the runway was listed closed on the ATIS; but it did not seem unusual to us that it was closed and then reopened by ATC. Furthermore; both Ground and Tower Control cleared us to the runway so we didn't question it. Finally; neither of us saw any markings to indicate that Runway 31 was closed. I feel that we both acted in a safe manner in this case. I don't recall seeing Runway 31 listed closed in any NOTAMs; and even if it was; I would assume that both controllers would be aware of their runway status. The next time; if there is any doubt; I will verify it with the controller.

On pushback in OKC; Ground Controller asked if we wanted Runway 35L or 31 for departure. We told them [Runway] 31. The First Officer made the adjustments to the OPC and FMC while we taxied out. He mentioned that he thought the runway had been closed earlier. I didn't recall seeing that but we both thought that the runway was open due to ATC offering it to us. I received a call from my Chief Pilot the next morning saying that Headquarters had been notified that we used a closed runway. We thought the runway was open. In hindsight; we should have asked the Controller about it.

First Officer and Captain reported departing a runway that ATIS showed as closed but controllers asked if they wanted to depart on. Pilots accepted runway and later found out through company that it was closed.

1273738

201506

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dusk

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1273738

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1273438.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Passenger

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

We were delayed for departure because of a late arriving aircraft. When our airplane arrived the [inbound] Captain advised me that the engines needed oil and called maintenance to coordinate that. Oil was put in the aircraft engines and the maintenance can was signed off and the aircraft was put back in service. The First Officer had completed his aircraft external preflight and the aircraft was being refueled. While we were doing our preflight preparation and checks in the flight deck; we noticed a fuel imbalance of between 900 and 1;000 pounds. The fueler approached us shortly after and mentioned the problem he had balancing the fuel. He asked us if he needed to over-wing fuel the left side. We told him that we had enough fuel and the fuel system was cross feeding to bring both tanks into balance and that it would not be necessary. What we did not know; however; was that he had over-wing fueled the right side without bringing it to our attention. There were no MELs for the fuel system and it was working fine from our vantage point. The First Officer checked the single point fuel cap and the fuel panel as per the SOP; the fuel was balanced and we finished up our checks and proceeded. On the taxi; the flight attendant called the flight deck and advised us that a passenger saw something fall off the right wing. We asked Ground Control to pull off somewhere to further investigate and as soon as we stopped; the First Officer went into the cabin to investigate and look at the right wing. He discovered the over-wing fuel cap was not secure. He came back to the flight deck; told me and we communicated to operations and then Ground Control that we would need to return to the gate and requested a fueler to be on hand. We did the shutdown checks after arriving at the gate; opened the door; I apologized to the passengers about the incident; and advised the fueler of the situation; the cap was secured; we added a couple hundred pounds of fuel; did our checks; and proceeded the reminder of the flight and arrived safely in [destination]. Two of the passengers stated they would be filing reports to the FAA. One; who was very angry and a retired doctor; who did not provide a name asked if we had risk management programs in place and reporting programs to which I responded that we did.The fueler over wing fueling the airplane with no fuel system problems and not consulting the Captain prior was one factor. Another was poor communication after the aircraft was refueled. It could have been stated more clearly that the aircraft had been refueled over wing on the right side. Also I as a Captain; having seen the imbalance could have inquired better as to why we had the imbalance and determine what had been exactly done. I have never had a fueler decide to over-wing fuel an airplane that had no MELs on the fueling system without first asking me. Having known that over wing fueling had been done would have allowed us to be more aware of the need in this case to check the relevant over wing fuel cap.With significant fuel imbalances; more thorough investigation by the flight crew to more thoroughly understand the general processes that led to the imbalance would have helped to promote better awareness of the situation and allow for better mitigation of potential problems. Also; despite having done a preflight already; another look at the other fuel caps in addition to those normally used; i.g. the single point fuel cap and the external fuel control panel; could have further mitigated these problematic situations.

The fueler approached us in the flight deck and mentioned that he had completed fueling; but it was imbalanced. We noted a roughly 900 pound right wing heavy imbalance. We interpreted this as his mistake; and did not note any mechanical abnormalities with the aircraft. He asked us if we wanted him to over wing fuel us to even it out. The aircraft was already balancing the fuel load and we had the total fuel that we needed; so we told him no. After this conversation I went outside and checked the fuel panel door and the single point refueling cap and door. All was normal. We continued our normal preflight actions. At departure time our fuel load was balanced; we pushed back from the gate; and started our taxi.

A CRJ-200 flight crew reported several passengers saw an over wing fuel cap fall off the wing during taxi out. The flight returned to the gate to have the cap re-installed.

1295173

201509

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Cessna Citation Mustang (C510)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Climb

Class C ZZZ

Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1850; Flight Crew Type 650

1295173

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Y

Person Passenger; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Immediately after departure passenger reported rear cabin was excessively hot. Simultaneously 'Duct O'Heat R' amber caution message appeared on MFD and pilot sensed an abnormal smell. As per emergency procedures manual; the air source was switched to L. Pilot requested ATC for return to departure airport which was immediately authorized. Subsequent investigation identified a cracked pre-cooler in the right engine as the source of the hot air and was slated for immediate service and repair.

A Cessna Citation pilot described an excessively hot cabin along with a duct overheat warning that resulted in a return to the departure airport. Subsequent inspection revealed a cracked pre-cooler.

1221445

201411

1201-1800

SFO.Airport

CA

8.0

2500.0

VMC

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Visual Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 600

1221445

Other laser

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

During the FMS Bridge Visual approach to 28R at SFO we were illuminated by a green laser for approximately 20 seconds at an altitude of 2500 feet approximately 8 miles out. The direction of the laser came from the 9-930 position WNW [west-northwest] of the San Carlos airport. I was distracted by the light initially and while looking in its direction was illuminated for a couple seconds. My First Officer saw it and looked away. I said something about the light and it didn't register to me as to what it was. The light moved slightly to the front of the aircraft and I reactively looked back towards the area and was immediately illuminated again. Total exposure to my eyes about 3-4 seconds. Tower was notified when we realized what it was. Approach and landing was normal. Felt slight discomfort in my left eye in the middle of the night. Upon waking up; decided to go to emergency room. Acuity in left eye was degraded to 20/40; right eye normal 20/20.

B737 Captain reported being targeted by a laser on a visual approach to SFO that later resulted in a trip to the emergency room and degraded visual acuity.

1559616

201807

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class C ZZZ

Landing Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1559616

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1559617.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure

Aircraft

While on approach we received a GEAR DISAGREE warning message with the right main landing gear showing not down. At this point the Captain notified tower we needed to break off the approach and run a checklist. I was the pilot flying so the Captain ran the QRH. As he went through it he got to the point of pulling the manual release handle. At this point I asked him if I could take a look at it first to make sure we were not missing anything. I read in the notations about cycling the gear and stated my desire to cycle the gear. He stated that he'd either seen this in the sim or heard of other guys cycling the gear and then it exacerbated the problem. He continued with the checklist and pulled the handle and the gear still wouldn't come down. He notified company; talked to the passengers and flight attendant while I flew and spoke with ATC. The checklist took us to the point of Gear Up/Unsafe Landing. We flew over the tower at 2500 ft so ATC and CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) could take a look at the gear and confirm it was up. They confirmed it was up so we prepared for a gear up landing and notified company of our intentions to land gear up. At some point close to here we transferred controls so the Captain could do the landing. We burnt down to 1000 pounds and were returning to land when we received an ACARS from company saying to cycle the gear. I asked the Captain if he wanted me to and he said yes. I pulled the gear handle up and got three white up lights then pulled the gear handle down and got three green downs. We notified the passengers and tower we had all good indications but to have CFR standing by just in case. We landed; stopped on the runway and notified everyone that we were okay and able to taxi to the gateI believe the QRH can lead to some confusion in this instance. I was always taught in training to read everything in the QRH from left to right/top to bottom. The notations I think should be labeled as action steps as to not confuse the reader. I suggested cycling the gear to the Captain because of the notation but the Captain has more time on the aircraft so I put my trust in him. As noted above he said he has heard of other guys having problems by pulling the gear back up. Overall I think the crew did an excellent job with the problem that presented itself. The flight attendant did an especially good job at briefing the passengers and directing them for the possibility of a rough landing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-200 flight crew reported landing gear malfunction on approach necessitating a go-around.

1704064

201911

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Heavy Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

1704064

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Other Person; Person Ground Personnel

Pre-flight

Human Factors

No DG information. DG information for pallet was not entered in flight management system; loading instruction did not reflect any DG loaded on pallet. Pallet was correctly labeled. Cargo staff notified and information inserted.

Ground employee reported loading data was missing from dangerous goods cargo information.

1091005

201305

1201-1800

M03.TRACON

TN

Tower MEM

Air Carrier

B757-200

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Final Approach

Class B MEM

TRACON M03

PC-12

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Descent

Other Instrument Approach

Facility M03.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1091005

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I had just combined both parallel finals at the ARM scope; and this was my first time working these positions with FUSION. Aircraft X; a B752; was on short final talking to the Tower. Aircraft Y; a PC12; was in trail just over 5 miles behind Aircraft X. I completed some work with traffic landing Runway 18L; and went to ship Aircraft Y to the Tower. It looked like I had just over 5 miles; but I was later told I only had 4.99. When Tower called to coordinate the break out for Aircraft Y; it looked like he was at a 5 mile final and Aircraft X was no longer observed. I was later told that the spacing was down to 4.86. FUSION made it very difficult to determine spacing because even targets firmly established on the localizer/final approach course wobbled back and forth. If I am forced to use FUSION; I will have to loosen my spacing in the final box.

M03 Controller described a loss of heavy jet separation event claiming FUSION equipment was a contributing factor.

1001787

201203

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-400

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class C ZZZ

Nose Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1001787

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

1001786.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Upon gear retraction; my First Officer and I noticed the amber (N. DOOR) and the red (NOSE) gear lights were illuminated and the nose gear felt as if it hadn't retracted. The mains appeared and indicated to be retracted. We leveled off at our initially assigned altitude of 3;000 FT. I was flying and my First Officer was the pilot not flying. We contacted Departure Control and let them know of our problem and they gave us a northern vector so we could run some checklists. My First Officer went through QRH Landing Gear Fail to Retract Checklist which led us to QRH ALTERNATE LANDING GEAR EXTENSION Checklist. We accomplished the QRH [procedures] and after discussion amongst ourselves and Dispatch; we decided to declare an emergency and return to [departure airport].We landed safely and came to a complete stop. We waited on the runway to be tugged in as per checklist because the nose wheel steering was rendered inoperative. When the tug arrived [ground personnel] said the integral nose gear ground lock mechanism was 'out'. We arrived at the gate and deplaned the passengers. I asked my First Officer and the ground crew personnel if they noticed whether or not the nose locking mechanism was in and locked and both of them said yes; that it appeared in and locked before we pushed back from the gate. Whether or not the ground crew pulled out the nose ground lock mechanism when they moved the airplane [earlier] I don't know the answer to that. What I do know is my First Officer said it was in when he did his pre-flight walk around; and the ground personnel said it was in when he pushed us back from the gate.

During my preflight inspection prior to departure; I noted no issues with the aircraft.

Q400 flight crew reported nose gear would not retract after takeoff. They declared an emergency and returned to departure airport where the nose gear ground lock mechanism was found out of position.

1141764

201401

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Dusk

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Nosewheel Steering

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Distraction

1141764

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure

Ambiguous

I was the PIC/pilot not flying. On the landing rollout at approximately 75 KTS ground speed we lost nosewheel steering causing us to be disabled on Runway 25L. I set the parking brake and notified Tower of our situation; and then ran the comp reset procedure. We were able to recover our nosewheel steering and taxi clear of Runway 25L; but not before causing two other aircraft to execute missed approaches. I then notified Maintenance Control and Company Operations of our situation. I was able to taxi to the ramp area; but requested to be towed into the gate as a precaution. Maintenance met the aircraft and began to troubleshoot the problem. They identified the problem and cleaned a sensor per Airbus procedures I was told. The aircraft was signed off and returned to service. We pushed after about a 45 minute delay for the continuation of flight. On taxi out to Runway 25R during engine two start we lost the nosewheel steering for a second time and became disabled on the taxiway. I ran the comp reset procedure again and notified all persons involved previously that a gate return was in progress. Once again I requested to be towed into the gate at which time the passengers were deplaned. At this time myself and the First Officer were notified that we were being removed from the duration of our planned flight because of duty time concerns. I was informed that the flight eventually departed late and completed the segment without any further problems. The loss of steering on the landing rollout was a strong pull to the left requiring differential braking to keep the aircraft from departing the runway. The loss of steering on taxiway was much more benign and required normal braking. I am not sure what could be done to prevent maintenance items from occurring. There did seem to be some disconnect between the different maintenance crews on the proper way to complete the maintenance procedure done in the previous departure station. Also I was concerned when the maintenance guys in where this last failure occurred told me that if they can't duplicate the failure at the gate all they could do was clean the part and sign off as op check good. I'm just glad that the loss of nosewheel steering the second time was not during the takeoff roll at a critical speed. Mechanical failures are going to occur and I think the maintenance guys did the best they could with what they were presented with.

An A319 nosewheel steering failed during the landing roll but was recovered after following the QRH which allowed the crew to taxi to the gate. Following maintenance the aircraft taxied for takeoff only to have the steering fail again which required a tow.

1204676

201409

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

20.0

21000.0

IMC

Center ZZZ

Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ; Class C ZZZ

Recirculation Fan

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 27

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1204676

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

My right seat captain just asked if I smelled the smoke when the passengers were yelling from the rear that they had smoke in the cabin. With about a 5-10 second delay we donned the masks. In the heat of the moment it took me a second to remember switching the mask mic on while the right seat captain made gestures she could not hear me (and I was unable to hear her mic). A few seconds later she realized that her ITT button was left off after her last transmission with ATC and we finally established communications. We took a look around the cabin for any signs of smoke and looked towards the rear. At no time did we have any visual signs of smoke but a strong smell. It did not appear electrical in nature. At the time of the event we were established in cruise at FL210 in IMC; Engine Anti-Ice and Ignition was on with the RAT at 3C. ATC had just given us new instructions but we did not communicate with them. It was very difficult to communicate between us crew with the masks on; especially since with every breath the mic would activate and a roaring noise was in the ears of the other person. At times we were forced to expand the headbands to remove the masks a bit so we can talk. While the second captain was adjusting her mask and volume; I relayed to ATC that we have smoke and request a descent. After the second transmission and clarification we received an immediate clearance to descent to 11;000 ft with two options as the closest airports. We elected ZZZ1 and were cleared direct. Although efficiently handled by ATC an assigned heading with a direct clearance would have helped a lot more (and I requested it after) because we had to reprogram the FMS and scale down the MFD to have an idea which way we are going to turn. I selected a moderate descent rate of 1;500 fpm in VSI and HDG mode until we were able to both verify that the FMS was correctly setup for direct ZZZ1. During the descent we started the checklist for environmental smoke and turned off the fan. We did not change the air source since the smell of smoke started to dissipate. After about 3-4 minutes and no smell of smoke the right seat captain removed her mask to communicate clearer with ATC and brief the passengers of the status. ATC advised us that only limited equipment is available at ZZZ1 and ZZZ would be 35nm southeast of our position. We decided; based on no more smell of smoke and having better equipment available; to divert to ZZZ. While enroute we completed the regular descent and approach checklist and noticed we will be 700 lbs overweight for landing. We considered holding to burn fuel but that would have taken approx. 60 minutes. We choose to accept an overweight landing since we have good weather conditions and a long runway available. The landing was uneventful and the aircraft was turned over to maintenance to inspect for the origin of the smoke and to perform an overweight landing inspection.

CE550 Captain is informed of smoke in the cabin by passengers and the right seat pilot at FL210. Difficulty is encountered donning and communicating with oxygen masks on but eventually ATC is informed and a descent is requested. The Checklist for Environmental Smoke is accomplished and the recirculation fan is turned off which seems to be the culprit. Flight diverts to a suitable airport for an overweight landing.

1202219

201409

1201-1800

OMA.Airport

NE

2800.0

Marginal

TRACON OMA

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class C OMA

Altitude Alert

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1202219

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

N

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

We were cleared for the approach to 35L. I set the wrong crossing altitude for the outer marker. The outer marker is RICKY at 2800; I set FAPON at 1700. ATC called with a low altitude alert. I climbed back up to 2800 and resumed the approach without further incident.Sticking to SOP would have prevented this if I had HAD the first officer verify the altitude at the outer marker. We were so preoccupied with getting down and slowing down neither one of us recognized my error.

When the Captain flying an A319 set an incorrect--and lower by over a thousand feet--FAF altitude in the Altitude Alert window contrary to SOP; the First Officer wasn't aware and didn't correct the error. ATC issued a low altitude alert.

1040764

201210

0601-1200

CHS.Airport

SC

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground CHS

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Ground CHS

Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

1040764

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1040765.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I contacted Ground abeam Gate for taxi instructions after completing the After Start Checklist. Ground's instructions were; 'Taxi to Runway 21; via Alpha; cross Runway 15; 33.' We proceeded to taxi with both engines started. As we crossed Runway 15; Ground responded to a twin Cessna with the taxi instructions; 'Plan Runway 21 taxi via Golf short of Alpha. Give way to CRJ 700 taxing left to right; we need him in front of you for a time.' The Cessna responded; 'Have the CRJ in sight.' Note there was a CRJ 200 in the holding pad at the end of Alpha. As we approached the Cessna we could see the pilot looking to the right at the CRJ 200 with no intentions of braking. We maneuvered to the left side of the wide taxi way avoiding contact with the intruding aircraft. The general aviation pilot did not comprehend the full instruction given by ATC of the company; size; or direction of the traffic he was to give way to.

[Narrative #2 contains no additional information.]

CRJ 700 flight crew maneuvered to avoid a twin Cessna that had been given taxi instructions that included giving way to a CRJ. Cessna pilot was looking at a CRJ 200 instead and did not see the CRJ 700.

1266975

201505

1201-1800

C90.TRACON

IL

11000.0

TRACON C90

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR WYNDE6

Class E C90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1266975

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

This report is for informational purposes as ORD TRACON said they had had several such wake occurrences lately and were tracking them.Inbound to ORD we encountered fairly severe wake turbulence while descending on the WYNDE6 arrival in TRACON airspace.We were cleared by ORD center to 10;000 MSL and had completed our descent checklist so the passengers were seated with seat belts fastened.We were out of 11;000 MSL and about 9 miles in trail of a heavy who was assigned to a different runway and level at 11;000 MSL.We had just crossed the eastern shore of Lake Michigan when our aircraft started to shake and buffet side to side. We were approximately at 10;700 MSL when this began. We advised ATC that we were encountering a wake and they cleared us to descend to 7000. As our descent continued the wake became more violent and I had to use fairly aggressive control inputs to stop large rolling movements both left and right so it was obvious that we descending deeper into it. I deemed it safer to climb and I advised ATC that I was climbing out of it and would return to 11;000 MSL.The autopilot was disconnected and we also flew north of course to exit up and out. The buffeting stopped as we climbed through about 10;700 MSL.We took a moment to contact the cabin crew to see if there were any injuries. Fortunately everyone was seated and both flight attendants were OK.We then were cleared by ATC direct to an intersection that took us well away from the heavy's track and were cleared to 7000. The rest of the flight was uneventful.After landing in ORD; ATC had us call TRACON to discuss the incident. They said they had had several such occurrences recently and would file a report.Inadequate separation given winds aloft and atmospherics.Greater than 1000 FT separation in altitude and more distance behind a heavy recommended.

CRJ-700 Captain reported encountering 'fairly severe' wake turbulence nine miles in trail of a heavy jet on the WYNDE6 arrival into ORD.

1184420

201406

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1184420

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Company Policy

Ambiguous

Received a Warning Message on ED1 during takeoff roll; I aborted the takeoff and cleared the runway. I'm concerned I might've initiated the RTO above V1. The warning message only lasted for a few seconds during which I initiated the RTO. The message cleared itself during the RTO and my focus was divided between evaluating the message; directional control and decelerating. I'm not sure if the message distracted me near enough to V1 that I initiated the abort at or over V1 or if I wasn't near calling V1 just yet. It really all just ran together at the time and I'm unsure that I followed procedure properly. Post event conversation with the pilot flying seems to indicate we were near but not over V1 when the message illuminated and RTO initiated. The RTO heated already warm brakes on a 90+ degrees F day to no more than 10 on two BTMS indicators and all post event Maintenance inspections were good. It's a good possibility that we weren't over V1 at RTO initiation; I just cannot remember our speed clearly enough to be confident. Some Warning Messages are a nuisance when overall conditions support a GO decision. 'Nose Door' or intermittent 'APU Overtemp' Warnings are not high on the list of issues for compromising performance or directional control under normal conditions. Our mandate for aborts indicates we will abort for 'Engine Failures or Warning Messages prior to V1'. We don't differentiate between a low speed and high speed abort criteria. Some Caution Messages require an abort. Some MX deferrals and additional Caution Messages (a deferred Gen then opposite side IDG Caution during initial takeoff roll) make an aborted takeoff the prudent course. But similar to some Warning Messages there should be some latitude during the high speed portion of the takeoff roll to continue if the problem does not indicate control or performance issues. That's a part in evaluating the prudence of aborts for any Warning Message when operating from a short runway on a hot day with a heavy aircraft. I reacted and initiated an aborted takeoff more out of reflex from standardized training than proper evaluation of the problem. Given we had a sufficiently long runway also contributed to the auto-abort decision; I'm sure there would have been more discussion prior to taxi had it looked like planned performance could be compromised. I followed procedure but I'm not sure of my timing. Continued effort in discipline and diligence to following established procedure. Strongly suggest we evaluate high speed vs. low speed abort criteria. I believe other carriers have similar considerations. Given we are going to be operating more massive aircraft we could benefit from a high speed abort criteria that allows spurious messages and other criteria that do not affect performance or directional control to be deprioritized so as to not lead us into a unnecessary greater potential for an RTO accident. Procedure and experience obtained at a previous operator would have allowed me to make what I think would have been an operationally safer decision.

CRJ200 Captain reports rejecting a takeoff at or near V1 for a momentary Warning Message on ED1.

1649278

201905

1801-2400

PBI.Airport

FL

10000.0

Daylight

TRACON ZMA

Corporate

Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID TBIRD2

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1649278

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Horizontal 328; Vertical 328

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Aircraft

Corporate CL-850 departing PBI Runway 10L SID TBIRD2. Flying through 10;000 feet at 250 knots; rate of climb 1;500 FPM. Heading 286 outbound from AHABB to DIAPR. Drone sighted approximately less than 100 yards ahead at our 11 to 12 o'clock position and viewed passing below less than 100 yards below. Noticeable figure of square drone; not a bird. Passed without evasive action; only few seconds of recognition. Reported sighting to ATC; ATC collected information and in turn ATC transmitted information to aircraft in vicinity.

Challenger Captain reported an airborne conflict with a UAV during climb.

1045127

201210

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

34000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 238

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1045127

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

We received a call from the Flight Attendant telling us that some passengers were concerned about a noise coming from the floor on the left side of the aircraft just forward of the emergency exit and just behind the leading edge of the left wing. The Flight Attendant informed us that she had heard anything like this before. The First Officer and I; as well as the jumpseater; began to check for any abnormal indications. All systems appeared to be normal. I decided to go into the cabin and check the noise out for myself. As I exited the cockpit and started to walk back to the area of concern; I could hear the noise almost immediately; also the floor over the location had some vibration. I; myself; had never heard anything like it before. I returned to the cockpit and informed the First Officer and the Jumpseater of the situation. I told them we would have to divert and a major station would be the best place. I also informed the Flight Attendant of the same. We contacted Dispatch; they concurred. We also informed Dispatch of our overweight landing. I then told the passengers and Flight Attendant of our plan. We received an ACARS message from Dispatch telling us that we would have to declare an emergency because of the overweight landing. I did declare an emergency. We landed without incident and had a normal taxi to the gate. The only thing I had a problem with was Dispatch telling me I had to declare an emergency. The First Officer and I questioned it. However; I decided to err on the side of caution; because of the abnormal problem with the aircraft and the overweight landing.

A B737-300 Captain diverted because of a very loud; unusual noise apparently coming from beneath the floor; left side just after of the leading edge; forward of the emergency exit.

1110511

201308

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

8000.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Bonanza 36

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Vectors; Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

AC Generator/Alternator

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 2320; Flight Crew Type 2320

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

1110511

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was at 8;000 FT on an IFR flight plan. After being given vectors around a hot area; I lost all electrical power suddenly. I had a hand-held radio; called Tower and declared an emergency. I manually counter-clockwise cranked the gear down because I had no power. With no green lights I could not verify down and locked gear and gear collapsed on landing. I don't know how this could have been avoided as the aircraft is meticulously maintained.

BE36 pilot reports electrical failure at 8;000 FT on an IFR flight plan. The reporter diverts to a suitable airport using a hand held VHF. The gear is manually cranked down; but collapses upon landing.

1494166

201710

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Dawn

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Vectors

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 225

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1494166

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Human Factors

I completed a walk around with tow bar still attached since it was needed to keep repositioning the aircraft to loosen taught chain tie downs. Once walk around completed and all tie downs were removed; I asked my wife to remove the tow bar; stow it in our cargo hold and join me in the cockpit as I was going in to get our cockpit ready for departure. Upon initial turn out from airport; I realized something did not seem right with the bottom forward of our aircraft. I asked my wife if she removed and stowed the tow bar and then realized that she did not. I returned to [departure airport]; did a low approach and asked tower to inform if we still had a tow bar attached to nose gear. It was confirmed that it was still attached. (The tow bar in use has a mechanical locking mechanism and as result remained attached and did not depart the aircraft.) We then landed safely and taxied shortest distance to an area where we could shut down. Upon inspection; we discovered that we incurred propeller damage. This has been a humbling experience and one that has taught me to ensure I pay unrelenting attention to detail.

PA28 pilot reported departing with the tow bar attached to the nose landing gear.

1046149

201210

0001-0600

SCT.TRACON

CA

4000.0

Air Carrier

A320

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1046149

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

Air Carrier X off opposite direction Runway 8 ONT; climbing to 4;000 FT. Cherokee off AJO climbing to 4;000 FT; stopped at 3;000 FT when communications were not transferred in a timely manner. I called to verify runway traffic configuration. Air Carrier X 1 1/2 South of ONT; I reached out to see if he was on frequency (not there) ONT Tower called and informed me that he was issued the wrong clearance and that they would re-clear and transfer communication after clearance was issued. I instructed the Tower to transfer communication and I would give him alternate instructions. Communication was not transferred in a timely manner after coordination with the Tower. Air Carrier X checked on frequency abeam PDZ. I originally gave him a right turn then realized he was going to fast and had already passed PDZ to make the turn and remain clean of the MVA's so I immediately re-issued instructions for a left turn and an immediate climb above the MVA's. Air Carrier X entered the edge of a 5;300 FT MVA as he was leaving 4;000 FT.

SCT Controller described a below MVA event when ONT Tower failed to transfer radio communication on a departure as requested.

1679934

201909

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

9000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

1679934

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 3281

Distraction; Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure

1679937.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

We departed ZZZ off of Runway X climbing up to 8;000 FT as depicted on the SID (Standard Instrument Departure); I leveled off and was maintaining about 240 KTS hand flying the aircraft. Shortly after we got a climb to 9;000 FT and instructions to intercept a course to resume the departure. I asked for the autopilot on at this time since it was high task saturation time of the flight while the Captain was entering the course into the FMS (Flight Management System) to intercept. Initially the FMS did not take the input on what the Captain asked it to do; we leveled off at 9;000ft and I got distracted trying to see what the FMS was going to do. We accelerated to 267 KTS before I realized the speed. I then reduced the power back to 245 KTS and continued the trip at 9;000 ft. ATC did not notice or call us so we just slowed down and continued on. No aircraft limitations were exceeded and no delays came from this event. When we leveled off; we were both distracted with the FMS programming how it was not doing what we wanted and had our heads down causing a distraction and allowing to airspeed to go past 250 KTS under 10;000ft. Maybe next time I should turn the autopilot on earlier in busy bravo airspace and when task saturation is high. Also if the FMS is not doing what we want; better off to just manually maneuver the aircraft to prevent distractions like this from occurring again.

FAR broken happened during an intercept between 2 points on the ZZZ2 SID. We were climbing from 8000 FT to 9000 FT which was the cruise. I was the pilot monitoring. The FO (First Officer) was flying. The autopilot was turned on just prior the climb to 9000 FT. Our clearance intercept ZZZ.ZZZZZ transition on current heading. The FO was unsure how to do such in the FMS (Flight Management System). I decided to do it for him. As I brought my head back up I realized we were accelerating to 266 KTS. I had him bring back the thrust and slowed to 240. The cause for such was because both pilots were heads down. The FO was brand new and he did not know how to set up a transition. He was curious as to how. Instead of keeping his full attention to flying; he was staring at what I was doing. Thus letting his speed get way ahead. The aircraft was not at redline/Vmo; so we were not going to get an alert. As the PM (Pilot Monitoring); I should have told him how to set it up and monitored the flight parameters. My suggestion is simply let one person do their own perspective role. If I had simply monitored and gave instructions versus setting us up; the speed wouldn't have exceeded 250. 2 pilots should never be heads down at the same time. The training department has been increasing its time in showing pilots intercepts in the FMS. I think it should continue as folks still don't know once leaving training.

Flight Crew flying EMB jet exceeded 250 kt restriction under 10;000 ft.

1226207

201412

1201-1800

K22.Airport

KY

340.0

20.0

5000.0

IMC

10

Daylight

3000

TRACON HTS

Government

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Initial Approach

Direct; Vectors

Class E HTS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Government

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 300

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1226207

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication

Prior to the approach phase; the flight was a normal IFR flight. Conditions were IMC for most of the flight at 7;000 feet. Checked on with Indianapolis Center and was asked if I had weather and NOTAMs at SJS as well as my approach request. I confirmed weather and NOTAMs and requested the RNAV (GPS) RWY 21 into SJS; direct ZUSRI (IAF). I was immediately cleared to ZUSRI by Center. I then loaded the same approach into the Garmin 530W. I was handed off to Huntington Approach. Approach stated that ZUSRI was not on the approach plate; and I was then cleared direct ECANE. I acknowledged the new fix and while loading ECANE into the Garmin 530W; discovered that it was not in the database. I notified Huntington Approach that ECANE was neither in my GPS database nor on my approach plate. Approach then asked if I had the correct approach plate for the SJS RNAV (GPS) RWY 21. I once again checked my approach plate provided by ForeFlight (iPad App) and noted the version. There were no updates pending during my preflight procedures. I had no evidence available to me that my approach plate was not correct or current. As it turns out; ECANE was an IAF on the outdated approach procedure. Hunting Approach then asked if I had the fix 'GENCE' (IF/IAF) on my approach plate. I responded affirmative. I was then cleared direct GENCE. I reloaded the approach into the GPS (3rd change in GPS programming) with the GENCE IAF and proceeded direct. By this time I was concentrating on eliminating the distractions caused by the conflicting approach procedure publications. A couple minutes later; Huntington Approach asked if I would accept radar vectors to final. I answered affirmative and received an assigned heading. I reloaded the approach for radar vectors (4th change in GPS reprogramming) and intercepted final about 4 nm from GENCE at 4;100 feet. Passed GENCE and encountered VMC at 3;900 MSL. I canceled IFR shortly thereafter. Final approach and landing were normal.I contacted ForeFlight immediately after the flight and confirmed with them that I had the most recent published approach procedure. The airport manager called Huntington Tower; in my presence; to ask them if they were aware that both RNAV (GPS) approaches into SJS had recently changed. They stated they were not aware until after I landed and they contacted Indianapolis Center and confirmed the changes with them. The significant issues were prolonged pilot/controller confusion; as well as spikes in pilot/controller workload during a critical phase of flight. I am not at all familiar with the methods that ATC facilities use to maintain their publications. I do know this was the first time I experienced an incident like this; and found it very surprising that it could happen. I also do not understand how ATC could have outdated approach procedure. The flight was successful in that a safe landing occurred.

Pilot reports of flying IFR to an airport and receives clearance to a specific fix. The fix is not on his approach plate and he questions ATC. ATC Vectors the pilot to the IAF and then later pilot cancels IFR. ATC did not have current IFR approach plates and was using an old approach.

1303596

201510

1801-2400

VHHH.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1303596

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I refused a shipment of approximately 10;000lbs of lithium ion batteries based on my feelings that this is in fact dangerous goods. No information is provided to me as to where the batteries have been stored and under what conditions. There is no information provided on the internal temperature of the batteries. Based on this; I feel that thses are dangerous goods.

A B777 Captain refuse an approximate 10;000 pound lithium ion battery shipment because he had no information about battery storage conditions or temperature and felt they were dangerous goods.

1791002

202102

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

1791002

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Ramp

Human-Machine Interface

1791006.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel

Pre-flight; Routine Inspection

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Ramp cargo ground personnel work as a Lead in one of my outbounds Aircraft X going to ZZZ1 leaving ZZZ at XA:37. I run into the same problem as before; missing 1155 pounds of cargo and like I explain in my last report our Cargo Facility they; most of the time; bring the Hazmat or Cargo carts at the last minute. The problem is that as a Lead we have to set up the scanners prior we Load our planes otherwise we can't do anything. That being said we are not allowed to load the aircraft if we don't pit our bags; cargo or even the mail. And yesterday like any other day I did what I usually do; pit all my stuff. In this case I only saw and put on the plane 11 bags and 2 small boxes. One was a quick pack and the other one a box with Human Tissue between both items it was no more than 20 lbs.

ZZZ gate control manager notified of an error after takeoff for discovering cargo at 1155lbs was not loaded on the aircraft. The gate manager stated cargo manager (name) notified of cargo DSTG [Departure Staging Guide] item 2 remained planeside in their warehouse. This revision generated a significant weight change of 1;155lbs representing 0.82% adjustment from the original takeoff weight. Percent MAC adjusted from 14.3 to 15.8 / +1.5.

Air Carrier Lead Ground personnel and load crew reported recurring issue of late planeside arrival of Hazmat cargo which results in departure delays; cargo weight and cargo handling errors.

1039144

201209

1201-1800

MHT.Airport

NH

1000.0

Tower MHT

S-70/UH-60 Blackhawk/Seahawk/Pavehawk/Knighthawk

2.0

VFR

Training

Initial Climb

Class C MHT

Facility A90.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1039144

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

An H60 helicopter was IFR doing an ILS approach to Runway 35 with a missed approach of 090 and 30. He departed VFR and was turned westbound by MHT. The Tower called and informed me he was VFR and not requesting advisories. When I advised the Tower; you do know that a Class C requirement is that I provide RADAR service to all departures until exiting the Class C? The Tower advised yes; but he doesn't want advisories. MHT Tower needs to learn what a Class C is; and what the requirements of a Class C are. Too many controllers in the Tower are just allowing VFR aircraft to depart without Class C services. The Class C was put in place because of the volume of passengers leaving the MHT airport. Failure to comply could possibly cause a mid air collision.

A90 Controller voiced concern regarding the lack Class C requirements demonstrated by some controllers at MHT.

1472499

201708

0601-1200

SLC.Tower

UT

4800.0

Daylight

Tower SLC

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Utility / Infrastructure

Landing

None

Class B SLC

Facility SLC.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1472499

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

I was working local east when the TRACON handed me off Aircraft X. I took the hand off thinking he was another helicopter that would be northwest of the field. On my initial radio transmission to Aircraft X I told him to report on station where he would be working today. Aircraft X started his bug spraying in his location that he said (3 miles nw of the field). All was going well until I noticed he was moving further south than I had planned. I asked Aircraft X how much further south he was planning on flying and he said 'no further than here. Just over here by this landing area.' I just said 'roger'. I had no traffic for him. I wasn't too concerned. Then I noticed I lost radar contact with him. I keyed up and said 'Aircraft X radar contact lost' there was no reply. I kept trying to get a hold of him and I was getting concerned. I told my supervisor what was going on and we looked up the company who owned that aircraft and called them. The company did not answer the first time. We called our admin staff and no one knew about him; supposedly; even operating in bravo airspace. Our supervisor let 30 minutes go by before we were going to call search and rescue.We tried the aircrafts company again and got a hold of someone. She said she would have the pilot contact us immediately. The pilot of Aircraft X called the tower and he was fine; but it turned out he was a fixed wing aircraft and he landed on a dirt road in the bravo surface area. We; in the tower; had no idea this was going to happen. The pilot claims that our admin staff was notified 3 days prior to this happening; but no one put out a read and initial on this whole operation. So now we have a fixed wing aircraft departing into bravo airspace multiple times an hour with no official bravo clearance right next to a busy perpendicular runway and management is telling us it's not a big deal. No one was aware of any of this. I have worked at SLC for many years and have never seen this operation with a fixed wing aircraft or even heard of it happening in any other bravo airspace in the country. There has already been a discussion about it after the fact; but no one knows the rules and procedures on how to work this aircraft correctly. In the meantime this Aircraft X is just departing in bravo airspace on his own off some dirt road just west of the airport. Our management team and admin staff needs to pass important information on to the operation.

SLC Local Controller reported a fixed wing aircraft landed on a dirt road in the Bravo airspace surface area. The Controller had no prior information that the aircraft would be landing.

1671200

201908

1201-1800

MSN.Airport

WI

3000.0

TRACON MSN

Air Taxi

Citation Excel (C560XL)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class C MSN

Facility MSN.TRACON

Government

Approach; Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Situational Awareness

1671200

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Human Factors

Aircraft X descending into MSN from the northwest; initially issued 4000 ft. to stay above MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) of 3200 ft.; aircraft still high 25 NM northwest; out of 8000 ft. aircraft issued 3000 ft.; anticipating would NOT be below 3200 ft. while still over that MVA area; however aircraft descended faster than expected and was observed at 3000 ft. at the very southeast portion of the 3200 ft. MVA where transitions to the 2700 ft. MVA. Weather in area better than 5000/5. C56X can perform very differently depending on flight crew and experience; in the future I won't anticipate quite as soon and observe how aircraft is performing initially.

A TRACON Controller reported aircraft was issued a descent clearance; descended faster than anticipated and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1254598

201504

1801-2400

PCT.TRACON

VA

VMC

Night

TRACON PCT

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR GIBBZ2

Class B IAD; Class E PCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 155; Flight Crew Type 11000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1254598

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

We were near KIKKR on the GIBBZ 2 Arrival and cleared direct MOSBY. We misheard the clearance and proceeded to MOSLE. Shortly after; the Controller asked if we were still on the arrival and we said yes. He said no problem that happens here and he meant for us to proceed to MOSBY on the approach to Runway 1R; he then gave us a vector. Either MOSLE or MOSBY needs to be renamed they are too similar in spelling and sound.

B737-800 Captain on the GIBBZ2 arrival to IAD; reports confusing their clearance direct MOSBY as direct MOSLE; and believes they are too similar to be in the same airspace.

1581939

201809

1201-1800

PHL.Airport

PA

VMC

Tower PHL

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B PHL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 21000

Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1581939

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 14000

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1581953.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

After being issued clearance for a visual approach to PHL Runway 27L in CAVU VMC conditions; I continued a descent to the runway while manually flying the aircraft while below the GS. The glide slope audio warning did sound during my actions. I did not go-around and completed the landing instead.The flight to the PHL traffic pattern was normal in all respects prior to approach. My First Officer (FO) [have] flown together many times over the years. Both of us are experienced with the Airbus. We were both in a positive mood and working well together prior to commencing the approach.Weather at PHL was perfect: CAVU; 23 degrees C; almost no wind; with the sun about 10 degrees above the horizon. There was almost no air traffic on the frequency...just us; a few other aircraft ahead of us inbound and one GA aircraft. He was issued a vector to '...remain clear of PHL inbounds.'We were handed off to PHL Approach while on the JIIMS Arrival at 9;000 feet. We were then cleared to 6;000 feet. While descending thru 7;000 feet; we were given a heading and cleared to 4;000 feet. We were near the WOJIK intersection; where we slow to 190 knots normally. So even though we were issued a heading off the Arrival; I began to slow on our own from 250 kts to 190 kts.We had slowed thru 220 kts; when the controller gave us 300 degree heading and 2;000 feet.That heading aimed us at the Runway 27L approach course to intercept about 1 mile east of JALTO; the FAF. Slam-dunk time. The controller then cleared us with a new altitude; '...2;100 feet.' We were high and fast. I continued to slow to deploy flaps and once we were slow enough; I was able to call for flaps '1' and then '2'. We were rapidly closing on the approach course but had not been issued a clearance yet. We were about 2 miles south of the localizer on the intercept heading when the controller started talking to the GA pilot about some aspect of his VFR transit. We still needed a clearance to turn inbound. We knew it was the controller's intention but we could not get a word in for him to give us the approach clearance. I stated to [the FO] that we're going to blow thru the approach course. Finally; the controller stopped talking and [my FO] said to him 'Air Carrier X; we have the airport in sight.' The controller said; '...Ooooh; yeah...cleared visual approach 27L.'By this time; we were over the approach course on a 300 degree heading; about a mile from JALTO and still high and slowing. I pressed the LOC button and then the APH button; hoping the airplane could still capture the localizer and glide path. The aircraft autopilot did begin to turn back to the approach course from the north side but I could see that were we not going to navigate over JALTO and that we're probably going to intercept inside the FAF. Then the controller said; '...maintain 180 knots until 5 miles out; contact Tower.'When the aircraft turned left to center up on the localizer from the right side; brilliant late afternoon sun glare hit us face-on. I pulled the sunshade down and assessed if the autopilot was adequate to complete the approach; as we had planned. I didn't think it could do what I wanted. I made a snap decision and felt I can 'fix' this problem by flying manually. I stated to [my FO]; ' ... autopilot off; flight directors off' while [the FO] was contacting Tower. PHL Tower cleared us to land while commenting we were 'way right.'I'm now hand flying the aircraft. I am navigating back to the localizer; thinking initially that we were still high and fast. I asked for 'gear down' and flaps '3.' I was concentrating on our lateral position with the localizer; trying not to look outside because of the sun glare. We completed the landing checklist after asking for flaps '3.' When the localizer started to come back in while still east of the Navy Yard; I realized that instead of being high on the GS; I was now below it and slowing to approach speed. I thought to myself; 'I can fix this; too.'I now concentrated on leveling off at 1;000 AGL and tracking inbound while waiting for the GS. I thought it would only be a few seconds but it was longer than that. I really couldn't see well in front of me into the sun glare without losing my instrument scan so kept my eyes mostly inside. I was able to maintain 1;000 AGL and level flight until the GS came back to normal descent path. It was then I began to hand-fly the final descent to the runway. I started a gradual descent and looked out to the runway and the sun glare. When I looked back; I was below the GS again. I reduced pitch; and called out to [my FO] '...below glideslope: correcting.' I could see that I was not getting back to the GS and pulled more nose up-input to the side sick and repeated; '...below glideslope; correcting.' The 'Glide Slope' audio and visual alarm sounded and I repeated again; '...below glide slope; correcting.' [The FO] cancelled the alarm. I looked up and was now able to see the runway clearly without sun glare. Landing was accomplished.It is hard to recount; on the day after; such a colossal deviation of my training; Federal Regulations; and Company SOPs. As P-I-C; I am completely responsible and at fault. There were; at least; 3 separate occasions; from the point when we were finally cleared for a visual approach to touchdown; that I should have called 'Go-Around.' 1. When we blew thru the localizer initially. 2. When I realized the autopilot would not be able to recapture the approach successfully and 3. During the entire time we were established on the final approach segment; when only momentarily on the GS at 1;000 feet AGL and then below it during final descent. Pure stupidity and excessive pride in my flying ability. When faced with the series of problems during what should have been an easy visual approach at my home airport in an aircraft that I have 11;000 hours in while flying with a close friend; I felt that '...I can fix this'.I can fix this. I can fix this. We've blown thru the localizer...oh ...I can fix this. The autopilot won't intercept the approach before the FAF... oh...I can fix that; too. We're high and hot on this visual approach...oh...I can fix that. The sun is blinding glare and I can't see the runway too well...oh... I can accommodate that. Oh...instead of high and hot on the final approach; I'm now low and slow...go-around...oh; I can fix it...no need for that. Now hand flying the final approach and I'm low on the GS....oh...I know it...I'm 'correcting' that problem; too.[My FO] and I are a team in the cockpit and we failed during this approach to do the right thing and go-around. We both failed. But as Pilot Flying and P-I-C; I am ultimately the responsible party for this occurrence. I personally don't feel any better about being candid about my professional failure. I read what I've written and realize the terrible thing that could have happened after this chain of mistakes.

While on approach to Philadelphia Runway 27R we continued an unstable approach that resulted in a glideslope caution at less than 500 ft.We were being vectored for a visual approach we received a late turn onto the final for the visual at 2100 ft. The Captain turned off the autopilot and commanded the flight directors off to make the turn to join the final course as we joined the final we were below the glide slope the descent rate to rejoin the path. As we joined the final course the sun glare was intense. I was wearing sunglasses and a hat and was able to manage; the Captain found himself in near IFR conditions flying a raw data approach. As non-flying pilot I did not understand his predicament until after we landed and debriefed. At 1000 feet we were stable and in a position to land; we should have went around. We continued; we were a half dot low on the glide path; at 500 feet we were back on the path but then went low again; on the PAPI we were 3 red 1 white when we got the glideslope caution which I canceled as it appeared the Captain was just moving his aim point on the runway to land in the touchdown zone. Having flown with this Captain many times; I am confident in his skill and ability. It wasn't his best approach I've seen him fly; I was confident we were still in a position to make a safe landing and he was just having an off day chasing the glide slope. It wasn't until our post flight debrief that we realized how unstable the approach was and we should have gone around.Continue to preach the go arounds. We completed the approach to a safe landing. Regardless the best and safest course of action would have been to go around and come back in with a proper turn to final using the automation to help mitigate the effects of the setting sun.

A319 flight crew reported continuing a visual approach even though they were not stabilized by 500 feet.

1016223

201206

0601-1200

BED.Airport

MA

230.0

2.0

750.0

VMC

10

Daylight

6000

Tower BED

Personal

Lancair Evolution

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Climb

Direct

Class D BED

Tower BED

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 91

Cruise

Class D BED

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 5400; Flight Crew Type 60

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1016223

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 0

N

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

After taking off from Runway 23 on an IFR flight I was cleared to climb on runway heading to 2;000 MSL. While climbing through 750 MSL TCAS called traffic dead ahead about the same time as we spotted a high wing Cessna right ahead. We broke right and narrowly avoided him. We had had no warning from tower about potential conflict. The Controller was very busy with many aircraft in training situations entering and exiting [his airspace]. In talking to the Tower supervisor later it appears the Cessna was on a practice approach and drifted across the end of the runway. I don't think the Tower controller should have allowed practice approaches (to another runway!) during such a busy time. He should have appreciated that they could drift into a conflict and should have warned me of the potential.One additional factor is that the Lancair Evolution is a very high performance airplane and the Controller may have been unfamiliar and not realized how fast we would go once released.

A Lancair pilot departing on a IFR flight plan experienced an NMAC with a Cessna single flying a practice approach to a different runway.

1675526

201908

1201-1800

BOS.Airport

MA

300.0

VMC

Tower BOS

Air Carrier

Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B BOS

Tower BOS

Air Carrier

A340

2.0

Part 121

Initial Approach

Class B BOS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1675526

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

Coming in on the visual 4L; I was 4 miles behind a heavy Airbus A340 on final for 4R. At 300 feet the airplane rocked and bounced wildly; and the airplane went into a right roll. I was able to recover the roll at what I can only estimate to be about 90 degrees. People were bounced out of their seats; and pinned against the right side of the airplane. I struggled to control the airplane; applying full left aileron and rudder to attempt to correct the roll. Finally I was able to straighten the aircraft. I executed a go around at full power. We came back into land on 4L without incident. I asked the passengers once in the air when we got leveled out; and twice on the ground if anyone needed any assistance. The only passenger that spoke up was a female who had previously had back surgery. She stated her back hurt and that she would need to take her pain medicine now. She also asked for a wheelchair which I already had plane-side for her. Wake turbulence from the heavy Airbus; plus a 15 knot crosswind; blew the wake right into my aircraft; thus causing it to become uncontrollable.

Reporter stated the big problem at BOS was the tendency for ATC to continue to use Runway 4L even in crosswind conditions that tend to 'trap' the preceding aircraft's wake in the approach path for the following aircraft to encounter. Reporter suggested using Runway 15 could alleviate some of the concerns.

C402 Captain reported his aircraft was rolled into a 90-degree bank from wake turbulence at 300 feet AGL on approach into BOS 4 miles in trail of an A340.

1212835

201410

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1212835

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

1213827.0

ATC Issue All Types

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Tower cleared us for Takeoff flying heading 090. Checked final and runway clear. Recollect stating both verbally. As the pilot flying; I pushed throttles up. (Captain) Pilot Not Flying stated thrust was set. (Captain) Pilot Not Flying stated 80 knots. I said that checks. 2-3 seconds later Tower stated Flight XXX Abort Takeoff 8R. Captain immediately brought throttles to idle and RTO activated. I stated on tower frequency Flight XXX was aborting on 8R. Tower asked if we need any assistance. We said we would let them know. Cleared runway. Followed Rejected Takeoff checklist in QRH. Followed Brake Cooling Schedule in QRH. Referenced Flight Manual Part One. Arranged with Operations and maintenance to return to the gate for maintenance inspection. Maintenance inspected aircraft. No damage. Returned for uneventful takeoff and flight. Additional Information: Captain nor I perceived the DC-10 cargo aircraft being a conflict even after roll out from rejected takeoff. No part of the suspect aircraft looked to be near the runway or over any line from our line of sight. We also estimated the speed to be 100 knots when reject was initiated.

Lightweight aircraft. Around 120;000 lbs. First Officer was pilot flying. Tower cleared us for takeoff. Runway was clear. Called out power set; then 80 knot call. A few seconds later tower called for us to abort. We were at approx 100 knots. I aborted and FO responded that we were aborting. I made PA for passengers to remain seated. We cleared the runway and declined assistance offered by tower. We checked the brake cooling chart . Called ops for a gate and advised maintenance of high speed abort. Ground control gave me number to call tower. Called tower. They said DC-10 wasn't following instructions and the alarm or alert went off on the ground radar system for the aircraft encroaching on the runway. Not sure if it was past a hold line but it did not appear to be over the concrete boundary of the runway. Maintenance performed their check and we Departed approx 1 hr later.

B737-800 flight crew reports being cleared for takeoff by the Tower then; at 100 knots; commanded to abort. The Tower Controller apparently perceived that a DC-10 was about to enter the runway down field.

1157067

201403

1201-1800

C90.TRACON

IL

TRACON C90

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

IFR

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class B ORD

Facility C90.TRACON

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Party1 ATC; Party2 Maintenance

1157067

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; General Maintenance Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

At approximately XA:00 Local in the middle of a configuration change from West flow to East flow at ORD TSOC personal vacated there position and were unavailable to change the localizers around to the new configuration. At the time we had arrival aircraft in the new arrival descent area preparing to intercept the new runways as the remainder of the West flow aircraft were touching down. This is a very typical situation that maximizes efficiency during a configuration change. When I went over to ask the TSOC personnel to change the localizers there was no one at their position. We are not trained in Air Traffic on how to do this. Another Supervisor went over to the localizer change equipment and attempted to change the localizers. This was done successfully but late. We have no way of knowing if there were Maintenance Personnel working on any equipment at the airfield at the time and whether or not this could have been a safety issue by energizing the equipment they could be touching. After the switch the runway 10C Localizer indicated a slight malfunction. TSOC then came back to their post and said it was just a DME failure. The controller vectoring that runway was notified and the Tower was told to add the equipment outage to the ATIS. TSOC then; without notifying Air Traffic; switched the localizer from 10C back to 28C to try to fix the problem. At the time there was aircraft on runway 10C with traffic on the other 2 East flow runways as well. Clearly this is a huge safety concern. Either Air Traffic should be trained on how to use the Localizer Equipment and be guaranteed that changing it will never endanger Maintenance Personnel at the airport or TSOC shouldn't leave their post without having it covered by another TSOC personnel.

C90 TRACON Controller states ATC personnel had to change ILS to a different runway configuration because Maintenance personnel could not be found to do so. After the change and a discrepancy was found; Maintenance changed the ILS back to original state to attempt to fix the problem while aircraft were inbound on the ILS.

1041469

201210

1201-1800

SFO.Airport

CA

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Situational Awareness

1041469

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Human Factors; Airport; Aircraft

Procedure

Tip Toe Visual to 28L. Had traffic; A319; called in the descent for 28R. Traffic went below cloud deck so he was not in sight. Controller stepped us down until below the cloud deck. Had traffic in sight. As we came down to capture the glide path from above we caught up with the A319. We were LOC capture on 28L. We were dead abeam with the A319 and he was CLOSE! I do not know if he overshot 28R center line or not. I decided too close for me and as I went for the TOGA; the TCAS RA 'Climb Climb Climb.' We executed a normal go around. Went around for left downwind and made a normal approach and landing on 28R. The passengers on the right side of the aircraft were grateful; as they saw the whole thing quite clearly. Suggestions; SFO operates on the edge of safety with simultaneous double parallel and intersecting runways operations (28L/R for landing and 1R/L for take-off) I am quite surprised that it is authorized to operate TCAS in the TA only mode (note on 10-7 page). Having had friends killed after silencing a safety system; I would never operate in TA only mode. In the future; I will be sure to have longitudinal separation of any parallel traffic. A kudos to the training department on the debrief with the FO; I asked him if I did the go around correctly. He said it was textbook. It all happened so fast; we just did it and I didn't remember. Relaxed and controlled.

SFO Air Carrier landing Runway 28L experienced a TCAS RA with traffic on the parallel runway and executed a go around.

1590541

201810

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

1000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

3000

TRACON N90

Air Taxi

Bell Helicopter 407

1.0

Part 91

None

Passenger

Climb

Class B NYC; Class E N90

TRACON N90; Tower EWR

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Cruise

Class B NYC; Class E N90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 6140; Flight Crew Type 3700

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1590541

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 50; Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

I had just finished a left turn in a climb from a westerly heading in front of the Statue of Liberty from 500 feet.In the turn I contacted EWR tower and asked for an alpha tour. Newark clears me in and tells me there are numerous other aircraft in the vicinity so I look around everywhere to see if there are more than what I already have seen which is about 3 other helicopters between statue of Liberty and Governors Island. I also look to the south and above me and I see no additional aircraft which will affect me.As I'm heading northbound just south and slightly west of Governors Island I notice a fixed Wing which looked like a white Cessna 172 above and to the left of me about 50 feet above. I'm climbing through 900 feet-1;000 feet as I see this. I immediately stop climbing and slow down my speed to around 90 KT from a 100 KT and turn slightly right. It looks like he's passing over me and turning to the left either to avoid me or just because he has just decided to make a turn to the left to follow the Hudson left of freedom tower.I'm not speaking to him and I'm busy listening to Newark for other traffic and also looking out for other traffic. The Cessna is probably on river frequency and continues ahead of me and I continue my climb behind the Cessna to 1;500 feet which Newark has cleared me to.

Reporter stated that no further information was available beyond what is provided in the ASRS report that was submitted.

A helicopter pilot reported an NMAC while giving a New York City tour.

1689531

201910

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

19000.0

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Climb

Direct

Class B ZZZ

Oxygen System/Crew

X

Failed; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Other / Unknown

1689531

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

This is the second flight of the day. We (my crew) had a plane swap in ZZZ; and boarded the plane. We began pre-flight duties. I quickly noticed three MELs deferments [for] ELT; Potable Water system; and Air Cond Pack. Working through them; I noticed there was a placard associated with the Potable Water system that was missing and wanted to ask about the ram air doors associated with the Air Pack MEL. I called Maintenance Control and was informed to add placard for the Potable Water system and then confirmed the ram air doors (associated with the Air Cond Pack deferment) were deactivated. With the exception of the cabin being slightly warm; the rest of the preflight went without incident and we complied with the Air Cond Pack MEL. I made an announcement to the passengers that the cabin should cool once we are airborne. My First Officer was designated as Pilot Flying; and we departed ZZZ via Runway XXL. We climbed out via the ZZZ5 with a bunch of vectors; but without issue. We were given a climb to 23;000 feet and normal speed. Climbing through 19;000 [feet]; First Officer and I noticed the cockpit was unnaturally warm. I checked the ECS page and noticed that not only was Pack 1 not operating (as expected); but also Pack 2 wasn't operating. Very shortly after that realization; we received an EICAS message and associated warnings with a Cabin Alt High. I advised First Officer to stop our climb and put on his oxygen mask. I grab my mask and realized the straps that inflate and wrap around the head; would not fully inflate. I pulled it over my head and realized my communication with my First Officer was intermittent (either because of the mic or oxygen flow). First Officer called for the QRC Cabin Alt High. I grabbed it and began running the check list. First Officer began a decent to 10;000 feet. I received a call from the cabin crew Flight Attendant. I momentarily answered and advised 'We are doing an [urgent] descent; standby.' As we worked through the check list; First Officer noticed my issue with the oxygen mask and took the radios and coordinated with ATC down to 10;000 [feet]. We [advised ATC] and [ask them] to standby. Leveling at 10;000 [feet]; I removed my mask and finished up the check list in the QRC and QRH. The check list drove us to press the cabin dump button and depressurize the cabin. We were advised by ATC that ZZZ1 was close and available. First Officer and I discussed shortly and I advised First Officer and ATC we would return to ZZZ below 10;000 [feet] for a normal Landing. I spoke with both flight attendants and advised them that we were depressurized and that we would be making a normal Landing in ZZZ with no need to brace. They said they understood. Sent a quick message to Dispatch about [advising ATC]. I advised First Officer to take the radios and continue flying. I checked the fuel and landing weight and asked First Officer if he was ok with flying the landing into ZZZ. He said he was; and based on our past flights; I was too. We requested and was able to decent to 8;000 feet from 10;000 [feet] to keep from getting any additional cabin alt high (9;700 feet.) messages. We received direct to ZZZ at 8;000 feet as requested. We briefed and set-up for Runway XXC into ZZZ and ran the decent check list. I spoke with the flight attendants (they said it was very warm) and I made an announcement to the passengers. ATC asked if we had the [situation] under control; I said we do. ATC started to assign us a STAR; but then allowed us to maintain our direct clearance to ZZZ. We were given a descent and dogleg to intercept the localizer to [Runway] XXC. We landed without issue. Exited the runway at P5 (I believe). I said we would taxi in as normal and First Officer spoke with crash/rescue and advised (after speaking with flight attendants) that we didn't expect any injuries onboard. They advised that they would follow our aircraft into the ramp; which they did. We blocked into gate.

EMB-175 Captain reported that during a loss of pressurization and descent; the Captain was unable to don O2 mask because the head strap would not inflate.

1039794

201209

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1039794

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

On our previous flight a maximum power takeoff was required due to tailwinds. During the takeoff roll with First Officer as pilot flying the right engine; although initially accelerating normally; was slow to develop full takeoff power of 1.77EPR. I manually attempted to push up the right throttle; but due to the very light fuel and passenger load the aircraft accelerated rapidly leaving little time for adjustment. Later; the First Officer and I discussed the takeoff and decided I may have not been aggressive enough in my throttle adjustment. All other engine indications and performance during the flight had been normal. The following flight again required a maximum power takeoff due to reported tailwinds and we discussed the merits of doing a standing start to ensure the right engine developed full maximum power of 1.76EPR. With a very light fuel and passenger load I decided to set power prior to brake release. During engine acceleration the right engine was slow to develop full power and when it finally did it began to rapidly fluctuate between 1.76 and 1.64EPR. I retarded the throttles; cleared the runway and returned to the gate for maintenance and fuel. Maintenance decided to placard the right Electronic Engine Control (EEC) inoperative. The subsequent takeoff attempt with autothrottles ON had similar results except the fluctuations ranged from 1.88 to 1.62EPR. I retarded the throttles and tried again with the autothrottles off with the same results. We then returned to the gate. Maintenance believed it was most likely a fuel control problem but since they did not have one available they were going to try replacing the Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) transmitter first. Somewhat later I was asked by a manager or maintenance supervisor--he never identified himself--whether we would be willing to do an engine run after the EPR transmitter was replaced because he was unable to locate a second qualified maintenance person. I declined the engine run for the following reasons: 1. There is no established cockpit crew procedure to do a maximum power engine runup on an active runway with an open writeup and having no intention of taking off. 2. Runway XXL was closed so YYR was the only runway for takeoffs and it was very busy. 3. Maintenance had already advised me that this was most likely not the solution to the problem so I would be intentionally doing a maximum power engine run with an engine that had a known EPR overboost history with potentially disastrous results. I offered to talk to a Chief Pilot about my options. My crew and I were subsequently reassigned.

Following two aborted departures due to fluctuating EPRs on the right engine the flight crew of a B757-200 refused the aircraft when asked to perform a max thrust run-up.

1796671

202103

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ; UNICOM ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

UNICOM ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Final Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1796671

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

We made a UNICOM frequency call; then taxied out to Runway X; called ZZZ Center to get clearance to takeoff; then on takeoff roll; a private aircraft calls and says that they are landing on Runway YY; resulting in a sidestep and go-around by the private aircraft. While monitoring UNICOM frequency and ZZZ center; both me and the First Officer missed calls made on the UNICOM frequency about potential traffic in the area due to a short taxi; high workload calling and obtaining departure clearance; running checklists; and making UNICOM frequency calls.In order to prevent this in the future; I could have made a 'traffic report' call on the UNICOM frequency; asking if there was any traffic in the area and what runway they were using. I could have also taxied slower to allow more time to monitor the UNICOM frequency in-between checklists. In the future I will be more diligent and alert to any potential communications on a UNICOM frequency in all phases of flight at an untowered airport.

EMB-175 Captain reported a ground conflict with another aircraft during takeoff roll at a non-towered airport.

1288559

201508

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

2200.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Elevator

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1288559

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Human Factors

No abnormalities found on preflight. No abnormalities found on the standardized checklist items when performed and completed. Taxi for departure was uneventful. On the takeoff roll; all calls and checks were uneventful. Approximately 110 knots to 120 knots; First Officer (PF) noticed nose coming up. First Officer pushed nose forward. No change in the pitch rate when full forward pressure was applied to the yoke. I called for abort and verbally called for 'my controls'. Positive transfer of controls were completed. First Officer completed his duties as required by a RTO. ATC was notified; Flight Attendants were notified and the passengers were given an announcement of the issue at hand as required. All checklists were completed.We taxied to the ramp without further abnormalities. Brake temps were rising and a tow into the gate was requested and completed. We checked the bag loads and they were in compliance with the count on the weight and balance manifest. We were met at the gate by the mechanic on duty along with his colleague. Maintenance checked and verified that the exterior control surfaces were in alignment with the flight deck settings on the CG; flaps and slats. They then did a control check on the empennage and the mechanics informed us that the left elevator was stuck in the up position. We also confirmed this finding. A logbook entry was made in the logbook. Flight crews were de-briefed and the duty pilot was contacted.

Reporter states that the rejected takeoff was initiated with the nose wheel well off the ground and continuing with the yoke full forward. Maintenance found that the elevator was jammed by an elevator actuator that had become separated from the elevator due to a missing castle nut. The nut had last been removed and installed by company maintenance during a maintenance check at company maintenance facilities. The reporter believes that had the aircraft become airborne; a serious accident would have resulted.

MD80 Captain reports rejecting a takeoff at 120 knots when the aircraft begins to rotate on its own. The yoke was full forward with the pitch rate increasing when the Captain assumed control and initiated the reject. Left elevator was found jammed in the full up position by Maintenance.

1634580

201904

EDDM.Airport

FO

VMC

Center EDMM

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Initial Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 117; Flight Crew Type 502

1634580

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather

Ambiguous

After takeoff [flying] INPUD Departure 10-3F. During turn we flew through either wake turbulence or weather turbulence. The aircraft activated intermittent stick shaker.

Air carrier First Officer reported encountering either wake or weather turbulence departing EDDM.

1365010

201606

1201-1800

LAS.Airport

NV

16000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

TRACON E10

Air Taxi

Eclipse 500

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Climb

Vectors

Class E E10

Electrical Distribution Busbar

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 110

Troubleshooting

1365010

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Weather; Aircraft

Aircraft

Departed Las Vegas on an IFR flight plan routing as filed. This was a repositioning flight operating under part 91 rule (returning to base operations after dropping off passengers at LAS). Upon initial climb thru FL160 - autopilot; yaw damper and generator #1 went offline followed by a CAS message warning. Crew and cabin temperature reached 110F - air conditioning/climate control were also offline. Upon reaching our final cruise altitude I noticed it became more difficult to hold altitude and heading. At that time I noticed the flight trim controls went offline (followed by another CAS message warning) the stabilator trim control had 'runaway' and had locked in a split configuration or indication We started to troubleshoot the problem with the QRH and subsequently managed to reset the electric system bus in flight to later correct the situation. Thereafter; all systems came back online and fully functional. The flight terminated uneventfully. Unsure what might have caused this situation to occur. Perhaps the extreme heat in the cabin?

Eclipse 500 First Officer reported experiencing an electrical bus failure. Running the QRH checklist restored normal operation.

1737717

202003

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1737717

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Failed to sign the flight plan release as the Captain. The First Officer and I elected to bypass the ramp office and computer terminals to comply with new COVID-19 recommendations. My normal habit pattern is to print out a hard copy of release. We elected to go totally electronic and brief the flight utilizing our individual ipads. I failed to verify that the release was properly electronically signed prior to departure.A break in normal habit patterns and multiple distractions and interruptions in the process.Recognizing the break in habit patterns and recognizing the interruptions and their potential in committing errors.

Captain failed to verify that the release was properly electronically signed prior to departure.

1186404

201407

0601-1200

DVT.Airport

AZ

2.0

2000.0

VMC

10

18000

10000

Tower DVT

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

None

Class D DVT

Tower DVT

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Class D DVT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 62; Flight Crew Total 480; Flight Crew Type 62

Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1186404

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 30; Vertical 10

Y

Person Dispatch

In-flight

Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Human Factors

I was an instructor on a dual flight out of DVT. My student was cleared to land on Runway 25L. After turning final approximately 3 miles from the runway the Controller issued him an instruction to sidestep to Runway 25R and contact Tower at 118.4. After completing the maneuver we contacted the Controller in charge of the north runway. She screamed at us that we were supposed to be on the other frequency and to return to 120.2. At that moment a Cessna appeared VERY close on our right side and we initiated a go-around.I would like to report the incident as there were a lot of mistakes done that morning. We had to make 3 attempts to contact Tower before entering Class D airspace and had to complete a 360 before radio contact was established. Many instructions and subsequent corrections were issued usually consisting of correcting the aircraft call sign to which the instruction was issued.DVT is an extremely busy airport with a huge amount of training activity; and it should be attended by experienced controllers. I would like to raise some awareness about the situation at this location; there are many instructors with similar experiences. If there is anything I could do to improve the safety of flying at this airport please let me know.

When the student and instructor pilots of a PA-28 complied with a clearance to switch their approach from Runway 25L to 25R at DVT they experienced an NMAC with a Cessna already inbound to the right runway as well as an excited admonition from the 25R Controller to return to 25L and their previous Controller.

1489593

201710

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Speedbrake/Spoiler

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1735; Flight Crew Type 150

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1489593

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Routine Inspection

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

Flaps 9 was selected and we were outbound (away from the airport) on the Arrival. We started receiving vectors from approach. We were intermittently getting aural warnings regarding our landing gear as a result of disabling the GPWS/EGPWS per an MEL we had accomplished at our departure airport. Turning a base; I selected Flaps 22 for the Captain (pilot flying) and when we were about 6.5 miles from the runway; we selected gear down and slowed to our flaps 45 approach speed. I performed the Before Landing checklist and we performed a stabilized landing; no issue. Upon landing; while performing my walk-around; I noticed that the outboard speed brakes were still deployed and brought it to the attention of my Captain. We then both confirmed that the speed brake was selected open. We turned the hydraulic pumps back on and closed the speed brake. While preparing to land; the gear warning aural alert began sounding off. During this time; it is possible that the Captain selected the speed brakes; but due to the loudness of the aural warning I did not hear him. While performing my before landing checklist scan I recall reading and looking at every item on the list but do not recall looking at the actual speed brake; rather trying to silence the gear warming horn so that the Captain could concentrate on landing and I could listen to the radios as simultaneous approaches were in use. I do recall checking the EICAS and did not note any abnormal messages associated with the speed brake. Because neither of us had noticed the brakes on approach and upon landing received no EICAS message for the Speed brakes; we believe that they were accidentally deployed on the ground. We can back this up further by noting that engine power and the approach profile did not differ from other approaches that day suggesting that we did not have any additional drag to compensate for. It was incredibly distracting to deal with the faulty logic of the system in a task-saturated environment. This plane had been MELed the previous day according to the logbook for the same issue. When these issues aren't actually resolved they put pilots at risk for these types of errors.

EMB-145 First Officer reported finding the outboard speed brakes deployed during post-flight inspection.

1076477

201303

1801-2400

IWA.Airport

AZ

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower IWA

FBO

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Class D IWA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 180; Flight Crew Type 90

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1076477

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors

I'm a flight student and I was doing a solo flight in the pattern at IWA for training purposes at night. I did already do about 4 patterns with no problems so far when they cleared me to land on Runway 30R. I answered it and about 1 minute later; I thought Tower asked me to change runways for 30C. I answered it again. They didn't correct me on my readback so I thought everything was fine and I was really cleared for 30C. When I did my next pattern they told me I made a deviation and they asked me if I could call them after my flight. I did this of course and they told me that I was not supposed to land on Runway 30C. It was kind of a surprise for me because I thought I did the right thing by answering the clearance. I decided to listen [to] everything. First of all; I heard I was cleared for Runway 30R which I answered at a decent way. Next thing that I heard was where it went wrong. I heard them saying that there was an aircraft taking off from Runway 30C and I had to be careful with wake turbulence. I understood this wrong and answered them by saying 30C cleared to land; so that was a really big mistake of me; but now comes the annoying part. The only thing I heard while listening to the tape I was saying back was the end of my callsign. Lots of times I have heard pilots say just their callsign if they acknowledge something. Even instructors do this sometimes so I think I broadcast just this part and because this is some sort of a normal way to read something back; Tower must have suspected nothing. To be really honest; I have never answered any calls by saying just the end of my callsign because we don't learn to do it that way. I'm not sure if Tower really didn't get my whole call but if they did they must have heard I gave them back the wrong clearance. On the other hand; I recognize that I was wrong by landing on the wrong runway.

A Student pilot landed on IWA Runway 30C after misunderstanding ATC's comment about traffic on that runway as he was approaching Runway 30R.

1687428

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B777-200

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Testing; Inspection

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1687428

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

MEL; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

MEL

Aircraft had a MEL of the left ram air fan. As final gate departure preparation occurred aircraft became extremely hot both on the interior and within the systems. System temperatures exceeded limits to continue and we had to stop the operation in order to lower the temperature of the aircrafts electrical systems. Additionally; cabin temperatures became extremely hot to the point that passenger safety was at risk. The Captain made the decision that in the interest of safety to the passengers that they should deplane. The Gate Manager tried to override the Captain's decision but passengers [were] already in the process of deplaning. The Captain made the decision that in order to take that aircraft the mechanical problem would have to be repaired. The company made the decision to change aircraft to another jet that was coming in from Europe. We waited for it to arrive and began preflighting the aircraft. On arrival Ground Personnel noticed speed tape around the radome that was peeling back in several places. Maintenance was notified and they began repairs. As the flight was prepared for departure we started approaching our MOT (Maximum Time Off) time. As that time got closer we received the logbook and the door closed 7 minutes prior to our MOT time. At that time; prior to brake release we received a status message of Integrated CLG Recirc Air. This message would have to be addressed by Maintenance and would definitely go beyond our MOT time. We contacted Dispatch and the decision was made to delay the flight until the next morning.At that time the Gate Manager entered the cockpit and began to berate the three of us. He accused us of knowingly and falsely creating mechanical issues and walking out on the flight when we could extend our legality. He threatened us with our jobs because he believed we were recording him. There was no recording going on. Cell phones were being used to check Sabre for flight details and scheduling. Finger pointing; loud language; accusations and threats were all part of this beratement and we all were shocked at the level of unprofessional conduct.

B777 First Officer reported switching aircraft due to maintenance issues and having to cancel the flight altogether due to maintenance delays.

1699187

201911

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 211; Flight Crew Total 5651; Flight Crew Type 5651

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Fatigue

1699187

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

This pairing and the fatigue it caused started with a day-over in ZZZ1. I only slept at best 4 hours during the day which is actually better than usual for me. It's difficult to wind down enough to sleep when your body is not ready to sleep. The added pressure and stress of knowing what lies ahead later that night and the importance of trying to get some sleep adds to the difficulty in falling asleep. We flew the red eye ZZZ1-ZZZ2. I didn't feel 100% for the flight but not fatigued by definition. Landing in ZZZ2 I went to the hotel and tried not to sleep due to an early show the next morning and if I slept I likely wouldn't sleep well that night. I was too tired however and slept for about 2 hours. I got up and felt like I'd been run over by a truck - just exhausted. That night I went to bed after dinner and got decent sleep of about 8 hours. But it wasn't enough; my alarm went off at XA50 a.m. and it was very difficult to wake up. We flew to ZZZ and coped ok with it but my thought was to consider a fatigue call in ZZZ in-lieu of flying ZZZ-ZZZ3 after a 2 hour sit as scheduled. But I decided to press on instead and we agreed if the flight to ZZZ3 was delayed there would be no way we'd fly it. The 2 hour sit was really tough; more like 3 since we arrived so early. By the time we got on the plane to ZZZ3; I was fighting some drowsiness and lack of focus. We had some coffee and that helped a little. In the air; it was just difficult to keep my eyes open; I definitely missed what ATC said to us a few times which is not typical for me. The flight was otherwise uneventful but looking back I should have called in fatigued for the ZZZ3 leg.

B737 First Officer reported severe fatigue due to flight scheduling.

1336011

201602

1801-2400

MMMX.Airport

FO

800.0

VMC

5

Night

2000

Tower MMMX

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 1800

1336011

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

On final approach to 05R at approximately 800 feet AGL aircraft enveloped by exploding commercial grade fireworks. First Officer and pilot flying did an outstanding job keeping a cool head and steady hands. Explosions felt through airframe and burning fireworks raked the windscreen. This is an unacceptable hazard to aviation.

B737-800 Captain reported his aircraft flew through commercial grade fireworks at 800 feet AGL on approach to MMMX.

1697996

201911

1201-1800

BOS.Airport

MA

0.0

VMC

Ramp BOS

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 191.43; Flight Crew Total 543.05; Flight Crew Type 543.05

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1697996

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication

Taxiing in to [gate] we briefed the arrival; approach and taxi plan enroute. Taxiing in to the alleyway the 10-9 and 10-7 charts show [gate] on the left side of the alley next to [gate]. It is actually on the right side of the alley next to [gate]. Certainly the diagram gets you to the right area but the alley gets very space constrained with aircraft and construction equipment so the last minute change to the taxi plan caught us off guard.

Air carrier Captain reported that charts do not show the correct location of gates.

1602582

201812

1201-1800

BOS.Airport

MA

VMC

Night

Tower BOS

Air Carrier

Embraer Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B BOS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Other / Unknown

1602582

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airport

I categorized this even under the runway incursion for tracking and organizational purposes; however; this was in no way even close to a runway incursion; in fact this report is to highlight a system; method; and equipment that was used to prevent a future runway incision. On a 5 mile final; Tower advises us that a vehicle was going to be conducting a runway inspection. It was an overcast day; still VFR; but it would have been impossible to see the vehicle on the runway unless the very bright flashing blue light on top of it. The vehicle exited the runway; and we were issued a landing clearance shortly thereafter. I have never seen such bright powerful lights on top of an ops vehicle before; and I would recommend all ops vehicles adopt this technology. It made such a difference that I called BOS Tower after we landed and gave them this same positive feedback on the phone. They said that the Port Authority recently switched to those types of lights and it helps them identity vehicles better too. Highly recommend all Ops vehicles adopt this equipment and technology at all airports to help reduce vehicle/plane incursion. It was an absolute great barrier today. I am sure it will be the same in the future. Adopt this technology.

Embraer aircraft's Captain reported operations vehicle with a new technology; very bright blue light; are very easy to see during limited visibility situations. Pilot stated this was a great improvement to safety.

1803090

202104

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 4800; Flight Crew Type 1000

1803090

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

The crew members assigned to Aircraft X ZZZ-ZZZZ: Myself and First Officer 1 and [First Officer] 2 reported to the aircraft to start our duties related to the proposed flight. Upon entering the cockpit First Officer 1 and myself noted the APU was running and the GPU was on. First Officer 1 asked me if I wanted for him to proceed to disconnect the GPU. I replied yes and he proceeded. 5 to 10 seconds after he pushes the GPU switch to disconnect we started seeing smoke coming out from the right side of the cockpit; unable to determine where exactly it was coming from. The cockpit quickly was full of smoke; based on odor we could determinate it was electrical fire. We exited the cockpit and I proceeded to call Operations Center. About 30 seconds later the smoke started to dissipate. I called Operations and requested Maintenance to be present in order to investigate the incident. After maintenance personnel showed up we were told to go back to Company pilots facility to wait for instructions. About one hour later we were called back to the airplane. We showed up and we were told the Number 2 CDU was inoperative and that it had been deferred. During the period we were out; maintenance personnel proceeded to write up in the airplane logbook the 'number 2 CDU unit inoperative' they told me the corresponding circuit breaker had been pulled out and that the airplane was back in airworthy condition. I inquired Maintenance about the cause of the fire and if they had made any investigation of the reasons and possible associated damage to the electrical equipment of the aircraft but all I was told was that the CDU was damaged so they proceeded to isolate the unit by pulling the CB (circuit breaker) and deferred the item and that was about all they could do at that point to return the aircraft to airworthy condition. At this point I brought my crew together for a meeting to discuss the situation. We all agreed that we did not feel safe to execute such a complex operation in the current conditions. I; as a Captain of the operation proceeded to listen to the opinions of my two highly experienced and very well trained First Officers; after that I had a phone call with the Chief Pilot and I expressed our concerns and that I would like to request to move the operation to the other airplane of our fleet. We were denied this option by the Director of Maintenance; as another option I was offered the possibility of switching CDU units from [the] new aircraft which after a few minutes was denied by the Director of Maintenance too. At this point I decided to get my crew involved again for another meeting to re-evaluate the situation. Again we all three agreed it was unsafe to fly the aircraft in the current conditions. As a PIC it is my responsibility the safe conduct of every flight; I'm responsible for the safety of the occupants; crew members; cargo and airplane. According to our Operations Manual 'If the PIC knows of any conditions; including weather; equipment; airport; runway or any obstacles observed in the takeoff path that are a hazard to safe operations; normal operations shall be restricted or suspended until those conditions are corrected.' Since the origins and causes of the smoke in the cockpit had not been duly investigated I; as Captain and PIC; after having evaluated the situation; with full support from my crew and in use of the authority and responsibilities conferred; have determined that it was not safe to conduct such operation. I would like to reinforce the fact that the correct write up in the aircraft logbook should have been 'smoke in the cockpit ' which is what I said in my statement to Operations Center and to maintenance personnel; instead of the one made by maintenance personnel referred to the Number 2 CDU unit inoperative. On a last note; on a conference call with the Chief Pilot; Director of Maintenance; Director of Operations; Director of Safety and Operations Manager somebody (I'm unable to determine precisely who) made the following statement 'We cannot have an airplane that has had a smoke in the cockpit situation to return to airworthy condition without an investigation to determine the causes of that condition' and I agreed 100% with that statement and I expressed it in that same call; after that I was kept being pushed very hard by the Chief Pilot to accept the flight; which I refused based on the facts previously stated in this report.

B767 Captain reported refusing an aircraft after a fume/smoke event during pre-flight. Captain stated that Maintenance did not determine the cause of the smoke event.

1746481

202006

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

N

Y

N

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Testing

Powerplant Fire Extinguishing

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Other Exterior

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1746481

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was performing an Operational Test of the L/H (Left Hand) and R/H (Right Hand) Engine Fuel Shutoff valves. I had armed the L/H and R/H engine fire bottles according to the task and went to ensure that the shutoff valves were closed. After which I had told fellow mechanic [NAME] to return to the cockpit to disarm the fire bottles; reminding him not to press the green switchlights beneath the FIRE PUSH switchlights he was supposed to press. I had prepared to witness the shutoff valves close when I heard the sounds of the engine fire bottles discharging. Mechanic [NAME] had returned to me and I asked him which switch he had hit and he told me he had pressed both of the discharge switch/lights; confirming my suspicions. I returned to the cockpit and verified that the bottles had indeed discharged before pressing both FIRE PUSH switchlights and completing my original task before dealing with the aftermath.I'm not too sure what more could be done to mitigate the issue other than a shield of some sort covering the discharge switch/lights.

Technician reported miscommunication during a functional check of the engine fuel shut off valves; resulting in the inadvertent discharge of both engines' fire bottles.

1601759

201812

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

1601759

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person

Routine Inspection

General Work Refused

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We have found two more undeclared mail parcels with lithium ion batteries during build up for Aircraft X and also for [another flight]. This is a daily occurrence of finding undeclared dangerous goods in mail. This mail should not be routed to passenger airlines putting passengers and flight at risk for safety. Someone [tried] to mark off the dangerous goods label which is a safety concern as well as trying to make a piece of mail not look to be containing dangerous goods. There [was] no indication that this parcel would be containing lithium batteries.

Cargo Agent reported two USPS undeclared Hazmat shipments assigned to passenger flights.

1493910

201711

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

35000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZZZ

FCU (Flight Control Unit)

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 4029; Flight Crew Type 2255

1493910

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

At 35;000 FT; both the First Officer`s and Captain`s navigation displays went blank. The autopilot then disengaged. After about 30 seconds; we got the message single FMC operation. The captain`s navigation display came back on. We were unable to re-engage the autopilot. We attempted to complete the irregular checklist for FMC FAIL. It was determined that the right FMC had failed. The checklist has us go to POS SHIFT (Position Shift) page 3/3. We were unable to do so because both CDU`s were inoperative. We were unable to go to the POS Shift page. At that point; we decided the best course of action was to [return to our departure Airport]. We were still in VHF radio contact with [ATC]. We told them our intentions of returning to [the Airport] and asked for a vector. After turning back; we communicated with the Flight Attendants; passengers; and dispatch. Dispatch agreed that [our elected diversion Airport] was the best place to go. We decided to begin a descent early so that we might burn a little extra fuel so that we wouldn`t land overweight.After about 10 minutes the First Officer`s CDU began to work sporadically. The Captain`s CDU was still inoperative. Using the First Officer`s CDU we were able to program [the new destination]. After about 15 minutes; we were able to engage the left autopilot. The Captain`s CDU began to work during the final 10 minutes of the diversion. We were given vectors to land on runway XXL. It was a normal landing; [which] was under the maximum landing weight.

A Boeing 737 Captain reported that during cruise; both navigation displays went blank and the autopilot disengaged.

1261639

201505

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Taxi

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Other Safety Observer

1261639

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Ground Personnel; Person Observer

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy

I feel that the new chocking process for mainline flights is exteremly dangerous and could possibly result in a fatality. I am a trained safety observer for my airline. We have made great strides getting our fellow co-workers to follow the now 'old' chocking procedure. From my own personal observations our co-workers are waiting for the all clear signal before approaching the Aircraft under the 'old' way. I feel this 'new' procedure is going to put our co-workers at great risk because after wing walking the Aircraft into the gate their next focus is going to be to get the chocks which are staged in front of the Aircraft. While focusing on getting to the chocks they will be walking past a running engine with the risk of a person being ingested. I think this process needs to left alone and stay with the 'old' procedure.

An airline Safety Observer reports that a new company procedure for chocking arrival aircraft could lead to injury of ramp personnel.

1865666

202112

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

25000.0

VMC

Turbulence

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Powerplant Fuel Valve

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 158; Flight Crew Type 936

Troubleshooting

1865666

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 89; Flight Crew Type 857

Troubleshooting

1865756.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Shortly after TO; Tower inform[s] all traffic on the frequency that they could expect moderate to severe turbulence at 15;000 feet [to] 17;000 feet. We climbed through this and verified it was every bit of mod turbulence and reported as such. Shortly after this turbulence; the L ENG (Engine) VAL EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) Light; and the ENG VAL Light above the fuel cutout switch illuminated. Engine indications were normal. After running the appropriate checklist which had us confirm the cutout switch was in run; I had a conference call with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. It was determined that we could no longer proceed ETOPS and we would return to ZZZ. Now we were presented the question....... Hold to burn off several hours of fuel or to land overweight. With weather conditions considered; and the light continuing to illuminate; It was decided that the safest course of action was to get the airplane on the ground. I [requested priority handling] and had ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) equipment standing by. Landing was uneventful; and subsequent inspection by the firemen confirmed all appeared normal. Brake temps remained normal to gate. FO performed outstandingly! Gave thoughtful; professional and timely inputs throughout.

On Date; I was operating Aircraft X; with Captain Name; which was originally scheduled to fly from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Shortly after departure we were told to expect moderate to severe turbulence. We experienced moderate turbulence which caused our L ENG FUEL VAL light to illuminate. We ran the appropriate checklist and contacted Maintenance Control who told us to return to ZZZ. At this time we prepared the aircraft for landing; after running the appropriate checklist we determined that we were 30;000 pounds over weight for landing; but fell within the performance landing limits of the aircraft. Not knowing what the underlying issue was of the ENG FUEL VAL we decided to [request priority handling] in case of a flame out of our left engine. Due to [requesting priority] we ran the overweight landing checklist. We proceeded to the airport and made a safe landing; landing 22;000 pounds overweight.

Flight Crew reported that during climbout in turbulent conditions; the left engine L ENG VAL EICAS Light; and the ENG VAL Light above the fuel cutout switch illuminated. The Flight Crew elected to perform an air turn back and overweight landing.

1094180

201306

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Climb; Takeoff / Launch; Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Aileron Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1094180

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

1094190.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Ambiguous

On takeoff and climbout I noticed aileron feel to be inaccurate; and very heavy. Reviewed logbook further and found this to be a re-occurring issue. Coordinated with Dispatch and made a precautionary landing; to avoid crosswind conditions. Dispatch message said Maintenance would meet our flight. No mechanics met us. Switched aircraft and departed.

No additional information.

B757 flight crew reports very stiff aileron controls during climbout. A Logbook review back more than nine days; reveals the aircraft has a history of aileron write ups. The crew elects to divert to a suitable airport.

1231105

201501

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

Training

Taxi

None

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Ground

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Confusion; Distraction

1231105

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight; Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

Aircraft X was in the traffic pattern for options; in communication with local 1. When Aircraft X requested to make the next arrival a full stop; with a request for a long rollout; Local Control (LC1) responded in the affirmative. When Aircraft X was abeam the tower on downwind; LC1 cleared Aircraft X for the option. Aircraft X read back the clearance; and then requested to taxi to ramp with LC1; 'In order not to wake up the ground controller.' I want to emphasize at this point; I was not sleeping; or in a sleep-like state. There were 2 people upstairs in the cab; and the LC can confirm that no one was sleeping.LC1 responded; 'I have your request.' when Aircraft X was on the ground; rolling down runway 21L; LC1 instructed the aircraft to exit at taxiway F; contact ground. Aircraft X responded; 'Can we stay with you? We don't want to wake up the ground guy. Oh; never mind; he'll need to get up anyway; he's going to leave the facility in 25 minutes.' This concerns the fact that we close[d soon]. LC1 instructed the aircraft once again to contact ground. When Aircraft X called me; the ground controller; I instructed Aircraft X to taxi to the ramp via taxiway F. Instruct student pilots and instructors that insinuating that someone is asleep in the tower cab; when they are not; is not funny; or acceptable.

Ground Controller reports of a pilot insinuating that Ground Control was sleeping and wanted to stay with Local and taxi to the ramp. Ground Controller was not sleeping and did not think the comments were acceptable.

1053683

201212

1201-1800

PRC.Airport

AZ

210.0

1.0

1000.0

VMC

99

Daylight

Tower PRC

FBO

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Class D PRC

Tower PRC

FBO

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Climb

Class D PRC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Not Flying; Captain; Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 1100

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1053683

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Horizontal 0; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

I was acting as an instructor on a training flight with my commercial applicant. He is at the end of our 141 training course at an FBO. We were heading eastbound on a simulated cross country. Tower cleared us for takeoff from 21L and told us to keep runway heading. We took off on runway heading. The other aircraft had just taken off prior to us on 21L (more than 1 NM ahead). Tower told them to make left traffic for 21L (they were remaining in the pattern). They were on left crosswind when Tower asked them to make a right 270 degree turn to join the downwind. We were climbing on upwind and Tower told us that our left turn eastbound was approved after 6;500 FT (1;500 FT AGL). Approaching 6;000 FT 1 NM on upwind I saw the other aircraft getting closer to us. I thought that the wind may have been blowing them toward us. That is when I noticed our ADS-B showed them heading directly toward us 100 FT or less above. He made a right 180 turn and headed directly at us. I could not turn right because of the parallel runway. My student froze up and did not know what to do. I grabbed the controls and dove (slipped) very quickly under the opposing aircraft (full right rudder and left bank to maintain runway heading; but lose altitude rapidly). I reported to Tower that we were diving under an aircraft on upwind. Tower ignored me and told the other aircraft to continue in right close traffic. This did not make sense; Tower never cleared them for right traffic. My commercial student and I saw the faces of the pilots in the other plane. If I did not react and dive under the plane; there would have been several fatalities. I suspect that the other instructor did not understand what Tower wanted him to do (I think that English is his second language). I also think that he made a bad decision to turn into another plane; not paying attention to traffic or his ADS-B. He made no evasive maneuver; he would have just run into us. This instructor has made a few really bad decisions. I feel that this instructor needs some re-training with situational awareness and aeronautical decision making and probably a reduction in workload (he has too many students); before something bad happens.

Two VFR aircraft departed PRC Runway 21L one mile apart and had a near miss because ATC cleared the lead aircraft; then in a left turn; to make a spacing turn resulting in that aircraft turning directly into the second aircraft.

1230335

201501

1801-2400

SCEL.Airport

FO

5.5

5000.0

VMC

Night

Tower SCEL

Air Carrier

Large Transport

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID DONTI 1C

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 904; Flight Crew Type 500

Other / Unknown

1230335

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 2200

Other / Unknown

1230347.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related

On departure; the flying crew noted direct illumination from two locations. First was in front; I do not know how far away. I personally saw the second which was off our left approximately 3 miles away. We were climbing through 5;000 feet approximately 5.5 mile off departure end. I estimate the location at PDH/160/6. The flying crew also mentioned three or four other sources; including NW of us once we got turned north. We were flying the DONTI 1C SID.

While departing from SCEL on the DONTI 1C RNAV departure; we experienced 15 or more laser illumination events. This departure departs to the south and makes a big left turn over the city to the north. We were illuminated almost immediately after takeoff (1;000 feet) from a sparsely populated area just south of the airport; which we reported to the tower. Tower acknowledged our report; but didn't ask any questions. The lasers continued as we flew over the city; coming from all directions. Some hit the aircraft and some didn't. I counted up to 5 lasers at the same time coming from different parts of the city. This problem is epidemic and is nearly a national sport!

An aircrew observed 15 or more laser illumination events immediately after takeoff from SCEL (Santiago; Chile). They reported their observations to the Tower who responded 'Roger'.

1643322

201905

1201-1800

COU.Airport

MO

225.0

15.0

3100.0

IMC

Turbulence; Windshear; 10

Daylight

2000

TRACON SGF

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Other RNAV Runway 13

Class D COU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 9950

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1643322

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Manuals; Procedure

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

While I fly practice approaches with safety pilots to stay current mechanically and while I handle the airplane acceptably; I haven't been flying the IFR System enough in the past 20 years. It's rarely IMC where I live. Even the Controllers get stressed out when it's IMC here. I am rusty on Terminology and Procedures. And so this was a 'last flight' to deliver the airplane to a potential buyer and quit flying forever.As it turned out; it was solid IFR on the way to the buyer; although the forecast for the Destination was for MVFR with a ceiling of 2;000 foot Broken. Even though I have a good EFB (Electronic Flight Book); I find it easier to get a complicated weather briefing by talking to a Briefer instead of reading a bunch of text in an on-line briefing. So I got my briefing the old school way and called FSS for my planned IFR flight. Near the end of my briefing; the specialist gave me the NOTAM that the ILS was OTS (Out of Service) at the destination. If he also told me that the VOR was also out of service; I don't recall hearing that NOTAM. Because the plane doesn't have a panel mounted GPS; and because I thought the VOR was operational; I had planned for a VOR Approach into my destination if the weather got worse.Sure enough; the destination went to 2;000 feet overcast; requiring some kind of IFR let down though the layer. 'No problem;' I thought. 'I'll just request the VOR approach.' I should add that; while; if by myself; I could have simply gone further down the road to my alternate; which was good VFR; my passenger an even more elderly lady needed to get on the ground quickly for bladder relief. Before I switched to Approach; I listened to the ATIS. That's when I first learned that the VOR was OTS. I was kind of stunned and not sure what to do. The ATIS was calling for the RNAV Approach. But I was certain that ATC would offer me something else since I wasn't /R.To my surprise; Approach assigned me the RNAV Approach anyway. My tablet EFB had the RNAV Approach; and in the past; my EFB has been remarkably accurate flying ILS's in my area; to the point that I have landed out of a practice ILS using the EFB's WAAS (Wide Area Augmentation System) based EFIS (Electronic Flight Instrument System). So I flew to the IAF (Initial Approach Fix) as instructed. However; Approach kept quizzing me about my heading; telling me that I wasn't quite going to the IAF. Even though the EFB said that I was spot on. I think one of the controllers figured it out and offered me Vectors for the Approach instead. Which I accepted. Except that; according to my 'trusty' EFB; Approach was vectoring me past the final approach course. So while I would initially fly the assigned vector; I also would turn when I thought I should to get on the final approach course. ATC said I was a mile off course. Everyone was confused as to what was happening - both me and the Controller.Fortunately I broke out at 2;000 feet and switched to a Contact Approach and landed uneventfully. As is becoming usual for me at this stage in my life; it wasn't until after I was on the ground that it occurred to me that I should have asked for an ASR (Alternate Supply Road) Approach. The airport had RADAR on site. I'm embarrassed to say that; as a former instructor; I used to teach about ASR's. But it's been so long since I've heard of - or done - an ASR that I just couldn't remember what to ask for on this flight. As I said; I realize my limitations and will be grounding myself with the sale of the plane. So that will prevent this problem from occurring in the future. However; regardless of one's age; errors like this in one's EFB's can be very disorienting; even for young whippersnappers. While tablet EFB's have disclaimers warning about using them for approaches; I often hear of pilots in Big Iron using their tablets to shoot approaches anyway. For example; I personally know a corporate pilot who flies Challenger jets that have three big glass panels. Yet he useshis tablet to fly approaches in the jet! We have come to trust these things to the point that when there's a conflict between what they say and what ATC says; we favor our WAAS based tablets instead which; arguably; are more accurate that ATC's RADAR.My particular EFB maker recently acknowledged their error when I reported this problem at this particular airport. They said it occurs on plates that are 'skewed.' And that they will correct this problem in the next data cycle. So my advice is to believe that disclaimer on the tablet EFB's; and if there's any discrepancy between what the tablet says and what others are telling you; believe the others. As parting works; while the FAA's Age 60 (now 65) Rule was arbitrary; I see now that it wasn't entirely baseless. Wise King Solomon said that there was a time for everything. While I'm saddened to quit flying; I'm glad that I've been blessed to fly as long as I have.

Pilot reported attempting an RNAV Approach using their Electronic Flight Book data for navigation but were off course so ATC vectored them to a Contact Approach.

1815642

202106

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties; Service

Physiological - Other

1815642

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

While setting up beverage cart; myself (4); 2; and 3 all at the same time noticed an abnormal smell. It smelled electrical and went from a level 2 to a 10 within seconds; and haze was also noticed. I pulled galley circuit breakers; turned chillers; and coffee makers off while 3 called flight deck and informed them of the situation. We diverted to ZZZ1. The entire incident was approximately 30 minutes. The three of us (2; 3; 4); experienced headaches; nausea; and dizziness.After deplaning in ZZZ1; we; as a crew; needed to debrief. We had NO place to do so. Ultimately; we all sat in the one restaurant that had seating. We politely had to request the loud music be turned down; as we didn't feel well; as well as needed to debrief. Scheduling had only called number 3; and was having her relay our account of what happened through her. Scheduling should have called EVERY crew member for our account of the incident from us DIRECTLY. Tracking was called and said 'we heard two of you want a [day off]'. None of us had any idea where that came from. In the meantime; Name 1 from safety had text or called us. He told us You all need to get out of your uniforms IMMEDIATELY; take a hot shower and wash our hair IMMEDIATELY '. He said to contact him if the company gave us any sort of push back. The company did give us a hard time. They told us in order to get a hotel; that we would be removed and coded as a sick call; using our sick time. Our Captain; was listening to this on speaker phone; and he told the company that this was a diversion due to fumes; and questioned why our crew would or could possibly be charged with a sick call and sick time taken away. Keep in mind; there were still approximately 50 passengers that were unable to be rerouted for one reason or another. It was our impression; that after FIVE hours sitting in the ZZZ1 airport; the company needed us to work the flight back to ZZZ to get said passengers back. I called tracking back; and after a very long wait on hold; told her that we took Advil and wanted to be reinstated to work the flight back. The agent had indicated to us that there were NO flight attendants laying over that could relieve us. We had also gotten back in touch with Name 1 from safety; letting him know we had no way of showering and getting out of the fume filled uniforms. I believe the only reason we were reinstated to work the trip is because the company wanted to get the passengers back to ZZZ without any regards to how we felt or the ordeal we went through. Each crew member should have individually been contacted by scheduling. We were dealing with two different people; and neither seemed to know what was going on."

B737 Flight Attendant reported a fume event which resulted in a diversion and cabin crew experiencing physiological symptoms.

1577168

201809

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Nose Gear

X

Improperly Operated

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Vehicle Driver

1577168

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

General Maintenance Action

Equipment / Tooling

We were cleared to push Aircraft X. During pushback; the Supertug began to lurch when brakes were applied at the end of the push. The aircraft began to bounce violently in the cradle; with the nose gear nearly escaping the cradle. During that lurching and bouncing; the nose gear rotated approximately thirty degrees while remaining in the cradle. I put the tractor into neutral; brought it to a stop; contacted the Tower to advise of the issue and lowered the aircraft. We chocked the main gear; and I attempted to open the cradle to recapture the aircraft and continue the tow. While opening; the sensor would not read the cradle as fully open; and a hydraulic leak was noticed. [Shop was] notified and removed the tractor with a wrecker for Maintenance. It was returned to service [the day after].The lurching behavior that happened has been previously reported to Management by several [ramp employees]. There has been no fix. If this tractor is not removed from service; an aircraft will escape the cradle and create potential injury or aircraft damage.

Tractor driver reported the tug began to lurch and bounce when the brakes were applied.

1019678

201206

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

11000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Beech 1900

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1019678

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

A B190 was inbound from the north on a 170 heading; level at 11;000 FT MSL to enter the downwind. Because the east departure push was just beginning; Tower coordinated all North gate departures on a 345 heading. A B737 was a North gate departure routed over the transition. Normally; this aircraft would be issued a 020 heading from Tower; but due to the East gate volume was issued a 345 heading. I was also working an IFR BE9L; 9;000 FT MSL that departed off a satellite airport routed on a SID. This aircraft was asking for higher and I explained that higher wasn't available for at least 30 miles and 13;000 FT was as high as I could go due to our East gate restriction of props to be level at 13;000 FT. The BE9L asked if he could cancel IFR and go VFR at 17;500 FT. I canceled his IFR Flight Plan; issued a climb through Bravo airspace up to 17;500 FT. I asked Flight Data to amend the BE9L to VFR at 17;500 FT. Flight Data was unable to make the amendment due to lack of proficiency on the Flight Data Information Operation (FDIO); and asked for my help. I turned around to explain the steps to amend an altitude and FLM working data said 'it says rejected.' I gave the FDIO instructions again and the B737 reported leveling at 10;500 FT for traffic. I turned the B737 right to 060 and turned a B190 twenty degrees right and issued traffic. The B190 reported the B737 in sight; I instructed the B190 to maintain visual separation from the B737. Both aircraft continued on without incident. At the very least; it is imperative that ALL members of the TRACON are familiar and proficient on all aspects of Flight Data and the FDIO. There are maybe 5 of us here that are familiar with the FDIO and how to use it correctly. That number is way too low. We are often asked to help with amendments because others cannot get them done in a timely manner. I had a similar situation less than 2 weeks ago where a Flight Plan could not be entered; then it was entered incorrectly and without a beacon code. It caused undue delay to the aircraft and increased my workload because I was asked to help enter the Fight Plan while I was very busy working 2 departure gates. I was forced to hand that aircraft off to the Center on a local; short range IFR clearance and it caused the Center to have to fix our problem. Flight Data needs to be staffed with qualified controllers/FLM's who know how to use the system.

TRACON Controller reported a TCAS RA event; relating it to the failure of the Flight Data Controller being able to adjust information in the FDIO.

1240216

201502

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion

1240216

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Equipment / Tooling

We were tasked to fly flight to ZZZ.We showed to the aircraft we all were doing our safety checks. In doing so our hydraulic system # 3 read 40% on the quantity which was below the limitations for the system. I called Dispatch and asked to speak with Maintenance Control. I informed the Maintenance Controller of the problem and told him that the outside temperature was -23 degrees. He had us trouble shoot the system with no positive result. I wrote up system #3 for low fluid quantity and waited for contract maintenance to show up. In the mean time we had the Operations (OPS) frequency up and was listening. I have been flying for 15 years now and what I heard on the OPS Freq. what so unsafe. Aircraft X taxied out to the de-ice pad. The Captain of flight; yelled over the frequency; 'HEY; THE TOP OF THE DE-ICE TRUCK IS ON FIRE'!!!I too also witnessed the truck catching fire. The whole top of the truck what engulfed in flames from the burner. After hearing what the Captain of Aircraft X said; the people operating the de-ice truck shut it off. The Captain then asked over the frequency to the de-ice crew; 'is that normal?' The response from the one of the people from the de-ice truck was; 'Technically no'I found this a blatant disregard for SAFETY. The Captain of Aircraft X then informed them that he did not want that truck next to his aircraft. I immediately told them over the frequency that; 'Aircraft Y will not be de-iced by the truck that just caught on fire. The Aircraft X flight returned to the gate. In the mean time I was in concert by phone and via ACARS to our Dispatch Supervisors and our Dispatcher. I informed them all what was happening with de-ice truck and the unsafe operations we witnessed. I also told them that in the interest of safety I would not allow our aircraft to be de-iced by that truck in question. Everyone agreed that it was unsafe and not to use the truck. So after some time of trying to get a hold of someone of the OPS frequency I requested to have the Ramp Supervisor to come to our aircraft. The Ramp Supervisor; came on the flight deck. I asked her if this was normal operations for the de-ice truck to catch fire? What I heard next appalled me. Her reply was 'No it was not a normal operation' I then asked her since you just said that it was not normal and not safe why did you knowing continue to try and de-ice aircraft? Her reply was; 'it was not safe and she was sorry'At that point the operation of safety was not paramount nor was it was considered by all of the people involved with the de-icing of aircraft. I informed her that we will not use that truck and if you could get the other de-ice truck running we would use it. She left the flight deck and we did not hear anything for some time. While we were waiting I called my Assistant Chief Pilot and informed him via a voice mail what had transpired and how unsafe the ramp was conducting operations. While we were waiting; the Assistant Chief Pilot called me and I told him what was going on. He said you are doing the right thing by not having that truck de-ice our jet. He also informed me that he informed Aircraft Y's Safety Department of incident. Meanwhile after what had transpired the ZZZ operations continued to de-ice Express Jet and Delta Express with the same truck that caught fire.I saw the Captain of Aircraft X walking across the ramp so I approached him and introduced myself. I told him that I would be filling an ASAP; and irregular reports with my company. He also said he would do the same. Captain also informed me that the truck caught fire 3 more times bringing it to a total of 5 times it caught fire. At this point I had no confidence in anyone from the ZZZ operations to conduct a safe operation. Finally after close to 4 hours the operations informed me that they were going to get the FBO de-ice truck to deice us and that it would be supervised by their certified employee. Before we loaded the passenger on the aircraft my passengers my flight attendants and I went inside. After we went back through TSA security we went to the gate to get let back out to the jet. As I was approaching the counter I heard two passengers on their phones saying the reason why they were so late was because the Captain and the Dispatcher were having a dispute on the deicing procedures. I could not believe what I was hearing. The gate was lying to the passenger about our situation. As we approached the gate the agent addressed me with an unprofessional attitude by asking me what the heck is going on here. I replied; would you like to discuss this in front of the passengers here or we could step outside. We went outside and I informed him of my grave concerns of the unsafe operations that the station were conducting. I replied; 'Would you like me to finish what I have to say?' His reply was 'No' and walked away. My flight attendant witnessed this unprofessional demeanor. We returned to the jet and waited for the FBO deice truck. Once we were informed that the de-ice truck was available we instructed OPS to board the passengers.After the passengers were all boarded on the jet I went into the cabin and picked up the PA and apologized for the lengthy delay today. I also thought it was important to inform the passenger the REAL reason why we were delayed today and informed them of the de-ice truck catching fire and that we take safety very serious and that I would not let them de-ice our jet and put everyone's lives in danger. We taxied to the de-ice pad and were de-iced with type I and had a tactile check done and depart without incident. In addition to the unsafe operations we dealt with today the Final Flight Attendant Report indicated that the reason why we were delayed was due to field conditions at origination. This was not the truth at all. In closing I would like to say I appreciated the professionalism and CRM from my crew First Officer and all of the outside sources from Dispatch; and the Assistant Chief Pilots. This CRM situation we had to deal with broke the bad link in the chain and stood our ground in the interest of safety because it was the right thing to do. I hope that this report will help make just and swift changes to the unsafe operation in ZZZ. FAA should audit the ZZZ station of their de-icing procedures the whole station would be retrained in the safe operation of de-icing procedures.

CRJ-200 Captain reported that while waiting for de-ice service he noticed a fire on the roof of the de-ice truck in the area of the truck's heater.

1236571

201501

1201-1800

MMUN.Airport

FO

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1236571

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Ten minutes prior to departure; I tried to get the clearance and could not understand the Controllers' clearance. It was different than the filed route. Another Company flight was blocking my read back thinking it was theirs. I was flying the leg and didn't understand the clearance. The box was loaded wrong for the departure. I was trying to tell the Captain but he was focused on going to get his commuter flight home. He thought we were cleared to six when we were cleared to seven. So; we pushed without knowing the clearance and the box loaded incorrectly to be on time. I challenged the Captain and we got into a fight; which contributed to an unsafe cockpit environment. He acted like he knew what it was all long; which he didn't. He was like we could just figure it out after takeoff. This led to checklists and procedures to be run in the Red. I don't remember putting the flaps to one. I just read the checklist and didn't back up the Captain to check what I was reading. We taxied out. He did his throttle burst and didn't get a takeoff configuration light or horn. We ran the Before Takeoff Checklist as we argued all the way out to the runway. He threatened to take me to the Chief Pilot. He acted like he knew what the clearance was and belittled me that I had just a hard time getting the clearance. Then; he explained how we could navigate in the air. I wanted the box correct with a magenta line. We were both in the Red for takeoff and never returned to the Green. I took off and we never had the takeoff configuration go off or the horn. During climb out; I asked for flaps up and realized they were already up. I don't know if he pulled them up without me noticing since I was hand flying. I don't know if we took off with them up or down. I didn't say anything to him or ask him about it. We flew back to ATL in pretty much silence. When we got to ATL; he ran off the plane to make his commute. I tested the takeoff alert and got it in the gate.

B737-700 FO reported the Captain was rushing the flight to make his commute home; making the FO very uncomfortable and leading to a possible zero flap takeoff.

1439934

201704

1201-1800

HPN.Airport

NY

360.0

10.0

6000.0

VMC

Turbulence; 10

Daylight

12000

TRACON N90

Personal

Bonanza 36

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Descent

STAR NOBBI 5

Class E N90

6.0

2.0

Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 994; Flight Crew Type 338

Workload; Troubleshooting

1439934

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

VMC conditions but filed IFR because of over Canada route to White Plains; New York; HPN. Most of flight in level cruise at 11;000 feet. On descent into HPN moderate to worse turbulence. Other planes in area started making repots of bad turbulence. Had been given NOBBI FIVE DCY transition but then at NOBBI given direct route to another point I can't remember because just about then the copilot i.e. the front door on a Bonanza came open in flight. There was one passenger in the co-pilot seat and one passenger in the aft seat. It was very loud and there was a great deal of static or wind noise in my headset so I could not hear New York Center (it may have been NY Approach). Because of this and because I had HPN in sight; I [advised ATC] and turned directly toward HPN; and transmitted my intentions. Eventually I was able to hear ATC and was cleared direct to HPN and to land at any runway. On contact with HPN Tower I was cleared to enter a right downwind for 34 and landed without incident. 34 was the active runway. This is not the first time I've had trouble with the co-pilot door opening in flight. It has happened [twice in the past two years]. After each incident I've had the door gone over by an A&P. At each annual I have the door checked. At each flight I am the only one to close the door. I make everyone in the plane be quiet and I focus on closing the door and making sure it is fully closed. I've read everything there is to read about Bonanza doors. I feel the design is defective. There is simply no way to be sure the door is closed and that all the door lock pins are properly seated. I warn all passengers prior to each flight that the door may come open and that they should not panic and that the plane will fly just fine. As for what else I could have done differently; there was an AIRMENT for moderate turbulence below 8;000 feet for the HPN area but there were no pilot reports of turbulence. The turbulence seemed to build as I entered the area. Because I'm paranoid about the door during the descent I looked at the upper rear corner of the door and could see sunlight. That's never a good sign. I suspect the top latch pin/hook did not fully engage when I closed the door and one good bump was enough to pop open the door. I have the annuals performed by a premier Beech Bonanza/Baron service center. The door problems have been very frustrating.

BE36 pilot reported the front passenger door opened in flight due to turbulence while descending.

1596326

201811

1201-1800

PHL.TRACON

PA

900.0

TRACON PHL

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

IFR

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class B PHL

Facility PHL.TRACON

Government

Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Situational Awareness

1596326

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors

Aircraft X departed PHL assigned a 065 heading. The heading did not separate Aircraft X from the 1;200 FT obstacle (center city) north east of PHL. Aircraft X entered the MVA 2;200 at 900 feet and was not laterally separated from the obstacle. I advised Local East I was turning Aircraft X away from the obstacle and local stated 'He was on a 065 heading.' Headings are routinely assigned without thought for separation required from the obstacle approximately 4 miles NE of PHL. The Tower Controller routinely misinterpret and/or apply the departure heading rules. Tower Controllers should be reminded and retrained on the importance of separating aircraft from aircraft and terrain.

PHL TRACON Controller reported an aircraft was not separated from an obstacle on departure; nor the MVA; which reportedly is a frequent occurrence.

1174061

201405

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

CTAF ZZZ; Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A310

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Part 91

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1174061

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Airport; Human Factors

Ambiguous

During the approach for the ILS we were directed by Center to call crossing [the IF 14 NM out] I felt that was a bit too close to the airport to be making the first traffic call; so I switched to CTAF and made my first traffic report just outside of [the IF]. I did not receive an immediate response but prior to returning to Center a C172 called that it was on a left base to [an intersecting runway]. I returned to Center and called crossing [the IF]. During this back and forth with the radio I noticed the Captain had fallen behind on the approach and was still fast and getting high on the glide path. I suggested lowering the gear to slowdown and increasing decent rate. 20-30 seconds later suggested speed brakes as well. The Captain called for Slats Extend and we received the Double Slat Failure ECAM's message. I called out the problem and we agreed to cycle the Slat Lever. This put us further behind getting to a stable approach. Also during this time I received a call from the C172 about our location. I responded we were about 12 miles out on final and as I extended the Slats. The C172 pilot responded that he had us in sight and had time to get one more approach in. Here is where I started to get very distracted. Our position relative to his Left Base put him over the city so I could not establish a visual with the C172. I was beginning to worry that he would be a conflict so I kept trying to acquire him visually. As we continued the approach the Captain was having a hard time slowing and inside of 1;000 feet AGL I realized we had not accomplished a Before Landing Checklist so I ran the checklist silently as the was very task saturated and I was still trying to find the C172. As we approached 500 FT I knew we were not going to be stable but I was now not sure where the C172 was; but was pretty sure based on his last call that he was going to be crossing the runway center line during his low approach. At this point I began to feel task saturated and unsure of what to do as it was still night out and there was terrain on our left and right and I am thinking there is a C172 somewhere in front of us. We crossed 500 FT approximately 15-20 KTS fast; but the Captain was making the proper corrections. He got a little low on the glideslope approximately 200 FT; and I stated; 'We were getting low;' and he made the correction as the aircraft made a glideslope warning call. I made one last call on short final to the C172 and he responded something to the effect he was staying high with us in sight. We landed on speed with no problems however as we rolled out approx 1/2 down the runway the C172 crossed the center line at 500-1000 FT.My inexperience with uncontrolled airfields combined with the Captain falling behind during the approach created a situation we should not have gotten into. Upon realizing that the C172 was staying in the pattern we should have either directed him to remain clear of the airfield or gone around at that point until we could establish who had the proper clearance to use the facility. My initial thought was the C172 was going to land and not be a factor. I didn't think much of it until he said he had time to do 1 more approach. At this point I became distracted trying to verify his location and did not back up the Captain properly during the approach resulting in the unstable condition and the aircraft in a position where we had only the choice of either landing or going around with unknown traffic location in front of us.

A310 First Officer describes a night ILS approach with the tower closed that is unstable from the beginning. The crew is distracted by CTAF procedures; terrain considerations; and a C172 making approaches to an intersecting runway. The approach is continued to landing as the C172 crosses down field on a low approach.

1760348

202009

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Type 9750

1760348

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

During boarding; flight attendants noticed four passengers that were being loud and disruptive and using foul language. There was discussion on the possibility of some of those in that group being intoxicated. Ground Supervisor was notified and came to address the situation. He elected to remove one of the passengers in that group. The determination was made between the crew to continue with the other Customers in that group.Approximately 30 minutes before arrival in ZZZ1 the in-flight crew called the cockpit to request another Ground Supervisor meet the aircraft due to those remaining three individuals in that group refused to comply with putting their masks over their nose and mouth. Dispatch was not notified at the time due to task loading during the descent and coordinating with Ground Ops and the usual business during the descent/landing phase of flight. After helping ensure the situation was being resolved upon arrival; I neglected to contact Dispatch.

Air carrier Captain reported a group of passengers appeared to be intoxicated during boarding. One of the passengers was removed from the flight; the others were reportedly not compliant with face mask policy during the flight.

1234132

201501

1201-1800

ABQ.Airport

NM

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ABQ

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1234132

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Landed Runway 8. During rollout tower instructed us to turn right on E6 or E7. As we slowed I looked for signs to the right to locate E6 or E7. I could see the yellow with black print E7 sign but nothing notating where E6 was. The 10-9 chart shows E6 before E7 but there is no E6 sign at all. There is a section of pavement with numerous yellow Xs (notated as closed on the 10-9). Unfortunately when exiting the runway the yellow Xs look like a maze of taxi way centerlines. I slowed our taxi; looked for the lead-off line; discussed where E6 was and decided if E7 was up ahead then this must be E6. We only has a few seconds to completed this as we were trying to exit an active runway. There were no runway edge lights; no closed signs; nothing other than the yellow X's which did not look like yellow X's from our point of view. The pavement color was the same grey the rest of the taxiways are colored. Once we had established ourselves on the closed portion of the old E5 I could see widely spaced raised blue taxi edge lights ahead. I slowed and started to turn back toward the runway; the ABQ ground controller said don't turn back on the runway (we hadn't technically cleared; our right wing was a few feet from the runway edge marking and we had not crossed a hold short line. The blue taxiway edge lights separating E5 from E were widely spaced (est 80 feet apart) and we asked if we could proceed between the lights. Ground approved. We continued via E with out further incident. During the decent briefing we discussed the taxi route and specifically Hot Spot 4 as it would likely apply as we proceeded west on taxiway E. We discussed the closures; runway crossings; notams; and the gate location. Without prior experience knowing how confusing the taxiway markings or lack of signage would be; we could not have done much more to prevent mistaking E5 for E6.The root cause was continuing to taxi when I was not 100% confident of our location. Contributing factors are the poor marking of the location of E6 and the inadequate markings for the closed E5 (it looks like a taxi way until your are on top of the yellow Xs). Closed taxiways should have the green infield paint if the concrete is going to remain. Especially along the borders of current taxiways and runways. Above ground signage should be added to denote the location of E6. Runway edge lights could be replaced so it does not look like an exit point from runway 8.

An air carrier crew landed on ABQ Runway 8. They mistakenly exited the runway at closed Taxiway E5 due to poor signage indicating closure and lack of signage indicating the location of E6.

1779649

202012

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

No Aircraft

Company

Other terminal

Air Carrier

Gate Agent / CSR

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1779649

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Person Gate Agent / CSR

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

Upon coming to work to I witnessed about 30 people all crowded together on the kiosk machines. Social distancing was completely impossible. ZZZ does not close every other machine; there are 2 rows of kiosks closed for the convenience of bag drop. There were no stations set up to crowd control.

Customer Service Representative reported crowding and social distancing issues near company provided kiosks in the terminal area.

1578432

201809

34000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 119; Flight Crew Total 15875; Flight Crew Type 991

1578432

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

While level at FL340; we received a TCAS TA; followed by a TCAS RA. The TCAS display showed a target approximately 100 feet above us (+01). We initiated a descent; at which time the RA resolved (went away). We had deviated less than 200 feet from our original altitude (down to approximately 33850 [feet]). We returned to FL340 and reported to ATC. They said they did not show any aircraft in the area.

B757 Captain reported responding to a TCAS resolution advisory at FL340.

1484974

201709

VMC

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Final Approach

Vectors

Trailing Edge Flap

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1484974

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1485769.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

While getting vectors to the ILS; the Captain (CA) called for flaps 5. We got a TE FLAP DISAGREE. The Captain took the radios and aircraft while I ran the QRH with the First Officer (FO). We ran the QRH down to step 4. When we pressed the TE ALTN FLAP arm switch the light extinguished. With no light on step 5 had us continue to step 6. We selected flaps 20 with the ALTN FLAP selector. The flaps did not move and the TRAILING EDGE light came back on. We then selected flaps 15 with the ALTN FLAP selector. The flaps still did not move. This lead us to move back to step 5 and move to the TE FLAP ASYM. The TE FLAP ASYM checklist was followed carefully with all step confirmed by all three pilots. The Emergency was then declared. We asked for fire trucks due to the high possibility of hot brakes. I [briefed] the FAs. The CA flew a great approach and landed on speed in the touch down zone. Full thrust reverse was promptly applied and the brakes did not get above 4 during taxi and parking.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

B767 flight crew reported landing with partial trailing edge flaps following a TE FLAP DISAGREE message.

1773413

202011

1201-1800

L30.TRACON

NV

167.0

6.0

5000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

TRACON L30

Air Taxi

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors; Visual Approach

Class D HND

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 48; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 4220

Situational Awareness

1773413

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airport; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

I'm writing to report the challenging nature/difficulty in making visual approaches in a jet to Runways 35L/R at Henderson Exec Airport (HND); where terrain is a prominent factor as close as a 3-mile final approach. Compliance with ATC spacing instructions can leave the pilot and airplane in a position where neither of the options for trying to land straight-in are particularly good options: Maneuver in proximity to high terrain; knowing in advance that you will be facing the prospect of repeated GPWS warnings as you try to visually get into a position to make the final approach as stable as possible; or; remain high until well clear of the foothills; but face the prospect of a 'chop and drop' close-in final approach; which is neither stable nor desirable.Our afternoon arrival was in excellent VMC conditions. HND was landing 35L and 35R. I have been into HND a few times; and from several years ago I remembered the terrain issues to the south; so I made it a special point of emphasis prior to top-of-descent to brief the SIC that I intended to maintain visual separation with the terrain and expected we would be dealing with the GPWS while maneuvering to get the airplane in a position to fly a stable final segment.We did not fully fly our filed STAR; but instead we were vectored SW of LAS and eventually turned inbound on an E-NE vector on what looked like a 10-15 mile left base leg. This initial vector looked promising; as I thought it might allow for a close-in base to final; which I considered preferable to having to navigate the mountains to the south of the airport. However; as we got inside of 10 miles; approach control instructed us that Tower wanted us to 'widen out more to the east; and square the base turn to final...cleared visual approach 35L.' This instruction basically put us in the position of having to navigate the mountainous terrain on our left base; with a turn to final at approximately 5-6 miles. I set the autopilot to descend for 5;000 MSL (approximately 2;500 AGL above touchdown elevation); but I knew that I would have to get the airplane down to a lower altitude before rolling out on final; or else be faced with either a 'chop and drop' situation or needing to ask for a circling approach over the airport in VMC.I opted to hand fly the airplane and visually maneuvered between the saddles of some higher peaks as I transitioned from left base to final. I was able to gradually descend another few hundred feet as I was flying this portion of the approach; but the GPWS had become active with constant terrain cautions; as expected. I was able to keep the terrain in sight at all times while maneuvering; maintaining a 500-700 foot margin on the radar altimeter over the path I was flying. Beyond dealing with the GPWS audio until we cleared the highest points; I did get the airplane into position to fly a stable final segment and land. Everything transpired pretty much how I thought it might; starting from the descent briefing all the way to touchdown. But I walked away from the airplane not feeling satisfied; thinking there has to be some better way to set up and coordinate visual approaches to 35L/R. Of course; the pilot always has full responsibility to maintain terrain avoidance on visual approaches; but where difficult topography exists; such as south of HND; some extra assistance from ATC in the form of additional vectoring and/or coordination with the local tower could go a long way in helping to better manage visual approaches to 35L/R at this airport.When we were instructed to contact the tower; the approach controller was appreciative of our cooperation in squaring the base as instructed; but I am left wondering if he realized that making me deal with the high terrain on extended final made flying the visual approach that much tougher.I've already decided that if I am put into a similar situation at this airport in the future; I am not going to consider either of the two aforementioned solutions to try and make it straight-in on a visual approach. Going forward I will opt to negotiate a circling approach in the traffic pattern with the controller(s) instead of battling issues with terrain or excessively steep final approach considerations. It may make things a bit more complicated for the controllers and traffic flow; but I think this course of action is really the safest alternative of the lot.

Air taxi Captain reported that several terrain warnings were received while on a visual approach to HND airport while flying through mountainous area. Reporter stated that due to the challenging nature of the area; straight-in visual approaches are difficult.

1109709

201308

1201-1800

PDK.Airport

GA

IMC

Daylight

Tower PDK

Fractional

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 21

Initial Approach

Class D PDK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion

1109709

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Troubleshooting; Confusion

1109710.0

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Weather

Ambiguous

When on the approach (ILS 21) at 3;000 feet out side of CHAMB we were given vectors to join the localizer and cleared for the approach. We were then instructed to contact Tower. As we attempted to join the localizer we both noticed green needle deviation to the right then full deflection. We both agreed to go missed approach and I contacted Tower and informed them that we were going missed approach. Tower asked us to repeat and I did. We immediately executed the published missed approach instructions from the approach plate. Shortly thereafter Tower said they would give us a heading which they did. The published missed altitude was 4;000 FT which [we] proceeded to climb to. Tower instructed us to contact Atlanta Approach and we did. Approach asked what altitude we had been given and we responded the published 4;000 feet. They instructed [us] back down to 3;000 feet and asked our intentions. We said we needed vectors for another ILS approach. We tried a second attempt and found the same NAV deviation. We then asked for the RNAV (GPS) Y Runway 21L. We executed that approach successfully and landed with no problems. After aircraft shut down on the ramp I contacted the Tower to ask if there had been any other reported issues of the ILS 21L. They said in the past there had been but not two in a row.

The reporter believes that an obstruction exists in the vicinity of the localizer antenna causing an unreliable signal. He and other pilots have commented about this anomaly previously; and obviously PDK ATC knows about the potential for the anomaly to affect inbound aircraft. The ILS glideslope issue is documented on the approach plate; the localizer issue should also be noted. He does not remember a NOTAM about the localizer reliability.

We were given vectors and cleared for the ILS Runway 21L approach into PDK. Clearance was maintain 3;000 feet until established on course. Frequency of 111.1 was set in both sides. Inbound course was set at 206 degrees. APPROACH mode was selected. I had previously briefed the pilot not flying that I would hand fly the approach starting at 2;000 feet. We were instructed to contact Tower on frequency 120.9.As we were intercepting the course near CHAMB we noticed the course was never quite captured and the green course indicator kept deviating further to the right until it was out of parameters. With 4;000 feet already set as the missed approach altitude; we initiated a missed approach.The next aircraft successfully accomplished an ILS approach but Tower said it was not unusual for the ILS localizer to be temporarily not working.

A flight crew executed two missed approaches to PDK Runway 21L because of a localizer discrepancy which ATC said occurs occasionally. No warnings were given to the crew who ultimately landed off the RNAV GPS Y Runway 21L approach.

1202563

201409

1801-2400

SAN.Airport

CA

Air Carrier

MD-82

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1202563

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

When loading the flight plan. We put in the fix KA12Q instead of KA21Q. We reviewed the plan and mileage and did not catch the error. I said will double check to be sure I don't transpose numbers again. Because the two fix's are about 108 from our last waypoint the mileage is about right. They need to change the fix name. It easy to swap the number and they are too close in mileage to show something is wrong with total mileage.

MD80 Captain reports inadvertently entering the waypoint KA21Q as KA12Q during preflight causing a track deviation. The route mileage increase caused by this error was reportedly not significant enough to be detected during checking.

1664734

201907

1201-1800

JNX.Airport

NC

500.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

UNICOM JNX

Personal

Light Transport

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach; Direct

Class G JNX

FBO

Small Aircraft

1.0

VFR

Takeoff / Launch

Class G JNX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 475; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1664734

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Horizontal 2000; Vertical 1000

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

The problem arose after being switched to VFR from Approach on approach to JNX. I then listened to ATIS and while I received most of the information I missed the fallout of the UNICOM frequency change from what is listed on the VFR sectional. Wind was out of 070 so I entered 45 to left downwind for Runway 03. There was also a helicopter inbound on the same frequency as me. After turning final and configuring for landing I visually checked the runway and noticed a small aircraft departing Runway 21. At that moment the traffic and I both deviated right leaving ample safe distance between planes. Both returned for landing and exchanged information.The main factors that caused this on my end were distractions in the airplane. While I was listening to the ATIS my passengers were training on our camera system obstructing the ATIS at times. Another factor that came into play is the flexible nature of aerial survey flying and frequent diversions.I have taken away the importance of mitigating distractions and careful preflight planning from this event.

Pilot reports that during transition to VFR from Approach; pilot felt rushed and missed JNX airport ATIS information; resulting in a conflict.

1280428

201507

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

clear; 50

Night

CTAF ZZZ

King Air C90 E90

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

CTAF ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8800; Flight Crew Type 3000

Situational Awareness

1280428

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Other takeoff roll

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

At an uncontrolled field after making calls I taxied to Runway 3 for a northeast departure. I cleared the runway made a call and then commenced takeoff roll with all available lighting illuminated. Somewhere around V1 I noticed an aircraft starting to enter the left side of the runway at the opposite end in which I was departing. I briefly thought about aborting but thought the safer alternative would be to rotate; establish a climb; and veer to the right side of the runway. The aircraft was exiting the runway by the time we crossed the departure end of the runway; [I noticed] the aircraft was a Canadair regional jet. I was about to make a call and noticed I must had inadvertently switched the frequency to the ground frequency at some point.

BE9L pilot reported a CRJ taxied onto his runway as he was on his takeoff roll. After takeoff the pilot noticed his radio was tuned to Ground frequency.

1589926

201810

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

330.0

8.0

4500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Bonanza 35

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Climb

Direct

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 150

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

1589926

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

After departure from ZZZ runway XX; we made a climbing right turn to a heading of 330 and 4500 feet. At 8 miles NW of ZZZ the engine made a loud bang and the aircraft started shaking violently. The cabin began filling with smoke and the windshield became covered in oil obstructing forward visibility. The engine then stopped producing power. We informed ZZZ tower and they cleared us to land on any runway. In the meantime we established a glide and made a right turn back to the airport. Winds were fairly strong out of the northwest and we were able to establish a high right base to runway XX. We lowered the landing gear and deployed full flaps and landed uneventfully on runway XX; and were able to roll to a stop after departing onto taxiway X. I contacted the tower by cell phone and thanked them for the assist. They asked if we required any other emergency services and I said no. FBO arrived and towed the aircraft back to the hanger.

Beech-35 pilot reported an engine failure and smoke in the cabin resulted in a successful return to the departure airport.

1568980

201808

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

4500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 150

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

None

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 2149; Flight Crew Type 1478

Troubleshooting

1568980

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Weather; Aircraft; Manuals

Aircraft

I was proceeding; by pilotage; at 4;500 feet. Abeam and east of ZZZ; I had a sudden interruption of power; a surge; and a further interruption. At the time; I was receiving Flight Following from Approach. Since emergency landing sites are very poor in the area; I decided to head to ZZZ. I was able to retain intermittent power by pumping the throttle. I first enriched mixture; but did not apply carburetor heat until later in in the glide when the engine was probably too cool to take effect. Approach turned me over to ZZZ Tower who cleared me to land on Runway XXR. I was able to make a right base approach and high final until I had the field made and performed a normal full flap landing. The engine was still running and I was able to clear the runway without interfering with other traffic.Carburetor icing was undoubtedly the problem; but I misdiagnosed it due to the sudden reduction of power. Prior experiences with carburetor icing were a gradual reduction in power. Instead of applying carburetor heat immediately; I richened mixture thinking I had a fuel contamination or sticking valve problem. I had plenty of fuel on board and subsequent examination of the sumps were clear. A full power run-up confirmed my opinion.In this case; I violated my personal rule to apply carburetor heat on first sensing an engine problem; having been misled by the sudden severe power reduction. Also; the Emergency Checklist was in the glovebox; but I decided not to fumble around for it because of the simplicity of the airplane and my familiarity with it. I intend to make up a separate Emergency Checklist and keep it on the glare shield for quick access. I also intend to drill myself on carburetor heat FIRST.

C150 pilot reported incorrectly diagnosing engine vibration due to carburetor icing.

1478684

201708

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

5200.0

VMC

10

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 150

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Climb

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

1478684

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

At approximately 5200 feet MSL I experienced a loss of power in the engine. I immediately turned towards the closest airport a distance of approximately 7.7 miles. I was with TRACON flight following. After turning towards ZZZ I called TRACON. Told them of my intentions; was asked how many souls; and fuel onboard. During the descent I tried repeatedly to get the motor to start producing power; but it would not. I was able to make the airport without incident; making the second taxi way turn off. At that point the motor continued to run; and was then able to produce power. Taxied it to transient parking to inspect the plane.

Reporter stated that post flight maintenance inspection of the carburetor revealed a cracked venturi; bent needle valve and non-fuel soluble grease.

C150 Pilot reported a power loss during climb and successful landing at a divert field.

1239966

201502

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

400.0

Icing; Snow; 10

Daylight

2000

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Hydraulic Lines; Connectors; Fittings

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Workload

1239966

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 1000

Workload

1239971.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

Upon takeoff from ZZZ; lost all hydraulic fluid and pressure. Opted for landing at [nearby airport] due to a longer runway. Landed uneventfully. Was noted a nose gear hydraulic line had ruptured and mx is looking into the issue.

I was acting as the pilot in command of a CE-680 on an FAA Part 135 charter. We had picked up four passengers in ZZZ. At 400 feet AGL I called to the second in command for 'gear up'. I immediately heard a loud noise and felt a vibration under my feet when the landing gear handle was selected up. As the gear handle was raised we were alerted to 3 messages on the EICAS telling us that we had low hydraulic pressure on the left and right engines as well as low hydraulic volume. We also got an almost immediate value of '0' displayed on our hydraulic quantity indicator. We notified ATC immediately and made them aware of our situation and requested time to go through our checklists. After completing the appropriate checklists; briefing the passengers and evaluating our situation we determined that it was in the best interest of safety to get the airplane on the ground as soon as possible. We determined that we needed to land at an airport with a longer runway than what ZZZ had to offer since our breaking would be severely limited. ZZZ1 was the closest most suitable alternative so we informed ATC that that was our intention. We were given radar vectors for the ILS and made a successful landing and were able to clear the runway on a high speed taxiway using emergency braking. We were then towed in to [FBO] at ZZZ1 without any further issues. Upon exiting the airplane we immediately noticed an orange fluid streaming down both sides of the aircraft and its belly emanating from the nose gear wheel well. Upon inspection of the nose gear wheel well we discovered what appeared to be a ruptured hydraulic line. The aircraft is now currently parked at [FBO] in ZZZ1 awaiting inspection and maintenance.

CE-680 experiences a loss of hydraulic fluid and pressure upon gear retraction at takeoff. Crew elects to divert to a nearby airport with longer runways. Upon landing crew notes hydraulic fluid streaming from the front wheel aft towards the belly.

1092101

201306

1801-2400

SFO.Airport

CA

6000.0

VMC

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 7500

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

1092101

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 10600

1092104.0

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft RA

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was the Captain on a Boeing 777 landing SFO. I was also the pilot flying with my First Officer as the pilot not flying. We were being vectored by NCT from over OSI VOR for a visual approach to Runway 28L at SFO. We were directed to descend from 8;000 FT to 6;000 FT and speed 210 KTS while on a base leg. Approach Control notified us of traffic for [Runway] 28R as an Airbus 320. We reported traffic not in sight. We were given a heading to intercept the final approach course for [Runway] 28L; and directed to slow to 180 KTS. We still did not have traffic in sight. Approach Control cleared us to 5;000 FT then gave us a rapid sequence of speed reductions to 160 KTS then to final approach speed. At this point we were getting high for a normal approach profile to the runway. My First Officer then confirmed visual with the traffic and we were cleared for the visual approach to [Runway] 28L. We were handed off to SFO Tower Controller near the San Mateo Bridge. We were still a little high and at minimum approach speed. Tower instructed us not to pass the Airbus. We were nearly wingtip-to-wingtip at this point; around 4 to 5 miles out on final. Tower asked the A320 to speed up 10 KTS. We continued to a landing on [Runway] 28L. I feel that safety margins were threatened during this approach for several reasons. The approach took place at dusk with diminished daylight. This made it difficult to make visual contact with the traffic approaching [Runway] 28R. The close spacing as vectored by Approach Control created a heavy workload in the cockpit. There was zero room for error as we tried to maintain visual with the traffic; reduce speed to minimum speed; and then fly a steeper than normal descent profile. The converging courses of the two aircraft and our descent rate triggered a TCAS RA advisory. Our relative higher altitude over the Airbus created a situation where I momentarily lost visual contact with the traffic due to visual cut-off angle from the left seat. I was relying on my first officer and TCAS to maintain separation. Our minimum approach speed was faster than the Airbus and there was insufficient in-trail separation. I called the SFO Tower and NorCal Approach by phone to discuss the issue and voice my concern and displeasure with this arrival. In retrospect; I probably should have initiated a go-around when I; as the pilot flying; lost visual with our traffic. There are; in my analysis; several causal factors that created this situation: When conducting visual approaches; it is common for us to plan a flaps 25 landing instead of using flaps 30. The approach planning takes place before top of descent. The approach speed for flaps 25 vs. flaps 30 is approximately 7 KTS faster. I believe ATC assumed we would make visual contact earlier than we did. The altitude and speed assignments created an unacceptable lateral and in-trail spacing given the low light conditions at dusk. The lack of separation then created an undesirable approach condition for our aircraft. The arrival rate at SFO at the time was high enough that NorCal was perhaps trying to 'squeeze' aircraft spacing. This may have been a different; even acceptable; situation if it involved two narrow-body aircraft. The fact that we were a 'heavy' aircraft put more limitations on us. I would offer these recommendations for consideration: Our company and/or the FAA should notify all pilots that the approach flap setting for heavy aircraft should be selected to allow the slowest approach speed when conducting closely spaced parallel visual approaches. This would mitigate the potential 10 to 20 KT closure with the other traffic. Approach Control should plan a minimum of 1-mile in-trail separation for heavy aircraft when paired with narrow body or light aircraft for simultaneous visual approaches to 28L/28R at SFO. This distance can easily be lost once the lead aircraft begins to slow to final approach speed. Approach Control needs to be aware of the change in lighting at sunset. The visibility reported by ATIS does not necessarily translate to in-flight acuity during low light conditions. In closing; this vector to final would not have been accepted at night or in dark conditions. Any deviation left of the [Runway] 28R centerline by the A320 would have put both aircraft at risk of a potential mid-air.

During vectors to approach to [Runway] 28L we were told to follow an Airbus we initially could not see and then when we could see it; we had to slow down significantly while still descending because the Controller kept us too high. We were able to slow down and get the aircraft stabilized within our flight manual parameters but ATC had to ask the Airbus to speed up or we still would have passed the aircraft.

Air Carrier on final for Runway 28L at SFO voiced concern regarding ATC handling with regard to staying behind an A320 on final for Runway 28R.

1612332

201901

37000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B787-900

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Pneumatic System Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 137.25; Flight Crew Total 11289.93; Flight Crew Type 2095.00

1612332

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft

Our left pack was deferred and MELed for several days before flight. The Captain accepted the aircraft with the deferral. Approximately 5 hours into the flight; we climbed to FL370. Shortly after reaching FL370; we heard several surging sounds from the pressurization system and we felt a shutter once in the airframe. We called Maintenance and decided with their explanation of the deferral; we would try FL360. While at FL360 we felt no more shutters in airframe and heard no more surges in pressure. The captain thought it was prudent; and the safest course of action; to limit our altitude to FL360 or lower; for the rest of the flight. We continued the flight with no further issues and we wrote it up in log book.

B787 First Officer reported resolving pressurization system malfunction during cruise.

1455597

201705

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

Thunderstorm

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A330

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1455597

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1455609.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

After takeoff from ZZZ; the flaps did not respond to being selected from Flaps 2 to Flaps 1. Shortly after realizing the flaps had not moved to the Flaps 1 position; an ECAM alert showed a 'Flaps Locked' fault had occurred. Since we were actively coordinating with ATC to avoid numerous rain showers; I continued to act as the Pilot Flying and called for ECAM action. The ECAM and QRH merely provided for preparations for an abnormal landing. It was at night; with numerous heavy rain showers in the vicinity. The prospect of burning off fuel down to a reasonable landing weight; or an overweight emergency landing with a turbulent approach to a night landing at maximum or greater landing weight with partial flaps; which would also require even higher touchdown speeds on a wet runway was not an attractive course of action. Seeking to utilize outside resources I directed the Relief Pilot to contact Dispatch to coordinate with Maintenance Control for more information or suggestions on how to proceed. Once in touch with Maintenance Control; they directed us to pull and reset the left and right flap control circuit breakers on the overhead panel. I advised the Relief Pilot to locate and pull and reset the circuit breakers as Maintenance Control directed. The procedure was successful with the flaps responding normally to the flap lever selection. The 'Flaps Locked' ECAM had also gone away. Maintenance Control was told of the successful operation of the flaps and with apparent normal function returned and extinguishing of the ECAM warning. Maintenance Control said we had apparently experienced a spurious anomaly of the flap control computer. He; Maintenance Control; said that we were good to continue our flight. By this time we had only used 1500 to 2000 pounds of fuel while resolving the flap problem. We conferred with the Dispatcher about the resolved flap issue and our fuel on board. The Dispatcher checked and agreed with us that we still had sufficient fuel and reserves and that continuing to ZZZZ was a good plan. So the First Officer; the Relief Pilot and I; along with the Dispatcher and Maintenance Control agreed that a continuation to ZZZZ was a satisfactory course of action. The flight continued on to ZZZZ with the flaps working normally throughout the remainder of the flight; taxi in and parking in ZZZZ. The takeoff flap anomaly and the cycling of the circuit breaker was recorded in the logbook. My [Company] training instructs us to use all available resources to achieve the safest solution to abnormal situations. Although the QRH procedures would have us prepare for an accomplished landing as a result of the stuck flap situation; I elected to contact Dispatch and Maintenance Control for help in arriving at a safe solution to our flap problem. To have returned for an immediate landing did not seem the safest course of action. The outside resources helped us resolve our immediate problem and return the airplane to its normal operating capability. Even if the flaps did not respond on landing at ZZZZ; we would have had a daylight landing on a 13;000 plus foot dry runway with a much lighter landing weight and better weather. Whereas; a return for landing to ZZZ or other nearby airports in dark; turbulent; rainy conditions to a shorter wet runway at much higher landing weights and speeds was a less safe options than continuing on to ZZZZ. Continuing training that emphases safety and using CRM and outside resources can help crews evaluate the abnormal situations that encountered.

The reporter stated that in this situation; flaps not responding; the QRH calls for 'Declaring an Emergency' and landing overweight if necessary. Due to the weather and it was at night; he did not like the idea of landing an aircraft of this size and weight in this in this condition if he didn't have to; so they called Maintenance Control hoping they could come up fix to get the flaps up so they can proceed to their destination. The weather at the destination was good; it will be daylight when they arrive; and the aircraft would be lighter. Maintenance Control suggested they pull and reset the flap control circuit breakers. This procedures gave the flight crew control of the flaps they had a normal landing at their destination. The flap anomaly was recorded in the logbook at their destination. The next flight crew had the same problem when they arrived at their destination.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A330 flight crew reported the trailing edge flaps did not respond when selected from flaps 2 to flaps 1 on departure.

1842820

202109

1201-1800

OQN.Airport

PA

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Climb

Class B PHL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Total 1300

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1842820

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Human Factors

I was departing OQN at approximately XA:00. Climbing to 2;800 ft. Became distracted with Auto Pilot setting course heading. Looked up at altimeter and found myself at 3;300 ft. in Class B segment 30/70 north of ILG. Immediately descended out of airspace to 2500 ft.

General aviation Pilot reported they flew into Class B airspace without a clearance. After learning of the airspace incursion the pilot exited the Class B airspace.

1467729

201707

1801-2400

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

36000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZDC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZDC

Center ZDC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZDC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 2489

1467729

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

While at FL360 in cruise flight we were given a 20 degree right turn for traffic by Washington Center. We were in smooth air and VMC conditions with the seat belt sign off. Unexpectedly we experienced two quick jolts of moderate chop which lasted less than 5 seconds. We immediately turned on the fasten seat belt sign and called the flight attendants. At that point they reported no injuries. Later during the flight; two flight attendants said they felt they might have been injured during the turbulence encounter. One said his hip and lower back hurt a little and the other said her back hurt a little. Both were able to complete the flight without incident. The First Officer and I believe we encountered some wake turbulence from an aircraft that had recently passed over us 1000 ft above heading the opposite direction.

B737 Captain reported two flight attendants suffered minor injuries after they encountered wake turbulence at FL360 from an opposite direction aircraft 1000 ft above them.

1031837

201208

0601-1200

IAH.Airport

TX

17000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Center ZHU

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Direct; SID JUNCTION

Class A ZHU

Center ZHU

Air Carrier

B737-900

2.0

Part 121

Climb

Class A ZHU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 3100

1031837

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related

[We were] departing IAH in a 737-800 at about 17;000 FT; 11 miles behind a 737-900 on the Junction departure over CUZZZ Intersection. Smooth air with wind on the nose bearing 275 degrees at 18 KTS. We were suddenly in moderate chop which lasted 4 or 5 seconds then stopped and then resumed for another 4 or 5 seconds with a significant amount of right rolling. Autopilot handled it; though I quickly moved my hands to the yoke to be ready to take the aircraft away from the autopilot if necessary. At this point I selected a max rate climb mode in the FMC in order to climb above the wake and flight path of the leading -900. We asked ATC for the type ahead of us and reported the wake encounter. The -900 was about 3;300 FT higher than we were. Both aircraft were climbing. No injuries in the back though the flight attendants were up and about preparing to start their service. My concern afterward was that our separation from the lead aircraft at 11 miles was enough that we could just as easily have been following a heavy aircraft with a much stronger wake.

B737-800 First Officer reported wake encounter from preceding B737-900 with resultant roll and moderate chop.

1224341

201411

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

Aerobatic

1.0

VFR

Training

Taxi

Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 200

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1224341

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Preflight inspection completed. Engine start-up checklist completed including initial brake test.Taxied to run up area using standard tailwheel S turns.Pre take-off checklist completed.Engine run-up to 1900 RPM's with control stick in full aft position.1. Magneto checks completed.2. Constant speed propeller cycling began. During the constant speed propeller cycling; the aircraft began to turn to the left abruptly. Suddenly; the nose of the aircraft began tipping forward. The propeller blades impacted the taxiway and engine had a sudden stoppage. Then; the tail of the aircraft came back down on the taxiway.

High performance tailwheel pilot experiences a propeller strike during engine run-up. As the propeller is cycled the aircraft begins turning to the left abruptly and the tail begins to lift. The propeller strikes the taxiway causing engine stoppage.

1199190

201408

1201-1800

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Off

Galley Furnishing

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Flight Attendant Airline Total 6; Flight Attendant Total 7

Service

Training / Qualification

1199190

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft

I had just finished preparing the cart topper for the main cabin service when my partner walked into the back galley for coffee. She was standing in front of the lavatory door waiting when I pulled the double beverage cart (nearest the waste cart) straight out to place the cart topper on. As soon as the cart cleared the metal separation bar it was if the wheels on the right side collapsed and the cart fell over. We were both completely stunned as neither of us had ever seen a cart behave in that way. It took a few seconds for me to realize that it had landed on the other attendant's foot. As soon as I saw she was profusely bleeding I handed her a pack of napkins and told her to apply pressure that I would be right back. I quickly made my way through the cabin asking for medical personnel. When I returned I retrieved the First Aid Kit and we began to administer first aid; a deadheading crewmember then grabbed the Emergency Medical Kit to retrieve another pair of gloves. I then called the Captain to let her know of the emergency. She called back to advise we would be diverting to a nearby airport and on the ground in the next 10 minutes. The deadheaders helped me get the cart upright and secured. We then got the injured attendant secured in an empty passenger seat. I briefed the dead header on the operation of the doors and he sat in an adjacent seat as blood had puddled in the floor area of the aft jumpseat. I then prepared the cabin for landing. Upon arrival I made an announcement requesting all passengers to remain seated as medical personnel would be coming on board. Once they got the injured attendant off the aircraft I went to the back and disarmed the rear doors.

When the wheels on a galley cart collapsed and crushed the foot of a flight attendant her partner with the assistance of other company employees treated the injury while the flight diverted for medical assistance.

1301400

201510

0001-0600

IWA.Airport

AZ

0.0

Night

Ground IWA

Fractional

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Taxi

Aero Charts

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

1301400

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Airport

Chart Or Publication

I was the PIC and flying pilot for our ferry flight from IWA. We started to taxi out while it was still dark. Our taxi instructions where E to B to G for runway 12R. I have made this taxi several times in the past from the Cessna service center. I expected to taxi straight across the large pad at the end of B and 12R area and hold short of 12R at G. The Jepp taxi diagram was just like [I] had remembered the area looking like. As we taxied on E we came to B taxi way and also saw the G taxiway signs. As I continued straight I saw a large triangle shaped new non-taxi area that is not depicted on taxi diagram to my right. I was just past the turn onto B. Instead of making a hard right 130 turn we asked and were granted permission to taxi via new unmarked unnamed taxi way from the holding pad to G. This taxiway was narrow but still wide enough for our aircraft. Everything else was normal. Update Jepp taxi chart. The chart revision date is 8/14/2015 and according to Google maps there has been construction in this area. I've attached the taxi diagram. I would also attach Jepp plate picture but only one attachment is allowed via asap web site.

The reporter stated that Taxiway G from the Service Center Ramp is NOTAM'ed Taxiway E permanently. The new no taxi area is across what would be a straight line extension of the new Taxiway E directly to the end of Runway 12R. As it currently exists; from Taxiway E an aircraft turns right onto B; avoiding the closure; then left onto G.

A pilot reported a new 'no taxi' area just beyond the new IWA Taxiway E and where it turns onto Taxiway B. IWA NOTAM 07/040 dated 1507282315 permanently changed the ramp Taxiway to E; but airport diagrams do not reflect changes.

1713190

201912

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

6000.0

Daylight

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

Embraer Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Climb

SID NEWARK FOUR

Class B EWR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1713190

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Distraction; Confusion

1713189.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Departing 22R EWR we followed the EWR4 departure. On a heading of 220 we were given a climb to 6000. At or about one mile east of ELVAE intersection we were told direct ELVAE (seemingly in the form of a question) I read back direct ELVAE; but doing so would've required a sharp turn west followed by another sharp turn southeast to intercept the course to COL. Because we were so close to ELVAE; I elected to join the course to COL. I can only speculate; but I believe that ATC might have been under the impression we were already given direct ELVAE (which we were not). He did mention that we showed one mile off course from direct ELVAE. This would not be ideal; at our speed; to turn so sharply one direction and back again in the other direction with a fix that's within one mile of our current position. This caused a discussion between me and ATC; to clear the confusion; but during that discussion we climbed 200 feet above the assigned 6000. Simultaneously both ATC and both of us realized this and we quickly went back to 6000. The First Officer was hand flying. The confusion about direct ELVAE drew our attention away long enough to deviate from our assigned altitude. Again; I believe ATC thought we were already direct. I do not believe ATC would issue a turn direct to a fix that's within one mile of an aircraft's position with another turn in the opposite direction in normal operations. I suggest not hand flying; and using the autopilot would have probably been an altitude deviation saver in this event. Going forward; I will insist on autopilot use while on these departures; and any other time during high workload environments.

We were cleared for take-off on 22R/W via Newark4 departure. Right after liftoff we're asked to contact departure which we did. NY departure instructed us to climb and maintain 6000 ft. I was hand flying while Captain was the Pilot Monitoring. As we turned right to comply the departure procedure per the DME depicted on it; NY departure requests that direct ELVAE meanwhile we were right over it. At that moment argument arises between ATC about a direct ELVAE which would had been a tight turn. I got distracted by their conversations which led me to burst altitude by 200 ft. above the assigned 6000ft.Probable cause was hand flying during busy workload & argument between ATC with the Pilot Monitoring.Suggest not hand flying at any time during high workloads. Will recommend the use of Autopilot during these phases of flight from congested airspace.

Flight crew reported that while departing EWR; confusion with ATC clearance resulted in a track and altitude deviation.

1660490

201906

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

VMC

Dusk

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Rudder Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Troubleshooting

1660490

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

Departed ZZZ; Runway XXL. Climbing out got a Rudder Limiter Caution message and Rudder Limiter Fault status message. First Officer was flying and he took the radios; I ran the QRH; at some point I told the First Officer to ask to level at 10;000 feet and vector us; that we were probably returning to ZZZ. Part of the QRH is to land at the nearest suitable airport. Flight attendants called and asked about ten thousand foot chime; told them we had a situation and that we may have to return to ZZZ; would let them know and would brief the passengers when able. Sent an ACARS to Dispatch; told them the problem and that per the QRH we have to land at the nearest suitable airport; ZZZ. Finally got hold of them on RCO frequency and confirmed that we were returning to ZZZ. ATC asked if we were [advising them]; initially I said no but then later when I realized it was a flaps 20 landing; I asked to have CFR standing by as a precaution. Made an announcement to the passengers that we had a fault indication on the flight deck and that we were returning to ZZZ. The First Officer and I set up for the approach; confirmed we were below maximum landing weight; completed the required checklists and advised ATC that we were ready for the approach. They vectored us on to a longer than normal final and we used the automation to fly an ILS approach to Runway XXL. The First Officer made the landing with no more than 400 FPM at touchdown. After clearing the runway; advised ATC that we could taxi to the gate and that CFR was no longer required. Taxied to gate and secured the aircraft.

CRJ-900 Captain reported a rudder limiter system failure; resulting in a return to departure airport.

1313060

201511

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

APU

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 137; Flight Crew Type 6097

Other / Unknown

1313060

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Weather; Company Policy

Weather

I refused the aircraft for an inoperative APU based on enroute terrain considerations as well as forecasted weather conditions in ZZZ1 at the expected time of arrival. The safest course of action was to have an aircraft with an operative APU. At a minimum having either (preferably both) a backup pneumatic and/or electric component provided by the APU is always the safest course of action in any sense.

An A320 pilot refused an aircraft with an inoperative APU because of terrain and weather considerations.

1157847

201403

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Physiological - Other

1157847

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Aircraft

Upon arrival; I was informed by the A Flight Attendant that there was a strong odor in the cabin. We called the paramedics and went to the hospital for further examination.

A synthetic oil odor was detected during descent. Strongest odor; described as dirty socks; was detected during descent and most strongly in the aft cabin. The entire crew sought medical help with high blood pressure being the primary after effect. An aft Flight Attendant is still off work one month after the event. Maintenance inspected the aircraft and released it for flight the next day. The reporter suspects and engine seal because the odor began during the descent.

An A320 flight crew faintly detected a synthetic oil odor during descent while the flight attendants reported a strong odor in the cabin after landing. Paramedics sent them to a hospital for additional care.

1696205

201910

0001-0600

DCA.Airport

DC

1000.0

IMC

Rain; Turbulence

TRACON PCT

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 19

Initial Approach

Other LDA Z RWY 19

Class B DCA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Workload

1696205

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Y

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

We were being vectored around weather to final approach for LDA Z Runway 19 into DCA. We were passed FAF (Final Approach Fix) descending to MDA altitude prior to our missed approach fix ZAXEB. Weather was being reported above minimums at the time we were established; and we were getting constant reports by ATC regarding rapidly changing weather due to heavy weather around Washington. On descent prior to the missed approach point; we got an aural 'caution obstacle' (the bridge) around 1;000 feet. At that point we corrected the situation immediately by leveling off and I had visual with the ground. Rest of the flight and landing continued uneventful.I think that the aural was triggered because of the rate of descent around the fix WEVPU which we didn't manually load; and at that moment dealing with high saturation workload; plus the moderate turbulence and weather that we had throughout the whole approach saturated us and we missed that fix and the rate of decent we had using vertical speed mode; which was probably around 1;100 feet and as soon as the aural came; we immediately took action; corrected the rate of decent and started to level off; which discontinued the aural immediately. I did not executed a go-around at that precise moment because I immediately had visual on terrain outside; plus the action taken fixed the problem immediately; and the flight characteristics were stable; without the need to make any evasive action. I think adding that WEVPU fix; or having a lower rate of descent will prevent this problem from repeating.Pilots talked about this approach when briefed while enroute from ZZZ; and we talked about not manually loading; adding the fix between FAF and MAP; due to the fact that we expected workload saturation to be high due to constant reports of weather; minimums for landing; visibility and the heavy storms around the area; and decided to monitor the altitude and make corrections for our rate of descent by monitoring distance from the set fixes and make corrections as needed. On final approach we were under moderate rain and continuous moderate turbulence; once past FAF we started our descent to MDA altitude set to 800 feet around 1;000 feet we got the aural 'caution obstacle;' at that point I had visual with outside terrain and decreased the rate of descent on flight panel since FO pilot flying was very busy trying to maintain controlled airspeed due to the turbulence; and simultaneously FO started to level off which subsequently came around 900 feet. I did not lost visual of outside terrain at any point when this happened (I was being eyes outside eyes inside and scanning airspeed and making changes in flight control panel for landing configuration and to maintain everything within limits. We got a visual on the runway prior to our MAP and were established for normal landing without any issues in regards with flight controls; airspeed; configuration.

CRJ-700 Captain reported getting an aural caution warning for an obstacle during descent on approach to DCA airport which resulted in evasive action.

1234180

201401

1201-1800

CNM.Airport

NM

8000.0

Marginal

10

Daylight

1500

Center ZAB

Corporate

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 21

Initial Approach

Direct

Class E ZAB

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 200

Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1234180

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Departed on IFR flight plan direct to CNM. Clearance was cleared to CNM runway heading 6;000 feet expect 220 in 10 min. Upon departure; we were cleared to CNM with climbs along the route. We were on with ZFW center and while on with center; we were going to fly an approach to get through the ceiling to land. The conditions at CNM were winds calms and ceilings were around 1500 AGL. I had my First Officer (FO) ask ZFW if we could go direct to KEREY which is the IAF for the RNAV/GPS RWY21. This fix is also almost directly in line to CNM from our departure airport so it would be a straight in approach. We run the route almost on a weekly basis and it's a tossup if they will give it to us or not as ZAB actually controls the sector. This time they stated they will have to hand us off to ZAB here in a few miles and to make that request to them. When that request was made; we were probably around 15-20 miles from KEREY. By the time they handed us off to ZAB; we were less than 10 and we immediately requested KEREY. The controller had us 'Stand by'! By the time he got back to us; we were less than 1 mile from KEREY and he stated that he had another aircraft conducting the ILS to RWY3. There was a quick exchange telling him that we can also set up for the ILS if that would be better for him and at that time he said; 'No; just hold at KEREY;' and gave us holding instructions. By the time he did this; KEREY was already behind us and our FMS had already sequenced us for RWY21. I then began a 180 degree turn and because there was no way to get to KEREY in such a short distance at the speed I was going; I elected to make an 'Educated' outbound that would put us parallel with KEREY and start our 2 min hold once parallel with the fix. After the first round and getting the FMS to recognize that we were wanting it to take us to KEREY; the controller gave us our instructions to fly the RNAV GPS RWY21 approach. We proceeded and everything from there was flawless. Here is where I perceive the problem lies. The handoff from ZFW to ZAB is too close to CNM. Many flights by the time we are handed off to ZAB and if it is a VFR day; we check in with ZAB and cancel IFR in the same breath. We also only have this problem coming from the East. Any other direction and there are no issues. I believe that the corrective action to solve this problem is that the handoff line needs to be pushed further east (and/or at a higher altitude) so that gives ZAB a chance to coordinate the aircraft that are coming into CNM. Contributing factors may have been that there was a higher than normal workload on both side; ZAB and ZFW.

Pilot reports of being handed off what they consider late to ZAB reference the close proximity of the airport they want to land at. Pilot requests direct a fix; but Controller cannot give it to them. The Controller tells the pilot to hold when aircraft is 1 mile past initial hold fix. Pilot makes educated guess and turns aircraft around; then is cleared for approach.

1811273

202105

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Corporate

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Photo Shoot / Video

Taxi

Class D ZZZ

Gate / Ramp / Line

FBO

Ramp; Lineman

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

1811273

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

N

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Aircraft X departed ZZZ approximately and almost immediately returned due to low fuel situation. Upon entering the ramp the aircraft was being taxied close to 30 to 40 knots. Upon marshalling the aircraft and giving the command to stop the pilot continued to taxi albeit at a reduced speed disregarding the signal to stop and almost running over and killing me. Pilot was visibly upset and was altogether negligent about the safe operation of the aircraft and preflight check due to not doing a thorough preflight inspection and checking the fuel.

A ramp worker marshaling an aircraft into parking reported the pilot continued taxiing after being signaled to stop and almost running over the reporter.