elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1825722

202107

1201-1800

RNO.Tower

NV

Tower RNO

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C RNO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1825722

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors

On approach into Reno we set up for and requested the RNAV RNP Y 16L. ATC denied our request and extended our downwind until we could sight another aircraft to follow on final. With the airport; surrounding terrain; and traffic in sight; we were cleared the visual approach to 16L. Once on final after maneuvering; descending; and configuring; our aircraft ground proximity warning system alerted us of the rolling terrain below which we could also clearly see. We leveled off and even started a climb when the warnings ceased. We then continued our visual approach to an uneventful landing on 16L.Being cleared for an unexpected visual approach while on an extended downwind behind traffic in mountainous terrain at an unfamiliar airport. Perhaps briefing alternative approaches in the event ATC should deny our pre-planned approach. Exploring and discussing other potential approach possibilities may have helped prepare us for the ATC visual clearance and to possibly avoid the terrain warning.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a GPWS alert while flying a visual approach into the RNO airport.

1570821

201808

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

1570821

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Flight arrived with a 325 lb. electric wheelchair in the aft cargo compartment. Although the [load plan] did show a 'wheelchair' onboard; there was no notation of the 325 lb. and no HAZMAT information. When we finally removed the wheelchair from the aircraft; we also noticed that the hazard paperwork was not attached.

Ramp personnel reported incomplete HAZMAT documentation during unloading of HAZMAT cargo.

1706243

201912

1201-1800

ZHU.ARTCC

TX

40600.0

VMC

Turbulence

Night

Center ZHU

Corporate

EMB-505 / Phenom 300

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Climb

Class A ZHU

Center ZHU

Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZHU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1706243

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

During climb in smooth air to FL410 at approximately 40;600 the aircraft experienced a violent jolt and right turn with a bank of approximately 40 degrees. The autopilot remained engaged. After about 2 seconds the aircraft returned to the required wings level attitude. I reported severe turbulence to ATC and inquired about traffic in the area. ATC informed us that there was a Gulfstream at FL410 about 7 miles ahead of us. We were assigned FL390 and experienced a smooth flight thereafter. The post-flight inspection by the flight crew did not reveal any apparent damage to the aircraft. Maintenance Control was informed and a write-up in the Aircraft Discrepancy Log was created; reporting severe turbulence in-flight. The event has increased awareness of the potential for significant wake turbulence from aircraft such as the Gulfstream; a type aircraft that prior to this event was not seen as a serious threat by the crew.

EMB-505 Captain reported a possible wake turbulence encounter climbing through FL406 from a Gulfstream cruising at FL410.

1855968

202110

MMU.Airport

NJ

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower MMU

Air Taxi

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class D MMU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1855968

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Other Takeoff

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Runway 23 at MMU has a temporary displaced threshold due to construction. Referencing FAA publication Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) the portion forward of yellow chevrons is defined as part of the TODA (takeoff distance available) measurement and is located behind the landing threshold. We positioned the Transport category aircraft forward of the yellow chevrons and behind the displaced landing threshold for takeoff in order to assure sufficient TODA vs computed BFL (balanced field length). Nowhere in the NOTAM was there reference to TODA being measured in a manner contrary to the depiction in the AIM. The Tower claimed our takeoff was started behind the displaced threshold. We believe that the displaced threshold is only applicable to landings based on the description and illustrations in the AIM and therefore is not applicable to takeoffs. Our takeoff was started at the beginning of the measured TODA as described in the FAA publication.

Small Turbojet Air Taxi Captain reported unknowingly taking off from a portion of the runway that was closed at MMU airport.

1156696

201403

1801-2400

FPR.Airport

FL

8.0

2000.0

VMC

10

Dusk

CLR

Tower FPR

Other Flight School

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Climb

None

Elevator ControlSystem

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Other Flight School

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 294; Flight Crew Total 780.8; Flight Crew Type 190

1156696

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I was the flight instructor for the flight; flying with my student. It was a normal flight to review some of the lessons and maneuvers with my student. After having completed all the required maneuvers for that lesson for the flight; I asked my student to climb back up again to do one last Power-On stall for consistency before returning back to [the airport]. He completed the maneuver and then recovered from the stall normally. On the recovery; I saw him pitching up for Vy pitch attitude as required. He then seemed to be struggling a bit with the yoke before he told me that he could not pitch down any further. At that point I immediately took over the controls by saying my controls and I found out that I could not push any more forward on the yoke. At that point; because of the power settings being set to full power; the pitch attitude was increasing more upwards due to the increase in airspeed and the airplane being trimmed for about 60-65 knots for the entry of the maneuver. I immediately trimmed the airplane to lower the nose and to prevent it from stalling. After getting back to cruise; I checked the stabilator and it appeared to be stuck in what seemed to be slightly higher than nose level pitch attitude at about 100 knots airspeed. Pulling back on the yoke was not a problem; the issue was pushing forward. It felt like something was there that prevented the stabilator from moving down. After checking the GPS for distance; I saw that we were about 8 nautical miles southwest of the airport. I then immediately contacted the Tower; and requested a full stop. The Tower asked me if I needed assistance but I said no we did not. I did not declare an emergency as I had the airplane under control and I was still able to pitch down and up. On the way back to the airport; I checked the ailerons too and they seemed to be fine. I also looked back at the stabilator to try to see if we hit a bird or anything in-flight but from where I was looking; nothing abnormal was to be seen. About 10 minutes later I landed the airplane normally and then parked the airplane. After getting out I checked the stabilator again by trying to deflect the yoke forward and back but it had the same problem. I also looked at the tail section but could not see anything abnormal. I squawked the airplane as per normal procedure.

Reporter indicated that maintenance personnel had identified interference between the control yoke and a fuel line under the instrument panel. The subject flexible line was replaced by a rigid line to prevent this interference.

A Flight Instructor observed his student pilot struggle with the pitch control following recovery from a power-on stall. He assumed control of the aircraft and confirmed that he could not pitch down normally. He was able to adjust the trim and perform a normal landing. Maintenance personnel later identified interference between the control yoke and a fuel line under the instrument panel. The subject flexible line was replaced by a rigid line to prevent this interference.

1040633

201210

0001-0600

SMO.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower SMO

EC135

1.0

None

Passenger

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D SMO

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 3700; Flight Crew Type 400

1040633

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

[I experienced a] loss of GPS reception to a dual set of GARMIN 430/530 receivers while landing at the helicopter pad [on a building]. When on the pad; the reception page of the GPS units was referenced and zero satellites were acquired and the strength of reception indicators was zero. [I have] been having this problem sporadically in recent months after three years of never having this problem at this location.

Helicopter pilot reports a loss of GPS signal during landing at the helicopter pad. The loss of signal has been occurring sporadically over the last three months with no previous problems detected.

1590629

201811

1801-2400

DEN.Airport

CO

11000.0

VMC

TRACON D01

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Final Approach

Class B DEN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 3122

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1590629

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

As per the ATIS we were expecting the visual; ILS; or the RNAV RNP to RWY16R. I had briefed the Visual backed up by the ILS. When we checked in with Approach we were told to expect the RNAV 16R. Using good teamwork and CRM we set up said approach. After a few minutes of setup I briefed the RNAV approach; I confirmed IAF CLFFF at 11;000 FT on the FMS and LNAV and VNAV PTH on the FMA but I didn't properly VVM [Verbalize; Verify; Monitor] the rest of the approach on the FMS; As we crossed CLFFF and did not start descending we realized something was not set up properly. At this time we had RWY16R in sight. We realized our oversight and began a turn so as to stay on the course; just as we were going to call the field in sight the controller told us to turn to a heading and descend to 8;000 FT. Shortly thereafter he cleared us for the visual. We landed without incident.

B737 First Officer reported track and altitude deviations occurred on the RNAV RNP Approach to 16R in DEN following an FMC programming error.

1314223

201511

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

32000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

FMS/FMC

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 22000

1314223

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

While cruising at FL320 our first indication of any problems to come was a 'HORIZON' light on the FMA. We looked at both attitude indicators; noting they appeared normal for now and after a few minutes the First Officer (FO) attitude indicator was tilting down 5-10 degrees while the Capt.'s appeared normal. We looked in the QRH for guidance. After a few more minutes a 'HEADING' light appeared on the FMA'S. We compared both compasses and found to be satisfactory. Next I noticed on the Capt.'s PFD a 'RNP' message appeared. I told the First Officer that we were not receiving any VOR's/DME's. The FO dialed in [a] VOR to check our position which was showing OK at this point. The aircraft started turning toward ZZZ which was our clearance; but we noticed it was turning too early and went into Heading Hold. ATC told us it was 9 miles too early. We asked for vectors which we received. While in that turn I noticed that the FMS DME was off and was counting down at a very rapid rate. The FO told me his Navigational Display showed an 800 knot tailwind. While on vectors; heading what ATC gave us (about a 235 heading) ATC asked again what our heading was and required another 10 degrees left to go where he needed us. ATC corrected us a few more times. I now realized that our heading system wasn't working correctly. Again asked for vectors. Soon our Flight Displays went away as well as we lost the Autopilot and Auto throttles. FO kept hand flying. Requested lower because of RVSM airspace. ATC gave us FL280 and we descended to it. Now I tried to figure out just what we really had. Notified dispatch of situation and asked about any other airport with better weather with what reaming gas we had. Told Dispatch our intentions.... Requested vectors to [destination]. Notified ATC as well of all malfunctions we saw. Notified #1 Flight Attenendats (FA) and told her of our situation. Working with ATC...I was able to test the #1 VOR system at several points to verify its accuracy. It appeared to work OK but at this time wasn't sure of anything regarding the Air Crafts navigation equipment. We then noticed that the FMA's were out along with the flight directors. Eventually we shut off the flight directors. They became more of a distraction than help. The F/O told me about a message in the FMS system that said 'PLATFORM FAILURE 2' and within a few minutes of clearing; another message 'PLATFORM FAILURE 1' was in the FMS message box. Next went the MAP feature on the ND's. This entire time there were NO flags anywhere. Eventually the message MCDU popped up on the PFD. Again looked in the QRH. Tried ACARS as well for ATIS but didn't work.Not one of these multiple events happened simultaneously. They failed one at a time just adding to the complication of this flight. Descent was uneventful with the help from ATC. We were vectored all the way to final until we broke out underneath the clouds at about 2300. The #1 ILS appeared to work correctly and a visual approach; with raw data only; continued until touchdown. At about 800 AGL the Ground Prox equipment sounded off with 'whoop whoop pull up' until I turned it off so it would not distract us during landing.

MD-80 Captain reported sequential loss of flight and navigational instruments; autopilot; autothrottles; ACARS; and FMS Platforms while in cruise at FL320 and during subsequent descent. Aircraft landed in visual conditions with assistance from ATC.

1238877

201502

0601-1200

TPF.Airport

FL

VMC

Daylight

CTAF TPF

Air Carrier

PC-12

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class G TPF

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Situational Awareness

1238877

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Other Person

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

While landing on runway 22 at TPF; under VMC conditions; the flight crew observed a barge in the channel that crosses the short final of Runway 22. At the south end of the barge was a tall wheelhouse belonging to what appeared to be a tugboat pushing the barge. The left seat captain was Pilot Not Flying (PNF) and both pilots had a clear visual of the barge and determined it would not present a safety concern to the short final that the aircraft was on; with only a slight deviation from centerline alignment. Pilot flying (PF) altered course slightly to the north of runway 22 and returned to centerline after passing the barge safely. While passing the barge; the Captain observed the wheelhouse off the left wing and below the aircraft. Aircraft landed without apparent incident and taxied into the ramp and shutdown.A line service employee later informed the Captain that the FAA had called about 'missing an aircraft by 100 feet.' Being that there was no other aircraft in the pattern when the crew landed; it seemed like it was another plane. A short while later; the company called and conferenced in a representative from the Tampa Bay Area Coast Guard who advised the Captain that his aircraft had come within 100 feet of a vessel and had 'scared the [expletive] out of the pilot in the vessel's wheelhouse.' The Captain apologized for any confusion and maintained that the crew had visual contact on the barge and had maneuvered to avoid presenting a hazard to the barge and both crew had extensive knowledge of the boats and vessels that operate in the channel near runway 22. The Coast Guard representative appeared somewhat appeased with the explanation of the events given and reminded the Captain that boats had been hit by planes before; before ending the call.With the channel in such close proximity to the runway and it being the active runway; it would seem it would benefit all parties for vessels transitioning the water to monitor CTAF; and if the barge captain had been; there would have been communication that a Pilatus was landing; had them in sight; and would not present an issue despite the relative proximity of both vessels.

PC12 Captain reports deviating slightly to the right during a visual approach to Runway 22 at TPF; to avoid a tugboat pushing a barge in the channel. The tugboat Captain apparently filed complaint with the Coast Guard.

1609050

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1609050

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Procedure; Weather; Human Factors

Ambiguous

First Officer loaded bags and then 2 passengers. We then had the aircraft de-iced due to existing ice on wings. We started aircraft per procedures with Gate Agent/Company. We followed aircraft appropriate checklists and then listened to ASOS for current weather. We then made a radio call on CTAF of our intentions to taxi to runway.Ramp area and entrance to taxiway leading to runway had been plowed. We continued to taxi toward runway until we slid about approximately a foot to the right of the center of taxiway and I applied brakes to stop aircraft. Upon inspection while stopped inside aircraft; we noticed a snow pile on right of taxiway between centerline and edge of taxi way. We then asked passengers if they were harmed. No one on the plane was injured or harmed. We then called on Company frequency and shut down both engines. We waited to have the aircraft to be towed to the hangar. Passengers were unloaded to the FBO shuttle that met them at the aircraft.Maintenance vehicles came over immediately after aircraft was stopped on taxiway and we were unable to disembark and they began to remove snow pile on taxiway in front of aircraft; prior to us inspecting aircraft. No damage obvious damage to aircraft. Very poor plowing technique. Taxiway entrance leading to Runway 35 was fully plowed. After approximately 100 feet; snow pile existed on right side of taxi way; upon exiting and inspecting aircraft and taxi way after the event.The taxiway was inconsistently plowed and nothing was NOTAMed and/or on the AWOS and Maintenance vehicles who were plowing on the CTAF had not alerted us of any snow piles or plows following taxi radio calls. Establish two way radio communication with Airport Maintenance from snow plows that all snow and debris and equipment are clear of taxiways and runways.In the event of no equipment or personnel; make sure Airport Manager NOTAMs all airport and runway conditions as required for safe operations.

Air taxi pilot reported stopping on the taxiway due to remnant snow on the taxiway.

1040311

201210

0601-1200

Daylight

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

1040311

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Normal takeoff; pilot flying announced abnormal vibration. Vibration grew in severity as speed increased maintained airspeed below maneuvering and started air return procedures. On descent vibrations continued and lead to emergency declaration; normal landing.

An EMB-145 developed a severe vibration after takeoff so the crew declared an emergency and returned to land.

1592736

201811

1801-2400

PIT.Airport

PA

2000.0

VMC

Tower PIT

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Final Approach

Class B PIT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 1073

Situational Awareness

1592736

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8260; Flight Crew Type 6445

Situational Awareness

1592722.0

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors

Approximately 2;300 feet MSL on RNAV (GPS) RWY 10L PIT (ILS out of service) night VMC on PAPI glideslope; runway in sight; fully configured; stable and cleared to land. [Received] GPWS TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP. Despite being on glide slope and believing we were nowhere near terrain; began escape maneuver (TOGA and pitched up) and warning went away. Discontinued escape maneuver and continued stabilized visual approach to normal landing.

EGPWS/GPWS terrain warning while on night visual approach to PIT [Runway] 10L. Performed terrain avoidance maneuver; warning immediately ceased as throttles advanced to TOGA thrust; continued approach and landed.Night VFR arrival into PIT ILS 10L Approach out of service. RNAV (GPS) RWY10L approach planned. On descent; GPS Primary on both FMGC's; accuracy confirmed HIGH; approach fix altitudes; final approach course; and FPA checked with approach chart.On 11NM left base leg for RNAV (GPS) RWY 10L. Autopilot; auto-throttles off. Speed 190; Flaps 1; 3000 MSL. Vectored 080 to intercept; cleared visual 10L. NAV lateral guidance engaged outside of RACOO (the FAF). Crossed FAF at 180 kts; FINAL APP engaged; Flaps 2 selected. Flaps 3 selected shortly after crossing FAF (approximately 1850 RA); then Gear and Full Flaps approximately 1700 RA. On track; on RNAV glide path; PAPI showed 2 red and 2 white. Got EGPWS/GPWS aural terrain warning (I recall 'terrain; terrain; pull up'). Captain stated that didn't make sense; I verbally agreed but executed the terrain avoidance maneuver since it was night time. The warning immediately ceased as the throttles were advanced to TOGA. We were fully configured; above glide path with PAPI showing all white. We visually confirmed no terrain hazard existed; and decided to continue the visual approach. We elected not to go heads down and re-program the approach and instead Selected VAPP speed and Selected 700 VSI for SA. The aircraft was stable at 1;000 [feet]; stable at 500 [feet]; and a normal landing was performed. After landing; IRS NAV drift and NAV position confirmed tight.

A319 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on RNAV Approach. Alert silenced as soon as escape maneuver was initiated.

1350377

201604

1201-1800

DFW.Tower

TX

Daylight

Tower DFW

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B DFW

Tower DFW

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B DFW

Facility DFW.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1350377

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I'm feeling a little snake bit. This is my second safety event of the day. The Final Monitor (FM) cancelled Aircraft X's approach clearance because they were overtaking traffic ahead. I do not recall the callsign of the lead aircraft. Although OJT was in progress on Local West (LW) I do not believe that is a factor in this incident. LW had just departed Aircraft Y on RWY 36R; turning to heading 340; climbing to 10;000; when shortly thereafter; FM cancelled Aircraft X's approach and issued fly runway heading; maintain 3;000. In LW's judgment there would not be sufficient space between the Aircraft Y and Aircraft X so LW issued a left turn to 340; maintain 3;000 to Aircraft X while Aircraft X was still several miles south of the field. I initiated a handoff to the Departure 3 controller (DR3) via the STARS and verbally coordinated with the FM [Final Monitor] that we were breaking Aircraft X out early. Next; I initiated verbal coordination with DR3; notifying him that Aircraft X was heading 340 at 3;000. It did not occur to me that I should have pointed out Aircraft X to Meacham North (MN) until later when the CIC notified me that 'Aircraft X is being tracked' which I clarified meant that D10 was investigating a possible loss.I must have assumed that the FM controller would take care of any point outs; which in hindsight was not good air traffic control. However; D10 airspace boundaries are not depicted on tower radar displays; nor are we trained on all the airspace that abuts ours. Instead; we are given standard missed approach headings and frequencies to assign. Several actions could have prevented this event.1. When FM cancelled Aircraft X's approach clearance; they could have broken them out since they have better familiarity with that airspace than we do.2. Airspace boundaries around tower airspace should be depicted and trained so we can better know into whose airspace we may be turning.3. Standard missed approach procedures should be replaced with 'assign heading and altitude to avert conflict with other arrivals/departures and hand off to the appropriate controller.4. When tower advised FM that they are going to turn somebody early; the FM should advise who to hand off the aircraft to or offer to take care of the point out. This one seems less preferable than teaching us the airspace more thoroughly.5. All this could have been completely avoided by better application of speed control by the arrival controller who set this all up by feeding the overtake to the FM and LW controllers to fix. FM should only be concerned with ensuring the non-transgression zone between parallel approaches is protected; rather than cleaning up after a final controller who didn't ensure their aircraft would remain separated to the runway.

DFW Tower Controller reported an airspace violation. Aircraft was taken off approach due to a lack of separation and turned. Controllers did not make appropriate point out.

1486452

201710

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Fractional

Citation X (C750)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Climb

Class D ZZZ

Navigational Equipment and Processing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1486452

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

We had a dual IRS failure immediately after takeoff. The nav database was updated that morning. We got no indications in the cockpit until the dual failure. The system logged 3 pages of faults and codes; starting when we left [departure airport]; but we got no EICAS messages in the cockpit. We navigated visually to [destination]. Navigation was reduced to only the standby magnetic compass and dead reckoning on the short flight. All navigation ability was lost. I have many reasons to suspect that Maintenance loaded the wrong database that morning. A different database was loaded at [destination] and their narrative was that no failures were noted; even after simulated flight parameters were entered. Luckily we were VMC on the short flight and we were able to complete the flight without further incident. No emergency was declared because it was roughly a 20 mile flight; and VMC prevailed.I would like to know why a Citation X lost all navigational ability in flight. Obviously this was a very serious issue and could have been exponentially worse in IMC conditions. How can a dual IRS aircraft; with a split bus electrical system fail at the same time? I believe the wrong database information was entered that morning. A detailed follow up is needed for this potentially serious condition.

Citation X Captain reported loss of all nav capability except standby compass shortly after takeoff. Captain suspects anomaly was related to improper nav database software load.

1857160

202111

1201-1800

JYO.Airport

VA

90.0

1.0

1200.0

VMC

50

Daylight

FBO

Small Aircraft

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 123; Flight Crew Total 2694; Flight Crew Type 400

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1857160

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 200; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Staffing

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was conducting flight training in the pattern at JYO. The pattern was extremely busy. The Tower instructed us to make left traffic for Runway 17 and upon reaching the downwind asked us to make a right 360 to rejoin the left downwind for spacing. Approximately halfway through the right turn; the Pilot of Aircraft Y was instructed to go around. The Pilot asked if he was to make left or right traffic and his call went unanswered. The Tower instructed Aircraft Y to make left traffic and to delay their crosswind turn however the Pilot immediately turned; accelerated to a fast speed; and climbed into the left downwind for Runway 17; which placed him into direct conflict with me as we were completing the 360 turn to rejoin the left downwind. I made visual contact with Aircraft Y and determined that a collision was imminent. I took the controls from my student and took evasive action. It appeared that the pilot of Aircraft Y did not have visual contact with my aircraft until I took evasive action. I informed the Tower that a near mid-air collision occurred and I requested to speak with them following the flight.I called the Tower by phone after the flight and spoke with the Controller who was on duty at the time. He stated that:- the incident was his fault- he lost situational awareness the turn we were instructed to make- I did nothing wrong nor contributed to the incident in any wayHe also said there is a blind spot on the east side of the airport that prevents them from seeing traffic in that spot. The Tower is a 'remote tower' where the Controllers view traffic through video screens via a camera at the airport. He said that the Tower facility is due to receive a radar feed 'in a few weeks' and this will help.The pilot of Aircraft Y contributed to the incident by failing to see and avoid and flying at a speed well above 'normal' for a traffic pattern.This is the second near mid-air collision I've experienced at this facility within the last 3 weeks. In the other incident; the Controller also admitted 100% fault due to a loss of situational awareness on the east side of the airport.I've been flying at this airport for years and we are as busy as we have ever been; with five flight schools on the field. I believe that we are headed for a serious safety problem if the following items are not addressed:1. JYO Tower must receive a radar display immediately. Lacking this data is contributing to a serious safety issues2. JYO Tower's 'blind' spot on the east side of the field must be investigated and corrected. If the remote Tower cannot see an area of the traffic pattern; the remote Tower should not have been certified3. JYO Tower is often staffed with only one Controller. Often times pilots must wait to read back instructions because the Tower Controller is reading an IFR clearance because he is also working the ground position. This is a serious safety issue. The Tower must be staffed with three controllers; without exception; at all times

Flight Instructor reported an NMAC with another aircraft in the traffic pattern at JYO airport with remote (Virtual) Tower.

1699314

201911

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1699314

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Human Factors

I'm am writing this report in the hopes that it reaches a level where this repeated violation of our CLEAN RAMP POLICY can be corrected. On flight ZZZ1 to ZZZ while parking in ZZZ there were cones inside the safety zone. These cones were inside the Aircraft Safety lines; but behind the RED FIRE LANE lines.It seems that our ground crews are now using the RED FIRE LANE markings as our Aircraft Safety Lines. Repeatedly; when arriving in ZZZ this is the case and when asked to move them confusion arises. The red and white safety lines are clearly marked yet items are moved only to be placed behind the Fire Lane Lines instead of outside the actual Aircraft Safety Lines.It took a good 15 minutes to have this corrected which held up our passengers; the vehicle traffic on the ramp; the next crew departing and on and on. I'm curious as to what the Fire Marshal would have to say if they knew that objects were intentionally being placed inside the fire lane when airplanes approach? Can anyone help rectify this recurring problem? Inform ground crews that the Red Fire Lane lines are not the Aircraft Safety Lines.

Air carrier Captain reported that Ground Personnel are not keeping the ramp aircraft envelope clear.

1638359

201904

0601-1200

DEN.Airport

CO

11000.0

VMC

TRACON D01

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Class A ZDV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 517

Situational Awareness

1638359

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were descending on the PEEKK 3 RNAV Arrival into DEN. At around 17;000 ft we talked to Approach Control and were given the RNAV (RNP) Z 16R. We were expecting the ILS 16R; so the new approach was entered and briefed. Around the same time and in the descent to 11;000 ft we received multiple airspeed changes by ATC. At 11000 ft at CEPEE aircraft did not turn on course to AAGEE; but instead continued on a 353 straight ahead course line. We made a manual heading change to follow the correct course within a couple seconds of passing CEPEE. ATC then canceled the approach and gave us a vector to intercept a visual final for 16R. We intercepted final and landed 16R.

Air carrier First Officer reported a track deviation occurred on arrival into DEN; citing a late clearance change as contributing.

1719570

202001

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 2734; Flight Crew Type 2734

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1719570

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were approaching Gate XX at ZZZ in day; VMC conditions. As we entered the ramp on the Charlie line from the south port the Captain verbalized the threat of vehicle traffic crossing in front of the aircraft as we approached the gate because there is a busy vehicle traffic lane running adjacent to the B terminal. We scanned out of our respective sides of the aircraft and identified multiple vehicles approaching to pass in front of our gate.As we were approximately one half airplane length from crossing the vehicle lane and with marshalers in position we expected to see the approaching vehicles slow and stop. Instead the first of the few; a tow vehicle with baggage cart in tow; accelerated to pass in front of us. We were at a slow speed but the Captain braked to yield and bring us to a stop. Now more cautious the Captain resumed a slow taxi and we observed a larger tow vehicle with large trailer in tow accelerate to pass in front of us. The Captain braked again and a third baggage tow vehicle raced in front of us.We identified the safety infractions to ramp and the Ramp Controller confirmed that she observed the actions of the ground traffic and was on the phone; presumably to pass feedback. The ramp controller suggested that the marshalers may not have been sufficiently positioned out in the alley for vehicles to recognize that an aircraft was approaching; but based on the position of the aircraft there was no doubt that we were arriving to the gate and that the vehicles should have yielded.

B737 flight crew reported that several ground vehicles failed to yield; resulting in a critical ground conflict.

1745054

202006

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Small Aircraft

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Landing

Other RNAV (GPS) Y RWY XX

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1735; Flight Crew Type 1400

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1745054

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Trainee

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Total 139; Flight Crew Type 139

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1745091.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

This was a 14 CFR 141 instrument training flight with a student nearing the completion of the program. This was the first training flight for the instrument student after not having flown for approximately three months due to COVID-19 precautions. We were on an IFR flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ; returning to ZZZ on the same flight plan. The student filed ZZZ1 ZZZZZX ZZZZZ ZZZ ZZZ2 ZZZ1. During the enroute phase; I requested from Approach the RNAV (GPS) Y RWY XX at ZZZ; with a touch and go on RWY XX; and a return to ZZZ with the ILS XYL to a full stop. Before we were cleared for the approach to ZZZ; Approach relayed the following missed approach instructions 'On the go; fly Tower assigned heading; climb and maintain 3;000 feet.' I read back the instructions because my student missed the transmission. Shortly after receiving the missed approach instructions; we received our approach clearance for the RNAV (GPS) Y RWY XX and transferred to ZZZ Tower. We decided to fly the approach using the autopilot; which the student was not familiar with. This required a significant amount of coaching; especially to manage the altitude step-downs. There was a single engine aircraft in the traffic pattern and we were instructed to report traffic in sight and that we were #2 for RWY XX behind the traffic. I was focused on coaching the student to use the autopilot and looking for the traffic in the pattern and did not hear the landing clearance transmission correctly. The traffic ahead executed a touch and go without incident. We followed suite and executed a touch and go. Several hundred feet in the air; tower asked us what we were doing. I explained that we were on the missed approach and climbing to 3;000 feet. The Tower Controller advised that we had been issued a landing clearance; not a touch and go. In the same transmission; the controller asked if we were IFR or VFR and to state our intentions. I explained that we were IFR and given missed approach instructions to a fly tower assigned heading; climb and maintain 3;000 feet and were planning to return IFR to ZZZ. I also apologized profusely. Tower switched us over to Approach - I read back the instructions and apologized again for the error. I was mortified.I believe that expectation bias played a crucial role in this error coupled with my inattentiveness to the landing instructions issued by Tower resulting from my focus on coaching my student through the use of the autopilot for the approach and looking out for traffic in the pattern. Without exception; in my prior experience as a CFII in northern State X; Tower has cleared my flights for a touch and go following an instrument approach when on an IFR flight plan that does not terminate at that airport. I believe this prior experience established a strong expectation bias. I also believe that I inappropriately focused my attention on coaching my student through the approach using the autopilot. This was his first flight back after an extended hiatus from flying; so we had to work through some fundamental refresher in addition to incorporating the autopilot. This was a high workload environment for my student. Finally; I was focused on visually acquiring the traffic ahead of us; which added to my workload. I have learned several lessons because of this experience. Focus and listen to the clearance. Regardless of how advanced the student is; do not assume they will take the appropriate course of action. As an instructor I am there to make sure a crucial error does not occur. Prioritize workload. Teaching is important; but making sure we are aviating; navigating; and communicating comes before anything else - even teaching.I truly am sorry for this error. While there was no evasive action taken by any aircraft (the preceding traffic was on a downwind leg by the time we executed the touch and go and no other traffic was in the airspace); I understand that was just luck.I know better and will do better next time.

My instructor and I were on an IFR training flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 round robin back to ZZZ. We flew the RNAV GPS Y RWY XX approach into ZZZ1. On approach; we were talking to Approach which cleared us for the approach and to see them on the missed approach. We were instructed to fly Tower assigned heading on the missed up to 3;000. My expectation was to do a touch n go and return back to ZZZ for our round robin.We switched to ZZZ1 that then cleared us to land. I became so fixated on doing a touch n go that we landed and did our touch n go. After we were airborne ZZZ1 tower told us that he had cleared us to land. We apologized.This was my first IFR training flight since COVID-19 shut everything down. I think that I became so fixated and accustomed to doing a touch and go and flying the missed approach that I missed that the tower had cleared us to land and not a touch n go. Confirmation bias on my part that I assumed he had cleared us for a touch n go and misheard the tower instruction. I think there may also have been a communication error to the tower as he was under the impression that we wanted to land and not do a touch n go. He had asked us if were IFR; which we filed for so I think there may have been an issue with the plan as I filed it.My takeaway is that I need to listen much closer to the instructions. During the approach I became fixated on flying the approach and read back the instruction but did not catch that it was a landing clearance and not for a touch n go. I was expecting a cleared for touch n go and my confirmation bias interpreted the cleared to land as that.

Pilot instructor and student reported distraction in the cockpit resulted in executing a touch and go without ATC clearance and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.

1207289

201409

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

23000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Leading Edge Slat

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Relief Pilot; First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 700

1207289

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 229; Flight Crew Total 16521; Flight Crew Type 387

Confusion

1207296.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Climbing out through around 23;000 feet. I was on the service phone with a Flight Attendant (FA) and I heard a caution sound. By the time I looked up it was gone. The captain requested a level off and advised ATC. Her and the First Officer (FO) said that the slats moved while handle was set in UP position as well as EICAS listed an LE SLAT Asymmetry. She directed me to run the QRH and I did. The Captain and the FO coordinated heading back. I continued with the LE SLAT Asymmetry checklist as well as the Fuel Dumping Checklist with the Captain. We dumped gas. I got our landing performance numbers and completed the overweight landing checklist. As a crew we discussed what to do in case of a go around. We also briefed the approach. And completed all checklists. The captain and I had a discussion about landing at Flaps 20 but we decided against it. We landed and stopped on the runway. Directed by the Captain I got on the PA and said 'Remain Seated; Remain Seated'. I completed the Hot Brakes checklist. We waited on runway until the brakes cooled and we got towed to the gate. While we were in the air the captain did speak to the FAs as well I did. I just don't remember the sequence of times.

During climb out thru FL260 to FL310 the aircraft had a sudden pitch change (the nose came up slightly and the left wing began to rise). At the same time. We received LE Flap light; the flap position indicator on the gage began to move from the up and locked position to flap 1. And as suddenly as the flaps extended they retracted back to up. The Captain was flying with the autopilot on during the occurrence.We leveled at FL260. The Captain put the bank selector to 15 degrees bank and gave me the aircraft. I flew and coordinated with ATC. The Captain and First Officer completed numerous checklists; contacted Dispatch; [Maintenance Control]; FAs and the Passengers. We descended to FL200 and slowed to 250 kts. We asked ATC to give us vectors as close as possible to [the airport] in case we suddenly had to land.We coordinated with ATC for fuel dumping. We informed ATC we plan to land on [the long] runway. All checklists were completed; performances were checked. We decided to try the flaps. If they worked we'd land with flap 30. If not; we would do a flap up or partial flap landing if the flaps did something abnormal again. The captain landed the aircraft safely and softly with flaps 30. We informed the FAs and Passengers to remain seated.We were met by fire services. They noticed no abnormalities. We had to remain on the runway for 75 minutes for brake cooling. Approximately 83 minutes after landing we were met by the towing procession. We were then towed to gate followed by fire services. The passengers disembarked. All [maintenance messages] were sent and we spoke with maintenance. Everyone inside and outside the aircraft did a great job helping assure our safe land and a safe operation.

B767 flight crew experiences an uncommanded LE slat extension climbing through FL230. As quickly as the slat extended it retracted; but the crew elected to dump fuel and return to the departure airport for an overweight landing.

1303793

201510

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

MCP

Rockwell Collins

X

Malfunctioning; Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction

1303793

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52

Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Training / Qualification

1303748.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft

Aircraft X had a Rockwell MCP; the one with the small pushbuttons; instead of the traditional classic paddle switch MCP. It worked without incident our first leg. During taxi out for the second leg; the First Officer (FO) asked; 'Do you want that?' and pointed to the CWS A light illuminated on the MCP. Somehow either it had engaged itself or we had somehow inadvertently pushed it. He looked puzzled. Since I was familiar to this from my Safety work and having had it previously; I said; I would explain this in-flight and pushed the autopilot disconnect button. We got the Autopilot Disconnect horn; and the CWS A light extinguished. We rechecked everything and took off. Everything worked fine the next two legs. I was fortunate to have a very sharp FO who first noticed the trim wheel moving without pilot input during taxi. It seems these new style MCPs may be incompatible with the older model aircraft. I know we have had several rejected takeoffs when the trim started to run with un-commanded pitch and roll commands during takeoff roll.It seems in the interest of safety we need to get a full understanding of this anomaly and either correct the situation or provide adequate training and or procedures to prevent this from creating an undesired aircraft state. NOTE: we didn't write it up because we couldn't tell if we had inadvertently pushed it or it had turned itself on. From a human factors perspective; it would be very easy to unknowingly lightly push it while the FO performs his flows.

Captain's leg. On taxiway C; CWS engaged on taxi out to departure runway in commanded engagement. I noticed that the trim wheel started to move as we were taxiing. I looked over to see if the Captain was trimming the aircraft and he wasn't. I looked up at the Mode Control Panel and saw the CWS light illuminated. I informed the Captain and he disconnected CWS using the autopilot disconnect switch. We discussed the issue prior to takeoff and he said some of the MCP panels have had a history of this. We briefed our departure to include watching to make sure it didn't happen again. It didn't nor did it happen from the [previous] leg. No other issues.

During taxi for takeoff; a B737 Mode Control Panel (MCP) Control Wheel Steering (CWS) engaged and began trimming the horizontal stabilizer. The First Officer caught the trim movement and disengaged CWS.

1762036

202009

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

3000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

PC-12

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Other Medical Transport

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Vectors

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting

1762036

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

Upon departure from ZZZ Rwy XX just after lift off a toxic smelling odor entered the cockpit and cabin. The Medical Flight Crew expressed much discomfort and began looking for smoke as the odor smelled of burning chemicals. I continued the departure under IFR in VMC. I was switched to Departure from Tower. The crew reported seeing a haze of smoke in the cabin. I immediately requested priority and turned back to ZZZ; switching back to the Tower and letting them know I was coming in to land. They cleared me into RWY XY where I landed without incident. I had the fire department dispatched. After landing I was cleared to fast taxi to our ramp and as I never actually saw smoke or fire. I had the crew get the extinguisher and they exited as soon as we stopped. I secured the aircraft and exited.

Pilatus PC-12 Captain reported a fumes event immediately after takeoff resulting in a return to the departure airport.

1856039

202111

0001-0600

EWR.Airport

NJ

1300.0

VMC

Tower EWR

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B EWR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 132; Flight Crew Total 567; Flight Crew Type 567

Situational Awareness

1856039

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

Was being vectored for stadium visual approach at 4000 ft. Was given slow to 190 kts (from 240 kts) and cross TEB at 3000 ft. cleared for Stadium Visual approach. Went to LVL change with speed brakes out to get slowed/configured; got distracted trying to get flaps 10 deployed as the airspeed kept gusting up to 210 kts. We set touchdown zone elevation in around TEB and I was getting the aircraft further configured for landing. I forgot to reselect VNAV and we descended to around 1300 ft. and got a low altitude warning from Tower. I was visually flying the aircraft already and proceeded to click off the auto throttles and climb back to 1500 ft. by SLIMR and landed.

Air carrier Captain reported receiving a low altitude alert from TEB Tower on a visual approach. Lack of awareness of FMS mode was cited as contributing.

1198689

201408

1201-1800

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Galley Furnishing

X

Design; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Service

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

1198689

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

The [Galley] Oven racks don't stay in place and do not lock when pulling meals out. During the flight there is potential of getting burned or severely hurt. What is the best way to retrieve the meals and prevent the oven racks from falling out? Is this [situation] violating an FAR since they [racks] are not secure and have the potential of causing serious harm? What steps is our air carrier taking to ensure the safety of its employees? Safety Concern.

Reporter stated that although the new galley oven racks are made of metal; they are very flimsy; bend easily; especially when loaded with two or three hot food plates and do not have safety stops to prevent the racks from completely sliding out of the hot oven compartment. Their B737-900s came with the new ovens and racks and have also been installed on their reconfigured two-class B767 aircraft. He doesn't know if the B737-800s have the new ovens. Galley ovens on previous fleet model aircraft he has worked had much stiffer metal racks with safety stops that prevented the rack (tray) from completely sliding out of the oven. Flight Attendant would have had to lift the rack up to clear a lip (safety stop) before they could remove the hot plate rack. Reporter stated that numerous internal company documents have been filed by flight attendants about hands; arms; and upper body areas being contacted by the hot plates or splattered by hot food caused by the racks falling out of the ovens due to the lack of safety stops as the racks are pulled out to access the hot plates. No response yet from his air carrier about improving the strength and adding safety stops to the new oven racks.

A Flight Attendant reports the new galley oven hot plate racks on their B737-900 and B767-300 aircraft are very flimsy; do not stay in place and do not lock when pulling meals out. Previous oven racks had safety stops. Concerns also raised about the potential for getting burned or severely hurt.

1230900

201501

LLBG.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Time Pressure

1230900

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Manuals; Logbook Entry; Human Factors

Procedure

Flight Attendants discovered a large bio waste bag of material; which seemed to include a seat cushion and which was placed in the overhead compartment in the rear section of coach. The item was not written up in the maintenance history. I looked for guidance in the FOM but found none. Maintenance was on board and indicated that they had taken these actions. The purser stated that they had guidance in their FAOM. I reviewed what I was shown and it seemed vague; appearing to refer to stowage of materials on the flight of event. The mechanics stated that this was a usual procedure; to carry bio-hazard out of the country because it could not be kept in [the country of departure]. He said that was written in their manuals. I asked if he could provide written guidance and he told me it would take him a half hour.I contacted dispatch; maintenance control; and [the duty manager]. Dispatch couldn't find any guidance. I stated that I was fine with any action taken but that I wanted to ensure that whatever we did was safe and legal as I had never heard of this procedure. Maintenance control couldn't find any guidance; except to say that this has always been the procedure; to carry bio-hazard waste out of a country back to the U.S. and put it in an overhead compartment. I...had never seen this procedure but was okay with whatever we did as long as guidance could be shown. The Duty Manager couldn't find any guidance. I was told that a decision was made to remove the bio-hazard waste from the aircraft to expedite departure. The local mechanic stated that the aircraft had arrived this way and that the inbound crew had not written it up. My concern now became one of an undocumented maintenance item that I was aware of and the potential ramifications of dispatching without documenting. I spoke to the dispatcher again and it was decided to document the item in the logbook and have it deferred. I did this and learned from the mechanic; who was in touch with maintenance control; that the MEL deferral number he was familiar with which allowed for carriage of the bio- hazard materials seemed to no longer exist and that there was in fact no such guidance provided for any longer. I looked in the MEL and could not find anything either. In today's environment of potential lethal bio-hazards such as Ebola; and the resulting geo-political; health; and legal ramifications of the handling of such waste; it seems to me that the system broke down on a number of levels. 1) The inbound crew should have written up the items. Our having to handle this and resolve it caused us to be delayed.2) The mechanics and ground crew dealing with these items should have ascertained that everything was properly documented; and they should have noted it in the logbook if the flight crew had not.3) On my commuting flight home later in the day I asked the F/A [her manual] and did discover that there is a reference recently added which accommodates allowance for placing bio-hazard waste in certain areas; including the overhead compartment. I am happy to have seen this. However; this should be in the pilots' FOM as well.This is the second time in a month that I have discovered maintenance items which have not been properly documented and dealt with which caused; in this case a delay for departure on my flight and potentially unsafe conditions; and in the case of a flight last month an overhead sign that was broken and which wasn't documented but had been improperly rigged with safety wire instead of a proper bolt causing it to fall down during taxi; potentially injuring a passenger or crewmember; and then resulting in the cancellation of our flight because of the length of time it would have taken to fix it. I am concerned that seeing two similar events in the course of four weeks may be the tip of the iceberg of unreported and improperly dealt with maintenance.

A B777 Captain about to depart a security sensitive Middle East destination was advised by flight attendants of a bag of bio-hazard waste in an overhead bin that was intended to be transported out of the country. A significant delay occurred as they searched for confirmation of language in writing approving such transportation.

1348155

201604

1201-1800

DCA.Airport

DC

VMC

10

CLR

TRACON PCT

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR FRDMM3

Class B DCA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Time Pressure

1348155

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Time Pressure

1348157.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Procedure; Equipment / Tooling

Company Policy

Upon pushback and normal startup at the departure airport; upon taxi out; ground advised us of a ground hold into destination airport. We parked on a taxiway and elected to shutdown both engines; due to the length of the projected ground stop and due to the fact that the fuel margin between planned and required was so slim. Once finally released departure was normal. Prior to reaching the initial point for the FRDMM3 arrival; we were vectored off the arrival. We were then cleared to LETZZ a little further down the arrival and told to descend via the arrival. This is where things started to become so busy and confusing.ATC notified everyone at least 3 to 4 times that runway directions had changed at National even though National had not published a new ATIS. They were landing south one minute and north the next; requiring multiple FMS changes and entries.This is when things started stacking up for ATC. ATC gave us a hold as published 3 miles prior to the fix they wanted to hold at; which does not allow a proper FMS entry nor even the ability to scramble and determine the hold via green needles without passing over the fix. After informing them that it was too close to the fix; they then vectored us off the arrival and holding fix.At this point we had sent a [message] to Dispatch and told them we were being held. We received back that minimum fuel was approximately 3;000 LBS. At this point we had roughly 3;200-3;300 pounds and that we could only take one turn in the hold if that. We declared minimum fuel. At this point we were roughly over IAD with 3;100 LBS of fuel. ATC then gave us a heading for the river and a descent. After being cleared for the river visual; they turned us off the approach again! We had started to configure at the point; we were approximately at Flaps 2 with the gear down and around 210 knots and slowing. After the turn we encountered a turbulent patch of air that [over sped] the flaps by a few knots for 1 second. We were then turned back and recleared the river visual. Landing phase was uneventful; turned off the runway with the fuel indications just beginning to turn amber.A determination should be established as to why National decided to change runways so many times during light and variable wind conditions which in turn stacked up arriving traffic. As well as the margins for fuel have become so stringent that it almost forces an emergency situation anytime undue and unplanned delays occur; even in a CAVU day.

We are not being given enough fuel. This fuel program looks fine on paper; but it doesn't work. Yesterday we boarded on a perfectly clear day. I didn't save the release to give you exact numbers; but we had the 'planned fuel' that Dispatch gave us. We pushed back from the gate and started both engines because the departing runway was right behind us. When Ramp Control turned us over to ground; ground informed us we were in a ground stop for DCA and long story short it would be about a 25 minute delay. We shut down both engines; leaving the APU on as our air/electrical source. We contacted Dispatch and [departure] operations to tell them what was happening. They informed us Center was the culprit and it was a volume issue.Finally Ground released us and we started the engines and headed to the runway. The time from Ground releasing us until the takeoff roll was about four minutes so we didn't have the engines running for an absurd amount of time. When we crossed the hold short line we were above the Minimum fuel by about 600 LBS if memory serves me. It may have been a little more. Either way it was legal and above minimum fuel.As soon as we were turned over to Departure Control we were given a twenty degree turn off course. At this point we would be landing with 3;500 LBS of fuel. Center got us on course only to turn us off course again. Landing fuel would now be 3;400 LBS. [Next] Center does the same thing. Constant turns and they inform us that Runway 19 is in use at DCA despite the fact that the ATIS is showing Runway 1. More turns; fuel now 3;300 at arrival in DCA. I recognize the 2660 rule for declaring minimum fuel (or the reserve plus the alternate fuel if it is more). But we have no alternate today and the weather is fine. My mind cannot comprehend why the vectoring.We check on with Potomac and they tell us the runway is now 1. They are vectoring the people around us and then they announce holding. He told us to hold at ALWYZ; but I told him he was too late on the assignment as ALWYZ now sequenced beyond us. He gave us a south heading and an Expect Further Clearance (EFC) about twenty minutes from now. I immediately could tell that would not work and informed him we would be diverting. Dispatch gave us a minimum fuel of 3;004 LBS from where we were to DCA and IAD as an alternate. We are now scheduled to land at DCA with 3;000 LBS so I told him we would be diverting to IAD unless he could get us right in to DCA. He says he can and began heading us east bound. I declared minimum fuel and he told me we were number one for DCA and we were getting right in. He then switched us to another frequency and this controller said he was aware we were minimum fuel and we were getting right in. Then he tells us to turn 90 degrees off course. At that point I told him he had ten seconds to figure out what he was doing. He told us they had switched runways again to Runway 19. This is the fourth runway change! Then he turns us back toward the river and clears us for the river visual Runway 19. At this point we are showing 2;900 LBS on landing. As we configure for the river visual and cross over the American Legion Bridge; he suddenly tells us to turn left heading 150. I yelled at him. I don't know what I said; but he became nervous and then gave us a 240 heading. At this point we had a flap over speed with flaps at 2 and speed at 210. It jumped to like 218 for like one second. I don't know how it happened; because there was so much going on.Finally he re-clears us for the approach and we landed with around 2;800 LBS. By the time we got to the gate we were in amber.I am concerned about this fuel program we have adopted. I feel it has compromised safety. I have no idea what Potomac Approach was doing; but things happen and if we would have only had 1;000 more LBS this would have been a non-issue. Our dispatcher told me; 'I will give you more fuel anytime you ask.' Again; we were legal per the release; (which is honestly my only measurement) but we are not given much room for errors or for unpredictable events.We wrote up the flap over speed.Giving us more fuel would have helped a lot.

A regional jet flight crew reported experiencing a minimum fuel condition due to ongoing delays at the destination airport; which were attributed to multiple runway changes. They also cited their company's fuel policy as a contributing factor to their fuel situation.

1669902

201907

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Fractional

Gulfstream V / G500 / G550

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class D ZZZ

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1669902

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated

Airport

VFR UNCONTROLLED AIRPORT. Visual approach with unlimited visibility. We chose to RNAV 03 for awareness. From approximately 15 miles I stated that there is a terrain issue with this approach. We elected to continue with the autopilot flying to allow us to better scan for VFR aircraft. As we approached the hill under the path I stated that I would be surprised if we didn't get a GPWS. We were almost past the hill when the GND PROX momentarily annunciated and extinguished faster than you could respond. (No PULL UP)...I contacted FOQUA to review this airport.

Captain reported problems with approach because of terrain; causing Ground Proximity warnings resulting in an unstabilized approach.

1271675

201506

1801-2400

ELM.TRACON

NY

11000.0

Dusk

TRACON ELM

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Descent

Class E ELM

TRACON ELM

Fractional

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ELM

Facility ELM.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1271675

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Airspace Structure

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

During all this we are in Full CENRAP [Center Radar Presentation] which puts me with 5 mile separation and a 12 second delay on altitude and position which I am not used to working. I had a [Aircraft Y] climbing non radar out of PEO to 8;000 feet east bound through Rochester approach's airspace; pointed out. At this time I got a call from Cleveland Rochester for a manual handoff on [Aircraft X] landing N03. At the time [Aircraft X] is about 10 miles northeast of PEO coming up to our border along with New York Center's border and descending to only 11;000 feet. Rochester Approach owns surface to 10;000 feet and we own surface to 8;000 feet and New York owns above us. The [Aircraft Y] and [aircraft X] were a factor for each other so I descended [Aircraft X] to 9;000 feet first then 5;000 feet while vectoring him to the east out of the way of the climbing [Aircraft Y]. The problem is I never pointed him out to Rochester Approach and didn't get control with New York Center Sector 50 for descent.Our Radar is out of service until further notice. This puts all of us in an unfamiliar and potentially dangerous situation. This needs to be fixed. I don't know that my mistake would have been prevented or not but my workload would have been reduced and I would be working with a familiar work environment. That part of our airspace is very confusing with 3 centers and 3 approach controls all joining at different altitudes. Having [Aircraft Y] handed to me 25 miles from their destination (non radar satellite airport in Syracuse's airspace) level at 11;000 feet over Rochester Approachs airspace and about to go through New York Centers airspace and then into Syracuse Approachs airspace while I'm also working other aircraft all on my backup radar was a recipe for something bad to happen. There needs to be a better procedure for a situation like that. To critique myself: I know better. I got overwhelmed and simply forgot to do this correctly. I am an OJTI [On the Job Training Instructor] and have been training a lot on tower and am very rusty on Radar. I need to take some time for myself and work Radar when there is traffic to stay proficient.

ELM TRACON Controller reports of an airborne conflict that was observed and resolved. The Controller did not point out the aircraft to an adjacent facility which owned the airspace that was descended into and did not get control of the aircraft from the overlying Center sector.

1035327

201209

1201-1800

ZLC.ARTCC

UT

VMC

Turbulence; Windshear; Haze / Smoke; Rain; Thunderstorm; 5

10000

Center ZLC

Government

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 137

None

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Cruise

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Government

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 16800; Flight Crew Type 1000

Other / Unknown

1035327

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Weather; Human Factors; Company Policy

Ambiguous

This report concerns the United States Fire Service (USFS); a government agency that I contract to; and non-FAA certified non-pilot resource managers that call themselves 'dispatchers'. I fly a firefighting air tanker and while on a mission; we are a Public Aircraft. Precluding this report are several 'non-flights' where I declined to go to a wild land fire due to meteorological conditions or daylight requirements. These have been followed up by complaints about me to the hierarchy of my government contractor and ultimately to me for explanation. This has ultimately affected my aeronautical decision making; for I have begun 'second guessing' to avoid any repercussions. So much of our dispatches are off airway and through areas of non or un-forecast weather that I believe that we must always favor decision making in its most conservative sense. I received a fire dispatch to go to Eastern Idaho (approximately 400 NM). I was given a choice to load retardant or not (in which case I would stop at a base closer to the fire for retardant); I chose not to load. I flight planned on my computer and showed and briefed the route with my First Officer. Checking the weather; we saw that there were areas of light to medium precipitation both North and South of my route. Departure; en route and arrival aerodromes were all reporting clear with better than 10 NM visibility. The satellite photos did show smoke all along the route; however. No pilot reports were available. For the entire flight we were encountering flight visibility from 20 NM to as little as 5 NM. Some of the route was between intermittent cloud layers with occasional scattered to broken tops below us and alto stratus and cumulonimbus above us. All of the route was basic VFR; though we had to fly in reference to instruments some of the time. About half way to our destination; Dispatch gave us a divert to Pocatello; ID (PIH approximately 200 NM south) to load and go to a new fire. The XM download on the Garmin 396 showed an area of light to medium precipitation (later observed as Cumulonimbus Mammatus) directly on our route and ending just north of PIH. The bases were initially 13;500 FT; but steadily dropped to approximately 11;000 FT in light rain. PIH was VFR with a 30 degree crosswind gusting to 22 KTS. The direct route was over 9;000-12;000 plus mountainous terrain. To the right of course was mostly lower terrain; but then it had occasional above 13;000 FT peaks. The sector altitudes were approximately 10;000-11;000 FT and between 12;000 and 13;200 to the right as well. We had to continually deviate to the right of course for terrain and weather. We were able to maintain greater than 2;000 plus terrain clearance; but had to maneuver to do so. Flight visibility quickly dropped to about 5 miles. The ATC radar was unfortunately of no assistance since they were experiencing some outages. The route was off airways and had no airports or forecasts. The weather forced us to divert towards taller terrain with decreasing ceilings. The last 50 miles was in and out of light rain with 20 miles visibility over 4;000 FT flat terrain. The next time I get a similar divert off of my flight planned route with any kind of weather and no forecasting; I will decline or land somewhere VFR to check weather if empty. This was a case of [a] Dispatchers harassment affecting my judgment.

Air Tanker pilot reports being harassed by USFS 'dispatchers' to accept missions that are unacceptable due to meteorological conditions or daylight requirements. The managers are non-FAA certified non-pilot resource managers that call themselves 'dispatchers'.

1302215

201510

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

700.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-30 Twin Comanche

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1254; Flight Crew Type 210

1302215

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Elected to reject takeoff after airborne due to lack of acceleration and climb performance. I was not in position to trouble shoot problem and took conservative action to avoid loss of control. I could have selected the longer runway for departure which would have improved margin of error for existing conditions at [the] airport.

PA-30 pilot reported rejecting the takeoff after liftoff because of poor aircraft performance.

1790701

202102

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

7000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Military

Helicopter

1.0

VFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

None

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X; Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Ground

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1790701

Aircraft X; Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1790728.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

A flight of 2 helicopters called Ground Control on for VFR flight following. They were on a non controlled ramp. Ground Control issued departure frequency and squawk. No readback was heard. Generally; this is an issue with military helicopters; and they usually call up local shortly after; when ready to depart. I reached out several times on Ground Control; inquiring if they had the ATIS information; and if they wanted to taxi to a runway or a present position departure. They were non responsive.I passed the strip to Local Control; thinking they would call him. Moments later a Aircraft Y who had been in the pattern was departing and I saw the 2 helicopters departing the ramp; right in the path of Aircraft Y. I alerted Local Control and he had the Aircraft Y make an evasive left turn to avoid the traffic. Both Local Control and myself on Ground Control made multiple attempts on all frequencies to reach the Aircraft X flight. They both almost had a NMAC with the Aircraft Y. TRACON was calling on the shout line and I answered on Ground Control as Local Control was trying to move the Cessna to a safe position. The TRACON controller alerted me Aircraft X had called them and they mistakenly thought they were calling from a different airport so the TRACON controller gave them a departure clearance which resulted in the unauthorized departure from ZZZ and the NMAC. Once Aircraft Y was safe Local Control and Ground Control both advised TRACON to issue a brasher.Military helicopter pilots need better training on how to depart here and learn to give appropriate readbacks. TRACON should have verified where the helicopters were. Assuming they were at ZZZ1 created a dangerous situation. The VFR flight plan was in the system. TRACON Flight Data should have seen it originating from ZZZ.

Aircraft Y departed climbing to remain in closed traffic for stop and goes. Aircraft X helicopters on a ramp near the departing Aircraft Y began to lift climbing in front of the Aircraft Y who did not have them in sight. Local Control issues immediate traffic for the Aircraft Y and told to turn left immediately. Local Control called out to Aircraft X on Local Control frequency several times and on guard frequency. Aircraft X did not answer and continued to fly toward Aircraft Y which was maneuvering to avoid the helicopters. Aircraft Y made an inadvertent low altitude turn to avoid colliding with the helicopters. Coming out of the turn the Aircraft Y reported them in sight.Approach Control called Local Control in a panic about Aircraft X saying she gave permission for departure to the helicopters saying she thought they were at another airport nearby. She did not know they were actually located at this airport. Aircraft X continued toward the Aircraft Y and eventually called local control once they departed the airport. Local Control told Aircraft X that they were not cleared by Local Control for departure and advised that they almost hit Aircraft Y that was climbing directly toward the helicopters.Aircraft X replied that Ground Control gave them the departure frequency. In error Aircraft X thought that they needed to contact Approach for takeoff from the airport. When Aircraft X called for VFR departure; Ground Control issued Aircraft X a squawk code and told them the departure procedure which is normal handling for VFR aircraft. The next expected sequence of events is that the VFR aircraft then contacts Local Control for takeoff clearance. Aircraft X bypassed Local Control and went directly to Departure Control thinking that is who they needed for departure.My recommendation is that there is clarity made to pilots that their receipt of the departure frequency is not a directive to contact them to depart while the Tower is actively controlled by a Local Controller who is issuing control instructions and safety alerts.

Tower Controllers reported a flight of two helicopters departed from the ramp without clearance from the tower and had a NMAC with a departing aircraft because Ground Control mistakenly issued them a TRACON frequency which cleared them to depart thinking they were at an adjacent airport.

1452529

201705

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

IMC

10

Dawn

2000

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class C ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1452529

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Flying at [cruise] altitude we received an EICAS message C HYD QTY. After checking our status page we realized we were down [to] 49 percent. Realizing we had a leak in the center system we elected to depressurize the system by turning off both electric pumps and the center demand pump and switching autopilot from center to left. This stopped the loss of fluid. We now had one hour and 20 minutes to plan for a total loss of the center system and our plan of action. Since we had 49 percent left in the center system and this was holding we decided we would turn the pumps on when on approach and see if gear and flaps would extend normally. We discussed our option if they did not and we both were well versed on HYDRAULIC SYSTEM PRESSURE (C ONLY) checklist. On approach flaps and gear did extend; however fluid loss was increasing. We had discussed that the loss of all center fluid down to the standpipe was a possibility; so we could use reserve brakes and steering if needed. Approach and landing were normal and we had 11 percent fluid left with steering commands normal. We taxied in leaving the flaps down and had enough fluid to steer to parking. The cause of the leak was determined to be an o-ring the size of a dime that had deteriorated.

B767 pilot reported landing safely with a leak in the C hydraulic system that ultimately reduced quantity to 11%.

1453267

201705

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation

Wheel Assemblies

X

Improperly Operated

Repair Facility

Contracted Service

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness

1453267

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Other after the fact

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Found damaged #2 main landing gear tire; replaced #2 wheel assembly.After removing installed wheel and before transporting it back to [the] hangar; failed to deflate the damaged tire in accordance with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual NOTE '...deflate the tire to prevent transporting an inflated tire.' Tire assembly was shipped still inflated.

A Maintenance Technician reported neglecting to deflate an unserviceable landing gear tire prior to shipping it.

1234608

201501

1801-2400

ATL.Airport

GA

0.0

IMC

Night

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ATL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1234608

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Chart Or Publication

We were operating a flight and we were instructed to follow a 757 to runway 8r for takeoff. As we approached the end of taxiway Echo there was an opposite facing aircraft and was not certain of who was next and could not get a word in to query ATC so I held short of the intersection just in case tower needed that aircraft to go first. Tower cleared the 757 for takeoff and I started my time just in case; 12 seconds later tower cleared us for takeoff on the same runway. Since I was a little ways back I knew it would take me a little time to get on the runway and start my takeoff roll. Both the First officer and I were a little confused by this a probably should have queried ATC immediately but as I stated I was not immediately ready for takeoff. We got lined up and I started to advance the trust at around 1min and 30 seconds after he cleared the 757 for takeoff. I did not stop on the runway or taxi any slower than normal but as I stated was slightly further back than normal. As we started to advance ATC queried us for not being airborne. My First Officer stated we were rolling and 'we needed space behind the heavy.' This made the controller mad and he started raising his voice stating if you need more time you need to let me know It's not a heavy!! We took off normally and Tower instructed us to contact departure and again stated we need to expedite the takeoff next time. I stated we were moving but that it was close to the heavy. Again more irritated than last time he stated it's not a heavy and all he needed was 6;000 feet between us and them. We didn't say anything else and switched over to Departure control. The next morning when we arrived at the gate I called ground control and got a number to the tower. I called them and they gave me to a supervisor who stated that Atlanta; Memphis and Louisville are part of the RECAT program which puts the 757 in class with almost every other large airplane and not a heavy. I told him I was aware of this program in Memphis but not yet at any other airports in the system. He stated they have been doing it in Atlanta for almost 6 months. I have the Memo 2012 for the MEM RECAT but have not seen any other memo's on this and was Not Aware that this practice was taking place in ATL. Again I'm not sure I could have expedited my take off much more but it apparently was not fast enough for the controller.I have consulted with other pilots and we have looked up the most current rules and regulations and could not find anywhere that states this is occurring in Atlanta. Clarification to the pilot group may help eliminate the need for this report having to be filed by another pilot.

An air carrier Captain reported ATL ATC was upset because the crew delayed their takeoff for spacing behind a B757 because they were not aware the RECAT program was in effect at ATL.

1340969

201603

0001-0600

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

Night

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B777-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload

1340969

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

In about an hour when I took the desk a flight reported that ATC in ZZZZ area issued very long reroute and crew asked for help and figure out what was the reason for the offset. I advised OM; chief dispatcher and ATC coordinator desk for help to figure that out because dispatcher is not supposed to call ATC facility directly. The investigation took some time and in about 30-40 min crew reported that ATC put them back on filed route. Such deviation cost fuel and crew started thinking about a fuel stop somewhere [along the route]. Crew calculations along with mine showed that REMF [Remaining fuel] dropped down from 16.0 down to 12.5 lb or about an hour. Optimizing route did not make a difference to save fuel so I advised the crew that we were working on possible fuel stop preferably at online station. Crew decided to continue to their filed destination and make a final decision later based on fuel progress. Further investigation proved that Sabre handled airspace restriction but due to 40 mins delay it put the flight thru the time frame when restricted airspace become active.

Dispatcher reported a B777 crew on an international flight was rerouted by foreign ATC which cost time and fuel. Dispatch discovered later that a 45 minute airspace restriction along their filed route necessitated the reroute.

1480029

201708

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

None

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

Nose Gear Wheel

X

Design; Failed

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Troubleshooting

1480029

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure

Manuals

General safety concern to raise awareness of recent safety of flight issue. Three incidents of nose wheel bearing failure on Company MD-11 aircraft have occurred within the last 10 months [on three separate aircraft at 3 separate locations]. Through our software I do not see this happening prior to 11/XX/16. This issue happens at high speed during takeoff and landing. Douglas MD-11 nosewheel installation and design is unique to all other Company fleet types. My observations are as follows:1) MD-11 nose wheel final torque is the lowest of all Company fleet 25ft/lbs. Initial torque is also comparatively low. 2) Axle sleeve that contains both inner and outer bearing races (possibly migrates).3) Tang washer part# ACG7220-1 contains a small 90 degree lip. This lip must fully seat in narrow channel made by axle and axle sleeve. 4) Tang washer is a snug fit circumferentially (possibly cocks sideways during installation). 5) Safety bolt does not go through axle. Douglas MD-11 nose gear design is cantered and set back further. During hard turns heavy side loads occur on the wheel and axle in the direction of the turn.

The reporter stated he's been in the industry over 30 years and this is the first time he has seen nose wheel bearings fail. The reporter stated since the beginning of the year he has seen 4 failures. The reporter also stated that flight crews would write this up as a nose wheel vibration or shimmy and the mechanic would find the nose wheel bearings completely destroyed and the wheel leaning against the strut. The reporter stated that he doesn't have any idea of what caused the failure and only suspects that the wheel shop is installing incorrect bearings. The reporter stated since he wrote the report he has changed his mind suspecting the tab washer as being a problem.

MD-11 Maintenance Technician reported 3 incidents of nose wheel bearing failures.

1467819

201707

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

37000.0

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1467819

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

At 37;000 MSL and approximately 380 NM from destination received communication from Flight Attendant Number 3 (FA3) in Aft Galley that she was not feeling well due to an apparent odor/fume. CA/FO immediately asked for more information specific to the nature of the smell and if she could identify the location; source and severity of the situation. FA3 did not believe the problem was serious enough for medical attention but wanted to keep the aircrew informed of the abnormality. CA/FO informed dispatch via ACARS Free Text Message and spoke to FA1 directly; asking her to keep an eye on the situation and inform CA/FO of any updates. Approximately 15-20 min later; FA1 informed the CA/FO that she has rotated the flight attendant crew through the aft-most station and the situation seemed to be contained but an obvious write-up would be necessary for the next crew. Approximately 15-20 min later; all flight attendants were beginning to feel ill due to fumes in the aft galley. Shortness of breath; tingling in fingertips; and dryness of throats were the most common symptoms amongst the FA Crew. Passengers did not appear to be affected but FA1 now believed medical attention would be required upon arrival for her and her crew. At this point we were approximately 20 min from landing.CA maintained aircraft control and managed arrival into our destination; FO communicated intentions to begin descent as soon as practical; informed FA1 to put any affected crew members on oxygen as discreetly as possible and immediately notified dispatch via ACARS that medical attention is required upon arrival. After landing with all flight attendants near incapacitation the FO made multiple attempts to convince the paramedics to board and treat the most seriously injured FA as soon as possible. Paramedics refused to board the plane for fear of also succumbing to any toxic gas/fumes present. At this point FO elected to deplane all passengers and asked the CA to make a public address announcement that one of the Flight Attendants was very ill in the back of the plane and medical staff would be seen upon their deplaning. After multiple Airlines Service and Maintenance Support Personnel boarded to help the ailing FA; FO was able to convince one of the medics to proceed to the aft galley and help the most seriously impaired FA. With passenger and FA deplaning complete; CA/FO went to back of plane and noticed a very obvious; toxic; chemical-like smell immediately aft of row 24.

A319 First Officer reported an aft Flight Attendant was ill from fumes and began rotating forward flight attendants aft. By arrival time all flight attendants required medical attention for shortness of breath; fingertips tingling; and throat dryness.

1031427

201208

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Marginal

10

Daylight

2500

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Duchess 76

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Taxi

Visual Approach

Propeller Pitch Change Mechanism

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 620; Flight Crew Type 80

1031427

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

After completing several landings at a local airport; I requested a full stop taxi back to the active runway. Upon exiting the runway the propeller on the left engine feathered without an adjustment of the prop governor or a decrease in oil pressure. The RPMs were low but the manifold pressure remained high which was an immediate notification that something was not right.Because only one propeller feathered it made it difficult and unsafe to continue taxiing at the controlled airfield. I then requested assistance from Tower and informed them of the situation. We were clear of all runways but sat on Taxiway A until the FBO was able to tow us back to the ramp. The problem has occurred three times before on the same aircraft. The aircraft has been squawked previously and returned to service but the problem persists.

An instructor pilot aboard a Beech Duchess was surprised when; after turning off the runway following a landing; the left propeller feathered for no apparent reason. This was the fourth instance of this exact event despite the aircraft being returned to service following each of the prior three events.

1044061

201210

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

2100.0

VMC

Turbulence

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B727-200

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1044061

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

Non-tower operations after a significant ramp hold for weather at our destination and departure airports. Non-tower operations procedures reviewed and thoroughly briefed to include the Obstacle Departure Procedure (ODP). ATC clearance received at end of runway from Center which stated: You are released; fly runway heading; maintain 5;000; direct your first NAVAID as filed; and expect 340 ten minutes after departure; departure frequency 118.55. First Officer was flying and briefed runway heading 5;000...all other appropriate items covered with reminder of no turns below 2;000 for ODP. Takeoff uneventful with strong crosswind out of south and significant weather to the east and north. As pilot not flying; I made final call on CTAF that we were departing the airport airspace and would be turning west. Contacted Center as the First Officer entered right bank at 2;100 MSL to proceed on course (ODP). Center immediately answered my check-in and asked if we were maintaining runway heading. We had turned approximately 30 degrees right and I directed First Officer to turn immediately back to 092 degrees. Told Center we were executing ODP and turning back to runway heading. He replied OK and said we could maintain current heading which by then was back to runway heading. About 30 seconds later Center said 'Radar Contact' and gave us a right turn direct as filed. Center made no mention of any course deviation or any problem with our ground track. No other aircraft were in the immediate area and no separation issues occurred. For me; I was predisposed for the right turn on course after the ODP as that was the standard clearance we received from departure control on my two previous departures. So even though we had just briefed; 'runway heading to 5;000' as per our clearance; once airborne at the minimum turn altitude for the ODP; I expected a right turn. When the pilot flying turned right; it didn't flag as an error as it should have. Clearance was copied; appropriately briefed and two folks let 'the standard' occur when a 'non-standard' was the clearance. Don't allow familiarity with a location set 'expectation bias'.

A B727-200 departed a non towered airport cleared to maintain runway heading to 5;000 FT but at 2;000 FT turned as per the Obstacle Departure Procedure (ODP) because of a predisposition for briefed pre-takeoff procedure.

1607743

201901

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

24000.0

Turbulence

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

1607743

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather

Just after accepting [this desk] as part of the turnover process; Aircraft X sent an ACARS indicating they had just encountered severe turbulence at FL240 just west of ZZZZZ. I asked the crew to confirm severe; which they did; and we ended up conducting an ARINC call. The crew informed me they encountered SEVERE TURB; +/- 40kts; loss of control; roll to the left and right of up to 40 degrees and a loss of altitude of 200 to 300 feet. The flight was planned at FL340; above the forecast turbulence ZZZ area; which was FL260 - FL330 [along that route of flight] with remarks on the release. During the subsequent 'Call Me'; the crew indicated ATC informed them the best rides were FL240; so they halted their climb at FL240. After the severe event they descended to FL200 where they reported it was smooth. The crew informed me there were no injuries; AC (aircraft) damage; and everyone was seated including the FA's (Flight Attendants) during the severe event.

Dispatcher reported receiving a flight crew message indicating a temporary loss of aircraft control during severe turbulence encounter.

1472677

201708

0601-1200

ZSE.ARTCC

WA

17000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZSE

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Climb

Airway J54; SID SUMMA9

Class A ZSE; Class E ZSE

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1472677

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1472690.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Procedure

Filed SUMMA9 BKE transition; clearance was SUMMA9 J54 BKE. We looked and saw they overlaid each other so we left the BKE transition in the box. Approaching SUMMA and passing through transition level and running checklist; ATC gave us direct to KOTAA. Requested spelling and thought we heard KOTTA and inserted that into the box; which displayed within 160 miles of our position but not on J54. We knew something was not correct; we requested spelling again; got it in the box and were turning when ATC gave us a heading on course.Lesson learned: Type in SUMMA9 J54 BKE (without BKE transition) so as to have the points in the box.Questions I have: Why does ATC sometimes feel the need to give us a 'direct' clearance just a few miles before we are approaching a turn point? Maybe one of those two waypoints (KOTAA & KOTTA) need a name change as they are very similar and near each other.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported being cleared direct to KOTAA; but mistakenly entered KOTTA which is 221 NM southwest.

1700962

201911

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Oil Line

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1700962

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy

Human Factors

On the walk around; my FO (First Officer) informed me that the engine was leaking oil. When I went back with them to see how bad it was; I saw about 2 quarts of oil on the ground in a 3 feet wide puddle on the ground. The engine was still dripping oil and there was a noticeable trail all the way back from where we taxied in. I immediately informed Dispatch and Maintenance. When Contract Maintenance came out; they had us start the engine so they could see where the oil was coming from. During the run-up; we were losing about a quart of oil a minute and the oil was coming from a cut in a pressurized oil line. Turns out a coupling on the pneumatic hose for the starter was incorrectly installed; so that it was rubbing against a pressurized oil line and ended up chafing a 1/8 inch cut in it. It was lucky the majority of the cut happened on landing because if it happened in the air; we would have lost the engine in a matter of minutes. Maintenance also remarked that it looks like the engine was freshly installed because there were many couplings all over the engine that were improperly installed and/or loose.First Officer observed oil spillage on walk around. Improperly installed components on engine. Called Maintenance and cancelled the flight. Better maintenance inspections and stressing the importance of not skipping the walk-around.

EMB-145 Captain reported the First Officer discovering an engine oil leak during the pre-flight walkaround.

1251940

201504

1201-1800

ZMP.ARTCC

MN

Marginal

+

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1251940

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were anticipating a visual approach with weather reported as a high ceiling and 10 miles visibility. We were in icing conditions so the Pilot Flying (PF) had the flight spoilers out to keep the N2 appropriate to provide icing protection. Leveling off we were working with ATC to get the appropriate procedure if the we were unable to get the visual approach to the airport. Leaving the flight spoilers out combined with gusty winds the stick shaker activated momentarily. PF immediately increased thrust appropriately and the spoilers were retracted. Aircraft state was immediately back in a desirable state and we had the airport in sight. We were a little high and not in a great approach position so we elected to go around for a second visual approach.The root cause of this event was failure to monitor the airspeed. There were many contributing factors we were task saturated as we became uncertain this would be a visual approach. Along with icing conditions and using the spoilers for Increased N2; and gusting winds.This was certainly a chain of events that started with poor planning. The weather reports were leading us to believe a visual approach was appropriate; but perhaps we could have acted sooner to elect an approach reducing task saturation. The gusty winds played a small factor but a little more thrust a few seconds sooner and we would have been well above shaker speed.

CRJ-200 Captain reports descending in icing conditions with spoilers extended and N2 up for warmer bleed air. The spoilers are forgotten during level off and airspeed is allowed to decrease to stick shaker speed which is quickly corrected. This action produces an unstabilized approach and a go-around is initiated.

1598079

201811

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

B737-800

Taxi

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Vehicle Driver

Situational Awareness

1598079

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

Supertug was dispatched to retrieve aircraft (737-800) from Terminal. As the tow team started the pushback from [gate]; the tow team was cut off by a U.S. Customs and Border Protection pickup truck. The driver ignored multiple stop signals by move team personnel. The near miss was reported by ground-to-air radio to ramp controllers who showed zero interest in taking action; [they were] even joking about our safety concerns over the radio.

Air carrier tow truck driver reported being cut off by a U.S. Customs vehicle while towing a B737-800.

1677404

201908

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Workload

1677404

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

1677405.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Other Arrival Cargo Unloading

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

After completion of loading; ZZZ ramp personnel entered flight deck with required paperwork; [Dangerous Goods Form] and weight and balance. They handed me the two clipboards with the paperwork that needed to be signed. After signing the [Dangerous Goods Form] and weight and balance; I took a copy of the WEIGHT and BALANCE and gave them both copies of the [Dangerous Goods Form]; presuming one copy would be placed into the Hazmat pouch at entry door. We departed for ZZZ1 and found that no copies were left onboard the aircraft when we reached ZZZ1. In retrospect it is ultimately my responsibility to make sure all required paperwork is onboard prior to departure. I didn't catch the fact that ZZZ had taken both [Dangerous Goods Form] copies.

After Weight and Balance was completed in ZZZ the Captain handed the load supervisor the [Dangerous Goods Form] and release. When we landed in ZZZ1 there was no [Dangerous Goods Form] in the folder and it became apparent the load supervisor had kept both copies. We advised ZZZ1 the problem and they immediately called ZZZ. Ultimately we should have supervised her placing it in the folder but we did not.

B757 flight crew reported on arrival at destination that the required Captain's Dangerous Goods Form copy inadvertently left behind at departure airport.

1868860

202201

1801-2400

S46.TRACON

WA

TRACON S46

Air Carrier

B737-900

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B SEA

TRACON S46

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B SEA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1868860

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1868854.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

Intercepting the ILS 16R from heading 140; level 4;000; cleared for the approach. Speed assigned 170. Flaps 5 selected. At ILS GP and course intercept experienced wake turbulence. Brief stick shaker due to wake turbulence roll. Added power; recovered; stayed on ILS path and advised ATC of the encounter. Turned back on auto pilot/ throttle and shortly confirmed we were good to continue the approach. Landed without incident.Carry more speed above yellow bar; I could have configured to flaps 10.

Reporter stated wake encounter was stronger than they expected.

Wake turbulence was encountered during an ILS approach to Runway 16R in SEA after receiving approach clearance. Prior to GS intercept and maintaining 4;000 ft. at an issued speed of 170 knots; the aircraft unexpectedly jolted and rolled with varying pitch; momentarily activating the stick shaker due to the wake. Immediate recovery was conducted with a small variation in altitude while tracking the LOC path. After stabilizing the aircraft it was determined that sufficient distance remained to safely continue the approach and landing; which was conducted without incident. ATC was advised of the encounter. Maintaining extreme vigilance of wake turbulence is imperative at all times; even in the absence of an ATC transmitted 'wake turbulence' caution.

B737-900 Flight Crew reported encountering wake turbulence on descent into SEA.

1731349

202002

1201-1800

GUTER

KS

87.0

8.0

1787.0

Dusk

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Part 91

Class E ZKC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 9300; Flight Crew Type 800

1731349

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related

There is a 1;787 feet [MSL] communications tower at the 57 milepost; west side of Interstate 135 that does not have the top of the tower lighted with an obstruction light of any kind. This is a recurring hazard.

Pilot reported that there is an unlighted communications tower by an interstate freeway that poses a hazard.

1778439

202012

1201-1800

LGA.Airport

NY

0.0

Daylight

Ground LGA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Ground LGA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 19000

Situational Awareness

1778439

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

We landed on Runway 4 and due to the snow removal operations that were occurring at the time as the front had just cleared the city; with numerous taxiways closed or impassable; we were instructed to exit onto Runway 13/31 and taxi to hold short of Lima. We were then cleared onto Lima; Alpha to the gate; but it turned out that there was on outbound Company coming out of the alley. We then were told to hold short of Bravo on Lima. We did and then I heard Ground give the outbound Company aircraft instructions to taxi Lima; Bravo. I said to my FO (First Officer) that I didn't think we had room for him to clear us. As he came past Spot X I was concerned. As he started onto Lima I said 'I think this is too tight.' As he started his turn onto Lima I knew it was unsafe and I instructed him three times on Ground frequency to stop. He did. We were staring at his right winglet very close to us. I then coordinated with Company and Ground to get a tug out to us. Because we were inbound; I had the Ground Crew push us back towards Runway 13/31 on Lima to allow [the Company aircraft] to continue his taxi. We then continued to the gate. I have since talked to and debriefed the other Captain to get his view of what occurred and to talk about the safety concerns that I had. No metal was bent; but it would have if we hadn't both realized his close proximity to our aircraft. There were parallax concerns from Ground's view and the other crew's view. Speaking up is critical when things don't look right. The substantial numbers of snow removal trucks and plows along with closed taxiways that were constantly changing made it even more challenging.

Air carrier Captain reported a near collison during taxi in LGA.

1863824

202112

1201-1800

CGI.Airport

MO

360.0

30.0

3000.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke

Daylight

Center ZME

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

2.0

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class D CGI; Class E ZME

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1863824

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure

We were on the descent in to the destination airport. We were given the local Center ATC frequency which controlled the airspace to provide clearance for an approach at our destination airport. I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring). I checked in with ATC who gave us a descent to 3;000 feet. We were approximately 30 miles to the North of the airport. ATC was heard talking to multiple aircraft at a field nearby and seemed task saturated. ATC said in a non standard; not instructive radio call telling us to expect Runway 28 at the destination and that if we wanted to we could turn to XXX heading (left heading) to set up for the approach in to the airport. The way he worded it wasn't a 'Call sign; turn left heading XXX for vectors for Runway 28'. It was very non standard and caught me off guard. Due to calm winds at airport; I ignored his suggestion for a left heading and asked for the opposite end of the runway; Runway 10 which we had already set up and briefed. ATC replied back saying unable due to traffic in the area. PF (Pilot Flying) and I then began our duties of changing our runway and briefing the differences. While this was happening we were still direct to the airport. As we were leveling off at 3;000 feet we get the 'Ground Prox' flashing and the 'OBSTACLE' audio warning. I look up and see a very tall radio tower at our 12 o' clock. I immediately tell the PF to turn left heading as I informed ATC that we are in a left turn to avoid a radio tower. He doesn't seem very concerned about the situation and says the current heading we are on will work for us to get set up for the visual approach to Runway 28. Unfortunately due to hazy conditions; we were unable to locate the field for a visual approach. ATC appeared to be stressing to us to locate the field; offering the location of it several times. We assumed this was to get us off of his mind so they could focus on the several other aircraft at the other airfield nearby. I briefed with the PF that the safest thing we can do right now is have him vector us for the GPS approach for a safe approach to our destination. PF agreed and we told ATC we are requesting vectors for the GPS approach to [Runway] 28. We landed safely at our destination minutes later. On the ground we debriefed the situation and looked up the radio towers on the VFR chart of our app; showing the towers around 2487 feet; with a minimum altitude in the area of 3600 Ft. It appears we were given a lower altitude in the airspace that brought us within 500 feet of the tower which triggered the Obstacle warning.Improper ATC communication; task saturated environment for both ATC and flight crew (lack of visual scanning due to setting up for last minute runway change); lack of proper arrival briefing of obstacles outside of the terminal area and knowing lowest safe altitude we could descend to for the area we were in. I think this could have been avoided by having proper ATC instructions instead of a laid back suggestive discussion. Besides that; looking more in depth at our arrival corridor for obstacles as part of the brief would have assisted us in knowing what to expect in the area.

Pilot reported ground proximity obstacle alert due to ATC improper clearance phraseology resulted in evasive action to avoid a radio tower near CGI airport.

1783883

202101

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

115.0

2.0

2300.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Class E ZZZ

Personal

SR20

1.0

Part 91

Training

Other Manuvers

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 500

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1783883

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was instructing on a training flight; and departed from ZZZ; while climbing out and making a crosswind departure to the east. The student was flying while I was making radio calls. Upon reaching approximately 2;300 feet MSL; I caught a plane performing a steep left turn bank towards us. I took flight controls from the student and descended around 500 feet approximately 1;000 feet AGL to avoid the other traffic. I made radio calls on CTAF at the local airport and the other aircraft was not on frequency. I proceeded to warn an aircraft behind us on CTAF performing a low approach with a departure to the east as well about an aircraft performing unpredictable maneuvers on the departure end at a low altitude. Once on the ground we were able to review the flight data and track logs of the other aircraft. My assumption is the other aircraft was unaware of their proximity to the airport and performing steep turns. Another contributing factor could have been the difference in altimeter settings between the two local airports and change from departure of approximately .11 in/hg. The maneuvers were being performed outside the local practice area box. Panel mounted ADS-B-In could have assisted with our situational awareness of the aircraft location. We had a portable receiver but did not have an tablet out as we were practicing crosswind landings so we had no traffic advisory until after corrective action. Once corrective action was taken; and tablet was consulted; we still had traffic above and turning towards us from the opposite side. We maintained a low altitude until well clear of the aircraft. Which leads me to believe he was unaware of us and their proximity to other aircraft and airport.

Flight Instructor reported an NMAC occurred nearby the departure airport when another aircraft maneuvered directly into their flight path requiring evasive action. The other aircraft was not on CTAF and appeared to not be aware of their proximity to the airport.

1449675

201705

1801-2400

MDW.Airport

IL

90.0

6.0

4000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON C90

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C MDW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Physiological - Other

1449675

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Human Factors

We were shined by a green ground based laser multiple times while on visual approach at MDW. The laser went into my left eye causing my eye to water and to see a green spot when I closed my eye. I went to the hospital and was released without any permanent damage.This is the third time I have encountered a laser in flight in the last three months! We need to think asymmetrical to defeat this threat. As a past Air Defense Officer in the Army; I know an aircraft without lights is harder if not impossible to target. Therefore; I make the sincere suggestion that when any aircraft reports a laser in the area; all the other aircraft should be allowed to turn off all of their lights including their beacon and navigation lights until clear of the threat. Also; when an arrest is made; I would suggest it be publicized so these brazen people that shine lasers at aircraft will be scared of being caught.

Air carrier First Officer reported being stuck in the eye by a laser while on a night visual approach to MDW. He suggested aircraft should turn off their lights in the vicinity of a reported laser event.

1210474

201410

0601-1200

PHL.Airport

PA

800.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower PHL

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B PHL

Tower PHL

Air Carrier

Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Class B PHL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 202

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1210474

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure

This is to highlight a safety concern with our departure from PHL. We were cleared for takeoff from Runway 9L; our departure instructions were to turn left Heading 081. After lining up on RWY 9L; I transferred aircraft control to the First Officer; the Pilot Flying for this leg. Although takeoff roll and rotation were normal; during the takeoff roll I heard ATC (Philly Tower) clear another Carrier for takeoff from Runway 8; on departure his instructions were to fly Heading 050. After our rotation and gear retraction; I noticed a TCAS Traffic Alert on our navigation multifunction display without an aural warning. As I scanned to my left; I noticed the other Carrier (a Dash-8) about 400 feet below us; very slightly offset to our left. Passing about 800 AGL we received a TCAS 'Maintain Vertical Speed' aural alert with a commanded climb of about 1500 fpm (our climb rate significantly exceeded this). The FO called for the normal speed increase passing 1000 feet AGL; but I directed him to continue the climb as the Dash-8 was maintaining an approximately 400 feet vertical separation and approximately 100 feet lateral separation. After a while the Dash-8 turned left and ceased to be a factor. I'm surprised this is an accepted procedure with PHL departures. There should be more separation between aircraft departing RWY 9L and RWY 8 in PHL. At the very least; RWY 9L departures should get a slight right turn (at least 090) and RWY 8 departures should get a left turn to provide lateral separation from the beginning of the departure phase. Heading 081 after departing 9L actually places the aircraft closer to RWY 8.

B737 Captain believes that the practice by PHL Tower of departing aircraft simultaneously of Runway 9L and 8 is unsafe.

1825706

202107

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Class A ZZZ

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting

1825706

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting

1825707.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Aircraft

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

Company Aircraft X; ZZZ to ZZZ1 departed at XA:00. We took off from Runway XX with right turn radar vector to a heading of 270. I was the pilot flying and my Captain was the monitoring pilot. We were in a normal climb and around 5;000 feet we got an advisory message; cyan color in the EICAS. The message we received said 'PACK 1 VLV CLSD.' Captain pulled the QRH; which indicated to reset the associated pack by pressing and then depressing the pack 1 button. The Captain did so and the message went away. We kept climbing and the same message then came back; she ran QRH again but I suggested to press the PACK 1 button; give it a few seconds; and then depress it again. The message went away. Passing 18;000 cleared to climb to FL330; the same message came back. At this time I felt like I was getting unusually hot even though we were flying against the sun. However; I checked the ECS and it showed 29 degrees Celsius in the cockpit and about 19 in the back. Captain did the QRH again and it told us to maintain FL250 and so Captain requested FL250 due to Pack issues. Captain then immediately looked for the cabin altitude in the EICAS and verified it in the QRH. QRH suggested a cabin altitude of 2700 and the EICAS showed a cabin altitude of 2900 and climbing. At that point Captain asked the FO (First Officer) to initiate an emergency descent immediately. Memory items were then performed by the FO while Captain asked ATC for an altitude descent to 10;000 feet. ATC asked to confirm the clearance descent to 10;000 and whether we were requesting priority. The Captain responded affirmative to both. The Captain then coordinated with the Flight Attendant for an emergency descent. We did the emergency descent QRH. Once we were in a stable descent at a rate of approximately 5;500 feet per minute while descending and keeping 245 to 250 kts for landing gear limitation; FO and Captain asked each other if they were ok and the answer was yes. Passing 15;000 feet; FO started reducing the rate of descent to 3;000 feet per minute and kept reducing the rate of descent gradually to 1;000 feet per minute by the time we got to 11;000. At 10;000 feet FO changed the plane to a clean configuration; we then requested radar vectors back to ZZZ and proceeded with normal flight. Aircraft X landed back in ZZZ with no further issues or incident.

During climb around 5;000 feet 'PACK 1 VLV CLSD' showed on the EICAS. CA (Captain) reset the associated pack; message extinguished and showed up again after a few minutes. Message persisted 3 more times. Pack one was reset 3 times following QRH procedures. CA messaged Dispatcher to run numbers for FL250 as it was the max altitude per QRH with one pack inoperative. CA put a request for the new altitude with ATC. Around FL210 CA noticed on the EICAS the cabin altitude was increasing quick and referred to the QRH. Airplane altitude was FL210 and cabin altitude was at FL290. CA told FO (First Officer) to initiate an emergency descent; advised ATC and Dispatch and was cleared to return to ZZZ and land. FA (Flight Attendant) was notified as soon as the pressurization problem was noticed and [procedure] was performed. FA was advised to prepare the cabin for landing. After reaching 10;000 feet FO and CA performed QRC and QRH. FO was flying; CA acquired landing data; and set up the approach. FO landed safely. Aircraft was deplaned and taken for maintenance.

Flight Crew reported a pack valve failure caused the cabin to not pressurize and resulted in descent and precautionary landing.

1600215

201812

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

200.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Situational Awareness

1600215

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Vertical 800

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

My student and I were on short final for Runway 10 at ZZZ when we each observed an unmanned aircraft operating directly above the airport at what appeared to be pattern altitude or possibly lower. It was difficult to gauge the size of the drone from our perspective but I would say at least 6 feet from wingtip to wingtip. We landed normally--we had been planning to fly the closed traffic pattern for a few circuits at ZZZ but quickly decided after seeing the drone to depart the area for the day; which we did without seeing the drone again. We had been monitoring the CTAF since 15 miles out and had communicated our position and intentions for a straight-in approach several times; starting at 8 miles away. No one else had made radio transmissions at ZZZ the whole time. After landing back at [home airport] and concluding the flight; we spoke on the phone to someone at an FBO listed at ZZZ. He said 'the drone people had been asking (him) earlier that morning if (he) could hear them on the frequency;' and he said he hadn't been able to hear them. Obviously we could not either. He suggested we file [this] report.

C172 Flight Instructor reported an airborne conflict with a UAV in the airport traffic pattern.

1014252

201206

0601-1200

LGA.Airport

NY

0.0

Mixed

5

Daylight

1600

Tower LGA

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B LGA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 285; Flight Crew Type 14000

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1014252

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 275; Flight Crew Type 7000

1014258.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

Human Factors

We took off without a proper takeoff clearance at LGA. LGA was landing 4 (ILS) and departing 13. Taxi times for departure were probably 45 to 50 minutes or so due to the weather and time of departure. Both the Ground and Local Controllers were doing an excellent job of keeping things moving along. It was finally our turn to depart and we were cleared to line up and hold on Runway 13; which we did. The brakes were set and I transferred aircraft control to the First Officer as it was his leg. We were cleared via the TNNIS Departure (an RNAV departure with a track outbound on a 050 course). As a Company flight was landing on Runway 4; we heard the Tower issue a go-around to another flight on the approach; but didn't really catch the call sign. As our company aircraft is turning off the runway onto Taxiway G; we see another flight on the approach a few miles or so out and the Tower cleared them to land; hence we mentioned to one another that the flight which was issued the go-around must be behind them. We are both used to the pace of LGA operations and the next thing we both believed we heard was a clearance for us to takeoff but to maintain runway heading. All of this made sense to us and we figured the runway heading and 3;000 FT clearance was to prevent a conflict with the aircraft going around. I read back the takeoff clearance and we commenced our departure. After we were airborne; the Tower advised that we had departed without a takeoff clearance and to contact Departure Control. Turns out the runway heading and 3;000 FT clearance was for the flight on the go-around; which had a very similar call sign also ending in #. I believe it may have been another carrier's # and we were Company #. Needless to say; neither one of us was too pleased to find this out. I cannot tell you if this was caused by some radio transmissions being incomplete due to the circumstances and frequency congestion; or a possible assumption on our part that the clearance was for us because it was understandable given these circumstances; and furthered by the similar sounding call signs. What I can tell you is if I should ever find us facing a similar scenario (a high volume airport with intersecting operations; combined with some weather and a not necessarily normal event occurring - i.e.; a go-around); I will make absolutely sure that the clearance was for our flight. Nonetheless; there was no conflict with any other aircraft and our flight proceeded uneventfully.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

An air carrier aircraft departed LGA Runway 13 without takeoff clearance because they became confused about which aircraft ATC was issuing clearances to and thought their callsign was given a takeoff clearance.

1846362

202110

0601-1200

ZID.ARTCC

IN

0.0

Center ZID

Air Carrier

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Class C CMH

Facility ZID.ARTCC

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1846362

Facility ZID.ARTCC

Government

Approach; Instructor

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Troubleshooting; Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1846367.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Procedure

I was advised that CMH Approach was going ATC Zero for cleaning. The time was XA:00-XC:00Z. The supervisor at CMH Approach called just before XA:00 telling me they were going zero and they had a LOT of planes to hand us. The controllers received the airspace. We were waiting on the down time for one aircraft. Problem #1 with us taking CMH airspace. The pilots cannot communicate with us when they are on the ground at CMH. We have to wait for them to call us. We ended up calling the company of the aircraft and received a confirmation that the aircraft was down. The pilot called about 30 minutes later to report his down time. In the meantime; I had phone call after phone call from pilots requesting a departure clearance. A couple of them wanted clearance to push off. They were calling the supervisor phone; rather than the sector phone. I advised them that it was going to be 30+ minutes before we could give a clearance as we were waiting for a down time. One pilot called for his take off clearance but he said there were 2 planes in front of him waiting at the runway. We had no way of knowing who was out there waiting. The biggest problem of all was Command Center refusing to put out a stop to CMH until AFTER they were ATC Zero. When we take their airspace; it is one in; one out. That is it. When we clear someone in; it takes a minimum of 20 minutes for the pilot to call us with a down time. Slowing down the traffic; unless you do this cleaning in the middle of the night; is a must when a center takes over an approach control's airspace. This was a set up for failure. The FAA did not provide Indy Center the tools we needed for success.When a facility goes zero; a stop or slowing down the traffic is a must. Not an optional thing. If there are more than 3 aircraft inbound; they need to be slowed down. Weather or no weather; we can only have one in or out at a time. ONE. Putting extra workload on other area's/facilities because someone at Command Center doesn't know how air traffic in a Center works is a set up for failure.The next solution is to STOP cleaning facilities in the middle of the day. They need to be done late night or very early morning.

CMH app went ATC zero around XA:00 Local yesterday for COVID cleaning. Never did our sector team do anything unsafe and I am proud of our work. Besides that; it was chaotic and confusing. There were so many people in our ears asking us questions and causing distractions. At one point at the sector; there was: R-side; D-side trainee; OJTI (me); name; on the FLM phone; and Name 1; Name 2; Name 3 from 3; Name 4 from 5 all pow wowing in a very small area a few steps away. It was loud and confusing. It did not help sector ops one bit. When we took over the airspace; Aircraft X was the last aircraft to land CMH. We NEVER got a down time from him so it tied up all 3 of the airports for a good 15 mins. Also; due to automation; his track just disappeared so no one remembered his exact call sign. CMH should have waited until he was on the ground before handing it off to us. Also; we could not let anyone depart because of it. The departures were calling the sup desk which is a terrible idea. No one was getting phone numbers so we couldn't call them back to give them a clearance. When name was on the phone; I asked him to get the phone number and he did. It didn't matter anyway because we never released anyone. That being said; there was PRESSURE put upon the sector team to start departing aircraft. It was uncalled for and added to the sector stress. How can we depart anyone if we are still waiting for a down time or aircraft on approach? I was going to call Aircraft Y to give a Hold for release clearance but no one had a way of getting a hold of him (phone number). I asked Name 1 to call dispatch to get his phone number and I believe she tried. We were specifically told to treat CMH; OSU; and LCK as one airport by management. For management to start pressuring us to depart aircraft that are safely on the ground is unsafe and irresponsible. Because CMH went ATC ZERO we had numerous automation issues which complicates matters. My trainee attempted to inbound an OSU arrival doing an RNAV approach but OSU tower blew us off and told us that CMH app was going to open soon and to wait. Wait?! why? A few minutes later; CMH app opens and calls us but the controller has no help. I had roughly 8-10 planes to manually hand off and he couldn't take them all because it was too many for him at one time. I specifically gave him the OSU arrival first because he needed an arrival clearance that we couldn't give him because OSU wanted us to wait. I could hear the CMH app controller silence that inbound when the arrival was 1-2 mins away from the IAF while I was attempting to hand other aircraft off to him. About 4-5 minutes later I called back and handed 2 more aircraft off to him trying to give him time. 1 aircraft he was blocking for and another was new caught in the transition time.Recommendations: DO NOT COVID clean in the middle of the day.If it MUST happen; no departures scheduled during that time.No taking approach airspace while a CMH arrival is still on approach.

ZID FLM and Controller reported CMH airport going ATC zero and described all the issues associated with the closure.

1742101

202005

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

12000.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B747-800 Advanced

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Trailing Edge Flap

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1742101

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

While vectoring around weather while approaching ZZZZ; the had a problem with the Flap Monitor System and a Flap Drive Message. The flaps had not been deployed yet. The Captain and other first officer worked the checklist while I maintained control of the aircraft. After working through the checklist we still did not know the status of the flap system or if the problem could be fixed in a timely manner on the ground in ZZZ. The Captain called the company on the SAT Phone while I continued flying the aircraft. At this point; the three of us did not feel confident that we would not get stuck in ZZZZ with an AOG (Aircraft on ground) aircraft. We asked to divert to ZZZZ1 and have the problem fixed there. After some discussion between the Captain and company; the decision was made and we proceeded to ZZZZ1. Repairs took longer than hoped and after about 1 hour we were told to go to the hotel. The only concerning part of this situation was Maintenance control asked the Captain to use ALTERNATE FLAPS. The checklist specifically says not to use ALTERNATE FLAPS. The Captain refused. While in flight; Maintenance Control should not ask the crew to perform a function that is against what is written in the checklist. That particular prohibition is there because 'Asymmetry and uncommanded motion protection are not provided in Alternate Model. Also; since I was flying and dealing with Country ATC I did not hear all discussions between the Captain and company; so for that reason if more info or different info is available I defer to the Captains report.

First Officer reported an uncommanded inflight engine shutdown; causing a diversion and landing.

1434511

201703

1201-1800

LGB.Airport

CA

5000.0

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class E SCT

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1434511

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Procedure

Aircraft X was on the new METROPLEX RNAV approach inbound to LGB. The pilot was given the phraseology to descend via except maintain 5000. The pilot read back everything correctly but was confused by what that meant with the new procedures. The pilot immediately started to descend to 5000 instead of complying with the crossing restrictions of the arrival. Since it's a new procedure; I asked the pilot if he was descending with arrival which the pilot responded yes. When I pulled up the map he was way below the arrival and also below the MVA.It's early in the Metroplex implementation but some of the pilots still seem confused on what they are supposed to be doing with the procedure changes.

SCT TRACON Controller reported confusion from an inbound LGB pilot on a the new Metroplex RNAV Approach clearance.

1299673

201510

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

30600.0

Turbulence

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1299673

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Weather

On descent encountered severe turbulence FL306 through approximately FL260. ATC cleared us from FL360 to FL280 told us there had been turbulence reported FL330 to FL300 but no specific area or intensity. Seat belt sign was on already so I tried to expedite through the altitudes we were warned of and descended at .76 Mach to 280 knots for turbulence penetration. Severe lasted about 2-3 minutes and we got clearance to continue descent to FL240; about FL260 it smoothed out. As soon as we were able we checked with the FAs and learned one was injured. [Advised ATC] and were given priority handling. EMTs met the plane and she and a passenger complaining of back pain were taken to the hospital.

B737-800 pilot reported encountering severe turbulence on descent that resulted in injuries to a flight attendant and a passenger.

1606039

201812

28000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Cockpit Window

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1606039

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1606040.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

At cruise altitude of FL280; Flight Crew noticed that the CA (Captain) side windshield was developing a crack. Flight Crew immediately notified ATC and requested a lower altitude and after careful evaluation; requested vectors to [an alternate airport]. Shortly after; the windshield shattered; now obstructing the CA's view. Flight Crew then accepted vectors to [the alternate].Visual scan by the Flight Crew of the cockpit and outside. First noticed brown crack along the top half of the windshield; along with some additional cracks toward the edges. Over the next few minutes; Flight Crew took note that these were possibly expanding; and were now developing air bubble-like patterns. Cause of the windshield fracture is unknown at this time.CA assumed PF (Pilot Flying) duties; and directed FO (First Officer) to notify Center of the situation and to request a lower altitude. Center cleared us down to lower altitude and shortly after cleared us to 10000 feet. Passing through FL200; a loud pop was heard by Flight Crew; and this was accompanied by the now shattered windshield. By this time; the decision was made to request radar vectors to nearest airport. Controls were once again transferred to the FO; and CA assumed monitoring duties; including setting up for an approach. Dispatch was notified via ACARS. FAs (Flight Attendants) were notified and briefed. Passengers were notified that flight was being diverted due to maintenance issue; and that more information would be available on the ground; once at the gate. Around this time; Flight Crew got a 'L WSHLD HEAT' caution message. CA ran appropriate QRH and message was extinguished. This message came on two more times prior to landing. Flight Crew was given vectors for a visual approach. Flight landed and safely taxied to assigned gate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported diverting to an alternate airport after the Captain's side windshield shattered.

1018150

201206

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

37000.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft Auto Temperature System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 6500

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Physiological - Other; Distraction

1018150

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

Cabin temperature was uncontrollable. At one point First Class temperature read 95 degrees and economy showed 92 degrees. After Captain conferred with Maintenance Control and Dispatch; decision was made to divert to a nearby airport which was along our route of flight. Center helped coordinate.

A B757 Cabin temperature became uncontrollable while in cruise at FL370 so the flight diverted to a nearby airport.

1111221

201308

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

32000.0

VMC

Thunderstorm

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 179; Flight Crew Type 10000

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1111221

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 134

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1111256.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Weather; Procedure

Procedure

Enroute; surrounded by convective conditions and following many prior deviations around large thunderstorms; we had a cell appear on the radar approximately 17 miles directly ahead on our course. We asked ATC for '10 right' to avoid the cell ahead. ATC's response was to standby. Cell depiction then turned to lightning bolt symbol. About 12 miles from cell; we contacted ATC again requesting 10 right for weather ahead. The ATC response again was to standby. Five prior to cell; ATC contacted us and asked what we wanted. We advised we were turning right to avoid cell ahead. ATC Controller then told us we were violating our clearance and wanted to know what emergency we were declaring. We advised we were turning for weather and ATC Controller then launched into a dialogue about how he was too busy directing traffic to deal with us and how we needed to declare an emergency if we wanted to deviate from his clearance; etc. Basically; instead of providing assistance and doing his job; the Controller appeared to be seeking conflict with us. I do not believe any violation of regulations occurred. This report is being provided based upon the recommendation from the Company ATC Specialist.

We were enroute and I was the pilot flying. We were flying in an area with scattered very large air mass thunderstorms. Some storms exceeded over 50;000 FT and were still building. We had been deviating for the last 200 NM over the front range of the Rockies. We could see thunderstorms rapidly building around and in front of us. Several times during the flight we were IMC and were flying around embedded thunderstorms. After navigating through a very large line of thunderstorms; we were able to proceed direct [to] an intersection on the RNAV arrival. Many aircraft were deviating around the storms too. We had been at FL360 and ATC descended us to FL320. We entered a layer and became IMC. We were approaching a thunderstorm cell [that] was building 20 NM in front of us. I asked the Captain; who was the pilot not flying; what he thought and we both agreed we should deviate around the storm to the north because there was large storms to the south. The Captain made three attempts to contact Center. The thunderstorm was rapidly building and was now above our altitude. We estimated the top of this storm to be above 42;000 FT. We received a lightning symbol over the storm and a magenta core had developed indicating a severe storm. The Captain attempted to contact Center again and received no response. I made the decision to deviate 10 degrees to the north. The thunderstorm had built so rapidly that I had to turn further 20 degrees to avoid contact with the storm. The Captain finally was able to establish contact with Center to tell him we were deviating to the north. The Controller became very irate and asked us if we were declaring an emergency. We told him no. Center angrily told us we had 'no right to deviate' from our clearance and demanded us to declare an emergency. The Captain and I were perplexed at the reaction of this Air Traffic Controller. The Center Controller began his tirade to us that he was busy coordinating a RJ and another 737 around thunderstorms and he was 'doing his job' and demanded that we declare an emergency. The Captain professionally told the Center Controller that he was exercising his authority for the safety of the flight to deviate around this severe thunderstorm and we were now proceeding direct to cleared intersection. We only deviated five NM to the north of this thunderstorm and the only closest aircraft was another carrier's flight 20 NM behind us at our altitude and they needed to deviate too. After landing; the Captain contacted Dispatch and spoke with the Supervisor about the incident and then spoke with a Company ATC Representative. The Company ATC Representative told us we did not violate any FAR's and recommended we both submit a report.

A B737-800 crew diverted around a fast building; severe thunderstorm without clearance because ATC failed to answer their request in a timely manner but the Controller objected to their action because no emergency was declared.

1155676

201403

0001-0600

OAKX.ARTCC

FO

Center OAKX

Air Carrier

B747-400

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Human-Machine Interface

1155676

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

The flight conditions were typical for this time of year with considerable weather and turbulence for the last 40 minutes of the flight. As we entered Bagram's airspace we were told that due to traffic we would be held high longer than normal. We approached the airport from the west and were being vectored northbound on the west side of the airport. When finally given descent clearance we were requested to maintain a speed of 300 KTS. This is a higher speed than we normally use when descending into Bagram; as a lower speed allows us to have a greater angle of descent. Once north of the field we were vectored to the east side of the airport for a downwind and base for Runway 03. The Controller was busy with other aircraft in our vicinity so when he turned us southbound for a downwind I asked the First Officer to request direct GINRI and clearance to begin the approach from that point as it would a better option. We were cleared as requested. I then had the First Officer request a speed reduction so that we would not overshoot the DME arc. We slowed to 210 KTS while descending to GINRI. When the aircraft began its turn to join the arc just prior to GINRI (still in the descent to 12;500) the First Officer asked me if I would like him to set a lower altitude in the MCP window. I said no as I wanted the aircraft to capture the altitude so that we could change modes from VNAV SPD to VNAV PTH. At this point Approach Control called out two aircraft in our area and asked us to slow to final approach speed. I was looking for the traffic; while slowing as requested; when the First Officer set the MCP altitude to 7;000 FT anyway thinking that the aircraft would descend on profile. We had not captured our altitude of 12;500 when he did this and the aircraft continued descent in VNAV SPD. When my attention returned inside the aircraft I noticed that we were low for that segment of the arc. There is a mountain ridge between GINRI and DAPUB which requires us to maintain 12;500 FT between these two points. Knowing this I disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles and began a climb to the correct altitude for that segment of the arc. At virtually the same time I did this we received a terrain warning from the GPWS. We reestablished ourselves at the proper altitude on the arc and continued the approach; landing without further incident. Other points to note are that all 4 crewmembers were in the cockpit for the descent and approach. The Captain of the second crew called out altitude as I was beginning the process of correcting it. Approach Control did not query us when we descended below the required altitude. I had weather displayed and the First Officer had terrain displayed.

B747 Captain describes an approach into OAIX where the aircraft is allowed to go below profile due to the First Officer setting a lower altitude in the MCP window before the previous altitude had been captured by the autopilot. This overshoot is quickly detected and corrected by the flying Captain.

1174636

201405

VMC

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other N/A

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 15100; Flight Crew Type 6200

Other / Unknown; Training / Qualification

1174636

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

Ambiguous

New Briefing Page format and major changes. We were enroute to ABQ and were discussing the arrival to Runway 26; the active runway at the time. We talked about the high terrain east of the airport and plotted some references in the FMGC and discussed that although there are two RNAV approaches in the database; we have no charts for those approaches (turns out they are RNP and NA). I had looked at the Briefing Page earlier to review how close the nearest alternates were and added some fuel because of the distance and the winds. I also noted the format and thought how difficult it was to read because of the typeface and font size. We both looked at the Briefing Page while planning the landing phase; primarily for gate information and I glanced through the notes and thought there was a lot less information than before; I believe turbulence and wind shear used to be discussed. The safety alert (in relatively big print and boxed) discusses arrivals to 26; but nothing about not using the runway. After discussing our arrival plan; I took another look at the Briefing Page; and saw; in very small type; that 26 was not authorized at night. My First Officer and I both thought 26 was a better option than Runway 30; which is only 6;000 feet long at the high altitude airport; but because of the recent change; it was our only option. Fortunately; the winds died down and ATC was able to fit us onto Runway 30. I called Dispatch and he was not aware of the change either and thought (as do I); that this should have been a NOTAM. I contacted [a fleet Captain] for the A320 who confirmed this was a recent change; he was also surprised at the Briefing Page format. He told me that a published visual approach is being worked on; but when winds are out of the west; the current situation is not good. When major changes to an airport's operation are made it should not be buried in small print. It is not even prominent in the Runway 26 notes; it is last. In journalism; they call it burying the lead! Finally; the [old] format is much easier to read; especially at night and THERE ARE REVISION BARS! That way; changes; even if buried; would be more apparent.

A319 Captain reports discovering enroute to ABQ that night visual approaches to Runway 26 are no longer authorized by his company and that the change is not obvious when scanning the Briefing Page.

1067515

201302

ZZZ.Airport

US

4300.0

Fighting Falcon F16

Part 91

VFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Fighting Falcon F16

VFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

1067515

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors

Aircraft X initially checked in indicating he was on the straight in; non-standard approximately 7 mile final. I issued a landing clearance and traffic; 'F16's will over take you high in the overhead; currently at 5;000 feet.' Aircraft Y checked in almost on top of Aircraft X and I immediately asked him if he had Aircraft X in sight ahead of him. He said 'RADAR contact; but no joy' which meant to me he had them on RADAR but not visually in sight out the window. I instructed Aircraft Y to maintain his current altitude and that traffic was 200 feet below him. Then I issued a follow up traffic report that it appeared that he was between the 2 non-standard F16's on the straight in. Aircraft Y eventually reported climbing to 4;500 feet and proceeding to initial. In my opinion the mistakes were made due to traffic volume and no assist position being manned in the arrival position. The Arrival Controller was over saturated and couldn't keep up with the traffic and proper scratchpad entries. The aircraft were handed off to me on top of each other; above the overhead pattern altitude without each other in sight.

Tower Controller described a conflict event when one flight of military fighters passed another flight on final; the reporter claiming the RADAR Controller was saturated and should have had some assistance.

1696108

201910

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

31500.0

VMC

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR ZZZZZ

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 169; Flight Crew Total 2352; Flight Crew Type 2352

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1696108

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

We were on the arrival into ZZZZ and I was about half way through my approach brief. ZZZZ Center gave us a descend via about 40 miles outside of top of descent. I put the airplane into a descend now mode from our cruise altitude of FL330 and the airplane started down at 1;000 feet per min in VNAV. The first fix to cross was ZZZZZ at FL300 and 280 kts. Autopilot and autothrottle were engaged. Once everything looked kosher; I resumed my brief. I remember at some point looking up and seeing the airplane at FL315 descending in VNAV while I was finishing my brief. At some point shortly after; I felt the airplane pitching over rapidly. I noticed that the Vertical Deviation Scale on the VNAV display said we were 6;500 feet above the path. The airplane began diving for the path. I reached up to the FCP to begin fixing the issue by trying to engage V/S and shallowing out the descent. It didn't engage and that is when I noticed the airplane was in 'control wheel pitch.' The airplane was still rapidly descending increasing its airspeed. I extended the flight spoilers; disengaged the autopilot and auto-throttle; and began hand flying the airplane to a desirable state. The airplane had over sped by my estimate of around 10 kts; but everything happened so quickly that it was hard to judge. I arrested the descent around FL290 about 5 miles prior to ZZZZZ; which needed to be crossed at FL300. The Vertical Deviation Scale still said we were thousands of feet above the path. How is that possible when we were prior to and below the altitude of the first crossing restriction? ZZZZZ had FL300 'big' correctly in the FMC. I hand flew the airplane back up to FL300 and 280 kts. The Vertical Deviation Scale for the VNAV display had disappeared from sight and then reappeared to show right on path. The Captain and I were left scratching our heads. I asked for everything to be re-engaged as well as VNAV. The airplane was happy now and performed flawlessly all the way into ZZZZ. ZZZZ Center said nothing and didn't seem to even notice. The Captain wrote up the overspeed and we alerted station ops that there was a maintenance write up upon arrival. My only conclusion is that the airplane's VNAV got disoriented or confused for a bit. It's always possible for human error; but I can't put my finger on a mistake that was made that would've told the airplane to do that.

B737 First Officer reported that the autopilot made an uncommanded descent while on approach that resulted in an overspeed.

1736305

202003

0.0

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

High

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Deplaning

Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant

1736305

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Deplaning

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Other / Unknown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant

1736314.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

After we arrived in ZZZ; we left XX passengers on the plane before the next crew was at the aircraft. We left for our next flight. We had a medical incident onboard during the flight. While our CRM was effective; there were many decisions to be made. While our country is currently in a national emergency; any serious medical event leads to uncertainty. All three flight attendants were in constant communication with the Captain. At first we were told no passengers could leave the aircraft when we landed. We had passengers who were aware of the situation and wanted to be involved. Of course our first priority was the safety of our passengers and crew; we also were aware of the effect any decision would have on the company. After discussion with Station Ops and Dispatch; the Captain was instructed to not hold the passengers; and that the aircraft would be cleaned upon arrival. We also spent the entire flight containing the incident so all passengers felt at ease about their safety. I felt we were successful. However; in this coronavirus environment; it was very stressful and we had to remain calm and in control. We were dealing with many different situations and important decisions during the flight.

After the deplaning of Flight XYZ from ZZZ to ZZZ1; the one of the crew members failed to stay with the XX through passengers. During this flight; we encountered many distractions including a passenger that vomited in the forward lav and we alerted the Captain due to the national concern over the scare of the coronavirus. The crew maintained excellent CRM skills when communicating with the flight deck. The flight deck notified medical service and Dispatch. I was also comforting a woman who was flying to see her gravely ill mother.

Flight Attendants reported concerns about a sick passenger in their flight.

1499673

201711

1801-2400

SAT.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Poor Lighting

Night

Ground SAT

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1499673

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1499670.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Chart Or Publication

Chart Or Publication

Upon landing on RWY 13R at SAT; we cleared the runway at taxiway D and proceeded to taxi straight ahead to the terminal. Apparently a new 'island' has been installed at the intersection of taxiway D and G that is not depicted on the 10-9 plate dated 17 Nov 17. There is a large gap in the taxiway blue marking lights right at the end of taxiway D. I ended up taxiing straight ahead between this large gap and transgressed into the island area. We realized that we were in the island area and started to taxi clear; but stopped because we might hit one of the ground taxi lights. We called Ground Control and advised them of our situation. We also called Base Ops and requested they send the tug out to our position. Ground Control sent over an operations vehicle to see if we could taxi clear of island without hitting any taxi lights. The Ops personnel informed us that we did not hit any taxi lights but might not clear them if we taxied clear of island. I decided to shut down both engines and have the tug hook us up and tow us clear of the island and to the gate. This is what we did and there was no damage to aircraft or any ground equipment or taxi lights.From the communications with SAT Ground Control; this new island has caused numerous problems with other aircraft exiting the runway at taxiway D also. Poor island placement and poor lighting depicting it. It was not depicted on the most recent 10-9 SAT Airport diagram. Night time arrival. Update the 10-9 Airport Diagram to depict the new island and possibly put a Hot Spot area at intersection of taxiway D and G. Also 1 or 2 additional blue taxi lights should be placed in the large gap at the end of taxiway D.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported entering an uncharted and poorly lighted island area while taxiing at SAT airport.

1188816

201407

1201-1800

AMA.Airport

TX

TRACON AMA

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Class C AMA

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown

1188816

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

Descending into AMA and given the GPS 22 approach cleared direct to a transition fix; cleared for the approach. Both FMS's looked good. Hit the fix and aircraft started turning the wrong way. As I was checking what might be the reason and about to ask for a heading; the Controller said I see you turning off course; what do you want to do? I said the FMS's still look good but aircraft turned the wrong way; give us whatever heading you need. We will reset the FMS's; request vectors to the approach. He gave us a couple of headings; asked if we were ready for the approach; I doubled checked everything; said yes. He cleared us for the approach and we flew the approach with no problem; landed. Thought about it a lot; First Officer and I talked about it. Still not sure why the aircraft did that as the courses looked good. The course lines were connected on both FMS's. We had already flown two other GPS's on this trip; one earlier that day with no problems. It shows the importance for the non-flying pilot's duty of monitoring the approach all the time in case of a glitch like this; rare as they are.

EMB-145 Captain experiences a turn in the wrong direction during a GPS Runway 22 approach at AMA; with the FMS and autopilot controlling the aircraft. Vectors are requested and the second approach is successful.

1010977

201205

0601-1200

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

22000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Indicating and Warning - Hydraulics

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

1010977

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1011274.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During Descent and going through FL220; EICAS showed a R HYD QTY and also RSVR light on the overhead panel. Status page of engine showed an 'RF' on the right system and also a QTY indication between .04 and .09. QRH was checked and landed the aircraft without incident. Emergency was declared.

The Reporter stated that all quantity indications returned to normal after landing and maintenance determined that the hydraulic quantity sensor failed.

A B757 EICAS alerted R HYD QTY; the RSVR light illuminated and the quantity indicating 0.09 so the QRH procedure was completed; an emergency declared followed by a normal landing after which all quantity indications returned to normal.

1433144

201703

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

1433144

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I received a 4 chime call from our Number 1 Flight Attendant. In a panicky voice; I was informed that there was fire and smoke in the cabin; and that we need to land immediately. We advised ATC and started our divert. During our descent; My First Officer suggested that we add the drag to help get the descent going as I started to slow through 265 as we were approaching 10000 ft. I thought we were fine. As we continued coordination with ATC; AARF; and Flight Attendants - I then decided that the gear would be a good option. I was hand flying and proceeding directly to the outer marker. I glanced at the airspeed and thought I saw 265 again and called for gear down; My First Officer put gear down as he was saying verified. And then said not verified and immediately put the handle back up. The gear never moved. Just the handle. I was around 285. So either I misread the airspeed and thought I was at 265. Or I was at 265 and pushed the nose over while hand flying and called gear down and airspeed crept up quickly. The correction was so swift that I quickly dismissed it. The rest of divert went well.Nothing I would change as I thought I saw the correct gear speed. If anything; slow a little bit down. Pressed a little [more] than other emergencies due to it was smoke in the cabin and hearing the panic in the flight attendant voice.

B737-800 Captain reported the landing gear lever was moved to the down position at a speed higher than authorized during a rapid descent.

1009328

201205

1201-1800

BNA.Airport

TN

45.0

20.0

4000.0

VMC

20

Daylight

TRACON BNA

Personal

Baron 58/58TC

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZME

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1009328

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Airspace Structure

Procedure

[I] was working Nashville Approach on an IFR flight plan that routed us to the east of Nashville; on a northwest track. Approach gives us an 80 degree heading change for vectors around a military operating area. We found that strange; as there were no NOTAMs; TFRs or MOAs depicting this activity. When asked what the deal was; Approach said that was a jet practice session for an up and coming air show. We strongly feel that if a group of military jets are practicing for an air show; at LEAST a NOTAM would be appropriate. We would have normally flown this route VFR and would have never known.

A BE58 pilot filed IFR on a route he normally flew VFR and on this particular day was vectored around a non NOTAMed military airshow training session which he would not have known about if VFR.

1003032

201204

1201-1800

MEM.Airport

TN

2000.0

TRACON M03

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Climb

Class B MEM

Y

Facility M03.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1003032

Facility MEM.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1003036.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

A CRJ2 departed Runway 36C on the CRSON1 RNAV departure; which should be approximately a 010 heading for about 12 miles then a northeast turn. I observed the aircraft make a turn to the northwest approximately 1 mile off the departure end. I made sure Tower didn't have any conflicting departures and then coordinated with West Departure. I asked the aircraft which fix he was heading to. The pilot responded 'RNAV to CASLN' which is a northwest departure only used on the midnight shift. I told the CRJ2 that their flight plan was for CRSON and spelled it for him. The pilot stated that CRSON was not in their data base. I then gave the pilot a radial to join off of the Memphis VOR and coordinated with ZME. I believe that this would be easily avoidable by re-naming one of the two RNAV departures. They are very similar sounding and in spelling.

I cleared a CRJ2 for takeoff with the following phraseology: 'CRJ2 Runway 36C; RNAV to SLONN; cleared for takeoff.' The aircraft read back correctly. I observed the aircraft airborne off the departure end and switched him to Departure. I gave control instructions to other aircraft. When I scanned the departure corridor I noticed that the CRJ2 had turned to the northwest when he should have turned to the northeast. I alerted the Local Control 1 Controller that the aircraft had encroached into his airspace. At that time the Departure Controller called and queried the situation. I told him Local Control 1 had no conflicting traffic. The Departure Controller advised me that the aircraft stated he was RNAV to CASLN and did not have the transition fix CRSON (which was part of his filed flight plan) in his database. Tower needs to issue vectors to departures instead of allowing RNAV aircraft to fly up to two miles off the departure end while 'hunting for their next fix' on RNAV departures. If this aircraft was issued a vector; this potentially catastrophic situation never would have happened. We were fortunate that Local Control 1 did not have a simultaneous departure which is a frequent occurrence at this airport.

M03 Controller described a developing conflict invoving IFR departures assigned RNAV SIDS. The reporters indicated that both similar sounding fix names CRSON and CASLN as well as Controller awareness issues were causal factors.

1563069

201807

0601-1200

ZJX.ARTCC

FL

0.0

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Facility ZJX ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Workload; Situational Awareness

1563069

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

Company Policy

I was assigned a detail; with overtime scheduled to cover for my absence. I signed in for my scheduled detail and was told by the Supervisor in charge (who is actually a Supervisor from another area assigned to cover our area) that I was needed to split a sector. I noticed two sectors were showing 'red' and I asked which of the two I should split. I split my sector and watched the other red sector become extremely busy. There was nobody available to split the sector or work the D side. Luckily; the Supervisor from another area who was watching our area used to work our area as a Controller years ago; so he was able to assist the Controller a little. I doubt this was a legal thing to do; but it was practical and he really needed the help. This is not the first time something like this has happened. Our staffing has become so low that any tiny thing causes a situation where people cannot get help. If we take a sick call in the morning; or there is weather early or late there simply are not enough people to safely conduct the operation. In fact; today our schedule was dropped under the 'normal' staffing numbers and we did not take a sick call. Supposedly our Traffic Management Unit helps with slowing the traffic; but it always seems too little too late to actually help. We need to get more controllers in the area. Short term; we need more controllers here on overtime or we need traffic slowed on a regular basis.

Jacksonville Center Controller reported staffing problems associated with no one available to assist another Controller whose sector was in the red.

1455735

201706

1201-1800

JNX.Airport

NC

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF JNX

FBO

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Class E JNX

CTAF JNX

FBO

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Part 91

Training

Final Approach

Class E JNX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 276

Situational Awareness

1455735

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 500; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was providing instrument instruction to a CFII candidate. The student was wearing a view limiting device. We were conducting practice instrument approaches to JNX runways 3 and 21. We were currently on the practice ILS approach to runway 3 at JNX at the time of the intentions.I made an announcement on the CTAF frequency that we were 7 miles out on the practice ILS runway 3 circle to land on 21. We heard another aircraft make an announcement that they were 3 miles away and entering the downwind for runway 21 on a 45 degree entry. The tone of the pilot's voice made me suspect it was a student pilot on a solo flight. The next announcement I made was a 5 mile final for the ILS runway 3 circle to land on 21. The other airplane in the pattern then made an announcement that they were going to join the crosswind for runway 3. I queried the airplane and asked if the pilot was by themselves and got no response. At this time I made the decision to continue the approach to a full stop instead of executing a circling approach. I made an announcement that we were on a 1.5 mile final and that we would be a full stop; at this time I observed the previous mentioned aircraft turn the base leg in front of us. My student was still wearing his view limiting device; I took control of the airplane and executed a missed approach sidestepping to the right of the runway and announcing my intentions on the CTAF too. We rejoined the traffic pattern on the upwind and made a normal approach to landing.

GA flight instructor reported a NMAC while on a practice instrument approach to Runway 3 at JNX when another GA aircraft turned base in front of them.

1426392

201702

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

25000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1426392

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

We were in the climb phase around FL250 when the Captain (CA) alerted me to the 'HYD LO 1 QUANTITY' EICAS message. CA pulled up the HYD page and we both noted that the SYS 1 HYD was in the amber range and very close to the bottom or empty indication. Maybe 30 seconds later the 'ENG 1 HYD PUMP FAIL' EICAS message appeared. We noted that the electric HYD pump automatically turned on and was producing 2800 PSI. The CA called for the QRH. The CA took the radios and asked to stop the climb at FL270 while I opened the 'HYD SYS 1 FAIL' page. I noted that the whole system hadn't failed so I flipped to the 'HYD SYS LO QUANTITY'; and the 'HYD ENG PUMP FAIL' QRH page. Both of which said to continue and monitor. It also said to reference the HYD SYS 1 FAIL QRH. So I flipped back to that. The QRH procedure said to turn off the electric pump if the HYD QUANTITY was in the amber. Because the electric pump was still functioning and producing acceptable 2800 PSI and we still had not lost HYD SYS 1 we chose to keep the electric running. Mostly so we could lower the gear normally. QRH also said slow to 250 kts and we did that immediately. We also briefed the 'ABNORMAL LANDING GEAR EXTENTION' QRH; to be ready if we did have a full failure.The CA and I both felt that there was a serious mechanical issue due to the LO QUANTITY and then the ENG PUMP FAIL. So we both decided that diverting was the safest course of action. We looked at what was closest suitable airport and saw that ZZZ was due North and about 80 miles away; we liked ZZZ because it is a normal airport we use and are familiar with and it has a long runway. We notified ATC then sent dispatch an ACARS divert message and alerted them to our situation. We were cleared direct ZZZ and down to 11;000 ft. We alerted the Flight Attendant (FA) of the divert; the CA then made an announcement about the divert. Reaching 11;000ft we lowered the gear normally; we got a 3 green down and locked indication. We also noted that was hard on the electric pump and momentarily dropped the PSI to 1800. We then took some vectors to the airport and burned off fuel at the same time enroute as to not land overweight. We did the ILS into ZZZ. We also reviewed the QRH and saw that it said do not taxi with a SYS 1 fail. So we had a tug team ready from OPS. We also had ATC have AARF ready to be as safe as possible. We landed and lost SYS 1 when the spoilers and breaks were used as the system couldn't take the extra pressure. We stopped halfway down the runway. We had started the APU on the descent from 11;000ft and planned to shutdown both engines after we had safely stopped. So we set the parking break and made a quick announcement to remain seated with belts on. We then shutdown engines and electric HYD pumps and other unnecessary systems. We hooked up to the tug and we're towed to the gate. We then completed the parking checklist.Threat was the loss of HYD fluid and ENG 1 PUMP. There was no warning or way to have seen this coming. Errors made would be opening the wrong QRH first. Also we decided to divert to ZZZ without checking the weather first; but we felt a mild urgency to get on the ground before the whole SYS 1 failed. I feel the CA was rushing more than me. Remember to slow down and think the plan you are going to make. Don't rush to decision when you have time; look at all available options and find the best one (best airport to divert too).

EMB-145 First Officer experienced a loss of hydraulic system fluid and failure of engine pump 1 during climb. The electric pump took over and maintained pressure; but the crew elected to divert to the nearest suitable airport. The QRH called for the electric pump to be turned off with hydraulic quantity low.

1243495

201502

1201-1800

SCT.TRACON

CA

4000.0

VMC

Daylight

9000

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors; SID VNY1

Class E ZLA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1243495

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1243497.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

On departure out of BUR we were initially flying the VNY 1 departure from RWY 15 via FMS NAV. We began the climbing right turn HDG 210 when I checked in with SoCal departure and I thought I advised the controller that we were flying the VNY 1 climbing to 4;000 ft. Then ATC advised fly heading 310 so I thought. My FO went to heading mode and dialed in what we thought was our new heading of 310. So while we continued our right turn ATC asked why we are heading north when we should be on a heading vector of 210. I was confused by his query because I thought I was doing as instructed. I had mistaken his initial instruction to fly heading 210 instead my FO flew HDG 310. My FO and [I] thought we were doing what was instructed. Then we were given another HDG which I honestly don't remember which I believe was further north. Then finally a HDG of 360 was given and we complied and then notified of a possible pilot deviation.Discuss more thoroughly the departure with the PF and possible scenarios that could be expected. Then if anything is outside of what is expected then query ATC for clarification and confirm with the PF that the instruction that was heard was the same. Then if still understood incorrectly query ATC again.

Pay closer attention to instructions and be more assertive.

An air carrier crew departed BUR on the VNY 1 but were given a vector by SCT which they misunderstood; were given a second misunderstood vector; and finally got the correct heading.

1717948

202001

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

180.0

1.0

300.0

VMC

6

Daylight

10000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Bonanza 36

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Class B ZZZ; Class G ZZZ1

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 7200; Flight Crew Type 1000

Time Pressure

1717948

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

Taxied the aircraft from the FBO to Runway XXL; run-up was fine; magneto checks were fine; takeoff roll was fine. Upon rotation although engine indicating proper takeoff manifold pressure; it was barely producing power and the aircraft was barely climbing. Engine began to sputter. ZZZ Tower noticed we were not climbing; and I advised them of engine issue. Tower asked to take a heading of 060 to make a downwind back to the runway. We were very low; very slow and the stall warning was sounding. The engine was running but barely producing power. We managed to climb to approximately 350 feet; maintained a southeast heading. GPS showed ZZZ1 was ahead; I advised ZZZ we were headed there. Water on the way seemed a lot softer than the crowded city. Once Runway X at ZZZ1 was assured; I selected gear down; full flaps and landed without incident.

BE36 pilot reported a partial power loss after takeoff that resulted in diversion and an uneventful landing.

1462578

201707

0601-1200

CLT.Airport

NC

Daylight

TRACON CLT

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 36L

Initial Approach

Class B CLT

Approach Coupler

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1462578

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1462579.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft

I was pilot flying. We were on a published arrival into CLT. Once ATC gave us heading vectors to swing us around to the approach end of 36L; the captain and I both switched to the localizer freq 36L and went to green needles. As we neared the localizer course; ATC gave us a final vector to join the localizer for 36L. Just as we captured the localizer; my flight director made a sudden climbing right turn off the localizer course. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and turned back left to try to recapture the localizer. Although it was just a matter of only a couple of seconds; we got a traffic alert for inbound traffic on the localizer for 36C but no RA. The controller gave us a vector for 090 but since I had already turned back to westerly heading to try to rejoin; he gave us a heading of 270 and canceled the approach clearance. At that time we reengaged the autopilot and it held the heading assignment. We quickly troubleshot the issue in attempting to figure out what caused the quick pitch and roll and could not find anything out of place. As the controller vectored us back around for another attempt to the ILS 36L; the captain and I did a positive transfer of controls and he became PF and I PM. ATC contacted us prior to the approach and issued a phone number to copy for a possible pilot deviation. As the controller issued us another vector to join the localizer; the captain armed the NAV button. As soon as he captured the localizer; the flight director again; pitched up and to the right as before. The captain caught it quick enough and disconnected the autopilot and stayed on course on the localizer manually. As we stabilized; I noticed on my FO side; my flight director was pitched up and stuck in an upright position and I did not have the glide slope green star and it stayed that way through the approach. As we continued prior to 1000 feet; pitch/roll commands kept appearing in place of the LOC and GS on at least 2 occasions. We rearmed the approach at least 2 times before it stabilized. By the final approach course beyond 1000 feet we were stable on the captain's side and he hand flew the approach down to just above minimums doing a great job of flying after all we had just went through. During the approach; we also received CAS messages of inboard ground spoilers and spoileron faults as well as the cargo door light message was on. The captain contacted ATC as requested and briefed them on the avionics failure we had and they stated they would be submitting a report. Maintenance was called to the plane upon landing and we deplaned after the aircraft was put out of service.

After receiving vectors from Charlotte approach control to intercept the 36L localizer; nav was armed; coupled to the FO's side. As soon as the course captured; the flight director made a sudden; sharp turn to the right. FO disconnected the auto pilot and attempted turn back to the approach course. Due to the speed and suddenness of the turn; we inadvertently encroached into the 36C approach course resulting in a TA. Charlotte approach issued an immediate vector to turn to a 090 heading; but we had turned to approximately 290 already. The controller then issued a 270 heading to clear us from both the 36C and 36L approach paths and to resequence us for an approach. The autopilot was reengaged and seemed to function normally. I opted to take the flying pilot duties to fly the approach. After receiving a vector to intercept the 36L localizer; I armed nav. As soon as the localizer captured the flight director again started to make a sharp right turn. I immediately disconnected the auto pilot and assumed manual control to remain on course. No further attempts were made to engage the autopilot for the remainder of the flight. As I was hand flying the approach; pitch and roll commands appeared on two occasions prior to 1000 feet. I reengaged approach each time and successfully landed the aircraft. Also; during the approach; we received intermittent inboard ground spoiler and spoileron messages and several cargo door CAS messages.Charlotte approach had advised us prior to the second approach that a possible pilot deviation had occurred and provided a telephone number for the Charlotte TRACON for us to call. I called after we arrived at the gate and after a brief discussion; was told that they would be submitting a report on the incident. I advised dispatch and maintenance control of the situation and entered the discrepancies in the aircraft logbook.

CRJ200 flight crew reported the flight director made a sudden climbing right turn off the localizer course during approach causing their aircraft to encroach into the adjacent approach path. The second approach resulted in the same anomaly; but the crew intervened quickly.

1052620

201212

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

39000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 229; Flight Crew Type 1090

1052620

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201; Flight Crew Type 10000

1052628.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

N

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

At FL390; the 'B' Flight Attendant called the cockpit and spoke with the First Officer reporting an acrid electrical smell at mid-cabin. The 'A' Flight Attendant also smelled it; while the 'C' Flight Attendant did not. At that time; the Captain spoke with the flight attendants via the inter-phone to get more information; and he determined that a diversion was necessary and we agreed on an alternate airport. We coordinated with ATC informing them of our intentions and the emergency was declared. We complied with the Smoke/Fire/Fumes QRH Checklist. The Captain was the pilot flying and I communicated with ATC during the descent; spoke with the flight attendants per the abnormal checklist; and retrieved the airport charts from the alternate binder. I completed all of the abnormal and normal checklists as we were on final approach; and we landed overweight at 129.4 LBS and stopped on the runway. The Tower asked if we could clear the runway; and we did so. At this time; the fire crews pulled up next to the aircraft and asked what our area of concern was: we reported over-wing/ mid-cabin. Fire crews completed a visual exterior and thermal imaging inspection with no defects noted; and we then taxied to the gate. After coordinating with Maintenance; Dispatch; and local Customer Service; the customers were deplaned.

[The Flight Attendant] described that the fumes could be from a possible electrical fire in the cabin overhead. He indicated that the fumes were not dissipating.

B737-800 flight crew had a Flight Attendant notify them of an acrid electric smell at mid-cabin. Flight crew declared an emergency and diverted.

1368474

201606

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

34000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Galley Furnishing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 245; Flight Crew Type 6397

Workload; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Distraction; Time Pressure

1368474

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 6705

Distraction; Workload; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1367197.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Leveling at FL340 we smelled a burning odor coming from first class. In the next few seconds the odor intensified and smoke filled the cockpit. All three crewmembers donned our oxygen masks and initiated our emergency procedures. I was the Pilot Monitoring and was notified by the First Class Flight Attendant that there was a large amount of smoke from the oven. I told her to pull the circuit breakers and to let me know if the smoke subsided. I told my First Officer to immediately return back to the departure airport and to let ATC know what our situation was. I ran the QRH for smoke in the cockpit and smoke removal. During that time the smoke subsided; but there was still a pungent odor coming from first class. We were given emergency priority into the airport. We landed without further incident. The fire department rescue inspected our oven and found hot spots; but no further immediate fire. We taxied to the gate without further incident.

I was directed to fly the airplane and handle ATC while the Captain ran checklists and coordinated with the flight attendants. I communicated with ATC that there was smoke in the cockpit and we were returning to the departure airport. After running the emergency checklist and descending; the smoke abated. We continued and landed overweight.

B737NG flight crew reported diverting after a fire started in the forward galley oven.

1777379

202012

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

7000.0

TRACON PSC

Government

Small Transport

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Other FAA Certification

Descent

Other Instrument Approach

Class D PSC

TRACON PSC

Air Taxi

Small Transport

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Other Holding Pattern

Other Instrument Approach

Class C PSC

Aircraft X

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1777379

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure

I was working the R1 position. Aircraft X was inbound from the south requested RNAV [Runway] XX approach to get below the deck and requested to proceed via own navigation to ZZZZZ. I cleared Aircraft X to maintain and cross ZZZZZ at or above 5;700 ft.; RNAV [Runway] XX ZZZ Approach. Aircraft Y was inbound from the east; and instructed to hold east of ZZZ at 6;000 ft. for sequence behind Aircraft X. Aircraft X was radar service terminated and switched to ZZZ Tower. ZZZ Tower had not been advised of Aircraft Y in holding. At approximately 5.5 mile; ZZZ Tower called and advised Aircraft X was requesting a 360. I approved Aircraft X request. When I observed Aircraft X continuing to travel eastbound; I called ZZZ Tower to verify Aircraft X had canceled IFR. ZZZ Tower advised they had not canceled IFR. When I observed Aircraft X began to climb higher than 4;600 ft. eventually up to 5;200 ft.; I issued Aircraft Y to continue in holding except to climb to 7;000 ft. CA went into alarm; I issued a traffic alert to Aircraft Y and advised a right turn heading 360 and to climb and maintain 7;000 ft. I called ZZZ Tower and asked them to switch Aircraft X back to me. Aircraft X was still on Tower's frequency and they rejoined the RNAV [Runway] XX at 10.5 miles and continued inbound.On initial call from ZZZ Tower; I should have verified that Aircraft X had canceled IFR with Tower. I could have instructed Aircraft Y to hold at 7;000 ft. from the initial call.

Controller reported previous IFR released to Tower made unexpected climb towards holding traffic resulted in an airborne conflict.

1677823

201908

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

24000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Super King Air 350

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 500

Situational Awareness

1677823

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

While in cruise flight; I received a bleed air warning light - red legend with associated red warning flasher. Immediate action is to simply turn off the bleed air on for that side of the aircraft. This was promptly accomplished. The additional items on the checklist were accomplished in a routine manner. This was not an emergency or even an urgent situation. At the same time; one of our passengers asked if we could land for physiological reason - bathroom break. I requested and received a clearance to divert to ZZZ. In the process of navigating to ZZZ and approximately 5 minutes after the first bleed air warning; I received a second bleed air warning; port side. In that there is no 'normal' reason for both independent systems to fail; this made the situation urgent. I turned the second bleed valve to ENVIR OFF; which stops most bleed air functions except pressurization. Shortly after that; [less than] 30 seconds; I received a duct over temp warning. At this point I was well on my way to ZZZ and was being vectored for a straight in approach to the runway. I completely shut off the second bleed valve; causing the cabin to start to depressurize. Due to the short time remaining for the flight and the fact that I was already enroute to the runway via the shortest route possible; I elected not to declare an emergency as I did not believe the situation warrant any additional risks - emergency crew responding; additional calls on the radio requesting unnecessary information; etc. I made a normal approach; landing; and taxied to the FBO (Fixed Base Operator). Shutdown was routine.Upon inspection; it was determined that a clamp had come loose; allowing hot air to melt the sensor line; thereby activating the bleed air warning. Due to its location; it activated the same warning system for the opposite side of the aircraft and the increase in temperature caused the duct over temp light to illuminate. Looking back; I do not know if not declaring the emergency was the correct action. Although everything ended safe; I should have at least conveyed a sense of urgency to ATC.

BE350 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport due to loss of pressurization related to a bleed air problem.

1749718

202007

1801-2400

ZMP.ARTCC

NM

17000.0

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZMP

Facility ZMP.ARTCC

Government

Enroute; Trainee

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Situational Awareness

1749718

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

Aircraft X was climbing southbound after departing; I initiated a handoff to Sector XY; anticipating a flash-through to Sector YX. I anticipated watching for the handoff to be made; and made a pointout to OMA approach. While this was going on; I had multiple aircraft needing weather calls in other parts of the airspace; as well as at least two calls from flight data and flight service; as well as two calls from aircraft airborne off of airports beginning IFR flights. By the time all these had been dealt with; I had failed to get back quickly enough to Aircraft X; and he had entered Sector XY's airspace without them accepting the handoff. I then called them with a verbal handoff and they accepted the automated handoff.Given the weather situation; I think having all three low sectors open with the need to provide weather reports in the northeast part of the airspace; given the volume; was probably not appropriate. We have been running thin crews do to COVID-19; and thus have been keeping sectors combined when they likely would have been split during normal operations. I think this added volume and complexity contributed to this airspace violation. In the future; as more controllers return; I think it would be better to split sectors off more quickly to reduce workload.

ZMP Center Controller reported an airspace deviation while working combined sectors. COVID-19 staffing levels contributed to the event.

1618807

201902

1801-2400

IMC

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Night

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

1618807

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

This is not the first time this has happened. We had a lateral deviation [prior to this event] and filed an [ASRS Report]. Fortunately this happened at cruise. FMS (Flight Management) # 2 dropped offline during cruise. Messages on the FMS included: Single Operation; flight plan drops off; Independent Mode; ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System) not INIT; ACARS does not work on both FMS's; Lateral Mode is also lost on FMS # 2.On this particular flight there was no deviations but I'm filling out this [ASRS Report] to bring attention to all concerned that this is becoming a problem with FMS # 2 just dropping offline for no apparent reason. This has become more frequent since updating a software on the FMS which now requires us to put in the landing airport; OAT (Outside Air Temperature) and Altimeter setting to get landing aero data.Look into the software update to the FMS to find out what is causing the FMS to go into single mode and especially why the flight plan drops off. A similar incident happen again [recently] and I will be filling out another report.

EMB-145 Captain reported a lateral course deviation after their FMS dropped off line.

1797291

202103

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other All Phases

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 190000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1797291

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was seated on the jumpseat on flight deck and the First Officer demanded I wear a face mask after pushback per policy; while they both (Pilot Crew Members) did not; which is inconsistent with Safety and general communication requirements requested of a Jumpseat Crew Member. Here is why:To ride on the jumpseat we must be a current licensed pilot; with current medical license and fit to perform duties.1. We are consistently asked to be a second set of eyes. Because I wear glasses where I wear my face mask my glasses fog up. I'm unable to see instruments and other traffic.2.The face masks impedes verbal communication with the other Crew Members if needing to intervene because the Crew is wearing headsets; jet noise and unable to effectively hear or read lips. This is well documented in studies.3. The time to useful consciousness is limited. Having glasses and face mask impedes putting on O2 mask on in the event of a Rapid Decompression. The flight deck door is locked; we have NO rubber jungle that falls and I'm solely responsible for my own Safety to get my mask on. This is an impediment to Safety as a Jumpseater. I am not treated the same as the operating Crew Members; even though I'm asked to be a Safety Observer.

Air Carrier jumpseat pilot reported the First Officer on this flight insisted the jumpseater wear a face mask throughout the flight. Reporter described safety related concerns with having to wear the face mask including fogging of glasses; communication problems; and issues associated with putting on the O2 mask in case of a rapid decompression.

1353603

201605

0601-1200

LAX.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Rain; Thunderstorm

Tower LAX

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Interphone System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 4220

1353603

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 5875; Flight Crew Type 16

1354131.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

Line Check Airman (LCA) in left seat; OE First Officer (FO) in right seat; new LCA observing in one jumpseat and 757 FO student on pleasure travel in the other jumpseat. During the takeoff roll on 25R LAX; the FO and I began to get a gradual increase in static through our headsets. After liftoff; the static turned to a full blown loud squeal which disabled both Captain and FO communication with ATC. I instructed the FO to just continue to fly the aircraft and comply with the departure.We completed the after takeoff checklist and engaged the autopilot. By this time the observing LCA and other jumpseater realized that we were having difficulty communicating with ATC and began to help trouble shoot the problem. We leveled off at 5;000 feet and 250 KTS and complied with the routing. A slight left deviation was needed for a build up at twelve o clock. We made several attempts to establish communication by selecting different mikes; headset plugs; etc. to no avail. I set the transponder to 7600 and began reading the SID lost communication procedure aloud when the LCA observing said he was able to hear and talk to ATC on the observer audio sel panel.Once ATC communication was reestablished; we continued climbing and assessed the situation. I plugged my headset into the observer panel and used the hand mic which worked well. Once above 10;000 feet; I discussed the situation with the rest of the crew as we continued to trouble shoot the problem. All radio functions were normal using the observer panel and the decision was made to continue for the time being. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were consulted and a discussion ensued about whether or not to pull and reset any radio circuit breakers. We chose not to because all radio functions were normal with that panel. We didn't want to lose what we had. The decision was made to continue to destination. As the flight progressed; the FO noticed the squeal seemed to be isolated to the interphone system and as long as we didn't use that part of the panel the radios were useable. We proceeded and eventually diverted for weather and sent a logbook entry concerning the issue and coordinated this with Dispatch and Maintenance Control prior to departure. The LCA in the jumpseat was paramount in the successful outcome of this event. Being able to reestablish ATC communication in a timely manner on the observer panel was key.

After starting the takeoff roll a squeal could be heard through my headset. I could still hear ATC; but after rotation the squeal became painfully loud at the current audio panel volume and ATC was very difficult to hear. We continued our departure to the west and the Captain changed our squawk to 7600 and began the lost communication procedures for LAX. I was on my first leg as flying pilot in the aircraft receiving OE. We had a new Line Check Airman (LCA) observing and another pilot in the jump-seat. The observing LCA understood by our body language and the squawk what was happening and was able to communicate from the left rear audio panel to ATC and we accepted the handoff to LAX departure. The 2 rear audio panels were not affected by the squeal the Captain and I were hearing. We both plugged our headsets into the rear panels and were able to communicate normally. We tried to troubleshoot the audio panels; adjusting volumes; checking the O2 mask positions; inter phones etc. but nothing stopped the squeal. The noise was also present when we used the speakers. The Captain sent an ACARS message to dispatch notifying them of our communication issues. We discussed the possibility of returning to LAX; but decided to continue. Maintenance Control sent a message through ACARS about resetting VHF communication circuit breakers; but the Captain didn't want to make the situation worse than it was; we all agreed.Due to weather at destination we opted to divert. Prior to the descent the squeal had diminished or disappeared entirely. The squeal also diminished or stopped when the flight interphone volume was turned down or deselected; that was different than our previous experience. We switched our headset jacks back to the normal forward locations and landed without further issue from the audio panel. The Captain spoke with Maintenance Control about the communication issue while we re-fueled for the next flight. The flight had no communication issues. After parking at the gate maintenance plugged into the audio panel on the nose gear and the squeal returned briefly.

A B757 flight crew and a pilot on the jump seat described a lost communications situation that developed during the takeoff from Runway 25R at LAX. A loud squeal was heard in both pilots headsets and over the speaker making ATC inaudible. Eventually ATC is contacted using observer audio panels without the squeal. Troubleshooting indicated that the squeal may have been coming from the interphone system.

1664726

201907

1801-2400

Night

No Aircraft

Observer

1664726

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Observer

Other From Ground

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related

We are at a summer camp. A group of kids and counselors saw a light and heard an extremely loud sound for about 5 seconds and saw it hit a tree. When we went to investigate what had happened; there were pieces of ice the size of a soccer ball and other smaller pieces of ice around the area where the noise had been heard. We believe that it was a megacryometeor; and have put some pieces in our freezer to preserve it should further investigation be necessary.

Observer reported ground strike from meteor.

1258788

201504

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2800.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Final Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161; Flight Crew Total 17500; Flight Crew Type 6100

Situational Awareness

1258788

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 38; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 38

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1258826.0

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors

Line Check Airman (LCA) directed a go around from the right seat. The landing by the left seat pilot had incorrect crosswind controls and was going to touchdown out of the landing zone. The aircraft touched down and then climbed out. While climbing instructions were to climb to 2;000 feet and turn to a 080 heading. The pilot flying continued to 2;800 feet and turned to 120 heading as the LCA tried to clean up the aircraft. The LCA directed the pilot flying to correct but the pilot flying continued to try to get the aircraft onto autopilot. The LCA took control of the aircraft manually and started to correct. ATC then directed a turn to 020 and climb to 3000 feet which was accomplished. The LCA flew the aircraft for the next 5 minutes to allow the other pilot to settle down and reprogram the next approach. The next approach was flown by the original pilot with no other complications. A long debrief was conducted after the flight.

We did an ILS approach to runway 4R. Take offs were being conducted on 4L. This flight was an IOE flight. The Line Check Airmen (LCA) was in the right seat; and I was the pilot flying in the left seat. The approach was stabilized; but I let the airplane float beyond the touchdown zone; resulting in a go around. The tower frequency was busy and the LCA in the left seat wasn't able to get a call off until approximately 400-500 feet. I missed the instructions from the tower. The LCA Told me to turn right to a heading of 080. I started the turn; but neglected to call for heading select. This resulted in overshooting the heading. We also possibly overshot the level off altitude; but there was some question in my mind as to whether tower wanted us at 2;000 feet or 3;000 feet.

IOE Check Airman and the Captain under instruction describe a go-around commanded by the LCA due to landing long and incorrect crosswind controls. Both heading and altitude deviations occur during the go-around and the Line Check Airman (LCA) takes over flying duties while the IOE Captain calms down.

1228552

201412

1201-1800

TNCA.Airport

FO

10.0

2500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower TNCA

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 11

Initial Approach

X

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 186

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1228552

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Airspace Structure

We were told to fly to the 10 DME fix off Runway 11 TNCA Aruba; expect visual approach. When we never received any clearance; we held at the 10 DME fix as instructed on the 10-9 back page tells to do. Could not get a word in with ATC. Finally they told us to turn right and do a 360 and then intercept the LOC.We started the turn; and when I looked out the window; we had a Hawker (small business jet) only one mile away and maybe only 500 feet below us. Captain stopped the turn and we let the Hawker fly away from us. Then we continued the approach. The Controllers did not have a clue where we or the Hawker were. At least 10 aircraft on the Tower freq; some speaking English; some speaking Spanish. Because of the non-radar environment down there; Crews should be high alert and watching for traffic on their own - not rely on ATC. Trust me; they had no clue]

An air carrier aircrew was unable to receive clearance to land at Aruba because of frequency congestion. They entered a holding pattern IAW SOP. They were then given a 360 degree turn; which they delayed because of traffic then intercepted the localizer and landed.

1194177

201408

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

3.0

700.0

VMC

5

Daylight

5000

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Other / Unknown

1194177

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4500

1194178.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

I wanted to practice a vertical speed approach. We set up and briefed a visual backed up by the ILS; done in the vertical speed profile as if the glide slope was out. We briefed it would take about 700 FPM down per our approach speed to the DA. We were cleared for the visual. Prior to the FAF we were fully configured and on approach speed. At the FAF we started our 700 FPM descent; at a 1;000 FT we noticed we were going to be a little high so I adjusted the VS to a 1;000 FT down. We didn't anticipate getting the glideslope alert and went below it. I turned autopilot off and corrected back to be on glidepath. All the stabilized criteria was met and we were in visual conditions; and determined that terrain was not a factor. We continued and landed in the touchdown zone.

First Officer wanted to practice a vertical speed approach for training. We set up and briefed a visual approach backed up by the ILS but did it in VS as if glideslope was inoperative. We briefed that it would take about 700 FPM per our approach speed and per the approach chart and we would descend to our DA. Weather was day VFR and we had the runway in sight more than 15 miles out. We were cleared for a visual approach. Prior to the FAF; we were completely configured at flaps 40 and at approach speed. First Officer set a vertical speed of 700 which we figured out from the approach chart and briefed at altitude. Around 1;000 FT; we noticed that we were a little high. First Officer set a vertical speed of 1;000. We went below the glidepath; and received an aural glideslope alert. Stabilized criteria were met; the runway was in sight; I determined that terrain was not a factor; and the First Officer corrected back to the glideslope. We continued the landing and landed in the touchdown zone.

A300 flight crew reports descending below the glideslope inadvertently during a visual approach; then correcting and landing normally.

1239743

201502

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

34000.0

IMC

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Oceanic

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 149; Flight Crew Total 23635; Flight Crew Type 8995

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1239743

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 4000

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1239726.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Aircraft

At cruise FL340; we encountered fumes that smelled like electrical wiring burning; or a motor burning up. Having experienced this on a 767; I recognized the smell; but it was worse; and in that previous incident it was a cargo exhaust fan that failed and disconnected itself. Actions -We first donned our oxygen masks; confirmed Oxygen on 100% and my First Officer (FO) immediately got the smoke/ fumes QRH out and started to accomplish the checklist items. We were in Moderate turbulence; and IMC at this time; autopilot/autoflight systems on. Turbulence was causing altitude deviations of +/- 100 feet. Previous to this; since we were in IMC; we checked the OAT which was -36C so we turned on engine and wing anti-ice. We did not fly over or near any radar returns of yellow or red. Several calls from the flight attendants (FA) indicated the presence of substantial electrical odor in the cabin; and it was significant. Passenger Flight attendant call buttons were going off in large quantity. We immediately were thinking about a return to the departure airport. Substantial thunderstorm activity was along our route and we were immediately thinking how to break track if this didn't improve immediately. Moments later; we lost our Mach Airspeed indicators; which spun down; our speed tapes dropped to minimum speed; and the auto throttles advanced along with an immediate stick shaker. We also received several yellow EICAS warnings however I was immediately task focused on flying the airplane. [Past aircraft accidents] came to mind. I disconnected the auto throttles; autopilot and hand flew the jet; referencing the standby airspeed indicator which then wound down almost instantly. We had no reliable airspeed indications and a stick shaker; in Moderate turbulence in IMC. I added thrust; as I was fighting Moderate turbulence; and flying wings level and a relative known pitch; and with virtually no airspeed references; I resorted to an approximate known fuel flow of about 4000Lbs/engine and pitch slightly above the Horizon. (Knowing cruise would also be about 1.55 EPR and pitch 2.5-3.5).We [advised our situation] on 121.5. Got a response from several aircraft; one was helpful and relayed our position and [situation] to Oceanic on HF Radio. I turned right to break off of the track; and was having to navigate between thunderstorms the best I could while in IMC. Knowing that ideal would be to get to 15NM parallel track; however with all the weather; I believed other aircraft may be deviating this distance left and right of track; and 15NM Right/South of track was not possible with the weather. 25-30 miles or halfway between tracks probably would be safer in such an emergency; and with no airspeed references. My FO was accomplishing the QRH Smoke Fumes checklist and checked with me prior to turning the left Recirc fan off; which changes many things to vent any smoke/fumes; and since we were already diverting; I nodded and said yes; do it. We flew approximately 20-30 miles off to the Right/South and set up a direct to the departure airport which the ALTN page showed as the nearest airport. We set up FL240 in the MCP Altitude window. I started a gentle descent; as aircraft controllability was of significant concern without reliable airspeed indications. Turbulence was still BRUTAL. Airspeed indications came back and were lost 3 different times; and I adjusted power based on what we had. Additionally I was having substantial right engine vibration of 5.0; and while I had no airspeed indications. Still in solid IMC; I was trying to differentiate between unrelenting turbulence; the stick shaker; engine vibration possibly due to ice crystal icing; and possibly airframe vibration/buffet possibly due to higher Mach speed (by feel) to which I reduced thrust gently to combat. I resorted to an approximate fuel flow and pitch as often as I could. We closed the right engine (#2) bleed; and opened the isolation valve in the event that the fumescould have been partially coming from the Right engine; since its N1 Vibration was at 5.0; which was Amber in color. This did not have an effect on the fumes on the airplane. My knowledge of the Ice Crystal Icing procedures above FL250 was to have Engine Anti Ice ON (already was on) and avoid suspected conditions (we already were trying to get out of it). We were task saturated. Mindset - When we initially got the electrical smoke/fumes/smell during the high level of turbulence followed by the loss of all airspeed indications; since we weren't flying over any yellow or red radar echoes; had no moisture indications on the windshield; no sulfur smell; my thought immediately went to a chaffed electrical harness supplying heating to Pitot/Static and possible other systems; which may have been the source of airspeed indication failures; rather than Ice Crystal Icing causing Airspeed/Mach Indication losses; and the electrical fumes were very strong. My FO had completed the Smoke/Fumes checklist. The Electrical burning odor was still prevalent throughout the aircraft but stable and appeared to be dissipating; so we did not choose to accomplish the Smoke removal checklist. My thoughts were to get off track far enough to avoid deviating aircraft; reverse course and descend to lower altitude both to safely get below the tracks; below the headwinds; other aircraft; and possibly out of the IMC so as to resolve any icing issue if we had a partially heated system; out of the turbulence to stop any electrical wiring chaffing and into VMC to help fly the airplane with more references; and less task saturation. After established heading back at FL240; an approximate speed of 280 knots indicated; Airspeed indications which had returned had stabilized and I was able to engage an autopilot and autoflight systems. The Engine Vibration indications (N1) were normal and not indicated in Amber. At this point we were able to talk with ATC and complete a phone patch with our company Dispatch and Maintenance folks. I explained the Fumes; the loss of Airspeed indications; the Right Engine vibration; etc. and was headed back. We contacted Approach with our position and were given FL240. They provided us a SQUAWK and cleared us direct. We reassessed the cabin situation; and I gave the passengers a PA explaining what we had; as far as the electrical smell/smoke concern and our decision to return. I did not explain the flight instrument failures or vibration issues; as this was not of concern to the passengers and would have been of no benefit to them. We eventually were provided landing data; which showed us possibly landing a couple of thousand pounds over structural landing weight but well under performance limits. My thoughts were to reassess the condition of the smoke/fumes as we got closer to the airport and determine if two slight further airports may be a better option. As we got closer; an assessment of the conditions indicated that all things were stable; no increasing smoke/fumes were being generated and while time was important; things weren't dire. The flight attendants indicated that the level of fumes would come and go but weren't increasing at this time. The weather at our destination was rapidly deteriorating; winds down the runway at close to 40Kts; as were in one of our optional airport; but the visibility at our destination was at 1 mile; mostly due to rain; which was below the Cat C landing minimums and reported to be deteriorating in rain. That was no longer suitable. The other two airports were the same in time; and with the fact that winds were high and one airport had one runway; I didn't want to get in the possible situation of some aircraft getting disabled on the runway there and us having to go to the third airport anyway; so the decision was made to go to the largest of our alternative. An uneventful landing was made and we taxied to the gate; followed by emergency vehicles as they were examining our aircraft continually. At the gate the fireman looked for my thumbs up and he returned the same and we completed our parking checklist.

The reporter stated that the aircraft was removed from service and returned only after completion of extensive maintenance procedures during which no systems anomalies were found. The reporter recalled the timeline and sequence of the anomalies. Because the Air Data and Standby systems have no physical connection and the respective systems failures occurred sequentially; the reporter has not ruled out the possibility of ice accretion; which the pitot static and engine anti-ice/deice systems were incapable of coping with. The airspeed indications' return to normal occurred sometime after the air turn back and during the descent; but the reporter does not believe the aircraft was in complete VMC conditions; just a thinning cloud cover. The most puzzling component of this event was the burning electrical odor which QRH did not describe in the Loss of Airspeed checklist.

We also received several yellow EICAS warnings however we were immediately task saturated and focused on flying the airplane. The Captain disconnected the autothrottles; autopilot and hand flew the jet. We were both referencing the standby airspeed indicator which then wound down almost instantly. We had no reliable airspeed indications; a stick shaker; in Moderate turbulence; all in addition to being IMC. The Captain was flying the best he could; which was fantastic; using known pitch and fuel flow settings to maintain altitude and airspeed. Our altimeters seemed to be accurate.I had completed the Smoke/Fumes checklist. The Electrical-burning odor was still prevalent throughout the aircraft but stable and appeared to be dissipating; so we did not chose to accomplish the Smoke removal checklist. We also decided to keep the aircraft cold since passengers were getting motion sick. Our thoughts were to get off track far enough to avoid deviating aircraft; reverse course and descend to lower altitude both to safely get below the tracks; below the headwinds; other aircraft; and possibly out of the IMC so as to resolve any icing issue. Not to mention; getting relief from turbulence; which may help to stop any electrical wiring chaffing; and into VMC to help fly the airplane with more references. After established a heading back at FL240; at 280kts indicated; the airspeed indications; which had returned; had stabilized and the Captain was able to engage the autopilot and auto-flight systems.

A B757 developed electrical fumes at cruise followed by the loss of all airspeed indications in IMC with turbulence. The crew turned toward a divert airport and completed the QRH. Airspeed indications returned prior to a safe landing.

1689015

201910

1201-1800

LAS.Airport

NV

3000.0

Daylight

Tower LAS

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Class B LAS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 502

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Other

1689015

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Y

Person Flight Crew

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

Data collected from reports and simulator testing indicate that Pilot workload and altitude deviations can be reduced by using VNAV for takeoff. This bulletin supplements material presented in Distance Learning 4 for [year]. Starting the first quarter of [year]; VNAV will be the recommended pitch mode for takeoff. VNAV may be armed on the MCP prior to takeoff provided the following requirements have been met: 1. A valid flight plan has been entered. 2. Both flight director switches are set to ON. 3. Performance data has been entered and executed. 4. MCP SPD is set to V2. During the Before Takeoff flow; arm or verify VNAV. When armed; verify that VNAV is displayed in white on the FMA. Set the lower of the SID top altitude; maintain altitude; or ATC clearance altitude in the ALTITUDE window on the MCP. During the Preflight flow; ensure the heading is set to the expected departure runway heading.I confused this bulletin as a green light to use VNAV for departures. It states on the top to be communicated via [notification] when activated and I missed it. My First Officer and I; as well as other Crews I have conferenced with; have also confused this issue and have been using this new procedure as well since the bulletin was issued. Perhaps there could be more concise language as to when procedural changes will occur and when.The bulletin differences have always been confusing to me and it doesn't make it easier when they are so frequent in nature. More importantly on this issue is the procedure itself and here is why. I have used it with different modes and techniques for the last week and I have found a few flaws. First and foremost is that if VNAV is selected: armed for takeoff and used for the departure the aircraft will accelerate on speed during flap retraction and will climb at the programmed speed usually 250 knots or whatever restriction is on the departure. This is all fine; except when it comes to meeting the second segment climb requirements. Example is on a departure that has no speed restrictions the aircraft will accelerate to 250 knots as soon as the flaps are up instead of climbing at its flaps up maneuvering speed until reaching 3;000 ft.; to meet the second segment climb then accelerating to 250 kts. until 10;000 ft. It was never stated whether or not we are to be concerned with this profile anymore or not. That needs to be addressed.Secondly if we are; and I believe we are; then we need to have the weight and balance date auto populate the FMC to alleviate potential errors or have procedural guidelines as to how to manage the VNAV departure. The easy way is to open the speed window and manually select the climb speed; which works very well but there wasn't enough guidance on that issue and it actually requires more steps than the current procedure.This is a typical release of a not very well thought out and or managed new procedure that is intended to create less work and enhance Safety; but actually creates more work at a critical phase of flight; due to poor verbiage and lack of enough guidance on how the system needs to be programmed and managed; to do what it is intended to do. In the future; major changes in procedural operations; as this; need to be thought out and articulated more clearly and include full guidance on the steps needed to perform them safely.

B737 Captain reported that a procedures bulletin that had not yet been activated resulted in an inadvertent policy violation.

1037081

201209

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

9000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-100

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class E ZZZ

Window Ice/Rain System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1037081

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

Abnormal odor while approaching destination; initially identical to peanut butter; then dull electrical. I mentioned windshield and side window heat issue(s) based on past experience. We immediately suited up and communicated. We looked everywhere for smoke and only First Officer could see slight stream (like a single blown out pastry candle) emitting from the electrical terminal bar at the top of the right windshield. I immediately turned off the windshield heat and the odor and slight smoke stream ended immediately. We reviewed the smoke related checklist(s) and continued our descent and landing without further incident. Upon speaking with Maintenance Control we discovered the same thing had happened on [a previous date].

Dash 8-100 Captain reported smoke and odor emanating from windshield heat terminal bar. Power to window was shut off and smoke and odor disappeared.

1057847

201212

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

IMC

Rain

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Speedbrake/Spoiler

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 8000

1057847

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Passenger

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

1;000 AGL on final approach Flight Attendant called the flight deck and reported that a passenger said that a part of the flaps broke off. We turned off the auto pilot to see how the plane flew. No noticeable difference was felt. We decided to add 5 KTS to approach speed and continue. Landing was normal. Ground inspection revealed that the left inboard spoiler had broken off.

B747 Captain reported he was notified by Flight Attendant on final that passenger told her part of a flap broke off. Aircraft seemed to fly fine; so a normal landing was made; and after parking Maintenance found the left inboard spoiler had failed and departed the aircraft.

1331782

201602

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1331782

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1329229.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Dispatch

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Company Policy

Upon arrival at ramp; we inquired about cargo weight being accurate. We were told that there may be up to 10K more freight than planned on the Flight Plan. With the additional freight; long flight with chance of ATC delays I was uncomfortable with the fuel over destination. I informed the ramp of the fuel total and then added fuel on the flight plan release. I got distracted with other things going on and forgot to call dispatcher from the ramp office. We did however notify dispatcher via ACARs when arriving at the aircraft regarding more fuel needed. A phone call would have been more appropriate versus an ACARS message regarding needing to uplift fuel.

Flight released with fuel load of 54000. Crew signed with uplift to 57000 without first contacting [dispatch] as required per FOM. Additional fuel required flight plan to be re-filed for lower altitude due to additional weight. Crew did not advise of uplift until after getting to aircraft and even after prompted; did not provide reason for uplift as also required by FOM.

The Captain of a cargo aircraft and the Dispatcher responsible for the flight; reported a deviation of company policy regarding communicating an additional fuel upload to dispatch in a timely fashion.

1780389

202012

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

High

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant

1780389

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

Minimum Crew Requirements were not followed during a crew change while through the Passengers were onboard. We had two through Passengers onboard that were continuing on to ZZZ1. I had a great conversation with them while I was tidying the aircraft. Our D Flight Attendant was the first Inbound Crew Member to leave the plane. There was a female Outbound Crew Member that came on to help clean; as well as a COVID-19 Cleaner from the Ramp. A second Outbound Crew Member came onboard as well; he stood in the forward entry area. I heard the Inbound A Flight Attendant ask him if all of the Outbound Crew Members were at the gate; I guess he said yes because she collected her things walked off the plane. The COVID-19 Cleaner and the Outbound Crew Member that helped us clean walked off the plane as well. I also noticed that there was an Above the Wing Supervisor standing in the jet-bridge. I think he was there because we arrived late and it was an aircraft booked FULL out of ZZZ to ZZZ1. The two through passengers had moved from the back of the aircraft to the front of the aircraft and sat in row two. They were seated below the overhead bin where my crew luggage was stowed; and they were asking me if they could use the lavatory. I brought my things down and thanked the male Outbound Crew Member for stepping onto the plane. I think that all of my other Crew Members had already walked off the plane; and that I was the last Inbound Crew Member to step off the plane. This is the part were the COVID-19 Brain Fog comes in. I'm not sure if the B Flight Attendant or myself was the last Inbound Crew Member to leave the plane. I do know that there was only one Outbound Crew Member onboard an aircraft with through passengers onboard. There was a lot going on during the crew change and I didn't think about having two Outbound Crew Members onboard before leaving the aircraft. Three months ago I had an on the job COVID-19 infection; and I was off work for three months recovering. I still have a couple of the COVID-19 'Long-haul' symptoms such as Brain Fog and some occasional fatigue. I should have made sure that two Outbound Crew Members were onboard before I stepped off the plane.

Air Carrier Flight Attendant reported a possible FAR violation due to an insufficient number of FAs on board while passengers were aboard. The Flight Attendant cited long lasting symptoms from COVID-19 that may have contributed to the event.

1314470

201511

1201-1800

SCT.TRACON

CA

2700.0

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B SAN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1314470

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

This event occurred on arrival/approach going into SAN RWY 27. We had set up and briefed an RNAV approach to RWY 27. The Captain was the PF (Pilot Flying). ATC left us high and fast to prepare us for the imminent slam dunk. To further complicate the approach they vectored us in tight to the airport and close to preceding traffic. As we approached the final approach course; ATC finally gave us descent clearance and told us to slow from 250 to 210 to 170 in about the same time frame that it has taken me to type this sentence. With all automation engaged; the aircraft would not slow down to a slow enough speed with the speed brakes extended to configure the flaps; and descending was out of the question. I had to disengage the autothrottle to get the aircraft to slow to flaps extend minus 10 knots; a speed about ten knots into the 'foot' when the speedbrakes were extended beyond half. The entire time this was going on; we were getting higher above the arrival's recommended vertical path; but we were still at 4000-5000 feet MSL and AFL; so we still had time to achieve a stabilized approach. Once slowdown was achieved; and we were able to configure; locate and get adequate spacing on our preceding traffic; we were able to re-acquire the vertical path by around 3000 MSL. Everything was getting back to normal. We were configured with gear; full flaps on a level flight path with autopilot on and autothrottle off. I was about to re-engage the autothrottle and call for the landing checklist; when we received a TCAS ALERT with an amber dot 300 feet below us. We started trying to locate the traffic in the high terrain area east of SAN and I got distracted. When I looked back inside at my PFD; we were about 10-15 knots into the amber airspeed foot. I realized that I had been distracted away from re-engaging the autothrottle. I immediately advanced the thrust levers and re-engaged the autothrottle; and the engines advanced to full power and then pulled back to a normal thrust level once normal speed was achieved. No altitude was lost. We continued the stabilized approach to a normal; uneventful landing. To reiterate; there was no lateral or vertical deviation from flight path. The approach speed we were attempting to fly was approximately 141 knots. According to the FOQA (data); we slowed to 126 knots for about 10 seconds and advanced to full power and flew back to normal speed in about 10 seconds. He also stated that VStall for our weight and configuration was calculated to be 116 knots.I flew the MD-80 and the B-757 for a lot of years; and in those years I heard countless times about how difficult it was to get those aircraft to slow down and go down. Compared to the A321S or H; they are a dream. The A321S/H is difficult to slow below flaps extend speed let alone get ten knots below so that you don't over speed in a gust. If you have to slow quickly to fit in behind traffic; or descend while slowing; and you extend the speedbrakes; the top of the 'foot' is; a lot of times; above your flaps extend speed. The autothrottle will not allow you to go below the top of the foot. You have to disengage the autothrottle in this instance; or maintain level flight until you slow below flaps extend speed; and hope you can make up for the late descent. ATC seems to be completely oblivious to this issue; nor do I expect that they'll ever understand. So; I must adapt my technique to keep us out of the yellow/red. Henceforth; if I have to disengage the autothrottle; I intend to have my right hand on the thrust levers as a constant reminder that I am now the autothrottle. This is not the normal Airbus MO of setting the thrust levers to climb on departure and not touching them again until they are moved to idle in the flare. The downside to this technique is that it takes my right hand out of the picture; and I'll have to direct the PM to do actions thus distracting him/her. Once airspeed issues are overcome; I will re-engage the autothrottle; especially in a high threat environment such as SAN.

A321 Captain reported a low speed event when the aircraft slowed with autothrottles off.

1795476

202101

PAMR.Airport

AK

TRACON A11; Tower MRI

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Other Any

Descent; Initial Climb; Cruise

Class D ANC; Class G ZAN

Aircraft X

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 450

Other / Unknown; Workload

1795476

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Manuals; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Company Policy

Airspace Structure

My aircraft does not have ADSB. If I depart Merrill to the north and do not receive the Part 93 deviation from ATC; then because of the combination of Part 93 and the ADSB requirement over Anchorage Class C; I am required to fly over Cook Inlet below 600 ft. MSL; which puts the aircraft in a position out of gliding distance to land. Recent local memory has multiple examples of this situation ending in a fatality. There is a large number of general aviation aircraft operating in the Anchorage area that are ADSB negative and that fatal outcome is likely to occur again in the future due to the airspace rule combinations currently in place.

General Aviation pilot who operates in the Anchorage Alaska terminal area reports complying with local Special Federal Air Regulations places aircraft in a position that they are unable to safely reach an airport to land in the case of an engine out landing.

1454462

201706

0001-0600

BNA.Airport

TN

0.0

IMC

Dawn

1200

Ground BNA

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 12699; Flight Crew Type 11043

Situational Awareness

1454462

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Weather

Procedure

Taxi out for departure in BNA. Visibility less than 1200 RVR. Ground Control not using charted low visibility taxi routes and charted flow. Ground Control had us depart out of ramp area at spot 4 instead of charted spot 1; causing extensive taxi in very low visibility [in] uncontrolled area of ramp; then proceeding onto a non-low vis taxi way. Numerous aircraft and lost GA aircraft. [This procedure] caused a very dangerous situation. No ground radar in Tower; [they] should keep everyone on charted low visibility (SMIG) taxi routes. Ground Control created a very dangerous condition that did not have to happen.

A320 Captain reported BNA Ground was not using charted low visibility taxi routes while visibility was less than 1200 RVR.