elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1744052

202005

1201-1800

DPA.Airport

IL

1000.0

VMC

Tower DPA

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Other VFR Traffic Pattern

None

Class D DPA

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Class D DPA

Facility DPA.Tower

Government

Local; Trainee

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

1744052

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft

Aircraft X was on short final when they reported a possible UAS at about 1000 feet; 200 to 300 feet over the train tracks on approach end of the runway. The pilot did not report proximity; but did not sound concerned and continued in the pattern. A P28A following was given an advisory about the reported UAS; but could not confirm a sighting. Both aircraft were switched to a different runway to prevent them from overflying the area until police could investigate. Notify authorities immediately; especially when in close proximity to a critical phase of flight; such as approach or departure. From notification by the pilot until the Controller in Charge called was about 10 to 15 minutes due to trying to get a visual sighting of the UAS.

A Tower Local Control trainee reported an aircraft reported sighting a drone in the Tower airspace.

1415233

201701

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

Icing; Turbulence

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Takeoff / Launch; Taxi

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1415233

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Equipment / Tooling; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Procedure

Ambiguous

Because of the temperature and snow condition we had a hold over time of 10-20 min. We called Dispatch to ask if we could get deiced near the only active runway; but were told we had to use the company deice on the ramp because we don't have a contract with the ZZZ airport for deicing. We already asked ATC for a closer runway to make hold over time and we were told the only available Runway was XYZ and to expect a lengthy delay. After we began taxi ATC offered us Runway X with no delay but it had not been used for 40 min. We accepted. We had a V1 of 122 and VR of 138. At approximately 125 kts and after the V1 call we saw an extremely large flock of birds on the runway. Estimated at 500-1000 birds; covering the last 6000 feet of runway. They lifted off as we rotated. It sounded like popcorn as we struck dozens of them. The aircraft continued climbing normally and the engines were normal. We contacted Dispatch and did not notice any abnormality. We were told to continue. As we transitioned to high speed/altitude we noticed a severe vibration in both yolks and rudder peddle sets. We advised ATC and returned to ZZZ. Upon landing we noted dozens of bird strikes on the wind screens; pitot tubes; engine inlets; fan blades; flaps; fuselage; gear doors; and bottom of the wings. Maintenance noted feathers in the left engine stator blades. ZZZ ops informed us that the runway was closed after our pirep; no other aircraft departed after us; and wildlife management collected over two dozen dead birds off the runway. If we would have a contract in place to allow us to deice near the runway this incident would never have happened. As a line pilot I'm starting to feel we are shifting to a profit first mentality. The fact that the company does not have a contract with ZZZ airport for deicing is the driving force in this incident. When the weather is low/snowy the ZZZ airport only uses the XY's for takeoff. With cold temperatures causing 20 minute maximum holdover times; a taxi can not be made within that time; unless deice would occur closer to the active runway. Stop risking my life by not providing me the tools required to operate safely.Put safety first; and do what it needed to make sure crews can choose the safest action; by using the active; safest; runway. Stop risking my life to save money. I feel I have the right to know the name of the person who caused this near catastrophic accident. Who decided that we don't need additional deice capability in a snow prone airport that can have 3+ mile taxis on snow covered taxiways?

B767-300 First Officer reported departing on an unused available runway to avoid exceeding their hold over time. In doing so; the crew encountered a flock of birds and returned to departure airport as a precaution.

1573630

201808

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

34000.0

Mixed

Thunderstorm

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1573630

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness

1573635.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

We started climbing from 34000 feet to 36000 feet; working our way around thunderstorms. We got a strong acid smell and haze in cockpit. The First Officer was [the] Pilot Flying. We put on Oxygen Masks and established communication. I instructed the First Officer to fly the aircraft. I would talk to ATC and work the situation. I saw ZZZ on my screen and to the west; the weather was clear. I typed in direct ZZZ. I asked ATC what runway was in use. I pulled up the runway Final Approach Fix. We flew maximum forward speed until a few miles from the Final Approach Fix; coupled ILS auto land; flaps 25; [and] maximum auto brakes landing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B757-200 flight crew reported diverting due to smoke in the cockpit.

1255112

201504

1201-1800

MSN.Airport

WI

1100.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower MSN

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

None

Class C MSN

Tower MSN

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Other VFR Traffic Pattern

None

Class C MSN

Facility MSN.TOWER

Government

Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Ground; Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1255112

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 4300

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1257216.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

I was working Ground Control; Flight Data; and Controller In Charge combined (GC/FD/CIC) in the tower and Local Control (LC) was stand alone for the use of line up and wait. I was not working the aircraft at the time of the event; I was trying to watch LC point outs I think he had 3 at the time of the event and one was at pattern altitude which was a conflict for his pattern traffic. I heard him tell the pattern guy Aircraft Y to make right traffic and stay at 1;500 feet for the low point out at 2;000 feet. Then I heard him say;' No make right traffic; right traffic!' Then LC cleared Aircraft X for take off. After the point out situation was fixed we started looking for the pattern guy. Aircraft X departed 36 and the pattern guy was on a left downwind just after his crosswind on runway 3. By the time I noticed the pattern guy he was west of 36 and west of taxiway Alpha. Which is still close; but I would guess a few thousand feet away. I think Aircraft X was mad that the guy was that close. Because of the runway lay out the downwind turn for left traffic is just west of runway 36. I think a combination of pilot error and readback hearback is why this event happened; also the large number of pointouts from radar. Usually the local pilots are pretty good; if they read back something wrong and you fix it they usually get it first try. We do a lot of touch-and-goes so usually there is an instructor on board. In this case it sounds like the student pilot; instructor and controller weren't on the same page. When you tell a pilot to do something 3 times there should be no question what the controller wants the pilot to do. It seems like the pilot needed to be told a fourth time. From what I heard from LC is the pilot didn't hear him say it; though from ground control you could hear the controller getting agitated which also [questions] the pilot that he isn't doing something right. By the time everyone noticed; there was nothing anyone could do; because they were passed each other.I would recommend that radar shouldn't point out so many people to the tower; especially if they are going to be under 3;000 feet. At 3;000 feet the tower really has no outs because of MVA's. We do have a lot of satellite airports and hospitals within 10 miles of the airports. Also; being so close to downtown there are a lot of city tours. So having lots of point outs isn't uncommon. When traffic is busy it's kind of a unwritten rule that tower and radar keep coordination to a minimum so each can only worry about their traffic. I think the tower here submits to radar too much. Seems like towers job is to make radars life easier. I think the word unable is under utilized here in the tower. I think unless a helicopter is a medevac which 95% are; and aircraft are shooting approaches; and city tours; radar should climb above or vector around tower airspace. As for the VFR pilots; some of them are not that experienced; we work with a large number of student pilots which adds hugely to stress and work load for all positions; because your bending over backwards to make things as easy as possible for the student and working extra hard to make things work and flow smoothly. I think when pilots are in the pattern doing the same thing over and over and expecting the same thing they get complacent; which is what I think part of this is; and controllers too. I think both sides need to strive for more perfection hear better get proper readbacks; look out the window more instead of at the D-Bright worrying about pointouts they approved even though they shouldn't of ever been a pointout to begin with.I guess my ultimate fix would be keep pointsouts to a minimum. Radar should stay above or go around tower airspace and departure area to the maximum extent possible. Tower should unable more point outs because they are too lazy to vector around. I understand trying to give pilots shortcuts. But tower airspace is only 5 miles and 3;000 feet not counting the departure pie. So I don't think 5 miles around is a very big delay. Because of this event that is how I will now work radar and unable more pointouts in the tower.

Take off clearance runway 36 at MSN was given. After the 'gear up' call out; The Captain (CA) noted an aircraft in near proximity at our 10 o'clock slightly higher while we were still below 1;500 feet AGL. (TCAS is inhibited) The CA immediately challenged the tower asking; 'Why is there an airplane crossing in front of us?' The tower's response; was; 'I see him... I'll have a talk with him.'Either the tower cleared us for take off into the crossing runway's (Runway 3) traffic pattern; or the Aircraft Y pilot was in the wrong place not talking to anyone. I do not recall hearing the tower talking to Aircraft Y before we started our take off roll.There is nothing from my perspective that we could do differently due to the inhibited TCAS and our close proximity to the ground. However; the tower needs to be more diligent to who is in their airspace; and the Aircraft Y pilot needs to listen up on tower while in class D airspace with multiple crossing runways in use. We heard no communications on tower suggesting an aircraft would be crossing in front of us.

An MSN Ground Controller and pilot of an aircraft report of a NMAC at MSN. The conflicting aircraft was off course in the traffic pattern and Local had to tell the pilot four times to make right traffic. Local Control departed the reporting pilot's aircraft and did not issue traffic to pilots.

1796447

202103

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

345.0

5.0

6000.0

VMC

5

Daylight

5000

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb

Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 12000

1796447

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Approximately at 6;000 feet; the 'L HYD Quantity' message and light illuminated. Shortly after we received the 'L HYD RES/PRESS' message and light. We requested priority handling and leveled off at 7;000 feet. While returning to the outer marker of our departure runway to hold we began performing the QRH checklist for the loss of the Left Hydraulic System. After determining we loss only the Left Hydraulic System but; the aircraft was safe to fly; we contacted Operations Control and Maintenance Control. The aircraft was overweight and required a significant fuel burn off to land below the Structural Landing Weight of the aircraft. Maintenance Control; Operations Control and the crew determined together that landing at ZZZZ was the safer course of action based on many factors. We received a release to divert to ZZZZ and continue to hold for another :45 minutes to finish the fuel burn required to land below the structure landing weight. The landing was uneventful and the runway was closed for around twenty minutes. Fire rescue gave the all clear and the aircraft was towed from the runway to the gate. Maintenance found two hydraulic leaks; one hydraulic flex line in the left gear well and the other leak was from left engine hydraulic pump.

B757-200 Captain reported loss of Left Hydraulic System quantity and pressure resulted in a diversion and hold to burn off fuel; followed by a precautionary landing.

1268057

201506

1801-2400

BWI.Airport

MD

1.0

400.0

Mixed

Rain; 5

Dusk

3200

6000

Tower BWI

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28

Initial Approach

STAR MIIDY ONE

Class B BWI

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 256; Flight Crew Type 12000

Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1268057

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 152; Flight Crew Type 6350

Workload; Distraction; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1268684.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Weather; Procedure

Human Factors

We got 'ACARS NO COMM' (immediately after receiving a 'reset WIFI' message from [internet provider]) and thought it would come back in 10-15 minutes as we got closer to Florida; etc. But it never came back 'on'. I monitored Dispatch frequencies on COMM 2; and finally when we were approaching coastline; I took action. We had been given a reroute from RAVNN 4 to MIIDY 1 due to thunderstorms in Virginia. I directed FO to pull and reset ACARS circuit breaker; then and only then did we restore ACARS full functioning. Now we finally could communicate with Dispatch and get weather updates for BWI; ZZZ; and other possible alternates. ATC told us BWI had closed due to storm; and we did a 'vectored' hold between ZZZ and ZZZ1 while we considered fuel reserves and diversion options. My FO and I wanted to divert; but after much discussion with Dispatcher; we agreed we had fuel to continue via MIIDY; and make at least one approach attempt into BWI; which was now reopened; before diverting. Because we were; 'International' and had to have Customs wherever we went; our options were very limited.Dispatch told us the weather at BWI and along the arrival was improving and we 'should' be able to 'get in'. ATC and Approach both told us aircraft were getting 'in' on Runway 28. ATIS at BWI indicated 'VIS5; -RA; and 2200 SCT; 3200 broken; CB's ALQ's.' FO agreed that we could keep going and try to attempt approach; so we continued.This was the first time I had flown the MIIDY since these new STARS were added; so I was not very familiar. This combined with storms scattered all along our route; plus fatigue from a very long day; definitely put me in the 'Yellow'; and I think my FO was there too. I briefed a HUD ILS approach due to possibility of heavy rain etc. and we proceeded under SOP in descent.ATIS and Approach told us to expect Runway 10 transition; but then 20 miles out they switched us to Runway 28 ILS due to rapidly approaching heavy thunderstorms from west and southwest. We set this up while using radar for weather avoidance; but weather was literally 'popping up' in all directions. Two cells kept us from joining a longer 28 final at HURTZ; as we deviated south around them and joining ILS less than a mile outside 'JURTI' at 2000 ft. It was hectic and slightly rushed; but we had five (plus) miles VIS; and had the field in sight for the entire approach. Due to weather in close proximity to airport and concern for possible windshear; I re-briefed new Vref plus 20 (150 knots) and autobrakes to three.At JURTI; we were already flaps 5; I verbalized and turned off the autopilot/throttles as we intercepted LOC/glideslope; and hand flew the aircraft via HUD. I called gear down; flaps 15; and FO complied. Under 170 knots on glideslope and LOC; I called flaps 25. At approximately 1500 ft and 163 knots; I called flaps 30; landing checklist; but at the same time we experienced a gust; and the FO hesitated due to closeness to flap limit speed. He verbalized this; and I acknowledged that I was slowing the aircraft. At this time we had several additional distractions including a large bright lightning strike three to four miles away just north of BWI; and several other flashes on both sides of aircraft. Also I believe there was a radio transmission that also interrupted us. We had 12 knots of tailwind 1500 ft down to 800 ft and I was completely 'outside' flying the aircraft via HUD; thinking windshear was possible; mentally prepping to execute WS recovery maneuver. I was 'tunnel vision' on flying and landing on Runway 28. We started with light rain; but as we approached the runway; rain increased to moderate but the runway was in sight throughout. At approximately 400 ft-300 ft AGL; we got the caution; 'too low flaps;' which startled us and I immediately looked at the flap indicator (25) then gear (down; three green); brakes (armed green light). I directed the FO to select flaps 30; and Landing check. I verbalized; 'We are not going around in this weather for that; the weather is too bad.' The FO agreed and selected 30. The radar was showing 'red in all forward directions'. However; we did NOT get wind shear; and in fact winds had been fairly steady; a left quartering headwind of eight to ten knots from 800 ft AGL down.I landed normally in the touchdown zone; stopped aircraft and we exited on taxiway G. Taxied to gate in heavy rain; lighting and thunder.

On the glideslope; the Captain called for flaps 30; but; after a short gust; I noticed we were too fast for 30 and the Captain called for flaps 25. The NAV display showed winds at 150/14. As we got closer to the field; the rain was definitely more intense; but the wipers were keeping up and we could still see the runway. As we descended on the approach; the NAV display then showed winds at 150/11. Just then; the Tower calls to report visibility greater than 6000 ft RVR. (I was thinking; 'not up here ....') At the same time; we should have configured to flaps 30. I believe we were both fixated on just seeing the runway; and distracted by the ATC call; and neglected to run the before landing checklist. Between 200-300 ft we heard 'too low flaps.' I looked at the flap gauge and noticed we were still at flaps 25. I called go-around; but the Captain continued toward the runway and called for flaps 30. After seeing he was committed; lighting strikes occurring all around us and as low as we were; I ran the flaps to 30 and we landed uneventfully.

Medium transport flight crew; distracted by weather conditions and lightning on final approach; missed the setting of flaps 30 until reminded by a too low flaps warning. Crew selected flaps 30 and landed.

1244717

201503

1801-2400

IAH.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Tower IAH

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1244717

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

After receiving our weights and takeoff performance; we were cleared to push for a runway 9 departure. Our performance was for RWY 9 with flaps 1. It was entered using the GW (Gross Weight) from the aircraft performance page. I was instructed to only start the #2 engine and we'd start the #1 as soon as we started rolling so we could get to the runway faster. When ready to taxi; ramp control instructed us to taxi to spot X for 15L. I quarried her since our initial assignment was Y. She changed the taxi instruction to spot ZA for runway 9 which is a very short taxi. I immediately began the delayed engine start followed by the after delayed checklist. By this time; we were at spot 22 where I switched to metering; followed by the tower frequency. I listened up on the FA intercom to make sure they were ready. The tower cleared us for takeoff. I ran the before takeoff checklist. After lining up with the runway; the Captain advised that it was my airplane. I spooled up the engine as per procedures then pressed the TOGA button and stated set thrust. I removed my hands from the throttle and the CA confirmed the power. At this time my attention is outside the airplane to maintain the centerline. I noticed the CA reach over and moved the flap lever from 1 to 5. I asked why he did that. By the time he responded; we were approaching 100 kts. He pointed to flaps 5 on my takeoff page. At this point; the safest thing to do was fly the airplane. Once airborne; he said that he'd received a new performance uplink and had sent for new numbers while I was starting the #1 engine. I looked down and saw both weight printouts. The first showed flaps 1 and the 2nd showed a higher GW (still less than the aircraft GW) and flaps 5. I estimate we were moving 10-20 kts when the Captain moved the flaps from 1 to 5.

B737 First Officer reports a rushed takeoff caused by a short taxi with a delayed engine start. During the event the Captain had sent for new takeoff data which showed a flap setting change from 1 to 5. As the First Officer begins the takeoff roll; the Captain moves the flap lever from 1 to 5.

1160013

201403

1801-2400

SBGR.Airport

FO

TRACON SBGR

Air Carrier

B777-200

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

SID BGC2A

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1160013

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

Full takeoff power used; no derates on takeoff power or climb power. Aircraft just made restrictions on SID even with extra power. Terrain was avoided vertically before turn away from SE procedure. This SID should be prohibited until the SE procedure is addressed if reduced power is used on the BGC2A. BGC2A requires Takeoff NO DERATES to position the aircraft at a safe altitude before turning away from required SE procedure.

B777 Captain reported his aircraft 'just made' the BGC2A SID restrictions even with full takeoff power; which was not required by the procedure.

1499984

201711

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Dusk

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

SA-227 AC Metro III

Part 135

Takeoff / Launch

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1499984

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

Airplane started normally and all checklists completed. No difficulties on taxi. Was told to line up and wait on Rwy. I heard tower call the winds at 080/6 just a few minutes before I took the runway. I was cleared for takeoff; I acknowledged that and set the speed levers to high and noted rpm in normal range. I advanced the power levers and noted the right engine torque was lagging significantly behind the left engine torque. The airplane started veering to the right. I brought both throttles to idle and into reverse. I tried to use differential power; nose wheel steering and brakes to keep the aircraft on the runway. However; I wasn't able to correct the large right turn to keep the aircraft on the pavement. As I saw that I was about to depart the runway; I attempted to steer the airplane to miss the obstacles on the side of the runway. I hit one runway light; but managed to miss the large black taxiway sign that was just a few feet left of the airplane. I'm sure that I had the nose wheel steering button depressed on the throttle; because I never reached a speed and power setting where I would have released it. I saw that the nose wheel was cocked to the right after I got out of the aircraft. With the engines shut down; I also saw that one propeller tip on the left engine was bent.

A Metroliner Captain reported losing control of the aircraft at the start of the takeoff roll; due to an asymmetrical thrust condition; which resulted in damage to the aircraft.

1502510

201712

1801-2400

PCT.TRACON

VA

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1502510

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Airspace Structure

Aircraft

This was our fourth consecutive night flying the departure out of ZZZ. On the first night I briefed the FO that in the past; some aircraft initiated the turn at ZZZZZ (Fly-by waypoint) earlier than ATC was expecting. The first three nights in three different aircraft were uneventful. Each aircraft remained within a mile or so of ZZZZZ in the initial turn to ZZZZZ1. While operating in NAV mode; the aircraft initiated the turn prior to ZZZZZ such that it would pass 3 to 4 miles inside the fix. I noticed the turn and advised the FO that this is the early turn I had been referring to and to slow the aircraft in an attempt to mitigate the turn radius. Departure queried us shortly thereafter and stated that we had initiated our turn too early. The controller gave us a heading vector of 300 and an admonishment for the perceived deviation. I advised him that we were operating properly in NAV mode as required for this departure. After a few miles; we were re-cleared direct to ZZZZZ1 and changed frequency. The next controller asked us a series of questions regarding our NAV inputs and whether we had modified the departure in any way. I replied to the controller that we had not; and that this was a known issue that had been occurring on occasion for a number of years; and that some but not all of our Airbus aircraft initiated the turn at ZZZZZ in this fashion. The controller indicated that he had heard of this issue and seemed satisfied with this answer. We were cleared direct ZZZZZ2 and the rest of the flight was uneventful. Uncertain. I had been under the belief that the early turns were perhaps speed related and that by slowing down; it would make the turns more as ATC expected. However; in the preceding three nights we elected to allow the aircraft to fly programed profile speeds and each aircraft made the turns close to the fixes with no issues. This particular aircraft on this night did not. Nor did slowing the aircraft have any appreciable effect on the turn radius the NAV system was planning. I have found no way to predict in advance when this is going to happen.

A300 Captain reported that the aircraft initiated a turn on the SID earlier than ATC was expecting passing inside the fix by 3 to 4 miles.

1285762

201508

0601-1200

ATL.Airport

GA

0.0

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1285762

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

While inputting data into the FMS; each key stroke would often cause multiple digits to populate the scratch pad. When entering the fuel weight into the ACARS for the Track Detail Message (TDM); I input 1;100 instead of 11;000. We didn't receive any error message and don't notice it. We set the speeds according to the TDM. We took off from ATL with takeoff data that was 10;000 pounds too low. I realized it when I pulled up our landing data and our fuel on arrival was -3;000 pounds.We didn't encounter any low speed indications; probably because the N1 setting was higher than the N1 required in the TDM. However; taking off with speeds predicated on erroneous takeoff weight was unsafe and could have resulted in an undesired aircraft state.Fix the FMS anomaly that causes multiple characters per key stroke. Program safeties for the fuel amount; similar to those that exist for the number of passengers in each zone; so that the ACARS wouldn't accept a planned fuel that would result in landing with unreasonable amounts of fuel. By the way; we received landing data included -3;000 pounds of estimated fuel on arrival; and the aircraft landing weight was stated as Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) minus 3;000 pounds.

CL600 FO reported taking off with a data error of 10;000 LBS entered into the FMS. FMS multiple character input issue was a factor in the incident.

1596849

201811

1801-2400

PWM.Tower

ME

1000.0

Tower PWM

Air Carrier

Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class C PWM

Facility PWM.Tower

Government

Flight Data / Clearance Delivery

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) .8

Situational Awareness

1596849

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was working flight data when a low altitude alert sounded on Aircraft X on about a 10 mile final. The Radar Controller gave a low altitude alert with a local altimeter and asked the pilot to verify he was established on the localizer. The pilot stated he was and the Radar Controller switched the pilot to Local Control. It was at this time I noticed the pilot's altitude of 900 feet. and descending. I believe I saw a low of 600 ft. on the radar scope when the plane was approximately 6 miles away from the airport. The MVA in that area is 1800 ft. I reached out to Local to find out if they were speaking to the aircraft and they weren't at that time; but the Local Controller was able to get in touch with the aircraft and issued a go around instruction with a climb to 3000 ft. We queried the aircraft on what happened and the pilot stated that the autopilot disconnected; an instrument was not working properly and they did not receive any low altitude warnings in the cockpit. The aircraft was vectored for a second approach and the pilot hand flew the aircraft safety to the airport without incident. The low altitude alert was not issued properly; and the aircraft should not have been switched to Tower while that low to the ground.

Flight Data Controller reported a Low Altitude alert on an aircraft 1;300 feet below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1746463

202006

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

High

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Physiological - Other

1746463

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

Company Policy

During cruise; we ended up circling for over 30 minutes due to a thunderstorm on the field in ZZZ. The airport was closed and we were holding. During this time; my C Flight Attendant and I started feeling dizzy. We both attributed this to the burden of wearing a mask the entire flight. Fortunately in descent; we both started to feel normal; but it was unsettling to think about what could have happened if 2 out of 3 of us became ill during the flight. On a side note; when working C it is impossible to properly brief the exit row passengers without taking a mask partially off one's face. The customers cannot hear us; understand us; and as I previously reported; I had to remove a passenger from the exit row because it was impossible to tell how old he was with his face covered up.Masks cannot be feasibly worn for 7-10 hour duty days. Masks only need to be worn during boarding; deplaning and walk throughs. This is becoming a huge safety issue.

Flight Attendant reported feeling dizzy along with another Flight Attendant and attributed it to having to wear a protective mask.

1507921

201712

SFO.Airport

CA

50.0

VMC

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B SFO

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

A380

2.0

Part 129

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 1916

1507921

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

Cleared to land on runway 28R. After landing clearance received; the approach continued. I visually noted an A380 still on runway 28R. As the approach continued; I witnessed the A380 starting his takeoff roll. At approximately 50 ft we were caught in the A380's jet blast and the aircraft began to rock back and forth. I thought it would be best to execute a go- around. The Tower asked the reason for the go-around and I advised wake turbulence/jet blast because the Super [had] just lifted off as we were about to touch down.

B737 Captain on short final at SFO reported executing a go-around after encountering jet blast from a departing A380 that rocked the aircraft.

1443335

201704

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

18000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Tablet

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 15488; Flight Crew Type 11708

1443335

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

On approach and following a three leg day; Captain's iPad charge at 8% and First Officer's charge at 12%. With only one QRH onboard; any circumstances that would require a reference to the QRH in the iPad would have been rendered an impossibility. Although remote; situations such as an incapacity of the pilot in possession of the QRH; combined with a need to reference both navigational charts and the QRH; would be impossible to execute at a charge of 8% or 12% while still having enough charge to reference all charts to the gate. Without the ability to charge the iPad while airborne; having no paper copies of the QRH is definitely premature and unsafe.

A320 Captain reported concern about the flight crew's ability to access the QRH if both iPads were at a low state of charge.

1045343

201210

0001-0600

GPI.Airport

MT

0.0

Center ZLC; Tower GPI

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Facility ZLC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1045343

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

An Air Carrier was cleared for a LOC Runway 2 approach to the Glacier Park International Airport; subsequently; RADAR service was terminated and the Air Carrier was advised to contact Glacier Tower on 124.55. Two minutes later; the Air Carrier came back on Center frequency and said Tower did not respond. I attempted to contact Tower on the shout line with no success. The Area Supervisor was notified and he attempted to call the Tower via the telephone line with no success. The Air Carrier landed on Runway 2 without clearance from Tower. The Air Carrier cancelled IFR on Center frequency. Five minutes later Tower called on the shout line and said the Air Carrier was an arrival and when I asked if everything was okay; he said everything was fine.

ZLC Controller described a failed communications attempt with GPI Tower by an IFR inbound on the LOC Approach. The reporter was unable to explain the failed communications.

1844110

202109

1201-1800

ZZZ1.ARTCC

US

120.0

28000.0

VMC

10

Dusk

28000

10000

Center ZZZ1

Personal

Hawker 900

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Airway ZZZZZ

Class A ZZZ1

Communication Systems

X

Failed; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Personal

Captain; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1844110

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

Reaching the boundary with US airspace Between Country 1 and US I was monitoring the frequency with Country 1. I then heard Country 2 Accent; I found that odd due to the fact that we were with Country 1. I asked my First Officer if he had swapped back to Country 2 Control for some reason. I switched back to Country 1's frequency and tried to check in again to make sure they were not calling us. My com 1 screen was not working and com two did not allow us to out any frequency. I could put the frequency on standby; moved it to active but then it would go back to a frequency XXX.XX. I was able to communicate with them which was ZZZ Airport. I mentioned what was going on; my location and if he could relay a message with ZZZ1 Center. I recall he gave a couple frequencies for me to contact but was not able. I asked for a landline number to be able to call from the sat phone on board. By this time the radio kept swapping frequencies automatically and I lost contact with ZZZ Airport. I squawked 7600 [and] brief my copilot and passengers and began our descent to follow our loss on comms procedure. On the descent I was able to get a hold of ZZZ1 Center and was instructed on heading and altitudes. Reaching ZZZ2; ZZZ1 Gave me another number to call which was Approach and that they would be the one to guide me and give me landing clearance. In the meantime I was being vector i believe 11;000 feet and 190 on the heading. Once I got a hold of Approach on the phone we were instructed and landed without an issue. I contacted our repair station and both radios were bad. Both radios have been replaced.

Captain reported communication system failure and having to use a satellite phone to continue with the flight.

1045153

201210

1801-2400

IAD.Airport

DC

11000.0

VMC

TRACON PCT

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class E PCT

FMS/FMC

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 2600

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

1045153

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

Got late 'descend via' for GIBBZ RNAV arrival; first portion of arrival was deleted by ATC; with instructions to cross MOSLE at 11;000 FT. [We] had to confirm that ATC wanted us to continue to descend via the arrival after MOSLE and wanted published 250 KTS speed at MOSLE. We had been in VNAV PATH with GIBBS altitude of 7;000 FT set when this clearance was received. We then went to FLCH with assigned altitude of 11;000 FT. As we approached 11;000 FT the FMA went to ALT CAP mode; as expected; but the jet descended right through 11;000 FT in full autopilot with ALT CAP annunciated. We deselected the autopilot and bottomed out at 10;750; then returned to 11;000. The remainder of the arrival was normal; but we conducted all further descents in FLCH and selected speed.

ATC initiated alterations to the GIBZZ RNAV STAR may have contributed to an altitude deviation for a Boeing flight crew when the autoflight system failed to arrest their descent at 11;000 per the MCP altitude window and the active FLCH mode.

1760738

202009

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Toilet Furnishing

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Lavatory

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding; Safety Related Duties

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1760738

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

Aircraft

ZZZZ-ZZZ 14.40 duty day operated Aircraft X with XXX souls on board with 3 working lavatories. Cockpit informed us we would operate all lavs in order to depart but not have running water in the other lavatories. Captain's decision. Cockpit had 1400 sanitary wipes boarded. FA's not comfortable with non COVID procedures so it was agreed to lock other lavs off and operate only 3 lavs with running water. Please note ZZZZ has increased their COVID protocol due to increased COVID numbers.Under no circumstance should an aircraft operate without the ability to wash your hands especially on long range flying. As a situation arises during a pandemic; even though a policy has not been updated to reflect COVID procedures; it is imperative a Captain make a decision based on the health and safety of the crew. We had 3 working LAVs. That's not acceptable during COVID. CDC recommends hand washing.

Flight Attendant reported there were only 3 fully operational lavatories during a long haul flight.

1234225

201501

1201-1800

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

24000.0

Center ZDC

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

STAR IVANE5

Class A ZDC

FMS/FMC

X

Design

Facility ZDC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

1234225

Facility ZDC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness

1234237.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

The A319 was in level flight at FL240. I issued the descend via clearance. The first altitude restriction for the IVANE5 arrival into CLT is at MSTRD. That window is at or above (AOA) FL270. The next window is at MAYOS with an altitude window at or below (AOB) FL260/ AOA FL240. After I issued the descend via clearance I noticed the aircraft was at FL236. GVE sectors altitude stratum at that location is FL240-FL330. I performed a point out to the SBV sector underlying my sector. I asked the pilot to verify his assigned altitude. Pilot replied with hesitation 'FL240'. Fortunately the SBV controller had already taken action and descended his traffic. SBV Controller anticipated the A319's premature descent since we have been briefed that this is a problem with the airbus FMS. The aircraft continued to descend to FL232 before climbing back to his assigned altitude of FL240. All of this occurred prior to the MSTRD intersection. Either they need to fix their FMS systems to correctly comply with the restrictions on the arrival or we need to suspend the descend via into CLT until this is fixed. This is very unsafe!!

I was working the radar at sector 22. The top altitude of my sector is FL230. Sector 32 is right above me FL240-FL330. The controller working sector 32 told an A319 to descend via the IVANE5 Arrival. The A319 was currently level at FL240. On the arrival the window they need to meet restrictions for is at MAYOS FL240-260. The A319 descended prior to MAYOS and entered my airspace. Lowest altitude witnessed via Mode C was FL232. This is a known issue with Airbus aircraft on this approach. Because of this known issue I had already began to descend my RDU arrival early because of the known issue. If I had not descended my aircraft who was level at FL230 this report would be a different one. Airbus either fixes their FMS; or Airbus aircraft are not allowed to Descend Via the IVANE5 arrival into CLT.

Two ZDC controllers describe a recurring problem they are having with Airbus aircraft not meeting the crossing restriction at MAYOS on the IVANE5 arrival to CLT.

1140139

201401

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

Mixed

0.5

Daylight

2000

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway X

Initial Approach

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 199

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

1140139

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

On ILS; weather lifted enough to visually identify landing environment and runway environment. Pilot flying transitioned visual scan to outside and maneuvered aircraft to ensure safe landing. Received a '[Glideslope] Pull Up' Warning simultaneously as pilot flying was reducing sink rate; repositioning flight path vector; and shallowing descent rate. [We] landed safely and uneventfully. Approach and Tower did a poor job of reporting and updating IMC conditions.

B737-700 First Officer reports a 'Glideslope Pull-Up' Warning during transition from instruments to visual on an ILS approach. The sink rate is decreased and a normal landing ensues.

1311812

201511

0601-1200

0.0

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

None

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Other home after flying

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Fatigue

1311812

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

Other post flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

We are now grossly understaffed and are being scheduled to the extent of 121 rules. The unique situation [here] is that we have pairings that go around the world for an average of 17 days at one time. We constantly change times zones; sleep cycles (day/night); and now endure innumerable schedule changes that also disrupt not only food planning but sleep planning as well.This has led to extremely unhealthy habits that are unavoidable and damaging to our abilities to operate safely. I am an average aged pilot; fairly fit with generally healthy eating habits. After coming back from a short pairing with three 20 hour overnights in a row; it took a better part of the week to recover from it. I am not alone. What we are being asked to do is undoubtedly scientifically destructive to our persons let alone the potential to the operation.Here is a very brief example of a summary of just one pilot's schedule:Day 1: Commercialed in from the states to the Near East. Rest before flight 13h.Day 2: 10h duty day flying Near East to Far East. Originally a short overnight was assigned.Day 3: 50h overnight due to a broken airplane. Delays kept rolling. A 24/7 was assigned.Day 5: 14h duty day flying Far East to Australia. 20h overnight assigned.Day 6: 11:30h duty day flying Australia to Mid East. 18:30h overnight assigned.Day 7: 6:30h duty day flying Mid East to Far East. 21h overnight assigned.Day 8: Commercialed home.To endure the '20h' overnights and prevent two sleep opportunities in favor of one big sleep opportunity; we stayed up as much as possible upon landing. Though this helped to feel rested for the flights; fatigue accumulated and by the time I got home my body crashed.This is an example of just one week of this unhealthy; unsustainable schedule.They say knowing is half the battle. I wanted to document this continual; no-end-in-sight situation to ensure the knowledge was there that this situation IS happening and not changing despite us having a fatigue program in place that is supposed to help prevent the continuation of these types of situations when documented.

B747 pilot reported the scheduling practices used at her international airline were extremely fatiguing and unsafe.

1457024

201706

1201-1800

F11.TRACON

FL

Daylight

TRACON F11

FBO

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Initial Approach

Class C SFB; Class E F11

Facility F11.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1457024

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Staffing

Staffing

Working North sector we had numerous training pilots who were missing control instructions; needing information repeated; and requiring extra attention. After approximately 30 minutes of this I asked the Supervisor if I could be moved to a different position after an hour on North; the Supervisor laughed and walked away. About 5 minutes later the FD controller walked to the Supervisor and informed them I needed help. At this point I had stopped SFB departures for about 5 minutes to help get it under control. A few minutes later another Supervisor came over and I informed them I wasn't giving any more practice approaches - they laughed and began to walk away at which time I informed them I was serious. He then walked over and asked me what he wanted me to do - I informed him it was his call and didn't care but frequency congestion was an issue. As he left he informed me that I only had 5 aircraft; failing to consider the entire scenario. Open more positions for the North sector. Three times Supervisors where informed of an issue and it wasn't until I told them I wouldn't provide services that they did anything. The North sector is too busy to continue to allow it to be worked how it is. No attention was given to the position when I asked for relieve after an hour; when the FD controller informed the FLM I needed help; or when I stopped departures. It wasn't until I informed them I wasn't providing multiple approaches that they opened a secondary position. The fix is simple; open the sectors we have available to us; Oviedo or Paola.

F11 TRACON Controller reported being busy; asking for help; and being laughed at three times by Front Line Managers. The Controller needed the sector to be split.

1078653

201304

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B717 (Formerly MD-95)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1078653

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On approach we got a HYDR QTY LOW alert. After going around; we continued to run the applicable checklist. We raised the emergency gear lever leaving the gear doors open after the gear extended. The aircraft landed and stopped straight ahead. No turns were made. We remained on the runway for approximately 45 minutes. Maintenance arrived and towed the aircraft to the gate where the passengers deplaned. There were no reports of any injuries and I'm not aware of any damage to the aircraft. Maintenance indicated leaking hydraulic fluid and possible broken hydraulic line.

B717 Captain experiences a hydraulic low quantity alert during approach and goes around. An emergency is declared and the emergency gear extension handle is used to lower the gear. Aircraft is towed to the gate.

1747322

202006

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

10.0

37000.0

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Type 10000

Workload

1747322

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 84; Flight Crew Type 1751

Workload

1747332.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft

Upon descent the aircraft pressurization system failed; leading to a loss of cabin pressure. Until point of malfunction aircraft operated with no observed anomalies or deficiencies. Flight was smooth and routine until shortly after reaching Top of Descent and leaving FL380. Descending from FL380 to FL300 Auto Fail light illuminated on pressurization panel. Estimate the illumination of the Auto Fail light occurred around FL370. First Officer acting as Pilot Monitoring located appropriate checklist in QRH and we commenced working through the items contained therein. Completed QRH 2.4. The Auto Fail light extinguished and we continued normal operation with panel now set to ALTN mode. Shortly thereafter there was erratic behavior in the differential pressure and cabin altitude gauge. The changes were noticeable in ears as the pressure/cabin altitude changed quickly in either direction. Scanned overhead panel and noticed the ALTN light no longer illuminated. Verbalized to First Officer that we should put our masks on. At this point estimate the aircraft was between FL360 and FL300 which was the initial floor of our assigned descent from ATC. We both donned masks and within moments the Cabin Altitude light illuminated with corresponding warning horn and a very noticeable drop in pressure. Called for and First Officer immediately secured and began with the Cabin Altitude Warning QRC. PASS OXY ON light illuminated as well indicating Cabin Oxygen masks had deployed. Accomplished Cabin Altitude Warning QRC. Cabin altitude spiked but can't recall to what altitude. At one point; cabin descended rapidly and diff pressure climbed to redline on gauge.Outflow valve seemed to be uncontrollable; which made the onboard pressurization issue uncontrollable. Coordinated with ATC for lower altitude and maintained an expedited descent that was essentially unbroken until landing. At completion of QRC we were directed to accomplish QRH 2.1. Used 2.1 through entire descent and uneventful landing. During descent while coordinating with cabin crew; flight attendants informed flight deck crew that one passenger briefly lost consciousness but was awake again and being attended to by cabin crew. Notified ATC of need for EMS to meet aircraft at gate upon arrival. ATC facilitated request and local EMS met aircraft and evaluated passenger. Upon arrival coordinated with Dispatch; both local Company Maintenance and Maintenance Control and Chief Pilot; to ensure aircraft abnormalities were properly documented in logbook; crew was taken care of and all other pertinent issues had been addressed. I think this was an anomaly and part of flying aircraft as a business. Things break. Just glad it turned out the way it did. As far as self evaluation goes; I did forget a few items that bug me. One; I should've let the First Officer handle communication with the cabin as I ended up unnecessarily task loading myself. Also; I forgot to send an ACARs to Dispatch or radio them letting them know about the situation. We were pretty busy but no excuse. I'm pretty sure ATC notified Company if only just the local ops folks. The checklist was handled correctly but as ALTN system failed and we were directed to go to manual. The cabin pressure spiked and dropped several times and then failed. That was certainly an enormous distraction and it took us a minute to get masks on and fully reengaged with the checklist. Feel like I could've done a better job leading in those moments. Will say that I was very happily surprised by how much our training kicked in; when the event got bad. Kudos to the training folks!

A routine flight changed as we began our initial descent. Aircraft pressurization began to fail which led to the loss of cabin pressurization. Between FL380 and FL360 the Auto Fail light illuminated; along with corresponding dashes in the FLT ALT window and LAND ALT window on the landing altitude selector panel. I was the PM for this leg; and as such I completed the QRH 2.4 Auto Fail Checklist. This drove the pressurization mode selector to be placed in the ALT mode. This did extinguish the Auto Fail light and temporarily allowed for control of the outflow valve. At this point the CPT and I felt pressure changes in our heads and noticed somewhat erratic oscillations in both the cabin differential and cabin altitude. The Captain made the decision to don the O2 masks at this point. I referred back to the QRH 2.4 Checklist as the cabin altitude was now not controllable. The checklist drove us to selecting the manual mode on the Pressurization Mode Selector. The Captain communicated with the cabin crew to; as to their status and the status of the passengers. We were approaching FL300 at this point and communicated with ATC that we needed lower; due to a cabin pressurization problem.Very shortly after donning our O2 masks the CAB ALT light illuminated along with the corresponding warning horn. Captain called for QRC Cabin Altitude Warning Checklist. We were granted lower by ATC as well as handoff to APP Control. Thanks to both ATC and Approach and Tower; we were able to basically keep our descent going all the way down from cruise to 6000'; and subsequent visual approach. The passenger O2 masks deployed automatically as we worked through the QRC Checklist. The Captain; again; checked in with the Cabin Crew to verify O2 masks had been deployed as well as their wellbeing. We learned here that a female passenger had fallen unconscious temporarily. She regained consciousness as we descended. As I continued to monitor the cabin altitude and manipulate the outflow valve the CPT let APP know we needed EMS standing by for her. At the completion of the QRC we continued on with 2.1 of the QRH and stayed with this checklist for the duration of the flight. The cabin altitude depressurized; as necessary; as we descended below 10;000 feet. The approach and landing were uneventful. I contacted Operations taxiing in to the gate and verified with them our request for EMS to meet us. They had not received word about the Passenger needing assistance. I fully thought I had contacted them airborne. This must have been missed on my part in all the commotion. Nonetheless; EMS showed up within a few minutes of setting the parking brake. The Captain proceeded to contact the Chief Pilot; Maintenance; and Dispatch to proceed with the necessary paperwork and communications. The things that I see could have been improved upon are communications and understanding task loading. Verifying each of our required tasks were accomplished could have been better. As these events unfolded rapidly; it definitely emphasized the importance of keeping a good pace; usually a slower pace; as tasks have the potential to be compounded.

B737-800 flight crew reported a normal landing following the loss of pressurization at top of descent.

1757569

202008

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

High

Aircraft X

Door Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Boarding

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

1757569

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

An X-year old child boarded the flight without a mask on with his parents. I politely informed the parents of the policy and they refused to comply; so I had a Customer Service Supervisor meet the plane to talk to them. He tells me that he 'doesn't have the heart to remove them from the plane;' despite our mask policy. Because he was allowed to fly; other passengers were at higher risk to contract COVID-19 and it negates our policy. Customer Service and employees; in general; need to unite and follow our policies. Clearly; other employees (including Ops) saw this family through the process and did not address it. This family should have never gotten to the plane before this was addressed. If we are going to make exemptions; then all work groups need to be on the same page. Customer Service Supervisors need to be trained to address these situations as outlined in our mask policy.

Flight Attendant reported family boarded with a child not wearing a face mask. The family refused to comply with the mask policy; but was allowed to remain on the flight.

1043654

201210

1801-2400

ZOA.ARTCC

CA

16000.0

Center ZOA

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class E ZOA

Facility ZOA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Other / Unknown

1043654

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

A B737 landing RNO; I attempted to hand off the aircraft 10 miles west of SWR. The handoff began to flash then flashed FAIL in the Data Block. I took the hand off back then forced the information to NCT RNO; using the RF function; and then re-attempted the hand off. The aircraft then failed again; so I re-adjusted the route and then forced the information again then restarted the hand off. The aircraft began to flash and I proceeded with my scan. The hand off did not complete in time nor did it auto flash when on the boundary; so the Controller at NCT RNO called and asked for us to flash the B737 and said RADAR contact. Once in their airspace I was able to flash the Data Block and NCT was able to take control of the Data Block. Hands off to NCT whether at RNO or Paradise/Kirkwood fail quite often; most of the time we are able to force the information then able to successfully hand off the aircraft. There are times when no matter what we do; re-routes; assigning hard altitudes or repeatedly resending the information the hands off will not work. We shouldn't have to trick the system into working properly. I attempted to do the correct thing and it did not work; which should've been caught but the aircraft also never auto flashed. To my understanding the system should have at least auto flashed or allowed me to hand off the aircraft properly when I attempted the first few times.

ZOA Controller described a failed automated hand off attempt to NCT RNO Sector; noting this problem is experienced on a frequent basis and needs to be resolved.

1321125

201512

0001-0600

SEA.Airport

WA

3200.0

VMC

TRACON S46

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 16R

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SEA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1321125

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

On approach to Runway 16R in Seattle in scattered cloud conditions while visually following preceding traffic to the runway I armed the ILS approach mode as a backup to the briefed visual approach. All ILS approach and arrival briefings were accomplished. ATIS was advertising approaches to 16L and 16R and departing 16L. We were told to maintain 3;200 until BUGNE then cleared 16R. I noticed the aircraft cross slightly to the left of the 16R centerline so I disconnected the autopilot and corrected back to the 16R centerline. The identifier for the ILS showed 34L so we continued the visual approach to uneventful landing. After blocking in at gate we called ground control to inform them that the 34L localizer was active. I called Tower and TRACON on the telephone to inform them of the issue also. The TRACON Supervisor told me the localizer was supposed to be down for maintenance and that the 34L localizer should not have been operating.There were two primary issues. First; the localizer was active for the opposite direction runway when it should have been off. Second; I armed the approach as a backup while not visually assuring the identification. The deviation was identified and only a minor deviation occurred.

A B737 pilot flying a SEA Runway 16R visual approach in the ILS APP Mode noted a track deviation and while manually flying back to centerline noticed the Runway 34L ILS identifier was active. ATC reported the 34L ILS was supposed to be off line.

1238306

201502

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1238306

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

After takeoff with the First Officer flying; FO announced that being unable to trim the aircraft with the control wheel trim switch. I looked down on the trim indicator on the center pedestal and saw no movement while FO was attempting to trim. I checked the main trim cut off switch which was in the correct position with the guard down. I then took control of the aircraft after announcing so and attempted to trim with my control wheel trim switch with the same result. The horizontal stabilizer did not move either direction. I then reset the main stab trim cutoff switch and tried again with the same negative result. Unable to trim nose down or up. I told the First Officer we [would] return to the airport while I tried trimming with the alternate trim switches with success. I then engaged the auto pilot; handled the aircraft and ATC while the First Officer ran the checklists. When we were level on downwind I disengaged the autopilot and tried trimming with the control wheel trim switch again with success. All trim systems worked normally after that and we landed normally albeit overweight at 135;000 lbs with a soft landing.

When their MD-83's normal stab trim failed to function after takeoff the flight crew returned to their departure airport. After maneuvering for approach employing the alternate stab trim and autopilot the normal system returned to operation when the autopilot was disconnected for final approach and landing.

1205251

201409

D10.TRACON

TX

VMC

Daylight

TRACON D10

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID RAMBL1

Class E D10

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

1205251

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1205260.0

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

While climbing out on the RAMBL 1 Departure; ATC gave us 'Climb via SID; except maintain 17;000 feet'. The Pilot Monitoring read back the clearance and said 'climb unrestricted to 17;000 feet. ATC did not correct the readback; and we proceeded to continue the SID with a climb to 17000 feet. If the clearance readback to ATC was not correct; the Controller should have corrected us; however; I should have made sure this was his intention.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737-700 Fligt Crew reports being cleared to 'Climb via SID; except maintain 17;000 feet'. The First Officer read back; 'climb unrestricted to 17;000' and was not corrected. The crossing restriction at ARILE was not clomplied with.

1817102

202106

1801-2400

SBA.Airport

CA

4000.0

TRACON SBA

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Aircraft X; Facility SBA.TRACON

Government

Approach; Instructor

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Radar 14

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1817102

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was instructing. Trainee issued a descend to 040 from 090 to Aircraft X. Aircraft X descended through a 055 and 047 MVA. Trainee anticipated descent rate wouldn't be a factor. I was researching a TEC route for an IFR overflight; and failed to prevent Aircraft X from descending through the MVAs.Do not allow trainees to anticipate descent rates. Issue altitudes that satisfy MVAs.

SBA TRACON ATC instructor reported a trainee issuing an aircraft a descent below the MVA.

1175750

201405

1201-1800

ASH.Airport

NH

800.0

Mixed

10

Daylight

1400

Tower ASH

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 14

Final Approach

Vectors

Class D ASH

ILS/VOR

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 210

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1175750

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Procedure; Weather

Ambiguous

I was given vectors to the final approach for ILS14 at ASH. My glideslope receiver became inoperative and I either advised Approach Control or Tower (I don't recall who I was speaking to at the time.) that my glideslope was inoperative and I was converting to a localizer approach. During the descent I popped out into visual conditions and shortly after that the Tower came on with an urgent message 'Altitude alert; suggest you pull up immediately.' I advised the Tower that I had good visual contact with the field and that there was no conflict. The Tower also mentioned something about being below the MDA. I am not sure why I got this warning message from the Tower but I am thinking they still believed I was on an ILS approach. I have sent an email to a flight instructor asking for clarification but I do not believe I was ever below any MDA before obtaining clear visual conditions in and around the approach path and around the airport. Visibility below the cloud layer was excellent with a ceiling at the time around 1;400 FT while on the approach.

A light twin's ILS glideslope failed on the ASH ILS14 so the pilot continued on a Localizer Approach and ATC issued a LOW ALTITUDE ALERT PULL UP but the reporter believed he was above minimums when he became VMC.

1290244

201508

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

12000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1290244

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

N

Person Dispatch

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Diverted

Manuals; Weather; Procedure

Procedure

The flight was a ferry flight with no passengers or flight attendant. It was an empty aircraft with 1500 lbs of ballast fuel added. While holding; we calculated decision fuel by adding reserve 1800; burn to alternate 800; and a burn of about 200 lbs to the destination which gave us a decision fuel about around 2800 lbs. We held till we had 3800 lbs and I decided to divert to the alternate because the weather over our destination was not moving and it was becoming apparent that we were not going to have enough time to get in. Dispatch also advised us that the approximately 800 lbs burn was at 17000 ft altitude (we were at 12;000 ft). When we were enroute to the alternate; Dispatch advised us that we couldn't burn into the 1500 lbs of ballast fuel that we had. So our real reserve was not 1800 lbs but 3300 lbs. Since we were already on our way to the alternate at this point; and the weather was good; I made the decision to continue to the alternate. We landed with a little over 3000 lbs which was below the reserve fuel of 3300 lbs. There was confusion over whether our reserve fuel was 1800 lbs or 3300 lbs and we didn't realize it was the higher number till advised by Dispatch. Dispatch also advised me that their software doesn't account for ballast fuel when planning for decision fuel and as a result we were not advised of the higher number earlier during the flight. I contacted a few other pilots and there is definitely confusion over whether the ballast fuel is used for actual ballast or to 'trick' the weight and balance program to giving us a proper calculation. I will verify the release paperwork for the 'reserve' fuel number and not just assume it to be in the vicinity of 1800 lbs. I think the company should clarify the reason for the ballast fuel and specific requirements of the ballast fuel for empty flights as there seems to be confusion about it. In addition; pilots should be made aware of this potential for confusion. Because of the added stress of holding during weather events; the potential for this to be overlooked is greater.

An EMB-145 ferry flight with ballast fuel diverted because of poor destination weather after holding and learned ballast fuel cannot be burned as holding fuel.

1116859

201309

EGE.Airport

CO

15000.0

Center ZDV; Tower EGE

Beechjet 400

Aerofoil Ice System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1116859

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

On descent into EGE the 'H Stab Ice Fail' light illuminated and we consulted the checklist and accomplished the relevant steps. There is a checklist admonition to avoid icing conditions. From our position it looked like the approach path to the EGE airport appeared clear. Denver Center advised us that EGE had reported a low cloud deck had begun to build at approximately 400 feet AGL and offered us a moment to switch to Tower frequency to consult with the Local Controller. EGE Tower reported that a thin layer was indeed building; but that the previous aircraft had landed just a few minutes earlier and did not report difficulty picking up the airport. The crew discussed this and decided to continue with an approach. We recontacted Center and received approach clearance. As we reached our minimum altitude on the approach it was evident that we would not be able to maintain adequate reference to the surface for a landing so we commenced a missed approach. The published missed approach path would take us back into the clouds where we had previously experienced icing conditions so that was not an option. I asked my First Officer to convey our failed anti-ice system and that we were currently VFR and could maintain our own terrain clearance and to ask for an alternate missed approach clearance that would take us to the left of course and away from the IMC conditions. ATC initially cleared us to 15;000 feet; and it took several exchanges with ATC; including a final clarifying call from me; to get our message across on our need for alternate missed approach instructions. Prior to the first turn on the published missed we were finally issued a heading to fly ; but due to my distraction with the lack of communication with ATC; and the fact that I was hand flying because the autopilot failed to engage earlier on in the missed; I flew through our assigned altitude by about 300 feet. I immediately corrected; finally got the autopilot to engage and continued. There was no mention of any issues from ATC. As another approach to EGE would have been fruitless; and other nearby airports were experiencing unforecasted poor weather; we requested and received clearance to APA. As we were working to load our new clearance into the FMS we received a call from Company as to what was happening. They were advised of our maintenance issue and our intent to go to APA and the conversation ended. We should have ignored the initial call as this was just another distraction in what is now a very busy few minutes. As it was taking longer than I wanted to locate the fixes we needed for our clearance; I asked for an initial vector from ATC and received it. Once on our way to APA we received another call from Company asking if we could go to ZZZ instead because of the availability of Maintenance. We received yet another clearance and the rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully. From our initial position when we received approach clearance it was apparent that we could maintain VFR throughout the approach; but it wasn't clear until much later that the missed approach path was going to be unacceptable. With 20/20 hindsight; I could have asked for a missed approach; 'Maintain VFR; headings and altitudes my discretion'; but the possibility of a missed approach seemed remote at the time. I have one suggestion for the Company: When you see an aircraft in the middle of a diversion; give the crew more than 4 or 5 minutes before placing a call to them. Yes; we could have not picked up the phone; but simply having the ringer going is a distraction we could do without during the busy time of a missed approach and early steps of a diversion. We will call once we're in a low workload environment.

BE400 Captain reports a 'H Stab Ice Fail' light during descent into EGE in VMC. A cloud layer building at low altitude results in a missed approach and a request by the reporter to remain VFR on the missed to avoid icing. Multiple radio exchanges are required to get the clearance straight along with a call from the Company are distracting and lead to an altitude deviation.

1467914

201707

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

M-20 M Bravo

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Initial Climb

None

Class D ZZZ

Main Gear Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29; Flight Crew Total 476; Flight Crew Type 475

Troubleshooting; Workload

1467914

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

The GEAR UNSAFE light remained on; confirmed with an unsafe indication on the floor indicator; shortly after raising the gear switch on takeoff. The GEAR ACTUATOR circuit breaker was also popped. I got into the checklist. I didn't know what position any of my gear were in at this point. After not finding what I needed in the checklist; I started troubleshooting with the goal of getting the gear indicating down and locked. I tried resetting the ACTUATOR circuit breaker with the gear handle up; and it popped immediately as expected. I put the gear handle down and reset the circuit breaker. It didn't pop; but nothing moved and the GEAR UNSAFE light remained illuminated and the floor indicator showed unsafe. So; I pulled the circuit breaker. Next step was to attempt an emergency extension using the checklist. The emergency extension clutch didn't feel like it engaged. I pulled the T handle about 40 times with no success. I stowed the T handle and the secured the emergency gear lever. The main gear were asymmetrically retracted (I didn't know that at this time) and may be the reason the emergency extension clutch wouldn't engage. I called the tower for a fly-by to look at my gear; and they cleared me for pattern entry and a low approach. Tower was able to tell me on downwind that they could see that my right main was slightly extended. At that point I ran through other ideas for getting the gear down; while also considering where to land if I couldn't. I had 2 hours worth of fuel to figure it out and let the airport get prepared to clear my airplane from the runway after the gear-up landing. At this point I had the ACTUATOR circuit breaker pulled; gear switch down; and the emergency extension lever stowed and latched. I put some Gs on the airplane while resetting the ACTUATOR circuit breaker and immediately heard the gear motor running. GEAR SAFE light and floor indication followed shortly after. The POH does not suggest putting Gs on the airplane to help extend the gear; but its a procedure in another airplane I fly so I gave it a shot. And it worked. I advised the tower that the gear was down and asked for clearance to land. It worked out ok; but in retrospect that wasn't the best decision. I should have executed the tower fly-by so that they could take a closer look and let me know if I had any damage or other weirdness. I had plenty of fuel.This incident was precipitated by a fastener on a gear door connecting rod failing/coming loose. This particular door is closed on the ground and the only way to preflight the fasteners on the connecting rods is to climb under the airplane and stick your head up into the wheel well with a flashlight; not something that I have routinely done in the past. I'm going to add it to my oil change ritual; easy to do while I'm under there checking tire pressures. Incidentally; the door felt secure on my 'grab test' during preflight.

Mooney M20M pilot reported that the right main gear did not fully retract. The pilot then G loaded the aircraft in order to get the gear down.

1578973

201809

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dawn

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Gear Pins

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 247; Flight Crew Type 6400

1578973

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight; Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Human Factors

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

On my preflight walk around; I found a bolt in the left gear; gear pin slot. Bolt was approximately 1' long; and no aircraft markings noticeable. I re-checked the other gear pin areas to ensure that I hadn't missed another one. Upon returning to the cockpit I informed the Captain who in turn passed my disbelief and findings to Chief Pilot on call.

B737-700 First Officer reported that a bolt was installed in a gear pin slot for the main landing gear.

1454918

201706

0001-0600

FAI.TRACON

AK

3500.0

VMC

TRACON FAI

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class D FAI

TRACON FAI

Air Carrier

Single Engine Turboprop Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Personal

Final Approach

Vectors

Class E FAI

Facility FAI.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

Situational Awareness

1454918

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Human Factors

I took the radar position from the previous controller. Right before I accepted the position; he cleared Aircraft Y for the Visual Approach. As Aircraft Y got closer to the field I realized the aircraft he had already instructed to contact tower; Aircraft X; was on an instrument approach (being afforded IFR separation). By that time Aircraft Y was 5-6 miles in trail of Aircraft X doing three times the speed.I cancelled his Visual Approach clearance and told him to maintain 3000 ft and fly heading 110 to square him off to final. Their mode C indicated they were at 3500 ft and descending in a 2900 ft MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). He asked for clarification on the altitude then read it back. I addressed other traffic and when I went back to him I saw he had descended to 2000 ft. I asked him to verify he was maintaining 3000 ft. He said he was already through 3000 ft when it was issued so he was climbing back up. I subsequently cleared him for the Visual Approach without losing IFR separation between him and the preceding Aircraft X. Deconfliction of traffic before passing the position to the next controller or a more thorough briefing.

A Controller reported an aircraft descending below their assigned altitude and the Minimum Vectoring Altitude; while the Controller was trying to de-conflict traffic already on approach.

1720754

202001

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

10000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Beechjet 400

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR ZZZZZ

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104.7; Flight Crew Total 5759.2; Flight Crew Type 759

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1720754

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors

On a passenger flight departing from ZZZ to ZZZ1; with a VERY inexperienced FO we neglected to put the sufficient amount of fuel on the aircraft for the trip. The plan required about 4;000 lbs to land with about 1;000 lbs of reserve fuel. When we were about 200 nm from the destination we got a low fuel light. We advised ATC that we were low on fuel and required priority handling. We were over water at the time. So diverting was not an option. Scary!!! We should have landed with about 1;000 lbs of reserve fuel. Instead we landed with about 500 lbs of fuel! Very embarrassing and humbling experience.I don't mean to reject responsibility. But I distinctly remember asking the inexperienced FO prior to departing if everything was ready to go. His answer was 'I don't know'...that should have been a sign of trouble. In the future I will always ask the other pilot specifically he/she agrees we have enough fuel for the trip.

BE400 Captain reported that the aircraft departed with less fuel than was needed for the trip and got a low fuel light during cruise. The flight landed with less than the required amount of reserve fuel.

1101564

201307

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

B717 (Formerly MD-95)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

1101564

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Crew showed early at airport after layover in an attempt to depart early. Door was closed eight minutes early and after completion of all checklists we called for push with Clearance as is the procedure. Clearance told us to monitor Ground for push. After a few minutes Ground told us to hold push & contact Clearance again for a full re-route clearance. After copying a lengthy clearance from Clearance Delivery; we proceeded to input the new flight plan into the FMS. There were few discrepancies during the process; re: spellings/names of new fixes etc; that we had to clarify with Clearance again; which was time consuming; as they were obviously very busy at the time; giving other aircraft re-routes; and we had to wait our turn to for air time; to ask our needed questions. [While] inputting the new flight plan into the FMS; I called our Dispatcher to let her know of our re-route; which she said she was aware of; and that she would send our new numbers via ACARS. It took a few minutes to get the new release on ACARS; and upon receiving we noticed our fuel had been brought up by about 1;200 lbs; whereupon we notified the station that we would need more fuel uploaded. It took several minutes for the fueler to show; and after finally receiving our fuel upload; and inputting the new fuel into the FMS; we proceeded to re-run the checklist. Approximately 50-55 minutes had passed since our initial door close at this time. During the process of; re-reading the checklist; and going over our final numbers; I noticed that the aircraft GW (Gross Weight) on DU #4 was about 1;200 lbs higher than our Max Allowable Takeoff Weight. (We were landing weight limited due to the relatively short flight.) With a burn of 6;400 lbs; and a Max Limited Landing Weight of 104;000 lbs; (104;000+ 6;400 = 110;400) our Max Allowable Takeoff Weight was limited to 110;400. With the GW on DU #4 showing a GW of around 111;600. This did not match up with the expected takeoff weight on the new release; and I did not feasibly see how we could possibly burn 1;200 lbs before reaching the runway. We proceeded to re-check all the numbers; and re-input everything into the FMS; in the event we had input something wrongly. After a couple of attempts and arriving at the same situation; I called our Dispatcher to let her know of the problem; she re-checked all her numbers and was not able to discover if anything was wrong on her end. We then attempted to fill out an [manual weight and balance form] to see if the numbers would add up on paper. This proved a little time consuming; checking and verifying each Load Sheet. After totaling up the numbers we found they added up relatively close to the new dispatch. So the problem had to be in the FMS. After a few more calls working with Dispatch; & and re-inputting the numbers; and an attempt with Maintenance at pulling the FMS circuit breakers in an attempt to re-set the FMS; we kept arriving at the same problem. However we discovered during this process; that the FMS would add up all the numbers correctly; until the takeoff runway was inputted into the FMS; which is the final step; and should have nothing to do with the Gross Weight of the Airplane. But upon doing so we would visibly see the Gross Weight on DU #4 jump up by 1;200 lbs. About 1:40 minutes had transpired at this point; and I was working with Maintenance on this new discovery when the Gate Agent asked me to open the Main Cabin Door; which we did. Everybody was 'stumped' with the problem. But after Maintenance Control consulted with their heads; it was decided that we should pull all the circuit breakers for both VIA's [Versatile Integrated Avionics] and do a complete reset. After powering down the VIA's for several minutes; and re-setting; this proved to be successful; with no further anomalies. After the power down of the VIA's; re-boot; fully re-loading the FMS; and re-boarding of all passengers; doors were re-closed three hours late; and flight was completed un-eventfully. I would like to say; had this occurred and the increased weight was not greater than our Max Allowable Takeoff Weight; it is quite possible the anomaly may have gone unnoticed. It was the fact that the anomaly had me heavier than our Max Allowable Takeoff Weight that brought my attention to it. It is possible that this has happened before and gone unnoticed because the increase in weight was not a concerning factor to the crew.

B717 Captain describes an FMS/VIA anomaly that results in an incorrect gross weight calculation greatly delaying a flight. Eventually the VIA is reset electrically and the flight departs with no further anomalies.

1233461

201501

0601-1200

SJC.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

5

Daylight

10000

2400

Ground SJC

Personal

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Direct

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 750

Confusion

1233461

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Manuals

Human Factors

Got a taxi clearance from [FBO at] San Jose (SJC) to Runway 30L for IFR departure; Victor; Delta; Charley; and Bravo to 30L. Started out on Victor but passed Delta due to it was the start of a +4000 foot abandoned runway. Believed he meant us to pass delta to charley the way we always used to go. Did not want to cross 29 runway that is still shown on my airport diagram with Jepps Charts. As we were passing Charley to Bravo; ground control called and asked why we did not follow his directions; turning on Delta and hold up at Charley for an intersection departure. I guess we screwed up but did hear a clearance to Bravo which would have brought us to the end of 30L. Never thought to cross runway 29 at Delta on our way to runway 30L. I wish Jepps would delete the 29/11 runway from its airport diagrams. We did not conflict with any traffic on our way to 30L but did cause the ground controller to waste his time to ask us what we were doing.

A pilot did not comply with taxi instructions at SJC. He interpreted 'Victor; Delta; Charley; and Bravo to 30L'; as meaning 'pass delta to charley the way we always used to go.' Ground control called and asked why he did not follow his directions.

1452374

201705

1201-1800

OAK.Airport

CA

98.0

7.5

2700.0

VMC

10

Daylight

1100

TRACON NCT

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28R

Final Approach

Vectors

Class C OAK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 310

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1452374

Facility NCT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

1452388.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

I was instructed by ATC to maintain 3400 ft on vectors to final ILS 28R OAK. I then intercepted localizer and was cleared for the approach. I continued my intercept; as localizer CDI was active but not yet fully intercepted. I turned to an estimated heading of 240. Upon noticing that I had an excess altitude of nearly 500 ft; I needed to increase my descent. I notified ATC of my intention to perform a left hand 360-degree turn and re-intercept localizer. I was in VMC; and had simply needed a reminder that upon receiving my IFR clearance; the responsibility of terrain and traffic avoidance became shared by ATC and myself. Approximately 90 degrees into the turn and after a response from ATC; I corrected the action and turned back on the proper heading by which time a possible pilot deviation had been noted. Cause for the excess altitude was a pilot lack of situational awareness. I expected to intercept localizer at GROVE; but instead was approaching URZAF. Factors affecting the quality of my performance under IFR was a direct result of unclear distinction as to when I fell under IFR regulations. In practice approaches in VFR conditions; when ATC was not responsible for aircraft separation; there was more flexibility in procedures. I called Norcal Approach when I completed my flight; and have been actively cooperating with any and all requests thereafter.

VFR day with low ceilings requiring IFR to land. Cessna 172 was VFR; I put him on a VFR vector for the downwind. I issued the IFR clearance; based the Cessna and cleared for the approach. For reasons unknown the aircraft did not descend after established on the localizer. At about a 6 mile final when I was switching him to the Tower the Cessna said he was making a left 360 to lose altitude. He was above the glide slope and below the MVA. I told him that he was IFR unable to make a left 360; to which he replied that he was established on the localizer and tracking it inbound. As the controller I should have canceled the approach clearance and climbed him and brought him back around for another approach.

C172 pilot and TRACON Controller reported confusion on the part of the pilot about following ATC instructions under an IFR clearance.

1232809

201501

SRQ.Airport

FL

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 217.43; Flight Crew Total 1314.33; Flight Crew Type 1314.33

Other / Unknown

1232809

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Going into SRQ landing data did not seem to calculate available landing distance correctly:Jeppesen Runway 32 10-9 runway length 9500 feet. Jeppesen 10-9A runway length from Threshold 7510 feet (with a bullet note 7 specifying that of the 7510 feet the last 840 feet is unavailable for landing distance calculations) and from Glide Slope 6460 feet. The ACARS LANDING DATA RWY 32 Shows the available landing distance for 32 as 7460 feet. The ACARS LANDING DATA AND JEPPESEN LANDING DATA DO NOT SEEM TO MATCH WITH THE BULLET 7 RESTRICTION.

B737 First Officer does not believe the Runway 32 landing length available is correctly calculated on the JEPP 10-9 A chart and does not agree with ACARS data sent by the company.

1296206

201509

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

Training

Landing

Class C ZZZ

Carburetor

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

1296206

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We are approaching runway for full stop landing. Everything looks like it is planned. Once we descent to our minimum descent altitude for the approach; I ask my student to remove his foggles to do a landing. Once visual contact with the runway and we are preparing for landing. The student set up for a full flaps and 65 knots approach. The airplane descend as close as possible to the runway; and we begin our roundout and simultaneously reducing the power to idle. Once we put the throttle to idle and flaring the airplane the engine sounds stops and the propeller stops spinning.During ground roll upon landing; I communicate with the tower that the engine stops working and we are ground rolling using the potential energy created by the descent. Luckily we are able to exit the runway to taxiway foxtrot.First we troubleshoot make sure everything is in order and on ON position (mixture; throttle; magneto). We try to restart the engine three times. The first two time we started our engine using the normal procedure; standard Operating Procedure that is specified by the FOM but it did not start. The last attempt I try to lean the mixture; thinking that the cylinder might be flooded with fuel but still no luck. I ask the tower if it's possible to pull the airplane to a FBO ramp so we don't need to block the taxiway. Once in the ramp; I tried to troubleshoot again the airplane by visually scanning the engine for possible abnormal FOD or missing screw but I cannot found anything suspicious. I called the head of the maintenance to be able to help me troubleshoot the problem and he gave me procedure to look and try to restart the engine. The engine was able to restart by using primer but cannot hold low RPM. We decided to stay in ZZZ for the night and wait for the maintenance to fix it the next day.The reason why the engine quit is there is screw that [fell off] during flight. Maintenance was able to repair it the next day. The missing screw is position on which it's really hard place to see and maintenance needed to remove the cowling of the airplane to fix it.

The reporter indicated that it was the carburetor mixture screw that had backed out and was lost during flight.

A flight instructor described an engine problem on landing. The engine was unable to run with the throttle pulled back to idle due to the loss of the carburetor mixture screw.

1126199

201310

1201-1800

SDL.Airport

AZ

300.0

2.0

2300.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON P50

Personal

PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Climb

Direct

Class D SDL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 9500; Flight Crew Type 3000

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1126199

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Procedure

I was in communication with Phoenix Approach and proceeded eastbound after a departure from DVT Airport. I was under the impression that communication with Phoenix Approach implied coordination with SDL Tower. Phoenix asked that I contact SDL Tower frequency upon landing; and said there was 'a possible airspace deviation'. I called SDL Tower upon landing and had a good and friendly conversation with the Air Traffic Controller.

VFR aircraft in communication with Phoenix TRACON was questioned with regard to transitioning SDL Class D without contacting SDL.

1189290

201407

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

Caravan 208B

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Ice/Rain Protection System

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1189290

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

Aircraft

I was complying with my airline's requirement to test the TKS System. Previous experience has taught that using it at the end of the flight reduces my exposure to the fumes sucked into the aircraft ventilation system. I turned the system ON for a timed 2 minutes prior to landing. I experienced several of the symptoms listed in the Kilfrost TKS 406B Safety Data Sheet. There was an immediate respiratory irritation which felt like a mild burning in my chest or upper respiratory tract and which continued while the system was operating. The system was turned OFF after 2 minutes of use. I landed within 3 minutes and then experienced additional symptoms to include mild headache and nausea; and dizziness that left me feeling unable to drive home for about 20 minutes. The nausea; headache and general fatigue continued for about 90 minutes. The only solution I have found acceptable is to don the oxygen mask set to 100% prior to starting the TKS flow and leaving the mask on for the duration of the flight.

The reporter is a former air carrier pilot; has been flying the C208B for several years and had three TKS episodes. In each event the physical effects have been very similar and persist two to three hours. The reporter personally believes pilots are reluctant to discuss their own experiences for fear of losing their job. Because the reporter is concerned for personal health; speaking out can also protect younger pilots from the long term MSDS listed hazards. Reporter has personally flown only one aircraft which had noticeable TKS fluid residue on cockpit surfaces. After flying that aircraft mild; but noticeable after effects were noted. Reporter feels that a pilot can only safely fly this aircraft with TKS ON and using 100% oxygen. When conditions warrant; reporter intends to begin using oxygen when the system is active and remain on oxygen until landing. The prop slinger fluid is also designed to deice the cargo box front. That fluid slinging also exposes the engine intake and windshield. The cockpit can then be exposed through engine heated air or fluid leaking around the windshield.

A C208B pilot delayed the TKS System two minute functional checks until on approach and experienced immediate respiratory irritation. After landing additional symptoms included mild headache; nausea; and dizziness.

1713699

201912

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

1713699

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

I first noticed something awry as the center pumps were nearing empty. The mains should have been perfectly balanced; yet they weren't. When the center tank was empty; I did a quick crossfeed to balance the 3 to 400 lbs. imbalance.Soon after; we crossed the first fix on our fuel/position estimates printout. We were 2 minutes early; 400 over burn. Usually; our flight plans are more accurate than that. We had leveled off at our first cruise altitude; but already we were ready to climb to our final cruise; so we requested and received clearance to climb. The mains indicated another imbalance occurring; approximately 500 lbs. We leveled off again; but my concern over the situation was growing slowly - I balanced the mains; and then watched the results carefully. After going back to four pumps on; crossfeed closed; the left main dropped 500 lbs in approximately 3 minutes. At this; I was on high alert. I pulled out the QRH; and began going through the checklist. I didn't want to take action too quickly; so I stopped short of taking any irreversible action for a few minutes.I called the FAs (Flight Attendant); and requested they look for signs of fuel leak. They didn't observe any misting behind the engine; but they did see liquid around the engine pylon; and at the trailing edge of the flaps. This was inconclusive; since we'd deiced fully - type 1 and 4 - before takeoff.The initial drop to 500 lbs imbalance tapered off; but continued; so over the next ten minutes or so; the imbalance reached 900 lbs. We were approaching our next fix on the plan; and we were now 1900 lbs. over expected fuel burn. At this point; I decided it was time to commit to the checklist; which required shutting down the leaking engine; and divert. An outstation was convenient at that point in time; so we made that the plan. I shut the engine down per the QRH; and walked the panel - Dispatch; FAs; and passengers.Communication was difficult as we descended to our drift down altitude. We were in mountainous terrain; and had trouble reaching the Local Approach Controller; as well as raising Operations on company frequency. I didn't have the chance to try DTMF microphone before [we] were able to get back in contact with ATC. [At] this point; I was too busy to get back to Dispatch over the radio; when the essentials of re-dispatch had already been accomplished.We landed slightly overweight; approximately 46;000 lbs; with a flaps 15 max of 44;200. The landing was smooth; with a minimal sink rate. I think the whole situation proceeded very smoothly. It's a very busy checklist; so I did my best to take my time and [to] get everything done properly. By the time we landed; I felt we were ready and well-prepared; rather than rushed or stressed.

Air carrier Captain reported a fuel imbalance event during cruise; which resulted in an engine shutdown and was followed by a successful diversion.

1285557

201508

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Marginal

5

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

Airliner 99

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class C ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

1285557

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Aircraft

Cleared for the ILS. After crossing the OM inbound; pilot detected indications of a right engine fire. The right fire T-handle illuminated. Pilot followed 'engine fire in-flight' flow and checklist. T-handle did not extinguish after 20 seconds so pilot transitioned to 'engine fire/failure in-flight' flow and checklist. Pilot at this time [let] Tower [know of their situation.] Pilot visually identified the airport and requested a side step to [a more suitable runway]. Pilot discharged the right fire extinguisher bottle as per procedures. Right engine was feathered and secured at 200 feet AGL. Single engine landing was uneventful and pilot was able to taxi clear of the runway and was met by emergency personnel. Pilot executed shut down checklist and Maintenance towed the plane to the hangar.

C99 pilot reported a right engine fire on approach that led to an inflight shutdown.

1059915

201301

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1059915

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1059919.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Other During Takeoff Roll

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Human Factors

We attempted a rolling takeoff. After selecting autothrottles the Captain (pilot flying) noticed the throttles wouldn't advance above mid-range using either the autothrottles or by pushing on them manually. We performed a low speed abort at 60 KTS without incident. Back at the gate; the Mechanic informed us that some pins that restrict throttle movement were not removed after some recent Fuel Control maintenance. This was a classic attention to detail mistake. The plane was late coming from the hangar where the Fuel Control Units had been worked on. I don't know it for a fact; but I feel the mechanics might have been rushed to return the aircraft to service.

On takeoff roll; with autothrottles armed and engaged; the throttles would not advance to takeoff power. I attempted to manually advance the throttles; but they still would not move any further. I discontinued the takeoff at approximately 60 KTS. The abort and subsequent return to gate was uneventful. Maintenance was called; and they found a problem with the Power Stops for both engines. Apparently; they had been positioned for maintenance action and had not been unseated when the procedure was completed. After unseating the Power Stops; the throttles functioned normally. The maintenance was signed-off and we continued; with the same aircraft; to destination without incident. We need to ensure complete adherence to procedures by all parties involved with the preparation; repair; movement and operation of our aircraft.

Two pilots and a Mechanic report about Part Power Stops (PPS) that had not been removed from both engines on a B757-200 aircraft after a Fuel Flow Governor (FFG) had been replaced. The Part Power Stops prevented full takeoff power; requiring a Rejected Takeoff (RTO).

1713638

201912

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

Dusk

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1713638

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Upon arrival for ZZZ; my FO (First Officer) and I had prepared for a landing to the south based on current winds and the recent ATIS report calling for landings on XXR; XXC; and XXL. We were on the ZZZZZ arrival. Prior to ZZZZZ; we were instructed to contact Approach while descending to ZZZZZ where we planned to cross at the RNAV assigned altitude of between 16;000 and 14;000. This was a normal descent for an arrival to the south. However; when checking in with Approach; the Controller MISTAKENLY instructed us to plan for a 'landing to the north.' This required us to rush re-loading the FMS for only one more fix ahead of us at ZZZZZ1 which also required a crossing at 10;000 ft.; and a mere 6-7 miles ahead of us; along with an abrupt slow down to 230 kts.After abruptly reloading the arrival and the new runway; we were instructed to contact a new Approach Controller where we were promptly instructed to expect a landing to the south! At this point; I alerted the new Controller that we would not have time to re-load the FMS in time to avoid passing through the new fixes and altitudes that belonged to the original arrival and promptly asked for a vector for time to work it out. He instructed me to descend to an altitude of 8;000; and provided me a vector for downwind to XXR where we concluded the arrival and approach with vectors and assigned altitudes without further incident.It is clear that the Controller we originally spoke with was in error to tell us to expect a landing to the north. On this particular arrival; the difference in altitudes and airspeeds are significant in a compressed amount of space and time. A small error in instruction to the north versus the south arrival; and at the last minute before arriving at one fix versus the other could have led a less experienced crew to violate altitudes; airspeeds and specific waypoints on one arrival versus the other. My suggestion is to please help this Approach Personnel understand the significant difficulty and unreasonable time compression to the aircrew that a small misspeak can cause.

EMB-175 Captain reported reprogramming the FMS several times after being issued ATC instructions to expect a landing runway different from what ATIS reported; then being issued opposite runway instructions by the next Controller.

1324761

201601

1801-2400

ZLA.ARTCC

CA

5000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZLA

Corporate

Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Visual Approach

Class E ZLA

Tower IFP

Personal

Texan T6/Harvard (Antique)

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Climb

VFR Route

Class E ZLA

Facility ZLA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8.0

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1324761

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Airport; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X was on a Visual Approach from the North. My Radar Assist called the inbound to the Tower in a timely manner and prior to me issuing the Visual Approach to Aircraft X. Once the Visual Approach was given and Aircraft X was descending through 7;000 feet; I noticed two aircraft departing and were climbing through 4;000 feet. The courses were head on. I called traffic to Aircraft X then immediately called Tower to ask if they had visual on the departures and Aircraft X because it looked like they were head on and climbing and descending. The Tower asked where the aircraft was and I responded by saying they were head on and only about 3 miles apart.I jumped off the land line and again called traffic for Aircraft X this time Aircraft X was descending through 6;000 feet and the departure was climbing through 5;000 feet still head on. I could not vector Aircraft X because by this point he was below my Minimum IFR Altitudes. I attempted one more traffic call but at that point the aircraft were almost side by side and less than 1 mile apart. It looked like the departing aircraft actually turned towards Aircraft X at the last second; but it is hard to tell. It looked like the closest the two aircraft got was about .5 miles; same altitude and opposite direction.These particular aircraft are operating out of the airport for 3 months (and just started this week) with course rules that do not separate VFR/IFR traffic. Tower should call Center on every departure to get a release in order to avoid this from happening.

A flight of two aircraft departed an airport VFR and climbed head on into an inbound aircraft cleared for a Visual Approach.

1262232

201505

VMC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 800

Fatigue

1262232

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Other Person

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

[We were] on a Boeing 777 'A' model with the two-class configuration. The 'crew rest facility' was 2 seats in first class with a sound-deadening curtain. The flight was a single augmented crew consisting of 1 Captain (CA); and 2 First Officers (FO). Additionally; we had an FAA inspector observing us from the jump seat.Upon reaching top of climb; and after rest breaks were determined; I proceeded back for my 1h 59m break as I had 1st break. Though the sound-deadening curtain does a pretty good job at keeping cabin lights and noise out of the rest area; I could still clearly hear the constant flushing of the lavatory by door 2L.Upon completion of 1st break I returned to the flight deck and took up position in the FO seat and assumed the duties of Pilot Flying (PF) while the CA was Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the other FO went back for 1h 59m break. The FAA inspector remained in the center jump seat. During this period I ate my crew meal; the flight deck 'Storm light' was on; and the CA and FAA inspector engaged in conversation. The entire time we were on SELCAL watch and logged on to Controller Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC) while flying over the eastern Pacific Ocean.Upon completion of 2nd break the flying FO took his position and assumed PF duties; while I stepped out of the flight deck to use the lavatory. When I returned to the flight deck I sat in the left seat so the CA could take 3rd break; and I assumed the PM duties. The FAA inspector continued to sit in the center jump seat. We were still on SELCAL watch and logged on to CPDLC and we were approximately 100 miles from our coast-in-point.As we neared the coast of California just north of San Diego we noticed some bright flashes; most likely lightning. We decided to extinguish the 'Storm light' since we weren't embedded in a cloud layer and could 'see and avoid' any adverse weather. It also became choppy so we turned on the 'Fasten Seatbelt sign.' Fortunately we were well above the weather.Once clear of the weather and some smooth ride reports we elected to turn off the 'Fasten Seatbelt sign.' It was smooth and quiet as we paralleled the U.S./Mexico border. I remember thinking to myself that this is one of the most exhausting parts of this type of flying. It was XA30 (Local Base Time) LBT; 39;000 feet; smooth; quiet....and I remember glancing over my shoulder and noticing the FAA inspector had changed jump seats. It was dark; especially over in the corner where that jump seat is and at the same time I noticed that the other FO appeared to have his eyes closed. It almost felt like both the FO and the inspector had their eyes closed.Contemplating what to do I turned back forward; made sure I was awake by doing my usual scan of the instruments; and the overhead panel. A few minutes later I heard the FAA inspector change back to the center jump seat and poke his head forward. While he did this he looked at the other FO; tapped him on the shoulder; and stated something along the lines of 'it's not a good time to be sleeping.' The FO startled a bit and apologized.The remainder of the flight proceeded uneventfully. After we blocked; and completed all necessary checklists; we said our 'goodbyes'; etc. The FAA inspector never de-briefed us on the other FO falling asleep on the flight deck.

B777 First Officer (FO) reported one of the other crewmembers fell asleep on the international flight.

1297315

201509

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Landing Gear

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 101; Flight Crew Total 2980; Flight Crew Type 63

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1297315

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Trainee

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Type 2

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1299067.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I believe the two main causes of this gear up incident were channelization on the student (pilot flying) and channelization and complacency on the instructor (pilot not flying). The sortie was a local training flight getting ready for an ATP practical exam. Both pilots were high time with plenty of recency. We were on pattern two of a two pattern delay before departing under VFR flight following to an area 20 miles southeast of the airport. The student was executing a simulated single engine landing. At 1;000 feet AGL; the instructor pulled back mixture slightly to simulate a failed number 2 engine. The student executed the boldface and secured the simulated dead engine. He then obtained his flight following clearance while on downwind. (It seems this distraction was the first link in chain because the normal checklist was put off to coordinate with tower; despite the fact that coordination was done prior to being beam the touchdown zone) When on base; the student noticed he was slightly fast and elected to use 10 followed by 25 degrees of flaps. Based off his previous performance the CFI's attention was channelized in making sure his airspeed was within Practical Test Standards (PTS). (The CFI could not and did not tell that the throttle was at an unusually low setting for a heavyweight single engine approach that required additional drag to maintain approach speed.) As the student rolled out on final he noticed some birds and began to add power and maneuver from them. In the end he called them out; the CFI also saw them and no evasive action was necessary and the student reset his power and continued on a normal glide slope. To the best of the CFI's recollection there was no gear warning horn malfunction; because the CFI heard it on the previous pattern as that was his initial demo. The aircraft was on short final; on speed and on glide path. The aircraft touched down approximately 1;400 feet from the end of the runway and came to a stop approximately 3;000 feet from the approach end of the runway. For an unknown reason; this is the first time I recall forgetting to mentally and verbally go through a safety check prior to landing as either the pilot flying or pilot not flying. It's also important to note that the student called gear down on his base leg to tower and due to the CFI's and student's complacency and possible distraction of birds and airspeed; another missed gear check occurred at that time. There was no mention from the tower about the gear being viewed up. Other than accomplishing a before landing check in a timely manner on downwind and throwing in a safety check on base and final; the only other recommendations I would have to help prevent this incident are the following: if tower is going to respond to a gear down call over the radio; then they actually put eyes on the aircraft's gear. Also; there is a lot of single engine work during the ATP practical preparation; if one throttle in the Seminole is back below 15 inches Manifold Pressure (MP) then the gear warning horn goes off. This horn seems to have different volume settings sometimes even though it has no volume control. 15 inches MP is an approximate value for the horn and during simulated single engine work; the throttle is often back around 12 inches MP. The gear horn is going off so often in training it breeds complacency as the pilots get used to hearing it. If the horn had a separate power source so the volume was standard; and if it went off when both engines were less than 15 inches MP then I believe that would offer a good warning to the pilots that something was missing prior to landing. In the end; it was the failed recognition of multiple very small in flight distractions that tore both pilots attention away from normal checklist procedures.

After initial takeoff the instructor demonstrated an engine failure followed by an emergency return to a landing. That was the first time I had seen this maneuver. I then took off to do the same thing. After securing the engine I forgot to lower the landing gear. I was fixated on maintaining flight parameters for the emergency return. Also; with only 2 hours in type I didn't have a very good GUMPS (Gas; Undercarriage; Mixture; Propeller; Seat belts) habit pattern. Out of habit I called to tower 'left base gear down' without checking the gear (I was focused on directional control and airspeed for the single engine maneuver). On final; we focused on some large birds near the approach end and again failed to check the gear. I set flaps to 25 because I realized I couldn't maintain airspeed without reducing throttle to idle. That should have been a huge clue to recheck the gear; but focus on the birds by both of us precluded that decision. During flare to touchdown I noticed the airplane was very squirrelly to control so I focused very intently on making a good soft landing. Right about then; as we descended past where the gear should have landed; I realized what happened (we had no gear down). I landed on the props and flaps very softly on top of the captains bars and skidded to a halt about 1;500 feet later on centerline.The instructor and I knew each other very well and I believe we trusted each other very much. That probably created some complacency between us. Also; calling out the birds and focusing on them right when we should have been checking configuration (fixation) was a large factor.

An experience pilot and his flight instructor experienced a gear-up landing in a twin engine Piper during practice engine failure and return to the field.

1425249

201702

1801-2400

IAH.Airport

TX

8000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Vectors; STAR DRLLR5

Class B IAH

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B IAH

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure

1425249

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were descending via the DRLLR5 arrival into IAH; RWY 26R transition. The aircraft was already established on the downwind approximately 6 miles west of SKLER and descending through 7;300 feet. Approach (124.35) had switched us over to final approach frequency 119.1. I checked in and immediately the controller told us to turn heading 360 IMMEDIATELY and climb to 8000 feet; there was traffic south of us heading right at us and climbing. The First Officer disconnected the autopilot and turned right away to 360 and began climbing as instructed to 8000. We ended up leveling off prior to 8000 because the aircraft was climbing much faster and ended up going over the top of us. I advised Approach that we stopped our climb and could see the traffic on our TCAS climbing above us. After getting the aircraft on the ground we queried IAH tower if we could get more information on what just unfolded. They gave us the IAH TRACON number and we called to get the details of the event. An aircraft departing to the North was given a climb to 16;000 feet right into our flight path. The aircraft came within less than 2 miles and 200 feet. Thank God it wasn't our time to go.

Air Carrier Captain reported being given an emergency turn and climb to avoid traffic the TRACON vectored north after takeoff into the arrival path.

1262656

201505

0001-0600

LBB.TRACON

TX

4300.0

Tower LBB

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class C LBB

Tower LBB

Small Transport

1.0

Landing

Other Instrument Approach

Class C LBB

Facility LBB.TOWER

Government

Local; Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.5

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1262656

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X [was] on ILS approach following Aircraft Y to runway 26. Dust storm with 3/4 mile visibility and wind approximately 270 at 25G35. I was training on Local combined with Ground/Clearance Delivery and Flight Data; not unusual for time of day and traffic. TRACON switched Aircraft X to Local on about 8 mile final; 4 miles behind Aircraft Y with a 20 knot overtake. I advised Aircraft X that he was number 2 following Aircraft Y and asked that he reduce approach speed as much as practical. Aircraft X continued to compress to 3 miles just inside the final approach fix when I asked my trainer if we are qualified to run 2.5 miles inside of 10 on final. He said that he did not think so; but did not tell me to send Aircraft X around. The Tower Controller in Charge (CIC) began looking up the rule to see if we were able to run reduced separation; but we were not certain; based on the wording; [if] whether we qualified. I advised Aircraft Y to expect to exit at Kilo in order to expedite his runway exit. Separation compressed to approximately 2.5 miles when Aircraft Y crossed the threshold of runway 26. After the event; my trainer discussed that I should have sent the trailing aircraft around. I called the ATM after being relieved; and he said that we are not single site radar and do not qualify for reduced separation. Three miles is required IFR at the runway. I believe that my trainer knew that we needed 3 miles; but when I questioned whether or not we are qualified to compress to 2.5 inside of 10; that he was uncertain and it led to confusion.Next time; I will send the second aircraft around for re-sequence with the TRACON.

LBB Developmental/Front Line Manager (FLM) reports of a loss of separation due to compression on final. The Developmental/FLM asked his instructor if they were capable of running 2.5 miles on final and the instructor replied he didn't think so. After the two aircraft landed the Developmental found out that they needed three miles instead of 2.5.

1781788

202101

1201-1800

ZLC.ARTCC

UT

VMC

Daylight

Center ZLC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZLC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Fatigue; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

1781788

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

While waiting for the airplane to be towed to the departure gate; I ate a heavy breakfast and did not consume any coffee as this was an Air Carrier X operation and I anticipated coffee being readily available on the plane. In spite of my request; the FA never made any coffee. ATC issued a 15 degree heading change for traffic. I made the heading change without incident. Subsequently; I began to feel a bit drowsy. After approximately 5 minutes; ATC issued 'Direct SUNED' fix. I selected direct SUNED in the FMS and activated after PM confirmed the change. I forgot to select the NAV mode on guidance panel and we continued on the previous heading for 3 more minutes. I snapped to attention ATC reissued the Direct SUNED clearance and after a moment of confusion as to why the clearance was reissued; I realized that the guidance panel was still set to HDG mode. The proper NAV mode was engaged and we proceeded direct to SUNED without incident or any further mention of the issue by ATC. Driven by adrenaline; I remained mentally aroused and vigilant for the remainder of the flight.Cause - PF's Postprandial lassitude caused by failure to ingest a suitable amount of caffeine following heavy breakfast. PM inattention/distraction was also a factor.Ensure personal availability of postprandial drowsiness countermeasures (aka Coffee) and remember to verify changes on flight mode annunciator.

Air carrier First Officer reported a track heading deviation during departure from SLC airport. First Officer cited feeling drowsy due to not consuming caffeine after a big breakfast may have contributed to the event.

1742159

202005

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1742159

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather

Weather

Was cleared to land on Runway XXR at ZZZ; airspeed was approximately 5 knots higher than usual on approach. Made a normal; smooth touchdown on XXR prior to Taxiway 1. Almost immediately on the initial rollout encountered a right crosswind and aircraft swerved hard to the left. The aircraft exited the runway pavement between Taxiways 1 and 2 and the remainder of the rollout was on the grass infield between Runways XXR and XXL until reaching Taxiway 2. Then taxied onto Taxiway 2 and; after receiving clearance; taxied the aircraft normally across Runway XXR to parking. The aircraft sustained minor cosmetic damage and there were no injuries. It was a solo flight. ZZZ Tower had inquired after the rollout as to whether any assistance was required to which I replied in the negative.Factors which I believe contributed:1. Due to Covid 19 pandemic and aircraft being in annual for a month did not have much recent flight experience.2. Due to Covid 19 pandemic; had to order shoes online; instead of being fitted in a store; which were heavier than expected and worn for the first time during this flight; which resulted in less rudder sensitivity and probably decreased ability to control aircraft on rollout.3.Crosswind force taking effect almost immediately upon initial rollout right after touchdown.4. Airspeed 5K too high on touchdown.5. Failure to react quickly enough due to lack of recent flight experience in regards to a go-around; though still not sure a go-around would have helped.6. Had been very mentally focused on instrument procedures and flying holding pattern during the flight prior to landing and had 'expectation bias' of a normal landing with no crosswind.

Pilot reported after landing a crosswind took control of the aircraft causing a runway excursion.

1434518

201703

1201-1800

ZMP.ARTCC

MN

35000.0

Daylight

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZKC

Facility ZMP.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1434518

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working the radar position at sector XX at ZMP ARTCC. I had bad rides and a few aircraft requesting different altitudes. I was working somewhere between 18-22 aircraft by myself which is not uncommon. The sector was still green. Denver Center was in the process of solving a situation between two aircraft that were coming together in level flight at FL350. Both data blocks were flashing and the loss of separation would occur in Denver Center's airspace. (There was no loss of separation as far as I could tell.) Both aircraft were coming to me from Denver sector XY. Both aircraft were also flashing to me in a handoff status. Denver proceeded to turn one aircraft to the north and solved the conflict.In the process they stopped the handoff flash to me on the lead aircraft whose call sign is Aircraft X. So Aircraft X was not on my scope anymore as they had taken the data block back. Here's where the issue occurred: Three minutes later they started the flash on Aircraft X to me and he was one minute away from my airspace. He was showing level at an interim altitude of FL350 with a requested altitude of FL370 I believe. I quickly took the handoff after doing a traffic search and started the flash to Kansas City Center by typing 'K CID enter' since he was a corner cutter and would only be in my airspace for two minutes. Since Kansas City sector XX was open the data block began flashing to them instead of Kansas City sector XY. Kansas City sector XX took the handoff a few seconds later and I did not notice that they had the hand off until the aircraft was one hit inside Kansas City Center's airspace upon which time I called Kansas City sector XY to do a late point out on Aircraft X. I wrongly assumed that the data block would flash at the correct sector based on the interim altitude. I was busy and I forgot that I needed to flash the aircraft specifically to Kansas City sector XY in such a situation.I recommend that En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) be updated to allow us to flash aircraft to any adjacent center based on the interim altitude. I understand this probably will not happen but it would have been helpful in this situation.

ZMP Controller reported an airspace violation because the controller did not ensure the handoff was routed to the correct sector. The reporter thought the En Route Automation Modernization computer would send it to the correct sector based on the interim altitude.

1442595

201704

1801-2400

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B737-900

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Inspection

Horizontal Stabilizer

X

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1442595

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1442596.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors

Human Factors

I stopped to see if the technician working the aircraft on the gate needed help. I had overheard a radio call about a dent on the left horizontal stabilizer. I also heard the Supervisor say the damage was old and had been archived. When I arrived at the gate; several technicians were looking at the damage. The general consensus was it was new damage and needed to be addressed. The Base Maintenance was notified on the radio that we needed 30 minutes to evaluate the damage. At that time the Supervisor made a radio call to the Base Maintenance and said the damage had been archived; the aircraft was released and ready to go. The technician working the gate wanted to create a logbook entry and called the shift manager to inform him. The shift manager informed him that based on the information he had received from his Supervisor; the damage had been addressed and was good to go. The Supervisor was also reported as telling another technician that felt the damage was out of limits that he didn't know what he was talking about.I believe the technician working the gate was placed under unreasonable pressure by management not to make a logbook entry. Prior the aircraft departing I took several photographs of the damage and showed them to the shift manager and the Supervisor. The shift manager informed me that he had contacted Maintenance Control at the arrival airport to investigate the damage when the aircraft arrived. He requested that I send him the photos that I had taken so he could send them to Maintenance Control. The Supervisor told me that after seeing the photos that he had called the control center and attempted to stop the aircraft from departing but was too late. This all took place within minutes of departure time and the aircraft was allowed to depart to ZZZ1.As of the next morning; I checked for a log or entry in maintenance software regarding the damage but found none. I found the aircraft had been dispatched to ZZZ2 and was about to depart for [an international flight]. At which time I attempted to contact the shift manager on duty without success. I then contacted the hangar Supervisor who contacted Maintenance Control and the shift manager. The aircraft was taken out of service in ZZZ2.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Maintenance Technicians reported that a B737 was allowed to continue in service before it could be determined if a dent was within limits.

1112842

201308

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

5.0

7000.0

IMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Personal

RV-10

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

AC Generator/Alternator

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 435

Human-Machine Interface

1112842

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Human Factors; Weather; Aircraft

Aircraft

Loss of electrical system resulted in communications loss in IMC. Attempted a return to the departure airport due to anticipated VMC weather conditions. Arrived and attempted landing but weather changed to IMC. Changed destination to ZZZ where visibility allowed a safe landing. Recently changed panel to glass panel with battery backup ADAHRS. This backup coupled with my iPad foreflight map program allowed for safe navigation and landing.

RV10 pilot reports electrical failure in IMC. Due to a recently installed glass panel with battery backup ADAHRS and an iPad with foreflight; a safe landing ensues at a divert airport.

1254295

201504

1801-2400

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

Center ZDC

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Climb; Descent; Cruise

Class A ZDC; Class E ZDC

Facility ZDC.ARTCC

Government

Traffic Management

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1254295

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

ZDC had convective weather from a line RDU to ORF and south. RDU NE departures and RDU NE arrivals are having to share the same airspace because of weather. ZDC requested ZNY and ZBW reroute RDU arrivals via J48 to stay on the back side of the weather and stay out of the departure corridor. For 4 hours the ATCSCC (Air Traffic Control Command Center) complied and put out advisory 092. ZDC requested to extend the reroute for another 2 to 4 hours. ATCSCC denied request; then the ATCSCC denied ZDC NTML entry to stop RDU arrivals from the east side; and finally ATCSCC denied ZDC request to ground stop RDU arrivals from the east side. The ATCSCC does not have the equipment to see our sectors; to see the deviating departing and arriving aircraft. The ATCSCC cannot see the sectors where aircraft are deviating and therefore should not have the power to tell ZDC that ZNY and ZBW cannot reroute RDU arrivals to the west when ZDC is trying to mitigate an unsafe situation by preventing arrivals in the corridor where departures are deviating.

Traffic Management Coordinator reports of issues related to flow control and the fact that when asked for an extension the Air Traffic Control Command Center (ATCSCC) denies the request. The reporter then goes on to report that the ATCSCC cannot see the traffic and should not deny the controllers what they need for flow.

1208283

201410

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 140 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Pitot-Static System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

1208283

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Departing runway 18L; above 80kts received a Caution EICAS message and captain stated 'continue'. In the climb; we began to receive intermittent 'IAS' comparator alerts on PFD 1 & 2 airspeed indicators. Continued the departure climb to 10;000 feet at which time the difference in airspeeds continually got more substantial. During this time we also received intermittent 'SPS Advanced' Cautions. We ran the 'Unreliable Airpseed' checklist; decided to return to [departure airport]; declared an emergency. The captain briefed the flight attendant and we landed flaps 45 degrees; below max landing weight. Cause: Apparent issue with pitot-static system.

EMB-140 First Officer reported loss of multiple pitot/static related components.

1782074

202101

0601-1200

IAH.Airport

TX

0.0

Ramp IAH

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Vectors; Direct

Ramp IAH

Other unknown

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Other unknown

IFR

Other unknown

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Direct

Aircraft X

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1782074

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1782076.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

After being cleared out of the parking alley we were instructed to taxi RB to the RB bridge. As the Pilot Monitoring I read back the clearance correctly to company ramp and the Captain correctly repeated it to me; but due to our focus on an aircraft that had just pushed back from the adjacent pier between us and the RB bridge; the Captain taxied over to RA instead. Shortly afterward we were asked to call a phone number; at which point were informed of the taxi error. I did not catch this error due to my relative inexperience at the airport (when I look at the respective bridges I don't immediately identify which is which) and the fact that I was obsessed with being on the correct frequency and listening for radio calls due to prior communications and taxi difficulties at this airport. This increased my workload inside of the cockpit and served as a distraction from my monitoring duties outside the cockpit.At the time of this incident I had obtained what I consider sufficient experience with this airport's operational complexities; yet I continue to personally experience and witness countless communications and taxi difficulties among our crews. This has led to near paranoia with my handling of communications and taxi operations at this airport. I now clearly brief the Captain on each frequency in each radio (active / standby) and obsessively announce the communications radio number I'm using at that time; i.e. 'now monitoring metering on 119.95; com 2'. The unfortunate consequence of this is increased workload and chatter in what should be a quiet cockpit with both sets of eyes up and outside. I am now convinced there are too many frequency changes between the gate and the runway at this airport. Metering needs to be done at the gate; much as it is at other airports so we exit the ramp and contact ground and then tower as we approach the runway -- just as we do at literally every other airport in the nation. All double-character taxiways need to be changed to single character names so they don't sound the same (or similar). This would also reduce the frequency time required to issue and read-back clearances. 'RA' should be 'A'. RB should be 'B'. 'WB' should be 'W'. The taxi to 15L is (and I did you not) 'Whiskey Golf; Whiskey Bravo; Whiskey Victor' which pilots (incorrectly) abbreviate as 'Whiskey Golf; Bravo; Victor' because they too realize the needless verbosity in the taxiway names. This is ridiculous. There are 26 letters in the English language and no where near 26 parallel taxiways at IAH airport. Therefore; all parallel taxiways should be given single letter names ('A'; 'B'; 'C'; etc.) and crossing taxiways given an associated single letter/number name such as 'A1; A5; A10'; etc. as is the case at many if not most of the airports in the US. I have also noticed that the taxi diagrams for the IAH airport is extremely poorly documented; with taxiway names adjacent to the physical representation of the associated taxiway; which leads to confusion in identifying the taxiways on the chart. Perhaps if the taxiway names were single character in most cases the diagram would be able to fit the single character name directly over the taxiway. Incidentally; just for reference; the vector charts built into the competitions product allow near infinite zooming and very clearly identify each taxiway because the text fits directly over the taxiway representation. Perhaps it's time to spend some money on the competitions product for our crews and dump our current supplier which is always crashing at inopportune times (yes; including during taxi). Additionally; ATC and ramp must be more consistent and explicit when they tell us to change to a new frequency as to whether they want us to 'monitor' or 'contact' the controller on that new frequency. I receive 'Aircraft X; taxi spot 1; metering on 119.95' all too often; and I am then forced to waste more frequency time asking whether I should monitor or contact them. I am at my witsend with the IAH airport and its operations. Someone needs to do something about this airport before more of our pilots are unfairly targeted for enforcement.

While taxiing on RC after departing alleyway; crew given instruction to taxi around an aircraft in front then taxi via RB bridge. Crew taxied around the aircraft as instructed but since the other aircraft was abeam Gate X and very close to the RB bridge; both thought we heard to taxi to via the RA bridge. We also changed frequencies to East Ramp and missed any calls from Company Ramp. We never heard any more calls from either ramp controllers until East Ramp called and continued our taxi. Unbeknownst to us; the ramp controllers had to stop a Aircraft X to prevent a nose-to-nose situation. We were asked to contact ramp via telephone and that's when we were informed of our error.This was a case of confirmation bias as we both thought we heard to taxi via RA bridge since the other aircraft was so near RB. I am familiar with the normal flow of ramp traffic and that RA is usually for westbound aircraft; though this is not always the case.

Air Carrier Pilot crew reported too many frequency changes; EFB taxi chart confusion and taxiway sign confusion during taxi to runway.

1223727

201411

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Class D ZZZ

Throttle/Power Lever

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 116

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

1223727

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

After taxiing the plane to the hangar from recent repairs and annual inspection; the mechanic met me at the hangar to shuttle me back to my car. After he helped me push the plane into the hangar; he wanted to look at where the breather tube came out of the cowl. He had installed new scat tubing for the heater intake and he was concerned that the resulting positioning might rub against the new cowl. After the inspection; he suggested we tie wrap the breather tube in one more place to secure it to prevent it from rubbing on the new cowl. I placed a tie wrap that pulled side pressure on the tube pulling it toward the cowl opening and away from the metal. After I completed the work; the mechanic looked in and said we were good. The breather tube cleared the cowl.That weekend; I went to fly the plane for one more check flight after having it return to service. The run-up was good and magnetos; carb heat checked out. It was a windy day with winds 20-30kts. I was cleared for RWY17 a long taxi that allowed the oil to come to temperature.When I applied power for takeoff; the aircraft jumped into the air due to the wind. Since it was gusty; I was getting tossed about by the wind quite a bit. Halfway down the runway; I noticed that the plane wasn't climbing as expected (even with the substantial headwind) and I noticed that it wasn't developing full power. I verified the Carb heat was closed and throttle was full forward but the engine was not developing full takeoff power. By the time I realized I had an issue I was at the end of the runway. I was 200-300 feet over the end of the runway but the aircraft was not climbing or building speed. In fact; the plane was starting to settle and I was losing speed so I declared an emergency and returned to land on RWY 35. The landing (even with a substantial tailwind); was uneventful.When I got to the hangar; I discovered the problem. The tie wrap I had installed to put side pressure on the breather tube had continued tightening itself due to the engine vibration. The resulting over-tightened had pulled the breather tube into a position that blocked the forward movement of the throttle lever; preventing full advancement of the throttle. I cut the tie wrap and the breather moved back to its position and I regained full motion of the throttleWhen I went back to the plane to take pictures of the configuration; I tried to push the breather tube into a conflicting position with the throttle lever and it would happen. I can't replicate the fault on the ground; it does not create the interference. Pushing the breather tube to the side and securing it with the tie wrap does not create sufficient pressure or interference with the throttle motion. I suspect that what happened was that engine vibration overtighten the tie wrap through some kind of position shift. The more the engine vibrated; the more it pulled the breather tube into conflict with the throttle. This continued tightening is capable of pulling the breather tube into a position that interferes with the throttle. That is the only way I can speculate it got positioned in a way that it blocked the throttle lever. I called the mechanic over to the hangar to look at the problem with me and he asked me to ground the plane until he can reroute the breather tube on the other side of the scat tubing (where it is more distant from the throttle lever) and secure it with an Adel clamp. The FAA called me after the incident and assured me it was right to declare an emergency. After submitting the honest full disclosure above; he informed me I would be under investigation because I performed work as the owner installing the tie wrap and not documenting it in the log book. I am extremely concerned that overzealous investigator at the FSDO will lead to pilots like me being gun shy to declare emergencies because they immediately draw investigation.

Taking his Small Aircraft on a flight shortly after its annual inspection; the pilot found himself airborne but producing insufficient power to climb above ground effect. Pilot was forced to declare an emergency and land safely downwind on another runway.

1764855

202010

0.0

No Aircraft

Company

Air Carrier

Gate Agent / CSR

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 Other; Party2 Other

1764855

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Gate Agent / CSR

Other in terminal; check in

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

During Xpm check-in there is no social distancing between passengers. There is no space for agents to move about kiosks to assist passenger check-in without tripping over passenger's bags that are everywhere in walkway and between kiosks. Security line is very long and agents and passengers have difficulty making way to kiosks. Passengers touch agents and pull them over to help them even though an agent is working with another passenger.

Customer Service Representative reported COVID-19 issues relating to agents in the terminal at check in.

1801750

202104

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 148; Flight Crew Total 1660; Flight Crew Type 782

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1801750

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Captain was the Pilot Flying. On the landing roll-out on Runway XX in ZZZ he noticed a fuel truck attempting to cross the runway on Taxiway XX. I was heads down monitoring the airspeed; around my '80' call out the Captain said...'That's a fuel truck'. I was unable to see it because of the windshield divider. He immediately applied full brakes and full reversers and we managed to come to a complete stop within 100 ft of the truck.The sound of the brakes screeching and reversers caused the driver to slow to a stop. He still managed to make it past the driver side door onto the runway. I made another CTAF call announcing we were on the runway still...there was no acknowledgment from the fuel truck. He backed up allowed us to continue down to Taxiway XY; then he crossed the runway on XX. I continued to make CTAF traffic calls and never heard the fuel truck make a single one while he continued to the side of the runway.I believe the fuel truck was not monitoring the CTAF frequency. We were switched from approach to advisory frequency well beyond 5 miles from the runway landing zone. Even after the event occurred we still did not hear him make any calls as he continued driving across the airport taxiways.Ground personnel should be trained to constantly monitor CTAF; Ground; Tower and ramp frequencies at all times when moving in vehicles around the airport.

Air carrier First Officer reported a max effort stop was required on the landing roll to avoid a collision with a truck crossing the runway.

1688615

201909

BNA.Airport

TN

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

High

4.0

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1688615

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Company Policy

Procedure

During taxi; as I take my position as B [flight attendant]; for the safety demo I could hear an electronic device rows away. As I approached I noticed two children in seats 10 A and C were watching their iPad without headphones. I informed the mom sitting in 10C they are required to wear headphones or it must be muted. She stated that this is their 3rd flight and no one has told them this before. I apologized that it was missed on a previous flight. I continued the safety demo and she said she would like to see it in writing. I told her I would need to get back to her as I am in the middle of the safety demo. A neighboring passenger showed it to her in the in flight magazine. After the demo; I secured the galley and it was time for takeoff. I was unable to go back to her at that time. After takeoff I checked the entertainment kit and no headphones were in the kit. Shortly after the seatbelt sign came off a passenger came to the back galley and handed me a paper with her contact info and told me she is seated in 11B is a witness to the exchange between the passenger and I and she wanted to make sure I was covered because she heard the passenger telling her son they 'cannot use the iPad because the flight attendant yelled at her and said they couldn't use it.'Also the other flight attendant said a passenger in front of 10C offered her an extra pair of headphones she had and the passenger refused and said her son was autistic and required special headphones.The work group could be consistent on their flights informing passengers about the headphone requirements. If there had been consistency this situation could've possibly been avoided as the passenger could have been prepared.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to comply with instructions for her two children to use headphones and caused a disruption during the safety briefing.

1636656

201904

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 486; Flight Crew Type 4286

1636656

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Dispatch

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Ground Ops forgot to give us the HAZMAT paperwork for a slide we were carrying in cargo bin D. Dispatch informed us of the slide we were carrying while we were at cruise.

B737 First Officer reported Dispatch notification during cruise of Hazmat material on board.

1345230

201604

0001-0600

KZAK.ARTCC

HI

38000.0

VMC

Night

Center KZAK

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Oceanic

Class A KZAK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 400

1345230

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 4500

1345315.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather

After reaching the first ETOPS check point; it was determined that a significant amount of fuel had been burned in excess of estimated flight planned fuel burn (approx. -1;500lbs). We monitored the fuel gauges and fuel burn and realized the fuel would be also short of flight plan at the next ETOPS check point. At approximately 200NM West of CORTT we calculated that the fuel at the Critical Point (CP) would be approximately 4;500lbs less than flight plan fuel. A wind bust of approximately 100 kts was found when the chart forecast wind and dispatch winds were compared to actual winds. At this point a request was made to KZAK for a clearance to return to HNL since we had not yet reached the CP. A reply of 'Standby' was received however we determined that we could not continue EAST bound without risking passage of the CP. We [advised ATC] and we initiated a turn utilizing the [company] ETOPS procedures; announced our intentions on the CTAF/121.5; and completed the Diversion checklist on the back of the ETOPS checklist. KZAK processed us and cleared us Direct HNL.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported encountering adverse winds far different than forecasted. This resulted in having insufficient fuel at the required checkpoints. Flight crew elected to return to HNL.

1505073

201712

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A330

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Low

9.0

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Flight Attendant Airline Total 44; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 7; Flight Attendant Total 44; Flight Attendant Type 100

1505073

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

We were about 2 and a half hours out from landing. There were two loud noises. It sounded like something was loose in the cargo area; and was banging around; as though cargo was unsecured. Then a shudder occurred. The Captain was asleep in the pilot bunk. The first officer called me on the interphone and asked me to wake the Captain. I woke him immediately. He said it felt like a compression failure had occurred. Unbeknown to me the engine had stalled. They then restarted the engine (number one). We continued without incident. No one was hurt or very concerned. After a very quiet landing; we noticed the runway was lined with emergency vehicles. The pilots informed us that the engine had stalled about five minutes before we landed; and they had [advised ATC]. No one in the cabin; passengers or cabin crew knew about it until then. All in all it was rather quiet and we were all fine. The pilots did an outstanding job.

A330 Flight Attendant reported landing safely after experiencing a compressor stall in the Number 1 engine.

1497378

201711

1801-2400

AGS.TRACON

GA

1100.0

Night

Tower AGS

Corporate

Global Express (BD700)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class C AGS

Tower AGS

Personal

Bonanza 33

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C AGS

Facility AGS.Tower

Government

Local; Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1497378

Facility AGS.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1497354.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Company Policy; Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

I was working Local Control and Tower CIC (Controller in Charge); and I changed the active runway from Runway 35 to Runway 17 due to wind change. I put Visual Approach Runway 17 on the ATIS and coordinated that with the Radar Approach Controller. A few minutes later a Local Controller and a Ground Controller came up to the Tower to man those positions. I was still the Tower CIC. I briefed them that I had changed the runway; and Runway 17 was now the active.Soon after they took those positions; 3 or 4 departures called ground control who I was actively monitoring along with Local Control and Ground Control taxied them to Runway 35. During this time; that the aircraft were taxiing a VFR Helicopter called Ground Control to depart to the southwest; then the Helicopter called Local Control for departure. Local Control launched the Helicopter from the Ramp on course to the southwest. Then the Local controller launched [A Global Express] off Runway 35 without coordination with the Radar Controller.At the time the [Global Express] got airborne; A Beech Bonanza was approximately 7 miles northeast of the airport on a Visual Approach to Runway 17. In our facility SOP; the cutoff point for ODO (Opposite Direct Operations) with jets is 15 miles and for propellers it is 10 miles. When Ground Control taxied the departures to Runway 35; I didn't catch that. And when Local control launched the Global Express from Runway 35; I didn't catch that.A Supervisor relieved me as Tower CIC; and realized the ODO problem soon after the briefing I gave him; which included that Runway 17 was the active. The Visual Approach clearance for [Beech Bonanza] was cancelled and they were told to enter the downwind for Runway 35 and cleared for a Visual Approach Runway 35. I recommend extra memory aids when switching runways; especially when one particular runway has been in constant use for several days or weeks.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Tower Controllers reported they had less than required separation criteria for an Opposite Direction Operation.

1160873

201403

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

20.0

7500.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Descent

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 9575; Flight Crew Type 1307

1160873

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1250

1160926.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After the passengers departed the aircraft at their destination; I shut and latched the cabin door; and confirmed the door to be secure by pulling the lever to make sure it was snug and verified cabin door light was extinguished. All the latches were visually engaged. At this point there was no reason to question whether the door was not latched securely. We then departed VFR on a 16 minute flight back to base. The takeoff was uneventful and the weather was clear skies with a light wind. After 10-12 minutes we had the airport in sight visually and started our descent. Soon after the descent was initiated; I felt a change in cabin pressurization. A quick scan of the instrument panel revealed no indicator lights; but the cabin VSI was showing a higher than usual descent rate. Suddenly there was an extremely loud 'boom.' At this point; I assumed it was the cabin door without any way to verify. The aircraft remained stable. I verified all flight controls were normal. I made the decision to land at destination considering it was the nearest airport. I landed the aircraft without incident. After the door was located; a visual inspection was done and it was determined that the door had unlatched due to the locking mechanism for the exterior door handle not being fully engaged which in turn; released the exterior door handle from the stowed position. Because of air load on the exterior door handle it opened the door and departed the aircraft. Let me be very clear; all the door latches were fully engaged. It was the exterior door handle that was not fully latched. In talking with a Mechanic he told me he has seen this more times than he cares to mention with Falcons coming into maintenance with their exterior door handle in the unlocked position. I was one of the unlucky ones that it actually opened the door. The cabin door indicator light switch was also found faulty. There are two switches for the door. One for the lower door latches and one for the exterior door handle. This was the one at fault. My corrective action would be to check to make sure the light is working properly and illuminated when the door is open as a prevented measure.

We departed VFR for a normal 16 minute VFR flight. Approximately 10 minutes into the flight; we were starting our descent and somewhere between 7;000 - 9;000 MSL we felt the pressure in our ears start to change. At the time I started to evaluate the cabin pressurization gage; I noticed a higher than normal rate of descent within the cabin. Within 30 seconds after noticing the pressure within my ears start to change we heard a very loud explosion; which was the main cabin door departing from the aircraft. We never had a door light or a cabin light signaling a issue on the caution panel. After evaluating that the airplane was still flyable; we finished the approximate 15 mile flight where we had a non eventful landing.

DA20 flight crew experiences the loss of the main cabin door in flight at low altitude and continues to destination for landing. When the door was recovered it was determined that the external door handle had popped out in flight and had been activated by the slipstream.

1187948

201407

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1187948

ATC Issue All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

Ambiguous

It appears that the vast majority of the PDC's now includes the clearance to 'climb via SID'; yet so many SID's have that altitude clearance written in small font buried someplace on the page. In other cases the altitude clearance on the SID is somewhat confusing as in the LAS SHEAD 8. This is just an incident waiting to happen. If ATC is going to put this on our back then the altitude on the SID should be more conspicuous.

A320 Captain laments the altitude restrictions burried in the routing section; in small font; in many of the new RNAV SID's.

1246078

201503

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

1

Night

200

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

Takeoff / Launch

Safety Instrumentation & Information

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 167; Flight Crew Type 4000

1246078

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

N

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

We were cleared for takeoff.... All checklists had been completed.... Turning onto the runway; the Captain increased the N1's to approximately 40-50% for a 'rolling takeoff.' Aircraft control was passed to me at which time I advanced the thrust levers. The Takeoff Warning horn sounded and I immediately retarded the thrust levers. The Captain quickly checked the speedbrake handle and the flap handle and advanced the thrust levers again. The Takeoff Warning horn sounded again and I once again reduced the thrust levers.Tower was notified and we cleared the runway.... The Captain 'jiggled' the flap handle and the speedbrake lever and then performed another Takeoff Warning Horn check. This time the check passed. Tower cleared us for takeoff and a normal takeoff occurred. The rest of the flight was uneventful and an 'info only' write-up was logged regarding the erroneous Takeoff Warning horn.

B737-300 First Officer performed a slow speed Rejected Takeoff (RTO) after the Takeoff Configuration Warning Horn sounded. After the Captain 'jiggled' the flap handle and speedbrake lever; Configuration Warning did not sound on the second takeoff.

1569510

201808

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

5000.0

IMC

Turbulence; Icing

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class E ZZZ

Pitot-Static System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Human-Machine Interface

1569510

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

Event occurred on descent during the RNAV arrival. Engine and airfoil anti-ice was on for the descent due to the weather. Conditions were IFR with moderate rain and moderate turbulence during the descent. Precipitation was evident on the windscreen but no ice buildup on the wipers was visible. About 13000 feet on the arrival we received 'IAS' alert indicating a comparison mismatch between Captain and F/O (First Officer) airspeed indication. As PF (pilot flying) I noticed the alert and queried F/O's airspeed and compared that to the standby airspeed indicator. Captain and F/O's airspeeds appeared to be within 5 knots of each other. However we were in moderate rain and moderate turbulence during the arrival descent. Captain's airspeed appeared to the one that matched the standby indicator closer at 290 knots. Very shortly after that we received Level 2 alerts for SEL ELEV FEEL MAN and SEL FLAP LIM OVRD. At this particular time I wasn't sure if we were losing input to the FCC's so I advised ATC we had possible navigation; and possibly airspeed and altitude issues. I requested from the controller ATC vectors to ZZZ. He gave me a heading and altitude. The autopilot and autothrottles subsequently disconnected. I advised the F/O that I had the airplane and radios and confirmed our airspeed; altitude; and heading with ATC. Then directed the F/O to run 'the most appropriate' checklist. We both agreed we suspected a pitot static issue. We had a few more alerts begin to pop up. As he worked through the QRH procedures for the alerts indicated and our aircraft condition we transferred to the 'Airspeed Unreliable' checklist based on the checklist notes we had for the indicated alert. ATC continued giving me vectors to the runway. Since we were comfortable that we had accurate airspeed on the Captain's side as compared to what ATC indicated and the standby indicator; and the HUD was accurate; I elected to continue toward a landing. The F/O continued the 'Airspeed Unreliable' checklist to a logical conclusion. During this time we continued descent to 5000 toward final. ATC offered the center runway but I elected the left to have a visual PAPI backup. At some point the airspeeds seemed to be back with normal indications. The F/O and I agreed it was most likely the F/O pitot static system that had froze up and not had finally thawed out. I elected to turn the autopilot and autothrottle systems back on and all systems were normal. We cancelled the emergency with ATC and landed normally on XXL with 35 degree flaps.Suspect the F/O pitot static system froze up during descent in moderate rain and IMC conditions. It thawed out and began functioning normally several minutes later while on a base to final. This was a system malfunction with the anti ice system. Fantastic job on ATC controllers part to provide me backup indications of airspeed; heading and altitude when we're flying in IMC conditions with degraded flight instruments. We did not get VMC conditions until about 4000 feet and on an extended base to final.

Cargo aircraft Captain reported an airspeed alert indicating a comparison mismatch between Captain and First Officer airspeed indication.

1091679

201305

1201-1800

STL.Airport

MO

100.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower STL

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Landing

Class B STL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 241

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

1091679

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 229

1091696.0

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

After the 100 FT call by the aircraft; the First Officer (pilot not flying) said; 'What is that; a truck?' He started talking about a possible go-around. I changed my focus further down the runway and saw an emergency vehicle clearing about midfield on the north side and didn't notice any other vehicle following across the runway. I made a decision to continue to land; which went uneventfully and; while clearing; the First Officer queried the Tower about the truck. We had heard nothing from Tower at all. The Tower Controller said there had been a communication error with the truck. We heard the Tower Controller ask the truck to call them. We proceeded to call our ATC Specialist to get him in the loop.

I was pilot not flying. The approach was uneventful until approaching 100 FT. I looked inside to make the 100 FT call and realized the aircraft had the voice callouts. I looked up [after that] and saw an emergency vehicle rapidly crossing the runway at midfield. I said; 'What the heck?' I started to tell the pilot flying to go around as we approached 50 FT; but the vehicle was going so fast (30 to 40 MPH) that; by the time the pilot flying looked up; the runway was clear. The pilot flying landed the aircraft uneventfully and we queried the Tower Controller to see if he had noticed the incursion. He said it was a communication error and told the truck to contact the Tower and sent us to Ground. We taxied to the gate without incident and called the Company ATC representative.

B737 flight crew reports an emergency vehicle crossing their runway as they are about to touch down. The approach is continued to landing as the vehicle is moving quickly. The Tower Controller sited a communication error as the cause of the incident.

1471162

201708

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

15.0

8000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Embraer Phenom 100

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Hydraulic System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 300

1471162

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 50

1471165.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

Lost hydraulic system. Completed abnormal and emergency checklist. Advised ATC and landed without incident.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Phenom 100 flight crew experienced a hydraulic failure while training and landed safely.

1210442

201410

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

4500.0

Mixed

6

Daylight

5000

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

M-20 B/C Ranger

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ1

Electrical Power

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 565; Flight Crew Type 370

1210442

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

Returning to ZZZ about 1hr 20 mins into the flight I had an electronics failure that wound up being an alternator failure. I was on an IFR Flight Plan; in [TRACON] control; cruising at 7000 ft. I was above an overcast layer that went from 5500-6500. [TRACON] called me up to amend my flight plan; it was at that moment I saw my GPS go Blank; I called [TRACON] and indicated I was having an equipment issue and to standby for 1 min. They did not respond. I transitioned from Autopilot to hand flying and began to diagnose the GPS failure; at the same time now wondering if the Radios also had an issue caused by the unknown Elec problem. [TRACON] called again; at this time I tried a backup headset; and used both sets of jacks in the front. Radios were able to receive but not transmit. I then squawked 7600. [TRACON] indicated they could see the squawk; and asked me to Ident if I could hear them. I did. At that time I checked my volts and saw I was in a discharge state; down to about 10 volts; and now realized my Alternator failed. I now began to consider my options of flying IMC ahead with no electrical power; a moment later I saw a break in the overcast and decided it would be safer to continue below the overcast under VFR; so I squawked 1200 to tell the controller I was going to fly VFR; they did not acknowledge the change; I then descended to 3500 ft and turned off my Master to save power for my landing Gear. I then began to brief POH to see if I could reset the Alternator; and also refreshing the Manual Landing Gear procedure so I would be ready for any option. I was on a straight course to my home airport; but it would take me over the top ZZZ1. I knew the top of Class C was 4400; so I climbed to 4500 to go over the top of the Class C; and remain about 500-1000 below the ceiling. During the stress of the situation it seemed like the best option. Upon reaching ZZZ I turned on the master and had enough power to lower the gear. I landed fine. I then called Tracon to tell them I was on the ground and close my flight plan. I spoke with an instructor today and he mentioned that although I was above the Class C; I would need the Mode C 'ON' to fly over that airspace; so I should have flown around the Class C; not over it. I did not catch this.The factors that led to this miss was not having good recall of the FAR related to the space above Controlled airspace with regard to Mode C; being more concerned with flying; avoiding IMC with no elec power); wondering if there was a bigger issue brewing (elec fire; or other); fuel burn now that the gas gauges were 'off'; and the stress of not knowing if 10 volts was enough to lower the gear (when it wasn't enough to power my GPS). I have read stories about radio failure in IMC and to fly last cleared flight plan....; however total elec failure is a bigger issue given the loss of Turn Coordinator. Getting below the IMC layer became my priority. A safety course on how to handle a total Elec failure would be good; what to do if you have the option to get safely below the IMC layer; vs if you cant; and what pitfalls to avoid (my over the top of Class C example); etc.

An instrument rated private pilot experienced an electrical system failure in instrument conditions. He was able to locate VFR conditions and continued to his destination.

1107956

201308

0601-1200

ZMA.ARTCC

FL

1500.0

VMC

8

Daylight

Center ZMA

Corporate

Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Climb

Vectors

Class D FXE

DC Battery

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 470

Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1107956

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was PIC; and due to crew conflicts; a contracted Captain was SIC and was sitting in the left seat as the PF. I sat in the right seat as PNF. We taxied and took off from FXE and during our climb trough 3;500 FT we received a L BAT RED CAS message. The temperature was 170 degrees and RED ([requiring that we] land as soon as possible.) Operating under the Gulfstream SOPs I actioned to the QRH and the PF continued to aviate and had control of the radios. After performing the QRH actions the CAS message was cleared; and we decided to continue. Approximately two minutes later we received the same CAS message and requested a return to our departure airport. Center stopped our climb at 8;000 FT and we were given a vector back to the airport and a descent. I again performed the QRH procedure and; when I was finished; took the radios back and was cleared to maintain 1;500 FT. I looked at the Altimeter and called out to the PF that he was descending below 1;500 FT. He immediately pulled back and regained 1;500 FT. We landed without event and no emergency was declared. I asked the PF about his ALT deviation when we landed; he told me he was only 150 FT low when asked to maintain 1;500 FT by ATC. He apologized and said he was distracted in the moment dealing with the abnormality and an FMS that was intermittent. I was not able to confirm how great the deviation was; and wanted to report this incident in the event that it was indeed greater than 150 FT. ATC did not ask us to call or report to anyone yet I still wanted to report this event. I think the unfamiliar crew; and the maintenance issues were contributing factors.

While the flight crew of a GLF 200 was managing a battery overheat and a return to their departure airport the PF; a temporary contracted airman; descended 150 FT below their cleared altitude.

1699885

201911

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

3000.0

Marginal

Cloudy

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Fractional

Light Transport

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Center ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1699885

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1700159.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Before departure from ZZZ; we picked up a clearance and got a hold for release. We contacted Center when we were number one for takeoff Runway XX. Center told us we were released; release time was XA40; void if not off by XA50; contact them no later than XA55 if not off. At XA42 we lifted off Runway XX and heard a plane in a panicking voice saying; Aircraft X; Center says 'DON'T TAKE OFF DON'T TAKE OFF.' We immediately contacted Center and he told us to make an immediate turn to 360; we were passing through 3;000 and he told us to descend to 3000 ft. We could see a plane closing in on the TCAS and banked about 45 degrees and pitched the nose down to start descent to 3;000. At that point we exceeded the flap speed. I immediately pulled flaps up. We leveled at 3;000 on a 360 degree heading. I asked the Controller where that traffic came from and he said; 'That was my fault. I was thinking you guys were coming off of ZZZ1.' As we were in the descending turn taking evasive action to avoid the traffic; I didn't get flaps up in time and we had a Flap Overspeed. Aircraft yelling don't take off when we were on climb out. Controller mistook our departure airport and released us for departure while there was traffic conflicting with our departure path and clearance. Steep descending turn to avoid traffic. Don't have any suggestions at this time. It was an honest mistake and glad it wasn't worse than it could have been.

Prior to departure; the Captain received our clearance from ATC and we were advised hold for release. We contacted ATC at the runway and advised we were number one and ready for takeoff. ATC released us for departure with a release void time of XA40; if not off by XA50; contact ATC no later than XA55. The Captain and I completed the before takeoff checklist and we began our departure roll down the runway. As we were lifting off the runway; another aircraft in the airport environment began broadcasting on the Unicom frequency looking for an 'Aircraft X.' The other aircraft called out again for an Aircraft X and said 'Center says don't take off.' [The Captain] immediately switched to the departure frequency and contacted Center. ATC Controller advised an immediate left turn to a heading of 360 and descend to 3;000. As [the Captain] called for me to turn and descend; I was already in a left descending steep turn to a heading of 360 and 3;000 ft. While during this event; [the Captain] was communicating with ATC; the aircraft accelerated past the flap speed; I immediately reduced the throttles to idle in order to correct my speed. When [the Captain] asked the Controller where the traffic came from; the Controller replied that it was his fault; he thought we were departing from ZZZ1. Aircraft in the airport environment during takeoff calling out 'don't take off.' ATC Controller mistook our departure airport for a different airport in the area. Steep descending turn to avoid traffic. No suggestion.

Light Transport aircraft flight crew reported departing from an uncontrolled airport that resulted in an NMAC due to ATC believing the flight had departed from a different airport.

1755314

202008

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

3000.0

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 20000

Workload

1755314

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors

Almost every -800 takeoff requires more than a normal amount of back pressure to rotate. I believe that our weight and balance methods are somewhat flawed. Due to concern of a tail strike (-800) I tend to apply normal rotation back pressure and if no normal results occur then slowly apply more; and do not rotate more than 10 degrees until at least 50 ft AGL (Above Ground Level). Quite often I find myself after gear retraction trimming at least one more unit of nose up; and it is not unusual to have to add even more. This was our first leg in this aircraft. Runway X is not short; but neither a very long runway. On this leg we were 20;000 lbs below ATOG (Allowable Takeoff Gross Weight) with a reduced temp takeoff. Dispatch planned a flap 15 and honestly I can't remember if Weight and Balance had us at flap 10 or 15. Anyway it was not the usual flap 5; so I had anticipated the aircraft easily 'levitating' rather than the usual flap 5 lift off attitude.Normal back pressure produced no effect so I slowly added more until we became airborne. This aircraft had a small nose wheel shimmy and wheel noise was somewhat louder than normal (small distraction). With a positive rate I called for 'landing gear up' and at 1;000 ft began calling for flap retractions just as ATC (Air Traffic Control) switched us. Departure gave a heading and altitude turning us into the sun...eyes outside; but a normal scan inside as needed. During the first minute of flight I commented that the nose wheel snubbers seem to be very worn; as the nose wheels rotated much longer than usual. I also commented that this bird was a lot louder than most; and this would be a long flight to ZZZ1. As I scanned inside I saw that the landing gear was extended; made a verbal comment as such and immediately the First Officer retracted the gear. I called out (but too late) that we were near the max retraction speed as clean acceleration had begun. Lots of events were happening simultaneously; but I believe we were approximately five knots below the limit. At cruise altitude we went over what had occurred and believe the cause to be mainly the trim issue distraction. That caused a slow rotation in the last 1;500 ft or so of the runway. This First Officer hovered his hands near the yoke during takeoff and landing (as trained in the Air Force) so was mentally ready to take over so (I think) became overly focused on having to assist in rotation. That caused the 'landing gear up' call to 'not be heard'. My failure to insure that gear retraction was taking place (never in my four decades of flying has this happened). A noisy nose wheel inducing an additive. ATC (Air Traffic Control) most always calling us as we passed through 1;000 ft AGL; another additive. When I was commenting on the additional noise and searching for the cause saw the gear still extended I should have immediately reduced some power; pitched up while verbally stating what I was doing to ensure that we were well below gear the retraction limit speed. Instead by saying 'oh the gear is still extended' this caused the First Officer to act rather than react. We both feel assured that retraction was near the limit speed but still below. Upon landing no message was indicated on the FMS (Flight management System) as it does for flap limit or over speeds; but I'm not sure if a message is generated for gear issues?Yes; our weight and balance is tested and approved; but if it is correct then almost every -800 takeoff would not require additional nose up trim after airborne. I have seen a very small improvement as we use bag scanners; but still not up to what I believe is correct. As a Crew; what was commented on when describing the event covered the rest. I would like to know if the FMS messages for gear limit speed Exceedances.

B737 Flight Crew reported they forgot to retract landing gear after takeoff.

1849546

202110

1201-1800

PCT.TRACON

VA

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

Fractional

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class D HEF

UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Class D HEF

Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

1849546

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

During level flight at 2;000; within the terminal area of HEF & inbound on radar vectors to the RNAV 34 approach; we experienced a TCAS RA. I; the First Officer; am Pilot Flying and the TCAS directed us with the aural warnings of 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC'. Just in my scanning of the terrain; I saw a small drone fly into my visual field. I was unable to tell how close it was before the TCAS system announced 'CLIMB' along with a red target on the display & a red Vertical Speed Arrow directing a 3;000+ feet per minute climb. At the top of the arrow was a green 'fly-to' cue. I took evasive action to climb above and called that It looks like its a drone.Immediately after the event was resolved; I safely flew the back to our assigned altitude of 2;000. Shortly thereafter; we acquired the airport (HEF) visually & proceeded with a visual approach to Runway 34 without any further incident & zero delays to the mission.

Fractional jet crew received a TCAS RA due to a UAS and took evasive action following TCAS RA guidance.

1468587

201707

0001-0600

SFO.Airport

CA

4000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B SFO

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 11376; Flight Crew Type 5700

1468587

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 3330

1468616.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

We were following a B777. We were in visual contact; however SFO is now requiring vectors to ILS during night time hours. Downwind we encountered some wake turbulence and advised ATC. On base leg we encountered stronger wake turbulence that put the aircraft into a greater than 30 degree left bank; generating 'Attitude' alert. The FO was pilot flying and disconnected the autopilot and recovered. We advised ATC and they said that we were 6 miles in trail of the B777. They gave us vectors to have greater spacing. No further encounters.

While being vectored to final approach runway 28R; experienced a wake upset behind a B777. Approximately 60 degrees bank angle. I overpowered the controls and disconnected the auto pilot. The Captain had previously reported an earlier wake of lesser degree to the Controller. After the second wake event; the Captain again reported and queried the separation mileage. The Controller stated 5 miles were the minimums and that there was at least that. The Controller provided an extended vector and no further problems occurred.

B737 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to SFO 6 miles in trail of a B777 that resulted in a 60 degree bank.

1564970

201807

1801-2400

ZDC.ARTCC

DC

IMC

Turbulence

Night

Center ZDC

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZDC

PFD

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1564970

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

About 3/4 of the way to [destination] at night; loss of MFD1; PFD2; FMS2; and COM2 blank on RMU2. EICAS only displayed messages: Check PFD2 and RA2 Fail. Followed QRH; no guidance on how to restore screens. Turned on dome and checked for popped circuit breakers. Moved seats forward and looked for popped circuit breakers. Discussed with CA (Captain) possibility of DC2 BUS failure. Looked over QRH procedure for DC2 off BUS. We did not get DC2 off BUS EICAS and on MFD; DC2 BUS still showed connected to electrical system. At this point we were then cleared to descend via STAR landing south. We notified ATC of lack of half navigation/communication systems and requested a descent in lieu of descending via. We were cleared to continue on route but ATC gave us step down altitudes to descend to. There was also a line of weather between us and the field at this point. [Destination] METAR had thunderstorms in the vicinity but ceiling was greater than 3000 ft. We requested the visual and were cleared for the approach. At around [10 NM from airport]; CA noticed a momentary flicker of avionics master 2. CA turned on dome and found avionics master 2 to be deselected but without white bar across button. The light turbulence we went through was enough of a jolt to momentarily illuminate the avionics master 2 button. CA tested all lights in avionics master buttons and lights worked. Somehow in flight at cruise avionics master 2 popped out without displaying the white bar across the button. It was very dark in the cockpit at this point as we had a higher overcast layer and were entering a line of weather on the arrival. CA pushed avionics master 2 as we passed [10 NM point on approach] and screens were restored and EICAS messages went away. Landed and parked at gate normally.Pilot selectable buttons failing without indication. No guidance from QRH in that situation. Weather encountered as the failure occurred. The amount of darkness in the cockpit made it impossible to visually tell the button was out. It would have been easy to lose situational awareness as we lost half our screens and were preoccupied with running QRH. CA flew the aircraft; and I let ATC know of our situation and limitations. We were initially cleared to descend via; but as a crew we decided that workload would be more than we were comfortable with in that situation and so we asked for step downs. ATC accommodated that request and offered to help however they could should we have needed it. I have learned from this experience to expect that when the aircraft breaks; it may not give you an indication that it is broken. If the avionics master button is deselected for some reason; it should display a white bar; in our case it did not. This fleet is aging and sometimes things don't work the way they were designed to work.

ERJ145 First Officer reported an inflight flight display and navigation systems failure due to Avionics Master2 breaker being popped out.

1222510

201412

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Rain

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Taxi

Citation X (C750)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

1222510

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Arrived at the airport at XA pm for an XC pm go with a 2 hour slide. Rain was moderate to heavy and I decided to do the external preflight then; to take advantage of what little daylight remained. Aircraft was a new assignment; having just been out of maintenance. External was completed and had my partner turn on the batts to read the fuel on board. It was 4;600 lbs. We left the plane and returned to the FBO. Not wanting to fire up the APU; to save gas; noise; and comply with new company APU usage memo. About an hour prior to departure; we left for the plane to start prepping for the flight; it was then that I was called by dispatch with concerns of the second segment climb and also a discussion of a required fuel stop. I quickly left the airplane without doing a cockpit prep; in order to double check the weather and to get the faxed release that; up till then; was not available due to we were not released until then. While in the FBO I ordered fuel to bring the load to 9;000 lbs. My partner was at the plane at that time; trying to manage a very large PAX catering order and do his cabin checks. I returned to the airplane late; about XB:30 pm because the fax machine in the FBO was very busy. Upon arrival; my partner was still handling the catering issue; but the APU was up and we were fueled. I quickly entered the cockpit anxious to run numbers for the flaps 5 departure due to our load and weather. A cursory glance at the cockpit suggested all was well and so I went about correcting the fuel order because I noticed we were about 200 lbs shy of 9;000 lbs. Normally; I would have let this lie and would go about running my cockpit prep duties but because of the weather; headwinds and the possibility of being with the APU on for two more hours due to the slide; I called the FBO; and requested 50 gallons more.Sometime during this phone call; I get a shout from my partner and a ramp member saying; fuel is spilling out of the left wing overflow vent. At first; I could not see it; it was raining so hard everything looked like it was dripping; falling off the wing and empennage. But as I went closer; it was there; fuel was indeed pouring out and going onto the Tarmac mixing with at least 3/4 inch of rain water. I immediately told my partner to kill the APU and power off the plane while I attempted to shake the left wing tip in order to close the fuel valve. Now that sounds corny but about a year ago; I had the same issue. I shook the wing tip vigorously and the spill stopped. When the mechanic arrived; he said; you did the right thing; sometimes dirt; debris prevents the fuel tank valve from closing when the tank reaches 3;500 lbs. By shaking it; you dislodged the debris allowing the valve to close well; this time it didn't work; and I told the ramp personnel to get help because I could not stop it. The next 10 minutes felt like infinity; I was on hold trying to reach maintenance; my partner was trying to reach our flight support folks; I had the ramp manager come up and tell me that this same plane; the same wing did the exact same thing a week or so ago. This just reinforced my position that it was the overflow valve that was the cause and I wanted help; and I needed it now. On top of that; the fire trucks arrive; lights everywhere and I finally glance over my shoulder and there is a fuel truck pumping fuel into the plane again! I mean with emergency equipment and about 20 personnel all over. I know; I asked for 50 gallons more; but at this moment!!! So; I run out get the fuel guy stopped; the crews have a 50 gallon drum containing the spilling fuel; and guys are setting up barricades to contain the contaminants. All the while I am still on the phone; trying to get to maintenance. Finally; I got through and hurriedly describe the situation and they say; AOG it. I am like; yeah; of course. Now I try to get hold of the customer service agent and tell her the plane is done. When finally a line mechanic shows up; boltsto the cockpit and finds the gravity cross flow valve engaged. He turns it off; and after what seemed like 2 minutes; the fuel stops leaking.First; let me say this: I should have caught that the gravity cross feed was engaged; but in retrospect; with the bad light conditions; I did not. You have to lean over and scan around the yoke and steering column to see that particular switch. It's not out in the open like being on an overhead panel that you can just look at and see a pattern; but you can believe me; I am going to look at that switch a lot more now! Second; in my attempt to try to communicate to all the company departments I was distracted and could not focus on the how and why. I was frustrated with the lack of response from company and I could not step back and think. My thought process was this; the outflow valve is stuck open; it is gushing fuel; and I can't stop it...I did not think of the gravity cross feed because--to my system knowledge--yes; the gravity cross feed will fill the low side tank to full; but that is where it should stop...just like we yaw the airplane when it is venting fuel in flight. We are trying to close that valve. We can fly with 3;500 lbs on one side and 3;000 lbs on the other; but it gets difficult if it keeps venting and your imbalance grows; anyway; I wanted the fuel system checked out; because to me; it should have stopped at 3;500 lbs. Looking back; what I really learned is to forget about trying to let everyone know hey; we got a possible situation that will disrupt our passenger convenience. I should have stepped back and thought about going back to see if all was right with the cockpit switches...I guess I got stressed; with all that is going on with the current atmosphere here at company. I wanted to fix the problem; but instead of stepping back. I instead concentrated on trying to let everyone know about this; that was secondary to the task at hand.

A Citation flight crew suffered a fuel spill event during fueling due to failing to notice the gravity cross flow lever was 'engaged.'

1000061

201203

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

Tower ZZZ

Cessna 150

1.0

Part 91

Cruise

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Other / Unknown

1000061

Other laser

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

A C150 called me on Tower frequency; inbound to land from the southeast. A few minutes later; the pilot reported green laser light activity from the area west of the airport. The C150 was at 2;000 FT entering a left downwind for Runway 19 at the time. Aircraft landed without further incident. I don't know if there is much that can be done to prevent unauthorized laser events; but it was helpful finding the phraseology for the 5 minute announcements and the ATIS broadcast in the 7110.65. Maybe if Laser Light Events was indexed; it would be faster to find.

Tower Controller described a green laser event; noting references to same could be better indexed in the 7110.65.

1300161

201510

0001-0600

MYR.Airport

SC

0.0

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

CTAF MYR

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Workload

1300161

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Leaving MYR this morning; the FO and I received an aircraft that had an INOP ACARS. Due to extra bags being loaded on; we left out the gate late. Weather was within takeoff requirements; but was extreme precipitation with standing pools of water. ATC clearance was short void time; task saturation and dealing with weather and maintenance issue. We departed within company SOPs and notifying CTAF of intentions. Due to work load; we departed without activating runway lights. Departure was normal and flight continued without incident.

CRJ-900 Captain reported departing a non-tower airport in early morning hours without activating runway lights.

1140557

201401

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Marginal

Icing

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1140557

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

1140283.0

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

After landing; exited the runway on the high-speed while slowing from 25 KTS to around 10 KTS on the taxiway. Then instructed by Tower to continue hold short of the parallel runway. Attempted to brake and slow aircraft as we continued on the taxiway; anticipating the dogleg turn to the right which the taxiway makes near its intersection with Zulu taxiway. Brake application had no effect. Then attempted to turn aircraft with both rudder and tiller; also no effect. Aircraft was on NIL surface; taxiway completely iced over. Aircraft continued to drift forward as taxiway turned to the right; finally stopping about 20 feet short of Zulu taxiway and about 15 feet to the left; and outside of; the taxiway boundary marking. We then set the brake and made the decision to not continue the taxi on a NIL surface with an aircraft whose landing gear status was unknown. Had tug sent out to tow us back to gate. Aircraft never exited paved surface during excursion and was able to be towed to gate. Post flight inspection by Maintenance indicated no damage to aircraft. Total time elapsed from initial problem to deplaning at gate was about 95 minutes. No injuries or problems with passengers reported. Dispatch did send us a FICON Enroute; which we received about 30 min prior to landing; indicating braking action good. We were never told nor given reason to suspect that NIL or even poor braking conditions existed on the field.

Once we landed the taxi seemed very bumpy; then suddenly we came to a stop. Captain called to inform me that we landed on a sheet of ice; and that we skid off of the runway. Majority of the passengers myself included were not aware of the incident until the Captain made an announcement. It just seemed like a rough landing; nothing really out of the ordinary. I was seated in my jumpseat with my seat belt and harness securely buckled. My passengers were all seated and seat belts securely fastened. There were no injuries; no one was alarmed or scared. Both pilots did an amazing job at keeping everyone informed every step of the way; so there were no concerns besides connecting flight information of course. According to the pilots the runway had not been salted or deiced; so once we landed we slid; they tried to regain control of the aircraft and failed. We then skid off of the runway. Once I was informed of the incident; I got up from my jumpseat to check on passengers. Everyone was fine and had no complaints.

CRJ-200 Captain reports a taxiway excursion during taxi after landing due to icy conditions. FICON had reported braking action as good. Aircraft is towed to the gate.

1839633

202109

ZZZ.Tower

US

230.0

1.5

900.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

SR22

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Initial Climb

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 54; Flight Crew Total 1086; Flight Crew Type 608

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1839633

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 100; Vertical 0

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I requested VFR flight following to ZZZ1 (a westerly departure) on the ground with ZZZ ground. I was issued a squawk code and frequency. I was subsequently cleared for takeoff by ZZZ Tower. I was on initial climb out and began a turn to the west. I heard an aircraft report; 'we have a Cherokee right in front of us'! At that moment my traffic information system called; 'traffic same altitude nine o'clock'. I looked again to my left and saw a high wing aircraft within 100 feet of me at the same altitude! He was so close I thought we were going to collide! I had little time to react and the aircraft passed within a few feet behind me. I pressed the PTT switch and said; 'that was close!'; to which the (presumably) pilot of the other aircraft responded; 'was that on purpose'? I responded; 'of course not'! I don't understand this comment. It was as if Aircraft Y saw the impending convergence and decided to remain on course even though I was on his right side. A few seconds later ZZZ Tower initiates my hand off to contact Approach. I responded with; 'ZZZ Tower; go ahead with your telephone number' as I was incredibly shaken up from the extreme near miss and wanted to debrief post landing.Why did the controller not prevent this? many minutes after my near miss the ZZZ Tower controller comes on frequency and advises all traffic the radar is out of service or intermittent. I understand that equipment can fail however; he should have had a mental picture of proceedings and not cleared Aircraft Y for an extended right downwind to Runway XX when I was departing for a westerly destination.After landing I called the ZZZ Tower at XX35 and spoke to Name; the ZZZ Tower supervisor. I discovered the following. I think the near miss aircraft was Aircraft Y. A flight school aircraft based at ZZZ. There is an apparent familiarity between the controller and the (presumably) CFI onboard Aircraft Y.

Pilot reported taking evasive action to avoid a collision with another aircraft. It was later determined that the Tower radar was intermittent.

1846936

202110

0601-1200

ZJX.ARTCC

FL

0.0

35000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZJX

Corporate

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR PRICY1

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 350; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 1200

1846936

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Concerning trend of increasingly surprising and inefficient ATC reroutes with new RNAV procedures; today was just an example. We received a completely unexpected reroute from JAX Center; significantly of original course via the PRICY1 Arrival. We expressed concerns to two Jax Center Sectors and one Miami Center Sector that the reroute would put us in an uncomfortable fuel situation due to the excessive addition to our original planned route. ATC not only did not respond constructively to our comments; they proceeded to route us further out of the way. We were one or two minutes away from declaring minimum fuel and considering declaring a fuel emergency and diverting when they finally turned us towards our destination.The reroute added over 100nm and 20 minutes of flying time to our original route; most at a very low altitude at high fuel flow and low speed. We've been flying in and out of ZZZ; our home base; for over 20 years and NEVER have received a routing such as this; it was not a 'plannable' occurrence. In the end; we went from landing with 1000 lbs of fuel above target reserves; to landing with 700 lbs under target reserves.Unexpected and unreasonable ATC reroutes onto new RNAV procedures and the unwillingness or inability of controllers to work with pilots when the situations create a significant situation is creating extreme hazard in the NAS. This is only an example; many operators I've talked to; including our own pilots; have noticed a marked increase in inefficient or even unflyable reroutes in the Florida airspace since the launch of the new airspace initiative in April. Some of our common regional city pairs now take 30 percent more time and fuel then they did last March and ATC seems less able to be flexible when needed for weather avoidance or other operational considerations.

Corporate pilot reported ZJX Center rerouted them such that flying time was increased considerably and caused a low fuel situation. Reporter stated concerns that reroutes using the new RNAV procedures in the area may be inefficient and creating unsafe situations.

1458121

201706

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Hail; Thunderstorm

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1458121

Aircraft X

Door Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties; Deplaning

1458990.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Y

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

We pushed off gate late after incurring several delays (late inbound aircraft and ramp closures due to lightning). Upon taxiing out thunderstorms delayed the flight from departing for approximately two hours. While number three for takeoff flight received ACARS message from Dispatch to return to gate for inspection due to possible hail damage. After arriving at the gate Captain asked First Officer to contact operations asking for Complaint Resolution Officer due to unruly passenger. Observation of passenger indicated he was extremely belligerent; agitated; and was filming crew threatening legal action. His behavior was becoming increasingly hostile and unpredictable upsetting other passengers and making flight attendants fearful for their safety. Captain made the decision to call for law enforcement to guard against any physical violence escalation. After the Conflict Resolution person arrived the entire aircraft was deplaned (hail inspection) and unruly passenger placed on later flight at crews request. Law enforcement never appeared despite Captain's request from CSR and supervisor. This is a clear indication of overriding Captain's authority; responsibility; and decision to request law enforcement. The Captain now does not have the confidence law enforcement will be called when necessary.

Flight was delayed due to weather. Held at gate due to ramp closure twice. Finally taxied out; sat on taxiway with bad weather and a wheels up time. Was away from the gate for maybe around two hours. (I do not have the brake release to brake set time).Hail pelted A320; we were instructed to return to gate Returned to gate; agent opened aircraft door and disappeared without giving passengers instructions or me; the purser. Captain told passengers they could get off the aircraft. Later found out agents at the gate were working [a different] flight at that gate but we used the gate so [they] gate changed.At least one agent should have stayed at that gate with our flight and should have instructed passengers on what to do; since we had been on the taxiway for so long and now were back at the gate with a mechanical. The agent just opened the aircraft door and left. They should not have done that after we were out on the ramp for an extended amount of time and we did not know how long the delay was going to be; passengers did not know what to do. So the passengers started coming up front to ask me questions. I could not answer the questions since the agent did not give us any instructions at that opening of the door. Captain went up the jet bridge to help an elderly non English speaking passenger because we had no wheelchairs meet the flight and the agent left us without me being able to tell her we needed a wheelchair. So the captain helped the elderly woman up the jet bride and told me he would also get an agent to come back down to instruct the passengers; the agent never should have left us after she opened the door; did not even tell me and everyone else she was now going to go over to the next gate; so the captain went up to find an agent to instruct the passengers. At this point a passenger came up to door 1L where I was; turned on his phone and started videotaping me saying he was recording and this was going to go to court. Mr. X was agitated and appeared to be crazy. I looked at the first officer; and told him to go get an agent immediately and get this Mr. X off the plane as he made me fear for my safety and felt threatened. So the first officer left the plane to get a Customer Service Representative (CSR); as the captain had not come back yet. Now it was just 3 flight attendants; all by ourselves dealing with quite a few upset passengers up by door 1L and I stared to fear for our safety as if anything happened to one of us; especially by Mr. X; we could not get off the plane with a plane full of passengers and we had no assistance. A CSR supervisor and the captain at some point; finally came back down to the plane and both had instructed us they had called for police assistance for Mr. X but [the company] would not send the police to the gate to get Mr. X off the plane. It is very unsafe for us to not be able to have police come to our assistance when it is needed. How unsafe and negligent of [our company to] not allow the police to come down when a captain who is responsible for his aircraft; crew and passengers; calls for police assistance. This is the only tool a crew has to remove an irate; videotaping passenger who won't comply with crew member instructions and stop videotaping us. Videotaping of crew needs to be illegal. We felt unsafe and threatened.A CSR customer service passenger handling supervisor finally came down and started talking to Mr. X; then another person came down; then another person came down. Mr. X at first got off the plane to talk to the first supervisor; but got back on the plane and would not get off the plane when another supervisor woman wanted to talk to him so she got on the plane to talk to him; we was still videotaping saying a bunch of stuff and that this video was going to court. Mr. X kind of had her up against door 1R still videotaping her and saying things in a threatening tone but I could not quite hear what he was saying.So we ended up deplaning the whole planeso we could get Mr. X off and also because I think [the company] was unsure of the delay because they had to check the aircraft for hail damage. Finally we had some help down on the plane. So number 1. When we returned to the gate a CSR should have stayed with the gate; and made sure an announcement telling the passengers what to do should have been made because those not getting any instructions made just about every passenger angry. It's also not safe to not have a CSR at the gate with a delayed aircraft in the event of an emergency.Number 2. A CSR or someone should have come back down to the gate much quicker and instructed the passengers instead of leaving just the flight attendants on the aircraft being put into a potentially unsafe situation. There were two Federal Air Marshals on our flight they got off and I asked to please also get a CSR to the plane as soon as possible. Number 3. Under no circumstances should a captain be denied police assistance when he asks for it as it is a huge safety risk to his plane; crew and customers.It was an unsafe situation and very bad customer service.

A320 Captain and the Purser involved reported a return to the gate to inspect for hail damage at which point a passenger became irate and was removed from the flight.

1212617

201410

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

25.0

2500.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Bonanza 36

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Throttle/Power Lever

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 2000

1212617

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

After takeoff was unable to reduce to cruise power so proceeded to a nearby airport and landed with full power to runway where I pulled mixture to idle and did a power off landing.The cable mounting in the A36 is such that after 3300 hours on the bracket it allowed the cable to fall free from the mount. If the mount was reversed gravity would then hold the cable in place and not depend on a swedging tension to hold the cable sheath in place.

BE-36 pilot reported his throttle cable came loose leaving the engine at full power. Pilot proceeded to a nearby airport where he shut down the engine and landed dead stick.

1129611

201311

0601-1200

ZAU.ARTCC

IL

33000.0

Daylight

Center ZAU

Air Carrier

Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 10C

Descent

STAR TRIDE ONE RNAV

Class A ZAU

FMS/FMC

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

1129611

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

After briefing the descent/arrival TRIDE.1 Runway 10C into ORD we were discussing an apparent discrepancy between the Arrival Chart and what the FMS was displaying. (Chart shows GIBNS to JUKIC then 090 HDG; FMS showed GIBNS to BAIRY [ILS 10C IAF] we never did figure out which was right). We were given clearance to cross 20 south VINCA at FL330. Pilot flying dialed in 330 and proper crosschecks and callouts were made. Pilot flying then entered VINCA/-20 in the MCDU. We got distracted trying to figure out the discrepancy and started down late. During the early part of the descent ATC queried us if we were descending and would we make the crossing. I replied we would not; we would be a bit high. ATC re-cleared us to descend to FL330. We replied we would expedite to FL330. One of us should have been aviating.

An A319 crew became distracted while comparing the FMS track of the ORD TRIDE ONE RNAV Arrival; ILS 10C which indicated GIBNS direct BAIRY while the paper chart indicated GIBNS; JUKIC then heading 090. The crew failed to begin a descent for a crossing restriction.

1324019

201601

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

100.0

VMC

10

Night

Corporate

Learjet 45

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Nose Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 910

Situational Awareness

1324019

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

Encountered landing gear problem upon departure. After rotation and selection of gear to UP position; gear did not retract indicating 'in-transit' only; and emitting Nose-Wheel Steering Fail (NWS FAIL) Master Caution annunciation.Departure control was advised of issue and asked to provide vectors and authorize slower cruise speed. Attempt to rectify the problem yielded no results or changes in condition. Checklist items were limited and inconclusive given our condition. Crew decided to select gear do DOWN position and confirm gear 'down and locked'. All indications pointed to gear having locked in down position and no further attempt was made to cycle gear. Nothing at the disposal of the crew allowed for a diagnosis or gave further clues as to what possibly happened.At his point the conclusion was that there was no available steering command to the nose wheel; and that; given the additional noise and aircraft's attitude while flying level; the nose wheel may have gotten stuck at an angle. Crew and company selected appropriate alternative destination with proper facilities; and a diversion request was made with departure. Coordination took place via relays between airplane and FBO's. This decision was imperative and allowed room for the best possible choices to be made in regard to operation and logistics; for both aircraft and passengers.Once in communication with approach; a request was made with ATC to coordinate with Tower at the field for a low approach in order to confirm gear position.Visual confirmation from authorities on the ground did not give crew a concrete answer as to whether or not the nose wheel was in fact angled left or right of center. Crew proceeded to hold in order to consume as much fuel as possible to relieve the airplane of the additional weight. Twenty minutes prior to landing; approach was advised of intention to land; and cabin preparations and passenger briefing was accomplished. Passengers were asked to seat at most rearward positions possible with heaviest passengers at the back. The aft shift in CG would allow smoother touchdown with nose gear.Upon landing the Pilot Flying (PF) felt a directional pull to the right once the nose gear touched down and an immediate correction was made via the use of differential braking in order to maintain centerline. Shortly after touchdown the airplane slowed to a manageable taxiing speed and exited the runway; approximately 4;600 ft from the threshold. Upon inspection the nose gear strut had collapsed; apparently indicating that a possible Nitrogen leak existed or happened sometime during take-off; causing the gear to not extend properly and center in order for the retraction sequence to complete.In retrospect; the crew had no prior signs or way to predict the failure. The airplane behaved predictably at all times and performed well. Communications with ATC was very professional and their assistance was invaluable. All parties involved were very attentive and courteous. Crew coordination and cockpit flows were performed as best as possible. Ample time was allowed for decisions and positive aircraft control to be maintained. Weather undoubtedly played a major factor in assuring the success of our mission. Conditions were clear. There was nothing else the crew could have done in order to correct the problem or to properly setup the airplane for landing. Preparation was intensive and all possible options waived.

LR45 Captain experienced a failure of the landing gear to retract after takeoff along with a nose wheel steering fail message and elects to divert to a more suitable airport. After landing it is discovered that the nose gear strut has collapsed.

1038371

201209

0601-1200

MKC.Airport

MO

0.0

VMC

99

Daylight

Tower MKC

Corporate

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 10850; Flight Crew Type 600

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1038371

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Horizontal 2200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

During taxi to the active runway normal communications with Ground Control did not reveal any communications with ground or maintenance vehicles. Taxiway A at the end of Runway 1 was closed and Taxiway B is approximately 500 FT down the departure end of Runway 1. The pilot not flying advised the Tower that we would like to back taxi for the full length of the runway. The Tower Controller stated to us; 'cleared to back taxi; turn right heading 030 after departure; cleared for takeoff.' The back taxi to the displaced threshold; turn around and lineup at the threshold took approximately 45 seconds. Final checks were completed and the autothrottle system was engaged. As we began the takeoff roll I verbally announced the spotting of a tractor to the left. It was on the west side of the runway on Taxiway D moving east toward our active takeoff runway and I observed its speed and lack of deceleration. As the tractor entered the runway we were at approximately 70 KTS and 1;000 FT into the takeoff roll when I determined to abandon the takeoff and the pilot not flying announced 'abort; abort; abort.' We began a very benign discontinuation of the takeoff. The tractor cleared the runway to the east side as the pilot not flying made the first radio call to the Tower to advise him of our aborted takeoff. There was no initial response and a few seconds later a second call was made. The Tower Controller then responded with an apology and clearance to make a 180 turn to back taxi. During the back taxi the Controller mentioned he had lost track of the tractor while he was on the phone to Approach Control. We were re-cleared for takeoff which was uneventful. I believe this was one Controller working both Ground and Tower frequencies and responsibilities. I believe that the ideal weather conditions and relatively overall low traffic volume contributed to the Controller losing his vigilance and becoming distracted by a phone call.

A Captain rejected the takeoff on MKC Runway 1 from about 70 KTS as a tractor entered the runway.

1807350

202105

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

TRACON ZZZZ; Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Other Dispatch

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

1807350

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Flight called approximately 10 minutes after departure stating that they had a frozen stabilizer. The crew said that the aircraft was still controllable with increased difficulty. When they called they were dumping fuel with intentions of returning to ZZZ. They dumped 82;000 lbs of fuel at X;X00 ft. The fuel jettison system failed before they could get under max landing weight. They continued to burn the remaining amount in a holding pattern. Flight [advised ATC] and landed the aircraft safely.

Dispatcher reported aircraft returned to departure aircraft after the stabilizer froze and the fuel jettison system failed.

1464504

201707

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Initial Climb

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Landing Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 45

1464504

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On a local post annual inspection flight in my Cessna 210B I experienced a failure to retract in the gear system. The wheels appeared to be in; but the gear doors would not close. The checklist calls for lowering the gear and after obtaining a 'green light'; to return and land. I put the gear handle in the down position and the gear unlocked and fell out of the wheel wells but would not extend. Again; following the checklist I extended the emergency gear handle and attempted to extend the gear manually. After numerous attempts to pump the gear down over 1 1/2 hours I had what appeared to be a nose gear extended but not the mains. This aircraft has hydraulic flaps as well that use the same engine driven pump. The flaps operated normally and the reservoir was full. Analyzing the situation I determined that no amount of pumping would get the gear down and locked if it wouldn't operate on the fully functioning engine driven pump. I exhausted all the options listed in the checklist including cycling the gear numerous times to no avail.At this point with about one hour of fuel remaining I requested and received special handling from Tower. I made one pass to allow Tower personnel to inspect the gear from the outside. They confirmed that the mains were not fully extended.After one last attempt to pump the gear down I elected to retract the nose wheel and land gear up. On the second pass I touched down on centerline approximately 1500 ft from the approach end. The aircraft slid approximately 400 ft and came to rest straight ahead about 35 ft right of centerline. The winds were from the left. The aircraft sustained minimal damage and after jacking it up and extending the gear by hand it was towed to the ramp and secured. The ATC personnel were professional and helpful. The ground rescue personnel were also professional and well trained. We are still looking into the cause of the gear failure but current speculation is a fault with the gear selector valve on the hydraulic power pack.

Cessna 210B pilot reported landing with the gear up after all efforts to extend the gear failed.

1722145

202001

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Class B ZZZ

N

Y

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Installation; Repair; Testing

Pitot-Static System

X

Improperly Operated

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Workload

1722145

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Logbook Entry; Procedure

Company Policy

Tasked to work non routine iPad write up for failing First Officer lower pitot/static system. The non-routine work history indicated the previous crew had troubleshot the cause down to the elevator feel computer. My work mate and I decided to do a test equipment test first to verify the integrity of the hoses and manifolds of the test unit. We found multiple problems with leaking hoses and a loose pitot connection.After obtaining a tight test system we performed a successful low range leak test of the lower probe. I signed off the write up as accomplished and noted the finding of bad test equipment on the sign off. I referenced the pitot/static [manuals] found on the job card that generated the non-routine.After the aborted takeoff on [date]; I was tasked with troubleshooting the First Officer airspeed indication failure; associated with the upper First Officer pitot probe. Upon removing the upper probe the quick disconnects for the pitot and 1 of 2 static lines partially engaged. Have pitot probe task cards amended to reflect the connection of the quick disconnects as an Inspection item as per [company procedure].

Technician reported unserviceable test equipment caused a misdiagnosis of a pitot/static problem and an aborted takeoff.

1583096

201810

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

Turbulence

Dusk

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1583096

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

While in cruise phase of flight; we encountered moderate turbulence. The auto pilot disconnected. Pilot flying reduced airspeed. A smell similar to ozone developed on the flight deck. We coordinated with the Flight Attendant. She smelled it as well and attempted to find a source. The smell briefly dissipated but returned. No smoke; fire or other unusual indications were noted. The autopilot was reconnected and functioned normally. The smell continued; therefore as a precaution; we donned the oxygen masks and [notified ATC]. The flight landed without further incident.The unknown source of the odor was the major threat. The ability to communicate with ATC was difficult due to an extremely busy frequency. Once the oxygen masks were on crew communications became more difficult as well. This was my first event that actually required crew coordination while using the masks. Training communication techniques in the actual aircraft with masks on would have been a valuable tool for me.

EMB-145 First Officer reported donning oxygen masks in response to an odor; resulting in difficult communications.

1646619

201905

0601-1200

D01.TRACON

CO

VMC

Daylight

TRACON D01

Air Carrier

B737-900

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class B DEN

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 162; Flight Crew Type 8408

Situational Awareness

1646619

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

After takeoff the Captain (Pilot Flying) could not trim the aircraft with yoke trim switches. I could not trim the aircraft with my yoke switches either. Captain manually trimmed aircraft with trim wheels. After aircraft was trimmed we did the 'electric trim inop' QRH checklist but electric would not work. Captain contacted Maintenance Control and Dispatch and decided to continue to ZZZ at a lower altitude and speed. Dispatch sent a new flight plan for corrected fuel burn. Asked Center for no large speed and altitude deviations and advised the problem; ATC Supervisor decided we were an emergency. Landed without further incident.

B737 First Officer reported a stabilizer electric trim control failure on takeoff.

1023601

201207

1801-2400

JFK.Airport

NY

240.0

40.0

17000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON N90

Corporate

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Vectors

Class E ZNY

FMS/FMC

X

Design; Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 182; Flight Crew Total 25100; Flight Crew Type 450

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1023601

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

Flight from JFK to the northeast; clearance Kennedy 1 Departure Breezy Point Climb RBV J230 BYRDD... After executing the departure and on radar vectors; ATC cleared us to the BYRDD Intersection. Shortly thereafter ATC asked if we were proceeding directly to BYRDD. We responded yes. ATC responded 'not the BYRDD I want you to go to.' A heading was issued and ATC asked what we showed for the BYRDD Intersection. The intersection had been entered in the FMS as 'BYRRD' rather than 'BYRDD'. We were shortly re-cleared directly to BYRDD. It would seem from the conversation that this wasn't the first time an aircraft had headed to the incorrect BYRDD Intersection. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.

The Reporter stated that when BYRRD was entered in the GNX ZLS FMC he saw the route displayed as south but did not see the distance. After ATC reissued the clearance the crew realized the error but not till after the flight were they able to see that not only was it South; but it was 8116 NM South. This particular aircraft's FMC has a world wide database; which in itself is somewhat unusual; but it did not issue an alert; such as insufficient fuel; which other FMS equipment would.

A corporate aircraft crew departed on the JFK Kennedy 1 Breeze Point Departure on a routing which included BYRDD Intersection. After being cleared direct BYRDD; BYRRD was entered in the FMS which caused ATC to alert them about a track deviation.