elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1829854

202108

1201-1800

ZZZZ.TRACON

FO

700.0

VMC

5

Daylight

5000

TRACON ZZZZ

Corporate

Twin Otter DHC-6-300

2.0

Part 91

None

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Climb

Visual Approach

Cargo Door

Y

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 6900; Flight Crew Type 950

Workload; Troubleshooting

1829854

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

On the initial climb out of ZZZZ to ZZZ1 we received a DOORS UNLOCKED annunciation light. We were at 700 feet AGL over the bridge. Looked through the cabin to see that the cargo door had opened. At that time the co-pilot went to the cargo hold to secure the door. He was unsuccessful due to no interior handle on the door. After passing the bridge the co-pilot returned to the flight deck and reported that the door had detached and fell into the ocean. There were no adverse effects to the flight characteristics of the aircraft. We continued the visual approach to ZZZZ1. I did not ask for priority handling and landed without further issues.

Captain reported cargo door departed the aircraft in flight and continued to destination airport.

1752091

202007

MMUN.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

1752091

ATC Issue All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors; Airport

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

While landing on Cancun (MMUN) Airport Runway 12R at night we noticed that many of the signs along the side of the runway and taxiways were not illuminated. We were not sure of the cause:1. Tower forgot to turn sign lights on?2. Sign lights worked at one time; and do not work now?3. Sign lights never worked?It is much easier to identify an exit taxiway from the runway and judge the proper braking required at night if all the signs are properly illuminated after sunset.1. Sign lights need to be inspected on a regular basis to ensure the sign lights are illuminated at night.2. Institute fail safe procedures in the Control Tower to ensure sign lights are turned on each night.3. Repair sign lighting system to ensure that the sign lights are operational.

Air carrier Captain reported runway and taxiways signs at MMUN Airport were not illuminated at night.

1269517

201506

1201-1800

GSP.TRACON

SC

Daylight

TRACON GSP

Small Aircraft

1.0

IFR

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class D GMU

TRACON GSP

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class E ZTL

Facility GSP.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.75

Confusion

1269517

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control

Procedure

The previous controller approved an opposite direction IFR approach to a satellite airport just prior to me getting briefed for the position. GMU ATCT was advertising Runway 19. Aircraft X requested and was approved for an opposite direction ILS Runway 1 approach and coordination was effected and complete. I took over the position; vectoring and clearing Aircraft X for the ILS approach. Meanwhile arriving from the north IFR to GMU requesting a visual approach to Runway 19 was Aircraft Y. I assigned Aircraft Y a westbound heading and to maintain 3;000. I then switched Aircraft X to GMU ATCT. Shortly after Aircraft X dropped off the radar on short final; I verified Aircraft Y had the airport in sight and cleared him for the visual approach to Runway 19. It was later brought to my attention that Aircraft Y needed to be at least 10 miles from the airport prior to being cleared visual approach and Aircraft X on the ground. Safety and separation was not an issue as Aircraft Y was at least 5 miles from the airport when Aircraft X touched down.In this day and age; opposite direction approaches provide no significant benefit to the operation under normal circumstances especially with all of the required coordination and separation. Therefore; I will not be authorizing opposite direction approaches anymore.

A GSP TRACON Controller reports of a deviation to the Opposite Direction Operation because the second aircraft was not within the standards for the operation to occur.

1329503

201602

1201-1800

ANE.Airport

MN

3500.0

IMC

Icing; 7

Night

1100

Tower ANE

Personal

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 27

Final Approach

Vectors

Class D ANE

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 1530; Flight Crew Type 453

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1329503

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

Below recounts my possible deviation from an altitude clearance on a missed approach. I tried to verify with Flight Aware data but was not able to correlate precise time of receiving clearance with actual altitude. I became somewhat preoccupied with the Propeller Heat being inoperative in icing conditions. Climbing out of DLH; the propeller heat breaker/switch popped and would not reengage. The system had functioned normally during an IMC descent into DLH 3 hours earlier. Our enroute altitude of 6;000 ft kept us well above cloud tops. Cloud tops were reported to be 3;500 in the area of our destination; ANE. I mentioned our prop heat circuit anomaly and requested and received a clearance to remain above the clouds as long as possible. During descent we observed tops at 3;300 - 3;500 ft and had moderate rime accumulation. ANE was OVC 1;100 ft using ILS-27. MSP Approach cleared us for the approach while at 4;000 ft only 5 - 6 miles from BOKYA; the final approach fix. I put in an aggressive descent ~900 fpm. Approach handed us to Tower approximately at BOKYA and probably 3;000 ft; still about 400 ft high.Tower issued a low altitude alert twice. With the second alert; I confirmed that our altimeter agreed with Tower's indication of 2;200 ft. The controller said with rapid descents; sometimes the low altitude alert is the result of a rapid descent profile rather than the aircraft actually being low. In hindsight the rapid descent would have worked out but I was chasing the glide slope. I was uncomfortable with the repeated low altitude alert which concerned my passenger so I declared a missed and requested vectors to repeat the approach. I also requested a climb to 3;500 ft to reduce the time in the clouds and exposure to icing conditions. Tower cleared me 3;000 ft and I requested 3;500 ft again. Tower in his hand off to Approach obtained the clearance to 3;500 ft.Although neither Tower nor Approach questioned my altitude; I may have been above 3;000 ft by the time I confirmed the clearance to 3;500 ft. However; I am disappointed that my preoccupation with the prop heat anomaly caused me to lead the clearance to 3;500 ft. Other components of the deicing system were operating normally and accumulation was light. When I requested the higher than normal altitude into the approach phase of the flight; I also should have negotiated an appropriate descent plan with ATC. I was aware controllers were busy given frequency congestion; time of day and issuance of holds. An alternative to requesting an ad hoc plan would have been to request the DME Arc portion of the ILS approach which would have minimized the amount of attention from ATC and allowed more time for an orderly descent.

Concerned about icing; the pilot may have deviated from his assigned altitude after a missed approach at ANE.

1335915

201602

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3.0

100.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Tower ZZZ

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Part 91

None

Utility / Infrastructure

Cruise

Class C ZZZ

Hangar / Base

Contracted Service

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 300; Flight Crew Type 100

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1335915

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Other Post Flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Procedure

I am a current private pilot SEL and commercial UAV (i.e. drone) pilot with Section 333 waiver and blanket COA (Certificate of Authority). I believed that my COA restricted me from flying within 5 miles of a towered airport without either authorization from the local ATC (i.e. tower) OR an amended COA setting out procedures for flying within 5 miles of a towered airport. I believed that I was following all requirements in my Section 333 waiver and COA when I was planning my flight to capture video footage for a TV station after a tornado. I filed a NOTAM and contacted the tower because my intended flight path came within 3.5 miles of a towered airport. After a description of my intended operation with the ATC tower manager which included the location of my flight; the anticipated duration of my flight(s); my flight path; the NOTAM #; my N#; and altitude (surface to 100ft) the ATC manager cleared the flight and I told him I would call back when it was concluded. I conducted 3 short flights totaling 20 minutes or less maintaining visual line of sight of the UAV at or below 100 ft AGL without incident. However; a day after the flights another pilot mentioned to me that he thought I needed a special COA to fly within 5 miles of a towered airport. I told him that it was my understanding that EITHER an amended COA OR authorization from the local ATC or airport tower manager was sufficient but that both were not required under my 333. I have actually applied for a special COA based upon the ATC at the tower where my home airport is located refusing to authorize any commercial UAV flights within 5 miles of their airport because they have never received a request from a 333 waiver holder. Although my home base ATC manager did not cite any safety concerns for refusing to authorize UAV flights he did say that he would send it up the chain of command. Since the ATC tower manager at the airport near which the flight which is the subject of this report 'cleared' and authorized my flight I believed that I was in compliance with all regulations. However; upon reviewing my Section 333 waiver and COA I saw that the specific language requires either a special COA OR Letter of Agreement (LOA) for flights within 5 miles of an airport. In the event that a LOA is required to actually be a written letter as opposed to a verbal communication authorizing the flight operation; although I complied with the intent of the rules by getting authorization for the flight I may not have been in compliance with the letter of the law. If that is the case my error was certainly unintentional based upon my misunderstanding of the requirements in my Section 333 waiver and COA. Unfortunately local ATC personnel are not familiar with the requirements and several attempts to contact FSDO with questions about my special COA application have not been successful. Additionally; since I did not have any commercial flights at all in 2015 (they were all training flights on my property) I did not file the monthly reports required under my 333 when due. However; after clarifying that the reports were due even of no flights were conducted I did file all past reports before the end of the year 2015 and I recently filed my January 2016 report. Although there is no guidance suggesting when the reports are due I have marked my calendar to file monthly reports within the 30 day period following the month in which the report is due.

A commercial UAS Operator was granted permission from local ATC to fly 3.5 miles from the Class C airport; but later questioned whether a Section 333 Letter of Agreement and Certificate of Authorization were legally required for his intended operation.

1572584

201808

ZZZ.Airport

US

10

10000

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Stearman

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 53; Flight Crew Total 12465; Flight Crew Type 2212

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1572584

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I took off Runway 6 after making radio call and saw and heard nothing; I did not realize another very small aircraft had landed on opposite runway. I apologized to other pilot as I passed over him at about 50 feet. I had been flying all that day and everyone had been using Runway 6. I had been giving free rides away all day and turned the radio down while switching passengers. But the time from picking up passengers to takeoff was about 30 seconds not enough time to hear someone changing runways I now will forever keep my radio on at all times and additionally ask if anyone is in pattern before taking the active at an uncontrolled airport.

Stearman pilot reported accidentally turning the volume down on the radio and during takeoff observing another aircraft landing on the opposite end of the runway.

1773121

202011

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

20.0

7.0

1700.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Personal

Cessna 150

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Parked; Cruise

Visual Approach

N

Y

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation; Inspection; Testing

Fuselage Door Frame

X

Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7.4; Flight Crew Total 100.9; Flight Crew Type 38.3

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1773121

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Y

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

The planned flight was VFR from ZZZ to ZZZ1 via ZZZ2 and ZZZ3 at XA:00 on November [date] 2020 in Aircraft X (Cessna 150) rented from Company. I was PIC; Person Y was the only passenger. We had previously flown Aircraft X on July [date] 2020 from ZZZ; ZZZ4; ZZZ3 and had noted that the passenger door was not closing properly -- a small gap in the upper-left corner of the window frame allowed wind to enter the cabin. The owner of the plane investigated the issue then and found that the upper window frame was bent. I assumed that the issue was fixed by an A&P mechanic after the investigation. The plane has been regularly flown by other pilots since July.On November [date] 2020; I noticed no irregularities during pre-flight. During run-up; I noticed that the gap in the passenger door was still present and was a bit bigger than I remembered it from July. I thought that the slight wind in the cabin would be unpleasant but not otherwise an issue and continued with the flight. During the take-off roll just after rotation; the passenger door swung open. Once we were stabilized on the downwind; I shut the door and reassured my passenger. However the passenger door swung open again -- the wind through the upper-left gap torqued the entire door outward and that overpowered the door latch. So I requested landing clearance from ZZZ Tower and executed a precautionary landing without any incident. I taxied back to parking; shut off the engine and investigated the passenger door. The upper window frame was flexing slightly and could be bent to snap into the correct position. I pushed the frame into the correct position; verified that the frame was now snug against all the door frame inserts and that no wind was leaking into the cabin.I took off from ZZZ around XB:00 and noted no issues this time. As we were transitioning ZZZ3 Class D airspace; my passenger noted that she heard some sound from her door. I verified that the gap in the window frame was not present and that the door was shut properly. Shortly after we flew through the Class D; my passenger also reported that she could feel cold air from near the lower-right part of her door. As we flew past the marina; the door again swung open. This time the door shook violently which caused the window also to be flung open. I requested landing clearance from ZZZ3 was given priority and then I clarified my situation. I noted that reducing the throttle helped remove the violent door shaking. I reached over to shut the door; then pulled the upper window frame back into the door inserts and then closed the window. The ATC alerted me with a low altitude warning; so I decided to ignore the door and climb 300 ft. to intercept the glide slope and fly the plane first. As I increased RPM; the door again flung open. The door was twisting and wobbling around the hinge like a sheet of paper with the hinge as a paper-clip; and either wind or resonant frequency was increasing the severity of the wobbles. My passenger held the door to dampen its shaking. The landing at ZZZ3 was without any incident; and I taxied to a maintenance shop on the field. An A&P mechanic diagnosed that the passenger door needs to be replaced entirely and that the plane was not airworthy. We drove back to ZZZ after ensuring that the owner of Aircraft X knew what had happened and where to find the plane's key.In follow-up communication with the owner; I do not believe that the plane door was inspected and fixed by an A&P mechanic in July. The owner mentioned that he adjusted the door latches and attempted to bend the window frame back into place. This 'fix' ensured that the 'door shut properly 90% of the time'. He mentioned that he drove up to ZZZ3 with a spare C150 door and replaced it -- I do not know that he is qualified to make such repairs. His name does not show up in the airmen registry as holding an A&P license. The owner also mentioned that he was checking the door occasionally and that it had clearly worsened in the lastcouple of weeks and that there is no strength left in the window frame.Based on our conversations; I believe that the owner fixed the discrepancies that pilots reported using methods that are not by the book.(1) Normalization of deviance. I should have canceled the flight after landing at ZZZ after the initial trouble with the door.(2) Normalization of deviance. Owner should have replaced the door in July; rather than waiting for the door condition to get worse and create an [issue].(3) Crew management. I should have briefed my passenger during/after the [event]. She thankfully did all the right things (e.g. dampen the door vibrations) purely on instinct.(4) Aviate & Declare. I did not use 'emergency' or 'mayday' in my communications; despite that; the ATC at ZZZ and ZZZ3 both realized that something was up and gave me priority. Kudos to them. When diverting to ZZZ3; I flew very close to the prohibited airspace near marina to minimize my flight path to the runway.(5) Pre-flight Airworthiness Check. I should have insisted on viewing the maintenance records of the airplane to verify that my previous squawks were satisfactorily addressed.

C150 pilot reported multiple issues with the passenger door opening in flight on a rental plane.

1160720

201403

0601-1200

LIRF.Airport

FO

6000.0

IMC

Daylight

TRACON LIRF

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1160720

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

While level at 6;000 feet on the TAQ 1D arrival into LIRF we received a TCAS TA. We observed on the ND traffic climbing fast towards us. I reduced range on the Nav display. I said to the First Officer if we get an RA it will be autopilot off; flight director off. Before I could even finish the sentence; we immediately got an RA to climb. I shouted autopilot off; flight director off; and immediately climbed the aircraft up into the green and saw a climb of 5;000 feet per minute. The VSI was full red with only a sliver of green at the top. I could barely make out the green. I had never seen this even in training. The TCAS then said increase climb. I instantaneously made the decision to pull the stick all the way back and hold it. I recall saying to the First Officer I was going to just trust the automation to keep us from stalling. I saw the target on TCAS merge with our airplane and by reflex hunched my shoulders expecting an impact. I can not say for sure how close we were. A lot was going on. Perhaps 100 feet or less. We were completely in cloud. The TCAS was alerting; the altitude warning buzzer was sounding; our airspeed was decreasing rapidly thru 190 knots and we were pitched up above 30 degrees. Then the TCAS alerted clear of traffic. We recovered normal flight and automation after the RA; and the First Officer advised the Controller of our actions. The IRO (Relief Pilot) called the cabin to ask if everyone was OK. The Flight Attendant reported everyone was OK. Later they reported two flight attendants who were standing were thrown against their jumpseats but were not hurt. Also they reported the feeling of floating at one point. This is probably when I pushed the nose over to recover as the airspeed had decreased into the orange band on the airspeed indicator. From listening to the Italian Controller and the Air Carrier pilot; the Italian Controller asked if they had climbed above 5;000 feet. They insisted they had received a clearance to climb to 15;000 feet at rate of 2;000 feet per minute or more. The Italian Controller insisted they were only cleared to 5;000 feet.

Widebody Airbus Captain at 6;000 feet during arrival to LIRF; experiences a TCAS RA requiring a maximum performance climb to avoid traffic climbing into them. A misunderstood communication between ATC and the other aircraft were cited as the likely cause of the NMAC.

989658

201201

0001-0600

LAS.Airport

NV

0.0

Tower LAS

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

None

Tower LAS

P180 Avanti

2.0

IFR

Landing

Visual Approach

Facility LAS.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

989658

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

I was working Local Control 1. The control of the intersection for the runways belonged to Local Control 2; where training was in progress. We had coordinated for the intersection to return to me after a B737 landing Runway 19L. I was holding a MD83 in position on 25R; waiting for intersection control. The aircraft behind the B737 was a P180; who seemed to be doing a short approach. I told the MD83 that it would be another minute or so in position; and my assist called Local Control 2. Local Control 2 said that the lander was squaring and slowing; and the trainer told the trainee to give up the intersection for my departure. I then cleared the MD83 for take off; and they started rolling. The problem occurred when the lander slowed very little; and did not square the turn; but continued straight for the numbers. The Local Control 2 trainer asked the Supervisor if they should let the P180 land; or send him around. The Controller was told to let him land; and did so. This was safe; as the 25R departure was already airborne when the lander crossed the threshold of 19L; but meant that aircraft were operating on intersecting runways at the same time. We used to have a tool we used that allowed simultaneous operations on the intersecting runways; using parameters that ensured safety. This tool is rumored to be coming back; but has not as of yet. In this situation; the parameters were met; and this would have been a legal operation. I recommend that this tool be returned to use. I should use my experience to decide what will work; rather than counting on an aircraft I am not talking to; to follow an instruction that I did not issue. My initial decision was to wait; but did not. Giving up control of the intersection means that the controller giving it up expects the plan to work; or will fix it if it does not. The lack of experience on the part of the trainee; as well as the years of experience the trainer had; should have clued me in to follow my original plan. The worst thing that would have happened would have been that the departure would have waited a couple of minutes. Next time; I will error on the side of caution.

LAS Controller described a possible intersecting runway separation error noting he should have delayed the departure for the landing aircraft; adding that an automated assistance tool would have been helpful in this scenario.

1725351

202002

1801-2400

GPT.Tower

MS

2800.0

TRACON GPT

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Other Instrument Approach

Facility GPT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1725351

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

After turning and descending the CRJ-900 I was dealing with a VFR south east of GPT that had traffic coming at him and didn't realize in time CRJ-900 hadn't turned as quickly as I anticipated and he was descending faster than I anticipated. In all honesty I remember him being higher than he was when I glanced back up at him. CRJ-900 was on the border of our antennas north of GPT 1780 highest obstruction where MVA is 3000 ft. His attitude when I saw was leaving 2900 ft. for 2800 ft. almost out of the MVA circle. No recommendations for the airspace I understand I just miscalculated the situation.

GPT TRACON Controller reported descending aircraft below the MVA.

1477502

201708

0601-1200

RJJJ.ARTCC

FO

VMC

Center RJJJ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Center RJJJ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Other; Party2 Dispatch

1477502

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Passenger

In-flight

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Flight crew on Aircraft X asked of any confirmed reports of a missile attack against Japan. [Later] Aircraft Y sent a message about missile launch. I checked [the internet] and confirmed that a missile had been launched. I contacted section manager; chief dispatcher asking for information. The director came to the pacific quad to advise launch had occurred; already in the sea; no action; no response. I asked if his source could give us the landing location of the rocket. When the director returned about 10 min later; we got info stating the missile landed approximately 1100 miles east of Japan coast; which would have covered all routes from the Alaska area. I set up a plan with the flights that based on a waypoint of a waypoint to decide if we would turn [aircraft] back. During the 10 min; we checked again with [the internet] and saw landing information. If corporate security has information of live fire; the dispatcher should have the information to pass on the flight crews. We had two flights advised by passengers of missile launches that crossed their routes of flight. Dispatch was given no information until passengers said something to the flight attendants onboard.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported two flights reported passengers observed a missile launch that crossed the aircraft's route of flight. Dispatcher reported no information was provided until after the fact.

1421785

201702

1801-2400

ZMP.ARTCC

MN

37000.0

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZMP

Facility ZMP.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15.5

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1421785

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Aircraft X checked on at FL390. I issued a descent to FL370 to get the aircraft out of Sector 40 airspace since the aircraft was landing at DSM. The pilot read back descending to FL370. I had traffic at FL360 and FL350 that was diverging. About a minute goes by and I notice my En Route Information Display System (ERIDS) light up with conflictions. I look back to the scope and observe Aircraft X descending below the assigned FL370. It takes about 3 seconds to fully process what I am seeing. Aircraft X is descending head on threw the traffic at FL360 and is busting through my base altitude of FL350. I ask the pilot what altitude I assigned believing I misstated the original altitude of FL370 or missed the read back. While this is happening I forced a data block up on Sector 39 scope. The Sector 39 controller shouted out it was ok; he only had traffic at FL300. The pilot responds that he was assigned FL270. Still not believing what I was seeing I asked if he was at FL370 to which he responded the altitude he was descending out of. I amended Aircraft X altitude to FL330 and hand him off to sector 39.This happened my last stint before I went home. I returned that night for the midnight shift and listened to the tape. I did issue FL370. Aircraft X responded descending to FL370. I question the pilot about the altitude I assigned he responded FL270. It was a pilot deviation on his part which I didn't react to quickly enough and I had an airspace violation with Sector 39. Had Aircraft X not descended as quickly as he did there could have been 3 aircraft with TCAS alerts to respond to. Luckily no separation was lost however I was giving quite a scare.I shouldn't have questioned myself. I should have forced that data block to Sector 39 and stopped the aircraft immediately and asked question later. I've been in the agency almost years and this skill is hard to teach and obviously execute when it matters. Pilot deviations happen. It all goes back to hear back/read back on both sides of the microphone.

ZMP Controller reported of a pilot deviation. Pilot read back correct altitude to descend to but went through the cleared altitude. No Separation was lost due to the descent rate of the deviating aircraft.

1712249

201912

0601-1200

DSM.Tower

IA

1900.0

VMC

20

Daylight

25000

Tower DSM

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Initial Climb

None; Visual Approach

Class C DSM

Tower DSM

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Cruise

Class C DSM

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 500

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1712249

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Horizontal .75; Vertical 0

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

This was a training flight. We had been instructed to 'make left hand pattern Runway 13'. This was our second pattern and were climbing straight ahead on a southeast; runaway heading. Another Cherokee behind us on Runway 13 changed his plans; aborted his approach; and was instructed to turn direct to IKV; which is a left turn. It appears he turned more to the East rather than northeast.We were told turn crosswind; which we did (to the left); to approximately 050. But; because we had been told to make left hand pattern; we turned downwind (approximately 310) putting us on a collision course with the other Cherokee. I saw the Cherokee just before the traffic collision avoidance system announced 'traffic ahead; less than a mile.' I took over and started sharp climbing turn to the right. At the same time; Tower advised; 'traffic; twelve o'clock; less than a mile.' I then announced I had the traffic in sight. Tower said maintain visual separation. Tower then directed the Cherokee to turn to IKV; now more north; northeast. After a moment; I asked if we could turn downwind and Tower approved. I believe the confusion started because we had been told to 'make left traffic.' Tower did not say they would call when to turn downwind; as the might for a base turn to avoid traffic on final. So; I assumed we could turn at our discretion. In retrospect; I should have inferred that because Tower said to turn crosswind; that we could only turn crosswind. I might have done a better job of envisioning where the other Cherokee; who seemed to be struggling; would be and possibly on a collision course.

PA-28 instructor pilot reported confusion with the tower controllers instructions resulting in an airborne conflict.

1258215

201504

UHHH.ARTCC

FO

38100.0

VMC

Center UHHH

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Situational Awareness

1258215

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Situational Awareness

1258787.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We were following a B-747. Over HEK; we were directly above them by 2000 feet. I heard them accept a new clearance but did not hear what it was. We then saw them start a climb. We also expected them to stop at 37;100 feet but they continued to climb which set off our TCAS. I responded by clicking off the auto pilot and started a climbing right turn (there was also a slight course change over HEK) Our level off was 38;400 when we noticed the B747 started a descent to 36;000 feet; then 34;000 feet shortly thereafter. During the event; we told ATC we were in an RA-resolution advisory at which time ATC questioned the B747 crew on their altitude. I believe the aircraft came within 600-700 feet of us.

We had just climbed from FL380 to FL381 (11;600 meters). We were still with Khabarovsk Control. We got a TCAS traffic advisory (TA) off of a B747 as they climbed through FL371. As they climbed through FL373 we got a TCAS resolution advisory (RA) to climb. The pilot flying disconnected the autopilot and followed the avoidance bars on the PFD. I (the pilot monitoring) made a call to ATC that we were following a TCAS RA. I don't remember if I said 'RA' or 'resolution advisory.' TCAS called for a stop to the climb at FL384. We leveled off at that altitude while Khabarovsk control communicated with the B747 crew and told them that they were cleared to 11;000 meters (FL361). They had leveled off at FL376; then descended back down to FL361. After the B747 was below FL370; we descended back down to FL381. Also; we then put in a 1 NM right offset to keep us from being directly above them. Shortly after this event we were handed off to Harbin control in China.During the event I believe the closest our two aircraft got was about 600 to 700 feet of vertical separation. On the ND it appeared that the B747 was directly below us. They had been at FL360 for several hour previous to this event. We had been behind them since we were in Canada. A couple of hours before the event we had climbed from FL340 to FL380. At the time we climbed; we were about 40 NM behind the B747. We slowly overtook them and were directly above them over HEK VOR.

B747 flight crew reports another B747 which they had been following through Russian airspace for many hours; suddenly starts climbing into them after receiving a clearance. A TCAS RA is triggered and the reporters crew begins climbing in response. Khabarovsk Control issues another clearance indicating that the triggering B747 had climbed in error.

1113077

201308

1801-2400

ORD.Airport

IL

4000.0

VMC

TRACON C90

Air Carrier

MD-82

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ORD

TRACON C90

Air Carrier

B747-800 Advanced

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Class B ORD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1113077

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related

We were on vectors for Runway 28 at ORD. Our heading was 360 on the left base leg. We were descending from 5;000 to 4;000 FT; and were informed that we were following a 'Heavy' aircraft. It was a B747-800; and was reported to be approximately 6 miles ahead of us. We encountered what we believe to be wake turbulence; which resulted in a roll to the left of approximately 40 degrees. The autopilot disconnected; but it is unclear if it was a result of the roll itself; or if we may have accidentally done so; as the First Officer and I both grabbed the control wheel when the roll commenced. It only lasted a few seconds; and the aircraft came back under our complete control. Immediately after the event; we notified the Controller; who reiterated the distances between our two aircraft; and the fact that we were above the Heavy's flight path. We continued on the vectors; choosing to fly slightly above the glideslope until just prior to landing. We landed without incident. After landing we were given a contact phone number; and I spoke with [an ATC representative]. She said a quick review of the two flight paths showed that we should have been free of any encounter with wake turbulence.

MD-82 Captain reported wake vortex encounter six miles in trail of a B747-800 on arrival to ORD that resulted in a 40 degree roll. ATC stated there should not have been an encounter based on the flight paths.

1112202

201308

0001-0600

AUS.Airport

TX

3.0

10000.0

IMC

Daylight

11000

TRACON AUS

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class C AUS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 234; Flight Crew Type 8100

Other / Unknown

1112202

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 137; Flight Crew Type 14000

1112627.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

Vectored south of KALLA descending to 8;000 FT. Entered CB clouds at 11;000 FT. Slowing for 10;000 FT in IMC. Was advised by ATC of 'pop up' VFR traffic at our 10 o'clock. We got a TA followed by an RA immediately climbing into our position. PF started climb as directed by TCAS and slight right turn to avoid traffic. ATC gave us a 080 heading to turn in front of traffic; which we rejected as it would turn us more into RA. RA passed very close off our five o'clock and last seen 400 FT and climbing into us. Clear of conflict at 8;500 FT.

In the descent just east of KALLA going direct to HOMAL going past about 9;000 FT the TCAS started saying monitor Vertical Speed at the same time AUS Approach issued traffic; then the TCAS said climb. All this was in IMC and happened very fast. The quickest thing I could do was run the radar scale in to the five-mile scale. I started a climbing right turn because the last time I saw the echo; it was on the left side climbing. He passed just to the left on me. ATC gave me a left turn but we were already in the right turn. After the 'clear of conflict;' I looked to the left and couldn't see anything. There were broken clouds at that point. I quizzed AUS Approach and they were not talking to the aircraft. He was climbing at a high rate of climb they said.

B737 flight crew descending into AUS in IMC experiences a TCAS RA with VFR traffic not talking to Approach Control. A climb and a turn are initiated to avoid the intruder.

1794827

202103

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

50.0

17500.0

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 2452

Troubleshooting

1794827

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Type 55

1794573.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

We were cleared to FL 230. Passing through 17;500 feet; #1 engine rolled back to approximately 30%N1. The N1 and EGT had flashing red and yellow arcs and the lower section had a red flashing box around both engine indications. Our initial analysis was engine failure. We requested to level at FL 180; communicated to ATC our situation and requested vectors to return to ZZZ. Upon further analysis of the engine condition; the Captain (Pilot Flying) stated the engine was still running but noted the indications were not normal. We also saw the EEC in ALTN mode. Captain continued to fly and directed me into the QRH for the EEC ALT MODE checklist since the engine was running and not surging; stalling; or any indications dictating complete failure or the need to shutdown. We completed the QRH for the EEC ALT MODE according to our situation and indications. We discussed and agreed to also reference and ran the QRH [for] One Engine Inoperative Landing. I continued communications with ATC; while the Captain communicated with F/A's and made a PA to passengers. I computed [landing] data and set up the FMC. Captain flew the approach and landing; taxiing clear of the runway to a safe location. Autobrakes were used and no manual braking activated until slowed (approximately 50 knots) and prior to the exit of the runway. Based on our weight and configuration [calculations] prior to landing required the use of autobrakes and brake cooling calculations. I calculated the [landing data] for Non-Normal One engine Inop with 15 Flaps landing. Brake Cooling calculations returned a 58 minute cooling period; which we accomplished at the turnout abeam runway. Emergency Rescue Crews communicated to us no visible smoke from brakes and heat signature negative. After the 58 minute cool down; we were given clearance to taxi and proceeded to our gate.

When we arrived at the gate; Maintenance was working on the #1 engine. The previous crew that had the aircraft had returned to the gate. When they started the number one engine they got the Engine Control light. Maintenance cleaned the cannon plugs did an engine run and returned the aircraft to service. Our engine start and initial climb were all normal. We were on radar vectors for our route and climbing through 17;500 feet or so when the #1 N1 Gauge flashed yellow twice. We both saw it; then the #1 engine rolled back to 31% on the N1 but the engine didn't quit. We leveled at FL 180 and requested vectors back to ZZZ. We ran the EEC ALT Mode Checklist and the Engine Failure or Shutdown Checklist from the QRH. Landed Flaps 15; autobrakes 3. We ran the brake cooling calculation prior to landing. We had a 58 minutes of break cooling.

B737 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing #1 engine anomalies that reduced thrust to idle.

1689028

201910

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Mixed

Daylight

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

1689028

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Many of the NG (Next Generation) aircraft I fly have wiper blades (the rubber part that touches the wind screen) shorter that the metal frame/bracket holding it. I have seen the wiper blade as much as an inch short of the frame on each end. I have also seen wiper blades that are exactly the same length of the frame so I know the correct length is available. I believe it is a safety hazard not to have a wiper blade that spans the length of the metal bracket/frame that holds it in place. In a heavy rain; the more wind screen I can clean with the wiper blades; the safer my approach and landing will be. (Older model) aircraft wiper blades were shorter than NG blades. I think a left over supply of (older model) aircraft wiper blades might be in use on many NG aircraft causing this issue. Wiper Blades on many NG aircraft are shorter than the metal frame. Company and Maintenance Technicians need to ensure all our aircraft have proper wiper blades in place on our NGs.

B737 flight crew reported aircraft wiper blades on many next generation aircraft are shorter than the metal frame.

1188203

201407

1201-1800

TPA.Airport

FL

800.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower TPA

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B TPA

MCP

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 3000

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1188203

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were several hours delayed departing. As we taxied; we had a maintenance issue and had to work the problem. We were under the pressure of an EDCT time. After working the problem through Maintenance Control; we rushed through a before takeoff checklist and were cleared for takeoff. As we passed through 400 FT; the Captain called for heading select; I selected heading and saw that the heading was set at 021 which is way off of the RNAV SID heading. We then received an ECAM (master caution) that distracted me from the turn that seemed wrong. I fixed the problem quickly and then asked him why we were turning. Before we could ask for clarification; ATC began vectoring us back on course. It is unknown why that particular heading was set in the window. I had been so busy that I assumed that we had received the heading and I missed and the Captain indicated that he thought I had set it and that he had missed it. The flight continued without incident.

An A320 departed TPA with an incorrect initial heading selected; but neither pilot remembered setting it. ATC and crew both quickly identified the track deviation.

1291600

201508

1201-1800

OAK.Airport

CA

135.0

15.0

3000.0

IMC

5

Daylight

1400

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 30

Initial Approach

STAR EMZOH1

Class E NCT

Approach Coupler

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 257

1291600

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 226

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1291625.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

We were flying the RNAV Arrival into Oakland and were cleared for the approach to 30L. It was about a 45 degree intercept to the 296 course from the arrival. The FO selected approach mode prior to the Localizer. Upon reaching the Localizer course; the aircraft did not join the course (autopilot on) and instead; continued in a right turn. By the time we corrected; the aircraft was about 30 degrees off course. Approach queried our deviation and gave us a heading to rejoin the Localizer.

We were on the EMZOH1 Arrival and cleared the ILS Runway 30 approach. Aircraft autopilot coupled to my side (CMD B); displaying LNAV and VNAV. Aircraft was following the proper course and altitude.Enroute to [MYCAF]; VOR/LOC was selected. After VOR/LOC capture; APP was selected. Aircraft displayed G/S and started descending. I immediately noticed I did not have any glideslope indications on my ADI. By the time I verbalized this to the Captain; the aircraft immediately rolled into a right 30 degree bank turn; away from the LOC course. I intervened with CWS R and CWS P and rolled back left towards the course. I verbalized what was happening; and stated I did not have good information.Approach Control queried us about the deviation; and gave us a vector for the ILS. During the time I did not have good ILS information; I verbalized that we were safely above the minimum approach altitudes and I passed aircraft control to the Captain. We broke out of the weather shortly after we transferred control. The aircraft was maneuvered visually and configured for a safe landing.The Captain and I were not clear why the aircraft veered off course. I informed the oncoming Captain of the LOC/glideslope issue; and recommended they pay extra attention during their ILS approach. Continually monitor 'Source Annunciation' display on the upper left of ADI; and be aware that the aircraft can aggressively roll away from course if there is a navigation issue.

B737 flight crew reported an autopilot anomaly while attempting to intercept the LOC and glideslope with the approach mode armed. Upon LOC intercept the autopilot turned right as if to join but continues in the right turn away from the LOC before the First Officer intervenes. ATC takes note of the deviation.

1619781

201902

1801-2400

ZLA.ARTCC

CA

16000.0

Center ZLA

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Climb

Class E ZLA

Center ZLA

Military

Military Transport

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Class E ZLA

Facility ZLA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Situational Awareness

1619781

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors

I took over the sector from an R-Side training team with Aircraft Y level at 140 and Aircraft X climbing slowly to 130. After sitting down and evaluating the traffic; I cleared Aircraft X to climb to 160 on his current heading; and direct BERYL intersection reaching 150. When I came back to reevaluate whether the plan was still working; Aircraft X was approaching 150 and turning toward BERYL; so it had worked out fine. I went on to do some more things; including issue a departure clearance off SGU when I noticed Aircraft X's altitude was down at 130 or so and climbing; with Aircraft Y opposite direction at 140. Given the close proximity and aircraft performance; I decided to descend Aircraft Y below to 130 and expedite Aircraft X's climb through 140 to 160. Aircraft X said he was showing his altitude out of 14-something; I think. I told him that it was not what I was showing and issued traffic alerts; further descended Aircraft Y and turned Aircraft Y because I didn't know what was happening with Aircraft X. Since Aircraft X had been radar identified prior to my sitting down; I decided to make sure the correct target was tagged up and reconfirming the altitude Aircraft X showed versus what I showed. At this point; Aircraft X sounded confused to me; and I began to suspect hypoxia; but figured it was probably his confusion between what I was showing and what he was reading in his aircraft. To be safe; I decided to turn him 10 degrees right to put him on V21 and descend him to 100. When I had a second; I checked my MIA and realized I could go to 100 without him being on the airway; so I descended him with a firm voice and cleared him on route. He read back 100 but his altitude eventually started to climb. When I again asked his altitude he said he was level at 160; his responses were slower and I really believed he might be hypoxic; so I started asking him questions to try to gauge whether he was responsive enough. Eventually I asked if he had oxygen on board and asked him to use it. His responses were getting clearer and he finally descended to 100. In the middle of all of this; I was trying to find the CIC who was apparently in another area talking to another CIC. I was able to get some help from a Co-worker at Sector 08 next to me. After confirming the oxygen on board and descending the aircraft; the pilot sounded different and maintained the correct altitude. I issued him our OMIC's [Operation Manager In Charge] phone number to call when he had time to clear up what may have happened. Pilots; don't forget oxygen! It's vital.

Reporter stated the QA department had another problem with this aircraft later in the day and that problem was attributed to an equipment problem. Reporter stated that in reporter's opinion; this was definitely a hypoxia related problem; but could not prove it.

LA Center Controller reported an aircraft conflict likely due to pilot hypoxia.

1638029

201904

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

1638029

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

I was the [Flight Attendant] B on our second leg of the day from ZZZ to ZZZ1. After the demo I was doing compliance to the back galley and around row 26 (to the galley) I smelled strong fumes with the engines running. I asked the [Flight Attendant] C if she smelled it and she said yes. Then the [Flight Attendant] D came back and also said she smelled fumes. The [Flight Attendant] C called the pilots to let them know that we smelled the fumes; but had not smelled anything on our first leg from ZZZ2 to ZZZ. We also reported it to the [Flight Attendant] A and he came back and confirmed the odor. The pilots informed us we would be going back to the gate; but there was not a gate available. We were exposed to the fumes for probably 30 minutes. I walked to the front of the cabin where it was better just to get out of the concentrated area. Due to the FAA requirements there was an odor on the plane and as a company requirement we have to report it.

Flight attendants reported informing flight crew of strong fumes odor during taxi. Flight crew decided to return to gate.

1567305

201808

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

25000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 5567

1567305

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Y

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Human Factors

Shortly after the sterile light came off; we received a call from the back. The flight attendant described a dog that was out of control. The Captain informed me of the situation. The dog was a large lab size dog.Only a few minutes passed before we got a second call from the back. The Captain gave me control of the aircraft; and ATC communications. After the call; the Captain informed me that the flight attendant was frantic; and the situation was getting worse. The dog's owner was apparently not in complete control of the animal. The passengers around the dog and the flight attendant were fearful for their safety.We discussed the situation; and began a phone patch with dispatch. A third call came from back (perhaps 2 minutes from last call.) We were leveling at FL250 (I think). The dog was out of control. The dog had attempted to bite passengers; and / or flight attendants. The Captain was managing the call to dispatch and the flight attendants. At some point the flight attendants were able to get the animal locked into one of the lavatories. At this point the comfort of our passengers had been compromised; and the safety of our passengers and or our crew was in jeopardy. The Captain and I discussed our options of continuing on [several hour-long] flight to [our destination]; returning to [our departure airport]; or diverting to another field. Dispatch; the Captain; and I concurred that the safest course of action was to return to [our departure airport].ATC informed us that they would be [giving us landing priority]. We would have [notified them] anyways due to possibility of overweight landing. After further planning; it was determined that we would be landing overweight. Dispatch contacted [Operations Control]; and sent the calculations for a safe overweight landing. We chose to land on the longest runway. No further incident.

First Officer of a large passenger transport reported a dog becoming uncontrollable in the cabin area; threatening the flight crew and passengers.

1311640

201511

1801-2400

LGA.Airport

NY

600.0

IMC

Cloudy; Rain; Turbulence

Night

Tower LGA

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B LGA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1311640

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1311638.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

I was the pilot flying on a delayed flight to LGA. The weather in LGA was marginal all day with low ceilings; rain and gusty winds. The two prior flights to ours had cancelled and the two flights after us cancelled as well. Our aircraft arrived late and we spent close to an hour in the awaiting our EDCT. We held for close 40 minutes just 5 minutes shy of diverting to AVP or JFK. We were vectored for ILS 13 to LGA and were informed of PIREPs reporting speed gains and losses of up to 15 knots on final. With the speed fluctuations; I instructed the FO (pilot monitoring) to watch my speed. At 1000 feet MSL we experienced the reported speed gains and losses of 15kts a couple times. We were in IMC; it was raining heavily and the wipers were on high - cockpit noise was high. I kept the AP and AT's on as I transitioned from 'inside the cockpit' to 'outside - flying visually' as the FO called the runway -'in sight!' [At] 600-700 feet [AGL] I got visual of the runway. Prior to the '500 foot call out' we got the wind shear warning. The warning lasted just a few seconds and my speed fluctuated only 10-12kts. By the time I realized what had happened the warning went away; we were still on glide path; localizer and the speed was under control. I continued the approach and landed safely. We discussed what had happened after the flight and both agreed that I should have initiated the wind shear recovery procedure. The FO said he prompted me to initiate the recovery procedure but I didn't hear it at the time. I realized what had happened too late and it was over so quick. I never actually heard the 3 wind shear audible warnings. This was my first wind shear warning on landing; outside the simulator.Be more proactive and vigilant when it comes to wind shear events. Brief recovery procedures prior to takeoff and landing; when wind shear warnings/PIREPs exist.

We experienced gains and losses of 5 to 10 knots for the first portion of the approach. The Captain was overriding the autothrottles the entire time; but he was able to keep the airspeed fluctuations to a minimum. We experienced at least one loss of about 15 knots at about 1;000 feet. When we switched to the tower frequency; we were told that the preceding aircraft reported a loss of 15 knots at 500 feet. When we were about 500 feet; we experienced a momentary loss of about 12 knots. The Captain quickly brought the power up; and the airspeed immediately recovered. Moments later; and after the speed recovered; we received a windshear warning. The warning surprised both of us because it occurred after the event. Regardless; I said; 'firewall thrust; go around;' but he did not go around. At this time; I remember looking at the instrument panel; and the aircraft was on speed; established; and on glide path; it was as if nothing happened. The Captain continued the approach; and we landed without incident. After we got on the ground; we discussed what happened. We both agreed that we should have gone around; despite the fact that the airspeed recovered so quickly. The Captain told me that he thought it was a windshear caution and he should have listened to me; I told him that I needed to speak up.In training; the difference between a windshear caution and warning should be emphasized and practiced more than once during each recurrent sim session. In addition; it should be stressed that whenever any flight crewmember calls a go around; it should be immediately executed without hesitation.

ERJ-170 flight crew reported receiving a wind shear warning on approach to LGA but nevertheless continued to landing.

1833018

202108

IAH.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Tower IAH

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 74; Flight Crew Total 18076; Flight Crew Type 3721

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

1833018

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Airport

Airport

After taking high speed runway turnoff NN off 8R at IAH; Tower instructed us to join SF. There was a line of aircraft on NA eastbound and both my First Officer and I missed that NN becomes SF. I followed the aircraft thinking they were going to join SF. We had originally planned to exit at NK and I turned eastbound on NA thinking SF was next right turn taxiway ahead. We informed ground control of our mistake and doubled back on NB and then joined SF southbound by their instruction. There was no conflict with other aircraft. The signage for NN turning into SF is nonexistent and in my runway turnoff I mistook and assumed SF would be ahead off NA. It was my mistake.

Air Carrier Captain taxiing in IAH reported they turned on to the wrong taxiway due to a lack of taxiway signage.

1755482

202008

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

500.0

VMC

10

Dusk

15000

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Final Approach

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1755482

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Horizontal 100; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

The problem occurred on short final when a small gust of wind made me slightly above a stable altitude; then above the runway number/threshold I floated in ground effect until half of the runway was up and decided to go around. If I had touched down at that point I would have run off the runway. After deciding to go around; the OAT was too hot to climb at a normal rate and there were 3 total people in the aircraft making the aircraft's climb rate lower than normal. These factors caused the aircraft to not climb enough to clear the tree line so I maneuvered through a gap in the tree and 100-200ft AGL over houses to avoid crashing and stalling the aircraft.After analyzing the situation; I realize I should've made the go around decision at the gust of wind and/or at the runway threshold to safely clear the trees.

C172 pilot reported that during a go-around the aircraft's poor climb performance resulted in close proximity to trees and houses.

1742781

202004

0601-1200

P50.TRACON

AZ

300.0

8.0

3000.0

VMC

20

Daylight

Tower DVT

Personal

M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Initial Climb

None

Class D DVT; Class E P50

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 1900

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1742781

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0.25; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

I am currently flying out of an airport which is very busy with flight school traffic. My last flight departed with a turn to the North West under the Class B shelf. Traffic in the area was busy as it normally is but I was somewhat comfortable with knowing that most all the traffic could be visually spotted with the assistance of my ADSB in. I was passing about 1500 feet below and between two slower aircraft headed in my general direction with a good visual on both. When I was about a mile from the aircraft on my left he made an abrupt 270 degree descending turn directly towards me causing a rapid closure rate. Fortunately we missed but it was way to close of a call for my comfort. I am not sure he ever saw me given he was descending and I was below him. I did get his N number from my ADSB in data and looked it up to see it belonged to one of the flight schools here. I called the school and talked to the head flight instructor. I was curious why this student did not do a clearing turn and why he did not see me on his ADSB in. I was surprised at his response that 'not all our aircraft have ADSB in'. I said as inexpensive as these systems are it would make sense for training aircraft doing maneuvers under the Class B shelf to have these. It was only a couple of years ago that they had two training aircraft collide just north of this airport. My phone call may or may not have had any beneficial effect. Any thoughts or advice?

A Pilot reported a NMAC with an aircraft from a flight school whose aircraft are not equipped with ADSB.

1185226

201407

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Normal Brake System

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 3300

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1185226

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

1185343.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Upon arrival our gate was occupied and we were instructed to hold. While stopping the aircraft it was noted that the brakes were very grabby as I brought the airplane to a complete stop. After being assigned a new gate we taxied to the new location and waited for the marshalling crew to arrive. Again the brakes grabbed several times as the airplane stopped. As we arrived at our final spot and the marshallers gave me the stop sign I was still a little concerned about the grabbiness of the brakes; so after initially setting the parking brake I released it and held them manually and started to let off a bit. I felt the aircraft move a bit and immediately reapplied the brake. At this time; however; the rampers were putting the chocks in and the aircraft rolled a bit. I talked to the ramp supervisor and the vulnerability of the ramper if the aircraft moves while they are near the wheels was discussed. I realize I should have waited until the chocks were signaled in to do any testing of the brakes and will be much more mindful of the safety issue involved in the future.

Flight was being marshaled into the gate. This arrival was a last minute gate change and there were only 3 [rampers] available for the arrival - 2 wingwalkers and 1 marshaller. Once the aircraft reached the stop mark; the Marshaller gave the stop sign (crossed wands) to the flight deck. The Marshaller then walked out of sight of the flight deck to chock the nose gear since the other two [rampers] were wingwalking and in position to chock the main gear. As the Marshaller was getting ready to place the chocks under the nose gear tires; the brakes were released and the aircraft started to roll backwards. The marshaller jumped clear and then the flight deck realized that they were rolling and reset the brake.

A B737 Captain and the ground person detailed to install the nose wheel chocks after gate arrival; describe an uncommanded brake release causing the aircraft to roll and the person placing the chocks to jump clear.

1689354

201910

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 378

Training / Qualification

1689354

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing Rollout

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

During landing roll; normal manual brake application produced a strong pull to left. As Pilot Flying; I compensated using differential braking and rudder pedals to keep aircraft on runway while decelerating. The Captain took over controls to exit onto D7. I mentioned the abnormal challenge to centerline control; and said it might be the brakes. He tested both wheel brakes at taxi speed; and response seemed normal. I said we should call out Maintenance to gate and he agreed.At gate; Maintenance discovered that #4 brake was cold. The associated brake hydraulic supply coupling was not fully seated; rendering the brake inoperative. It appeared that a recent brake change in ZZZ1 on that assembly was not completed correctly. The ZZZ Maintenance Personnel reconnected the supply and tested the brakes; yielding normal operation. The Captain wrote up in the logbook that the aircraft pulled left on landing. I am grateful that we discovered this on landing; with a light Passenger load; low approach speed; and manual braking. A heavy [Rejected Takeoff] on a short runway would have produced a very different outcome.It appears that a safety critical system was not properly returned to service. The procedure and personnel involved need to be looked at closely; as well as any work performed by them.

B737 flight crew reported faulty brakes during landing roll out.

1290112

201508

1201-1800

P48.Airport

AZ

6100.0

VMC

30

Daylight

TRACON LUF

Corporate

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Passenger

Descent

Direct

Class E PHX

Personal

Other

1.0

None

Personal

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 8115; Flight Crew Type 215

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1290112

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Horizontal 300; Vertical 100

Y

Person Passenger

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

On the let down into the Phoenix area; East North East of Lake Pleasant; I had a near miss with a guy hanging from a parasail. I was talking to Phoenix Approach Control at the time and had just been issued a frequency change to contact Luke Approach Control. My eyes were temporarily in the cockpit while dialing in the new radio frequency and I did not see the parasail until alerted by a passenger in the back seat. We were in a highly-traveled corridor used by commercial and general aviation aircraft and the near miss occurred as the aircraft was descending through 6100 ft. I estimated vertical separation of 100 ft and lateral separation of 300 ft when the parasail was spotted off our left wing; close enough to make out the man's facial features. I reported the near miss to Luke Approach Control.

C182 pilot reported a near miss with an individual operating a parasail in the vicinity of PHX.

1222066

201411

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

15.0

9500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZZ

Personal

Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Final Approach

Direct; Visual Approach

Reciprocating Engine Assembly

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 550

Other / Unknown

1222066

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

While on a 700 fpm descent for landing; leaving 5500 ft. (approximately) I started my before landing checklist. Mixture full rich; prop high...while I pushed the prop control in; the RPM's didn't change; there was no increase in RPMs but a drop; then I proceeded to add throttle hoping to gain some power back on the engine but it didn't affect it; the manifold gauge would increase but the power on the engine wasn't increasing; almost seemed like the engine was stuck on idle. Realizing there was something wrong with the engine I kept my descent but now trying to maintain about 90 kts. I was already cleared to land but I reported some engine trouble to the controller; at about 2500 ft. (approximately) I realized I wasn't going to be able to make it to the airport so I decided to turn towards the right just so I can align the aircraft on a highway; at that point I reported to the controller I wasn't going to the able to make it to the airport and that I was landing on the road. While getting close to the road my configuration was no flaps; power to idle; prop full in; mixture rich. Right before my flare onto the road; I cut off the mixture; and then decided to put the landing gear down. I decided to wait longer for the landing gear to come down because I wanted to improve my chances on trying to make it to the airport runway. The nose gear locked down but not the mains; the planes landed on its belly on the center of the road; but then the left wing hit a road sign breaking the fuel tank and sending the aircraft into a 180 turn and leaving the aircraft in a ditch in between both traffic lanes. After impact then I reported to the tower that I was ok and that I was shutting down all comms. I turned off the avionics; starter off; and master switch off; and then I evacuated the aircraft. For this trip I had 89 usable gallons (the aircraft was topped off); I departed on a direct flight burning 14 gallons per hour. While en route I had a constant tail wind at 10;500 ft. which gave me 165 kts indicated airspeed; and around 180-185 kts ground speed indicated by my portable GPS. After the landing I decided to check my flight time on my GPS and showed me 5 hours and 5 mins.

C210 pilot experiences a loss of engine power during descent for landing after a five hour flight. When it is determined that the airport cannot be reached a highway is chosen for landing. The gear is extended late and the main gear do not extend fully before landing on the road.

1683042

201909

1801-2400

RJAA.Airport

FO

9000.0

Thunderstorm

Center RJJJ

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

STAR SWAMP G

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 17748; Flight Crew Type 3797

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1683042

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Total 8867; Flight Crew Type 1971

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1683047.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were on arrival to Narita and were cleared the SWAMP G STAR and the ILS Z16L approach. We had descended to FL 150 and was about 50 nm from SWAMP when ATC gave us a clearance to cross SWAMP at 9;000 ft. The fix past SWAMP (VIXEN) has a crossing altitude of 11;000 ft. I read back the clearance to cross SWAMP at 9;000 ft. with no further response from ATC. I have been in Narita a lot; and a clearance below the STAR speeds and altitude restrictions is normal there. The FO (First Officer) was descending to reach 9;000 ft. by SWAMP. Then after a short time; ATC said to comply with the restrictions. I read back this clearance to ATC. The FO was doing the descent and quickly trying to make 9;000 ft. at SWAMP. We crossed SWAMP at 9;000 ft. and as we approached the next fix VIXEN; ATC asked us if we were complying with the restrictions. I replied yes we were. There was no further response from ATC after that. Then we continued the arrival without any further issues.

We had just returned from break and [we] were beginning our descent for landing. There were some TRWs (Thunderstorms) in the vicinity which required ATC clearance to deviate around. Shortly after returning back on course to a fix on the flight plan; ATC gave us a heading. Then another. Then they began issuing descent clearances. At one point they cleared us direct SWAMP. Then; they issued a descent clearance to 9;000 ft. at SWAMP. I took that to mean to descend to and cross SWAMP at 9;000 ft. We put 9;000 in the MCP (Mode Control Panel) window and I started down. In order to cross SWAMP at 9;000 ft.; I had to use FLCH and speed brake. I have only been to NRT about 5 or 6 times in the last year; but it seems common to me that they frequently issue headings; airspeeds and altitudes that do not comport with those on the STAR. So; down I went. Now SWAMP at 9;000 ft. is 2;000 ft. below the next fix altitude which is VIXEN at 11;000 ft. As we got to 9;000 ft. ATC inquired if we were meeting the restrictions and we replied yes; thinking that we were going to be at 9;000 ft. at SWAMP; as per his instruction. After SWAMP; one of the relief pilots questioned whether or not we were actually supposed to descend to 9;000 ft. or had done it prematurely. At this point; I am unclear if we busted our altitude or not. I recall being cleared to 9;000 ft. at SWAMP; but among the four of us there was disagreement.I awoke [very early] the day of the trip. We had two 3 hour breaks enroute but I didn't sleep well on either. At the time of the incident I had been up for the better part of 22 hours. So; my mind could have been less than sharp. As usual in NRT; communication is less than optimum due to both the language and level of communication that is occurring on the frequency. I felt secure enough to validate 9;000 ft. in the MCP window and start down.

Boeing 777 flight crew reported a communication breakdown between flight crew and ATC during initial approach resulting in missing an altitude restriction.

1099412

201306

0001-0600

IAH.Airport

TX

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR TXMEX

FMS/FMC

X

Design; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1099412

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Manuals; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

When crosschecking the [line selected] TXMEX RNAV STAR into Houston; I discovered that the 280 and 210 hard speeds at TXMEX and CRVZA; respectively; were not displayed. I contacted the Dispatcher to see if he knew why? He returned an ACARS message advising the flight planning software team said the program only does mach speeds; knots can't be entered.In any case the commercial producers of the database need to be informed so they can include the missing speeds in the next revision.

The actual problem was that the FMC was not displaying (and; therefore; autoflight would be unable to comply with) the mandatory speed restrictions at TXMEX and CRVZA. He also advised that he has flown both B757 and B767 aircraft on the STAR and both failed to program the restrictions.

A B757 Captain advised that the FMC database on both fleets failed to display the airspeed crossing restrictions at TXMEX and CRVZA published on the TXMEX RNAV STAR into IAH.

1728337

202002

DCA.Airport

DC

1500.0

Daylight

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

None

Class B DCA

Hangar / Base

Personal

Observer

1728337

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Observer

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

Daughter was playing in park with toy [UAV]. Previous hops had not reached more than 20 or so feet. The toy launched; immediately zoomed to 100 feet; then started a steady climb to at least 1500 feet when visuals were lost [as the UAV was] drifting west toward Reagan airport and Pentagon.

Observer reported a 'toy' UAV operated by his daughter failed to respond to controls and flew toward DCA airport at approximately 1500' AGL.

1033049

201208

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-100

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Air/Ground Communication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1033049

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1033050.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

Human Factors; Weather; Aircraft

Weather

We departed after an hour delay on the taxiway due to weather. Our minimum fuel for departure was 2;937 LBS and we departed with 3;000 LBS. Weather at our destination was forecast to be VFR for our arrival. After checking on with Approach we were informed that the weather had suddenly dropped to 3/4 SM visibility; a completely unforecasted change in weather conditions. With no approaches available to us; and no alternate on the release; I attempted to contact Dispatch on the satphone; but was unable to get a connection. Because we were low on fuel and unable to get help from the company; I elected to declare a fuel emergency; and asked the Approach Controller for help. She directed us eastward toward better weather; and mentioned that the airport of ZZZ was about 45 NM to the east and was reporting 10 SM visibility and 6;000 FT overcast. By this time we were down to just 1;350 LBS of fuel; and so began heading in that direction.While en route I attempted once again to contact Dispatch on the satphone; and this time got through; though the connection was poor. I declared a fuel emergency and informed the Dispatcher of our current position and situation. The Dispatcher asked about the airport we were headed to; and whether it had fuel; and I replied that the Controller had informed us that its runway was 100 x 5;299 FT and it had an airline terminal served by turboprops; and an FBO that had jet fuel available. The airport was about 13 minutes away. At this point the Dispatcher said something about 700 LBS of fuel; and I thought he was describing how much we would burn to get there. He then said to call him back on the ground; and we both signed off. We continued to the airport and landed in VMC with just over 1;000 LBS of fuel remaining. After parking and calling Dispatch back; I was informed that our landing was at an airport not in our Operations Specifications had created a complicated situation. Our Dispatcher informed me that after hanging up he had tried to call us back on the satphone and also tried to contact ATC with the aim of telling us to continue on to another airport but was unable to do so.Having initially no communication with Dispatch; and no good information about weather at surrounding airports or fuel planning information to reach them; I had to fall back on ATC as a resource to resolve our emergency situation. By the time I established contact with Dispatch our critical fuel situation gave us very few options; and I elected to get the aircraft on the ground safely rather than fly further to a more convenient airport. We would not be able to depart under Part 121; so the passengers were bussed an hour to their destination; while we waited with the aircraft for the situation to be resolved to the point where we could depart under Part 91 to return the aircraft to the Company's system. The company took various steps to ensure that we could depart legally. I have experienced other situations where the satphone system had a very poor connection or would not connect at all; especially when the local weather is poor. It would have been easier to resolve the problem if it had worked better. If we had been able to communicate with Dispatch earlier it would have been possible to divert to another airport with a greater margin of fuel.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

A Dash 8 flight crew; dispatched to their destination with no alternate; encountered unforecast below minima weather and were forced to divert. When they were unable to contact Dispatch they requested assistance from ATC and were directed to a nearby airport where they landed with minimum fuel. Unfortunately the airport was not authorized in their company Operations Specifications and they were unable to refuel and take their passengers to their destination.

1601849

201812

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1601849

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

External air needed for start. Had minor display problem on air synoptic requiring discussion with Maintenance. Problem fixed and continued with start. Tug was not visible after start; but thought to be attached to aircraft. Completing External Air Start Checklist; felt aircraft moving forward. Immediately stopped aircraft. Asked [Ramp] on intercom if tug was pulling aircraft forward. No one on com. Tug was not hooked to aircraft. Someone pulled chocks after external start. I believe normal checklist flow with Maintenance due to display problem had the effect of disrupting procedure. Distraction. Abnormal events during air start procedure. Slow down. Insure standard phraseology used.

MD-11 Captain reported ground personnel pulled the chocks without coordination with the cockpit and the aircraft rolled forward before the Captain applied brakes; endangering ground personnel and equipment.

1275797

201507

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

3300.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Total 11500; Flight Crew Type 1849

Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1275797

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 99; Flight Crew Type 230

Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1275774.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

Following an uneventful flaps 10 takeoff; on climbout after reaching 3;000 feet [AGL] and beginning to accelerate; the flaps stopped responding to flap lever commands at the flaps 5 position. Following completion of QRH procedures and consultation with Dispatch; maintenance; my First Officer; and the cabin crew; a return to and landing at the takeoff field was made after burning fuel down below maximum landing weight. The Flaps 15 landing and taxi back to the gate were also uneventful. A logbook entry was made.We had a lot of difficulty getting a VHF phone patch with Dispatch and maintenance to work reliably using [company communications] local frequency. After much frustration we resorted to using just the ACARS to communicate with the company. Also; I distinctly recall during simulator training flying this exact same scenario. Back then we were taught that we could get Flaps 15 landing data from dispatch. Last night Dispatch informed me that they do not have; and cannot provide Flaps 15 landing data. We then calculated our own corrections using the appropriate charts in the QRH.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A B737 crew was not able to retract the flaps from the flaps 5 position after takeoff so they circled to burn down to landing weight and landed uneventfully. Communication with the company was difficult.

1761348

202009

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 208; Flight Crew Total 9209; Flight Crew Type 488

Distraction; Time Pressure; Other / Unknown

1761348

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Other / Unknown; Distraction; Time Pressure

1761351.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Other Pushback

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

After TSAT (Target Start Up Approval Time) was moved ahead approx 15 minutes; we inadvertently began push-back without Final DG (dangerous goods) Summary. Immediately recognized error; sent for summary; received Final DG Summary; and continued push.

We briefed twice in the flight deck we had DG on board and the Captain placed the Planned DG notification paper between the throttles to remind us before we pushed to have it. Inside of 20 minutes prior to our scheduled push; our TSAT was moved up to an earlier time. The ground crew was ready for push after we received notification of the earlier TSAT and as we started pushing; I noticed the paper between the throttles and advised the Captain we had pushed without the Final DG. The DG then came over the printer 2 minutes later while we started engines.

B-787 flight crew reported pushback was initiated without required Hazmat documentation.

1051348

201211

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

15000.0

VMC

10

Night

CLR

TRACON ZZZ

FBO

Citation X (C750)

2.0

Part 91

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1051348

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1052010.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

We were in the descent for landing passing through about 15;000 FT when the HYD VOL LOW A EICAS message illuminated. We checked the hydraulic page and it showed 16%. We ran the appropriate checklist and advised Approach that we would need delay vectors; for time to finish running the checklist; and that we would be declaring an emergency. [The] Captain had talked to our passengers of the situation and said they were comfortable and at ease. After checklist was complete we advised Approach that we were ready for vectors to final. The landing was normal. We stopped aircraft on the runway and shut the engines down; leaving APU power on. We chocked the aircraft with chocks borrowed from the fire truck. FBO arrived with a van and we got our passengers loaded and on their way safely. [FBO] hooked aircraft to the tug and towed us to the ramp where we continued talks with the company; completed paperwork and secured the aircraft for the night.

We stopped on the runway using the Emergency Brake System. Fire and rescue was plane side in case they were needed. The aircraft was moved by tug to [FBO] ramp. Post flight the crew found fresh HYD fluid on the belly of the aircraft as well as leaking from two wicks located on the aircraft's right side fuselage above the nose wheel marked as Emergency Pneumatic Brake and Gear Relief vents. All tires appear to have fluid on them.

CE-750 flight crew reported loss of Hydraulic System A on descent. Crew ran the checklists; declared an emergency; and landed safely; coming to a stop with the emergency brake system.

1149038

201402

1201-1800

VNY.Airport

CA

5500.0

IMC

Turbulence

TRACON SCT

Corporate

Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class E SCT

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class E SCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 77; Flight Crew Total 4100; Flight Crew Type 950

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1149038

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 3950

Other / Unknown

1149059.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Vertical 500

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

A deviation in altitude occurred during initial approach to Van Nuys Airport. I was hand flying the airplane due to turbulence encountered on descent. While on frequency with SoCal Approach; we were given a heading of 070 degrees. We were level at 5;000 FT in IMC conditions with continued light to occasional moderate turbulence. At approximately 4 miles from KADIE Intersection; we were given a heading of 130 degrees to intercept the localizer and clearance for the ILS for Runway 16R at VNY. While in the turn to intercept the localizer with continued turbulence; we received a TA message from our TCAS system. I initially climbed thinking that there was traffic right below us. I increased our altitude to 5;500 FT. Upon further review of the TCAS we received an RA to descend. I complied with RA advisory and descended immediately. I leveled off back to 5;000 FT and intercepted the localizer for the ILS Runway 16R at Van Nuys and landed. We notified SoCal Approach of what we had experienced. SoCal also advised us that traffic above us; a Boeing 737; had responded to an RA to climb. After the flight; my Co-Captain and I took the initiative to contact the SoCal Approach Controller by phone to describe our experience. The SoCal Approach Controller thanked us for taking the initiative to call him. He understood why I felt the urgent need to climb. He indicated to us that there was never a loss of separation and safety was not compromised.

A deviation in altitude occurred during initial approach into Van Nuys Airport. My Co-Captain was hand flying the airplane due to turbulence encountered on descent. While on frequency with SoCal Approach; we were given a heading of 070 degrees. We were level at 5;000 FT in IMC conditions with continued light to occasional moderate turbulence.At approximately 4 miles from KADIE Intersection; we were given a heading of 130 degrees to intercept the localizer and clearance for the ILS for Runway 16R at VNY. While in the turn to intercept the localizer with continued turbulence; we received a TA message from our TCAS system. My Co-Captain initially climbed thinking that there was traffic just below us; the altitude increased to 5;500 FT. Upon further review of the TCAS we received an RA to descend. My Co-Captain then complied with the RA advisory and descended immediately. The aircraft was leveled off back at 5;000 FT and intercepted the localizer for the ILS Runway 16R Van Nuys.We notified SoCal Approach of what we had experienced. SoCal also advised us that traffic above us; a Boeing 737; had responded to an RA to climb.

G-IV flight crew experiences a TCAS TA at 5;000 FT and the flying Captain climbs 500 FT thinking the traffic is below. The traffic is above and a TCAS RA is generated to descend. A normal approach and landing ensues.

1482997

201709

0001-0600

FTW.Airport

TX

VMC

Tower FTW

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Initial Climb

None

Class D FTW

Tower FTW

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Initial Climb

Class D FTW

Facility FTW.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1482997

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Airport; Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was relieved of Local Control and it was busy. During the overlap; the relieving controller had a go around with Aircraft X on Runway 17 and told them to extend upwind 3 miles. Aircraft Y was in the pattern for the parallel Runway 16 and was turning crosswind. Local Control told Aircraft Y to make a wide right 270 to enter the downwind. Majority of our attention was north of the field given that there were so many inbounds being sequenced. I looked on the radar and out the window and saw that Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were getting close; even though they shouldn't have been. I told Local Control about it and before he could key up; Aircraft X [reported] a NMAC and requested to leave the airspace.I believe Aircraft Y misunderstood what was being requested of him because it looked more like he tried to fly heading 270 instead of doing a 270 maneuver.

FTW Tower controller reported a near mid air collision in the pattern when one pilot misunderstood the clearance.

1241290

201502

0.0

Air Carrier

A319

Other Preflight

Tablet

X

Malfunctioning

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1241290

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

I have noticed numerous times; when updating the [electronic library] portion of the company issued iPad; not all items are downloaded properly.The page is blank (gray) instead of the document or bulletin downloading properly; I have to delete this blank (gray) paged document and attempt another download.The safety issue that I have noticed is that if there are multiple newly updated procedures; such as QRH; MEL; bulletins etc. it is almost impossible to determine which documents are downloaded due to the speed at which the preview page happens and then the download process begins.I have also noticed that occasionally; items which were previously downloaded correctly; will then disappear with only a blank (gray) page taking its place after a new update in [electronic library].This is a safety issue if I am not aware that this change took place in [electronic library]. I have contacted IT support and they have said it is a known issue.

A319 Captain reported frequently experiencing difficulty updating his company issued iPad.

1253844

201504

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Physiological - Other

1253844

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Company Policy

I felt extraordinarily tired and somewhat airsick for much of flight to Airport ZZZ. It wasn't due to turbulence; and I was feeling unwell enough to not remember that per my company's recent instructions; the pilots had probably turned down the airflow in the cabin. When I was feeling even sicker on the return flight; I mentioned my condition to the purser. She reminded me of our company's fuel and cost saving measure to lower the airflow in the cabin until flight attendants call the cockpit with reports of illness or unease in the cabin. She suggested that I tell the cockpit that I was feeling sick; and ask that the airflow be increased. I called; and within 5 to 10 minutes; I was feeling normal. Flight attendants are safety professionals in the cabin; and we should not have to feel sick before we get adequate oxygen flow. This deficiency of oxygen is the definition of hypoxia. I was feeling so sick that I wasn't thinking clearly; and the condition occurred gradually enough that I didn't realize it. It is unsafe and unwise to deprive working crew of sufficient oxygen. In retrospect; I don't know if I could have responded appropriately in an emergency given my oxygen deprived state.

A flight attendant reported feeling ill while at cruise on an out and back flight. Then she was reminded that her company had pilots use pressurization low flow to save fuel. She felt better after asking for increased air flow.

1036427

201209

1801-2400

ZAU.ARTCC

IL

14000.0

Center ZAU

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZAU

Center ZAU

Corporate

Queen Air 65/70 (Seminole)

1.0

Other 105

VFR

Skydiving

Cruise

Class E ZAU

Facility ZAU.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1036427

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

An Air Carrier was assigned 14;000 FT. Beech 65 was VFR conducting parachute jump operations. The jump aircraft had been up and down all day; they had earlier reported that they were going to 13;000 FT. This was in my mind; but I don't remember if they said it specifically this time. The Air Carrier asked if I had traffic for him; I said 'Yes; 12 o'clock 3 miles will stay below you.' The Air Carrier responded that traffic was not below but level with him. I then asked the Beech 65 their altitude; they reported 13;300 FT. Then [I] noticed that the Air Carrier was 100 FT low; asked if they were descending. The Air Carrier reported TCAS had them descending and now they were following it to climb. Move parachute jump operations to less congested airspace.

ZAU Controller was alerted to a TCAS RA experienced by an Air Carrier arrival when the ceiling altitude for a parachute aircraft was miscommunicated.

1705928

201911

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

180.0

0.5

2000.0

VMC

5

Daylight

3200

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Final Approach

Other RNAV-XX Circling

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 358; Flight Crew Type 357

Situational Awareness

1705928

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Human Factors

I was heading to ZZZ on the ZZZZZ transition of the RNAV-XX IAP. I hadn't anticipated the gusty winds to be so strongly favoring RWY XY; so when I got the TAF; I decided to execute a circling approach to land. I followed the IAP (instrument approach procedure); down to 2;000 feet MSL; breaking out of the clouds somewhere around the FAF. I turned right; entering a left-downwind for RWY XY; and realized that a hilltop with a tower was going to be in my path. I applied power to climb over it (almost back into the clouds); and then resumed my descent and turns to landing.Hours later; debriefing the situation; I noticed the admonishment I had missed earlier; buried at the end of five lines of textual notes on the approach plate: 'Circling NA South of RWYs XX and XY.' The sectional chart also depicts that RWYs XZ and XY are RP; but I wasn't relying on my sectional chart during IFR in actual IMC.I suspect the IAP designers intend RNAV-XX circling aircraft to cross the field and enter downwind for RWY XY; right-pattern. The hints were there for me to find; but being single-pilot IFR; hand-flying in actual IMC; and relatively novice at it; I erroneously thought that keeping the plane on heading; on altitude; and on speed while following the IAP was more important than reading through five lines of text as each successive line seemed to provide information that was useless to me at that moment. I guess at some point I stopped reading and missed the applicable final line.Given that pilots are human; I wonder if it might make sense to make important notes like that more prominent on the approach plate.

C172 pilot reported that a loss of situational awareness during a circle to land approach resulted in CFTT.

1176912

201405

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

APU

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1176912

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

The aircraft had recently undergone maintenance that cancelled the previous round trip. The Captain had reported ahead of me and met me plane side. He informed me that the GPU powering the aircraft had dropped offline and drained the batteries below 22 volts. As such; we needed a new GPU in order to start the APU and/or an engine. I took my bags on-board the aircraft and the Captain found a ramp supervisor. I was stowing my bags when the GPU came online and the aircraft came to life. The Captain came aboard and said he wanted to get the APU going in order to cool the aircraft. I quickly looked over to ensure all of my circuit breakers were in; which they were and he began the start sequence as I began unpacking my flight case in preparation for the flight. As I was unpacking I noticed a warning light illuminate. I thought it was a Check Fire Detect light; but I wasn't sure. It only flashed once or twice; and I only saw it from the corner of my eye. The APU had failed to start. At that point I heard a circuit breaker pop. By the time I was able to look up to positively identify the warning light it had extinguished. I checked the APU fire panel. There were no indications (normal or non-normal) from the APU fire panel. I looked over to find the popped breakers. The APU Main and Aux breakers had both popped. I told the Captain that I thought I had seen a Check Fire Detect warning light; and I was going to inspect the bottle disks for a discharge indication. When I arrived at the tail section I noticed heavy smoke pouring from the APU exhaust and APU bay. The smoke was increasing in both intensity and smell. Further; neither bottle discharge disk indicated a discharge. I quickly informed the Captain who instructed me to run the APU Fire Checklist. I returned to the flight deck and completed the APU Fire Checklist. I exited the aircraft and awaited the Fire Department. When I was back on the ramp I noticed very little smoke coming from the APU. There was only a trace of smoke coming from the APU exhaust and the flat screen ahead of the exhaust port. When the firefighters arrived they informed the captain that they saw no signs of fire. We all waited for the mechanic; who promptly announced it to be a [APU] starter contactor that had welded. He deactivated the starter generator and MEL'd the APU according to procedure. The flight was later cancelled due to weather.

When an APU starter contactor welded and resulted in fire and smoke at the gate the flight crew ran appropriate checklists and called for CFR assistance. The APU was deferred inoperative but the flight ultimately cancelled due to weather.

1021515

201207

1201-1800

LAX.Airport

CA

128.0

4.0

2500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

25000

Tower LAX

Corporate

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

None

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Cruise

Class B LAX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129; Flight Crew Total 1171; Flight Crew Type 102

Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1021515

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

This was my first time overflying LAX. I asked SMO Ground prior to departure if it would be possible to overfly at LAX at 3;500 FT. The Ground Controller said it was possible; and that I should expect to make a climbing right 270 at the shoreline after departure from Runway 21; and then cross over the SMO VOR before proceeding over LAX. After departure; Tower instructed me to proceed to the shoreline; and then make a climbing right 270 to 2;500 MSL. I climbed to 2;500; but then Tower instructed me to climb to 3;500 and change frequencies. I initiated my climb and contacted LAX Tower as is required to fly the LAX mini route.Upon contacting LAX Tower and reporting my altitude; Tower told me I was above his altitude and to contact SCT Approach on another frequency to overfly LAX. After checking in with SCT at 3;500 for the mini route; they informed me that I needed to talk to Tower to fly that route and handed me back to LAX. I reported back in with LAX Tower at 3;500 for the mini route; and Tower said 'you will have to descend to 2;500 before I can clear you through the Class Bravo for the mini route.' I descended as directed.I was expecting a discrete beacon code and a Bravo clearance. However; as I neared the edge of the Class Bravo airspace; Tower hadn't told me anything. I figured that maybe because this was a special VFR transition route; a discrete code was not required. This made me uncomfortable; so just prior to entering the Class B airspace I called LAX Tower one more time: 'Tower; this is my first time flying this route. Just want to confirm what I'm doing is OK.' Tower responded; 'Affirmative; just keep flying that heading and hold that altitude. You're doing great.' After hearing that; I guessed I must be okay; and continued through the Class B airspace over the top of LAX at 2;500. Shortly after crossing over midfield at LAX; Tower advised; 'you are one mile from exiting Class B airspace; radar services are terminated; squawk VFR...oops; looks like I never gave you a code. That's alright. Squawk VFR and contact Hawthorne Tower.' I responded; 'Switching to Hawthorne Tower; good day.'I was very uncomfortable through the whole ordeal; but after asking Tower if I was doing everything correctly and being told 'affirmative;' I was convinced that everything was going fine. However; upon being given the frequency change just prior to exiting Class B airspace and having the Controller admit to forgetting to assign a beacon code; I became very flustered and forgot to check on with Hawthorne Tower. Hawthorne Tower called about a minute later; I responded; and the rest of the flight went smoothly.I think this whole event could have been avoided if there wasn't the confusion on what altitude I needed to climb initially to fly the route. Had either the Ground Controller or Tower Controller at SMO told me I needed to be at 2;500 rather than 3;500 for the route; I would not have had to make the rapid descent to 2;500. If I hadn't had to make that descent; LAX Tower would have been able to clear me for the route 4-5 miles earlier and would have had more time to remember to give me a Bravo clearance and discrete code. I believe the whole event was due to a breakdown in communications from all parties involved.

A small light aircraft pilot attempting his first north to south crossing through the LAX Class B after taking off from SMO met with multiple conflicting ATC communications and clearances; ultimately confusing him to the point he forgot to contact Hawthorne Tower after completing the passage.

1090540

201305

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

11400.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Vectors

Military

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Part 91

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 2000

1090540

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Horizontal 4000; Vertical 100

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft

While on a vector for a Precision Approach Radar (PAR) approach while maintaining 11;400 FT the Approach Controller called UAV traffic in our 2 to 3 o'clock position; 12;500 FT and informed us there was NO radio communications with the traffic.We were given a right turn which should have maintained a safe distance and altitude from the UAV traffic. Two seconds later while in the turn; UAV traffic turned towards our aircraft while descending to our altitude; at which time the crew received an RA advisory to descend; followed immediately by a climb advisory 'climb; climb now.'The Captain disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles; and throttles were firewalled to comply with RA advisories and the right turn steepened. Visual contact was made with the UAV; approximately less than one mile and 100 FT below moving right to left.At 12;500 FT the Captain arrested the aircraft climb per TCAS instruction 'clear of conflict' advisory and then returned the aircraft to 11;400 per ATC instructions. Then the aircraft was given a right 360 degree turn to rejoin the approach.

A B767-200 was given vectors to avoid a UAV and received an RA.

1043840

201210

1201-1800

CID.Airport

IA

100.0

Marginal

Rain; 7

Daylight

1700

Tower CID

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Final Approach

Class C CID

Tower CID

Military

Helicopter

Class C CID

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 500; Flight Crew Type 30

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1043840

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 100

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Thirty minutes after a VIP TFR ended at a Class-C airport; I was cleared to land while on an ILS approach in IMC. A few miles from the airport; I emerged into marginal VFR conditions. During my flight; I received no traffic advisories to advise of a helicopter operating near and above runways. Before my flight; in a telephone briefing from FSS; I was read a list of NOTAMs at my destination; and these did not include any that warned of helicopter operations. As I touched down on the runway; I heard the Tower advise a Cessna; which was number two for landing behind me; to go around. At the same time; my Skywatch traffic surveillance avionics (similar to TCAS) called out 'traffic! traffic!' I discovered the problem by looking over my left shoulder; where I was surprised to see a military helicopter flying parallel to me at approximately 100 AGL and 300 FT from the runway centerline. The helicopter was faster than me as I was landing at less than 80 KTS; and it overtook me as I slowed down on the runway. The helicopter continued circling the runway vicinity at low altitude for at least another fifteen minutes. Occasionally I heard Tower or Ground make calls to '[X] Helicopter;' but I never heard any warnings given to traffic of the conflict that the helicopter posed. I believe the helicopter's operations endangered my safety by presenting a significant hazard to traffic.Contributing factors include: a lack of a NOTAM; a lack of an ATC advisory to alert inbound pilots to the presence of the helicopter; and marginal VFR conditions that made it impossible to visually discover the helicopter until late in the approach. I do not believe that I was given adequate separation. If ATC is unable to keep adequate separation of general aviation traffic from a helicopter performing a mission after a VIP TFR; then the FAA should at least issue a NOTAM to advise pilots of the hazard. This NOTAM should indicate the nature of the hazard and it should define how long the hazard will persist; so that pilots can plan their flights to avoid the hazard.

A pilot emerged from IMC on the CID ILS to see a military helicopter 300 FT from him on short final with no communication from ATC about the near miss traffic.

1771468

202011

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

5700.0

IMC

Daylight

700

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Vectors

Class C ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Supervisory 3.5

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1771468

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1771904.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Aircraft X was on heading 360 and instructed to descend to 6;000 ft. I observed Aircraft X descend through 6;000 and at 5;800 I issued a low altitude alert; the MVA was 5;600. Aircraft X did not respond and kept descending. I issued another low altitude alert; climb and maintain 6;000 immediately and when their data block displayed 5;100 they reported level at 6;000. I told them altitude indicates 5;100; they asked to verify altimeter 30.25 and I gave them the current altimeter 29.24. After a couple miles they showed a climb and climbed to 6;000.It was apparent watching the replay that Aircraft X check on indicating 12;100 and reporting level at 13;000. For some reason I did not catch it. I even descended them to 8;000 and they leveled at an indicated 7;000 and I did not notice. I think this is because 7;000 is a normal altitude that I would descend them to at that location but I had left them a little higher. When I descended them to 6;000 and they indicated lower it was apparent something was wrong and I was immediately concerned about the MVA so I issued a low altitude alert before they went below the MVA and a climb to 6;000.A snowstorm had just blown through the airspace and there was still stiff winds out of the west gusting to 30 kts. I had a sequence developing for ZZZ and Aircraft X was near the front of it. I recall planning ahead; looking at strips; using the STARS (Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System) to determine how much the wind was pushing the vectors. Also ZZZ had many taxiways closed from the snow so I was vectoring for much greater distance than usual (10 miles on final). I must not have looked at Aircraft X's altitude when they checked on and just used the reported altitude. While I am happy I got a low altitude alert out when they were near terrain; I wish that I had caught it on check-on.I found it strange that their altitude in STARS was accurate but not in the cockpit. I thought the altimeter setting would change what STARS reported. I have to be diligent to verify altitudes when the aircraft check on; so altimeter discrepancies can be caught early.

Descending into ZZZ through FL 180 we completed the Approach Checklist and verified 30.24 altimeter setting. On vectors to final as we were leveling off; Approach Control asked us to climb to 6;000 ft. We were indicating 6;300 at that time; so the clearance just sounded odd. The Approach Controller said that we were at 5;200 and for us to climb to 6;000 and turn to a heading of 030. I immediately clicked the autopilot/auto-throttles off and started my turn towards 030 heading and started climbing; as my Pilot Monitoring verbalized that we had the wrong altimeter setting of 30.24 instead of 29.24. We leveled off at 6;000 on a 030 heading; and at that time I engaged the autopilot and auto-throttles. We got vectored for approach and landed uneventfully on Runway XX. We were asked to contact TRACON on landline by the Ground Controller as we taxied to the gate. We realized that we had unintentionally set altimeter setting of 30.24 in error instead of 29.24 which directly led to the altitude deviation. We failed to catch our error during crosschecks as we ran the checklist due to expectation bias. Lack of digital ATIS was also a contributing factor; however; we should have trapped this error as we updated the new weather. We needed to be more vigilant to trap these kind of errors.

TRACON Controller and the pilots of aircraft reported setting the wrong altimeter in the aircraft which led to low altitude alerts on final approach.

1084128

201304

1801-2400

ZZZ.Tower

US

2500.0

VMC

CLR

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Initial Approach

Trailing Edge Flap

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification

1084128

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

The Captain was the PF and I; the First Officer was the PM. Just as we started to configure the aircraft; we got an ECAM message stating that the flaps were locked due to the actuation of the wingtip brakes; with a note not to exceed 200 knots. We were at approximately 2;500 feet at the time and executed a missed approach and notified ATC. We were given vectors and an altitude. The Captain kept control of the aircraft staying well below 200 knots and took over ATC communications. I pulled out the Manual and searched for the appropriate procedure. Per the slat/flap indicator on the upper ECAM; our flaps appeared to be 0; while the slats were working just fine. Since we had recently switched over to the 'new' Manual; we both were determined to ensure that we were accomplishing the right procedure; along with the right landing distance calculations and corrections to our landing/approach speed. Not only did we maintain a continued dialogue throughout the whole event; but I went thru the procedure several times; and we even handed over controls so that he (the Captain) could review the Manual procedures and make sure that we got it right. We notified company and had a message relayed to Maintenance; hoping to get some helpful guidance. The message back was just to follow the Manual. In the meantime; we were vectored around for another visual. There was very little traffic in the area so we were not really concerned with sequencing behind other aircraft. We discussed our landing distance calculation (5;000 feet or so from what I can recall) and we discussed our landing speed; which would be flown 25 knots faster per the procedure; and decided as a precaution; to have emergency equipment standing by. We briefed the flight attendants; got new weather (VFR still) and completed appropriate checklists. We just treated it as a slightly faster than normal landing using max reverse; low brakes; with everything else being fairly normal (other than the flaps.) It was an uneventful approach to an uneventful landing. The emergency vehicles followed us to the gate and we were met there by our Maintenance personnel. One issue concerning this event was that while trying to involve Maintenance in the process; we received word from them that we should just follow the procedure. Fair enough; that is just what we did; but we would have liked to get them more involved in the process; as we value their opinion on all matters mechanical. They may not have had anything to tell us that would have made any difference in the actions we took; but it's always nice to have them in the loop during these kinds of situations and to receive some kind of helpful feedback. Secondly; I do not want to speak for the Captain; but for me; trying to follow an unfamiliar 'new' Manual procedure for a no-flap landing with partial slats was a bit unnerving. The procedure itself is really fairly simple now that we have seen it and ran through it in real time; but it IS different than the old procedure that I ran in SIM training. We spent a lot of time during this event running and re- running the procedure; when it could and should have 'flowed' better. I think we knocked out all the appropriate checklists; but I just can't be sure. Overall; I think we did a good job; but I personally would have felt more confident about it with a recurrent SIM (with the new Manual) under my belt.

A320 First Officer reports a flap fault with wing tip brakes locked during approach. A go-around was initiated in order to comply with new procedures. Eventually a zero flap with slats 3 approach and landing ensues; flown at Vref+25 to an uneventful landing.

1157077

201403

1801-2400

ZKC.ARTCC

KS

37000.0

Night

Center ZKC

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

VFR

Photo Shoot / Video

Cruise

Other unknown type or operator

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Other unknown

Facility ZKC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21.5

Training / Qualification

1157077

Facility ZKC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Training / Qualification

1157091.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Staffing

Ambiguous

I was training a Developmental on the D side. The aircraft asked on frequency if we had any targets in his vicinity. The R Controller replied affirmative and called a target in his vicinity about 300 feet lower; moving away. The pilot sounded shaken and decided to end his photo mission and return to MHK. We learned later that the pilot stated to management in a phone call that the other aircraft had passed by very close. He estimated 50 feet. The R Controller was busy at the time with a steady stream of clearances and advisories on the radio. Right before the event he was talking to another aircraft going into SLN VFR and then activates an IFR flight plan. While this discussion was going on; the event occurred. No conflict alert or Mode C intruder was activated.This aircraft was operating very low; just above the MHK Class D airspace. It is possible that better advisory service would have been provided by the Tower.

A small high wing aircraft was performing a low-altitude photo mission in the vicinity of MHK; and had requested and received flight following. At one point; the pilot of the small high wing aircraft asked if we were showing any VFR traffic in the area. The Radar Controller replied in the affirmative; that there was an aircraft in the vicinity; and provided specific range; bearing; and altitude information. The pilot sounded shaken; and reported that he was terminating his photo mission. Later we learned that the pilot believed to have passed within fifty (50) feet of another airplane. While this had been occurring; the radar team was responsible for two sectors and was working complex traffic including approaches into other towered airports. At no point was a conflict alert or traffic warning exhibited by the Center Computer.In this particular situation; I would suggest leaving the advisory role with the control Tower; due to its proximity to and the low altitude of the event.

Pilot receiving flight following questioned Controller about traffic in close proximity to his aircraft. Controller did not issue traffic until pilot questioned Controller. Unknown traffic was extremely close to traffic under ATC control.

1768830

202010

0001-0600

ZZZ.TRACON

US

7000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Vectors

Class C ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness

1768830

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure

I was working Approach; it was south flow. I cleared Aircraft X; a heavy B7XX RNAV approach then switched him to tower. Then; tower called me said that Aircraft X was going around and they issued him 185 heading climbing to 5000 ft. Then; Aircraft X came on my frequency; I radar identified him; told him to climb to 7000 ft.; because there was a 6300 ft. MIA block to the east. Once he was level at 7000 ft.; he was about 14 miles southwest; I issued him a 030 heading; then a 350 heading vector for RNAV approach. There was a 11000 ft. MIA block east of the 6300 ft. MIA block; but the distance from Aircraft X's position when he made the turn to the boundary of the 11000 ft. MIA block was about 5.6 miles. I thought that was enough space for him to make the turn. However; Aircraft X took an unexpected very wide U turn and clipped the corner of the 11000 ft. MIA block; he clipped the corner of 11000 ft. MIA for about 3 seconds while turning to the north; the MSAW alert was triggered; I issued him a low altitude alert. The aircraft then exited the 11000 ft. MIA back into the 6300 ft. MIA safely.

TRACON Controller reported issuing a late vector resulting in air carrier entering higher MIA.

1310054

201511

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

25000

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 125

Situational Awareness

1310054

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

While on final approach to land there was a van traveling west on the north perimeter of the airport.I developed a higher than normal sink rate while landing. The van slowed as if to watch but then continued and traveled under the airplane.I added throttle to arrest the sink rate.The left landing main wheel touched the top of the van leaving a skid mark on the top of the van. The right main gear wheel touched the top of the windshield cracking the windshield.I continued my landing without further incident. I parked the airplane on the hangar ramp just west of the runway; and after shutting down went back to the road to check on the people in the van. All the people in the van were fine; no injuries incurred.

Light aircraft pilot reported contact with a vehicle on an airport perimeter access road.

1842461

202109

1201-1800

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1842461

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

1842713.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

When airborne; we were notified by our Dispatcher that one of our positions had dry ice that was not accounted for in the DG [Dangerous Goods] paperwork.Uncertain as to the cause given the event occurred at some point during the loading or ULD [Unit Load Devise] build process.Uncertain; as the process breakdown occurred external to the flight crew.

At XA:31 [name 1] informed me that Aircraft X; position Y; had 6kgs of dry ice that was not accounted for in the DG [Dangerous Goods] manifest. The flight was on the active runway ready for take off. At XA:31 I informed Duty Officer [name 2]; of the event. I also told him I would inform the crew via ACARS. We agreed the flight is still legal; it is safe and within limits. Aircraft X may proceed to ZZZ1. At XA:32 I informed [name 1] of my discussion with the Duty Officer. I requested from [name 1] the Ramp Agent's employee number #X; [name 3]. At XA:44 I sent an ACARS message: 'Hello Aircraft X. At XA:31 I was made aware that position Y has 6 kg of dry ice that was not accounted for in Dangerous Goods [manifest]. Duty Officer has been notified. Please file a report; I will be doing the same.We have determined that the flight is safe; legal; and within limits. I called [name 3];to inquire about the event. [Name 3]; said it was a can from ZZZ2 that came in from another area; when the Hazmat agent updated the DG summary the aircraft had already blocked. [Name 3]; received an alert and called [name 1]. [Name 3] the can was originally assigned to a can aircraft cargo container type that is not in this aircraft's configuration for this flight. It took the Hazmat agent time to correct it; he entered the information after the aircraft blocked.I suggested Hazmat agent make a phone call to Operations or ramp agent as soon as he encountered the error rather than trying to figure out how to correct the error and entering the information in the DG Summary after the aircraft blocked.

Air Carrier Captain reported Dispatch notification of Hazmat documents violation while airborne.

1631359

201903

1201-1800

ORD.Airport

IL

3000.0

IMC

Daylight

TRACON C90

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 10C

Final Approach

Class B ORD

TRACON C90

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Final Approach

Class B ORD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195; Flight Crew Type 1211

1631359

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

On ILS PRM (Precision Runway Monitor) approach ORD 10C (autopilot and autothrust required); assigned 170 KIAS to FAF (Final Approach Fix). I called 'Flaps 3' below 175 KIAS to maintain 170. Just prior to the FAF; the aircraft encountered either wake turbulence from the proceeding aircraft or some other form of unstable air. The airspeed quickly rose above the Flaps 3 limit of the aircraft. During our debrief; the Captain and I thought it was about 10 knots above the limit for 2 to 3 seconds. I called for the landing gear to help manage the speed. Airspeed returned to normal; we continued to configure for landing; and landed uneventfully. The Captain contacted Maintenance to write up the overspeed. Maintenance did the inspection and reported to us the overspeed was within limits.

A319 First Officer reported a flap overspeed occurred on approach into ORD when they encountered either wake turbulence or unstable air.

1814508

202106

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction

1814508

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Distraction; Troubleshooting

1814513.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Climbing on the SID the forward Flight Attendant called the flight deck about noise coming from the main cabin door. We verified that the doors indications were all closed. No pressurization abnormalities were noted with the CPAM system. The noise was not audible in the flight deck. Shortly after the Flight Attendant called again saying the noise was louder; at which time the CPAM and doors EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) page indications were checked again. Pilot Monitoring advised the Flight Attendant to verify all door securing pins were in the green position and to try and detect if air was passing through. During this time ATC amended our climb instructions from 37;000 feet to level at 32;000 feet for traffic. When the Flight Attendant called again she said she felt air coming from the right side of the door.At this point the noise was audible through the flight deck door and inter-phone rapidly increasing in volume. We then donned our oxygen masks and decided a descent was immediately required. Pilot Monitoring advised ATC that we were beginning a descent. Upon completion of the emergency descent and at a safe altitude; Pilot Flying gave aircraft control to Pilot Monitoring. At this time an announcement was given for a precautionary landing. The Pilot Flying began setting the aircraft up for a return to ZZZ; via straight in. The approach and landing phase was conducted in accordance with normal operations and checklist procedures resulting in a standard landing and taxi to the gate. Once at the gate; the Flight Attendant had difficulty opening the MCD (Main Cabin Door). This was in addition to difficulty experienced closing the MCD for departure. Both Flight Attendants reported hearing a loud pop prior to the sharp increase in sound from the MCD in flight.The risk was a complete and rapid; possibly explosive decompression of the aircraft. Suggest extra vigilance in verifying the airworthiness of MCD seals.

As were climbing after departing ZZZ; our Forward Flight Attendant called the flight deck advising us that she was concerned about a loud noise coming from the main cabin door. We verified that the door was secured and all systems reported normal. We continued our climbout. She then called back and said it was getting progressively and rapidly louder and she can feel air coming from the right side. Systems were still normal. After being given an amended altitude of 32;000 [feet] from a previous altitude of 37;000 [feet]; we were cleared higher. It was at this time we heard the sound from the main cabin door through our flight deck. It was very rapidly getting worse. As a crew; concerned about pressurization issues; we immediately decided to initiate a descent. We donned our oxygen masks as a safety measure. During the descent; all systems still reported normal. However; the issue with the door was still evident. Once the descent was completed and we were at a safe altitude; as pilot flying; I handed controls to the pilot monitoring.I stated that this would be a precautionary landing and to prepare the cabin. I also made my passenger announcement. We then set the aircraft up for a return to ZZZ. The return and landing at ZZZ was completed under normal procedures and checklists. We returned to the gate as planned. After talking with the flights attendants upon landing; they reported that just prior to the sound becoming very loud they heard a 'pop' further exacerbating the issue. It should also be noted that there was trouble closing the main cabin door prior to departure. There was also trouble opening the door once we arrived at the gate. Cause MCD (Main Cabin Door) seal.

CRJ-700 flight crew reported they returned to their departure airport when they heard air passing through the Main Cabin Door and the Flight Attendant reported air was passing through the door. The flight landed safely and they discovered the Main Cabin Door seals failed.

1797754

202103

HOU.Airport

TX

0.0

Dusk

Ground HOU

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 12000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1797754

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight; Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

The HOU ATIS states Runway 17/35 is closed; along with Taxiway G2 and G3. The Jepp 10-9 Page does not identify any of these surfaces. Ground Control gave us a clearance to taxi on H and hold short of Runway 35. So; does the runway exist or not? The Jepp 10-9 should reflect the proper surfaces that ATC is using in their communications. I think this can create confusion. Fix the Jepp or have ATC stop issuing instructions including surfaces that no longer exist.

Air Carrier Captain reported confusion regarding information on the Jeppesen 10-9 vs. instructions given by ATIS and Ground Control.

1050662

201211

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Climb

Powerplant Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1050662

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

[We were] climbing/accelerating out of 10;000 feet when I saw a flickering red light out of the corner of my eye. The source of the intermittent flickering was the Number 2 fuel lever which coincidentally had one loop of the fire detection system already deferred due to a long history of problems. There were no other fire detection alerts or any engine instruments to indicate a problem. Touching the fuel lever caused the rest of the fire detection system to go off. Shortly after silencing the bell all of the alerts went away. I tested the fire detection system successfully and rechecked all of the engine instruments which were normal. We had initiated the engine fire checklist by placing the Number 2 throttle in idle but decided to declare an emergency and return to [departure airport] with the engine running in idle. Also; decided not to touch the Number 2 fuel lever any more. We had no further abnormal indications of any sort. First Officer continued as PF for an uneventful ILS. With fire/rescue equipment standing by we stopped on the runway; shutdown Number 2 and had the fire/rescue personnel inspect our airplane. Given an all OK by them we taxied clear and continued to the ramp without incident.

MD10 Captain experienced engine fire warning so he declared an emergency and returned to departure airport.

1443304

201704

1801-2400

STC.Airport

MN

3000.0

Center ZMP

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 31

Initial Approach

Class E ZMP

Facility ZMP.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Situational Awareness

1443304

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Human Factors

I gave aircraft X an approach clearance to maintain at or above 3;500 feet until established at (SANLY) on the localizer ILS 31 Approach into STC. The pilot read it back; however descended to 3;000 feet which is 500 feet below the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA). I climbed the plane back up to 3;500 feet.Do pilots know the MIAs? Do their flight management systems know?

ZMP Center Controller reported an aircraft descended below its assigned altitude and went below the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA).

1290159

201508

0001-0600

SCT.TRACON

CA

3600.0

Night

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B LAX

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B LAX

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 22

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

1290159

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness

1290375.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Aircraft X was an arrival from the east who was sent around by the tower because of a departure from the same runway [RWY24L]. Aircraft X was vectored back to the downwind by the departure sector and contacted me abeam a VOR on a 070 heading at 5000. The pilot did not mention any concern about fuel. Several miles later Aircraft X asked for their sequence. I advised them that they were #5. I honestly was aggravated by the question because I had more important things to tend to do. Several miles later Aircraft X called but I had other priorities to take care of first. Aircraft X called a second time and again they were not my top priority since they had never advised me of any issue with fuel. We were restricted to 5 miles in-trail because of a runway closure and I had an aircraft to clear for approach; another to slow to make room for Aircraft X; a departure who was on a converging course with an arrival. Both of those aircraft needed to be advised of each other since they were on a converging course 1;000 feet apart.As I'm calling traffic to other aircraft; Aircraft X [advised ATC] on 121.5. When I finally acknowledged Aircraft X on my frequency [128.5] they said they were an urgent low fuel flight and had already turned final on their own. I stopped Aircraft X at 3600 and advised them of Aircraft Y traffic 1 mile ahead. I cancelled Aircraft Y's approach clearance and turned them away from Aircraft X. I then cleared Aircraft X for the approach. I did not have the time to get souls and fuel because I had other issues to attend too.If Aircraft X had at any time advised me that they had fuel concerns I could have worked out a different sequence. I'm not sure how an A321 makes 1 missed approach at their intended airport of landing and goes from 'whats my sequence?' to 'we are an [urgent low fuel flight] and we are turning final'. What ever happened to 'minimum fuel?'

Aircraft X arrival. Cleared in Runway 24L. Due to runway construction 5 miles in trail required between arrivals. Shipped to tower and told to make s-turns for heavy departing prior to arrival. Subsequently a go-around was required due to traffic on runway. Handed off to Arrival controller and vectored to downwind. Pilot asked what his sequence would be. Told number 5. Continued on downwind and then attempted to contact controller to advise of fuel shortage. Frequency congestion did not allow for immediate attention. Pilot then called Mayday on 121.5 and reset transponder to 7700. The airplane turned right base behind Aircraft Y ahead of him. Another aircraft was abeam for south complex. Both aircraft were vectored off and Aircraft X landed Runway 24L.

SCT Controller and Front Line Manager reported of an aircraft that went around due to traffic; then was being sequenced to same runway as another arrival. Pilot attempted to question and advise the controller but; due to congestion on frequency; was not able to get a word in. Pilot squawked emergency and turned in to final. Traffic in front and alongside aircraft had to be turned out.

987753

201201

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

Parked

Main Gear Door

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

987753

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

Human Factors

I received a phone call from the Chief Pilot regarding the discovery of worn gear door skid plates during preflight by a crewmember. Apparently; Maintenance had not done a thorough check of the aircraft after we had turned over the aircraft at the gate following the emergency landing. During the downwind leg following the low approach and go around after initial discovery of right main gear down indication light; I specifically requested from Tower that Maintenance be advised of our emergency status and requested Maintenance be standing by with gear pins for pinning the gear and a tug and tow bar in the event we would have to be towed from the runway. After turning final and no positive indication of right main gear down; the decision was made to use the emergency extension gear lever. We now were low on fuel and on short final for landing. We left the emergency gear handle in the extended position which meant the main gear doors would be open for landing and would drag the ground. Landing proved to be uneventful. ARFF took control of the situation after we came to a full stop and checked out the aircraft. I called Maintenance after not seeing or hearing any input from them. We then held our position on the runway for 20 minutes awaiting maintenance arrival. We left both engines running and the emergency extension gear handle in the up position (extended). After Maintenance arrival; cockpit to maintenance personnel communication was done via the Captain's window. The landing gear safety pins were passed from the cockpit to the ground via Captain's window. After all gear was pinned; Maintenance told the Captain to stow the emergency extension gear handle to retract the landing gear doors. I stowed the emergency extension gear handle upon the Captain's command. The aircraft was then taxied to the gate without incident. Maintenance specialist informed us the aircraft was out of service and they were taking possession as is. We were told the spare aircraft was awaiting us and I packed my bags for the gate change and was not involved with any further maintenance discussions or logbook entries.

MD83 First Officer describes his role in a landing with the gear doors open resulting in gear door skid plate abrasion that is not addressed by Maintenance prior to the next preflight.

1206731

201409

YSSY.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Autothrottle/Speed Control

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1206731

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Human Factors

While taking off in Sydney at 648;000 [pounds] I had briefed and loaded max thrust with NADP 1 for a thrust reduction at 1500 feet vs. 800 feet.Upon loading the take off data from the new ACARS 2 version I knew to check the NADP 1 as it defaults to NADP 2. I also changed the numbers to max weight as briefed. What I didn't realize is it defaults to a reduced take off by putting in a reduced thrust temperature.I realize I am to check this but all of our attention was diverted to burning fuel as we left the gate at 649.5. We were watching closely to make sure we could burn down to take off weight prior to reaching the runway.Upon applying take off thrust the Captain noticed it was reduced thrust and manually set thrust to our max take off N1 setting.This needs to be brought to the attention of the 777 crews; as none of us were aware that the new ACARS 2 version did this. I would venture the majority of the pilots are the same; as we received no training on this as is usual now at [our airline]. This lack of training on new systems and procedures is dangerous. There is always ambiguity in the cockpit on what system we have and how to use it.It's also bad business; as one accident/incident will negate any cost saved by not paying for proper training.No SOPs or FARs were intentionally violated.

A B777 First Officer addressed unanticipated and untrained for interaction between programming of NADP (Noise Abatement Departure Procedure) thrust settings and modifications to the ACARS software that caused a default to a reduced thrust takeoff setting when the intent was to utilize max thrust for a MTOGW takeoff.

1501968

201712

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Rudder Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1501968

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

1501961.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After takeoff on climb out aircraft seemed to be in a slight slip/ out of trim not too unusual for this fleet; I was hand flying with use of Flight Director in: EPR LIM; HDG SEL; ALT set for 15000; and IAS 250 knots. As we passed through 10;000 feet I inputted rudder trim [and] we heard/felt a pop as if something broke. The aircraft then began rolling left and right due to rudder yaw - it was as if we were in a Dutch roll scenario. I immediately slowed the ascent rate. We then requested a return to [departure airport]. Notified ATC of our predicament; started a slow descent toward [departure airport]. All control inputs after this point were small; smooth and measured in an attempt to gather information as to what we may anticipate the aircraft state may be in the future as we prepared for approach and landing. When aircraft was slowed and configured for approach and landing the aircraft flight controls seemed to become more effective. A visual approach and landing was completed in normal fashion. Weather was VFR; winds at 210/13kts.

At approximately 10;000 feet and 250kts; the Captain began trimming the rudder while hand flying. It immediately felt like something broke in the flight controls and the aircraft began to shake; roll and yaw fairly violently. We then got a Yaw Damper and Mach Trim caution light. We landed without incident with Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) on standby. ARFF checked the exterior of the aircraft and cleared us to taxi to the gate. Upon reaching the gate; we found Circuit breaker C18; DFGC (Digital Flight Guidance Computer) System popped.

MD-80 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing a rudder flight control anomaly.

1194639

201408

1201-1800

N85.Airport

NJ

4000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

5000

CTAF N85

Personal

Sail Plane

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

None

Class E ZNY

CTAF N85

Corporate

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

Skydiving

Descent

Class E ZNY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Glider

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 1412; Flight Crew Type 168

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1194639

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 400; Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

Airspace Structure

I was flying a high-performance single-seat sailplane on a local soaring flight. At the time of the incident I was heading in the general direction of N85; looking for lift under some scattered cumulus clouds with bases around 5;000 MSL. I was monitoring 123.3; which is used by cross-country soaring pilots for informal communications about conditions; etc.; and was not on the CTAF for N85. I noticed a line of open parachutes about 1 mile ahead of me; at and slightly below my altitude. There was no collision hazard at this point. I circled to try to work some lift and heard engine noise. A powered aircraft that was obviously the jump plane appeared from behind and circled outside of me until his higher speed took him away (in effect flying across my nose). I stopped my turn and headed away from N85. After a short interval I again heard engine noise from behind; I maintained a straight course and the jump plane passed me on the right and again cut across my nose (from right to left) before heading away. The jump plane was a single-engine high-wing aircraft with the door removed; I am not sure of the type. I did not see the tail numbers. Presumably the pilot was trying to warn me of the parachutists and divert me away from the area; we were not in radio communication. I was heading toward the parachutists when I first saw them; but was not heading toward them at the time of either pass by the jump plane. The passes were uncomfortably close; and the second was completely unnecessary; I was already leaving the area. An uncharitable interpretation would be that this was an 'air rage' incident. I have flown in this general area about 4 times in the last 3 months; in good VMC; and this is the first time I have seen any parachuting activity even though there is a NOTAM for it that blocks out more or less the entire spring; summer and fall. In future I will monitor the CTAF for N85 when in this area.

A glider pilot near N85 saw parachutist 1 mile ahead and circled to gain altitude but was then approach very closely by the jump aircraft twice before exiting the area.

1235343

201501

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Marginal

Icing

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Physiological - Other

1235343

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Physiological - Other

1235353.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Procedure

On pre-flight we experienced smoke and fumes in the airplane. We evacuated the airplane along with telling the ground crew to get off the plane. It was determined it was caused by de-ice fluid. We were removed from the trip and went to a hospital to be checked out. De-ice fluid being sprayed into the #2 engine while the APU was running and providing air.

During preflight with APU running and packs on; aircraft rapidly filled with smoke accompanied by fire horn and cargo smoke alert. Emergency evacuation performed with load crew. Captain and First Officer suffered smoke inhalation and treated at the Hospital.Unknown to crew; Maintenance sprayed Type 1 deciding fluid into number 2 engine.

A MD-11 crew suffered smoke inhalation during preflight and required medical treatment after exposure to Type 1 deice fluid vapor which was sprayed into the number two engine while the APU was running.

1769994

202011

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 57; Flight Crew Type 25

Human-Machine Interface

1769994

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

This is my second solo cross country of the day. I went to ZZZ1; ZZZ2 and back to ZZZ. Landings in ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 were good. Final was stabilized and right as the wheels were going to touch to ground the airplane yawed to the right. There was an eight kt. cross wind and using the rudder pedals to straighten out. Ended up weaving left and right until ending up leaving the runway to the right in the grass. No taxi way lights were hit and the plane did not seem damaged.

PA-28 solo pilot reported loss of directional control on landing resulting in a runway excursion.

1252013

201504

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1252013

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were instructed to line up and wait after an MD-11 had received take off clearance. As my standard I started my clock for wake-turbulence separation as soon as the [departing MD-11] began to roll. After only 1 minute of the MD-11 rolling we were given our take off clearance with an initial heading (instead of the RNAV departure). I instructed the tower we still needed 30 sec for wake turbulence separation but that we were clear for takeoff. I omitted the heading portion as at the time I did not comprehend the change as my mind was thinking of why I was given a take off clearance behind a heavy after only 1 min. She replied roger. At approx. the 90 second mark after the 11 rolled we began our roll and I advised the tower. At 400 feet we hit Navigate (NAV) on the Flight Computer Plan (FCP) for our departure procedure. Before being switched to departure a different controller came on and chastised me for not telling them when we accepted the line up and wait that we would need more time on the runway than normal. I explained that there is a min separation for wake turbulence that should've been met. He quickly said that they have re-categorized wake turbulence separation-----it's on the ATIS. Upon switching to departure I inquired as to what instruction had been given to us--a heading or NAV departure. He said we should have been given a heading and cleared us to direct the next fix. [The] flight resumed [with] no further complications.The heading assignment was missed by us because it was not expected and I instantly switched thinking modes as we were given a take-off clearance before expected. So I blocked everything out after the early take-off clearance. Simply listening better could have avoided the mistake. However; I was not aware of any other or re-categorization of wake turbulence separation leading me to block out everything she said after the take-off clearance.

A CRJ-200 Crew were issued a takeoff clearance behind an MD-11 that included a change to runway heading instead of the briefed LNAV departure. The Captain was preoccupied with wake turbulence concerns and missed the runway heading instruction. At 400 feet; he engaged LNAV and the aircraft deviated from runway heading.

1701912

201911

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

10500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1701912

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

Upon departing ZZZ; our plane reached 10;500 feet and flight crew's ears automatically popped. Upon diagnosing what happened; we noticed the cabin altitude rise into a red warning of 10;000+ feet and cabin rate went to f dashed lines in orange color. We leveled off right away at 11;000 feet; assessed the problem; and communicated with ATC (Air Traffic Control) that we had a pressurization issue. ZZZ Departure took us down to 10;000 feet fairly quickly. Once we got to 10;000 feet; ATC turned us around and vectored us for a XXR landing. The issue was diagnosed carefully by both cockpit crew; and while the Captain PIC (Pilot In Command) started to problem solve; the SIC (Second In Command) flew the plane and communicated with ATC. The plane arrived back in ZZZ safe and sound with no injuries.

EMB-135LR flight crew reported a pressurization problem during climbout.

1129123

201311

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

PQ

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Unscheduled Maintenance

Emergency Brake System

Embraer

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1129123

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Ground Personnel

Other During Gate Arrival

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We pulled into the gate at ZZZ and set the Emergency Brake. I then turned off the 'fasten seat belt' sign and hydraulics. After that; I slid my seat back to pack up my things. A few seconds later I heard some yelling from the ground crew. At that point I realized that the plane was moving forward and reached for the emergency brake; but the emergency brake was already set. I then moved my seat forward and applied the foot brakes which then stopped the plane. The ground crew then had to push us back because the plane had moved too far forward of the gate. I then called Maintenance to let them know the emergency brake was not working. The emergency brake was not working correctly.

Reporter stated the emergency brake is the parking brake. They do not have a separate handle for emergency brake applications. The EMB-145 had full hydraulics on with engines running at the arrival gate; when he initially set the brakes by applying the foot pedals and pulling the parking brake handle. A similar incident occurred 3-4 years ago on the same type of aircraft; but that happened after pushback; when he set the brakes to start the engines. Suddenly they realized the aircraft was rolling forward and he had to reset the brakes. He was never informed as to the cause or maintenance fix for either incident. The emergency brake system on the EMB-145 uses accumulators and pilots have approximately six applications before depleting accumulator pressure. Both he and the Co-pilot are required to have an ATP rating.

Captain reports he heard yelling from the ground crew and realized their EMB-145 aircraft was rolling forward beyond the gate; even though the parking brake handle was pulled and set.

1243939

201503

0001-0600

SCT.TRACON

CA

3000.0

TRACON SCT

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class E SCT

Corporate

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Initial Climb

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness

1243939

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X was enroute from TOA..HHR about 5 miles south of HHR airport and level at 3000 feet when I took over the LAKR position from the previous controller. The previous controller had issued the aircraft a heading that would not have provided sufficient separation of 1.5 miles from the adjacent airspace to the east (Harbor sector) and so I initially issued a heading of 040 to maintain this airspace separation. This particular operation of putting HHR arrivals on the downwind to runway 25 requires very precise timing to both remain clear of Harbor sector's airspace as well as remain 3 miles south of the LAX final for runway 25L. There is only about 1/8 mile - 1/4 mile wide margin of error in which an aircraft being vectored for the downwind at HHR will remain clear of both.When Aircraft X was in the appropriate position I turned the aircraft from the 040 heading to a 070 heading for the downwind and issued a frequency change to the next sector (Downey). The pilot's hesitated and responded with multiple incorrect read backs; meanwhile tracking a heading of roughly 090 or 080. It appeared to me at the time that the track could have been erroneous radar returns as they looked a bit erratic or that the pilot was correcting to the appropriate assigned heading as I did reissue the heading of 070 multiple times because of the incorrect read backs. After the aircraft changed frequencies to the next controller; it was evident that the aircraft was still not heading 070 as instructed and therefore ended up not maintaining 1.5 miles lateral separation from Harbor sector's airspace. Around the time I was issuing the frequency change to Aircraft X; Aircraft Y; departed off runway 30 at LGB on the SENIC departure. This aircraft climbed out at a very high speed and ended up taking a wide turn to the south as a result (to me it appeared that Aircraft Y did not comply with the SID as he should have begun a southbound turnout of 1500 feet but did not). Because of the speed on departure this aircraft also did not remain at least 1.5 miles away from my airspace boundary and therefore I believe lost separation with Aircraft X. I am unaware if LGB tower or the Harbor sector controller were able to achieve visual separation between the two aircraft.I could have called LGB tower to stop departures. This was a consideration I had when I took over the position but considering Aircraft X was a small aircraft indicating 100 knots; if LGB did have any departures they would have had to wait for at least 5 minutes; possibly longer.I could have pointed Aircraft X out to Harbor sector before putting the aircraft of the downwind so that the Harbor controller would at least be aware of my traffic. If Harbor denied the point out; I would have had time to either spin my aircraft or Approval Requested (APREQ) something different with the Downey controller.As mentioned above; this handoff only has at most a 1/4 mile margin of error within which the handoff from Laker to Downey maintains 3 miles separation from the LAX final and 1.5 miles separation from the Harbor sector airspace boundary. If an aircraft either tracks a heading just 10 or 20 degrees off the handoff heading of 070 or has a crosswind that pushes an aircraft even a little to the north or south an airspace deviation or loss of separation can happen almost immediately. With the LGB departures initially climbing to 3000 feet and the Laker handoff altitude for HHR arrivals to Downey at 3000 feet; a loss of separation can occur very easily. I feel that changing the handoff altitude from Laker to Downey to 4000 feet would dramatically improve safety with regards to mitigating an event like the one I experienced from recurring.

A Southern California TRACON Controller reports of a loss of separation with an aircraft he was vectoring to an airport while another faster aircraft departed a different airport. The departing aircraft speed was too fast and the aircraft was wide in turning leading to the loss of separation.

1835632

202108

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1835632

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

I refused Aircraft X to fly to ZZZ due to a history of terrain faults. I also was not comfortable taking a basic aircraft that was not RNP qualified into an airport where the only approach to Runway XX is an RNAV/RNP approach. Added to that; neither I nor my FO (First Officer) had ever flown into ZZZ before. There is zero guidance given to pilots tasked to fly into ZZZ. No airport familiarization on company app. No special notes in the FOM under special qualification airports other than the 75 hr requirement. No guidance in the XX pages. No guidance in the company airport pages. History of terrain faults on this aircraft x. Basic aircraft when the only approach to Runway XX has to be RNP certified. This runway is used quite extensively. First time flying in as Captain. First time for FO to fly into ZZZ. Mountainous terrain and complex procedures listed on the company airport page.After flying my first flight into ZZZ; I recommend this city pair be designated one that requires a check airman for first flight into. I have flown into all of our domestic mountainous terrain airports and some international airports. There is usually some guidance in the airport familiarization pages or the FOM or the airport pages. ZZZ company page states 'this airport is designated as special (14 CFR Part 121.445) due to mountainous terrain and complex procedures'. Mountainous terrain and complex procedures is an alert to me that there should be some kind of verbiage in the airport pages for safe conduct into this airport; along with ZZZ being included in the airport familiarization section on company app. I also recommend that this airport always have a destination alternate and takeoff alternate on the flight plan release.

captain reported refusing the aircraft because it was not equipped to fly to the destination airport.

1828001

202107

1801-2400

COL.VOR

NJ

138.0

8.0

2000.0

VMC

10

Night

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

VFR Route

Class B N90

UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Class B N90

Multi-Rotor

Aircraft / UAS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4.2; Flight Crew Total 163.1; Flight Crew Type 163.1

Time Pressure

1828001

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Horizontal 30; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

While performing a night flight operation as the sole occupant and PIC; I was en route to the New York Skyline Route via Direct the Verrazano Bridge. I was receiving flight following at the time from New York Approach. I was cruising at 2;000 feet VFR. At XA:44 EDT I spotted a White Drone that came into alignment and coverage with my left-wing landing light about 20-30 feet away. The drone had 4 props. My spotting and reaction time was within 2 seconds and I performed an evasion maneuver with a quick bank to the right and turned about 10 degrees with a bank angle of about 20-30 degrees. The drone barely missed my left-wing. I immediately then radioed New York Approach and reported the near-miss of the drone. The controller asked for a description; altitude; and if I had to perform an evasive maneuver.There was nothing I would have done differently in this case; however; it does once again bring around the constant issue of drones in the NAS. I believe that drones need to be programmed to not be able to exceed a specific altitude at any time without an FAA waiver. I know some manufacturers already have these restrictions in place but there is no valid reason a drone should be at 2;000 feet AGL along the New Jersey Shoreline area during the night (or day).

General aviation fixed wing pilot had a near miss with a UAS.

1691423

201910

0001-0600

ZSPD.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

3.0

IFR

Taxi

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 40

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1691423

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 50

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1691425.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Before we pushed back for start; the crew attempted to establish contact with multiple ground and apron frequencies and eventually Apron West responded. We believed we were cleared to push back and start and did so. Shortly afterwards a 'follow me' wagon arrived and we indeed followed the wagon to the holding point. On arrival at that position ATC then 'accused' us of not having had approval for push back and start. We informed them that we had been given clearance and were then told to contact Tower to confirm our departure clearance. This was completed and we eventually taxied. During the taxi out we were then told that we should have contacted Clearance Delivery for our clearance. We had used the DL (Departure Clearance Services) and received and had our clearance accepted. We were confused by the inference from ATC that we had not operated in accordance with known procedures especially at a time of night when there was minimal traffic. ATIS stated that we should accept our clearance via DL and also there was no information regarding frequencies which were not monitored during the quiet periods.

[Second narrative contained no further information.]

B767 flight crew reported receiving data link clearance and started pushback and was told they needed to confirm clearance with Delivery.

1645655

201905

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

29000.0

IMC

Turbulence

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1645655

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Weather

Weather

While in flight to ZZZ we experienced an updraft at FL290 that caused the airplane to climb at 4-6000 feet per minute. We both had our weather radar operating at the time and neither of us were picking up precipitation echoes on it; although we were IMC. The Captain took control; disconnecting the autopilot and auto-throttles; and leveled the plane as the updraft has cause up to roll slightly to the right. Once leveled we noticed that the pitch limit was coming down. He applied max thrust and lowered the pitch slightly. At no time did the speed exceed operational limits; nor did we receive a wind shear warning. We were unable to maintain our altitude however; and were forced to climb which I promptly alerted ATC as soon as I was able that we were in a climb and would try and stop at FL310. ATC then cleared us to FL330.

EMB 175 Captain reported an updraft causing the aircraft to climb.

1782995

202101

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

5000.0

IMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Window Ice/Rain System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1782995

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Diverted

Weather; Aircraft; Company Policy

Aircraft

We took off from ZZZ into what I knew would be consistent icing to our destination. From my pre-flight weather brief I knew the icing was at all altitudes. After departing ZZZ we actually got into the clear at about 5;000 feet with very little ice. About 15 minutes into the flight we again entered the clouds and started picking up light to moderate ice. My windshield began picking it up; so I went to turn on the electric windshield. When I did the switch broke off in my hand and the electric windshield was stuck in the off position. I decided to turn around immediately because I knew that it was clear behind me at 8;000 feet. I knew everywhere around me was overcast with an icing layer below me; so I decided to return to ZZZ. I notified ATC because I knew I was going to have to descend through ice and may get some on the windshield. I wanted to spend as little time in it as possible. We landed in ZZZ with no further incident. We only picked up a small amount of ice; but I was able to see just fine to land. The plastic switch broke; and I could not get the windshield heat on.

Cessna Twin Piston aircraft pilot reported the windshield anti-ice system was inoperative in icing conditions.

1728970

202002

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1400.0

VMC

Clear

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

FBO

Scout 8GCBC

Part 91

None

Other Glider Tow

Initial Climb

None

Class E ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Small Aircraft

Part 91

Landing

None

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 2760; Flight Crew Type 223

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1728970

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 200; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Airport; Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Near miss occurred in the traffic pattern. Reporting aircraft was a Bellanca Scout towing a glider. Near miss occurred while towing aircraft was on crosswind departure. Another aircraft was entering downwind leg for landing. Towing aircraft was at approximately 1400 feet. Another aircraft passed approximately 200 feet below my aircraft and 100 feet ahead. No evasive maneuver was attempted by me since I was towing a glider. The other aircraft probably took no evasive action but announced on CTAF 'Ive got the glider' as he passed below me. ZZZ is an uncontrolled field with no control tower. The weather was excellent and so there were a lot of take-offs and landing occurring. I was towing a glider which is a source of pilot distraction. The other aircraft appeared to make a non-standard approach. It did not enter the traffic pattern on a 45 degree angle. It made a direct entry.

A pilot towing a glider at a non towered airport reported a NMAC with traffic entering the pattern.

1668087

201907

1801-2400

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

31000.0

VMC

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Hydraulic System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1668087

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

In cruise at FL310 with Autopilot 2 engaged; I noticed a flashing HYD 2 level one alert. We had a level 1 HYD 2 off. The system QTY was 2.7. The Captain gave me the aircraft and radios while we reviewed the HYD off and fail checklists. The Captain made a SATCOM call to [Dispatch/Maintenance Control] and they concurred that we were okay to continue to destination. Over the next 3 hours; the QTY decreased to 0. At top of descent; the Captain took over as Pilot Flying. We configured early and landed in ZZZZ without any issues. The Hydraulic System developed a leak and shut down at 2.5. Over the next 4 hours it slowly decreased to 0 and a system fail annunciated.

MD-11 pilot reported slowly decreasing hydraulic fluid in the Number 2 system; ultimately decreasing to zero; which resulted in a precautionary landing at the destination airport.

1297435

201509

0601-1200

TPA.Airport

FL

VMC

Daylight

Tower TPA

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Class B TPA

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Class B TPA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Distraction

1297435

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Departing TPA Runway 01L. Possible drone sighting 200 feet in altitude off the departure end of runway about on-fourth to one-half left of centerline. Reported to ATC. Flight continued normally.

After takeoff an Air Carrier Captain reported a possible UAS at 200 feet; approximately one third of a mile to the left of TPA Runway 1L centerline.

1470176

201707

0601-1200

SFO.Airport

CA

0.0

Mixed

Dawn

1100

Ground SFO

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1470176

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Airport

Ambiguous

I noticed that SFO had installed new taxi lights that were sticking up about 25 inches; and were not lit just after sunrise and overcast conditions. These are new and not mentioned anywhere; and prevent Crews now from taking shortcuts from Taxiway Hotel or Alpha onto the ramp. Obviously they are placed to make us use the taxi line but are not very visible and could easily be missed and run over. Maybe a note on the SFO page could make crews aware of the new situation.

Air carrier Captain reported that the 'islands' adjacent to Taxiway A at SFO have new tall taxiway lights that prevent crews from taking short cuts into the ramp and should be noted in the crew briefing page.

1748455

202006

No Aircraft

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Other Baggage Handler

Situational Awareness

1748455

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Due to this pandemic I'm concerned about me and my fellow co-workers safety due to the fact that we are handling these bags on a daily basis. I understand that it might take time; but our safety comes first cause we all do have families to go back home too. What I like to see is that they spray and wipe down everything including straps.

Ground employee reported concerns with touching bags on a daily basis and would like the bags to be sprayed to prevent infection.

1200200

201408

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Personal

Piper Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Landing Gear

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 1300

1200200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

Landing gear collapse on landing. No injuries to any property or any persons.

An Aztec suffered a collapsed landing gear on landing.

1047260

201211

1801-2400

ZTL.ARTCC

GA

12000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZTL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR HONIE RNAV

Class E ZTL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1047260

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Weather; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

Ambiguous

On descent into ATL we were assigned and maintaining a speed of 310 KIAS. We were then cleared to cross HONIE at [the charted] 12;000 and 250 KTS. [This would require a] 2.9 degree descent rate according to the aircraft instruments. I proceeded to descend to meet the crossing restriction. I also started to slow the aircraft to the 250 KT restrictions. At somewhere less than 15 miles from HONIE we were asked by ATC what our airspeed was. We told them 270 KTS; told them we were slowing to meet the restriction and that we had strong tail winds. They asked if we were assigned 310 and I told them we were but had started the speed reduction early to allow for the heavy tail winds and meet the crossing speed. I increased the speed as much as I thought I could yet keep it slow enough to be sure to make the crossing restrictions. We were then handed to another frequency and flight continued as normal. [I was concerned about] tail winds in excess of 90 KTS; which made planning speed reductions more difficult and we slowed earlier than may have been necessary to make sure not to miss a crossing restriction.To avoid this in the future we could have possibly slowed a little later in the descent or told ATC we were slowing. ATC could help by providing a little more spacing of the aircraft when there are strong tail winds; or we could have been cleared to keep our speed at 310 until told to slow to 250. That way ATC would have known when we were going to slow to meet the restriction.

A CRJ-200 flight crew cleared via the HONIE RNAV STAR to ATL was assigned a speed of 310 KTS but to cross HONIE at 12;000 and 250 KTS as charted. Strong tailwinds caused the pilot flying to begin his speed reduction earlier than anticipated by ATC and separation issues ensued.

1244092

201503

0001-0600

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

VMC

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Pressurization Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Physiological - Other; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1244092

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

I was the Relief Pilot on this trip. While the Captain was on his break; we got a CABIN Automatic (AUTO) Inoperative (INOP) light followed by AUTO INOP light. We followed the procedures laid out in the 767 QRH on page 2.9 titled CABIN AUTOMATIC INOPERATIVE; and as directed; began controlling the pressurization using the CABIN ALTITUDE MANUAL control. We determined that BOTH 1 and 2 were inoperative. We woke the Captain up. The manual pressurization became difficult to properly maintain; and started getting away from us. Both our Flight Attendants and passengers began complaining about ear discomfort from pressurization; and I felt discomfort as well. With about 4 1/2 hours left of flying to get to our destination (MIA); we decided that the best course of action was to divert to our nearest suitable alternate with maintenance capability. On my post flight walk around; I discovered a massive water leak from the water drain near the tail of the aircraft. This was a continuous steady leak of ice cold water that continued right up until well AFTER we left the aircraft when our flight attendants became no longer legal to fly. This was at least 3 hours of continuous steady flow. Maintenance discovered that the leak originated from the aft galley coffee maker; and determined that BOTH AUTO CABIN controllers had been frozen to the point that they became inoperative. Pictures were shown to me (taken by maintenance) of large chunks of ice found in the aft sections of the aircraft as they attempted to trouble shoot the problem and find the water leak. [The flight] was continued later that day after our crew was rested and the flight attendants were once again legal to fly. We took off at XA:30 PM and landed in MIA at XE:48PM without any further issues with our Auto Cabin Controllers nor any further problems with water leaks. It was flown with the leak isolated with the aft galley water system turned off.

A B767 flight crew while enroute experienced a cabin automatic pressurization failure of systems 1 and 2. The standby pressurization system was difficult to control and they elected to divert and landed. Post flight revealed that a water leak had frozen both auto cabin pressurization controllers.

1871809

202201

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 181; Flight Crew Type 11500

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1871809

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1871793.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors

Received NOTAC forms to carry fire extinguishers in cargo. We realized at cruise that it was not noted on the Dispatch Release. We notified Dispatch via ACARS and amended the Release. Rest of flight [was] uneventful.

At cruise; we noticed that we were without a remark from Dispatch on the Release regarding HAZMAT to accompany our NOTAC paperwork. We ACARSed Dispatch for the amendment and continued to destination without incident.

Air Carrier flight crew reported gate departure with flight release missing 'Hazmat Onboard' notation. Flight crew contacted Dispatched and received amended release via ACARS. Remainder of flight continued without incident.

1363819

201605

0001-0600

TOL.TRACON

OH

2400.0

Tower TOL

Corporate

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Initial Climb

None

Class C TOL

TRACON TOL

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

IFR

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C TOL

Facility TOL.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1363819

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Aircraft X was doing IFR practice approaches to Runway 25. Aircraft Y wanted an IFR Visual Approach to Runway 7. Per the local procedure; Aircraft Y needed to be 7 NM from Runway 7 until Aircraft X was airborne and issued a turn away from the incoming traffic. Aircraft Y was 7NM from the Runway 7 threshold when Aircraft X was over the threshold. I didn't limit the tower to a low approach; and I didn't have any way to know when Aircraft X was airborne because it had dropped off radar at the threshold (the radar site is right next to the runway about 1/3rd way down Runway 25; so there is typically no radar coverage from the Runway 25 threshold to 2/3 the way down the runway). Aircraft Y was 5 NM from Runway 7 when Aircraft X showed up at the departure end of Runway 25 turning to heading 300. The 'airborne' requirement for opposite direction procedures is tricky for tower controllers to predict and not always obvious to the radar controller when an aircraft is airborne (which is the point the radar controller can allow the other aircraft past the cutoff point). I think it makes sense to add a mile to the cutoff points and changing the qualifier to the aircraft rolling. That way; when the radar controller receives the rolling call; they know it is okay to let the inbound aircraft past the cutoff point.

TOL TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation related to an opposite direction operation. The arrival and departure were not within the tolerance limits.

1678957

201908

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

21000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

PC-12

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class B ZZZ

Electrical/Electronic Panel & Parts

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

1678957

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 97; Flight Crew Total 2015; Flight Crew Type 798

1679053.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

At 21;000 ft. during normal cruise we had DU1 & DU2 flashing red X's with associated check DU Cautions. Once the caution was pressed; the system reset; but failed again; it cycled this way several times. The First Officer was assigned to fly while the Captain referenced the QRH. The First Officer coordinated a descent and diversion to ZZZ as directed by the Captain. While running the QRH procedure; the Captain noticed the system status message that indicated there was an AGM1 failure. The Captain referenced the Check DU1 with AGM1 message and selected AGM2 for DU1. The crew requested assistance ATC in the form of vectors for the visual approach to Runway 1 at ZZZ. The Captain took the controls after regaining video on DU1 and then flew the visual approach to landing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight crew reported multiple display unit failures; requiring a diversion.

1601329

201812

0601-1200

PDK.Airport

GA

1500.0

Marginal

Rain; Fog; 2

600

Tower PDK

Corporate

Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Other RNAV 21L

Class D PDK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 23600; Flight Crew Type 900

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1601329

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1601332.0

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Human Factors

RNAV 21L approach PDK airport. The flight crew made a mistake interpreting the approach plate. There was a visual step down point and we descended early to MDA 1;500 feet. A note on the plan view we missed briefing on. (LNAV only note Number 2 fix SEDOY was a visual descent point on the chart required 1;780 to cross for LNAV ONLY). The MDA LNAV for this approach was 1;500 feet MSL. We did have ground contact before MDA. PDK tower advised altitude alert which alerted the crew. A better review of approach plate on iPad will helpful.

The flight crew misinterpreted the approach plate and made a descent to the MDA too early during the RNAV Y 21L Approach into PDK. There was a visual descent point at which descent to the MDA would have been allowed; but this was overlooked and the flight crew descended the aircraft to the MDA of 1;500 feet MSL prior to this point. The flight crew had established visual ground contact prior to reaching MDA and prior to the visual descent point. PDK Tower gave us an altitude alert which alerted us to the issue and reason for further review upon landing.

Citation flight crew reported descending early on RNAV approach and receiving a low altitude alert from ATC.

1018616

201206

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

13000.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 10

Daylight

50000

Center ZZZ

Personal

Chancellor 414A / C414

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Descent

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 900

1018616

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Ambiguous

A TFR was in effect over the foothills north west of the field. I was using in-plane Garmin 696 hardware receiving XM satellite updates displaying the graphical depiction of the TFR over a forest fire. I had departed for a one hour VFR flight and was curious if I could see my father-in-laws house which was near the fire. The XM satellite info depicted 12;000 MSL to surface TFR as well as a graphical area hashed in red. I flew over the TFR at 17;500 and circled down to 13;000 near the south eastern corner of the TFR. I was careful to not go below 13;000 in the hashed area I was displaying on the G696 navigator. We descended below 13;000 only after exiting the TFR displayed and landed. I was told to call Center by the attendant at the FBO. He informed me Center had increased the TFR to 13;000 MSL to surface and the area had increased. Those changes had occurred sometime that morning; he did not specify. I explained the XM satellite information had not updated or did not show the changes during my flight over the TFR; and if they had I would not have inadvertently entered the corner at 13;000 MSL. He explained no harm was done but to be aware that the area had increased in size and altitude for my departure. Upon departure the next day the G696 was showing the TFR larger and at FL180 to surface. He explained he was trying to make sure Center was getting info out to all areas of notification; and he wasn't sure why XM was not updated in a timely manner. Next time I will call the local Center and verify the TFR parameters before flying over it or near it. XM information is not always immediate as I had been led to believe.

C414 pilot reports inadvertently entering a fire fighting TFR when his G696 with XM does not depict an increase in the dimensions of the airspace that occurs after takeoff.

1669653

201907

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

36400.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Citation Excel (C560XL)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Pitot-Static System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1669653

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Weather

Ambiguous

At FL370; we were about 20 minutes from ZZZ; we noticed we had a mis-compare between the ADC 1 and 2 readout. We notified ATC about the problem and requested a descent to find warmer air suspecting we had freezing moisture in our static lines. We worked with ATC the whole way into ZZZ advising them of our misleading altitudes and speeds. We crossed traffic and received a traffic advisory but not an RA. ATC did not mention any issues. We landed and had mx look at the static system. The problem was a large amount of moisture in the static lines. We are working with maintenance to find a static port cover for the plane. We've also mentioned to the plane owner that we could start hangaring the plane to reduce this chances of this problem again.

A Cessna Citation Excel Captain reported an anomaly with the pitot static system; suspected to be due to icing; which affected the air data computers.

1743200

202005

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Landing; Taxi

Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 46; Flight Crew Total 9140; Flight Crew Type 3035

Situational Awareness

1743200

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 1158; Flight Crew Type 1158

Distraction

1743209.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Aircraft

Had a BRAKES auto brake fault ECAM on landing. Taxi to gate was normal. Autoparked Gate X. Set parking brake and realized immediately that the aircraft was slowly moving. Applied normal brakes to stop aircraft. Reapplied parking brake. Ground crew gave us the chalks in signal. It pains me to write this because I am a brake pressure fanatic; but since this was my first trip in over 2 months; my scan was rusty; and I didn't verify the brake pressure; and this happens. Pressure was definitely normal with the second parking brake attempt. Sent report and called maintenance.

During the short taxi in from Runway XX in ZZZ to Gate X (less than 3 minutes) we parked the aircraft with both engines running since we were still within the 3 minutes cool down period. As the Captain set the brake; and before he can verbalize 'Brake Set' the aircraft began to move forward. The Captain immediately stepped on the pedal brakes and stopped the aircraft. Prior to landing we received a ECAM message 'AUTO BRAKE FAULT' which went away after a few seconds. After landing we had normal braking and steering. At the time we didn't think anything of it; but after we reset the brake after the movement at the gate we thought they might be connected. We reported it and called maintenance.

Air carrier flight crew reported a brake issue on landing and re-occurring at the gate. Captain stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.

1029571

201208

0601-1200

ACK.Airport

MA

1000.0

2000

Center ZBW

Air Taxi

Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner

1.0

Part 135

VFR

Descent

Class E ZBW

Center ZBW

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

IFR

Final Approach

Class E ZBW

Facility ZBW.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1029571

Conflict NMAC

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Weather; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We still owned Cape Approach's airspace; and were giving multiple departure and approach clearances; as well as holding aircraft and working a few overflights. The weather was approximately OVC020 at ACK; and all over the Cape Cod area. The normal air-to-air frequencies are used as Clearance Delivery frequencies; as well as air-to-air frequencies when Cape Approach and the airport Towers are closed. We had airplanes calling on the frequency requesting departure clearances every couple of minutes; and they were starting to get testy that we were making them wait; as we have a one-in-one-out rule. A C402 checked in; at first we thought he was on the ground looking for a clearance; and then we realized he was in the air; but thought he was looking for an IFR clearance; and then eventually he made it clear he wanted VFR advisories to ACK; but he was already in the descent to the airport. The RADAR Controller gave him a beacon code and RADAR identified him; but did not tell him about the other aircraft that was inbound on the ILS; approximately 2-3 miles away; also descending into ACK. I prodded the RADAR Controller a couple of times; and he finally called the traffic to one of the aircraft; I can't remember which; but not to the other; and was fairly vague about what the plane was doing. He is normally very thorough; so I can only guess that it was the complexity of the traffic situation with all the departures trying to get clearances and giving others holding instructions that diverted his attention from calling the traffic alert. I was lax in not being forceful enough about his making sure they were both aware of the other traffic. After the data blocks separated; the IFR called up to cancel his flight plan; and asked if we were talking to a VFR airplane in the vicinity. The RADAR Controller responded in the affirmative; and the pilot said; 'He almost hit us;' and that the other airplane was flying around in the clouds. The RADAR Controller apologized and continued working the rest of the airplanes without incident. He tried to reach the VFR aircraft; but was unsuccessful. When Cape Approach called to open; I told them there was a VFR; and the call sign that we never got a hold of; and were not sure if he landed; and the Approach Controller said he would inform the Tower when they opened. The situation was made complex due to the sheer number of aircraft looking for departure/approach clearances and not understanding why they were being told they had to wait. If there was a separate Clearance Delivery frequency from the normal air-to-air frequency; I could have been talking to the planes on the ground while the RADAR Controller was working the planes in the air. This is only an issue once or twice a week; in the summertime; but it could have potentially life-threatening consequences.

ZBW Controller described a conflict event between a VFR and an IFR inbound to ACK. The situation was complicated by a number of aircraft requesting IFR clearances.

995675

201202

1801-2400

LGA.Airport

NY

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower LGA

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

995675

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Airport; Human Factors

Ambiguous

LGA [was] landing Runway 31; departing 4. [We were] holding at B4 hold point on Taxiway B at LGA. An Air Carrier was ahead of us. As soon as the aircraft ahead of us was cleared for takeoff; we were cleared to line up and wait. First Officer acknowledged and I started to taxi into position. There was almost constant talk on the Tower frequency; including instructions for an aircraft to square their base and a reroute for someone. Before we got into position; the Tower Controller told us that we were told to hold position. First Officer told him we never heard the clearance. Controller said he told us four times; an obvious exaggeration; as it had only been about 15 seconds since we were cleared onto the runway. We never heard a 'hold position' clearance and of course never read anything back. We were still on B; but completely across the B4 hold line. Controller then told us to continue to line up and almost immediately cleared us for takeoff. There was no traffic conflict as there were no arrivals to our runway. Tower controllers at LGA try to move a lot of traffic at a small airport. Sometimes they talk almost non-stop; and very rapidly; which was the case in this instance. In the 15 seconds or so that this event took; he cleared an aircraft to takeoff; cleared us to line up and wait; told an airplane on the Expressway Visual to square his base (which from prior experience we knew meant he was going to get us right out); tell another aircraft something about a reroute; and then cleared us for takeoff. He may have thought he told us to hold; but either didn't; or was blocked; or we didn't hear it. Communication only happens when information is sent and received. We never received the message. This controller's workload was very high; as he was trying to do about four different things at once. With more traffic; more different company call signs; some of which don't 'roll off the tongue'; and 4 digit flight numbers; the tendency for controllers and pilots alike is to talk faster; slur words; abbreviate clearances; read backs and call signs; and generally rush to cope with high workloads. Saying something once clearly is much more efficient than repeating it several times quickly.

A319 Captain reports being instructed to line up and wait on Runway 4 at LGA; then almost immediately informed that he was instructed to hold short. Aircraft were landing on Runway 31 so no conflict existed and the reporter is cleared for takeoff.

1010742

201205

1801-2400

U90

AZ

5000.0

VMC

TRACON U90

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach; Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C TUS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 318

Situational Awareness

1010742

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Airport; Procedure

Human Factors

We were cleared off the STAR to CALLS and cleared the visual approach; following a runway change from 29R to 11L. Initially high on the path; we were correcting in VNAV; and rolled the FAF altitude into the MCP when cleared the visual approach. Descent rate was high and correcting; and as we approached 5;000 FT; it was evident terrain would be a factor; and the Captain directed me to climb; as we got the Terrain Caution and visual symbol on the Map display. Approach also alerted us we were below MVA for the area as we were climbing. Once clear of the terrain; we descended to 5;000 FT MSL and completed the visual approach without incident. When faced with a time-sensitive change to the briefed approach; ensure fully re-briefing the new game plan; not just loading the correct data into the FMC. Most importantly here is verbalize the terrain issue and step-down altitudes because they were not in the LEGS page due to being cleared direct the FAF; preventing a safe VNAV descent path.

B737-700 First Officer reports descending below MVA during a night visual approach to Runway 11L at TUS after a last minute runway change from Runway 29R. The reporter was attempting to descend to the FAF altitude prior to reaching CALLS. The crew; ATC; and the EGPWS all became concerned at the same time and corrective action was taken.

1239664

201502

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

Icing; Snow; 0.75

Dawn

200

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 179; Flight Crew Type 8600

Situational Awareness

1239664

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 194

Situational Awareness

1240083.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Upon pushback at ZZZ; ATIS A reported 3/4 mile visibility with light snow. This concurred with our snowfall intensity based upon visibility chart and our aircraft was deiced using 100% DOW UCAR AD-40 with a holdover time between 1+00 to 1+30 minutes. Upon completion of deicing; ATIS E reported 1/4 mile and heavy snow and an RVR of 2400 touchdown and 2600 rollout. The snowfall intensity based upon visibility chart does not have a holdover time for heavy snow in this case but it does contain an RVR component; which indicated that an RVR of 2400 equated to light snow.As we approached the end of Runway 01; the Tower reported RVR of 4000; but ATIS G reported 1/4 mile visibility and heavy snow. Since the RVR is a reported measurement and the Tower visibility is subjective after discussion amongst ourselves we completed the cockpit inspection of the wings; finished our checklist; and departed without incident. I did not complete the cabin wing inspection required in the AOM for heavy snow because I felt the reported RVR was a more accurate MEASUREMENT of visibility and reflected what I was seeing out my window.Recommendation: Determine and delineate which of these two sources takes precedence when determining snowfall intensity based upon visibility for the calculation of holdover times and required cabin/cockpit wing inspection.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

B737-700 flight crew expressed concern they may not have complied with policy when they departed in snowy conditions without conducting a wing check from the cabin.

1014191

201206

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2.0

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Taxi

Caravan Undifferentiated

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Climb

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 12800; Flight Crew Type 600

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

1014191

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

The aircraft's airworthiness status was verified with no open discrepancies so I accepted the aircraft for flight. On climb-out I discovered the status (white) message 'ETM EXCEED'. I referenced the checklist which required a maintenance inspection prior to the next flight. At this time I wasn't sure why the message appeared since I had not observed any exceedance during the start; taxi; takeoff; and climb. The Garmin G1000 integrated flight deck is new to this company. All of our other aircraft of the same type are legacy configured flight decks without this level of electronic messaging capability. I am one of a few pilots at our company checked out in this G1000 aircraft; and like the others who are also checked out; I am discovering things. On return; I notified Maintenance of the status message and the Technician attempted to download the data; but was unable due to a dead battery in the notebook computer. I was feeling the pressure (self inflicted) of the flight schedule; and knowing/feeling the lower level of concern that a Status message carries compared to the higher level caution (yellow) message 'ETM EXCEED'; I made the decision to depart on the next round trip flight. On return; the Maintenance Technician successfully downloaded the data and it was discover that the aircraft had experienced an over-torque the day before when flown by another pilot. Based on the data; a maintenance technician inspected the engine in accordance with the Engine Maintenance Manual and found it airworthy. The exceedance was at the very bottom of the envelope based on the slight excessive torque setting and short duration. In hind sight it is easy to see what I did wrong. On my first flight; I should have returned to the airport and had the aircraft inspected based on the ETM EXCEED message. Something was wrong and for me to assume it was minor or a non-issue was wrong. In discussing this with the other pilot who had flown the aircraft when the torque exceedance occurred I found that he had known that he had experience an over torque. This should have been taken care of at that time. We are learning that flying an aircraft with this level of electronic sophistication requires increased and different levels of awareness and action. In all our other legacy aircraft of this type we will never know about exceedances unless the pilots are reporting them. At this company we are fortunate that the culture is open to the discussion of errors without blame and we are continually discussing issues and focusing on correction and adaptation.

C208 pilot reports discovering a Status message (G1000 equipped) for ETM EXCEED during climbout and elects to inform Maintenance upon return. Maintenance is unable to download the fault information and another round trip is flown while the notebook battery charges. Upon return it is discovered that the Status message indicates an over torque the day prior requiring an engine inspection.

1832831

202108

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Electrical Power

X

Malfunctioning

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

1832831

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

Had electrical issues on climbout of ZZZ. Diverted to ZZZ1 and advised ATC.

Dispatcher reported a B767-300 aircraft had electrical issues during departure climb and diverted.

1583448

201810

1801-2400

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

IMC

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

Oceanic

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Distraction

1583448

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Oceanic; Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction

1583649.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft

In preparation for upcoming scheduled crew change at XA:31 the First Officer (FO) requested a wind update at approximately XA:18. At XA:21 we called FB/FC with ten minute wake-up call. A few minutes later wind load appeared on the FMC. The FO confirmed; loaded and executed the winds. We were approximately 170 miles east of ZZZZZ and 370 miles west of [coordinate X]. After loading and executing the winds the aircraft initiated an immediate right turn eventually rolling up to approximately 20 degrees of bank. I immediately selected heading select to initiate a left turn back on course. The aircraft deviated approximately one-half mile right of the Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure (SLOP) offset. I noticed a magenta dashed line on the ND extending off our next (supposed to be current active) waypoint. The extension of the magenta dashed line off of [coordinate X] was to the left at about a 260 degree radial from [coordinate X]. The ND also showed two additional dashed blue lines extending forward from our aircraft position (pictures taken of ND). The FMC Legs page now displayed [coordinate Y] as our current active waypoint; not [coordinate X] which was the next point in front of our position and where we were navigating to prior to loading the winds. The POS Report page of the FMC displayed POS as [coordinate X] and an ATA of XA:22 and an EST for [coordinate X] of an ETA of XB:06. Our correct ETA for [coordinate X] was XB:06. We activated RTE 2 Legs since our current active waypoint; [coordinate X]; had disappeared from the RTE 1 Legs page. At this point the FB/FC returned to the flight deck. Shortly thereafter we received an ATC message asking that we 'CHK FMS and Correct Active Waypoint'. The FO; FB; FC and I all verified our course was now correct and we re-intercepted LNAV course to [coordinate X]. Shortly thereafter we saw weather ahead and requested deviation around weather. The weather deviation was approved. We briefed the FB and FC on what occurred and they continued deviation around weather and the FO and I went on break. Later in the flight after the completion of the oceanic crossing we updated winds again with no issues. At no time during the loss of LNAV and our current active waypoint did we deviate more than one-half mile off course. After we were established back on course to [coordinate X] and it once again became our active waypoint we received no other requests from ATC.

I was FB on rest break when event happened. The FC and I returned to the flight deck just after event occurred. Captain briefed us on the event. We were on a random oceanic route in ZZZZ FIR. The First officer (FO) requested new wind data to update the FMC. After loading the uplinked winds the aircraft began an uncommanded right turn off track. The current active waypoint [coordinate X] was replaced by the next waypoint on our route; [coordinate Y]. Captain intervened with heading select and worked to re-intercept the proper course by updating and activating route 2. He made sure we all agreed that the aircraft was back on the cleared route and the waypoints verified before completing the crew change briefing and leaving the flight deck for his rest break. It appeared that we were less than .5 mile right of track before returning to course. We experienced no further issues after that. This is a known anomaly that was supposedly fixed by [the manufacturer]. However it was different from previous events of this type in that we were not near any route waypoints when it happened. We were 100+ miles from our last waypoint and 300+ miles to the active waypoint. Suggestions: a renewed awareness by pilots and a positive fix by [manufacturer].

Air Carrier Captain reported shortly after updating winds aloft the FMS commanded a turn off course. The First Officer reported this was a known anomaly issued from the aircraft manufacture.

1050212

201211

1201-1800

PCT.TRACON

VA

5000.0

TRACON PCT

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

IFR

Cruise

TRACON PCT

M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 137

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Facility PCT.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1050212

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I was working BELAY and Aircraft X departed BWI. The aircraft was handed to me from WOOLY Sector. The aircraft appeared to be a normal IFR track. The flight progress strip however had an equipment suffix of X and had no beacon code assigned. The track had a locally assigned code. This confused me because 90 percent of Aircraft X flights I have worked fly VFR. It was a VFR day. Based on the strip; I treated the aircraft as IFR and cleared him to his destination and climbed him to the requested altitude on the strip. We work with no assistant. We have one Flight Data Controller. My Flight Data Controller was having a social conversation with a Controller at a far away scope. I needed a computer generated code to automate the hand off with HAR Approach; so I had to walk away from my scope to the data position and amended the equipment type. When I returned; I terminated the track so it would auto acquire with the new code. I then had to go to flight data position to make several 6-10 amendments on VFR aircraft; as our Data Controller was still distracted. Aircraft X never auto acquired and I had several other aircraft that called. So; now I had forgotten about Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was at 6;000 FT and being vectored toward his destination southbound. A flight of 2 military jets departed MTN northbound needing a climb to 7;000 FT; so I descended Aircraft Y to 4;000 FT. When I saw the 'splat tag' that I instantly remembered was Aircraft X; I immediately saw he was in conflict with Aircraft Y and converging. I think the aircraft were about 2 miles apart and 500 FT and Aircraft Y was descending. I couldn't remember Aircraft X's flight number; because I had left the strip at the data console. So I turned Aircraft Y to the east and issued traffic. I then turned Aircraft X northbound and issued traffic. I issued subsequent traffic calls to each aircraft. Aircraft X then reported traffic in sight. The remainder of the session was uneventful. Someone (BWI Tower?) had to manually assign Aircraft X a beacon code. They should understand that this causes more trouble for the Departure Controller as we have to either complete a manual hand off; or assign a computer code. The latter of those two requires much effort to get the new track to acquire and automate properly. It also requires we drop the track which is one of the most dangerous things we do; because it is very easy to get distracted and forget about a 'splat' tag. Our flight data position (which is really two positions combined) is rarely split. The supervisors also rarely reign in distracted data controllers; who often wonder off; or have side conversations instead of working their assigned position. This requires controllers walk 5-10 feet from their scopes; with their backs turned and make 6-7-10 and other laborious data entries. This is dangerous and it happens on a daily basis in my area. I did not follow one of my cardinal rules; which is never leave a 'splat' tag. If it doesn't auto acquire; start a manual track.

PCT Controller experienced a loss of separation event when leaving the RADAR control position to modify a flight plan; the Flight Data Controller otherwise engaged in another location.

1739824

202004

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

1739824

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

1739827.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

Procedure

It was after flying 1 leg from ZZZ-ZZZ1 that we found out our Z [Flight Attendant] sat in the jumpseat a/c right; to avoid contact with crew as she had previously flown with someone who tested positive for COVID-19.

Was notified that the Z Flight Attendant occupied R2 jumpseat(s) for takeoff and landing. Z FA was concerned with social distancing. Encourage FAs to look at other options or maybe a temporary approval from FAA to occupy different jumpseats during this time.

Two flight attendants reported being notified that another Flight Attendant on the same flight had possible exposure to COVID-19 and as a result occupied a different jumpseat in order to maintain social distancing from cabin crew.