elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1022606

201207

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1022606

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Aborted takeoff due to negative engine spool up. Actually; I find it very depressing that the FAA now defines a rejected takeoff as a pilot deviation. It has always been my impression that the safety reporting program was designed to improve safety. How is it that we; as crew members/pilots; did exactly what we were trained to do but we are now required to fill out a safety report. In my opinion; this isn't why the program was developed. I find it insulting that the FAA has gone to these levels. More paperwork doesn't make our or any other airline safer; addressing the real issues that are safety related will. Just one pilot's opinion; maybe I don't 'get it' because I don't have the 'big picture.' What I am afraid of is that some pilots will take the approach that they might not abort a takeoff due to the fact that they do not want to have to deal with the consequences. As sad as that is; I'm afraid it could become reality. In some cases; a low speed abort may be required; however a crew might try to 'troubleshoot' or determine if its an 'indication' problem and continue the takeoff. Just food for thought.

A319 First Officer laments the requirement to file a written report after a low speed rejected takeoff.

1750465

202007

SR20

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Airspeed Indicator

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting

1750465

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft

After being cleared onto 27C for take off the student went full power and began his takeoff roll. All engine indications were good and the airspeed indicator was 'alive'. When reaching 70 kts the student attempted to rotate but there was not enough lift so the stall warning horn went off and the aircraft was slightly airborne(>20 feet) then landed back on the runway. By this point enough airspeed had been built up and the student rotated successfully. All of this occurred in the span of about 5 seconds. I took controls and made the decision to continue climbing as there was not enough runway to land. At this point it was clear the airspeed indicator and stand by were wrong so I tried to keep the ASI higher than normal and use known power settings and the feel of the controls to return and land. We landed on 27L without requesting priority handling. Aircraft X had been written up for the ASI on two separate occasions and my student and I briefed that prior to the flight which allowed us to quickly diagnose the problem quickly; however we did not notice anything unusual prior to the takeoff.

Flight Instructor reported an airspeed indicator malfunction that resulted in a return to the departure airport.

1488438

201710

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1488438

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure

Ambiguous

I was one of the four crew members who were all eye witness to the horrible fire which persisted directly under the aft cargo compartment door burning it to charcoal black oblivion. I find it extremely ironic that as of this writing no one from the company or union has contacted me about the incident. I realize that none of us has any training or expertise in determining the cause of the fire however out of the four of us we have over 120 years of aviation experience; some civilian and some military. All four of us performed an evacuation of the aircraft as it filled with smoke fumes. All four of us did a thorough walk around examination of the fires' aftermath. Several of us obtained videos; dozens of photos and eye witness statements which contradict the theory of the loader catching on fire. All four of us had an extremely difficult time sleeping that night. Several of us had throat Irritation from the acidulous; electric smelling fumes. All four of us met in the morning wondering when we were going home because we were told we were going to ferry an obviously severely damaged aircraft back to ZZZ that night. We were in constant question on how to prepare for our next legs crew rest.

Air carrier pilot reported performing an evacuation of the aircraft at the gate during boarding when the cabin filled with smoke from an external fire in the vicinity of the aft cargo compartment.

1673461

201908

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

210.0

6.0

2500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Personal

Aeronca Champion

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Powerplant Lubrication System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Time Pressure; Workload

1673461

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Plan was to fly from ZZZ to [destination] for fuel.Weather clear - light winds from east/north east.Preflight i.a.w. checklist: 4.5 qts oil; 4.0 gal fuel in left wing tank; 4.5 gal fuel in right wing tank.Start; taxi to runway XX and run-up normal.Takeoff on runway XX into left quartering headwind. Flew runway heading to left cross wind to left downwind while continuing to climb out of pattern altitude. Approximately mid field downwind turned left to southwest over top of ZZZ on course to [destination]. Continued cruise/climb at 70 mph to 2500 MSL on course. At 2500 MSL reduced power to 2150 rpm; engine instruments checked normal and trimmed for cruse.Shortly after level off; engine began running rough;losing power with oil pressure dropping to zero. Immediately made a climbing 180 left turn to north back towards ZZZ. Engine continued to lose power. Trimmed to maintain 60 mph and secured engine by turning mags; master; generator and fuel all to off.Recognized that there was not enough altitude to make it back to ZZZ and began looking for best alternate landing area. Having seen the large plant to the east with long wide straight access road; no apparent power lines; little traffic and aligned into the wind; turned in that direction. Continuing to monitor traffic on the road; positioned aircraft for a left base for landing to the northeast. On rolling out for final saw a car traveling in same direction at similar speed so side slipped aircraft to lose altitude; speed and create separation to land behind the car. Landing in center of road and roll out normal. Once stopped exited the aircraft and pulled aircraft tail perpendicular to road into grass on the side of breakdown lane so aircraft wing would not obstruct traffic on road and waited for authorities. Aircraft wings were removed; and the aircraft transported by trailer to ZZZ.Preliminary examination of the aircraft looks like the oil temperature probe that screws into the back of the oil screen cap became loose allowing the oil to be pumped out the loose fitting. There is still a lot of oil all over the engine compartment so will need to verify but this looks like the source of the leak. The oil screen cap was properly safety wired to the engine block but the temperature probe is not designed to be safety wired on to the oil screen cap. Perhaps it should be.

Aeronca Champion pilot reported oil system failure which resulted in an engine shutdown and a forced landing.

1477136

201708

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

12500.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1477136

Flight Deck

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159

1477115.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

During climbout...passing 12;500' the right pack light illuminated. I continued to climb to approximately 14;000' and then immediately descended back to 10;000' MSL and initiated the QRH. As the QRH steps were accomplished and the outflow valve was opened; significant pressure bumps occurred. The cabin pressure never exceeded 10;000'. At about 10;500' MSL and leveling at 10;000'; the Cabin Altitude Warning light illuminated and horn sounded. The Cabin Altitude Warning light QRC was initiated but the cabin altitude was below 10;000' so the mask were not donned. The cabin altitude was climbing so I directed the First Officer to close the outflow in accordance the Cabin Altitude Warning QRH. After the cabin pressure was finally stabilized and return [to departure airport] was initiated. The Flight Attendants reported that a Passenger (small child) was experiencing a bleeding nose a possibly bleeding ear. An overweight landing...was accomplished at approximately 149;000 pounds.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

B737-800 flight crew reported a Right Pack failure and loss of pressurization on climb out at 12;500 feet with subsequent return to departure airport after regaining control of pressurization.

1595778

201811

1801-2400

ZSPD.ARTCC

FO

10800.0

VMC

TRACON ZSPD

Air Carrier

B787-900

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Descent

STAR DUMET

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1595778

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

1595779.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

On descent into ZSPD; ATC assigned us 3;600 meters. As Non-Flying Pilot; I read back 3;600 meters. While I was reading back the altitude to ATC; the Relief Pilot called out the meters to feet conversion from the chart incorrectly using the 3;300 meter equivalent of 10;800 feet rather than the 3;600 meter equivalent of 11;800 feet. After completing the read back with ATC; I glanced at the meters to feet conversion chart I had up on my iPad. I saw the called out altitude of 10;800 meters and did not notice that it was one line lower than the correct altitude of 11;800 feet. ATC called us about our altitude when we were approx. 800 feet low. The Captain who was Pilot Flying turned off the autopilot and returned the aircraft to the correct altitude.The Chinese [ATC] change you back and forth between Feet and Meters without notice several times during the same approach. It can get very confusing. The altitude set from the conversion sheet do not correspond directly to the altitude assigned and so it can be very difficult to look and see whether the correct altitude is being flown.Having the crew members reading the conversion altitude; wait until the radio read-back is complete before calling out the converted altitude might help all of the pilots be more involved in the cross check of the altitude.

Cleared to 3;600 meters and set corresponding altitude in feet for 3;300 meters box. [We were] approximately 1;000 feet below assigned altitude. Turned automation off and manually climbed back to correct altitude after resetting mode control panel. I was the Pilot Flying and we were going into Dumet on the Dumet 22L arrival.Difficult environment operating in meters and changing to feet and then setting corrected altitude in mode control panel. The group of us checked the meters chart and agreed to the wrong altitude in feet. Air Traffic Control brought this error to our attention and correction was made.Have to be more big vigilant when operating in meters and changing back to feet for altitudes assigned from Air Traffic Control.

B787-9 crew reported descending below cleared altitude due to confusion over the meters to feet conversion.

1685052

201909

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

1685052

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Y

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy

I had a flight the other day and this has been on my mind. When I approach a gate I always ask if we have any special passengers. On this flight I was told there were none by the agent. I received the pilot release form prior to shutting the door and it also showed no special passengers. We arrived at the destination and I was told we have 5 wheelchair passengers and 1 of them is an aisle chair. I watched the aisle chair passenger being taken off and he basically had very little body mobility. I thought this is very important info we as the pilots should know about in case of emergency evacuation. My next flight I was surprised to see under special passengers -- emotional support animal -- I thought this is ridiculous. I am given info about people basically getting a free ride for a dog; but I do not know about an aisle chair passenger. I brought this up to the ZZZ flight office. I was given an email saying this info used to be on the release form; but the pilots did not want it. I believe this is very important info for me as the Captain to have if I need to evacuate in an emergency. Please include this info for all special passengers; blind; deaf; aisle chair. Anyone who I would need to look out for in an emergency.

A320 Captain reported that he was not notified of special needs passengers aboard his flight; causing a potential safety risk in the event of an evacuation.

1650005

201905

0601-1200

ONT.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ONT

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Class C ONT

Nosewheel Steering

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Situational Awareness

1650005

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1650012.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Aircraft

In position on Runway 26L; we were on centerline; with calm winds. Once cleared for takeoff; I transferred aircraft control to the First Officer (Pilot Flying). He called 'Set Standard Power' and as I did so; I noticed he was veering to the left of centerline. Before I could set the power; he said; 'Steer right; steer right; steer right!' I could feel the right rudder pedal was fully deflected. Simultaneously; I also applied full right rudder and reduced the power to idle. The aircraft still was not turning right; so I ultimately had to apply right brake to regain the centerline. We notified the Tower of our reject and they instructed us to taxi down the runway and turn left on [the taxiway]. As we proceeded down the runway; I checked the steering with both the tiller and the rudders. The FO (First Officer) also checked the steering with his rudders. The aircraft responded normally at this point; however; we returned to the gate for further troubleshooting. We are not aware of what caused this un-commanded left turn on the takeoff roll. Maintenance is currently working on the problem. On both taxi-out and taxi-in; the aircraft turned without issue or resistance. The following comments would not prevent this event; but we did discuss the reject procedure. It does seem that it would be advantageous in certain circumstances for the FO to call the reject. In this instance; I did not know that he was holding full right rudder and still turning left. We both thought this procedure should be re-evaluated.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

MD-11 flight crew reported the aircraft started an uncommented turn to the left on takeoff roll which resulted in a rejected takeoff.

1306508

201510

0001-0600

OEJD.ARTCC

FO

37000.0

Night

Center OEJD

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

Crew Rest Area

Air Carrier

Captain; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1306508

Aircraft X

Crew Rest Area

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1306509.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Human Factors

Equipment / Tooling

As per our Operation Specifications 'Planned Redispatch or Rerelease En Route;' this flight was unable to obtain the Required Updated Fuel in Time from the Recleared Point IMRAD to continue on to the final destination. The aircraft crossed waypoint 'IMRAD' at XA48 at FL370 with 23;500kg of fuel on board. Required fuel was finally provided at XB04 for 20;578kg. Then another required fuel of 18;685kg came later through ACARS at XB07. Opsec Section 4 states the following: A new operational analysis must be conducted within 2 hours prior to the flight's arrival at the planned redispatch or rerelease point. In preparing the new operational analysis; the dispatcher or person designated to exercise operational control (other than the pilot in command) must: (a) Conduct an updated fuel analysis based on the current route of flight; wind conditions; and aircraft weight on the route from the planned redispatch or rerelease point to the intended destination airport and ay required alternate airports; and........ According to the dispatcher; the system was offline and was unable to compute a new Flight Plan from the recleared point. In summary the Recleared Flight Release was not issued until after crossing the Recleared Point. Not sure if this was legal; since the information should have been obtained before crossing the Recleared Point. The D.O. was in the Dispatch Center and instructed us to continue beyond the Recleared point until the system came back online. We therefore proceeded and obtained the official numbers 16 minutes past the recleared point. We then continued to our destination with no further incident. Dispatch did not have a backup system. Dispatch should obtain a backup system to avoid any further similar incident.

I was in the bunk bed for crew rest at the time of this event. The following narrative is what I was informed when I reported back in flight deck.At approximately 2:45 prior to estimated rerelease (RR) point; Ops Control sent a message via ACARS to the aircraft requesting estimated time; fuel on board; and altitude for the planned rerelease point. Information was provided as requested to Ops Control by the IRO's on the flight deck as the PIC and FO were crew resting in the bunks.At around 1:40 prior to the rerelease point; the crew queried Ops Control via ACARS about the destination and alternate weather; any notam changes; and the recalculated fuel required at the RR point. Ops Control replied stating that the flight planning software was currently down; and that the required fuel was unable to be calculated and that the crew should stand by until further notified by Ops Control. Weather for the destination and alternate airports was sent at this time; and no new notams were in effect.Around 30 minutes prior to the RR point; Ops Control was contacted by the crew via satphone and asked again about fuel required. The crew was told to call back in 10 minutes if no fuel number was sent by Ops Control via ACARS. The crew contacted the PIC out of rest to come to the flight deck at about this time.Ops Control was called again about 10 minutes later via satphone; the crew discussed the still inoperative flight planning system with Ops and the need to make a decision whether a diversion was to be planned; or if any other option was available such as a hold prior to the RR waypoint. Ops Control asked how much 'extra' fuel we had onboard as shown on the flight plan at the last waypoint crossed; which was around 1800 kilos. The crew was told that the DO was in the Ops Control area and was telling the Ops controller that we could proceed beyond the RR point to the next waypoint due to the fact of having this 'extra' fuel available. The crew questioned the legality of continuing beyond the RR point without actually having the required fuel calculation to continue; and was told that the DO was authorizing this.The crew was told to continue past the RR waypoint and six other waypoints several times towards the destination airport before finally receiving the recalculated fuel required for the rerelease 16 minutes after passing the RR point.

B777 flight crew reported being unable to receive a rereleased fuel required at their planned redispatch point due to the fact that the flight planning software was currently down. The crew was told to continue toward their destination and the required fuel was finally sent 16 minutes past the redispatch point.

1365126

201606

0601-1200

ATL.Airport

GA

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189

1365126

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 183

1365148.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 26L in ATL. During the takeoff roll; I observed a Caravan taxiing south on Taxiway D; approaching the runway. At some point above 100 knots; the Tower said '(call sign) cancel your takeoff clearance.' I initiated a rejected takeoff around 110 knots. We cleared the runway and taxied to the deice area on Ramp 6 to let the brakes cool; perform the QRH; and calculate the brake energy in the Optimum Performance Capable. I contacted Dispatch and let them know what happened; and we were doing a gate return. At the gate a logbook entry was made. Maintenance performed an inspection and signed off the aircraft off after a 90 minute cooling period. I kept the Passengers updated during all phases of the event.I would like to see a PA microphone hooked up to the existing jack on the pedestal. The 'remain seated' PA announcement would be easier and quicker with a dedicated PA microphone; considering the many different existing COMM panels.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Tower Controller issued a cancel takeoff directive to a Part 121 aircraft during it's take off roll prompting a high speed abort.

1256239

201504

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Fractional

HS 125 Series

Part 135

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Work Cards

Cockpit Furnishing

Hawker-Siddeley Raytheon

X

Hangar / Base

Flight Deck

Fractional

Other / Unknown

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1256239

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

N

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

April 2015; A Hawker arrived in ZZZ for a scheduled inspection. Two days later; early A.M.; a Technician was opening cockpit floor boards for the inspection. When he opened the co-pilots floorboard he discovered a large 12-18 inch [long] screw driver underneath the rudder pedals and linkage. I was notified four days later of the event. The Hawker Quality Assurance (Q/A) Manager has contacted the Air Carrier Q/A department and [was] instructed to send the screwdriver to ZZZ1. Not sure where the aircraft was prior to coming to ZZZ1 but we need to find out. This could have easily ended up as a catastrophic event with the loss of life. This should have been seen by whomever was giving the OK to close the panels.

A Maintenance Manager reports an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) discovered a large 12-18 inch screwdriver underneath the co-pilot's rudder pedals and linkage while opening up cockpit floorboards for inspection on a Hawker-Siddeley HS 125-900 aircraft.

1831286

202108

90.0

40.0

39000.0

Dawn

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 4500

Workload

1831286

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors

Halfway through our flight our B-Flight Attendant asked to come into the flight deck and talk with us. When she got to the flight deck she indicated that there was a very strong cleaning/bug spray smell in the aft galley. Additionally; our C-Flight Attendant was complaining of coughing and having a hard time taking a deep breath because of the strong cleaning smell. Our A-Flight Attendant didn't smell anything. No Passengers were indicating concern and we didn't smell anything. The Captain asked the Flight Attendant (F/A) if she was medically concerned; and if so; we would patch through to medic so she could communicate her concern. All the F/As indicated they were feeling OK and did not want to contact medic. They just wanted someone to look at the aircraft in ZZZ. At that point the Captain told her we would put the packs to high to help eliminate the strong cleaning odor. We also contacted Dispatch through ACARS to discuss the situation and see if there was an anti-microbial spray completed the night before. Additionally; we informed Dispatch that the F/As were not comfortable taking the aircraft on our next leg. Dispatch wanted a patch through ARINC to get F/As; operations and medic on the line for a conference call. During their discussion; Dispatch sent us an ACARS message to divert to ZZZ1. As a result; we notified ATC of our intention to divert. The Captain notified the F/As and Passengers of our intent; as well.As a precaution we accomplished the Smoke; Fire; or Fumes QRC and referenced QRH Smoke; Fire or Fumes Checklist in case the situation escalated. Dispatch notified us the aircraft had been sprayed the night before with antimicrobial spray. We communicated with our A-Flight Attendant on what to expect on landing; taxi; and at the gate. We kept in constant communication with the A F/A to constantly reassess our situation. On our descent into ZZZ1 medic recommended the two Flight Attendants having issues breathing use the portable oxygen. With that information; we [advised] ATC to have Medical Personnel standing by. We then accomplished all appropriate checklists and landed uneventfully.The anti-microbial spray the night before was a bit much. That needs to be more regulated. I think the call to divert was a good call; but happened very fast. Our Crew day also ended up being super long with this diversion on our first leg. We were OK to continue after the diversion; but that kind of day; with what we went through; is probably not completely safe.

B737-700 First Officer reported Flight Attendants were experiencing physiological symptoms from 'very strong ' cabin fumes. After consultation with Dispatch it was determined to divert for maintenance action.

1489255

201710

1801-2400

ZUA.ARTCC

GU

40000.0

Center ZUA

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 129

IFR

Cruise

Oceanic

Class A ZUA

Center ZUA

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Oceanic

Class A ZUA

Facility ZUA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1489255

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Routine Inspection

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Manuals; Procedure

Company Policy

I was working the Radar Assist Position; transferred out Aircraft X at FL400 at OATSS and Aircraft Y at FL400 at NATSS; utilizing degrees divergence in the transition from Radar to Oceanic Non-Radar separation. Advised the Radar Controller that Aircraft Y would need to be on the airway after NATSS as Aircraft X already was on the airway after OATSS to establish the required separation criteria and that they would need to wait until the fixes to terminate radar or establish them on the airways prior to the fix. The Radar Controller then cleared the aircraft to deviate direct to NATSS and OATSS when able; terminated them both and switched them to ARINC. I do not believe that the Radar Controller; nor many people at ZUA understand what it means to terminate radar and that it is our responsibility to establish the transition into Oceanic Non-Radar Separation.The training program here is dismal and does not properly teach the airspace and requirements of Terminal Radar to Enroute Radar to Domestic Non-Radar and Oceanic Non-Radar. It really just address's the Terminal Radar in the [simulator lab] and then it appears a lot of people here look for ZOA to tell them what we can or can't do when we transfer aircraft out.

ZAU Center Controller reported the Radar Controller did not follow proper procedures to ensure required non radar separation criteria were met for the receiving facility.

1694020

201910

0601-1200

IAH.Airport

TX

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174; Flight Crew Total 2779; Flight Crew Type 2779

Situational Awareness

1694020

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness

1694038.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Y

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Equipment / Tooling

During pushback tug driver announced 'Breakaway; Breakaway' so I applied breaks forcefully to stop aircraft from rolling back any further. This caused aircraft to come to hard stop. Flight attendant was standing in first class galley and was thrown to ground injuring her. After stopping I contacted cabin crew and was told [Flight Attendant] was injured. No other injuries were reported. We contacted Operations and told them we were coming back to gate and would need [medical personnel]. I asked tug driver what happened and was informed the pin popped out of slot. He then towed us back to gate. I informed passengers what was happening. I then verbally briefed [Chief Pilot] and Dispatch. A logbook entry was made. I requested chief pilots office come to gate. [Medical Personnel] removed [Flight Attendant] and a replacement flight attendant was sent to aircraft. Maintenance performed inspection and signed aircraft off. I discussed situation with Flight Manager and Dispatch and we all agreed it was OK to continue.

During the pushback; we were pushed approximately 100 ft. from the gate. Suddenly the ramp personnel driver of the tug shouted a command 'breakaway; breakaway'. The Captain immediately applied the brakes using the foot brakes then followed by setting the parking brake. This caused the aircraft to abruptly come to a stop. The Captain asked what happened the tug driver said 'the pin popped out'. The flight attendants immediately called and said a flight attendant had fallen and injured herself during the aircraft coming to an abrupt stop. We coordinated with Ramp; Operations; [Chief Pilot]; Flight Manager and Maintenance. We returned to the gate. [Medical Personnel] aided to the flight attendant and a replacement flight attendant came on board. We had maintenance inspection completed. Received a new [release] and proceeded without any further incident.

B737 flight crew reported an abrupt stop during pushback due to tow pin failure resulted in a flight attendant injury.

1439855

201704

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Y

Pneumatic System Control

X

Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1439855

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1440400.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft was deferred with MEL 36-10-XX-XX (Pneumatic Supply Systems #3). The MEL does not specify whether to operate the air system in auto or manual--only that isolation valves are functioning. On pushback and starting #3 engine; the auto controller did not open the appropriate isolation valves to pressurize the #3 manifold for engine start and there was consequently no N2 rotation. At this point; while FO was starting the engine and stated that there was no rotation; I switched the controller to manual and opened the 1-2 and 1-3 isolation valves as is done to pressurize the manifold for start; thinking this was an MEL issue. I directed the FO to start all three engines in this configuration with the thought that after engine start the auto controller would operate normally. When switching back to Auto; after all engines running; the 1-3 isolation valve closed and the #3 manifold depressurized - same problem.At this point; we realized that to operate in manual; we should have explicit direction in the MEL and wanted to check with maintenance about the need to defer the auto mode or some other procedure to pressurize the #3 manifold. Ramp control directed us to park at maintenance area and maintenance boarded the aircraft through the avionics door. Subsequent maintenance efforts to correct the problem showed that a manifold fail indication (part of their process to do an air system decay check) had not been cleared. By the time this was discovered as the problem; and another manifold decay check was executed; we had burned enough fuel to require return to a gate and refuel.What led to problem: rather than applying systems knowledge and operations with an MEL of uncertain effects; in hindsight; when the #3 system did not pressurize; I should have gotten pulled back into the blocks; written it up and handed the problem to maintenance. It is unclear whether an earlier block turn back would have led to an earlier discovery of the problem.Even though the MEL didn't direct operation in the auto mode; there was nothing that directed use of manual mode. Automatic mode is the default on an MD-11. If there was an explicit note in the deferral about operating in auto; I may not have been inclined to attempt a start in manual. Having flown the first leg of the evening in a different aircraft type may have given me some propensity on my part to do so in this case on an MD-11. From a CRM standpoint; as a minimum; I should have stopped the start and discussed any actions with the FO so we were on the same page. Also; regarding the source of the problem (Maintenance procedures for the deferral results in a manifold fail detected); Maintenance procedures never direct this fault to be cleared and consequently; the auto controller will not try to pressurize a manifold for which it has an indication of failure. Maintenance procedures should explicitly direct that this fault is reset after the mandated manifold decay check. Such a note would have prevented the issue altogether.

An underlying cause of this issue was the omitted resetting of the intentional manifold failure directed by the decay test. This led to other than expected indications of the air system. The system did in fact work as intended in AUTO when it 'thought' the manifold was failed and did not allow the system #3 to be pressurized. Thus; is not the aircraft system as a causal factor but the maintenance publication which does not direct the malfunction to be reset after testing is completed. Maintenance experience with this particular omission is not common place so they did not know to look for this particular factor.On the human side: Fast hands in my humble opinion led to what could be deemed a prolonged resolution. The action of setting the system in Manual before stopping for a moment to think about it set in motion actions that were resolved through combined effort. But I wonder if issue would have been approached in quite the same way had we stopped the push immediately and pulled back to allow maintenance to troubleshoot on their own after a debrief by the CA.1) Hindsight: I could/should have been more verbal in taking the more conservative route and recommending that we stop the start attempt and figure/think things out before proceeding further. 2) The MEL did not specify to operate the air system in AUTO or MANUAL. Correct it to reflect expected mode in such a condition and perhaps specify expected indications. For example: Instead of stating '...provided: a. Both isolation valves are operative...' in the remarks or exceptions box of the MEL; perhaps it could state '...provided system is in AUTO and: a. Both isolation valves are confirmed operational (green) with APU air ON; and b. Pneumatic pressure is verified in the affected system manifold when supplied from an alternate source.'3) Correct the Maintenance publication to ensure it specifically directs the resetting of the intentional manifold failure.

MD-11 flight crew reported that instructions were unclear for an MEL item for the pneumatic system.

1183144

201406

1801-2400

ZNY.ARTCC

NY

24000.0

Center ZNY

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Class A ZNY

Center ZNY

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZNY

Facility ZNY.ARTCC

Government

Enroute; Instructor

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Party2 Flight Crew

1183144

Facility ZNY.ARTCC

Government

Enroute; Trainee

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1183142.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Aircraft; Procedure; Weather

Aircraft

Training in progress. Trainee is a new radar trainee with 14 hours at his first sector. Hand off Controller on duty; about to commence a relief briefing. Aircraft X was on a vector to establish a climb to FL320 and at 250 KIAS assigned. Aircraft Y was in level flight at FL240 westbound on J230 east of COPES intersection. Aircraft X was given normal speed and resumed direct MXE to return to course; then switched to next frequency. Relief briefing commenced. Hand off and relieving Controller were discussing heavy J75 restriction which was lightly confusing (other departure fixes were closed due weather and most southbound traffic was being routed J75; placing them over COPES.) Training Controller had interjected a comment about it; and noticed Aircraft X had flattened his climb to gain forward speed. Trainee turned Aircraft Y left heading 240 to avoid; which the pilot did in a timely fashion (there was 10 miles at this point) and called receiving sector 09 to expedite Aircraft X for 500 feet; but the convergence was too steep to maintain 5.0 and 1;000 feet with 100% certainty. There may have been a loss.Greater vigilance by all parties during briefing.

I have approximately 14 hours of training on my first radar sector. I was training at R55. Aircraft X was on a vector west of course and was given a climb from 17;000 FT to FL280 and direct COPES intersection to resume navigation southwest bound on J75. Aircraft X was also assigned a slower than normal speed at one point so his climb rate was excellent. The problem began when Aircraft X was given normal speed which negatively affected the aircraft's rate of climb. Aircraft Y was on J230 level at FL240. The two aircraft were on courses that intersected at COPES. Aircraft X was given a frequency change to sector 09 before the conflict had been resolved and the unsafe situation continued. Upon realizing Aircraft X's climb rate was not sufficient to 'top' Aircraft Y; Aircraft Y was turned left to a 240 heading in an attempt to correct the situation. Also; I called sector 09 to ask the controller to expedite the climb of Aircraft X. This mistake is a direct result of my inexperience. I feel that the unsafe situation could have been avoided with a greater personal understanding of how a changing an aircraft's speed effect's its climb rate.

ZNY Controllers report of a loss of separation between two aircraft due to one aircraft slowing its speed to increase the climb rate.

1012692

201205

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

800.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B727-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 105; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 1800

Human-Machine Interface

1012692

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

I was the pilot not flying during our approach to the runway. We were vectored for the ILS; reported the field in sight and then were cleared for the visual approach. ATIS winds were reported at 030/10G14. During the approach brief we decided to plan on VREF+10 for our landing speed and I would get a current wind report on short final. Flaps 25 and the landing checklist were called for around 1;200 FT. I called '1;000 FT; cleared to land' and started the landing checklist. At approximately 800 FT during the landing checklist it was discovered that the TE FLAP DISAGREE light was on and both flaps were indicating 20. The wind check reported the current wind at 030/8. I asked the First Officer if he was comfortable continuing the approach with the intention of landing with flaps 20. He said 'yes and we already have a higher Vref speed set.' The flap handle was repositioned to 20 to match the indicated flap position. At 600 FT we decided to continue the approach and did not reference the QRH. The GPWS did report its' 'FLAPS-TOO LOW' warning on short final several times. The warnings were attributed to a known reason - as not having the flaps set at 25 or 30 for landing - and not having run the checklist to override the GPWS oral warning system.

B727 Captain discovers a flap disagree light during approach with the flaps selected to 25 and indicating 20. With Vref set at plus 10 for a crosswind the crew elects to continue to landing without referencing the QRH. The GPWS flaps warning sounds several times prior to touch down.

1429161

201703

SNA.Airport

CA

8000.0

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

STAR DSNEE1

Class E SCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

1429161

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Airspace Structure

Chart Or Publication

We used the DSNEE 1 arrival into SNA for the first time on this date. The aircraft used was a B737. Several issues were noted. 1. After the DSNEE 1 arrival was programmed into the FMC; it warned of 'steep descent after ROADE'. After passing BRCKK waypoint; nose pitched down significantly to maintain VNAV path. Use of full speed brake was necessary to maintain the 280 knot restriction. After passing ROADE waypoint; nose pitched down even further; and the path indicator showed us 900 plus feet above the VNAV path. Full speed brake use continued. After passing PHIYA waypoint; airspeed immediately slowed to 220 knots in preparation for the DSNEE waypoint restriction 220 knots at 8000 feet; but we were still 23 miles from DSNEE. We informed SoCal approach that the aircraft was slowing; and we asked her if this would cause a problem. She responded that we should just fly the arrival as published and that he would file a [safety] report and requested that we file a report. We responded that we would file a report about the issues encountered with the DSNEE 1 star. This report is for informational purposes only; as we exceeded no limits during the arrival.

B737 First Officer reported several unusual maneuvers the FMC commanded to comply with restrictions for the SNA DSNEE1 Arrival.

1676876

201908

1201-1800

Turbulence

Daylight

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Situational Awareness

1676876

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Company Policy; Weather; Procedure

Weather

Both myself and the other Flight Attendant were securing the back galley and I was making an announcement when we hit turbulence on the E-175. We both grabbed the assist handles and were trying to get to our seats when the aircraft rolled and my feet were thrown out from under me. If she had not pulled me down on top of her and hugged me; my face would have been smashed on the aft bulkhead wall. We had a passenger in the lavatory who started screaming and I yelled to her to close the lid; sit down; and hold on. I have bruises on the left side of my body. I am submitting this report because a report needs to be submitted. There are numerous reports online about the NTSB investigating incidents on this plane to flight attendants in the back galley who were injured during clear air turbulence. This needs to be addressed with the company; the ripple effect on this aircraft; initial approach cleanup should start before descending so that the flight attendants are in their seat at that point. I also experienced it on the next flight and we had to grab on to the jump seat on the back and strap in. The seatbelt sign was not on and Captain said the turbulence came out of nowhere and he didn't think it would be that bad. This is a recurring theme with this plane.

Flight Attendant reported being injured during turbulence.

1020307

201206

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

Takeoff / Launch

Airspeed Indicator

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1020307

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

No airspeed on Captain's side during takeoff. Aborted takeoff and went back to gate.

A320 Captain lost his airspeed indicator on takeoff roll. Rejected takeoff executed and aircraft was returned to the gate.

1481372

201709

1801-2400

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Air Taxi

Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner

1.0

Part 135

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1481372

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Aircraft

Upon applying takeoff power while on the runway. The engine began making power. Then without notice or hesitation; the airplane began yawing hard to the right. I aborted the takeoff and while re-centering the airplane on the runway noticed that the right engine was no longer running. It had died during the application of takeoff power.

C402 Captain reported a rejected takeoff due to an uncommanded yaw from an engine rollback.

1664447

201907

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Other Arrival Ramp Unload

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Situational Awareness

1664447

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Ground Personnel

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Bag arrived with battery attached. Met customer in Baggage Service Office and advised of policy. Customer stated that she was not aware and no one asked her when she checked bag.

Commercial Airline Agent reported a passenger bag arrived in cargo compartment with Lithium Ion Batteries installed.

1820981

202106

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

5500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Descent

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

Sail Plane

Part 91

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1820981

Conflict NMAC

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure

We were descending from 6;000 ft to 4;000 ft on an IFR flight plan. As we passed through about 5;500 ft the Pilot Flying (PF) saw an aircraft at our 1 o'clock. They appeared to be climbing. The PF disconnected the autopilot and stopped our descent and turned left. We missed the glider but were able to see the other pilot. The glider did not show up on our TCAS and approach was unaware of any aircraft operating near us. After passing the glider we returned on course and continued our descent. Approach was unaware of our deviation. We did report the near miss to approach.

Captain reported a Near Mid Air Collision with a glider that required evasive action.

1241022

201502

1201-1800

ZHN.ARTCC

HI

28000.0

VMC

Center ZHN

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Oceanic

Class A ZHN

Navigation Database

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 400

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

1241022

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161; Flight Crew Type 161

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1241168.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Aircraft

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

I was copilot on flight ZZZ [mainland] to Kona. During preflight; the FMC routing was datalink loaded. The flight pub bag and FMC database were checked to be current. After uploading the winds; the runway and departure were loaded along with the runway in Kona. I did not load the arrival into Kona as I was taught adding the arrival will likely add distance to the flight and could potentially create fuel issues at the critical point. After passing the critical point I attempted to load the arrival and approach for Kona. However; we noticed that there were no arrivals or approaches available to load; only the runway. Further investigation found that there were no departures; arrivals; or approaches in the FMC for any Hawaii airport. We continued raw data on arrival and flew an uneventful ILS approach into Kona. We wrote a maintenance discrepancy in the logbook; notified maintenance via ACARS; and debriefed the mechanic upon arrival into Kona.Today (18 days later); the captain was informed that the aircraft was loaded with an Airbus navigation database and that is what accounted for the lack of coverage for Hawaii. I don't know how I would have caught this on preflight; or how long this plane had been flying with the wrong database.FYI; I had the same experience on Airport ZZZ2 to ZZZ3 [also Hawaii] (8 days ago). Again we flew raw data on the arrival and ILS approach for an uneventful landing. We wrote up the discrepancy and thoroughly debriefed maintenance upon arrival into ZZZ3. I never found out what the problem was but I suspect it was the same issue. I remember looking in the logbook of this plane and noted that it had not been out to Hawaii for at least a couple weeks.

Attempts to load arrival STAR and approach in FMC unsuccessful. No data for any Hawaii airport; except runway threshold; available for selection. Flew arrival procedures to Airport Kona using raw data only. Made logbook entry upon arrival and briefed maintenance. ACARS info message sent to company maintenance prior to landing. Notified next day that Airbus Navigation Data was loaded in aircraft by mistake by maintenance.

A B737 air crew discovered that they were unable to bring up the required STAR and approaches in FMC. They were later notified that incorrect Airbus data had been loaded in the aircraft by mistake.

1478906

201709

0601-1200

IAH.Airport

TX

8000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Initial Approach

STAR SKNRD4

Class B IAH

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

IFR

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Initial Approach

STAR SKNRD4

Class B IAH

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 1400

1478906

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

SKNRD 4 arrival into IAH; approximately 10 miles outside of ZOEEE; descending through approximately 8000 ft; aircraft encountered moderate wake turbulence. Aircraft buffeted and rolled right 15-20 degrees. Buffeting continued and aircraft began to roll with moderate force back to the left. Pilot flying immediately disconnected the autopilot; set TOGA thrust and pitched aircraft 15-18 degrees nose up while attempting to level the wings with side stick input. As aircraft approached 30 degrees of bank to the left; we began to clear the wake. PM immediately notified ATC that we were maneuvering for a wake turbulence encounter. ATC responded 'ok'. We leveled at 9300 ft; reestablished automation and continued so as to cross ZOEEE at 7000 ft. PM queried ATC as to what type of aircraft we were following. ATC responded 'a 747'. They then asked us to slow for spacing. This was the first time we were notified that we were following a heavy. As best I can remember; our noted distance behind the B747 after the encounter was between 7-10 miles. Winds were light and variable. PM checked in with cabin crew and they verified that there were no injuries; but that passengers were frightened by the encounter.

A319 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence 7-10 miles in trail of a B747 on arrival into IAH.

1591953

201810

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

10

Dawn

CLR

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Challenger CL600

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 14250; Flight Crew Type 1550

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Fatigue

1591953

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 49; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 1250

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Training / Qualification; Distraction

1592275.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

Main Entrance Door came open on initial takeoff roll at about 60 knots. The door contacted the runway at which time the takeoff was aborted. Raised door; secured it and then taxied off runway and return to [company].The initial inspection of the door revealed there was sheet metal damage to the outer skin at upper end of the air stair door. The foot of the door was broken off as well. The door locking mechanism was checked and found to be working as designed. The initial inspection of the damage to the door didn't rise to the criteria of an accident.The contributing factors to this incident were:1. Flight crew was operating on only a couple of hours sleep after a late arrival that morning. Should have declined to do flight under these circumstances in advance. 2. Had not flown this particular aircraft type for a couple of months and had been operating a 'new' type by another manufacturer. I was distracted when closing the door and did not catch the usual 'door unsecured' indications as we prepared for taxi and takeoff. I believe that there was a mental transfer of 'door unsecured' indications from the new aircraft that I was applying to this model. Mental confusion!3. Complacency from having operated this aircraft for 1500+ hours; closing and successfully securing the door for multiple hundreds of time without incident.This has all led to deserved self-evaluation and awareness that operating under any of the above conditions can easily lead to a mishap of minor significance as this; bent metal; or more serious consequences.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CL600 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff due to the main entry door opening.

1558030

201807

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 640

Situational Awareness

1558030

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1558015.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel

Other Pushback

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

During push back; the Tug Driver began shouting on the interphone; 'The plane is loose...stop the aircraft! Stop the aircraft! Stop the aircraft!' I simultaneously noticed the tug appearing in front of the nose and the aircraft picking up speed backward. I immediately stopped the aircraft by applying brakes. Apparently; the tow bar pin was not connected properly to the tug. FAs (Flight Attendants) notified me the A FA had lost his balance and hit his head on the forward galley. We returned to the gate and contacted Operations for medical personnel to meet the aircraft. We coordinated with Dispatch for StatMD; who discussed the situation with the paramedics. FA was unsure if he wanted to go to the hospital. It was decided that he would go to get checked out. Operations supervisor was called and was to meet FA at the hospital. We had a replacement FA assigned. There was no damage to the aircraft. We departed uneventfully.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported an abrupt application of the aircraft brakes and injury to a cabin crew member during pushback when the towbar became disconnected.

1235742

201501

1201-1800

ORD.Airport

IL

8000.0

IMC

TRACON C90

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ORD

Landing Gear

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Time Pressure; Confusion

1235742

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 15000

Time Pressure

1236034.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

At 11000 feet ATC told us that we were to expect 28C at ORD. We were concerned about the landing weight due to the amount of shortcuts enroute we received. We decided to burn extra fuel to get under landing weight and lowered the flaps to 9 at 11000 feet 245 kts. We were given a descent to 8000 ft. Once level we also lowered the landing gear to burn more fuel. When on vectors for the approach we were then given a 180 turn; and assigned a different runway. While reprogramming the FMS and setting new ILS frequencies the Captain told me to put the gear up; which I did. Shortly afterwards we received a landing gear handle disagree on the EICAS. I was busy reprogramming the FMS and radios and did not look at the speed when I moved the lever; even though I am not required to. During the turn the plane was in 1/2 bank mode in which I did not realize; I was not the pilot flying. After 30 degrees of turn ATC said to increase the rate of turn because of inbound traffic to a different runway. We then received a traffic advisory (TA) due to the inbound traffic. The landing gear disagree may have been due to speed. At 230 kts. He then told me to put the gear back down which I did. During the turn we were slowing at a very fast rate and ATC continued to give us new vectors. By the time I was able to look down and see the speed we were already at 180 and slowing rapidly. I called out 'speed speed' and placed my hand behind the trust lever with the captains to advance it. We received the stick shaker as the plane was accelerating. The Captain called for gear up then reduced the thrust again. While in the turn still receiving vectors we received a second stick shaker in which the Captain immediately corrected. I finished programming the FMS and radios and the rest of the flight was uneventful. We oversped the gear cause of being reassigned a new runway coupled with landing weight issues and poor aircraft management. We received the shaker because of the EICAS warning coupled with the TA as well as handling multiple calls from ATC. We should have asked for an extended vector to allow time to set up for the new approach. And we should have left the gear in the down position while being vectored.

Due to an early ATC short-cut (nearly direct to field); headwinds less than predicted and landing RWYs 27/28(Straight-in). We projected landing above MLW. We leveled at FL200 (vice planned FL240); and descended early to 16;000. At 35 nm; below 10 k and 250 kts; flaps 9. Still project above MLW; 25 NM LG down.On vectors to final RWY 27L. At 20NM RWY changed to 28C; followed a few seconds later by a turn 180 degrees away from the field. I turned the HDG bug; but the aircraft was slow to turn. Re-selected HDG and noted in 1/2 bank. Touch Control Steering (TCS) autopilot (AP) off and rolled into 30 degree bank (as ATC was calling again to turn). My thought process now changed from needing to burn fuel (MLW) to saving fuel (going away from airport; weather getting worse and distant alternate). I was concentrating on alt; bank angle and heading; when I called for landing gear (LG) up. As my scan reached the airspeed I saw 220-230 kts and realized the over-speed. The LG showed in-transit; (amber) ECIS (LG/Lever disagree) I called for LG Down.During the turn I had the power back; anticipating LG retraction; at 180 Kts; flaps 9 and 30 degrees bank I added a little too much back pressure (was 200 ft. low; trying to correct) and got a momentary stick shaker.Powered up and bank reduction stopped stick shaker immediately. Once I rolled out; I slowed back to 180 kts; retracted LG; 200 kts retracted flaps. Autopilot on; verified new FMS/Nav data. Briefed new approach and sent message to Maintenance (MX).After landing waited for MX to add any info they needed to augment the write-up. Flight segments with unusual configuration; i.e.; LG extended early to burn fuel; require special attention. Anything being done outside the normal routine should be briefed as a specific event. Didn't plan to ever retract the LG; but when lowered early; I should have covered retraction limits and crew procedures and coordination for that contingency.

EMB145 flight crew reports arriving at their destination above maximum landing weight and attempting to burn down by extending their gear and flaps early. ATC changes the runway and issues vectors and the Captain elects to retract the gear but is above the maximum retraction speed when the First Officer raises the handle producing a gear disagree. A TCAS TA and two sticker events also occur during vectors for the new runway.

1867763

202201

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

TRACON ZZZ

No Aircraft

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

1867763

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

Environment - Non Weather Related

As of Date; after more than a year of each area working mid shifts in their own areas to keep COVID safety precautions a priority; ZZZ [TRACON] as a facility has forced their controllers to congregate into one poorly ventilated area and needlessly work next to other controllers from other areas. The primary safety concern was highlighted as last night; Date; a positive COVID case was reported in Area B and it prompted an early level 3 facility cleaning. Area E controllers are permitted to stay in their own area; great for them. However; Areas D; C; A and B are now forced to work together in area D for hours on the mid shift. The person who worked for 8 hours the previous morning with the person who reported they tested positive just after that shift is now sitting next to 3 people from other areas in Area D which is closed off with a plastic tarp with a small hole for entry. It's one thing to contract trace and potentially wipe out one area; but allowing the cross contamination of multiple areas together is plainly irresponsible. Additionally; at least for Area C; there is NO Orange emergency jack in Area D. If the TED goes down; Area C has zero recourse. We would be forced to abandon position and sprint to Area C to try to save a imminent disaster (I.e. a plane full of 200 plus people smashing into the ground). This is probably true for areas A and B who are working from area D on the mid shift. ZZZ should not be subjecting their controllers to potential cross contamination; regarding COVID tracing. Also; the safety redundancy doesn't exist for other areas in area D. ZZZ claims they are following some MOU that was in effect years ago. It's plainly irresponsible that management at ZZZ cannot coordinate a new MOU or a waiver with the primary concern as SAFETY of this controllers and if considering the safety of the flying public (no Orange Jacks). All areas should work in their OWN areas as we have successfully done for more than a year.

TRACON Controller reported issues relating to COVID-19 at the facility.

1184064

201406

1801-2400

ZAU.ARTCC

IL

38000.0

IMC

Rain; Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZAU

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZAU

Pitot/Static Ice System

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

1184064

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

While at cruise flight we received an 'EFIS COMP MON' caution and a boxed amber IAS on the PFD. The First Officer was the pilot flying and I was pilot not flying. I followed the QRH for those items; and when compared to the standby instruments; led us to determine that the Captain side ADC (ADC 1) had failed. With ATC we initiated a descent to FL280 in compliance with the checklist (to exit RVSM airspace). Once we were at FL280 and out of the weather; my First Officer noticed an increasing discrepancy between his airspeed and the standby airspeed. We were level; power set for cruise; and the airspeed on PFD 2 was bleeding off. At this point he stopped using the PFD and was relying on only the standby instruments. It became obvious that ADC 2 was unreliable (airspeed on PFD 2 eventually got as low as 88 KIAS) and I ran the complete ADC Failure Checklist. As per the checklist we determined the nearest suitable airport. We communicated with the Dispatcher that we were diverting due to an air data problem. We declared an emergency with ATC and received direct the field. I informed the flight attendants of our problem; that we were diverting. A PA was then made describing our problem. After we turned toward the divert airport; it appeared that ADC 2 made a recovery of some sort; and was then matching what the standby instruments were indicating. The First Officer continued using the standby instruments until a visual approach and landing were made. The approach and landing were uneventful. The Mechanic that inspected the pitot system stated that pitot systems 1 and 2 were approximately 30% full of water.The threats came in waves. The first threat was the thunderstorms that we were deviating around. After the problem began the threats were not only the ADC 1; but now ADC 2. Questions swirled in my head as to what exactly is the problem? Why are BOTH ADC's erroneous? That I must be missing something; the last threat was managing the communication with everyone - ATC; Company; flight attendants; passengers - while keeping an eye on things. I think that I may have needed to 'stop and wind the clock'; or slow down and evaluate more.

The reporter stated that the engine cowl anti-ice was ON but the wing ice was OFF because they were not accreting ice. He recalled the OAT was about -30C at FL380 before descending to FL280. He stated that an EMB-170 pilot friend had this same experience recently and he has heard of other similar instances but could not speculate about the cause.

A CRJ-700 experienced an apparent dual ADC failure inflight as first PFD1 then PFD2 airspeeds differed from the standby. The QRH was completed; an emergency was declared and the flight diverted but during descent the systems returned to normal. A Mechanic found both systems approximately 30% full of water.

1221807

201412

0001-0600

HIO.Tower

OR

VMC

Night

Tower HIO

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Class D HIO

Tower HIO

Small Aircraft

1.0

Final Approach

Class D HIO

Facility HIO.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.2

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1221807

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Procedure

Aircraft X was IFR and released from P80. I told the aircraft cleared for takeoff. Aircraft Y was on final and I cleared it for a touch and go with a wake turbulence cautionary. I told Aircraft Z who was on final too that he was number 2 on final and cleared touch and go. Aircraft A called me on the left downwind and I told the pilot 'Aircraft A; number three; follow Cessna three mile final; runway 31 cleared to land.' Aircraft A replied; 'Follow Cessna; clear to land three one.' I then made other transmissions to other aircraft and then scanned for Aircraft A to make sure it had turned base. I saw the aircraft on base but was not sure if he was going to follow Aircraft Z mainly because of the visibility. In the background there were dark clouds and it was hard to spot some of the airplanes and also judge distances. I asked Aircraft A if he had the Cessna ahead and to his right on final in sight because at that moment I thought he was in a base turn that would cut off Aircraft Z. He said he had the Cessna in sight but I did not know if he was referring to Aircraft Z or Aircraft Y who was short final. I told Aircraft Z to turn left so that he would turn away from the final; but instead Aircraft A took evasive action and climbed the aircraft to avoid hitting Aircraft Z. That's when Aircraft Z said on frequency that he wanted to report that. I told Aircraft A to proceed northbound and then I told him to head towards the airport and he was cleared to land. He landed safely. I don't have any recommendations. I thought when I gave Aircraft A his sequence and clearance to land he knew which aircraft to follow.

HIO Local Controller describes a NMAC where an aircraft is told to follow an aircraft type on final; while there are two of the same type of aircraft on final. Downwind traffic turns in to follow wrong aircraft.

1561873

201807

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

400.0

VMC

9

Daylight

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

2.0

Other 61

None

Training

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Personal

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 540; Flight Crew Type 315

1561873

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Horizontal 0; Vertical 100

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Human Factors

I was conducting take off and landing practice with a student; staying in the traffic pattern at ZZZ. At approximately 500 AGL; on short final for 17R my student was flying when I noticed a Cessna at our altitude on a collision course. At the same time the TCAS reported the traffic and I took controls to emergency descend below the traffic. At that time ZZZ Tower reported traffic alert and that he was unaware of where that traffic was going. I completed a normal landing and ended the training flight.

PA28 flight instructor reported a NMAC with a Cessna on short final.

1753517

202007

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1753517

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

Passengers in row XY did not comply with the mask rules on multiple occasions. Masks were present but not being worn properly. This also caused a separate passenger to become uncomfortable and resulted in that passenger confronting crew in the galley. He was not happy and felt like we weren't being harsh enough with the mask rule. We ended up giving a final warning to the passengers about masks before the flight was over.

Flight Attendant reported two passengers were not compliant wearing face masks during the flight. Another passenger was uncomfortable with them not wearing the face masks and confronted the crew.

995541

201202

1201-1800

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

10500.0

Center ZDC

Corporate

Cessna 350

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Cruise

Class E ZDC

TRACON FAY

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Part 91

Skydiving

Class E FAY

Facility ZDC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

995541

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

A Cessna 300 was receiving en route RADAR advisories from me; level at 10;500. When aircraft got about 10 NM northwest of FAY; the track coasted and then jumped onto another target about 10 miles away. I had two sectors combined; as was working several IFR and VFR aircraft in different parts of those two sectors. I had the pilot ident; but I was having trouble seeing him; due to numerous limited data blocks (LDB) in the area; in FAY TRACON airspace; underneath and around him. I noticed a limited data block and called FAY to ask what altitude this aircraft was climbing to; since there were VFR parachute operations in the vicinity being conducted. I was afraid the Cessna 300 was going to be traffic for the limited data block aircraft. FAY said that he was staying at 060 FT. Since I had other duties to perform; IFR handoffs and coordination; I was splitting my time between that situation and the rest of my duties. Shortly thereafter; the Cessna 300 said he saw an aircraft pass 400 FT below him; and sounded very concerned about it. Since I still did not have a full data block associated with the Cessna 300; I was having difficulty trying to see what just happened. It was then I realized the Cessna 300 was squawking the same beacon code as the VFR parachute aircraft. That is why the data block jumped. I assigned the Cessna 300 a new beacon code and re-identified him. I apologized and said that my RADAR was not tracking correctly; and also that FAY TRACON had not told me about that aircraft climbing. Subsequent discussion with FAY TRACON revealed that the VFR aircraft with the same code that they were working; had told them he would stay below 10;000. Regardless; I needed a point out from FAY so I could tell my aircraft that. They also said that their guy had my guy in sight the whole time. That was little comfort to me or the pilot during all of this. Many times a day; especially weekends; numerous VFR aircraft operate parachute operations at several airports FAY controls. These aircraft routinely climb to between 11;000 and 14;500 to initiate the jumps. It happens so fast; that we do not take RADAR handoffs from FAY; rather we accept point outs on the LDB's. In this case; I hadn't received a timely point out on their aircraft; and I did not point out my aircraft to them; even though he was only 500 FT above their upper airspace limit. Had both of us done this; it would have helped; and I might have noticed the fact that both aircraft were on the same squawk.

ZDC Controller described a conflict event involving a parachute operation aircraft that was on an identical code as another VFR operation causing the data block to 'jump' making the developing conflict difficult to identify.

1618515

201902

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

Us

IMC

Icing; Turbulence

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS YANKEE XXR

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

1618515

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

1618149.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was the Pilot Monitoring on the flight. While stopped and holding short of the departure runway I requested the ATIS for ZZZ. During this process I missed that I requested the departure ATIS for ZZZ it was ROMEO. Once in route the Pilot Flying asked if I have ever been to ZZZ with our company and I stated no. He told me from his past experience we do the ILS Z XXR approach. The Pilot Flying set up and we briefed the ILS Z XXR approach. As we got closer; I requested an updated ATIS in which I showed to the Pilot flying on the CDU. The new ATIS was Foxtrot; which seemed strange to me they went from R to F. I updated the winds and altimeter on the Performance software. We both missed on the ATIS they were calling for the approach ILS Y XXR. I read what I wanted to see and missed the 'Y' portion of the text. On checking in with approach they stated expect ILS XXR. As we were descending through 10;000 feet; I asked the Pilot Flying if he was ready for approach check. He said yes; but did not have an ID yet for the ILS. He then asked me to try to ID it from listening to it. Both Pilots heard beeps but they were broken up and hard to hear. We were getting vectored for the approach and ATC told us to intercept the localizer. I told the Pilot Flying he needed to arm the localizer. He stated he did not have one shown. About that time; ATC gave us another heading to rejoin the localizer. I stated to ATC that we did not have the localizer for the ILS Z XXR. ATC then said they were doing the ILS Y XXR. As the Pilot Monitoring; I looked up the correct frequency for that localizer tuned it in and we were able to join the approach and without further incident. Once on the ground we briefed the errors; we made as a crew. For further discussion; it would be nice if the Approach Controller could state the exact approach in use instead of just ILS XXR. It would be beneficial for ILS YANKEE XXR. This was definitely pilot error on our part and very thankful there was no loss of separation by us with ATC. I will definitely be more diligent when requesting and updating the ATIS. I should have more diligence requesting and reading the ATIS. Do not 'poison the well' with type of approach expected from past experience. ATC could advise type of approach in use weather it is ILS ZULU/YANKEE XXR/L.

During approach preparations we prepared for an ILS XXR. This was based on the latest ATIS we had. As PM (Pilot Flying); I perused the ATIS and saw 'Approaches and Departures in progress XY L; XXR; XXL. in the back of my mind and based on the ONE other time I operated into ZZZ...no mention of ILS Y XXR meant they were using the ILS Z XXR. That's what we setup for...ILS Z.On downwind; we were having trouble identifying the LOC frequency as we were being vectored quickly to final the controller cleared us for the ILS XXR...saying we were xx miles from [FIX](best recollection) cleared for the ILS XXR. At this point I realized that point was not on the ILS XXR we had briefed/built and asked the PM to confirm we were going to XXR. The controller confirmed XXR but this time said ILS XXR 'YANKEE'. I had LNAVed onto the ILS path we had programmed to join up on the LOC when the controller asked us to fly heading 245 to rejoin the LOC. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) dialed in the correct frequency and we joined the 'Yankee' approach path; which is offset 3 degrees from the ZULU ILS.When we checked in with both approach controllers they confirmed 'Runway XXR' No mention of ILS Z or Y. After we landed and on taxi in; the PM discovered that; the new ATIS stated ILS Y XXR. When we blocked in; he informed me of this information. This was different language from what was printed out and what I read when we pulled the ATIS in cruise after leaving ZZZ1. I asked the PM to print out this new ATIS. At this point; I was more than a little annoyed at ATC thinking how lazy it is to not say YANKEE when telling a flight what to expect when they say ILS XXR or XXR...simple just to say YANKEE or ZULU along with that I thought.As I looked at the NEW ATIS we just printed out...I noticed that it looked different...the new one was the actual ARRIVAL ATIS F. The one that was pulled and printed was the DEPARTURE ATIS K or something. The PM briefed from this and I looked it over mostly concerned with wind and weather and landing runway. Although it nagged me at the time that it did not specifically say 'ILS XXR'; I did not give it much thought and I did not catch that the wrong ATIS had been printed.We debriefed the event and discussed the failures that came together for this and how to avoid issues in the future.Factors: it was curious that inflight the ATIS did not default to the ARRIVAL ATIS when using ACARS. Failure to detect that fact by either the PF or PM. ATC: We take on the responsibilities to manage complicated descend via arrivals with altitude and speed management now that used to be the domain of the controller...that's helpful honestly but this event highlights some issues with ATC. ATC is no longer required to verify or correct erroneous read backs of a clearance and now we see that are not of much assistance now in this matter...seriously; how hard is it to say XXR Yankee or Zulu in an effort to close the comm loop when you have Y and Z ILS approaches to the same runway.Was this ATCs fault...No; it was our inattention to the ACARS ATIS header that put us in an awkward position...could they have been more assistive when checking on?...I think there is room to improve some of these aspects. Closer attention by the PM and PF to verify the correct ATIS is pulled.

B757 flight crew reported misreading the ATIS and selected the incorrect approach.

1602192

201812

BOW.Airport

FL

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

6000

Tower BOW

Government

De Havilland Canada Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Vectors

Class D BOW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Government

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57; Flight Crew Total 1450; Flight Crew Type 1250

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1602192

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors

We were on approach VOR 09L (BOW) and in communication with BOW Tower. The Tower cleared us for the circle to land to Runway 5 and instructed us to report when we commenced our circle. We completed our circle to land and landed without incident on Runway 5. While rolling out on Runway 5; we asked the Tower for taxi instructions to [Runway] 09L where we wanted to completed touch-and-goes. The Tower responded that we had not reported our circle-to-land and had not received a landing clearance for Runway 5. I believe the problem was caused by proficiency and task saturation. I have not flown in this aircraft since late [date removed]; flown approximately 5 hours total since that time; not completed a circle-to-land in a long time and not operated in BOW before. In terms of task saturation; I was flying with a newer copilot and had a brand new copilot observing from the cabin. Lastly; fatigue played an issue as we were two hours into our training flight and had already completed an approach to holding pattern; air maneuvers and then an approach into BOW.

Pilot reported landing with out clearance after ATC advised they did not report commencing a circle to land.

1441548

201704

1801-2400

SNA.Airport

CA

2500.0

TRACON SCT

Military

Helicopter

VFR

Cruise

None

Class C SNA

TRACON SCT

Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C SNA

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1441548

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Staffing; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was on a control position for nearly an hour and 45 minutes then was told by the Controller in Charge (CIC) to take over his position. I now was CIC after a busy session on RADAR. I went around the room and made sure traffic was not an issue for the controllers. I asked the controller on Tustin if he was ok or needed a handoff or spacing from the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) because and average amount of IFR traffic was coming in. He declined. After about 10 min I heard this controller make comments that alerted me to a problem. When I went to the sector I noticed the Citation making a left turn into an MVA and alerted the controller to it. I asked what was wrong and he said some issue with a VFR military helo not communicating near his arrival final to SNA. At that point I alerted him to another IFR arrival on final nearing the VFR helo; he tried to take action to turn the aircraft. He then said the Citation had an RA. I am not sure if the other aircraft involved had RA.Staffing problems and no supervisors when needed. Controller should have asked for help earlier or resolved the potential conflict earlier before it became complex. Don't take a controller who has already been on a busy position off that one and make them CIC or to another position for that matter.

SCT TRACON Controller in Charge reported that another Controller was having separation problems with aircraft; was asked if the needed help and Controller denied help. Reporter stated staffing issues and no Supervisor in the area at the time.

1087568

201305

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Crosswind; 10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Bonanza 36

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 165; Flight Crew Type 84

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

1087568

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Upon attempting to land on Runway XXL with a crosswind from 220 degrees at 18 knots gusting to 22 knots; I failed to keep the aircraft on the runway and drove off the the runway surface on the left side of the runway; proceeding into the grass and coming to a stop on a taxiway approximately 2;000 feet after leaving the runway surface. No damage was sustained to the aircraft or to the airport property. I attribute this to a failure on my part as Pilot in Command to initiate a go-around after a gust of wind pushed me off the centerline while in ground effect. With full rudder and significant aileron deflection; I was still unable to maintain the plane on the center of the runway. Due to my extremely low altitude; I decided to land; and landed on the runway left of center. After the gear touched down; the plane immediately became oriented towards the grass. Because the plane was still traveling in excess of 80 knots; I decided the most prudent course of action was to allow the plane to travel into the grass rather than try to correct the direction of travel to remain on the runway. I attribute this event to an unusually strong wind gust in ground effect; coupled with my failure to initiate a timely go-around; and also a possible failure to remove left rudder input prior to the nose gear touching down. Following the incident I taxied the undamaged plane to parking without any further issue.

BE-36 pilot reports losing control during a crosswind landing resulting in a runway excursion on the downwind side of the runway. No damage occurs and the aircraft is taxied to parking.

1430235

201703

0601-1200

DTW.Airport

MI

1000.0

VMC

Turbulence; Windshear

Daylight

Tower DTW

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B DTW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1430235

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Weather

Arriving; the winds in DTW were reporting approximately 220@23G29. During the descent; we started to encounter moderate turbulence around 4;000 ft MSL and it continued throughout the entire approach each time. We were cleared for the visual approach to 22R and upon contacting tower; we were advised the wind again (same as we had on the ATIS) while being cleared to land. At approximately 1;000 ft; after flying through continuous moderate turbulence (with the expected airspeed fluctuations); we received a windshear warning and immediately executed the windshear escape maneuver. After we cleared the windshear warning (maybe 5 seconds later); we were vectored around for another approach. At this point; we had approximately 2100 lbs of fuel on board when we briefed the approach (for the second time) and since we did not have any alternates and the winds were just as bad when we took off; I decided to continue for a second approach.The second approach mirrored the first approach with the winds being approximately 240@27G37 now. After being cleared for the visual approach; when we were handed off to tower after getting configured to flaps 45; we heard another airplane go around due to windshear. We continued in and this time at approximately 800 ft AGL; we received another windshear warning and immediately executed the windshear escape maneuver. After leveling off after this go around we were at approximately 1670 lbs of fuel remaining. At this point; we declared minimum fuel and requested another approach to 22R in DTW after determining that all of DTW's runways were experiencing the same windshear events.On the third approach; I briefed that I would be continuing to land and that I would be aiming for an airspeed somewhere in the middle between the bugged airspeed (Vref + 10 knots) and the Vfe flaps 45 (170 kt) to ensure minimal altitude loss; if we did receive a third windshear event. During the final approach with flaps 45; we experienced the same moderate turbulence throughout the approach however; instead of a windshear warning; we received a windshear caution due to a 20-30 knot airspeed gain at approximately 500 ft AGL. At this point I went to idle thrust but our airspeed continued above 170 kts. The clacker sounded for approximately 5-7 seconds before finally slowing back to my target speed. After this event; we were able to continue to a landing with no windshear warning events. We arrived on the ground with approximately 1100 lbs of fuel remaining on board. I wrote up both windshear escape maneuvers and the flap overspeed event in the maintenance log when we arrived at the gate.Prior to [departure]; I [had] reviewed the wind report and forecast for DTW and it was reported at 220@23G29 at XA:53 and forecast to be 230@22G34 From XD:00 until XF:00 (Scheduled Arrival = XD:45) so I did not think much of the winds prior to departing. When we pushed back from the gate; we had approximately 2800 lbs of fuel predicted to be on board after landing in DTW but because the winds were not forecast to be anywhere near as significant as they were; I did not consider adding an alternate airport with calmer winds before we departed. With regards to the last approach with the flap over-speed; since I intended to prevent altitude/airspeed decay if we did encounter another windshear event; I believe my target airspeed was appropriate for the conditions; given what we had experienced on the first two approaches. Since we did not encounter any positive performance windshear events (that were notable beyond the continuous moderate turbulence); I simply did not expect to encounter it. Although I responded immediately with idle thrust and a slight pitch up; I could not stop it from exceeding the flap speed without becoming too out of position to continue the approach; which was my primary concern at this point due to our fuel status.At this time; I am genuinely at a loss for what preflight planning step I could have taken to avoid being put in this situation. Because of the winds in ZZZ; I knew it was going to be turbulent but; with the winds approximately 'right down the runway' at DTW and a 12 knot difference between the worst sustained wind and gust factor on the METAR/TAF (much 'better' than the winds we just arrived in ZZZ with); I simply did not judge this threat to be as concerning as it would become. The only thing I can think of that would have at least given me a slightly bigger weather picture would have been to look at a station model plot chart or ask my dispatcher which direction we needed to fly to get to an airport with calmer surface winds however; as I said above; my judgement of how threatening the winds in DTW were before takeoff would still probably not lead me to consider this option; if I was to repeat this scenario.After the first windshear go around; I considered a possible divert with 2100 lbs of fuel but; based on how bad it was in ZZZ (over 100 miles away and just as turbulent/windy); I did not think we could make it anywhere where the winds would be better and even if we could; DTW had a 10;000 ft runway with winds; more or less; straight down the runway so I decided our safest course was to attempt the approach again in DTW.

Air carrier Captain reported several go-arounds due to windshear warnings at DTW; then finally landed during a windshear caution alert on the third approach.

1237108

201502

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

12000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1237108

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I was the pilot monitoring and passing through approximately 12;000 feet we got a right oil strainer clogging annunciator light. Upon checking the engine parameters; the oil pressure was reading high. Shortly thereafter; the oil quantity rapidly decreased to zero. About a minute later; the right engine began vibrating and immediately shut down by itself. There was no indication of fire.I declared an emergency with ATC and requested a return to ZZZ. I accomplished the QRH and we got the engine secured and prepared for the landing. The landing was uneventful and after clearing the runway; I had the fire chief inspect the right engine to see if there was any smoke or fire. He indicated that there was oil all over the cowling but no indication of smoke or fire. I elected to taxi back to the gate to deplane the passengers. I notified dispatch; and all applicable parties.

An MD-80 flight crew experienced an engine failure during climbout at about 12;000 feet and elected to return to the departure airport. The return was uneventful; and the passengers were deplaned at the gate.

1292422

201509

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Class B ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction

1292422

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion

1292423.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

The incident occurred during the landing phase on Runway 36R. We had our right thrust reverser on MEL and my captain mentioned on the approach briefing that he would only deploy the left side thrust reverser. As we were on final approach I mentioned to him as a last minute reminder that the right side thrust reverser was on MEL. As we touched down I could see in my peripheral vision the left thrust lever being pulled back into the shutdown position. As I looked down to confirm this; I noticed from the gauges that the left engine was in fact shutting down. I mentioned this to the flying pilot and asked what had happened. After some confusion; we taxied off the high speed taxiway onto the ramp while checking for any abnormalities of the engine gauges. A few seconds later; ramp control advised us 'we noticed some white smoke coming out of your engine on the rollout'. We acknowledged that statement; taxied to the gate; shut down the right engine and contacted company maintenance. This job develops a repetitive nature from day to day operations and anything that is abnormal to that nature can serve as a big distraction. With any abnormal op or MEL extra care and vigilance must be exercised to avoid a dangerous situation by not meeting the demands required. For example; during the landing phase the majority of our attention is placed outside the aircraft; so the pilot flying relies on muscle memory and specific habits such as deploying both thrust reversers. To change or go against those strong habit formations would cause a big distraction especially during critical phases of flight and ultimately reduce safety. A more thorough briefing in the future will help in situations like this.

Upon landing with the right thrust reverser on MEL; I inadvertently started to move the left thrust lever to shut-off very briefly before realizing the error and moving the thrust lever back to idle. As we exited the high-speed; the engine appeared to be running but I elected to shut it down not knowing if it might be in a partial state of shut-down.While on final; the preceding landing aircraft was slow to exit the runway and tower had cleared another aircraft into position on the runway for takeoff. We had briefed a go-around should it become necessary but the one aircraft cleared and the other was cleared for takeoff and rotated in time for us to make a normal landing. Close in; before touchdown; the First Officer made mention of the one reverser being inoperative as we had briefed we would do before takeoff and before landing prior to initially leaving the departure gate (this was our first leg of the first day of the trip).After getting to the gate; I called Maintenance Control to confer about the incident since I had shut the engine down without the normal 2-minute cool down and also tower had reported there was a brief puff of white smoke from the engine after landing. Maintenance Control was quite confident that no significant parameters had been exceeded and that we should be ok to proceed on our next flight.As is often the case; I believe this incident was the combination of a number of circumstances. We were combining an inoperative system/abnormal procedure with the distraction of a pending go-around situation on the first leg of the first day after an extended time off. With the last second mention of the inoperative reverser; I was focusing so much on 'only the one reverser' that it allowed me to react differently in placing my hand on the thrust lever and responding from muscle-memory as when shutting only one engine down. So much of what we do is based on habitual reactions that we do over and over that it is difficult when we try to break those engrained responses and deal with an inoperative system that requires altering those habits. This circumstance involved an additional distraction with the pending go-around situation and a refocusing at the last second to deal with the abnormality. We must simply remain vigilant and focused in these abnormal situations.

A CRJ-200 Captain shut the left engine down during the landing roll because after guarding its inoperative thrust reverser lever; 'muscle memory' combined with a pre-landing discussion about the inoperative thrust reverser allowed him to unconsciously move the thrust reverser to cutoff after guarding it.

1317708

201512

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

32100.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 2500

Distraction

1317708

Aircraft X

Lavatory

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 7500

1317710.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

We were at FL9800m offset 6 miles right of course on the airway. We received a reroute to a random waypoint then back to the airway flight plan route. When the reroute came; the Captain was out of his seat in the bathroom. The First Officer; the flying pilot; attempted to insert the cleared waypoint into the FMS and at the same time receive a frequency change to contact a second controller. His attempt to multi task caused a spelling error for the Waypoint. The aircraft started a right turn; when it should have turned left. After contacting control; he gave a heading of 240 degrees; to the correct to the waypoint; the error was corrected in the FMS; and the controller cleared us our own Navigation to the waypoint then flight plan route. The rest of the clearance was uneventful. The Captain was briefed on the reroute issue. In this situation there were multiple threats. 1. Language Barrier 2. Clearance reroute in flight. 3. One pilot away from duty station. 4. Task saturation of remaining pilot. This threat would have been trapped with both pilots verifying and checking the reroute clearance. No further comments from ATC have been received.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

First Officer misspelled cleared waypoint into the FMS. The aircraft began a turn in the wrong direction. The error was discovered and corrected.

1094709

201306

0601-1200

MIA.TRACON

FL

VMC

Daylight

TRACON MIA

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1094709

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

We followed pre-departure procedures per FOM and PH; including route verification and departure briefing. After takeoff; when handed over to Departure Control; we were told that we were not supposed to turn on the RNAV departure and instead we were supposed to hold a heading. We explained that we had not received that amended clearance via PDC NOR had the Tower told us about it. ATC's reply was 'It was on the ATIS.' Although I have heard ATIS information say things like 'expect to fly the RNAV departure' or 'expect to fly runway heading;' I have never gotten an amended release to a PDC clearance via ATIS. Out of MIA; in fact; we are sometimes assigned a heading by the Tower before takeoff. NOTE: I am new on the Airbus; and ATIS arrives to us via a piece of paper. I noted the ATIS we got after this event and it was Arrival ATIS. Apparently; this is always the case when requesting ATIS via the MCDU. The 'amended clearance' was on the DEPARTURE ATIS which; in hindsight; is something that we should have gotten over the radio. 1) There should never be an amended clearance delivered over the ATIS; especially if it is not reflected on the PDC. 2) We got arrival ATIS instead of departure ATIS. For # 1: Tell ATC to stop that confusing procedure. PDCs should never be amended via ATIS. For # 2: Emphasize that sometimes airports have different ATIS; one for arrival and one for departures...and put out a bulletin emphasizing the importance of getting the correct information for the next phase of flight.

A320 Captain reports departing MIA without a revision to their PDC issued via Departure ATIS. ATIS requested via ACARS is Arrival ATIS and did not contain the revision.

1293808

201509

1201-1800

ZDV.ARTCC

CO

28000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZDV

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Class A ZDV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1293808

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1294038.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Beginning the KIPPR THREE arrival into DEN; ATC assigned FL280. Prior to reaching SUSHE; ATC assigned descend via the KIPPR THREE arrival. Pilot Flying (PF) started descent from FL280 prior to passing SUSHE; which had the restriction of FL300 or above. Pilot Monitoring (PM) advised ATC of the descent to which ATC responded 'Roger'. Passing through FL200; ATC inquired as to why the descent was started prior to SUSHE. The PM explained that given our altitude being lower than the restriction at SUSHE; we had interpreted we could begin descending. ATC responded that we were supposed to maintain FL280 until after SUSHE. ATC then handed us off to the next controller; and we continued on the arrival; meeting all altitude and speed restrictions. The flight concluded with no more issues/deviations.There was a misinterpretation of what was expected at SUSHE. Given that the aircraft was assigned FL280; lower than the crossing restriction at SUSHE; the PF interpreted that there was no addition restrictions and began decent to meet the subsequent altitude/speed restrictions. It wasn't until later that ATC explained we needed to maintain FL280 until SUSHE; regardless of the published altitude.The flight crew should spend more time briefing the arrival; which may have allowed us to recognize the unique situation. From there; an inquiry can be made to ATC as to what is expected at SUSHE or other applicable fixes. Another mitigation strategy would be to hold off on descending until passing the first fix with a crossing restriction when given 'descend via' when the aircraft is at a lower altitude; unless confirmed by ATC. In addition; if ATC clears 'Cross SUSHE at FL280; then descend via...' in a similar nonstandard situation; it would have been clear as to what the expectation was for the arrival.

Also; since our altitude as it pertained to the arrival was somewhat nonstandard; a clearance of perhaps; 'cross SUSHE at FL 280; then descend via the KIPPR 3 arrival' would have helped as well.

A flight was cleared to descend and maintain FL280 on the DEN KIPPR 3 STAR; 2;000 feet below the charted SUSHE FL300 constraint. The confused crew continued the descent to cross ANCHR near FL240. ATC queried the crew about the continued descend below FL280 prior to SUSHE.

1286949

201508

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

15000.0

Mixed

5

Daylight

10000

Center ZZZ

Fractional

Embraer Legacy 600 (EMB135BJ)

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Altimeter

Embraer

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 600

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1286949

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

Climbing out of ZZZ; I was instructed to turn direct to ZZZ1 passing 15;000. My Altimeter in the airplane showed 15;000 and the airplane started a smart turn to ZZZ1. As soon as the plane started to turn; the Controller asked what I was doing and why I was turning. I told her that I was turning toward ZZZ1 as instructed. She then told me that I was only at 14;900. I was very confused; because my Altimeter showed 15;000. I then verified the Altimeter setting; and it was correct on all three gauges. At that point I initiated an expeditious climb to reach 15;000. The Controller and I had several back and forth discussions on the altitude. I rebooted the system on board; and after that; the altitude read correctly. The next day; I was in the same plane; and it did the very same thing to me again. This time I caught it before any terrain or compliance issues came into play. Rebooted the system; and did not have any issues after then.

Pilot was queried by Controller why he was turning his EMB-600 Legacy aircraft at 14;900 instead of 15;000 as directed. Pilot noted all three altimeters did read 15;000. They rebooted the system onboard and the altimeter read correctly. The next day the same aircraft had the same condition. They rebooted the system and no further issues arose.

1757905

202008

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1757905

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During boarding we noticed door strap not fully retracted into housing. I wouldn't normally think this was a big thing but this is the 2nd time in as many weeks that I noticed the door strap not retracted. The earlier incident however caused a delay due to door being closed with strap not fully retracted resulting in damage to safety strap housing. I suspect this strap being more often used by cabin cleaners when aircraft is being sprayed which happens every day and in some cases multiple times a day.

Flight Attendant stated a door strap would not fully retract.

1837663

202109

0001-0600

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

IMC

Turbulence

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Takeoff / Launch

Vectors

Class B ZZZZ

Main Gear Wheel

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1837663

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1837665.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

On takeoff roll ZZZ-ZZZ1 at (XA05L); we went through a large flock of birds. I observed numerous birds illuminated by the landing lights passing by both sides of the aircraft. We simultaneously heard several thumps as birds impacted the aircraft nose area. Considering the quantity of birds and impacts; I expeditiously decided to reject the takeoff in the interest of safety; concerned about the possibility of bird ingestion by the engines. Windshield wipers were on high in moderate rain with somewhat reduced visibility. Estimated speed at the time of the event was between 105-120 knots. We applied the rejected takeoff procedure; stopping with approximately 2;500 feet remaining; notified ATC; and initiated the rejected takeoff QRH checklist. Initially we expected more moderate brake temperatures; and did a 180 turn at tower's direction; expecting that we would later be able to taxi clear. We stopped; completed the Recommended Brake Cooling Schedule charts in the QRH Performance Inflight section; and monitored the Brake Temperature Monitoring System (BTMS) display. As the temperatures increased and we saw brake temp values increasing above 4-5; a decision was made to remain in place and request fire trucks; which were dispatched to our location; arriving after several minutes. In hindsight; remaining stopped straight ahead may have been the best option; however the turn did enable the fire trucks to approach us from the front; which aided in coordination; and possibly safety. The BTMS indications peaked at 7 on most brakes; 8 on two; and one eventually reached 9. The fire trucks monitored us for a time; seeing no indication of fire or smoke; but eventually informed us that we had 2 flat tires; one on each truck. At this point I shut down both engines and we ran the after landing checklist. We informed [the company] and the duty officer what had occurred; as well as coordinating through tower control; who was helpful at relaying information. The fire trucks continued to monitor us as the brakes cooled to the normal range and we coordinated with maintenance to be towed back to parking. Once the brakes had cooled; and the tug crew was on scene; the fire trucks were released; and maintenance towed us slowly to parking IAW their procedures. Maintenance inspections later found bloodstains on the leading edge slats #2 and #9. I wish to point out that the First officer performed in an exemplary fashion; providing extremely helpful and timely inputs and suggestions; his excellent CRM skills undoubtedly contributed to the safe outcome for this event. Thank you for your time. Multiple Bird Strikes on Takeoff Roll; leading to a rejected takeoff.Bird control at ZZZ; bird strike events are frequent

At (XA05 L) we were cleared for takeoff from runway XX. It was a rainy night after a typhoon had passed through; and although the wind was calm; we needed our wipers on for the rain. We were accelerating normally; I called 80 knots and the captain acknowledged. A few seconds later when my eyes were scanning the engine instruments I heard several thumps against the fuselage and heard the captain say 'Birds.' He later told me he said this when he saw many medium-sized white streaks pass through our lights. I saw the captain pull the thrust levers to idle and say 'Reject.' I believe we were about 110 knots (V1 of 143 knots was well above our speed on the speed scale) but I did not notice the exact speed. After a normal RTO procedure; the captain called and I completed the QRH procedure for Rejected Takeoff. Tower instructed us to make a 180 degree turn on the runway; and after the turn we noticed that the BTMS was climbing more than expected.I calculated for a 120 knots reject at our takeoff weight (345;000 lbs) we should see a BTMS Indication of 5. When the BTMS indication on several brakes increased above 5; I called Tower and requested the fire services to come check for fire and smoke from the brakes. After the fire services arrived and told us (via Tower because fire services did not have an aviation frequencies radio) there was no smoke or fire; we saw one wheel (#2) indicate BTMS 9; and two wheels (#3 and #4) indicate BTMS 8; so asked fire services if any tires were flat. They told us that one wheel on the left side was flat; and at that point the captain decided to start the APU and shut off the engines as it was clear that we would not be taxiing back. I tried calling Company ramp/maintenance on the frequency on the chart but we got no answer; so we asked Tower to relay information to our maintenance and request assistance. Fire services then relayed to us that a tire on the right side was also flat. Maintenance arrived around time XA50 and plugged in to the intercom to let us know they would inspect and decide on a course of action. At XB25 with BTMS in the range of 1-2; they started slowly towing us back to the ramp. We exited the runway at around XC05 and set the parking brake on the ramp at 1825 Z.Multiple Bird strikes on takeoff roll causing a rejected takeoffAirport authority should be better at controlling the birds at ZZZ airport

Flight Crew reported multiple bird strikes and rejected the take off causing 2 main wheel fuse plugs to melt and deflate the tires; requiring a tow back to the ramp.

1832343

202108

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

IMC

Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZZZZ; Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Climb; Initial Climb

Vectors

Class B ZZZZ1

Normal Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting

1832343

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

After the Pilot Flying called for 'Slats retract; after takeoff checklist;' I promptly moved the flap/slat handle to RET and after slats retraction we received the Level 1 Alert HYD 1 OFF. After running the QRH and as a crew we elected to continue to ZZZZ. Once in cruise we discussed potential outcomes of our situation we planned that we may have a total HYD 1 Failure and discussed what we wanted to do if we did. After planning to configure early to see if our problem would manifest into a failure we did indeed have a total HYD 1 FAIL level 2. We [requested priority handling] with ZZZZ Approach asked to continue on our current heading for 5-10 minutes and we would get back with them after we accomplished our checklists. We were given Runway XXR as an option; given that this runway was the longest we elected to utilize this option. We ran the QRH procedure and discussed potential threats and issues. Given that our nose wheel steering would be limited to the left we elected to stop on the runway and request to be towed in via a tug. We informed ZZZZ Approach of this issue and let them know souls on board and approximately how much fuel we had remaining. After being handed off to ZZZZ Tower I once again reminded them we were not going to be able to clear the runway due to our failed condition. I thought this might be important because of the restricted visibility and poor runway conditions so no one would commence a takeoff or an approach with our airplane parked on an active runway. Tower understood clearly our intentions there was no miscommunication. Our approach was normal and normal procedures were utilized in the event. The airplane performed exactly as we anticipated. After engine cool down; assuring the brakes we not too hot and we started the APU we let Tower know our engines were shut down and the aircraft was safe to approach with our company tug. As Company Maintenance personnel entered through the FWD avionics compartment and communicated with Company ground personnel via his handheld radio and would sit in the CA (Captain)'s seat while in control of the aircraft's brakes. I continued to perform Pilot Monitoring duties to obtain a taxi clearance and monitored the aircraft until we set the parking brake at Gate XX. The event overall was a well orchestrated event; [the] Captain showed excellent leadership; CRM and cockpit management skills. [The] Captain reacted calmly and confidently as I backed him up during the process. I posed questions and [a] hypothetical to ensure we had all of our bases covered and [the] Captain was very respective the few I had to offer. [The] Captain demonstrated by example exactly how a captain should react and respond to a potential dangerous situation. I would also like to note that ZZZZ Approach and Tower performed above expectations despite a slight language barrier we all had an understanding of what we needed and they were able to provide that with ease. Lastly ZZZZ Company Operations performed flawlessly we couldn't have asked for anything more. After landing in ZZZZ; Maintenance personnel identified the issue right away it was stated it was an 'auto brake controller'; that caused the #1 HYD system to leak all of its fluid and fail. I have not followed up to see if this indeed was the case after maintenance completed its final inspection and repair.

MD-11 First Officer reported hydraulic system 1 failure due to a faulty auto brake controller.

1166993

201404

1201-1800

ILM.Airport

NC

7.0

1000.0

Haze / Smoke; 10

Glare

4000

Tower ILM

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Visual Approach; None

Class D ILM

Tower ILM

Personal

Amateur/Home Built/Experimental

1.0

Part 91

Aerobatics

Class D ILM

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 500; Flight Crew Type 500

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

1166993

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

While on a scenic flight from ILM I piloted a Cessna 172 with 2 passengers (3 souls on board) on a route following the coast from the north end of Wrightsville beach. I was using flight following and in communication with Wilmington Departure. While approaching the coastline from ILM I noticed what appeared to be a large light green bird near ground level. I lost sight of it and I asked the passengers if they could see it and they could not. I continued to the north end of Wrightsville beach at about 2;000 AGL. I turned right following the coast and reduced altitude to about 1;200 AGL. At approximately 7.0 NM on a radial of 138 from ILM I notice a lime green aircraft low between me and the beach. I was approximately one half NM from the beach over the Atlantic Ocean following the coast on a parallel course with the beach and the other aircraft. I was able to keep the aircraft in sight and maintained visual separation until I reached the south end of Wrightsville Beach. I contacted Wilmington Control and asked if they had any other aircraft in the area. Control advised me that they were not receiving any transponder signal from any other aircraft nor were they in radio communication with anyone else along the beach. The other aircraft was performing aerobatic maneuvers such as rolls and loops. The other aircraft was much faster than the Cessna that I was flying. As I observed the other aircraft I attempted to turn and bank in a way to make my wings more visible to the other aircraft. Although the other aircraft was turning back and forth and at times flying in the opposite direction the other crafts general direction was the same as mine. At times I lost sight of the other aircraft and once decided to climb hoping to be above the other pilots operating area only to regain sight as the aircraft was turning left and climbing directly at me at a distance of less than 500 FT. Again I maneuvered in an attempt to make myself visible. I did not get any indication that the other craft saw me. I lost sight of him as he flew past my right side even as I turned right trying to keep the aircraft in sight. I turned back to the left and could not see the other aircraft. I decided that I may be more visible if I were lower over the water so I dropped down to approximately 500 FT. By this time my passengers were beginning to get airsick from the maneuvers. In just a few min we spotted the aircraft directly in front of us at a distance of 1 to 2 miles and higher. At this time we were approaching Carolina Beach. As we were approaching Carolina Beach I increased my altitude to 1;500 FT. The aircraft again started performing Acrobatic maneuvers looping and at the top of the loop coming directly at us. Again I banked to try to show my wings to the other pilot. The other aircraft looped 3 or 4 times in a row and rolled out of the last loop on top again heading directly at us. I banked to the right trying to keep the aircraft in sight and at the same time again exposing the highest profile so we would be more visible. As the aircraft passed by on our left and at a high rate of speed the distance was less than 300 FT and we lost sight of it again. At this time we were near Fort Fisher and spotted the aircraft behind us and on our right at the same altitude. He came up on our right and slowed to match our speed. At this time I could tell it was a lime green small experimental aircraft similar to a Sonix. The aircraft stayed next to us for about 30 seconds and then banked to the right and we never saw it again. I again contacted Control and told him that I felt I would have to write a Pilot Report. The Controller asked me what direction and alt that I last saw the other aircraft. I reported that it was last seen it flying north east at approximately 1;500 AGL. The remainder of the flight and the return flight back to ILM later that evening was uneventful and very pleasant. Although I did everything I knew possible short of abandoning the flight there were several times that visual separation with the other aircraft was not possible because of the steep and erratic flying of the other pilot. I am sure that if this event were seen from the ground it would have looked like a WWII dog fight.

C172 pilot experiences several encounters and an NMAC with a small experimental aircraft performing aerobatic maneuvers off the North Carolina coast near ILM.

1288167

201508

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1288167

Aircraft X

Door Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Boarding; Deplaning

1288216.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Evacuated

Aircraft

During preflight the upper deck cargo fire suppression activated. After upper deck cargo deck door was opened; it was not possible keep Halon from entering the forward vestibule area. To keep the crew from getting sick from breathing Halon; at my insistence; I escorted the forward crew off of the aircraft while passengers were still on board the back part of the aircraft. This was a Combi. No passengers were affected.

Flight Attendants in back called and said they heard a loud POP. First Officer came back and opened sliding door and thick vapor came billowing out and filled vestibule. Mechanics and rampers came within minutes and opened big cargo Door and found that the two 125lb Halon bottles were discharging from the ceiling. I started to feel very lightheaded. Captain told me to step out on the stairs right away to get fresh air. I realized that I was in violation and stepped back in. By the time most passengers were done deplaning I had to get off again to get fresh air. There were still passengers; but I could not stand it any more and had to get air.

Test button activated the upper cargo deck Halon fire suppression system during preflight for a Combi modified aircraft; Crew evacuated the aircraft.

1498720

201711

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

36000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Cooling Fan; any cooling fan

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 3564; Flight Crew Type 1307

1498720

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

Shortly after leveling off at cruise I noticed a smell of electrical smoke. We called the cabin to ask if there was anything in the oven. He replied no and said he smelled the smoke too. It persisted and got worse. Within approximately three minutes we [advised ATC]; made an emergency descent and landed in ZZZ.Dispatch was immediately notified via sat phone of our situation and intentions to divert.The cockpit oxygen masks were removed but were not donned. There was no visible smoke; only the smell. The QRH was accomplished up to the point of troubleshooting the source of the smoke as there was very little time left before landing.An overweight landing was accomplished with a smooth touchdown and minimal braking. No injuries or ailments were reported from the crew or the passengers. An orderly deplaning was accomplished at [the gate].Maintenance personnel identified a tripped circuit breaker for the equipment cooling fan. The fan was removed and had evidence of smoke and soot on the rotor vanes as well as the same smell experienced in the cabin.

A Boeing 757 captain reported an electrical odor smell evident in the cockpit and cabin. The flight completed a successful diversion to a suitable airport.

1699943

201911

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Pitot-Static System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 383

Distraction; Troubleshooting

1699943

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 292

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1700001.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During my preflight walk around; I was looking at the left side landing light. It looked inoperative but with the side light it was hard to tell. So I looked at the right side to compare what it should look like and confirmed that the left side was out. So at that point I continued on with my walk around. Once I got back up to the flight deck I informed the Captain of the inoperative landing light where he then completed the MEL with Maintenance Control. After pushback and engine start; it was noticed that the Captain's pitot heat light was illuminated. I continued with my After Start Flow and then we did the Before Taxi Checklist. Once that was completed we ran the QRH for the Captain Pitot light and determined it needed to be MELed. Once the paperwork was completed we continued to the runway.During the takeoff roll; where I was the Pilot Flying; the Captain called for the reject around 70 kts. We cleared the runway and ran brake cooling and determined it was safe to proceed back to the gate. Once at the gate the Captain asked me to do a quick walk around of the aircraft. As soon as I got down to the aircraft I noticed that the Captain-side pitot tube was missing from the aircraft. I was not part of the conversation that determined when the pitot tube may have departed the aircraft; but was informed that I must have missed that it was missing during my walk around. Shortly after that I recalled that after looking at the lights I must have never went back to the Captain side of the nose to start the preflight from my normal starting point. This event was a great reminder that when doing [an] important task; once you get distracted you should always start from the beginning and start the task over again so important items aren't missed.

FO (First Officer) returned from exterior preflight and informed me that the left fixed landing light was inoperative. We confirmed this and MELed it. After pushback; we accomplished After Start Flow and the 'Captain Pitot' light stayed on. Circuit breaker was in; and we contacted Dispatch and Maintenance via phone to MEL this. We were able to continue per the MEL and taxied for takeoff. On the takeoff roll; I noticed; at about 70 kts on the FO's side; that I had no airspeed indication. I rejected the takeoff at that point; we cleared the runway; ran the brake cooling numbers; and requested taxi back to the gate. A three minute cooling at the gate was returned.At the gate; after writing up the discrepancy; I asked the FO to do a walk around; as we were going to terminate the aircraft and likely would not take this aircraft out. He returned immediately and informed me that the entire pitot tube was missing. I was met on the jet way by Company Maintenance Personnel; working on another aircraft. After discussing various possible ways the pitot tube could have been torn off; we suspected that it had happened in or out of the gate the previous night; or on the remote pad where the aircraft overnighted. Shortly thereafter; the actual pitot tube was found on the Ramp at the remote pad. We simply missed the pitot tube damage on the originating exterior preflight. We clearly missed the damaged/missing pitot tube on preflight. The FO could have been distracted by the actual runway turnoff light in his face; or by attempting to tell if; in fact; a left fixed landing light was inoperative. Regardless; we missed the damage. We MELed the cockpit indication correctly and applied all MEL procedures properly; to my knowledge.

B737-700 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff due to a lack of airspeed indication on the Captain's side.

1221799

201411

1801-2400

I90.TRACON

TX

1000.0

Night

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B IAH

TRACON I90

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B IAH

Facility I90.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Distraction

1221799

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

I had been working Final South 'O' for the 3rd time that day. Even though I had not worked Finals for about 3 weeks. The volume was steady and the aircraft were fast and not on the STARs (contrary to the SOP). The feeder was training and by not following the SOP; created a lot more communication for the Final Controller. When the aircraft are on a STAR; it is easier to use fixes as crossing points to slow down after; descend after and depart after. But when aircraft are vectors; then the final CPC has to constantly work to descend and vector aircraft thus that causes more communication and increased workload. Thus if I90 chooses to pack them in; then it becomes sometimes difficult. Nonetheless; I vectored the left downwind Aircraft X to turn to a heading of 290 and join the 27 localizer. I can't remember if I gave him 2000 in the turn. However; when I assured the 2000; there was plenty of distance and time for the aircraft to get down (approx. 20 miles from IAH and in the turn). I noticed the Aircraft X; after some time; that he was still at 4100; so I inquired as to whether he was descending. He mentioned that he was and that I had just gave him the descent clearance. Now the aircraft was about 17 from the airport (straight in) and I turned him to a 250 heading to allow the Final Center CPC room for his aircraft to get down. The Aircraft X decided to chat about the heading; which took up valuable time. I slowed him to 180kts and asked him if he saw the airport or the Aircraft Y ahead of him. I believe at about 2200 he saw the airport so I cleared him for the Visual Approach and told him join at REDOK (FAF). At that time he was about 2.5 behind the Aircraft Y but still about 50kts faster. I told him to slow as much as practical and he said that he was coming through 145kts and then saw Aircraft Y. I re-cleared him to follow Aircraft Y and shipped him to the tower.First and foremost; training has to be done via the SOP. We as receiving controllers don't expect anything negative to come from a poor feed; but as a result it becomes a contributing factor as to more talking and vectoring. The Aircraft X pilot has to be more vigilant when inside the finals box. Asking questions and delaying instruction leads to potential issues. As a result Aircraft X had to go around; thus causing him delays and fuel. I failed to insure his descent to 2000 and his speed behind Aircraft Y. However; (I have not seen the replay; so I reserve my comments) I do believe that there was no loss of separation because of 3 factors; I had Aircraft X going direct REDOK (1000 feet above) and Aircraft Y was already past REDOK; (thus passing behind); before REDOK and joining the final Aircraft X saw Aircraft Y and was told to follow and the tower was using visual rules.

I90 Approach Controller describes a feed from a trainee that causes him to work harder then he should because the trainee is not following the SOP.

1642127

201904

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Windshear; 10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

None

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 274; Flight Crew Type 104

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1642127

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Student and CFI were practicing student's landings on Runway XXR at ZZZ. Prior to the flight; CFI obtained a weather briefing that indicated manageable wind conditions were forecast for the flight. Student was preparing for his first progress check (pre-solo) and working on demonstrating control of the airplane in the traffic pattern; during approach to land; and during the stages of landing. During the first three touch-and-go landings; wind was calm and student made successful and stabilized approaches and landings. CFI allowed student to fly the airplane with minimal assistance throughout the flight. During the downwind leg prior to the incident; wind was reported by Tower as a direct crosswind (040 @ 9 kts). CFI allowed student to continue to fly the airplane in order to evaluate the student's crosswind landing skills. Student had trouble with centerline control on final and CFI took control of the airplane; guiding the airplane back toward centerline before giving control back to the student. Student entered ground effect off centerline; regained centerline in the flare; but touched down just off centerline. Student did not continue to use crosswind correction during ground roll and both CFI and student observed an unexpected gust of wind; causing a wing to rise during the ground roll. CFI did not correct in-time and the airplane continued to veer from centerline further until it left the runway and rolled into the grass and down a shallow embankment. Both CFI and student were uninjured and the plane rolled to a stop in the grass. Following this; CFI shut the engine down and both occupants exited the aircraft safely. Maintenance personnel from the flight school inspected the aircraft and runway 10 minutes later and observed no damage to the aircraft or runway environment.In the future; this could be corrected by stopping the chain of events that lead to the incident. CFI should have recognized the danger of allowing his pre-solo student (no matter how advanced) to deal with strong crosswinds. The CFI also should have taken control from the student earlier in the flare as it became clear the airplane would touchdown off centerline. Alternatively; the CFI could have called for or initiated a go-around when the flare appeared to be unstable. The CFI also should have recognized the student's lack of understanding of wind correction and initiated the wind correction sooner during the ground roll.

C172 flight instructor reported encountering crosswind during landing rollout causing aircraft to depart runway.

1690568

201910

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

IMC

Cloudy

Daylight

Air Carrier

Airliner 99

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class C ZZZ

Air/Ground Communication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1690568

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I lost comms while flying IMC into ZZZZ; they said as soon as insight let them know and they'd clear me for visual. Hit some turbulence comms started making a large squelch sound. Tried switching comms; switching head set to first officer connection; checking squelch; and tried using hand mike and intercom . Still nothing squeaked 7600 became visual with field entered the down wind and began the visual approach. Just to see I put my head phones in phone and hand mike in mic location made contact went back to 1200 and they cleared me to land. They said they could here me making calls the whole time. Checked all headphones and intercoms after landing all working again.

Captain reported losing communications on approach in IMC conditions.

1214257

201410

0601-1200

JAX.Airport

FL

0.0

Daylight

Tower JAX

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

None

Class C JAX

Facility JAX.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Maintenance

1214257

Facility JAX.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Maintenance

1214260.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

OPS vehicle called local control (training in progress) to request to go into the RSA to sweep up some glass from a broken light. He said he would be on the asphalt but clear of the runway by taxiway Juliet. This was established between several transmissions. OPS confirmed more than once he would be clear of the runway. At no time did he mention or did we approve him to cross runway 8/26. Air carrier was informed of the men and vehicle on the west side of the runway. OPS then proceeded to cross the runway to the north side without permission. Before local could key up to tell air carrier to go around they were telling local they were going around on their own due to the vehicle. OPS then called local to try and confirm what he was approved to do. He was already across the runway and on the north side which is not by any taxiway like he originally stated. We could have been a little clearer on communications with the OPS vehicle about what he wanted to do. Even then though; we cannot read his mind that he needed to cross the runway. So if he never would have mentioned this to us we wouldn't know.

Aircraft X on final for RWY 26 when OPS vehicle called Local for coordination. OPS requested to sweep glass from a broken runway edge light and stated that they would be on the pavement but at no time across the runway edge line infringing onto the runway. At no point in time during OPS request did they mention crossing runway 26 and OPS was instructed to hold short of the runway at all times. There was some confusion apparently because OPS really wanted to sweep glass across and down the runway and needed to cross in doing so. This was not requested to Local control and OPS was told to proceed with their operations. OPS turned out onto taxiway J and then proceeded to cross runway 26 while Aircraft X was on short final. Aircraft X was re-sequenced by Local and landed without incident.Recommendation is that OPS be fully aware if a runway crossing is granted or denied by Local/Tower.

JAX Controllers report of a runway incursion by an airport vehicle with an aircraft on final that goes around due to the vehicle's position.

1628839

201903

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb; Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 87; Flight Crew Type 1731

1628839

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On takeoff; once takeoff power was set; a dirty sock/gym odor was prevalent till about 7-8 minutes into the flight. After approximately 7-8 minutes the odor dissipated. All systems were normal; and recorded the information needed for Maintenance. Write up was made; and Maintenance met the aircraft for a fumes form to be filled out.

B757-200 Captain reported dirty sock odor for 7-8 minutes after takeoff.

1697658

201911

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

500.0

Tower EWR

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Final Approach

Class B EWR

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Climb

Class B EWR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying

1697658

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure

On final approach; fully configured and cleared for approach to Runway 4R; at approximately 500 feet we visually acquired a fixed wing aircraft departing Linden airport in a climb toward us. We received a TCAS RA and began to execute the climb maneuver when the RA terminated resulting in zero gain of altitude. We continued to an uneventful landing and reported the RA to Tower after landing.

Pilot reported receiving a climb RA at 500 feet on final approach to EWR.

1303547

201510

0601-1200

CLT.Tower

NC

VMC

Tower CLT

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 36L

Landing

STAR ADENA 3

Class B CLT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Human-Machine Interface

1303547

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

The entire flight was uneventful up until the approach into CLT. On-time departure; smooth flight; and what looked to be an on-time arrival. The Captain was the Pilot Monitoring and the First Officer was Pilot Flying. We set up early for the ADENA3 arrival into CLT and placed the ILS 36L into the FMS based on prior experience of having that runway assigned on this arrival. The approach briefing was completed prior to FL180. Upon checking in with CLT approach; we were assigned 36C. I personally was surprised as I know this is mainly used for departures. I changed the runway in the FMS and placed the new LOC frequency in standby. (Just habit from flying the 200 for most of my career; I understand the 900 will auto tune the correct LOC frequency in the active.) The First Officer (FO) then briefed the approach for 36C.We were vectored onto final and cleared the visual for 36C and told to hold 180 kts until the FAF GLASI. Just prior to GLASI; I observed an aircraft taking off and checked in with Tower. She advised that we were cleared to land and that another aircraft would be departing prior to us landing. At about 2 miles before the runway; I recited the go around calls to refresh the FO on what to say because I had that feeling it was going to be close. We had just descended below the 'minimums' aircraft call; and the aircraft on the runway had not rotated; I was just about to call tower when tower stated to 'Go Around.'The go around was executed successfully and we were handed off to Approach. We were assigned 36L now. As Pilot Monitoring; I finished all checklists; input the ILS 36L into the FMS and placed the new LOC frequency in standby. Since we had already briefed that approach; we discussed the main highlights- LOC frequency; MDA adjustment; etc. Then I called the Flight Attendants to advise what happened and the time until next landing. Next; I made a brief announcement to the passengers - I felt the need to do so since the go around was made at such a low altitude; I did not want them to be too scared or worried.Approach asked if we wanted to switch to 36R; but I opted no. Reason #1; we had already switched runways; I didn't want to keep switching frequencies and Reason #2; our fuel was getting close to touching our Reserve fuel. I just wanted to land as soon as possible. The error that I made was I forgot to switch back to white needles. I have been trying to use the 900's feature of hitting APR mode without switching the frequencies from Standby to Active; as you do in the 200 and 700. I set up approaches as if I am in the 200 so I do not forget to switch frequencies if I do switch planes; but I told myself I need to learn and adjust to all aircraft and use all the different features. Not realizing though; since I had not switched back to white needles; the aircraft did not auto sequence to the new 36L LOC frequency. When given the final vector to join 36L LOC; the aircraft intercepted 36C before I realized what was going on. I was looking at my MFD and saw the aircraft was not on the white line (inbound course for 36L) and just as I realized what was happening; Approach controller asked which runway LOC we were on. I apologized and told him we were correcting. By the sound of his voice; Approach was not upset. He handed us off to tower and said to have a good day. I know he understood we had just gone around from 36C and were under a higher workload.We had a stable approach; landed on 36L; and taxied in the gate without any issues.FO; as pilot flying; disengaged autopilot to get aircraft on correct LOC quicker while Pilot monitoring corrected navigation set-up. First; make sure to switch back to white needles after go around and auto tune! Second; always double check the LOC ID on the MFD lower left screen. I usually always state the LOC ID; but this event proves that under high workloads; there are areas that are missed that would not be missed during calmer flights.

CRJ-900 Captain is told to go-around by the Tower due to a departing aircraft still on the runway. On the next approach the runway is changed by ATC; but the frequency is not changed by the crew; resulting in lining up on the center runway instead of the left. The Captain and ATC detect the deviation at the same moment and the crew moves over to the left runway.

1157855

201403

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Class C ZZZ

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1157855

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

[During approach we] got a Flaps Fail caution message selecting flaps 30 on a left base prior to landing. Retracted the gear and notify ATC to have some vectors close to the airport to analyze and develop a plan (weather was not a factor being VFR; just the fuel being 2;300 LBS). First Officer (pilot not flying) run the Flaps Fail QRH. Declared emergency with ATC to have fire and rescue vehicles standing by. [We] advised Flight Attendant of the abnormal situation. Also; made announcement to the passengers of the failure and the faster than normal speed on landing and the presence of fire rescue vehicles. Landing and rollout was uneventful.

Regional jet Captain experiences a flaps fail caution message during approach when flaps are selected to 30. A go-around is initiated and the following approach and landing is conducted with flaps less than 30.

1507480

201712

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

10

Daylight

25000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 220; Flight Crew Type 220

Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1507480

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

I went for a short flight just to get out and enjoy the day. Flew over to [destination airport]; landed and got 23 gallons of fuel. At XA:13PM I departed; heading back to [departure airport]. At approximately XA:28; I called the Tower who told me to enter a 2 mile left base for Runway 1. Winds were calm. About 4 minutes later; 4.5 miles out; I turned on the fuel pump; landing light; and lowered the gear. The right green light did not light. First thought was that it was the bulb but thought maybe it needed to be cycled. Raised the gear lever; then lowered it again. Same result. Swapped the left gear bulb; which was working and showing left gear locked; with the right gear bulb. Still not lit. Put the bulbs back in their proper place. Gear lever still down. Tower cleared me to land Runway 1. I acknowledged; still thinking about what to do. Called the Tower back and told them my issue and requested a low flyby so they could visually check the gear. They confirmed that the right main gear was partially extended. I raised the gear while the tower had me in sight and they told me the right main never fully retracted. That is when I knew this was real and not just a light or switch problem. The Tower had me do a 360 on the downwind so they could again check the gear visually. Right main still not down. Pulled out my emergency checklist for gear issues. Tried yawing the plane; bouncing it up and down in the air and using the emergency extension handle.The Tower suggested that I land in the grass next to Runway 28. I needed to see that first; not realizing we had enough grass to land in. I requested a low pass on 28 and was cleared by the Tower. Once I had a visual on the landing spot; I knew it could be done. Gear was up. I was verbally confirming to myself the opposite of what I usually say out loud: gear UP and no green lights. Came around on a long final to get a stabilized approach and have enough time to slow down. Flying over the mall on approach I thought; this is it; the real thing. I get one chance at a good short field; soft field approach and landing. I tightened my shoulder straps and opened the door latch at the top.I knew I had to clear the final taxiway Charlie before shutting down the engine. Over Charlie; I shut down the throttle and confirmed no green lights; prepared for the impact. Pulled the mixture and felt the plane touch the grass. It wasn't the short quick stop I expected. I still thought the plane was sliding on its belly and it started veering to the right towards the fence. I tried left rudder thinking I was moving enough for the rudder to steer. At the last second; the plane ground-looped; missing the ditch and fence. Once stopped; I turned off all electrical; unbelted and got out of the plane. It was then that I realized the left main and front gear had come down. That was why I didn't stop as fast and why I veered right.

A PA-28 pilot reported not being able to extend the Right Main Gear. After troubleshooting; the pilot attempted what he thought was a gear up landing in the grassy area next to the runway; but he was surprised when he touched down with the Nose Gear and Left Main Gear extended.

1749931

202007

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Light Transport

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 490

Distraction; Other / Unknown; Workload

1749931

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Other Post Flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Human Factors

I flew a trip ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ in which the aircraft was past the due date for the weighing requirement in 14 CFR 135.185. While doing preflight planning I happened to overlook the due date; which was documented by an aircraft status sheet in the aircraft's logbook folder as well as in the aircraft's AFM. I believe the oversight was due to distraction from saturation associated with additional COVID-19 guidelines; limited recency of experience also due to COVID-19; as well as mental saturation due to the additional considerations and extra planning that goes alongside flying into a complicated mountainous terrain airport like ZZZ1.

Pilot reported flying a trip with the aircraft being over due on the CFR 135.185 weighing requirement.

1089788

201305

1201-1800

ATL.Airport

GA

0.0

Daylight

Ground ATL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

Taxi

AHRS/ND

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1089788

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1090014.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

Taxi

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Airport

Ambiguous

We were cleared to taxi into position and hold for wake turbulence due to prior heavy aircraft departure. Due to the large amount of rebar used in the new runway addition on 27R; we received a nuisance fault message. We told the Tower that we could not accept a takeoff clearance and asked to taxi off of the runway. The fault cleared before we exited the runway. We got back into line and departed a short time later without any abnormalities. The thrust levers were never advanced for the purpose of takeoff. In hindsight; I should have contacted Maintenance Control and possibly documented the nuisance fault. Being that the fault cleared itself so quickly; we did believe that it was an issue. Since the thrust levers were never advanced for the purpose of takeoff; we did not feel the need to notify the company via filing a report.

We were given a taxi into position and hold [Runway] 27R at LC clearance by Atlanta Tower. After we taxied into position and held on the runway; aircraft gave us an 'EFIS COMP MON' caution message.......and 3 red flags appeared on Captain's PFD. The flags continued to remain on Captain's PFD as we held on Runway 27R. After discussing issue amongst one another; Captain made decision not to continue; and asked me to inform Atlanta Tower that we would need to exit the runway. Captain advanced thrust levers to taxi aircraft off of runway as ATC granted our clearance to exit and get back in line. As we taxied forward; Atlanta Tower asked us if we needed assistance; I replied negative and Captain explained to Atlanta Tower that the rebar in the runway caused us to have interference in our flight instruments. After taxiing off runway; Captain's PFD was cleared of any red flags; and 'EFIS COMP MON' caution message cleared as well. Thrust levers were never brought to the full take off power position; as decision to taxi off runway was made upon discovery of red flags. We got back in line and when it was our turn; ATC cleared us for takeoff Runway 27R; rest of flight was uneventful.

CRJ200 flight crew reports being cleared to line up and wait on Runway 27R at ATL; then noting an 'EFIS COMP MON' caution message....and 3 red flags on Captain's PFD. The crew taxies clear of the runway and the problem disappears. The next attempt at takeoff is successful. The Captain believes the rebar in the new runway extension is causing interference with the aircraft compass system [AHRS].

1736397

202003

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

180.0

5.0

4000.0

VMC

6

Daylight

4000

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Initial Climb

Direct

Class C ZZZ

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 150; Flight Crew Type 90

Human-Machine Interface

1736397

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

On multiple occasions HDG on Garmin G1000 has 'X-ed' out for 2 seconds to several minutes. This causes me to cancel my IFR training mission multiple times and return to base. I have attempted to have this issue resolved by several certified avionic technicians to no avail. After online research I have found blogs describing the same issue; so this is not happening to just me. My avionics technicians have had communication with both Cessna and Garmin about the issue. Apparently; both Cessna and Garmin are aware of this and are saying it is a software glitch. I consider this to be a 'Safety of Flight' issue since I could lose HDG during IFR in a critical situation and it appears to be across the aviation community with Garmin G1000.

Cessna 206 pilot reported the Garmin G1000 GPS system has 'X-ed' out on multiple occasions from 2 seconds to several minutes at a time.

1201519

201409

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

Parked

Aircraft Logbook(s)

X

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Lead Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Lead Technician 3; Maintenance Technician 27

Confusion; Time Pressure

1201519

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Aircraft

Company Policy

Management has stated they want the Logbooks on-board ETOPS trips 30-minutes prior to departure. This is an unfair burden to me as an ETOPS Lead Mechanic; and a violation of critical behaviors. Yesterday; September 2014; Management once again reiterated this policy. This time; however; Supervisor X stated he was being pressured from Shift Manager X to get the ETOPS logbooks on-board 30-minutes prior to departure. Safety and compliance must be a priority over scheduling. Creating artificial timelines to get the Logbook on-board to satisfy scheduling concerns is a detriment to safety and compliance. Furthermore; I was advised by a Mechanic that Shift Manager Y has limited mechanics taxi/tow walkarounds to obvious damage and bird-strikes. This follows a Mechanic documenting B757 brake cracks on three occasions. The cracks on the brake's faceplate is a known defect and can easily be seen through the wheel spokes. This is another example of ZZZ Management favoring scheduling over safety.

Reporter stated that since Management started putting time lines on Maintenance personnel to have the Logbooks on-board ETOPS aircraft 30-minutes prior to departure; an unwritten cryptic message is being sent to technicians that scheduling has priority over their responsibilities for safety and compliance.

A Lead Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports his Air Carrier Management has stated they want the Logbooks on-board ETOPS trips thirty minutes prior to departure. Creating artificial timelines is a detriment to safety and compliance. He also notes a Shift Manager has limited mechanics Taxi/Tow walkarounds to obvious damage and bird-strikes.

1873569

202202

1801-2400

LGA.Tower

NY

Icing; Turbulence

Night

Air Carrier

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ILS 04

Landing

Direct

Class B LGA

Autothrottle/Speed Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1873569

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1873567.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Ambiguous

We were cleared directly to BENNG roughly 20 miles out by Approach. The approach is a Non-Autopilot coupled approach (ILS 04 LGA) so the Captain being Pilot Flying set up the aircraft earlier than normal to insure we would be stable when needed. Shortly after turning inbound we switched over to Tower and simultaneously the throttle rolled back to the point that if left alone the aircraft would be in an undesired state. The Captain attempted to ease the throttle up to see if it would mitigate the situation but it didn't. He proceeded to turn them off all the automation and I monitored closely the instruments while doing my flows and call outs; I advised the speed fluctuations verbally 'speed increasing/decreasing.'Due-to the 5G network in the area and active NOTAM in the ATIS I was being extra vigilant with my focus on the aircraft instruments. We were configured and stable at my 1000 ft. and 500 ft. call outs and continued on the approach to land. After landing; Tower gave us directions to turn off and go ground. While turning off we noticed the landing light was still off giving us the cue that we may have missed the landing clearance. Tower gave us instructions to taxi off the runway per normal operation; and at no point did Tower or Ground advise that there was an issues; and nothing further was said to us. Verify landing light on. Clearance received at 1000 ft. configured call.

We were cleared directly to BENNG roughly 20 miles out by Approach. The approach is a Non-Autopilot coupled approach (ILS 04 LGA) so I decided to start to set up the aircraft earlier than normal to insure we would be stable when needed. Shortly after turning inbound we switched over to Tower and simultaneously the throttle rolled back to the point that if left alone the aircraft would stall. I attempted twice to ease the throttle up to see if it would correct and it did not; so I chose to turn them off while still on the Flight Director. I advised what I was noticing to the First Officer who then looked to notice any other deviations. During this time I am still making call outs to finish configuring the plane while looking for any other deviations due to the 5G network in the area. We were configured and stable when needed and continued on the approach to land. After landing; Tower gave us directions to turn off and go to Ground. While turning off we noticed the landing light was still off giving us the cue that we may have missed the landing clearance. Tower gave us instructions to taxi off the runway per normal operation; at no point did Tower or Ground advise that there was an issue. [I suggest] being more aware when an abnormal situation comes up as such; remember once situation is over to zoom out and look at the bigger picture; [and to] confirm the landing light is on when cleared to land if unsure earlier.

Air Carrier Pilot Crew reported while on final approach the autothrottle failed to keep the aircraft on speed. As the aircraft slowed the pilots disconnected the autothrottle and continued in manual mode to landing. The pilots reported they were aware of 5G interference around LGA.

1130343

201311

1201-1800

BKF.Airport

CO

VMC

Daylight

Tower BKF

Air Taxi

Helicopter

1.0

Part 135

Ambulance

Cruise

Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Y

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Commercial

Situational Awareness

1130343

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 75

Person Other Person

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

After switching from a backup aircraft into our primary aircraft; we flew back to our base. During takeoff Tower reported that they were not receiving our Mode C encoding; I re-entered the transponder code and recycled the transponder. Tower approved my frequency change to Denver area CTAF. It was a dual nurse crew with one of the nurses orienting for his second shift. After crossing through Boulder and making all of the appropriate calls; we were discussing the importance of maintaining eyes out whenever possible; especially through this area. About 3 miles east; on an easterly heading; the veteran nurse on the left side called 'Traffic! Break Right!' I immediately broke right and lowered the collective. As I straightened out I said; 'That's odd it didn't show up on the TCAS;' and as I looked back out there was another airplane about 1/2 mile at the 12 o'clock level position moving left to right. I called traffic and broke left. That airplane was on about a 5 mile final landing at the Erie airport. I had switched from Boulder CTAF to 123.025 just prior to the first near miss and switched to Erie CTAF just after the second close call. The first airplane never reported and the second was on the correct frequency. After clearing the area I scrolled to the TCAS page and it read 'Failed' which explained why we didn't receive any traffic alerts. After an uneventful landing; I went up to the circuit breaker panel and saw the Altitude Encode circuit breaker was popped. I reset the breaker and the TCAS and Mode C both began operating normal. During the post-flight debrief the nurse reported the first target was between 50-100 feet above us. I never saw the first target because of the blind spot. Following the debrief with program management; it was determined to take the crew OOS for the final 2 hours of the shift for them. I consulted with the Lead Mechanic to try to determine why the circuit breaker popped. I was unable to duplicate the event during ground testing; and a 10 minute maintenance flight. I could not 100% verify that the circuit breaker was in during my start up; although I did my normal physical and visual check of the breaker panel. It's possible that the breaker was bumped during the move from the back up aircraft or it popped during the start up. I didn't correlate the Mode C not working with the circuit breaker or the TCAS failure until after we landed. Having had 2 flights since then; I have changed that portion of the start and spend an extra moment to visually and physically ensure all breakers are in.

Helicopter pilot is informed during a VFR departure that his Mode C transponder is not working and attempts to recycle are ineffective. A few minutes later an NMAC occurs and the reporter cannot initially understand why the TCAS did not alert. Post flight reveals a tripped Altitude Encode circuit breaker which had caused both failures.

1562774

201807

0601-1200

BJC.Airport

CO

140.0

50.0

7200.0

VMC

Turbulence; 15

Daylight

25000

TRACON D01

Personal

Bonanza 35

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Descent

Vectors

Class E D01

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 945; Flight Crew Type 635

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1562774

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was approaching Class B airspace and being vectored to my home airport. There was mild to moderate turbulence at the time. The controller called and instructed me to change heading; descend; and change frequencies. I repeated back the instructions. I was instructed to descend from 10000 feet to 9000 feet and I apparently acknowledged this in the read back; but in my head; I heard 7000 feet. I changed heading and began descending; and called the next frequency. On that call; I identified my aircraft; assigned heading and stated 'out of 9 point 8 for 7.' The new controller gave me a brief acknowledgement. It was busy. General Aviation aircraft are frequently instructed to descend low in this area because of landing and departing commercial aircraft. I did notice I seemed lower than usual. When I reached about 7200 feet; I was called by a controller with a low altitude alert. I responded I was cleared to 7000 feet and asked what altitude he would like me at. He stated I was actually cleared to 9000 feet and to climb. I immediately did this; and shortly afterwards; asked to call the TRACON because of a possible pilot deviation (which I did after landing). The rest of the flight and landing were uneventful. Obviously; a miscommunication was the root of this problem. Because I received multiple instructions from the controller in significant turbulence; I misheard the assigned altitude; though I apparently initially acknowledged the correct altitude. When I called the next controller and stated the altitude I had 'heard;' which was incorrect; she did not catch the error. This two-part error chain caused the deviation. To prevent an error on my part like this again; writing down the instructions from ATC would allow me to check the instruction and verify it at the time and later. Also; when I noticed that I seemed lower than usual; I should have called ATC and verified the assigned altitude.

BE 35 pilot reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC; after mistakenly descending to 7000 feet instead of ATC assigned 9000 feet.

1261129

201505

1801-2400

N90.TRACON

NY

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B N90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Workload

1261129

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Confusion

1261134.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Other next day

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Approaching JFK near midnight; we were told that weather has immediately gone down to 1800RVR and the active runway has been changed from 31L/R to 22L. We were also told that center line lighting to runway 22L was inoperative. There was a lot of commotion in the air as crew after crew was trying to figure out their requirements for an approach or to go to an alternate. Approach control asked us what we wanted to do. We asked to be vectored while we looked things up. The First Officer (FO) was pilot monitoring; began to input the runway change as I looked into the manuals and charts. I found out that we could shoot a CAT II with 1;200 foot ceiling and no centerline lights. I briefed it; made the appropriate PAs and we shot the approach with auto-land and landed uneventfully. The next day as I was pulling out the paper work for the [next] leg; I noticed that in the NOTAMs there is a line in the approach section at the bottom that said starting May 2015 Cat II and III operations to runway 22L are prohibited Until Further Notice (UFN). There was no other indication of this restriction anywhere else in the paperwork; on ATIS or anywhere else. And even though this NOTAM was on the release of my flight the day after the landing; I am assuming that the release on the previous day had the same restriction. The change in the runway and approach was made very late. In fact we were informed of this just as we were abeam Kennedy and had begun to configure. Myself and my FO were both instantly overwhelmed by the amount of work that had to be done. To the best of my knowledge; we did everything correctly and made a CAT II approach uneventfully. But we missed the note at the bottom of the release. I guess the way to avoid this would have been to take even longer and study all the notes. But at the end of three legs and at midnight; with all of this going on; going through the release just didn't seem like a priority. Studying the release is something that I always do; but apparently I didn't do a good enough job or I would have seen it before the flight. Another suggestion is that dispatch could have done a better job being aware of the changes as well. When approach control first announced the change in runway; weather conditions and center line lighting; we could hear several [Company] crews not sure what to do. Everyone seemed concerned with the RVR and center line lights being out. If the runway in use during CAT II or III operations is restricted for these approaches; some heads up time would have saved a lot of anxiety as well as the agony of sending a bunch of airplanes to [an] alternate at midnight.

Normally; the NOTAMs for a flight are minimal and easily reviewed. However; with the extensive construction occurring at JFK; the list of NOTAMs for that airport is extensive. I suggest we add NOTAMs as a briefing item in the Airbus Approach Briefing Checklist.

A321 flight crew reported missing an important NOTAM that would have precluded their approach to runway 22L at JFK; citing workload resulting from a late runway change as contributing.

1602059

201812

1201-1800

ROA.Airport

VA

Tower ROA

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach; Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ROA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1602059

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Environment - Non Weather Related

While operating flight to ROA; we had a GPWS event. I was the Pilot Monitoring; and the First Officer was the Pilot Flying. We were cleared for the visual approach to RWY 24 in very visual conditions. As we crossed the mountains on an extended base to final; the GPWS event occurred. We took immediate; appropriate action and arrested the descent. Once clear of the conflict; we continued on the visual approach to land without any issue.

Air carrier Captain reported a GPWS event during approach in visual conditions.

1299688

201510

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Thunderstorm

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Takeoff / Launch

Autothrottle/Speed Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1299688

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1300253.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Procedure

During takeoff roll; the throttles split during engine run-up. I attempted to match the throttles by pushing up Number 1 throttle when the auto throttles disconnected. I initially thought that I may have inadvertently hit the auto-throttles disconnect on the left throttle. We rejected takeoff at approximately 80-90 KTS and cleared the runway. After completing the rejected takeoff checklist and after landing checklist; we called maintenance control and the Duty Officer concerning the reject. Maintenance advised us to attempt another takeoff and the Duty Officer advised us to fill out a safety report for the rejected takeoff. We reconfigured the aircraft in accordance with the checklist; and completed all checklist to perform another takeoff. During the second attempted takeoff; we rejected again. During run-up of the engines; the auto-throttles lever kicked off and the ECAM warning initiated. We rejected again; ran the rejected takeoff checklist; after landing checklist; then initiated the maintenance process. The auto-throttles were inoperative and we had to make a non-profile takeoff and departure.System malfunction caused the auto-throttles to malfunction during takeoff roll. The auto-throttles would disconnect during engine run up for takeoff resulting in a reject and a non-profile takeoff after the MEL was complied with.

On initial takeoff at about 70 KTS Auto Throttle System (ATS) disconnected with an ECAM message and paddle switch disconnect. Captain stated that he inadvertently hit the throttle disconnect button. Captain rejected and we exited the runway and we performed all applicable checklists. In consultation with maintenance and duty officer all were in agreement that since the cast disconnected the ATS inadvertently the aircraft was good and no write up needed. We reconfigured and attempted another takeoff. On the second attempt ATS again disconnected on power application. Crew wrote up the ATS via maintenance process and completed all checklists. Rest of flight uneventful. Crew should have written up ATS after first failure. The auto-throttles don't disconnect via the throttles buttons. The throttle buttons disengage the ATS and on some aircraft you get an ecam message. I believe we misdiagnosed the problem.

A-300 Captain rejected the takeoff when the auto-throttles were disconnected. Thinking that he had inadvertently hit the disconnect switch; and after consultation with maintenance control; he attempted another takeoff with the same result. Engine run-up detected an ECAM warning for a malfunctioning auto-throttle system.

1037203

201208

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

3000.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class C ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1037203

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working in the Tower with all positions combined. We were arriving and departing Runway 24. East RADAR brought two airplanes to the final approach course; a Dash 8 and a CRJ2; at the same time and had the Dash 8 cut in front of the CRJ2. The Dash 8 was supposed to be providing visual separation with the CRJ2 but there is no way that he could do that as the CRJ2 was behind him. East RADAR called up and asked if I 'had visual on the aircraft.' I replied 'I see them' because there was no way that it was possible for me to provide visual separation with the two as there was no other approved separation existing. I explicitly did not say that I could provide visual separation. My guess is that they were separated by less than one mile. I cleared the Dash 8 to land; but did not tell him anything about minimum time on the runway because I had already planned to send the CRJ2 around. Somehow the Dash 8 touched down and turned off at Taxiway Alpha before the CRJ2 got to an unsafe altitude for a go-around so I cleared him to land as well. Runway separation turned out to not be an issue. However; in my opinion this was an extremely unsafe operation. I assumed that the RADAR Controller had done everything required of him until I listened to the tapes later and found out that things were in fact far worse than I had originally thought. More practice sequencing from the Approach Controller and additional instruction on how to properly apply visual separation.

Tower Controller described a developing separation problem on final. Controller noted the TRACON Controller's application of 'Visual Separation' as questionable.

1771925

202011

1201-1800

LAX.Airport

CA

VMC

Tower LAX

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Class B LAX

Tower LAX

Air Carrier

Heavy Transport

2.0

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach

Class B LAX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57

1771925

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

On approach to 25L at LAX; ATC vectored a heavy Airbus onto approach in front of us. When I expressed concern for wake turbulence ATC stated only 3.5 miles was required between us. Since there was a tailwind on the approach and calm wind on surface I advised ATC that I'd like to slow to final approach speed to get more spacing with the heavy. On handoff to Tower; Approach Controller again reiterated that 3.5 miles was sufficient with a heavy Airbus. I thanked him and switched to Tower. We ended up with 4-5 miles separation and still experienced wake turbulence on short final.

B737 Captain reported ATC was uncooperative when he requested more spacing to avoid wake turbulence on approach to LAX.

1762014

202009

0601-1200

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Aircraft X

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 8140

1762014

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication

I am working on the module to train our pilot group on accomplishing the cold temperature altitude corrections. The FAA publishes a list of airports. This document contains the list of airports that corrections should be accomplished at; and gives the segments that need to be corrected. At the bottom of the document there is a list of military airports that should get the cold temperature altitude correction also. If you read the AIM; the FAA charts put a snowflake on the chart notes with the temperature that requires correction. Jeppesen puts notes on the approach charts also; that suggest that corrections should be made. When I looked up these military airports; neither the FAA or Jeppesen charts have the note that cold temperature corrections are necessary. Apparently; the FAA Chart Publication is not used as the source by Jeppesen for the Cold Temp Airports. The NASR database is our primary source for the Cold Temp notes.' There is apparently a breakdown in the transfer of information at the FAA level. Despite the military airports being on the list that require the correction; that information is not passed to the pilots on the approach plates. This may have to do with the approach procedures at military airports are not developed by the FAA. Whatever causes it; the end result is the charting does not correctly denote cold temperature corrections are necessary.

Air carrier Captain reported that approach charts at certain military airports do not have a note requiring cold temperature altitude corrections.

997865

201203

0601-1200

SRC.Airport

AR

350.0

8.0

1300.0

IMC

Rain; Turbulence; Thunderstorm; 6

Daylight

1000

TRACON LIT

Corporate

Small Transport

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Initial Approach

Other RNAV 19

Class D SRC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 3850; Flight Crew Type 675

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

997865

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Was on RNAV GPS 19 approach into SRC. From intersection Bollu to Dinge I read the 'descend to altitude' wrong and was advised by ATC of my low altitude. I took evasive action and climbed back up to the correct altitude of 2;000 FT and continued the approach from there uneventfully.

A Corporate pilot on the SRC RNAV GPS 19 approach misread the BOLLU to DINGE altitude and descended but was advised by ATC of his error and climbed back to 2;000 FT.

1173533

201405

0601-1200

ZOA.ARTCC

CA

10000.0

Marginal

Icing; 10

Daylight

3600

Center ZOA

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Descent

Class E ZOA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 9975; Flight Crew Type 600

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

1173533

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

Procedure; Human Factors; Weather

Weather

My plan was a flight from the North Central California area to a plains State. The leg of the flight in question was over for fuel. I received my weather briefing in from DUATS. I reviewed the FAA TFR site. I reviewed the radar for the flight. Realizing there would be weather to contend with I made it a point to frequently review the weather along the route. I did note that there were limited weather reporting stations. I was weary that a complete picture of what was to be expected might not be available.I departed for a short flight to a fuel stop. I departed that airport without fuel approximately 30 minutes later due to temporarily unavailable fuel because of a fuel tanker delivery in progress. My original plan was to perform the trip under VFR and I filed a VFR flight plan though DUATS to my next stop. The aircraft is IFR certified and I am IFR qualified and current; flight total time 9;975 and current IFR charts are on board the aircraft. I departed a Central California airport and activated my VFR flight plan shortly thereafter through radio. I acknowledged the AIRMETS and Convective SIGMETS along the route. I also verified the freezing level for the route of flight to 7;500-8;800 MSL. I had an extensive conversation with Flight Watch shortly after activating the VFR flight plan as to the location of the embedded thunderstorms along the route and the current surface reports along the route. I was specifically monitoring an airport in the Nevada high desert. Its reports were approximately 7 SM and 3;600 overcast with some lower scattered layers. My thoughts were that although not ideal this would be adequate to proceed VFR. I also wrongly presumed as mentioned on the phone; that in the western arid higher altitude environment convective weather is usually isolated with limited wide spread areas of reduced visibility and mountain obscurement as commonly found in more humid lower elevation environments; usually providing more than adequate room for maneuvering well above the minimum VFR cloud and visibility regulations. This combined with the lack of weather reporting stations in the area allowed me to paint an inaccurate picture of the weather I was planning to expect. I have learned from this experience that this may not be the case. That the weather is not predictable and alternative plans should always be in place to address any unforeseen weather phenomenon. Over the Sierra foothills I executed a 180 degree turn as further flight would result in not being able to maintain minimum VFR cloud and visibility clearances. I noticed that the area of weather seemed to start and stop abruptly at foothills extending to the north and south. It was clear above just to the west and I elected to climb and see if the area of mountain obscurement could be over flown.Above 9;000 FT MSL I was in the clear between layers with the bases above estimated above in the flight levels. I obtained flight following through Oakland Center and had some difficulty reaching them directly. I obtained a relay from another aircraft to obtain the proper frequency. This in addition to the review of the low IFR enroute L-11 prompted my attention to the relatively high sector altitudes in the area. This is something I have learned from the experience; as high sector altitudes and MEA/MOCAs may result an aircraft of limited performance such as a single engine or a multi-engine with one engine failed to end up in a predicament should altitude not be able to be maintained. I was able to establish VFR flight following with Oakland. Visibility and cloud clearances were well above the minimum required; however; as a precaution; I though it prudent to arrange to pick up an IFR clearance in the event that conditions deteriorated. I wanted to ensure that the minimum sector altitudes that Oakland was able to provide were within the capabilities of the aircraft. I was expecting to traverse the area of higher terrain until northwest Nevada and then descendand continue VFR. I was monitoring the current local ASOS/AWOS as I progressed and from what I was hearing; especially at the high desert airport I was expecting the weather to improve. I had also thought of joining a Victor airway to take advantage of the lower MEA/MOCA's on the airway in order to exit the higher altitudes of decreased performance and increased headwinds. My ultimate objective was to descend to a lower altitude as soon as possible in accordance with what Center had available for minimum sector altitudes. I did not full appreciate until this incident how quickly a normal situation can deteriorate into an abnormal situation and I should have taken more aggressive steps to assure I had lower altitudes available for descent. There was no visible precipitation at this time and no indications of ice accruing on the aircraft. From the time the aircraft began to pick up ice to the time I began my descent to 12;000 and requested a 180 degree turn I estimated no more than 5 minutes had past. I elected to turn around due to the fact that the ice accumulation had only recently started. I predicted that I would be out of the situation just as fast as I had entered it. I realize now that by descending to a lower altitude while executing a course reversal I may have descended into more extensive icing conditions. The aircraft began shortly thereafter to exhibit classic signs of performance degradation with a lower than usual indicated airspeed. However; the performance loss seemed more rapid then I had seen before. Being familiar with the weather at the high desert airport I elected to divert direct to the VOR serving the airport. Center approved lower as requested. I was joining the 10 DME arc north west; west of the VOR when I realized with full power I was unable to maintain altitude. Observing the terrain under the lateral path and the added distance of the DME arc I was approved to proceed direct to the VOR. My plan was to position the aircraft within reach of the airport should the ice further exceed the performance capabilities of the aircraft. I took into account the missed approach procedure profile and holding pattern as well as the final approach fix and minimum descent altitudes. At this point it was apparent that Center had no way with in their protocol to issue an approach clearance as there is no initial approach fix at the VOR for the VOR/DME approach. They asked if I could accept the GPS approach which I replied that I could not. Looking back I see now that the straight VOR approach has the VOR as an IAF with slightly higher minimum altitudes. Had I requested that approach ATC could have issued the clearance. However; at the time I had formulated a plan based on the VOR/DME and thought it more prudent to concentrate on maneuvering the airplane and anticipating potential non-standard unpredictable ice related flying characteristics of the aircraft. Plus; it was unclear at the time whether I would have been able to maintain the published altitudes on either approach. It was for these reasons I elected to exercise my pilot in command authority to declare an emergency. I completed a teardrop entry to the missed approach hold in order to align myself on the final approach course. I was unable to maintain 8;800 FT for the arc but I was able to honor the straight in step downs prior to the FAF and the MDA. I circled the airport in visual conditions being able to maintain approximately 5;300 FT. After about two minutes the ice broke free from the aircraft. I was able to cancel IFR. I then landed uneventfully and am waiting for a significant improvement to the weather.

A single engine pilot attempted to fly over the Northern Sierra Nevada Mountains VFR. Enroute he picked up an IFR clearance in IMC but because of wing icing declared an emergency; began descending and diverted to a nearby airport below the initial approach altitude.

1480194

201709

1201-1800

GSP.Airport

SC

3000.0

VMC

TRACON GSP

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class E GSP

TRACON GSP

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

VFR

Climb

VFR Route

Class E GSP

Facility GSP.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 25

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1480194

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Airport

Airspace Structure

I was busy and working West radar. I gave a sequence to East radar on Aircraft X to Runway 4 at GSP. We were both busy and the East controller had been certified for 1 week. I did not notice a VFR on a 1200 code depart GMU to the southeast. The East controller was busy; but he noticed the GMU departure and issued vectors to Aircraft X and held the plane at 3;000 MSL. From what I can tell he did a really great job.Only about 20 minutes before this I had an aircraft on arrival to Runway 4 at GSP. There was also a VFR that departed GMU. For whatever reason (the GMU Controller or the pilot); it was the best deconfliction I have seen in this scenario from the VFR. The VFR crossed GSP Runway 4 final 8 or 9 miles from the runway; which made it a non event for my traffic on the base.I was relieved shortly after the Aircraft X event. I went to the Tower before my break to suggest a runway change. I thought there would be a lot more GMU departures to the southeast because of a fly in at SC00. I had rather have the unidentified aircraft under a departure than an arrival. The Tower initiated a runway change.Recommendation: This is a terrible situation because it is not obvious that it is getting ready to happen. Once you realize it; your options are: an unstable approach; TCAS RA; or vectors around for a re-sequence. There are also wake turbulence issues. The GSP Air Traffic Manager (ATM) suggested a VFR fix on the GSP Runway 4 final. The VFR's would be required to cross at or outside of it and at or below a certain altitude. We know this is a problem. We have the opportunity to fix it before the problem changes to disaster.

GSP TRACON Controller reported an occurrence which routinely happens of VFR aircraft not in communication with ATC departing one airport into the final approach course traffic of another airport.

1740213

202004

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown

1740213

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

Missed direction on company page to contact Ground for pushback. Due to similar ramp appearance to many other company-owned; uncontrolled; small; remote ramps; pushed back onto the adjacent taxiway without asking Ground. When taxi clearance was requested; Ground Control mentioned that what we thought was an uncontrolled part of the ramp; was actually a taxiway. They said there was no conflict; but to note it in the future. Apologized and continued.I believe that several factors added to the cause: Similarity to many other small ramps; my unfamiliarity with this particular airport; and; truthfully; the disruption in my normal flows and habit patterns due to the change in operations during the Coronavirus pandemic. I normally don't use my iPad for things like checking in or reading and signing the flight planning requirements. I previously exclusively relied on printed paper flight planning requirements because of the ease; accuracy; and speed of access and unmatched ability to understand the entire plan when referencing them. I also have found it faster to exclusively use the touchpad in the airplane for all in-flight info; and consider taking out and attaching the iPad to be superfluous; time-consuming; and limits visibility. During COVID Operations; I have been trying to find the best way to alter my flows and vary from proven habit patterns to comply with changing sanitation requirements and necessary technological operational changes. I believe the combination of dealing with cleaning the flight deck; reduced communication while wearing a mask and distracting tactile limitations of gloves; changes in where and how quickly pertinent information is obtained (iPad vs paper; iPad vs. Touchpad); and changes as simple as where your eyes look to get info; lead to this mistake. Simply put; I looked at the ramp depiction on the company page on the iPad; had it sized incorrectly to see the parking space only as opposed to looking at the depiction on the airplane's touchpad where I would normally look and see the requirement to call Ground for pushback; and missed it based on experience-based expectation bias. I think the FO did pretty much the exact same thing; causing him to miss it too.As always; slow down; communicate; and don't fall to the limitations of previous experience before confirming an action from more than one source.

Air carrier Captain reported pushing without contacting ground; citing COVID-19 operations as the reason for disrupting flows and habits.

1574535

201809

0601-1200

TCY.Airport

CA

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

CTAF TCY

FBO

Cessna 152

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Personal

M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 91

None

Takeoff / Launch

Class G TCY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 25; Flight Crew Type 25

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1574535

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Horizontal 50; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Active Runway was 30; I was communicating thru the CTAF. I was taking Runway 30 for left downwind departure. I was rolling down the runway; about to rotate when suddenly a Turbo Mooney was lifting. He took off Runway 12 without communicating. Another aircraft on Run-up saw what happened; both of us were trying to call him; he couldn't be contacted. The Mooney was about 50ft away from me and above when I was taking off.

C152 student pilot reported a NMAC and runway incursion by opposite direction departing aircraft.

1091295

201305

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

10000.0

IMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb; Landing; Initial Climb

Class E ZZZ

Engine Air

X

Malfunctioning

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew

1091295

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Dispatch

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Weather

Ambiguous

Flight departed. Shortly after takeoff crew experienced wing anti-ice fail and bleed temp message. CA declared emergency and landed at the departure airport. Dispatcher noticed diversion notice on computer at time of landing. Captain called Dispatch after landing to explain situation. All dispatch entries regarding destination change; RH record and times were entered post flight due to delay in communications. Dispatch did not amend flight plan as flight was already completed. Captain did not have time to contact Dispatch prior to landing. Dispatch did not fully understand post-flight amendment procedure.Dispatch will now amend flight plan regardless of flight completion or status.

While in icing conditions after takeoff; an EMB-145 CAS alerted WING ANTI-ICE FAIL and BLEED TEMP so the crew declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport.

1058914

201301

0001-0600

ONT.Airport

CA

2300.0

VMC

Night

Tower ONT

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ONT

Tower ONT

Government

Helicopter

1.0

Part 91

Tactical

Cruise

None

Class C ONT

Facility ONT.Tower

Government

Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

1058914

Facility ONT.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

1058918.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Air Carrier X on Visual Approach Runway 26L. Helicopter Y maneuvering near 4 mile final. LC issued traffic to both and both said they had each other in sight. Air Carrier X got a TCAS/RA and went around. Then Air Carrier Z was issued traffic about the Helicopter Y; and Helicopter Y was also issued the traffic of the Air Carrier Z and to maintain visual. Air Carrier Z got an RA and went around. Air Carrier W was then cleared for takeoff Runway 26R (in due time for wake turbulence) and then LC canceled takeoff clearance and told to line up and wait. LC had to say something and that is what came to mind; instead of continue holding in position. If the aircraft has the other in sight; why would they have to respond to an RA? Why do they not trust their eyes but listen to a computer? I would have liked the aircraft to either let us know that they lost contact with the Helicopter or said that they never saw it.

Air Carrier X was on a Visual Approach to Runway 26L about 7 miles final; traffic was a primary only target at his 1 o'clock; traffic was issued. A police helicopter called and said that it was him about 6 miles NE of ONT and was on a police mission; chasing a subject. The police helicopter was issued traffic on Air Carrier X and said he had it in sight; and was then instructed to maintain visual separation. Air Carrier X was also issued the traffic on the helicopter and reported traffic in sight. At about 4 mile final Air Carrier X said that he was responding to an RA and was going around. I cancelled his landing clearance and told him to go around; coordinated with Approach; and gave him the appropriate instructions. Air Carrier Z was on a Visual Approach to Runway 26L about 8 mile final; the Helicopter Y was about 4 miles NE of ONT at 1;900 feet MSL. Helicopter Y was given traffic on Air Carrier Z and was told to remain north of the I-10 Freeway (about 1 mile north of the final approach corridor). Air Carrier Z was also given traffic on the helicopter and was told that the helicopter would remain north of the freeway. The helicopter was also instructed to maintain visual separation from Air Carrier Z. At about 4 mile final Air Carrier Z said that he was responding to an RA and that he was going around. He was told to cancel take off clearance and go around. I then coordinated with approach again; and issued the appropriate go around instructions. While Air Carrier Z was still on approach; I cleared Air Carrier W for take off on Runway 26R. Air Carrier W was on the runway and about to roll when Air Carrier Z said he was going around. I told Air Carrier W to cancel take off clearance; and line up and wait since he was already on the runway. I then waited for both Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Z to land before clearing Air Carrier W for take off again.After both aircraft had gone around and were back inbound; the Approach Controller called me and yelled at me to move the helicopter away from final. I asked the helicopter to move 1 mile north of his position temporarily until the aircraft passed him. The helicopter informed me that he was on scene and that his partner on the ground had a suspect underneath a bridge and that if he moved then his partner may lose the suspect. I told the helicopter to just move north a mile and I would get him back just as soon as possible. Recommend some type of LOA with the Police Department that describes whether or not to move them if they are actively pursuing a subject. Not sure if I was supposed to move him out of the way for the inbound traffic or let him continue his mission and have the inbound traffic hold or give way to him. Approach controllers should be briefed to not interfere with the Tower's traffic. Pilots should also be able to trust their eyes when they have traffic in sight and not have to respond to the RA and go around on approach.

ONT Controller described multiple TCAS RA events; resulting in two go arounds during police helicopter operations near the landing runway.

1272240

201506

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

20000.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Airframe

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Distraction

1272240

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

Climbing out of about 20;000 feet; speed about 295 Knots; V/S about 2;000 feet per minute we experienced sudden significant and strong aircraft vibrations. Vibrations were more pronounced in the aft of the aircraft and seemed to originate from the tail section. According to the aft flight attendants it was intensity of vibration they have never felt before. We were in absolute smooth air. We did not have any abnormal engine vibrations and no other warning messages associated with the vibrations.After leveling off at 27;000 feet and reducing the airspeed to about 270 Knots the vibrations stopped. We ran the QRH checklist for aircraft vibrations. Then we got in contact with [operations command] and maintenance control. We discussed the event and since all indications were back to normal; we concurred to continue on to [destination]. We also agreed that if vibrations would return we would [land at a nearby airport]. About 10 minutes later we experienced another event of vibrations; this time not as strong; would call it light vibrations. Still; we made the decision to divert at this point. I used ACARS to inform dispatch. Dispatch acknowledged and gave us diversion info. We diverted and landed without further incident. During the descent and approach phase we felt more light vibrations; however we could not tell for sure that it was not turbulence related. After deplaning and taking care of the passengers I made a very detailed log book write up in accordance with QRH.To prevent other flight crews experiencing an event like that I would like to see serious maintenance attention and really trying to find the cause of the problem. The aircraft was placed back into service and considered green after only a general visual inspection based on a certain Aircraft Maintenance Manual task card. No panels were opened and no computer flight control checks and tests were performed.

A flight crew experienced sudden significant and strong aircraft vibrations while climbing out of 20;000 feet in smooth air. The vibrations stopped after they leveled off and reduced power. Ten minutes later lower intensity vibrations returned and they elected to divert. The report was submitted because the reporter would like to see serious maintenance attention and really trying to find the cause of the problem.

1425041

201702

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Lancair 360

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach; Direct

Nose Gear

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 360; Flight Crew Type 5

Other / Unknown

1425041

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Upon landing with 3 green lights indicating landing gear down; the nose gear failed and collapsed; folding under the airplane and causing a prop-strike. No injuries. The aircraft came to a stop pretty quickly. The aircraft remained on the runway the entire time and the aircraft sustained no damage beyond the portion near the nose of the aircraft to include the nose-wheel; and prop sections.

A light airplane pilot reported the failure of the nose gear upon landing; resulting in the propeller making contact with the ground.

1561274

201807

1801-2400

ZLC.ARTCC

UT

Center ZLC

Military

Fighting Falcon F16

IFR

Tactical

Climb; Initial Climb

Class A ZLC; Class E ZLC

Facility ZLC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.0

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1561274

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Procedure

I received a call from Approach stating 'zoom departure' active/rolling. I did not receive the prior required coordination from Approach as per Letter of Agreement. After stating I was unable the controller left the line so I began frantically calling the surrounding sectors instructing them to turn all aircraft around the Zoom area. Aircraft X climbed through my airspace without a clearance and caused a major distraction to myself and could have potentially caused a loss or collision with another aircraft. This error was and has been assigned to Approach. Perhaps a different procedure could be developed to avoid this from happening again. We were lucky no one was killed today! Review the zoom departure procedure; there is too many moving parts that when missed as described above could cause a major loss of life. If it could be consolidated somehow between two parties there would be no communication breakdown.

ZLC Controller reported the underlying Approach Controller allowed a military aircraft to climb through the airspace without Center approval.

1038805

201209

0601-1200

EWR.Airport

NJ

5000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Descent

Class E N90

TRACON N90

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class E N90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

1038805

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

We were on downwind being vectored with New York Approach to Runway 4R in EWR. ATC called out traffic at our 11 o'clock at 4;500 FT (we were at 5;000 FT) doing aerial survey work and were advised that the traffic was under their control. The weather was clear and we searched for the traffic. Traffic showed on our TCAS screen as closing but only 200 FT below not the 500 FT reported by the Controller. We were on the latest and current EWR altimeter setting. We then were issued a TA by the TCAS system. Shortly after we were issued a RA TCAS climb. Almost simultaneously ATC recommended a climb to 5;500 FT. I used the TCS button to override the autopilot and commence the TCAS climb of about 2;000 FT/minute as directed by the VSI. We advised ATC that we were in a TCAS climb. The RA ended near 5;500 FT and the flight continued normally.It is possible that the survey traffic either was not on the current altimeter setting or was not maintaining 4;500 FT as directed by ATC. ATC said that the traffic was under their control but we never heard them issue any instructions to that traffic to avoid us or to even point us out to them.

Air carrier First Officer is advised by ATC of VFR traffic ahead maintaining a 500 FT lower altitude. TCAS indicates a 200 FT separation and issues a climb RA; which is complied with.

1044823

201210

1201-1800

DFW.Airport

TX

VMC

Daylight

TRACON D10

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID LOWGN

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1044823

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1044819.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Human Factors

Flight plan for the LOWGN4 Departure off 18L with a ADM transition. Followed procedures and verified legs on RNAV departure with the FMS. On taxi out; Tower switched to Runway 17R. Updated FMS; verified RNAV departure with the First Officer. It was the First Officer's takeoff; after passing JGIRL; Departure cleared us direct to BLECO. I did not see BLECO on route; asked Controller for a heading. He gave us a heading; then direct to IRW. Subsequently; I reviewed the PDC; and the revised segment called for the BLECO4 Departure. Fortunately; both RNAV departures have the same first four waypoints; so no deviation was incurred. Procedures call for both pilots verifying the PDC with the flight plan. Neither one of us picked up the revised segment. The ACARS print was very light; and I failed to see the revised segment. I will be more attentive when reading the PDC.

A flight crew failed to notice that the lightly printed PDC changed the DFW LOWGN4 RNAV to the BLECO4 and so after being cleared to the BLECO intersection the crew asked for vectors because it was not in the FMS.

1706548

201911

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

28500.0

IMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 96; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 5500

1706548

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 195

Physiological - Other

1706937.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft

We were climbing out to the north and the First Officer was the pilot flying. Passing through about FL280 we received the master warning horn and light and the CABIN PRESS EICAS warning. I reached over and returned the left pack to auto (it had been turned off due to dual pack noise); we donned oxygen and established communications and we ran the QRC procedure. I got a clearance to stop the climb at FL290. I saw that the pressure gage read somewhere between 10;000 feet and 15;000 feet cabin pressure. I requested a descent; initially to FL250 and then to 10;000 feet. I did not feel that a max rate decent was warranted due to traffic and weather; so we descended safely but expeditiously. The First Officer advised me that he felt some symptoms of hypoxia. During the descent the cabin altitude got below 10;000 feet and the warning horn stopped. I did not know what the problem was since there were no other EICAS or system failure lights. It could have been descending that fixed the problem; or it could have been returning to dual pack operations; or it could have been both. Since I didn't know what problem I had; and since my First Officer had indicated that he had been hypoxic; I elected to advise ATC and return to ZZZ. Since I was asymptomatic I flew the approach and landing and there were no further abnormalities. We returned the plane to Maintenance.

I was the First Officer and the pilot flying; we were on climb out through FL280 heading northwest; we had the left pack off for cockpit noise reduction with the right pack in the auto position. We received a CABIN ALTITUDE EICAS message and lights; and the warning horn and light. We initially asked ATC to stop the climb at FL290 and were approved to do so. We donned oxygen and established crew communication; ran the QRC; and asked ATC for a descent initially to FL250; then to 10;000 feet. At some point during the event I recognized the onset of hypoxia symptoms from the momentary delay in donning oxygen and informed the Captain. He elected to divert back to ZZZ at that point. The cabin altitude indicated on the gauge descended through some combination of turning the left pack back on as part of the QRC procedure and the aircraft descent to lower altitude; and eventually the cabin altitude EICAS message and lights went out. Since the cabin pressure altitude was descending (not uncontrollable) we did not do a maximum performance descent; but rather an idle flight level change descent. The Captain spoke with ATC; we picked our way through multiple cells on the weather radar and set up the FMC for an ILS to XXR and briefed the approach. Though the hypoxia symptoms quickly dissipated; I elected to remain on oxygen for a prolonged time based upon my military training. Since I had been symptomatic and the Captain had no complaints of hypoxia; I recommended that he assume the pilot flying role for the approach and that I back him up as pilot monitoring. He flew the approach uneventfully and we returned the aircraft to Maintenance.

B757 flight crew reported a loss of pressurization during climb resulting in a return to departure airport.

1276166

201507

1201-1800

DEN.Airport

CO

29000.0

VMC

Thunderstorm

Daylight

Center ZDV

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

STAR ANCHR3

Class A ZDV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 248

Situational Awareness

1276166

Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather

Flight to DEN was the last leg of a busy three-day trip with the day scheduled for 8:28 block flight time with the final leg scheduled for 2:35 flight time. I was the Pilot Flying and we departed on time with the legal amount of time left in our day to complete the flight to DEN; adequate fuel for the route filed; and a very full aircraft. Denver was forecast for the typical PM thunderstorm activity and we had an alternate of ABQ and COS. [Shortly after takeoff] we were cleared direct to LKT with rest of routing unchanged. After LKT; we were assigned a new arrival; the ANCHR 3; into DEN due to thunderstorms. We could deduce by ATC and other airlines that Denver arrivals were really being affected by thunderstorms and things were stacking up. Upon passing BFF; we were vectored off the arrival and given a southerly heading by a Controller who was highly saturated. Then we were turned back north nearly on top of Sidney; NE told to hold there with an EFC [25 minutes in the future]. At this point in time; we realized that we were not going to land in Denver for possibly another hour and that became concerning. Because of the highly saturated ATC; it was very difficult to communicate in a timely fashion. Our work load increased exponentially within a matter of minutes: navigating the aircraft; communicating with ATC; trying to coordinate Dispatch over ACARS; keeping the F/A's and Passengers in the loop; as well as communicating with each other. Our fuel quantity was starting to concern us and we had to continually stop and get back into the green RRM. I was tired and feeling a bit concerned about fuel; WX; exceeding duty time; and the possibility of landing at an off station airport. We told the Controller that we needed to receive the most direct routing back to DEN or our fuel could be an issue. They cleared us direct LAR (Laramie) for the FRNCH 3 Arrival. Along the way; the Captain and I discussed our alternate plan and we decided it would be Cheyenne; WY; which would be suitable for WX and technically for the 737. Flying all the way to LAR would have used quite a bit more fuel and as we flew past the edge of the thunderstorm; I asked the Captain to get me direct to a point on the arrival; they gave us SKARF and cleared us to fly the arrival. We landed safely and taxied to the gate. I think that as a Flight Crew we were lulled into complacency by several factors: fatigue; nice WX during the first two legs of the day; poor advanced warning about rapid deteriorating WX in Denver both by ATC and Dispatch. This caused us to fly away from our destination with our fuel decreasing and our legal flight time timing out; thus limiting our options. In hind sight; I want to be a bit more proactive in communicating and monitoring the developments. When we were assigned direct BFF that should have been our cue to contact Dispatch about the possibility of heading to our alternate. But complacency can creep up on a Flight Crew and I was starting to feel the effects of a long trip which accentuates these things. I realize that both ATC and Dispatch become task saturated during events like this; however; communicating by ACARS is slow and we need real time WX and communication because it loads up the Pilots when we cannot get quicker real time information.

B737 First Officer describes a difficult arrival to DEN due to weather; holding; and fuel considerations.

1504353

201712

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Marginal

Dawn

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

VHF

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1504353

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1504481.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Taxiing out we were to hold short of [taxiway] and contact ground. The FO (First Officer) transmitted but ATC did not hear him; we tried again and then I tried on my side to contact ground; they did not hear us. Ground control then called 'who's at [taxiway]?' and we could not reply. I asked the FO to switch to comm 2 and try again; that was successful. We were given the runway assignment and taxi clearance. I started following the given route to the runway. While taxiing I tried to see if any button or knob was out of place so we could transmit; but to no success. As we got closer to the runway I determined that RTU 1 (Radio Tuning Unit) was not transmitting; but was receiving. I discussed the possibility of contacting Maintenance. I was trying to figure out what to do; and did not have a solid answer whether to go or not. After discussion with the FO about FAR's dealing with IFR flight on one radio; I came to the decision to go on the flight because we had Comm 3 available as a backup and I still could receive on Comm 1. That was a mistake. Enroute I ACARS Maintenance control and they advised to call when on the ground. I also notified Dispatch of the problem. As we flew I checked the QRH vol 1 to find any answers and read a Min. Equipment List that stated only 1 VHF is needed for flight; so I felt justified in departing; figuring we would be able to defer the radio. I talked with Maintenance control and we came to the conclusion that the Comm 1 was broken. I asked Maintenance to defer the radio and was told that Comm 1 is NOT deferrable because it's on the hot bus bar for emergency power loss. That's when I realized I made a mistake in departing.

Captain asked me how I felt about departing and I told him I was unsure. Captain felt pressured to stay on schedule and did not want to return to the gate. I need to be more assertive when unsure of a decision being made.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported departing with Comm 1 transmitter inoperative; but discovered after landing that Comm 1 was not deferrable.

1152695

201402

1801-2400

ORD.Airport

IL

0.0

VMC

Ramp ORD

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other Push-back

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 11300

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1152695

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Ground Personnel

Other Pushback

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

While being pushed back the tow bar disconnected from the Push Back Unit. Just as the nose of the aircraft cleared the Passenger Boarding Bridge the aircraft made a quick 90 Deg turn to aircraft left relative to the lead in line. This sharp turn was odd since we where in the early phase of the push back procedure and close to aircraft on adjacent gates. It was a smooth almost floating feeling as the aircraft made the sharp 90 Deg turn without the normal jerking motion that you normal feel on push backs. At that moment the pushback tug driver said over the headset; 'We're disconnected'. I said; 'As in BREAK AWAY?' He responded that; 'The Tow Bar has disconnected from the Push Back Unit and the tow bar is still connected to the aircraft.' I quickly stopped the movement of the aircraft by getting on the brakes and setting the parking brake. I then asked if all ramp personnel where ok. He replied that they were fine and the aircraft DID NOT hit anything. We advised Ramp that we had a break away and would like to stay in our current location until Maintenance could inspect the aircraft. We called to have Maintenance come and inspect the nose wheel and nose landing gear for any possible damage. Maintenance reported that there was no damage and we were safe to continue our flight. After the tow bar was reattached; push back crew advised ready; requested and received pushback clearance; we continued the flight without incident.

B737 Captain experiences a breakaway during pushback; but the ground crew does not convey that information in a succinct or timely manor. Time is not a factor however and the aircraft is stopped without damage.

1239445

201502

1801-2400

GSP.Airport

SC

Turbulence; Windshear

Night

Tower GSP

Air Carrier

Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Class C GSP

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1239445

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Weather

We encountered a windshear warning on final approach to runway 34 in ZZZ. This resulted in a go around and we tried another attempt to land. On the second approach; ATC issued a microburst alert; resulting in another go around. While performing the go around; we received another windshear warning. At this point it was obvious we were not going to get into ZZZ and decided to return to the departure airport. While on the way; we realized that the airport had switched to a northbound operation which caused us to show a landing fuel of under 1500 lbs. Reserve on this flight was 2200 lbs. We then decided due to the low fuel; our only option was to land in GSP. While on the way; we showed landing with under 2200 lbs of fuel and declared min fuel to ATC. The conditions in GSP were not much different than in ZZZ or the departure airport; reporting windshear on final and other aircraft that had previously had to go around. As we were becoming critically low on fuel and multiple passengers were vomiting in the back; it was clear that we needed to land urgently. While on final; we received another windshear warning between 1000-1500 feet. I made the decision to continue the approach and not go around as we had no other options and only one go around could possibly be done with the critically low fuel. I wanted to make sure I had the go around available to me if it became necessary to save the aircraft while critically low over the runway; so I made the PIC decision to fly through the windshear warning as we were still flying and had some altitude to work with. We ended up landing safely in GSP with 2000 lbs of fuel on board and the wind conditions rapidly deteriorating. This event occurred due to the windshear conditions at all the airports in the area. We appeared to have plenty of fuel on board when we left and as there was no real convective activity along the route; I was under the impression that the flight would be windy; but nothing too out of the ordinary. The second attempt into ZZZ and the subsequent turning around of the departure airport also compounded the issue. My decision to continue through the windshear event in GSP was caused by the lack of fuel and lack of options available at the time and I feel it was necessary to be done to safely get the aircraft and the passengers on the ground while still having a little fuel left over in case of an extreme emergency close to the ground.This can be prevented by not sending airplanes into the air with a smaller fuel load when extreme windshear and microburst conditions are present at nearly all the available airports in the area. However; the conditions deteriorated rapidly and there may not have been enough warning to plan for multiple failed approaches and a subsequent diversion.

CRJ Captain describes a diversion caused by a windshear on the first approach and a microburst alert from ATC on the second. The diversion airport has equally unstable air; and the Captain elects to fly through a windshear warning at 1;500 feet to land due to a low fuel situation.

1451805

201705

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

PC-12

Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1451805

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 0; Vertical 300

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

While remaining on my IFR flight plan; we were cleared the visual approach by Center into ZZZ approaching the airport from the west. The wind was favoring Runway XY so we entered the left downwind traffic pattern at 4;000 MSL. While entering the pattern and making traffic calls I noticed a target (Pilatus PC-12) appear on TCAS 15 NM away to the south of the field level at 3;500 MSL not making radio calls. We continued making position reports over the CTAF. On the midfield downwind the traffic approached 5 NM south of us and 10 NM south of the field; we finally received a radio call from the Pilatus saying they had us in sight. He did not state his intentions of how he would sequence himself in the pattern. We continued downwind when my First Officer reported traffic in sight turning right to enter the downwind beneath us and I received a TCAS 'monitor vertical speed.' I immediately got on the radio and broadcast to the other pilot that he was cutting us off. My TCAS reported the traffic at 3;700 MSL and climbing (300 feet) beneath us. My First Officer reported him off our right side by about 300 feet laterally while maintaining visual contact with him at all times. It was not until I was yelling at him on the radio did the Pilatus pilot call back saying they would make a right 360 degree turn in the downwind to enter behind us. After flying the remainder of the pattern; we landed safely rolling the airplane to the end of the runway. As I began my left turnoff to exit; I glanced behind me and the Pilatus was touching down on the aiming point. I estimate he was approximately 5;500 feet laterally behind us while I was still in the center of the runway before clearing.

CRJ-200 Captain reported a NMAC with a PC-12 in the pattern at a non-towered airport.

1799188

202104

0601-1200

0.0

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

1799188

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Dispatch

Pre-flight; Routine Inspection

General Work Refused; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

I was so focused on no altitude restriction per tail number and dry ice restrictions due conversation with other Dispatcher about dry ice on his flight that ended in an ASAP event he experienced that I did not tell the ramp agent no lives allowed except on main deck. Lives were listed. Crickets coded AVI [live animal] in the ABK [aft bulkhead compartment]. Ramp insisted they are [US] Postal Perishables not lives. Told ramp to remove crickets. [I was] so focused on not making a mistake in one area of MEL that mistake was made in other area of same MEL. I will print and highlight areas of all MEL's that must be communicated prior to making phone calls to ramp agents.

Air Carrier Dispatcher reported a communication breakdown between Dispatch and Ramp personnel regarding Hazmat loading configuration resulting in removal of Hazmat cargo.

988544

201201

0601-1200

DAL.Airport

TX

12.0

4000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

30000

TRACON D10

Personal

Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Final Approach

Visual Approach; Direct

Class B DFW

TCAS Equipment

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 2300

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

988544

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Was given clearance to proceed directly to FACIA and intercept the localizer for Runway 31R. About a mile from FACIA I began to get a TCAS TA. While looking for traffic I missed the intercept and flew through the localizer perhaps 1/10 of a mile or less. ATC issued a turn back to the localizer. I continued to get the TA during final and while taxiing into the FBO.ATC did not say there was any conflict or problem from the deviation.Maintenance has been alerted.Corrective action: I had the number two VOR set up for the ILS. I should have had the number one set up as well or had the approach set up on the FMS so when the TA occurred and I was distracted looking for what could have been a false echo; the aircraft would have made the turn inbound on the localizer. The approach should have been flown as if in IMC conditions; even though we were VMC.

Distracted by an apparently false TCAS TA the single pilot of a C-550 flew through the localizer he had been cleared to intercept.

1346593

201604

0601-1200

MMGL.Airport

FO

7000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower MMGL

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Climb

Tower MMGL

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 6831

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1346593

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 300; Vertical 100

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

We were airborne from MMGL runway 28. Tower switched us to approach control and started speaking Spanish to a domestic Mexican aircraft. With the Spanish; we had no idea where the aircraft was. As we climbed through 7;000 feet MSL we got a TCAS advisory which then turned into a TCAS RA with a 'descend; descend' command. We followed TCAS RA procedures and as I tried to visually acquire what I thought would be a GA airplane; [an airline aircraft] flushed out at our 5' clock position approximately 100 feet above and 300 feet laterally. Guadalajara Departure said nothing to us neither did Tower. The other aircraft had executed a go around and was over taking us and being above us the whole way probably did not have us in sight.

A U.S. air carrier departed MMGL Runway 28 and while climbing through 7;000 feet responded to a TCAS RA from a domestic Mexican airline aircraft speaking Spanish with ATC after initiating a go-around. The event resulted in a NMAC with no prior warning from ATC.

1759282

202008

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1759282

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1759285.0

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

The day began with a maintenance delay. In ZZZ XXX Radio issued us a Hold For Release Clearance about 15 minutes prior to departure. I read the clearance back and wrote down 'HFR' at the bottom of my clearance.Once bag loading was complete we started engines taxied; and took off. After takeoff XXX Radio called us and asked if we had departed. We then realized we had not gotten ATC release. Nothing further.Keep the pacing normal; no need to rush.Develop a technique to remind you that you do not have takeoff clearance.On the next leg we also had a Hold For Release clearance and I put the checklist between the throttles to remind me and verbally repeated 'Hold For Release' on every radio call on CTAF frequency.

We were running late due to an FMC issue in ZZZ and trying to make up time. XXX radio said they would issue us a hold for release time when we had a better idea when we would be taking off. We finished up with loading; engine start and check lists. We took off and before we reported in with ZZZZ radar XXX called and asked when we would be taking off. We explained that we had forgotten to get the hold for release time and were enroute. They activated our flight plan and we proceeded without event. They gave us a phone number for ZZZZ and we called reaching ZZZ1.I had not flown in 6 months due to the pandemic. In the future I will go slower and put out a visual reminder when ever issued a hold for release; such as a QRC between the throttles.

Air Carrier flight crew reported taking off without an ATC clearance. Captain reported having not flown in 6 months.

1616257

201902

KZAK.ARTCC

HI

38000.0

Center KZAK

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Oceanic

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 166; Flight Crew Total 3604; Flight Crew Type 258

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Dispatch

1616257

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Due to NOTAM A0XXX/XX for military airspace; Dispatch filed us off R465 between CORTT and CUNDU. However; the PDC looked identical to standard R465 routing; because not all intermediate fixes are listed on the PDC. Pilots mistakenly interpreted this to be a removal of the non-standard latitude longitude; and contacted both Dispatch and Honolulu Center to verify the removal of [latitude/longitude] from route; and therefore standard routing on R465; CORTT to CUNDU. Both Dispatch and Honolulu Center indicated military space was not hot; and routing was back to normal on R465.Immediately after CORTT; via CPDLC; Oakland Center questioned our routing and then instructed us to offset right of course 25 miles between CORTT and CUNDU to avoid military airspace; and we complied. After parking [at destination]; pilots phoned Oakland Center and discussed the incident. Oakland said they had reviewed it with Honolulu Center; and they could understand how Honolulu misunderstood our verbal requests for route clarification. Thanks to Oakland's quick action at CORTT; we never entered military airspace.Considering the hundreds of lines of information delivered to the cockpit printer every flight; the routing instructions on the PDC should never be abbreviated. We thought we had clarified the routing ambiguity with Dispatch and ATC; but we were wrong. In hindsight; we should have requested a full route read back from ATC at anytime from the receipt of the PDC until approaching CORTT; and recovered from this miscommunication without incident.

Air carrier First Officer reported erroneous clearance provided to flight crew by Dispatch and ATC was corrected by Oceanic ATC sector.

1598969

201812

0001-0600

PHX.Airport

AZ

24000.0

Center ZAB

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Class A ZAB

Center ZAB

HS 125 Series

IFR

Descent

Class A ZAB

Facility ZAB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1598969

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Ambiguous

Aircraft X was descending via the GEELA arrival. There were at FL240 descending. 14 miles behind was Aircraft Y going to SDL. They are filed on the same route. Procedurally we take them north and get them down to 110 or 090. I started them down to FL240 for airspace with the intent of going lower and left once they cleared an over flight. The pilot leveled at FL240 and asked if they were following someone. I told them about the B738 (Aircraft X) 14 miles in front; they said they got some pretty significant wake turbulence. I asked them to describe it in terms of turbulence; they said moderate turbulence (although they hesitated when they responded) and said they had a significant rolling of the aircraft. I vectored them a little left and staggered them above the B738 until I had enough diverging course to get them lower. I asked the Aircraft X pilot if they were heavier than normal; he said no they were actually very light. The FLM (Front Line Manager) told me to ask Aircraft Y if they had any injuries or damage; they said no.I've had this happen a few times; mostly with B738s and 9s; but also with an A321. It seems to be an aircraft relative size thing; where the following aircraft is smaller or much smaller. It doesn't seem to matter whether the B738 is heavy or not; it appears to be a design issue; much like the B757 wake problem was discovered to be.This is unfortunately a known problem; but the issue does not seem to be adequately communicated to the workforce; specifically the enroute workforce. It seems to be significant enough that it causes consternation among crews. I even had a CRJ7 pilot who piped on frequency and mentioned they had experienced the same thing quite often. I think we need to visit the issue of wake turbulence separation; much like RECAT has done in terminal; to address some of the wake issues we are seeing. Compounding this is the increased traffic in the system and the accuracy of RNAV putting aircraft much more directly behind each other.I think the ERC (Event Review Committee) needs to issue a report to look into this wake turbulence issue with the B738/9/MAX and A321; in addition to the obvious problems of heavies (especially A380; B772/3; B748; A124). At a minimum we need information in the system; if only to let controllers know about the issue (I know wake turbulence was touched on recently in recurrent training; but more from the A380 problem). I think someone will get hurt by a wake encounter.

ZAB Center Controller reported that a Hawker pilot encountered wake turbulence while 14 miles behind a B737-800 aircraft.

1808729

202105

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

225.0

10

Daylight

CLR

Government

DJI Matrice 600 Pro

4.0

Part 107

Surveying / Mapping (UAS)

Other All

Class C ZZZ

N

Small

Multi-Rotor

VLOS

Y

Waypoint Flying

Critical Infrastructure

Purchased

Number of UAS 1

Outdoor / Field Station (UAS)

Government

Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)

Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 14.25; Flight Crew Total 0; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 29.5; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 14.25

Training / Qualification; Workload

1808729

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person UAS Crew