elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1216426

201411

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

36000.0

Mixed

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Climb

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 1900

1216426

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

Climbing to cruise altitude Right Bleed EICAS Message followed by a Left Bleed EICAS message. Resulting in loss of both PACKS. Resulting is CABIN ALT warning message. We began descent to 10;000 while preforming QRH procedures. Landed safely.

Following the loss of both packs due to right and left engine bleed air failures the flight crew of a B757 diverted to a nearby airport and landed safely.

1259509

201505

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Dusk

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Taxi

Winglet

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue; Distraction; Time Pressure

1259509

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Airport

Pushing back; hooked up to tug; off gate; approximately 1/3 of the way through pushback the aircraft made a shudder and came to an unusual stop. I immediately asked the tug driver if everything was ok. He replied his wing walker let him hit a B757 tail. We set the parking brake and secured the aircraft. [This Gate] is extremely tight to operate in. Extreme caution needs to be used in and out.The flight was an empty ferry flight. The aircraft had less than normal fuel; no bags or passengers and new Sharklet wings. This makes for a very high wing tip off the ground. Also; the Red eye flight landing that morning; departing that same night; only allows for 4-5 hours of circadian sleep. While able to operate per the 117 rules; lack of sleep does not allow for 110% clear focus. This type of pairing should be reviewed.

An A320 was being pushed at dusk in a confined area when one of its Sharklet wingtips hit a B757 tail because the wing walker did not warn of the collision and also the new wingtips are very high off the ground.

1422368

201702

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 224; Flight Crew Type 2000

1422368

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Horizontal 1

N

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Weather; Airport; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

We were taxiing into [the] gate. It was still very dark on the ramp and wet. After lining up on the J-line; the Ground Crew directed us to continue forward with a deice truck in the Safety Zone. I stopped and flashed the left turnoff light on the truck and pointed at the truck. The Ground Crew continued to motion us forward; but the Deice Truck Driver saw us flashing the lights and moved the truck himself. Then the Crew directed us to proceed forward again; but stopped us again because the auxiliary ground power unit was in the nose area Safety Zone. Finally we started to taxi forward again and came to a normal stop and shut down the engines. When the Agent came aboard; he said that we had been stopped too far forward on the 737-800 stop line. It was about eight feet past the 737-700 line. The Agent said that he moved the jetway back as we were stopping because we were marshaled within one foot of the jetway with the engine nacelle. There was no contact with any part of the aircraft to the jetway; but it was close. He had the Ramp Supervisor come up stairs to ask what happened. The Supervisor said that the Crew had both just finished training and were placed together too soon.

B737-700 Captain reported being directed onto the B737-800 parking spot which resulted in a close encounter with a jetway.

1445626

201705

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach; Initial Approach; Climb

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness

1445626

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Manuals

Procedure

Issue: Procedural clarification requested for go-around/missed approach procedures for aircraft on a ILS approach procedure and subsequently cleared for a visual approach. Specifically; precarious situations could rapidly develop during high-workloads and a deviation from prescribed procedures in both the AIM and various flight manuals. Events such as lost communication (equipment failure) or absence of landing clearance coupled with frequency congestion preventing tower communications to go-around aircraft could potentially create hazardous flight conditions as crews scramble to choose a prudent go around/missed approach procedure. Particular cases in point might be DCA ILS 01; SFO ILS 28; or GUC ILS 06.Discussion: As part of my normal approach briefing; I have always briefed an Instrument Approach Procedure (IAP) Missed approach procedure that in lieu of no instruction from the tower we will fly the published MAP. At the heart of the argument is a scenario where your aircraft is cleared for a visual and you have to go-around without any guidance from the tower. Two possible courses of action are highlighted below.1. Maintain visual conditions and reattempt contact with ATC for further instructions. This statement is supported by the AIM.AIM 5-4-23E. A visual approach is not an IAP and therefore has no missed approach segment. If a go around is necessary for any reason; aircraft operating at controlled airports will be issued an appropriate advisory/clearance/instruction by the tower. At uncontrolled airports; aircraft are expected to remain clear of clouds and complete a landing as soon as possible. If a landing cannot be accomplished; the aircraft is expected to remain clear of clouds and contact ATC as soon as possible for further clearance. Separation from other IFR aircraft will be maintained under these circumstances. Argument against the prescribed AIM procedure may entail using Captain's Authority; if communication cannot be established and at the airports listed above violate TFR areas or compromise terrain clearance. 2. Execute published MAP for runway in use in the near term as you try to reattempt contact with ATC. Argument for this maneuver is based upon circling-type maneuver MAP as defined in the AIM 5.4.55C. At a minimum; this maneuver would allow for obstacle clearance and include TERPS (Terminal Instrument Procedures) compliance. And; in the DCA illustration the MAP alleviates penetration into the Restricted Area.AIM 5.55c. If visual reference is lost while circling-to-land from an instrument approach; the missed approach specified for that particular procedure must be followed (unless an alternate missed approach procedure is specified by ATC). To become established on the prescribed missed approach course; the pilot should make an initial climbing turn toward the landing runway and continue the turn until established on the missed approach course. Inasmuch as the circling maneuver may be accomplished in more than one direction; different patterns will be required to become established on the prescribed missed approach course; depending on the aircraft position at the time visual reference is lost. Adherence to the procedure will help assure that an aircraft will remain laterally within the circling and missed approach obstruction clearance areas. Refer to paragraph H concerning vertical obstruction clearance when starting a missed approach at other than the MAP. To further support this position; AIM 5-4-57 states that lost communications in a non-tower environment you would proceed with a go-around or MAP.AIM 5-4-57: In the event a balked (rejected) landing occurs at a position other than the published missed approach point; the pilot should contact ATC as soon as possible to obtain an amended clearance. If unable to contact ATC for any reason; the pilot should attempt to re-intercept a published segment of the missed approach and comply with route and altitude instructions. If unable to contact ATC; and in the pilot's judgment it is no longer appropriate to fly the published missed approach procedure; then consider either maintaining visual conditions if practicable and reattempt a landing; or a circle/climb over the airport. Should a missed approach become necessary when operating to an airport that is not served by an operating control tower; continuous contact with an air traffic facility may not be possible. In this case; the pilot should execute the appropriate go-around/ missed approach procedure without delay and contact ATC when able to do so. Conclusion: Several years ago; while flying as an FO we could not contact with tower after Approach Cleared us for the Visual after initially being cleared for the LAX ILS 25L. Tower was trying to deal with a runway incursion with a foreign carrier. We went around at 500 feet and proceeded to fly Runway heading (this was almost the MAP; but not exact). Preemptively; upon landing we called the LAX tower Supervisor who cordially told us that they 'expect aircraft to fly the published MAP; if cleared for a visual and cannot establish communication nor obtain landing clearance.'Adding to the noise; Looking at several [company] flight manuals; fleets have different opinions:A320 FM (Flight Manual) is very specific. When flying a visual approach; flying a published MAP is not authorized without ATC approval. [Aircraft 2] FM has a different slant. While conducting a circling approach or 'visual maneuvering;' fly the MAP for runway in use and attempt to contact ATC.[Aircraft 3] FM Almost same verbiage as [Aircraft 2] as stated above.Lastly; the procedural outcome of executing a go-around close in due to equipment failure; tower congestion; etc. obviously could have very detrimental effects. Though gaming every scenario would be near impossible; having consistent guidance or at least a discussion on prudent courses of action would be very beneficial. As a final addendum; it is noteworthy to mention that internet searches have many different opinions on this subject in both the domestic and international regions.

Reporter stated that he has no supplemental information about the report. He did state that this report was prompted by a recent approach briefing that he accomplished where he briefed that if a go around was necessary after a visual approach; he would execute the published missed approach for an instrument approach to the same runway. When his First Officer remarked that the AIM did not direct a published missed approach after a go-around from a visual approach; a discussion was spawned. He stated that the actual incident in this report occurred approximately 15 years ago; and he thinks this particular situation could be addressed better than it is.

A320 Captain reported ambiguity in procedures; AIM guidance; and ATC expectations during missed approaches that occur following a go-around from a visual approach clearance given subsequent to an instrument approach clearance.

1102485

201307

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2.0

728.0

25

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

Indicating and Warning - Fuel System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22.7; Flight Crew Total 2861.3; Flight Crew Type 7.8

Situational Awareness

1102485

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Procedure

Prior to the incident; I received an instructional ride and completed my C-172 checkout. I then flew with a passenger and solo; for a total of 5.3 hours in the bird. In all three of those flights; I observed erroneous fuel quantity indications; including intermittent cycling of the gauges to zero and LH Fuel Low Level Warning light coming on intermittently. An [instructor] told me this condition was well known; typical for this aircraft and not uncommon for general aviation aircraft. I discussed the erroneous fuel quantity indications with the Chief Pilot; and asked him if I should write them up. He said no; that the indications were within the spec; which requires only that they read accurately when empty.The purpose of [this] flight was to complete my mountain flying checkout. I was in the left seat and my instructor pilot occupied the right seat. Our plan was to fly from [base] Airfield to [intermediate] Airfield; then plan our return leg based on existing and forecast weather in the...mountains; while attempting to fulfill the requirements (3 hours in the mountains and 3 landings at high altitude airfields) for the checkout.... We preflighted the aircraft and paid special attention to the fuel load as we would be flying for a total 3 hours and 30 minutes; longer than a typical aero club flight; but required to complete the mountain flight checkout. [The instructor] checked fuel levels at the filler caps in the right and left wing tanks. A full load of fuel (52 gallons) was physically confirmed; and the fuel quantity gages indicated full. From this we knew we had about 46 gallons of usable fuel. According to the performance charts in the pilot/operators manual; we should expect at least 4 hours and 30 minutes of endurance. [After departure] we paid special attention to fuel flow; including leaning to approximately 9 GPH. We also kept a close watch on the fuel quantity indicators. Due to the aforementioned erroneous fuel quantity indications; we knew to take the fuel quantity indications with a 'grain of salt' and rely on fuel flow and performance calculations to maintain fuel quantity awareness. During the outbound leg; I noticed occasional intermittent fuel quantity indications of zero; and an occasional left fuel quantity low warning light illuminated. This was consistent with what I had observed on past missions. We negotiated [several] passes without incident; landing at [a...] County Airport in accordance with established mountain flying procedures; we did not take on fuel. This would improve our climb performance and increase our maximum attainable altitude so that we could safely clear mountain passes on the second and final leg of our flight. As we had used a few minutes less than an hour of our endurance; we knew we had at least 3 hours and 30 minutes of fuel remaining. We headed south and climbed to 13;500 FT MSL Fuel flow remained around 9 gallons per hour; but the fuel quantity indicators continued their intermittent erroneous readings; sometimes displaying half full; other times displaying empty. We did a touch and go at [an airfield]; then headed back east; climbing to 13;500 FT. Level off checks were performed according to the checklist. [The instructor] became increasingly concerned about the fuel on board the aircraft. We observed not only the fluctuating fuel quantity readings mentioned above; but now also the right fuel low level warning light. I checked the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) to confirm that the fuel low level warning lights come on steady at 9 gallons (6 gallons usable) fuel remaining in each tank. This should have given us at least one more hour of endurance. We established a course direct to [the...] Airfield. When within radio contact we informed the Aero Club that we were planning a precautionary approach using the shortest route to the airfield. We began a descent to the traffic pattern altitude and established ourselves on a left base. I was flying the airplane; as Ihad most of the flight. As I was modulating the throttle and lowering flaps; not more than a minute from touchdown; we both noticed a loss of engine thrust and realized there was no longer any response to throttle inputs. [The instructor] took control of the airplane; and I initiated an air start with the propeller windmilling. The air start was unsuccessful. With the strong headwind and no engine thrust; we successively realized we would not make the airfield. [The instructor] elected to dead stick the airplane into a (not so) grassy field. [The instructor's] short field; soft field and dead stick landing techniques were absolutely outstanding. We rolled to a stop in an estimated 500 FT.Evidently the flameout was due to fuel starvation. This is despite a total Hobbs meter reading for the day of only 3 hours and 30 minutes. A post flight inspection revealed no fuel in the right wing and little if any usable fuel in the left wing. If this is correct; the airplane ran out of fuel more than an hour earlier than advertised. It is unfortunate that the fuel quantity indications were suspect; but we thought we knew where we were fuel-wise using careful flight planning; physical inspection of the fuel quantity in each wing; close monitoring of fuel flow in the cockpit and careful in-flight calculations. Another minute or two of fuel and we would have made it safely to the airfield.

C-172 instructor and student pilot flying an aircraft with known fuel gauge problems; landed off-field near their destination due to fuel starvation. Although the fuel quantity was visually confirmed prior to departure; the aircraft flew approximately one hour less than standard burn rate would predict.

1290778

201508

1201-1800

JNU.Tower

AK

800.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower JNU

Air Taxi

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

None

Class D JNU

Tower JNU

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Landing

Class D JNU

Facility JNU.TWR

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1290778

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was conducting training as I was working Local 1 position. Aircraft X reported 3.5 miles outside the Class Delta airspace on initial call. He was told by the trainee to make a right base for the runway and to expect to be number 3 to the field. I immediately overkeyed and told the pilot to be number 2 following a B-737 on a 4 mile straight in to the runway. Aircraft X was 2 miles closer to the field than a Cessna behind him. I told Aircraft X to make a left turn into the downwind to follow a B-737 (THREE times). The pilot refused to do what I instructed him to do and gave himself a 360 degree turn on a 2 mile right base. He put himself in an unsafe situation with inbound traffic behind him; instead of staying in a smooth flow as I told him to. The pilot NEVER said 'unable' or gave a reason as to why he wanted a 360 turn. The pilot was also told to make a left turn to enter the downwind 3 miles away from the field and should have complied. Aircraft X delayed other aircraft as he was arguing and swearing on the frequency. The pilot has been told numerous times in the past to comply with ATC instructions and I believe he has a tendency to ignore the controller just to prove that he can do what he wants. I was told by my supervisor that I should have been more authoritative. I listened to the tapes and found that because the pilot was not complying with instructions; that I was speaking more plain English to get him to comply. I believe I stepped in and over-keyed the trainee with plenty of extra time for the pilot to comply with my instructions (three whole flying miles). This pilot put himself in an unsafe situation and did not comply with any control instruction.Aircraft X called inbound on the edge of the Class Delta and would not have had enough room to turn around before entering the airspace if we had not cleared him in. The pilot should have called inbound at the appropriate landmark. The pilot did not comply with instructions given by ATC and should have listened to the controller instead of putting himself in an unsafe situation. The pilot also put himself in the way of other aircraft for no reason.

Aircraft entering traffic pattern refused to comply with ATC instructions. Pilot conducted their own maneuvers in the pattern not issued by ATC. Pilot argued and used inappropriate language on the frequency.

1061134

201301

0601-1200

M03.TRACON

TN

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Autoflight System

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1061134

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

1061126.0

ATC Issue All Types

N

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Ambiguous

We were assigned to 'descend via' the FNCHR RNAV STAR; landing North transition at MEM. As we were descending we were vectored off the arrival; given a speed to fly and then cleared direct FNCHR; resume published speeds. I then asked ATC what speed he wanted until we arrived at JESTI; which has a 250K restriction? ATC stated that JESTI was not on the arrival for landing North; only if we were landing South. The First Officer and had I talked about this; referring to our plates; and decided that we indeed needed to overfly with JESTI if we were on the landing North transition so; again; we asked ATC what speed he wanted us until JESTI as it was part of the landing North transition. He again stated that JESTI was not to be overflown by us and that we were cleared for the landing North transition; not landing South.Again; we looked at our plates;and again agreed that we were doing it right and that indeed JESTI was part of our arrival so this time we asked him where he thought we should be flying. I can't remember exactly; but he again stated that JESTI should not be part of our route. We again disagreed and that there is obviously a problem with either our arrival plates or his. He told us that these are all new to everyone; but the problem was not on his side but our's. That was the last of it and we continued via the arrival flying what we saw as correct and landed without incident.If you look at the FNCHR arrival; if you are landing South; you depart FNCHR for JAMLA at 230 kts; then a 095 degree heading after JAMLA....There are arrows on the chart depicting your 095 degree heading after JAMLA; and those arrows at a quick glance point to JESTI. Maybe the Controller saw those arrows and read JESTI as being part of the landing South transition.....Not really sure what he saw; but JESTI is definitely a fix to fly over only if you are landing to the North.

We [attempted to verify] with ATC that we were cleared via the FNCHR ONE arrival; North Transition and JESTI is one if our fixes. It went back and forth about three times that ATC told us JESTI was only a fix when landing south.

ATC and the flight crew of a CRJ200 descending on the FNCHR RNAV STAR to MEM were unable to come to agreement as to the cleared routing after FNCHR.

1091256

201305

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

VMC

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Leading Edge Slat

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 105; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 700

Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1091256

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

On approach; EICAS messages LE Slat Disagree and TE Flap ASYM posted after selection of flaps 25. Captain then moved the flap selector back to flaps 20. We initiated a go-around and received ATC instructions to continue track and maintain 2;000 FT. I asked for gear up. The Captain elected to leave the gear in the down position because he was not sure if the gear horn would sound. The flap needles appeared to be aligned and in the white band at 20 degrees; but the needles appeared just beyond the center mark in the middle of the band. I agreed that we could leave the gear down if he wanted and noted the fuel remaining at 15;000 LBS. The Captain then told me to continue flying the airplane and take over ATC communications and he would run through the QRH procedures and talk to the passengers and crew. I received a few ATC instructions while the Captain began the first QRH checklist. LE Slat Disagree was posted at the top of the EICAS; so we started with this procedure. At some point he told me he was going to go to the other procedure; TE Flap ASYM; as it indicated to do so. I tried to pay attention to the QRH procedures as he read them aloud as much as I could; but I may have missed some information as I was receiving ATC instructions for a heading; altitude; and frequency changes. I confirmed these changes with the Captain as I received them. I heard him read items from the checklist and saw him perform the instruction. We asked ATC to keep us fairly close to the airport because we believed that the checklist shouldn't take very long and didn't want to stray to far away with the higher fuel burn. After he finished the TE Abnormal; the Captain went back to the LE ASYM procedure to compete it. After a few minutes we completed the checklist and he took over the communications as I continued to fly the aircraft. He then declared an emergency and we were given a new runway assignment. I briefed the approached and we landed with flaps 20. Some additional thoughts: During the first approach while on the downwind portion; we noted a heavy 777 that we would be following for [our original runway]. That traffic was cleared for [the runway] and after we called him in sight; we were cleared for [the runway]. During the base turn and descent (I think out of 4;000 FT) we encountered light to moderate turbulence. It could have been wake turbulence or some turbulence due to winds. While on downwind I noted the wind was from a northerly direction around 35-40 KTS. We were at 210 KTS with flaps 5 and after we were given the lower altitude and told to slow to 170 KTS; I asked for flaps 15. As we descended and turned to base; the wind changed very quickly to around 15 KTS. In doing so; the indicated airspeed quickly ran up to the flap limit and it's possible it may have momentarily bumped past the limit speed. I'm not sure if this was a factor in the flap abnormal; as we were still able to go from flaps 15 to 20; but thought I would mention it. After talking with the maintenance technicians; they said they didn't see any indications of overspeed.

A B757 EICAS alerted LE SLAT DISAGREE and TE FLAP ASYM after flaps 25 was selected on approach at about the same time as a light to moderate turbulence event. A go-around was executed; the QRH completed and an uneventful landing followed.

1290830

201508

0601-1200

AUS.Airport

TX

IMC

Windshear; Thunderstorm

TRACON I90; Tower AUS

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 35R

Descent

Class C AUS; Class E I90

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure

1290830

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 169; Flight Crew Total 7537

1290446.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Weather

Chance of thunderstorms was forecasted and HOU was listed as the alternate. The only thunderstorms showing on the radar during preflight planning were near Dallas or out in the gulf. We started the LINKK1 arrival with the FMC showing fuel at IAH around 7.3. After passing BBQUE intersection; ATC advised that IAH was now closed for arrivals and we were leveled off at FL180 and vectored East for a planned hold over BBQUE. During the vectors; ATC stated that Hobby arrivals weren't affected. The ATIS for HOU listed calm winds and SCT TCU. The ATIS for HOU had winds listed at 350@5 kts with no mention of TCU or CB's. Based on the current ATIS and continuing arrivals for Hobby; I had no reason to suspect that HOU would close due to weather or windshear before our arrival. The FO and I discussed bingo fuel for the hold and decided on 6000 lbs. 1000 lbs for the arrival and approach with 5000 on landing. We were given the holding instructions and the EFC was [a later time]. We were unable to hold for that long so our plan was to enter the hold and brief the new arrival and approach then advise ATC that we were diverting to Hobby. ATC stated that we could expect the PUCKS2 arrival and the ILS 30L at HOU. I programmed the box and briefed the arrival and approach. I sent dispatch a message stating that we were diverting to HOU. I briefed the flight attendants and advised the passengers that we had to divert due to weather at IAH. We advised ATC that we needed to divert to HOU at this time and we were given a clearance to join and descend via the arrival. We were vectored off the arrival for 'high altitude traffic that was descending' and eventually cleared back to MMOOW intersection. Approach control vectored and cleared us for the ILS 30L approach. We were number three on the approach. Approach announced a windshear alert for a 15 knot gain at 1000 feet and reported the surface winds of 20 something gusting to 40. The wind direction was right down the runway. The radar still had the cells north of the airport but the gust front had hit the field. During the approach; we experienced large airspeed and pitch fluctuations and encountered a moderate windshear. We did a go around. I advised ATC that I needed immediate vectors to Ellington (EFD). ATC stated that EFD was now reporting similar weather as Hobby. I asked for reported windshear at EFD and I was told that EFD doesn't have windshear reporting equipment installed. I knew I didn't have enough fuel to go missed off of EFD and reach another suitable airport. I asked if IAH had opened back up and I was told no. I requested priority handling and I headed for College Station (CLL) since it was the closest suitable airport. Unfortunately; the line of thunderstorms prevented a direct route to CLL. The distance required to go around the west end of the storms and turn back to CLL was about the same distance to Austin. We decided to go straight to Austin since the weather was good with no reported thunderstorms. I declared [low fuel] since my projected fuel on landing was 2500 lbs. I notified Dispatch that I was now diverting to Austin and that I had declared [low fuel]. Once clear of the weather; I proceeded direct to ZEDKU intersection which was the FAF for 35R. We landed safely on 35R with 2400lbs of fuel. After parking; I called dispatch to discuss the diversion.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

A B737 flight crew diverted to an airport not on their flight plan when their destination airport closed and weather at their filed alternate precluded landing.

1781169

202101

0001-0600

ANC.Tower

AK

0.0

Tower ANC

Air Carrier

Heavy Transport; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng

IFR

Initial Climb

Class C ANC

Tower ANC

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ANC

Aircraft X; Facility ANC.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1781169

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

Procedure

Prior to the event; I came up from break and took a LC (Local Control) position that controls a satellite Class D airport with a gravel strip and water lanes. This position was combined with both CIC and Clearance Delivery/FD. This was never trained as a standard; but some work crews have made this a normal practice when staffing is short. Quickly after taking position; and before the event occurred; I did call up someone to split off the position but I should not have allowed it to remain de-combined in the interim. LC and GC (Ground Control) were de-combined; and while working I heard GC bring a potential conflict to LCs attention (good tower teamwork from GC). As I examined the situation I saw the same conflict- a heavy aircraft had taxied into departure position (Runway 33) with a large aircraft arriving behind on a non-intersecting runway (Runway 7L). With the spacing of the aircraft it did not appear that there was enough space to ensure compliance with our facility order. Our facility order details spacing required with aircraft arriving Runways 7R/L and departing Runway 33. I advised the LC that I did not believe adequate spacing would exist and suggested; but did not instruct; alternate courses of action to avoid a situation where the arriving aircraft might encounter jet blast. The LC insisted it would work and did not take any action. With the proximity of the aircraft; I don't believe a safety issue existed; however lack of compliance with facility guidelines with no standard for separation is an unacceptable risk to the users of the system.This event highlights many issues.As CIC during the event; I take responsibility for my own personal performance. I should not have taken CIC combined with an LC position. I should have had more engagement in the operation - if this situation had been detected earlier there may have been more time to correct it. I also should have given the LC instruction instead of suggestion when I saw action was not going to be taken.1. Lack of staffing. Perpetual lack of staffing leads this facility down the path of using what should be contingency practices into day to day practices. Positions are too often combined and because this has become the norm; controllers do not understand that they are providing a reduced level of service.2. Lack of safety culture. LC had two controllers address concern over this action and did not appear to consider an alternate course of action. This is not a behavior to this specific Controller but throughout this facility.3. Lack of training. The training culture and training at this facility has fallen short on ensuring that the staff of the facility have a thorough understanding of the rules we are expected to apply.4. Lack of supervision. Much like our Controller workforce; our supervisory staff is frequently understaffed and asked to do an excessive amount of duties that take them away from the operation. There was not a supervisor present at the time of the incident.5. Bad procedures. The facility; and region as a whole have done a poor job at creating procedures that are not easily followed by pilots or controllers. Many of these procedures don't have reasonable 'outs'; which put pilots and controllers in dangerous situations in a recovery situation.Consider revising ANC jet blast procedures.Provide clear expectations to CPCs on services we are expected to provide pilots.Provide adequate staffing to accomplish existing goals.

ANC Tower Controller reported Local Controller failed to follow facility policy nor take action to comply. Reporter states facility policies are unclear and difficult to follow.

1414899

201701

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

Air Taxi

Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1414899

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

During takeoff after reaching 2000 ft on top of the field I began to notice the right engine was surging. At first I thought it might be the turbulence just rocking the aircraft making the props make a little noise but the surging began to become worse and I quickly turned back to [the airport] and called on UNICOM that I was returning to the field and had an emergency. I elected to shut the engine down as the surging was making it difficult to control especially with the turbulence coming off the mountains. Before I shut it down I noticed the right engine was at 300 pph. I quickly pulled out the QRH and joined the downwind and performed the items inside the QRH. The aircraft was able to hold altitude and we landed safely without further incident. During run up and takeoff the aircraft indications were normal.

Cessna 402C pilot reported returning to departure airport after shutting down the right engine due to surging.

1849785

202110

0601-1200

SRQ.Airport

FL

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Ground SRQ; Tower SRQ

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

Personal

Taxi

Tower SRQ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Final Approach

Class C SRQ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Total 3094.25

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1849785

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors

After a normal landing on Runway 14 at Sarasota/Bradenton Intl Airport (SRQ) the Tower Controller instructed me to turn left at Taxiway Delta and contact Ground Controller. The Ground Controller told me to turn right on taxiway Charlie cross taxiway Delta and hold short Runway 4/22. When I stopped at the hold short line I accidentally rolled part way over the hold short line; causing the Tower Controller to instruct an aircraft landing on Runway 4 to go around. I understood all instructions; and I believe the problem was my concern about my position in relation to busy Taxiway Delta that I miss judged where the hold short line was. I would have been better off to pay more attention to the hold short line and disregard Taxiway Delta.

Small Aircraft Pilot reported they failed to hold short of an active runway.

1688278

201909

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

N

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Testing; Inspection; Repair

Fan Reverser

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

1688278

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Procedure; Manuals

Manuals

I worked an inbound reverser log item on aircraft XXXX log page XXXXXXX. I pulled [aircraft maintenance manual] 78-XX-XX-XXX-XXX-XXX and [aircraft maintenance manual] 78-XX-XY-XXY-XXX-XXX. Went out to aircraft and performed Engine Accessory Unit reset and then went to flight deck and cycled engine 1 reverser 4 cycles. Determined reverser was good and had no faults; signed off item. My maintenance manuals never had me go out to engine 1 to open fan cowls so fan cowls were never opened.

Maintenance Technician reported that aircraft maintenance manuals did not have a step to open fan cowls while working on thrust reversers.

1578117

201809

0.0

Air Carrier

No Aircraft

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

1578117

Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

Yesterday a motor vehicle accident occurred between a catering van and a ramp agent driving a tug pulling a cart. I was driving as the team leader was coming towards my direction. As he was coming forward he didn't realize the van was coming out already. Once he realized he then tried to avoid the collision but in that instance the cart on the bag of the tug swerved back in. When the cart came back in that's when it collided with the van. Immediately as I see this take place I notified [a supervisor] over the radio and told him that an accident had just taken place. When he came over to my gate he asked (3) questions! Did I see what happened? What had taken place? Who was at fault? I then gave him the run down as to what had taken place. I went back to uploading and pushing out my flight. After [pushback] a Supervisor was still at the gate and I asked him if he had wanted my statement in which he then told me that it was stated that there were no witnesses to this incident. He then took me to the office to write out my statement.

Ramp Agent reported an accident between a catering van and a tug pulling a cart.

1444501

201704

0601-1200

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Corporate

Decathlon 8KCAB

1.0

Part 91

None

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 3100; Flight Crew Type 77

Distraction

1444501

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Winds were calm and conditions were clear. I was taxiing to the runway at about 5 mph and 1;000 RPM; and applied brakes approaching the movement area hold short line for a 10 minute ferry flight. The hold line is just forward of a bump in the ramp corresponding to track for a fence that used to be located there. The tail unexpectedly came up to the point that a propeller strike occurred. Following the propeller strike; the tail immediately came back down. The only point of impact was the propeller blades and no other damage is noted to the aircraft. There were absolutely no injuries or collateral property damage. This occurred shortly after leaving my desk handling urgent; unrelated matters. I completed all relevant preflight actions; but did not take a moment to slow down and allow my brain to switch gears. In the moments leading up to the propeller strike I believe my brain was processing/filing/deleting my tasks and actions of the previous two hours and was not focused on taxiing. I was surprised by the approaching movement area boundary; and applied the brakes aggressively; which as it turns out was excessive. Possibly related is that the different aircraft that I had flown most recently the day prior required maximum effort braking for a moderate deceleration response.

Decathlon pilot reported a propeller strike after aggressive application of brakes while taxiing.

1366759

201606

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

38000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Electrical Distribution Busbar

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Distraction

1366759

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Troubleshooting

1366897.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft

While at cruise altitude (FL380) midway through flight; R IRS DC FAIL EICAS displayed along with DC FAIL light for approximately 10-20 seconds then extinguished. QRH checklist completed and we decided to continue to [our destination]. Around the same time; we began hearing a clicking sound coming from the area right of the First Officer's seat near the right Circuit Breaker (CB) panel; printer and AC power outlet. All CBs checked in and clicking stopped for a while. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later; the clicking sound returned. This stopped after a few minutes and at this point we were near our top of descent. Shortly thereafter; we lost the Captain's displays; FMC and the top EICAS display; as well as losing all autopilots and auto throttles. EICAS messages were plentiful...upwards of 30. Captain asked for lower altitude below RVSM airspace and asked for clearance direct to [destination] while breaking out the QRH. First Officer flew the airplane. Captain determined that the L AC BUS OFF EICAS message was the source of our problems. He then ran the QRH checklist for L AC BUS OFF. L AC BUS would not reset. Captain selected Right Instrument Source Select Panel to receive displays and managed flight from right FMS. We initially were on vectors to intercept ILS; but due to Flap indicator being inoperative; we chose to back up flap operation with ALTN flaps. Requested delay vectors to configure properly and discuss flap indications. We decided to use flaps 20 for approach and use [a different runway] for longer landing rollout. In addition; received EQPT OVHT message and Captain ran appropriate checklist. Approach and landing conducted uneventfully. Maintenance debriefed and AML entry input by Captain. Duty officer called and debriefed by Captain.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B757 flight crew reported experiencing an electrical issue resulting in several system rendered inoperative or degraded. Flight landed normally.

1062628

201301

1801-2400

ZSE.ARTCC

WA

No Aircraft

Facility ZSE.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

1062628

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Pilot departed SLE and gave me a tops report. I assume Tower must have asked the pilot to report the tops since he did so right after check on. I filled out a PIREP form and sent it off. The PIREP came out but was wrong. It showed OVC013 TOP013. I had the Supervisor go back down to the TMU with the correction. Another corrected report came out shortly afterward. I called SLE Tower to make sure they had received the PIREP but they said they had not received it on the FDIO Printer. I called TMU and asked if they could send the PIREP to SLE and they said that they could not send it. I told them they most certainly can and that I wanted them to send it to SLE Tower. The individual argued with me that he could not send the PIREP to the Tower and needed an address to send to it. I said I didn't know right off hand and I would have to research it. He asked for an address again and again. Then he asked if the address was SLET. I mentioned that might work but that I wasn't sure and would have to do some research to find out for sure. However; my main concern is that the individual was not even aware that he needed to or even could send it to the Tower! How many PIREPs have we assumed were sent to the Tower which were not really sent? We never know unless we call the Tower to verify it. I would electronically forward the PIREPS to the Tower if I could but I do not have the tools to do so. TMU has the tools; but refuses to do so either because of improper training or a willful choice not do so. Have a software string written to allow automated forwarding of PIREPS to the Towers. Provide training to TMU personnel and stress the importance of sending PIREP information to all concerned facilities including Towers. In this case; the PIREP clearly impacted their operations and was within their area of jurisdiction. I had put SLE for the weather reporting station and SLE for the location. I don't know what else I can do except remind them to send it to the Tower each time I send a PIREP.

ZSE Controller voiced concern regarding the TMU's apparent lack of awareness regarding sending PIREPS to Towers in the area; noting some training in this area is needed.

1322187

201512

0601-1200

CYUL.Airport

PQ

IMC

Icing

Daylight

Tower CYUL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

De-Icing Fluid

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1322187

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated

Procedure; Weather

Procedure

Prior to departing YUL; we needed de-icing and anti-icing of the aircraft. We taxied to the de-ice area; configured; and communicated our needs to the ice-man. We asked for a full body Type 1 and Wings; Tail; [and] Top of fuselage only Type 4. The entire process was normal. We taxied to Runway 24R for departure and performed the requisite 60% N1 run-up for 20 seconds and waited the 3 minutes prior to turning the packs on. Since icing conditions were prevalent at the time of takeoff; we used the Bleeds closed; Wings and Cowl Anti-Ice On configuration. The takeoff roll was normal; and about 3 seconds after rotating and liftoff; the cockpit started to fill with smoke. We quickly ascertained it was the Type 4 fluid running down the fuselage into the APU inlet; and being burned and discharged thru the packs into the cockpit. The intensity was fairly great initially; but quickly dissipated. By the time we climbed to 1;000 ft. AGL and started the climb sequence; the condition had abated entirely. After the post takeoff checks were completed and we were safely climbing; I contacted the FA to ask if anything unusual had occurred in the cabin since takeoff. The FA said all was OK in the cabin; and no anomaly occurred; and all the passengers were fine. Apparently the anti-ice fluid smoke only infiltrated the cockpit. The root cause of this event is the change mandated by Transport Canada that we anti-ice the fuselage of the CRJ-200 if the Wings and Tail require anti-icing prior to takeoff. Contributing factors could be excessive amounts of Type 4 fluid applied to the airframe; but we would not be able to discern that from our vantage point.The current Flight Operations Bulleting in circulation outlines that we do not takeoff unpressurized after de-icing; anti-icing unless performance limitations require that configuration. We could institute unpressurized takeoffs in Canada; during icing conditions; and after being anti-iced on the fuselage to prevent smoke entering the cockpit; and or cabin. Or CRJ-200 operators wait for Transport Canada to rescind this current requirement to operate in an unsafe manner.

Immediately after takeoff; CRJ-200 crew experienced smoke in the cockpit which they determined to be Type 4 anti-ice fluid being burned by the APU caused by runoff from the fuselage. The smoke quickly dissipated and none entered the cabin. Crew recommends that until the recently imposed requirement by Canada Transport; that the fuselage of any CRJ-200 be anti-iced if the wings and tail require anti-icing; is rescinded that company policy be modified to permit unpressurized takeoffs following deicing/anti-icing.

1673599

201908

BOS.Airport

MA

0.0

Ground BOS

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 307

1673599

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Airport

Ramp told us to stop at Spot 7; we did. Ground eventually gave us taxi instructions. We went out single engine and couldn't get moving from Spot 7 due to a very large low spot/indention/hole right at Spot 7. Ground even asked us if we were stuck in the hole; so they are well aware of it. I had to start the second engine to get out of the hole; even applying an abnormal amount of power to get out of it with both engines running. You need to do several things; first put a note on the airport pages that says DO NOT SET. Secondly the airport needs to fix this. Thirdly; in the meantime prior to it being fixed; preferably with concrete not asphalt again; is to instruct ramp to have aircraft hold at either Spot 8 or Spot 6 to avoid this hole.

Air carrier Captain reported parking ramp deterioration at BOS airport caused taxi issues requiring high breakaway thrust to be used.

1330867

201503

1201-1800

F11.TRACON

FL

5000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON F11

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR CORLL1

Class B MCO

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Cruise

Class B MCO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

1330867

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Ambiguous

Everything was normal; we were at 5;000 ft between CORLL and DIGGR. ATC told us to climb to 6;000 for traffic. The First Officer (FO) started the climb. I looked at the TCAS; saw a yellow dot target in front of us 200 feet high. I quickly looked outside and saw the traffic above us. Before I could even tell the FO not to climb the TCAS gave us an RA; 'Descend' at about 1;000 ft per minute. I then told ATC that we have an RA and we are descending. ATC gave us a descent to 4;000 and a turn to 250. I watched the light twin engine plane fly above us from right to left. My suggestion is that we stop using the CORLL 1 Arrival. This arrival is getting very dangerous. We are getting traffic alerts all of the time. We need to be grouped with the MCO arrivals using the BUGGZ 2 Arrival.

Air Carrier Captain arriving SFB via the CORLL1 arrival experienced a TCAS RA which he attributes to using this arrival. He believes that MCO arrivals would be more suitable for his aircraft and away from VFR traffic.

1634163

201904

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Repair

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 101; Flight Crew Total 1790; Flight Crew Type 1005

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1634163

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

Arrived at aircraft to find inbound Captain and local maintenance putting a ladder up to the number one engine. There was an MEL deferral for a 'feather gap seal' which had 'departed the airplane' on a previous flight.The 'fix' that ZZZ Maintenance had completed was to tape over where the panel had come off; adhering tape to angle iron on the pylon and the translating sleeve for the thrust reverser. This was completely ineffective as when the airplane went into reverse; the tape was ripped off.When I got up on the ladder to inspect the new fix; further investigation showed that not only was there a missing feather gap seal; but also the angle iron attached to the engine pylon was cracked for a significant distance; over 12 inches in my estimation.During multiple conversations with [Maintenance Control]; Local Contract Maintenance as well as in consultation with my First Officer; it became clear that there was a miscommunication and lack of comprehension and understanding as to which aircraft components were actually cracked/ missing as well as to the severity of the cracked angle iron. (Initial maintenance release document showed a '3 inch crack 12 inches aft of leading edge of angle iron.)In conversation with [Maintenance Control]; I expressed my concerns as to accurate identification of the problems and the proposed fix and was eventually forced to refuse the aircraft. Hearing this; the [Maintenance Control] 'hung up on me.' I contacted Dispatch and got phone patch with [Maintenance Control] and did official refusal of the aircraft [and] also entered 'unable to operate' code into ACARS.At my request; [Flight Operations Manager] became involved; multiple conversations ensued ; additional pictures were exchanged; [Engineering Authorization] was referenced and a 'fix' using 'high-speed tape' was effected that I believed address the situation at least from a legal standpoint. Although I had little confidence the tape resolution would hold; I did believe the airplane was airworthy at this point and we flew the aircraft to ZZZ1.

A319 Captain reported they initially refused aircraft based on unairworthy repair of aircraft.

1582902

201810

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

SR20

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 430; Flight Crew Type 60

Situational Awareness

1582902

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Human Factors

I received a weather briefing for a local training flight with a student. Winds were gusting 25 knots at home airport and decided to listen to AWOS at ZZZ to see if winds were better. They were only gusting 17 so I decided to take my student there to practice short and soft field landings. Never was it in my mind to check the NOTAMS for the field. We entered left traffic for runway 28 and landed. We departed again on runway 10; as it was a 90 degree crosswind for either runway; and we did another landing. At this time another aircraft was taxiing for takeoff so we exited the runway at the end of 10 and taxied back to the beginning of 10 to allow the other aircraft to depart. We held short of runway to allow my student to reconfigure the aircraft for takeoff and made a traffic call that we would be departing runway 10. Before we started moving; the airport manager came over the CTAF frequency and told us that the runway was closed for fresh tarring till [XX:00]; he said it was NOTAM'd closed and that there were runway closure X's in the grass. He said we could depart. At this time; I looked down at the beginning of the runway and saw the X's; which were hard to see as they were in the grass and made of orange construction netting. I apologized for the confusion and we departed. Had I not been so focused on the better winds at ZZZ and teaching my student landings; I would have thought to check the NOTAMS for the airport and would have discovered its closure or at least seen the Xs for the runway.

GA flight instructor reported performing multiple take offs and landings without realizing the runway was closed.

1795928

202011

No Aircraft

Company

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Other / Unknown; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

1795928

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Other Person

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Software and Automation; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

It was determined that pilot's FAA Medical was updated on 202011 with special Issuance / Expiration date and it was defaulted to the 6-month expiration date in Pilot Records.Due to the high volumes of FAA Medical coming in for the past few months and FAA Medical extensions; this one fell through the cracks.Because of the pandemic last year; pilots were granted FAA medical extensions on their 'Expiration Time'; and that may have caused the confusion and to slip by.We are very careful when processing FAA Medicals including other work that we process; and fully intend to process our work as accurately as possible.

Air Carrier Administration Office employee reported a pilot's FAA Medical Certificate was erroneously marked as expired during the COVID-19 extension period.

1001727

201203

1801-2400

ZDC.ARTCC

VA

26000.0

Center ZDC

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZDC

Facility ZDC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1001727

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working the Marlinton Sector; weather was in the North part of the sector causing aircraft to deviate South off the arrival routes. I was told that IAD; DCA and BWI arrivals were not getting in on the routes through my sector. Because the aircraft were deviating; it was difficult to find holding and management did nothing to find alternate routes. I had 3 landing DCA; 2 landing BWI and 2 landing IAD and 16 plus Data Blocks on the scope. I was told that the sector to the Southeast; MOL; would take the IAD arrivals. I cleared the aircraft on a heading for MOL VORTAC. I was expecting the route to be told to me or entered in the computer; so it could be issued and a hand off to the MOL Sector could be accomplished. Neither happened and an E145 entered MOL sector without a hand off; I don't know for sure if the aircraft had been PVD'd to the MOL Sector or not. At this point I was told that the MOL Sector would not work the aircraft. When weather is significantly affecting the area; do not leave one supervisor in charge. The supervisor in charge during this event was very inexperienced and did not know where to get the help we needed. Supervisors need to know how traffic affects the area; in this instance aircraft being shortcut from New York Center area should have been stopped. Coordination with other areas to find alternate routes should have been accomplished. Until Washington Center stops hiring supervisors with little to no Center experience this problem will continue; this Center cannot be used as a stepping stone for someone's road to headquarters. Should be more training on L-Side functions; we don't use them very often but when they are needed the person needs to be proficient.

ZDC Controller described a complex and heavy traffic period that resulted in an airspace infraction; noting the absence of experienced supervision which contributed to the issues at hand.

1068695

201302

1801-2400

HOU.Airport

TX

7000.0

VMC

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Approach

Class B HOU

0.0

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 147; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 4500

1068695

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

During descent we received a fire indication on the right engine (Bells; Lights) when passing 7;000 FT MSL. We had already been cleared to XXX intersection for the ILS and the runway was in sight. I called for the Engine Fire Checklist which the First Officer performed while I continued to hand fly the approach. We declared an emergency and the fire trucks were scrambled. The right engine was shut down according to the QRH and I made an uneventful single engine landing. After landing; the emergency crews inspected the aircraft and saw no indication of fire; so we were cleared to taxi to the gate. This was a ferry flight with no passengers and just one intern observing.

Crew received a right engine fire warning during initial approach.

1667871

201907

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

10.0

3500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3.1; Flight Crew Total 163.5; Flight Crew Type 119.1

1667871

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On my return trip from ZZZ1 while cruising at 3;500 ft MSL approximately 10 Miles north of ZZZ.I was calling to ask for permission to cross their airspace; (although only 3;400 [feet] ceiling). During my communication; my engine starting running rough; and I had a slight loss of power.I told Tower what was happening and that I may need to land; I tried to gain altitude but did not have enough power to do so. Once I knew I had the airport 'made' under a no power situation; I tried troubleshooting with changing fuel tanks; trying carburetor heat; and changing mixture. Nothing changed the power I was getting. I still was getting 2000 RPM; which was enough to maintain my altitude.After the brief troubleshooting I informed ZZZ Tower that I did want to land Runway 10. The employees in the tower were extremely helpful; and their professionalism kept me calm. I turned for a one mile final and dropped in for the landing. The landing went very smooth; and the plane had enough power to taxi to FBO.This morning I contact mechanics on site; they towed my plane to their shop and discovered 'I Lost a Valve'. They are backed up a few weeks; but I will get more information from then soon.

Piper Cherokee pilot reported precautionary landing due to engine malfunctioning.

995718

201202

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

4000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B747-400

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class B ZZZ

Y

Powerplant Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

995718

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Prior to departure; Maintenance was working a Fire Loop issue on engine #4. They changed Loop B and subsequently deferred Loop A. All tests passed prior to departure. Engine start; taxi; takeoff and initial climb out to 4;000 FT were normal.About 5 minutes into the flight; after being cleared to climb to 16;000 FT; we got a Master Warning Light and alarm bell; with a Fire Eng 4 EICAS message and fire light in the #4 Fuel Control Switch and #4 Fire Handle. Per company QRH procedures; I reduced the #4 Thrust Lever to Close; directed the Fire Engine Checklist; and coordinated with ARTCC for level off at 10;000 FT.With the Fire Engine 4 message still indicated I directed activation of the Fire Bottle. After 30 seconds the message was still displayed; and I directed firing the other Fire Bottle for #4. The Fire Eng message remained displayed and I began to consider an emergency return for an overweight landing. After approximately 3-4 minutes; the Fire Eng message was no longer displayed; and I had the engine visually scanned both from the FO window and from the main deck windows. No abnormal indications were noted by visual inspection; and there were no indications of fire on any indicators. I elected to jettison fuel and make a 3-engine approach and landing. We declared an emergency; jettisoned the fuel; and accomplished the landing on runway 26R at our departure airport. Emergency equipment met us on arrival and their inspection revealed no apparent damage to the engine. We taxied to the gate and deplaned.

A number four engine fire warning during initial climb; later determined to have been false; led the B747-400 flight crew to shut down the engine; discharge both fire bottles; declare an emergency; dump fuel and land uneventfully back at their departure airport.

1738524

202003

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Personal

Pitts S-2 All Series

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 30

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1738524

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

I was taxiing my Pitts around to get used to taxiing fast; it has been [X] months since I flew it. So I was taxiing fast to get used to the quick responsiveness of the rudder. Upon one of the simulated takeoffs the canopy must have not been locked fully and came open; as I reached for the canopy I pushed foreward on the elevator pushing the tail up and striking the prop on the ground to which the plane came to rest nose down. I turned off all switches and got out of the aircraft. I removed airplane from the runway and parked it back in my hangar.

Aviat Pitts S2A Single Pilot reported a prop strike during taxi practice.

1695192

201910

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

25000.0

VMC

Dusk

Center ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 3000

Situational Awareness

1695192

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness

1695187.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

During cruise at FL250 the FO (First Officer) and I were having a conversation and mid-sentence we simultaneously noticed a strange odor. There was no visible smoke in the cockpit and we both agreed that it was not an electrical smell but something we could not identify. At that moment the FA (Flight Attendant) used the cabin emergency button to notify us that there was smoke coming out of the passenger vents. I immediately turned off the recirculating fan and radioed ATC and needed to land as soon as possible. He asked what airport and I asked what was closest. He mentioned ZZZ was only 20 miles away and knowing the runway is long and the weather in the area is good chose that and asked to immediately start a descent and vectors for the airport. At that point I had the FO take the radios and start getting down. We were given a lower altitude and he started a 3000 fpm descent. I then turned my attention to the QRH and ran the appropriate checklist. After turning off the gasper fan as well I wanted to know if that got rid of the smoke. I called the FA back and she said that the smoke was no longer coming out just some residual smoke in the cabin. She also said that they were all OK and there was no need for passenger oxygen and then continued with the QRH. It seemed that the smoke was no longer as big a threat; so having coming to an END point in the QRH I then began to prepare for landing. Even though there didn't seem to be any new smoke; the possibility that there was still a fire we could not see was a huge concern. I used the speed cards to get landing numbers and since the QRH was out quickly looked at the landing distance. We were now approximately 3000 feet and I ran the descent checklist. Looking at our current weight I realized that were about 450 lbs. overweight but decided it didn't matter. We were now getting vectored for approach and I just focused on landing. After landing we stopped on the runway and I told the passengers to remain seated. I communicated with ATC that I would like the fire trucks to check the aircraft for any issues we may not be aware of. At this point I made an announcement to the passengers to not be alarmed by the trucks; that we were just being overly cautious; that at this time there was no danger and to remain seated. After I called the FA and asked if she and everyone else was OK. She said yes. After the fire trucks notified us that they could not see any damage or issues; we taxied to the gate; and deplaned normally.The smell was obvious to us and the cabin crew saw the smoke. It seemed to be an issue with either the recirculating fan; gasper fan or pack 2. I had MELed pack 1 before we left the gate 3 flights prior. I believe we did everything we needed to and we landed with no injuries or damage to the aircraft. This has been an issue that to my knowledge has happened several times in the past few weeks and needs to be resolved. Not sure if it is the same aircraft or multiple ones.

While in cruise flight; shortly after the completion of the cruise checklist; the CA (Captain) and I noticed a strong odor consistent with something burning. The smell was not exactly electrical but of a nature we could not readily identify. Within a few seconds; the FA (Flight Attendant) chimed us on the cabin emergency button and told us smoke was rolling into the cabin from the air vents and the cabin was becoming filled with smoke. The CA immediately requested priority handling with Center and asked for the nearest airport; which was ZZZ. Center then cleared us for a decent at which time I began approximately a 3;000 fpm descent from FL250 to 10;000 feet. The CA began running the QRH and I continued to fly the aircraft and speak with ATC. Upon reaching 4;000 feet; ZZZ Tower began vectoring us for the visual to the runway. The CA ran the landing number via the speed cards; I quickly briefed the approach and landing; and began the approach. After landing; I stopped the aircraft on the runway and the CA told the passengers to remain seated. Fire rescued then visually inspected the aircraft and followed us to the gate. Strong smell of something burning. The smell was obvious to all of us and the cabin crew saw the smoke. It seemed to be related to the recirculation fan; grasper fan; or pack 2. Pack 1 was MELed three flights prior and was not operational during the flight. The crew completed all required tasks and safely landed the aircraft at a suitable airport in accordance with piedmont procedures and FOM. This seems to be a recurring issue; not sure if this is the same aircraft but within the last few weeks I am aware of several aircraft that have had to return to the field because of smoke. This issue needs to be resolved.

EMR-145LR flight crew reported a strong unidentifiable odor at cruise; which resulted in a diversion.

1861866

202112

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 MAX 8

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

INS / IRS / IRU

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1861866

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1861858.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft

On descent to [destination]; I was the flying pilot. Autopilot tripped off and lost attitude information on Captain's side. Gave aircraft to FO as his attitude information was reliable. I started into the QRH looking for a checklist dealing with loss of attitude; heading; etc. I had a difficult time finding the correct checklist so I decided to hit recall and see if that would lead me to the right direction. It had an IRS message which led us to see the IRS 1 Fault. Now I was able to execute the correct checklist procedure for the IRS FAULT on the MAX aircraft. Per checklist we were allowed to use the autopilot on the right side and continued descent. I had attitude information back but did not have a full flight director. The FO continued to fly as his flight director was reliable. Checklist called for autopilot off for the approach. We were set up to fly the RNAV. Just prior to reaching [an enroute waypoint]; I noticed the STABILIZER OUT OF TRIM light on. I directed the FO to turn off autopilot since it had to be off for the approach anyway. When he disconnected the autopilot; the aircraft was trimmed heavy nose down resulting in descent. We lost VNAV so we asked to abandon the approach and were given a heading and altitude to fly. Because of the out of trim situation; the FO was having a difficult time controlling the aircraft. Not knowing what exactly was going on; I [advised ATC] and our attention was focused solely on flying the plane. Airspeed trended up and down rapidly but I don't believe it was ever in danger of being slow or fast but took rapid and immediate corrective actions. Eventually aircraft control was stabilized and correctly trimmed and a return to the airport continued without the use of the autopilot. This time we elected to fly the [other approach] knowing that we did not need VNAV. The FO did a great job hand flying the approach and we executed a normal landing.This event was somewhat confusing at first because I had a difficult time finding the correct check list. Then we were both uncertain as to why the aircraft got out of trim while flying on the autopilot without the autopilot disconnecting. I do not know if the issues are related or a separate event. It would be nice to know. The FO was surprised at the out of trim forces on the aircraft after the autopilot was disconnected and struggled momentarily to regain a stabilized trimmed aircraft. Since I did not know the forces he was experiencing; all I could do to help was monitor aircraft flight and call out deviations from normal.We discussed the first chain of events which was the autopilot disconnecting and the lack of attitude information on the Captain's side. It took some time to determine the cause and the correct checklist to execute. We don't believe it resulted in a master caution light which would have directed us to the cause. Doing the recall; did finally alert us to the problem. I don't know for certain if we got the master caution and if it was pushed out too early before analyzing the situation. It's possible but we didn't think that happened. We also don't know if these events are related and if the QRH needs to be modified.

Reporter stated the aircraft was a B737 MAX 8. No feedback from company on root cause. Reporter expressed concern that the autopilot did not disconnect sooner; allowing the out-of-trim condition to go beyond normal parameters; resulting in abnormally high control forces to overcome the out-of-trim condition.

#1 IRS FAULT right before top of descent. Captain transferred aircraft control to me; and ran QRH checklist. As Pilot Flying now and still working Radios I handle Center requests; advise of equipment failure; meet crossing restriction and continue down to I believe 11;000 [ft]. Listening to Captain reading checklist; [approach] setup; I was assuming unable RNP not usable due to equipment limitation of IRS FAULT (not resettable in air.) In terminal area; we decide to try RNP as there was no note in checklist about approach type limitation. Also try autopilot; and CMD B does engage. Plan is now to disengage autopilot; as prescribed in QRH; before commencing approach. Descend from about 11;000 to 3;000 using CMD B autopilot; checklists were complete; everything was green. ATC advises us there is a strong crosswind of 50 kts; and to plan for it. I believe we were configured to flaps 10 and 170 kts as we received the approach clearance; maintain 3;000 until established; cleared RNP. In the turn we are going to be turning the autopilot off shortly; and receive a STAB OUT OF TRIM light. We both agree to turn autopilot off; and I turn the autopilot off. The airplane is heavy; and trimmed nose low. I commence correcting the undesirable attitude; trimming; and then adding power gradually. We lost 200-300 feet; but went back up to 3;000 in short order. Airspeed still not increasing as fast as I like so I push the power way up; and get a desirable trend. In the time between turning the autopilot off; and returning to 3;000 feet we lost approach vertical guidance. Advise the captain we need to go around; get us some vectors out of here. Captain advises ATC; we get vectors; settle everything down; setup for the [approach]; and return to land without incident. Airplane handled just fine with the autopilot off; and after trimming.The QRH did not mention that the autopilot stabilizer trim would fail to be able to keep up with demand; or at all during an IRS FAULT (assuming ADIRU/FCC failure as well?) It only mentioned that the autopilot should not be used during approach; which it was not. Assuming that the VNAV approach guidance quit because I descended below the path (which I am not proud of having let happen) when the autopilot was disconnected; and the stabilizer was in a nose down trim condition; and VNAV didn't disconnect/quit because we were shooting an RNP approach with a single IRS; then I guess not having an approach type limitation isn't necessary in the QRH checklist for IRS FAULT notes? Previous flying experience and experience in the simulator training I had for stabilizer malfunction was good enough to keep me from panicking as I was able to trim; and just added power; and knew we could just fly away. Had I known to EXPECT or been forewarned of the potential that stabilizer trim would be so out of sorts; I may have been much more aggressive in my control of aircraft attitude; and would not have had to jockey the power. The airplane did not seem like it was flying out of trim in the moment when CMD B autopilot was on. I am quite familiar with this airspace; the MSA; and the approach into ZZZ; and that I am glad something like this didn't happen to a crew with 15-20 flying miles to go.Experience. Better systems knowledge. Afterwards I read there are different types of IRS systems on the 737-8; besides just the difference between them; and the B737NG.

B737 MAX 8 Captain reported landing safely following loss of IRS 1 that manifested as multiple system failures; including autopilot 1 and Captain's attitude information. Autopilot 2 was engaged but allowed an out-of-trim condition to develop; resulting in control difficulties.

1670399

201907

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B757-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection

Door Warning System

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Door Area

Air Carrier

Technician

Training / Qualification; Fatigue; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

1670399

Door Area

Air Carrier

Technician

Confusion; Fatigue; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

1670397.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Maintenance; Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

[Crew] called [Maintenance] to help the Gate Agent close the door. I got to door 2L and the Gate Agent said the Pilot had a door indication problem. So I closed the door 2L from the inside and went to the cockpit to check for the indication and get a briefing from the crew. The Pilot Captain said a door entry light on the overhead panel was on. I confirmed the light was on. I made a log write up for that. I thought that if we cycled the doors real quick it would possibly clear itself. I then proceeded to cycle door 1L as my partner cycled 1R. We thought that the caterers might have not closed the door all the way that's why we tried starting from doors 1. I wanted to cycle door 1L as a precaution. I first cycled the arm/disarm lever twice. Once I proceeded to open the door it felt difficult to open so I pushed on the door with my left hand lifted the handle with my right. Then the slide deployed. I went to let the pilots know what happened and was then told door 2L indication had an issue on EICAS. I was rushing due to the plane being boarded and ready to push back. Since I was just opening and closing the doors I didn't use a checklist. I worked swing shift the night before. I got about 5 hours of sleep the night before.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

Maintenance Technician reported while checking door operation on an aircraft inadvertently deployed the emergency slide.

1003821

201204

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

No Aircraft

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Workload

1003821

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

The three positions were all combined. It took me several minutes to take over the position since the controller I was reliving was having a tough time and considering 20/20 hindsight; I should have suggested to the supervisor that I open up one sector. I was on position 5 minutes [and] I was so far down the crapper it took 5 more minutes just to break even. Right after I sat down I noticed that the edges of my screen were a sea of flashing white hand off's as there are more than 6 routes into the Class B airport; and 7 into the Class D; and of course none of these are metered. We were running instrument approaches and when I went to turn an aircraft to join the Class B localize somebody checked in; then when I went to turn that aircraft again my transmission was blocked so I tried again and he said; 'was that for me'; so I had to restate his instruction a 3rd time and he got into AR1/2's airspace. Basically; I had 4-6 aircraft inbound to the Class D and 1-2 departures from the Class D; 1 inbound to a second nearby Class D and 3 departures from there and 7-10 arrivals to the Class B and 1 departure from the airport! There were too many aircraft; frequencies and airports for 1 Controller to safely work! All it takes is 1 missed communication and you're behind and that happened right away as I did not have enough room; airspace and altitudes for all of the aircraft. They tried to open up a new sector five or so minutes after I got so busy but it's hard to split off positions when you don't even have the time to brief the other controller. I can't really remember the last time I got this far behind. It's been years. If I would have 'strongly' recommended to the supervisor that I open up the new sector when the previous Controller was briefing me and if that had happened I probably would not be filling out this report now! But I didn't so I have myself first and foremost to blame. Besides what was said above; we have several 'perfect storms' brewing at the TRACON. We are no longer under a microscope for loss of separation. The new two thirds of required separation rule instead of the 90% PE rule or the 100% required before that has added to the apathy of 'following the rules'. We are thinly staffed yet we constantly have people on 'details'. People are fatigued from constantly working lots of traffic. Despite what I just stated above Controllers are our own worst enemies by complaining about being on a position that should be combined because it is slow. When traffic picks up it's always too late to open up another position! There seems to be an agency wide attitude because it doesn't matter if you're dealing with another facility or somebody across the room; once a plane is off frequency; and/or out of my airspace; then it's no longer my problem; even if you just crapped on the next Controller working that aircraft. We have several supervisors with 1 year of experience or less that seem to have the good old days syndrome of 'well I could have handled that push of aircraft'. That really isn't a 'safe' way to staff the TRACON when there are a lot of aircraft on the way! They do not adhere to the theory that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link; which totally applies to ATC!

TRACON Controller described an extremely busy and complex traffic period that resulted in an airspace infraction and loss of separation event; the reporter acknowledging he should have insisted on splitting the combined position during the relief briefing.

1105442

201307

1801-2400

DFW.Airport

TX

0.0

Ramp DFW

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 10000

1105442

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Human Factors

During taxi-out [in DFW] I had to stop the aircraft quickly due to a 9 passenger van driving on the ramp. The van was outside the painted roadway on the ramp; heading south and a possible obstruction to my taxi. When I brought the aircraft to a quick stop all three flight attendants were in the aircraft galleys and received injuries from moving carts or being thrown off balance and into the galley structure. Ramp was notified on the behavior of the van and flight attendant possible injuries.

B737-800 Captain reported coming to an abrupt stop on the taxiway at DFW to avoid collision with a large passenger van; three flight attendants were injured as a result.

1337163

201602

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

1337163

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Weather

I received the before landing chime. I proceeded to make my announcement and walk through the cabin doing my final compliance check. I got back to the galley just as we started experiencing light turbulence. Nothing out of the norm. I was cleaning up my last couple service items in the galley when we experienced 1 major drop. I was thrown into the galley counter where I hit my head; arm and leg. The flight was turbulent the rest of the way. I went through the cabin to make sure all passengers were okay. My Captain also called to make sure everyone was okay. I told him I hit my head; but other than that I believed everyone was okay. Then took my jumpseat for the remainder of the flight.During the deplaning process I was informed by 2 passengers that they too hit their heads on the overhead bins. I asked them to stay on the airplane until we were finished deplaning. I notified my Captain that we had 2 passengers who may have been injured. He came out of the flight deck to speak with the passengers and had the agent come to the airplane. At this point I walked to the back of the airplane and sat down as my head was hurting really bad. My Captain took care of the passengers. One of which denied treatment and the other really just wanted to know if the airline was liable if her husband suffered any injuries. It was later brought to my attention that he was taken to the hospital once inside the terminal.My Captain then asked if I was okay I responded with yes my head just hurts give me a minute. He told me he was writing up the airplane and that maintenance would have to come inspect it. He then went into the terminal. A few mins later I walked into the terminal to use the bathroom; I then decided to seek medical attention as the pain was increasing and my vision was blurring in and out. I was taken to the hospital and treated for a head injury and some bruises.I don't believe there is much that could have prevented this incident as we were all just doing our jobs. Unexpected turbulence is just that.

Dash 8 Flight Attendant reported experiencing head injury symptoms after a turbulence incident.

1462238

201707

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

33000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Unscheduled Maintenance

Testing

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1462238

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

1462255.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors

When we arrived in ZZZ; we called maintenance to check a right Inertial Reference System (IRS) deviation. They came out and checked it and told us not to mess with any settings on the FMS or realignment until they were done. There was poor communication with maintenance as to how long this would take. The Passengers were boarding. It took almost an hour before we could hop in the flight deck to perform the setup for the next flight. I was definitely rushed and was focused on getting the FMS set up. I got the clearance and read it; but didn't look at the departure in the EFB. When we were ready to push; the fueler was pulling the hose to the aircraft and we had to wait for the Ramp Agents to tell him this was the wrong aircraft. There were people standing up in the aisle and we had to wait for them to sit. We taxied out to [the runway] and as we neared the runway; I realized I didn't know if we were on a heading or LNAV for this departure; so I looked in the EFB as we were taking the runway.We took off and after the heading was selected; we were switched to Departure. I had to bring up the ATC clearance to remember if we were to climb via or not; and then I talked to Departure. I either missed hearing the flaps up call; or the Pilot Flying (PF) didn't make the call and we kept climbing with the flaps not up. We both noticed a vibration and noise and thought it could be the fuel door left open; because that had just happened on a previous flight a few days before. We caught the mistake at FL 330.[Suggestion] SLOW DOWN!! All of the everyday distractions are easy to take care of if we are not rushed. I need to make sure I understand and read through the departure before we leave the gate. It's easy to get caught up in the scheduling crunch; but I should just say; SLOW DOWN

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported that being unable to climb beyond FL330 because the flaps were not completely up.

1326769

201601

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

39100.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZZ

Air Taxi

Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

VHF

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1326769

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

After approximately 30 minutes in cruise at FL391; No 2 RTU showed signs of intermittent transmit rendering VHF unserviceable for transmit and receive. Initially intermittent but deteriorated as flight continued. Communications switched to No 1 RTU. Shortly afterwards No 1 RTU showed same symptoms. For rest of the flight the symptoms occurred concurrently with very intermittent radio communications. Shortly after VHF transmit indication problems EICAS showed FDR FAIL status message. The message cleared for a short while then reappeared. Continued intermittently for duration of flight. CB reset did not clear the message. Shortly after FDR message the GROUND AIRBRAKES advisory message came on EICAS followed by FLIGHT AIRBRAKES advisory message. Unable to clear after CB reset. This was followed by SLAT/FLAP MAINTENANCE status message. In each instance QRH abnormals were consulted and followed. Nil messages able to be cleared. Even with radio transmission problems; sufficient ATC clearance able to be copied to commence descent and obtain landing runway. Further into the approach no radio contact possible; 7600 selected on transponder and continued approach as per last clearance. On final approach temporary radio communications resulted in allocation of new transponder code and landing clearance obtained. Utilized Follow Me car to locate parking bay. Due SLAT/FLAP MAINTENANCE Status message a NO SLAT/NO FLAP approach and landing carried out as per QRH.

G200 Captain reported intermittent loss of VHF transmit and receive capability along with EICAS indications of flight data recorder; ground/flight airbrakes; and slat/flap failures. Sufficient communication was established for approach and landing clearance to a successful no slat/flap landing.

1086110

201305

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

10000.0

VMC

Turbulence; 10

Daylight

10000

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Aileron Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 240; Flight Crew Type 210

1086110

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft; Weather

Weather

I was on the first hour of a 4 hour flight. The cloud tops were forecast to be at 5;000 and I had filed for 6;000. I found the tops to be at over 7;000 and getting higher. Most of the traffic (including me) were asking for higher altitudes to stay out of the very bumpy cumulous clouds. The flight conditions were VMC but it was turbulent in the clouds. There was no precipitation or thunderstorm activity; it was just turbulent. I was cleared up to 10;000 and climbed to that altitude; however I was just a few hundred feet shy of getting on top and the Controller could not give me higher at the moment so I entered the top of a white puffy cumulous cloud and had a couple of pretty good bumps. The autopilot was engaged and as I came out of the cloud; the Controller was calling me asking why I was flying south when my as filed course was west northwest. I noted that the autopilot was flying off the desired track and so I disengaged the autopilot. However; I had trouble holding heading. As I flew on; it was clear that there was something amiss as I had to hold right aileron (at about 10 or 11 o'clock on the control wheel) to keep it flying on a straight heading. I immediately informed the Controller that something was wrong (possibly with my aileron after my encounter with turbulence) and I asked for vectors to the nearest airport. He was very helpful and vectored me to a close-by airport; and once I had it in sight cleared me for the visual approach as I was in VFR conditions below 4;000. I took a couple of turns around the airport and was having difficulty with any left turns as it over-banked in that direction. I came in on a long stabilized final approach and landed safely. Having to get back to work; I left the plane with the FBO and flew home on the airlines. The FBO will give it a test flight this week to determine what the issue is. Yesterday and today three separate A&P's inspected the plane and found that the plane did not sustain any physical damage from the turbulence and they see nothing visibly wrong. Speculation is a stuck servo from the autopilot. Thank god for ATC assistance; it is very lonely up there when something goes wrong with your airplane or the weather!

After conversations with aircraft mechanics who had inspected his airplane; the reporter speculates that an autopilot malfunction caused his lateral control difficulty during turbulent IFR flight.

PA32 pilot was alerted by ATC of a large heading deviation while on an IFR clearance and experiencing turbulence in the cloud tops. The pilot then noticed a strong left turning tendency; and needed to add significant opposite control input to maintain course. With ATC assistant flight was diverted to the nearest airport and landed safely.

1008824

201205

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

21000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Personal

Super King Air 200

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Center ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 11600; Flight Crew Type 6200

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1008824

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was en route in a King Air 200 on an instrument flight plan in good VMC. I had filed for FL230. Every controller had step climbed me; usually a thousand feet at a time; and this step climbing continuing sort of like happens when following another airplane same direction. I was still being step climbed 25 minutes into the flight; which I thought was unusual. When it came time to switch Centers; the Controller told me the next Center wouldn't answer him in order to take the hand-off; but he gave me the frequency and said I should just go ahead and contact them myself. The next Center answered me right away and then cleared me from 13;000 to FL210. After a while had a feeling that communications between ATC and me and ATC and other aircraft were very strange during this flight or there were some sort of technical issues occurring or something. I know ordinarily a delay of a response when checking in sometimes means a change of shift briefing is happening or the Controller is temporarily on the land line etc; but I thought things just didn't feel right. Then maybe it was just because it was a slow afternoon; I don't know. There were very few airplanes and very little talk but even during initial call-ups by other planes I noticed the controllers seemed preoccupied with something else. I don't know really... it was just a distinct feeling. Climbing through about FL198 FT for FL230; to the best of my recollection; the Controller suddenly told me to stop and level off at FL200 which I did. I wondered why because I hadn't heard any other planes on our frequency that could have caused a conflict. As I said it was pretty quiet. A few minutes later the controller then cleared me from FL200 to FL230. Climbing through 20;900 he abruptly said something like 'King Air X; descend immediately to FL200.' I didn't question him as to the reason; I just nose the plane over as I hit 21;100 and started back down; trying not to lift my passengers off their seats. Then he said that I should 'expedite my climb' which didn't make sense; but I responded with something like 'I've already started down.' Then he asked me to say my altitude and I believe I said 'descending out of FL210.' I was trying to increase the rate if descent as best I could when an airplane went whizzing by my windshield close enough to hear him. I don't know what type and I can't tell with any certainty how close because I just saw him for a moment; but he was above and ahead moving right to left. It was one of those things that was such a shock that I couldn't believe it and wondered what the heck had just happened. What made it even spookier was that the Controller never said anything more period. I've occasionally had controllers call traffic alerts even after-the-fact; but nothing at all was said. The traffic was never called. The other plane never said anything. It was quite surrealistic. I think there was nothing more said until the hand-off to the next sector several minutes later. And then that Controller treated me with extreme courtesy as if he was personally happy I was still alive. I was still sitting there wondering what had happened; but I didn't think it was something appropriate to discuss on the radio. I also started thinking that there was no way my passenger could have not seen that other plane; and no excuse or explanation on my part was going to keep my from getting fired. As far as a TCAS alert; I noticed that I was not getting any traffic information on a flight earlier in the day. I called the pilot who usually flies this airplane and told him that the TCAS did not appear to be working and he told me that was because one of the TCAS system components was in the avionics shop; so that explained that. When I think back on this; I believe that any one of a number of other traffic avoidance resolutions would have been better that what I was told to do. If I had been advised of the converging airplane I would have been looking specifically for him in order to get visual contact with it immediately if not sooner. If I had been warned that he was that close; converging at the same altitude; the urgency would have been even greater. If the controller had said turn right immediately; or turn left; or break right or left; or expedite climb or ANYTHING instead of telling me to stop my climb and descend which in actuality caused me to be around FL210 for the longest duration possible; it would have been better than what happened. If he had not said anything and I had just been allowed to continue my climb I would have be 500 FT above the other plane when we crossed paths. If the Controller had told me to expedite the climb I could have been over a thousand foot above him. It was a bad situation made worse by the wrong 'resolution.' As far as me personally; I don't think I alone could have done a single thing to have completely avoided this close call. We were converging at an angle so that the other plane was probably hidden from my line of site right; behind the solid area between the left and right windshield sections; and I couldn't see him coming. I know that without a doubt this is the closest I have been to another airplane in flight except while in formation flight; and the closest I have ever been to having a mid-air collision in 36 years as a professional pilot. I'm just happy to be here.

A King Air pilot reported a near miss at FL210 when ATC issued a climb clearance to FL230 then abruptly canceled the climb and ordered a descent after he was above FL210; but did not issue any traffic alerts.

1037561

201209

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Stall Warning System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Distraction

1037561

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

1037785.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

The First Officer was not yet at airplane; so I accomplished the origination preflight. During the preflight; we were also dealing with several maintenance issues; including a broken VSI indicator and 2 of 4 brake wear indicators that were at or below the limits. During the Stall Warning test; I observed the aural warning and both Push to Inhibit Switches illuminate; but with the distractions of the other issues; I didn't notice that the Captain's white switch cover with the words 'Stick Shaker Push to Inhibit' printed on it was missing. It wasn't until after level off that I noticed the yellow cover showing [which should have been] behind the missing white cover. The switch still operated; just the cover was missing. I entered the discrepancy in the logbook and the switch was replaced at our destination.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

While distracted by unassociated maintenance considerations during his preflight; the Captain of an MD-83 failed to notice a missing switch cover until at cruise.

1726705

202002

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

1726705

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Find the source and stop the leaks. On descent into ZZZ; base to final; we had an extremely strong odor of engine oil in the cockpit. It smelled like sour dirty socks. It was so intense; almost 'thick' if you will. We donned our masks; turned off the packs; opened the ram air valve; and landed as we were approaching the final approach fix. No passenger reported any smell. The aft Flight Attendant reported a short faint smell.

A320 First Officer reported a strong odor of engine oil in the cockpit during initial approach and continued to landing at destination.

1227913

201412

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

5.0

1600.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

TBM 700/TBM 850

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 29R

Final Approach

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 3203; Flight Crew Type 648

Situational Awareness

1227913

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Horizontal 1500; Vertical 0

Automation Aircraft TA

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

On the ILS 29R maybe about 1 mile from the FAF we observed a traffic conflict 2 miles out 12 o'clock same altitude on TCAD. We were on the radio with socal approach. We were looking for the traffic didn't see it visually. As the traffic alert sounded I initiated a climb. A few seconds later socal called with the conflict and asked for a rapid descent. I pushed the plane over into rapid descent following ATC instructions. We passed the traffic same altitude with 1/4 mile horizontal separation. I should have initiated the conflict resolution and climb and at the same time break into the busy frequency announce the climb for TA resolution. Following the ATC instructions actually made the situation much more dangerous.

TBM pilot experiences an airborne conflict at 1600 feet approaching the FAF for the ILS. TCAD had indicated the traffic and the reporter had started an evasive climb at the time TRACON/ATC called for a descent. The climb is reversed resulting passing co-altitude with a quarter mile separation.

1570471

201808

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Daylight

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Pax Seat

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1570471

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1570275.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

Taxi

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

While arriving [at the gate]; Number 3 FA (Flight Attendant) called and conveyed that there's smoke and fire at row 18; left side and that he is taking the extinguisher to it. I informed the Captain and he expedited our parking as I tried to contact the Tower for ARFF assistance. The Tower frequency was congested and after a few tries I got through. Tower called ARFF and after shutdown the Captain went to the back and by that time the smoke had already dissipated.Smoke had actually originated from under row 18; right side. By the time we parked passengers sitting nearby apparently had poured water onto the electronics box that was smoking. We deplaned normally and upon inspection by Maintenance and ARFF; it was concluded that no other components of the plane were affected. A seat power box was removed and had a strong electronic burning odor.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737-800 flight crew reported that a Flight Attendant reported a fire under a passenger seat in the cabin.

989492

201201

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

10000.0

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Commercial

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

989492

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

898493.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We made the decision to return to the departure airport. As we passed through 10;000 FT the Captain and I heard a loud hissing and vibrating sound that seemed to be coming from the cockpit escape hatch. The sound lasted only a few seconds and we promptly called by the Flight Attendants asking if they had heard the sound as well and how the passengers were doing. They told us that some of the forward passengers had heard noise and that it seemed to come from the Main Cabin door. At this point we had begun a descent back to 10;000 FT and slowed to 200 KTS. During the descent we checked the pressurization several times and it seemed to be holding the correct pressure. As the power was decreased for the descent and to slow down; we heard the noise again and could hear the packs surging as they adjusted for the new power setting. We referenced the QRH for the problem; but there was not a corresponding checklist. The Captain then called Maintenance and informed them of the situation and then called Dispatch through [a commercial radio service]. The Captain and Dispatch collectively decided that returning to the departure airport was the best course of action. No emergency was declared [but] Tower had chosen to dispatch the fire and rescue trucks as an additional precaution. We landed the aircraft without incident and returned to gate where the aircraft could be further inspected.

We did not suspect any structural damage or safety issues and thus did not declare an emergency; however the Tower out of precaution rolled the trucks (there was an emergency aircraft landing about 5 minutes after us). Swapped airplanes and arrived in our planned destination later that night.

A Q400 main cabin door developed a loud hissing noise and vibration at about 10;000 FT so the crew returned to the departure airport as a precaution although pressurization remained normal.

1566852

201808

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

32000.0

VMC

Windshear

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1566852

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1565900.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

During ATC assigned level off at FL320 we received Hyd 3 Lo Press and IB Ground Splrs cautions. Also displayed were several status messages regarding electrical ties. Captain took control of the aircraft and the radios and called for the Hyd 3 Lo Press QRH. Ran the QRH which only asked for 3b pump on and monitoring of system with sufficient pressure. No further action but we noticed Gen 2 was not operating properly. We [advised ATC] over being down to one generator and back up Hyd 3 pump. We started to return to ZZZ as quickly and safely as possible. We were faced with the added challenge of wind shear reported on 2 mile final as storms moved through the terminal area. On short final we got two instances of positive wind shear followed by a good landing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported the loss of a hydraulic system and a generator resulted in a return to the departure airport.

1246055

201503

0601-1200

ZLA.ARTCC

CA

10.0

23000.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR BAYVU3

Class A ZLA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 107

1246055

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Type 10000

Training / Qualification; Confusion

1246364.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was on the jumpseat performing a Line Check on the Captain of this flight. Prior to descent into SAN; LA Center had the crew slow to slowest practical airspeed and gave them a late descent clearance causing them to be high on path for the BAYVU3 Arrival. Shortly after passing LAX; ATC vectored them off of the STAR to a heading of 090 and cleared them to FL200. There were multiple aircraft on the frequency with many non-standard instructions. Passing approximately FL300; ATC cleared the flight to turn right direct OTISS and directed them to contact the next Controller. Once again; the frequency was very busy with the Controller handling many aircraft. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) checked in with their clearance to OTISS and descending to FL200. As we were descending through FL235; ATC calls out crossing traffic from another carrier that was climbing to FL230. The next three events happened simultaneously. 1. The Crew recognized that they were about to pass through the altitude that the called traffic was cleared to climb to and stopped their descent. 2. The Controller asked them to verify their assigned altitude. 3. A TCAS TA was received. The Pilot Flying (PF) reversed his descent to a climb and climbed to FL240. ATC issued a clearance to maintain FL240. ATC issued a clearance to the other carrier to maintain FL200. Once the traffic conflict no longer existed; ATC cleared the flight to descend via the BAYVU3 Arrival. Continued without incident.This was a very busy event. We talked about what happened and about possible errors made by all involved. Our best solution to prevent incidents like this in the future is to maintain an extra vigilance in the future when we encounter non-standard handling/vectors/clearances off of and onto RNAV STARS and SIDS.

We were being vectored for our descent into SAN. We were given a descent to FL200 and changed frequencies. We checked in descending to FL200. We were then given a right turn of 090 degrees to a fix on the arrival and issued traffic climbing to FL230. WE received a Traffic Advisory for an airplane 1;900 Feet below us. I stopped the descent and climbed to FL240. About the same time; ATC gave the other carrier's aircraft a stop climb clearance and then asked us what our clearance was. We responded FL200 but that we were climbing back to FL240.

A B-737 Flight Crew and a Check Airman describe a TCAS TA event during which the crew took evasive action. ATC had pointed out the climbing traffic; but had not indicated there would be any conflict.

1452394

201705

0601-1200

ZLA.ARTCC

CA

36000.0

Daylight

Center ZLA

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZLA

Center ZLA

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZLA

Facility ZLA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute; Handoff / Assist; Trainee

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1452394

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working D54 when I observed three aircraft; 'Aircraft Y' at FL360 heading SW and one aircraft 'Aircraft X' heading NW at FL360. I told my R-side to be watchful of these aircraft. My R-side tells the R-55 radar controller to put Aircraft X on a 20R vector; R55 controller took a while because he was busy but then complied. I told my R-side once Aircraft X came over to ask if he can accept FL380 but my R-side did not comment back. He then told me his plan was to fit Aircraft X between Aircraft Y and another aircraft which was in front of Aircraft Y (also at FL360; can't remember the call sign). I told him again 'see if Aircraft X can take FL380' but no response was given nor was the question asked to the pilot.At this point he vectors Aircraft X to what I believe was a 315 heading watching the situation get closer. I thought to myself well lets go ahead and descend Aircraft X to FL340 so I PVD (Suppress/Request Data Block) the aircraft to Salt Lake Sector 46 and as I'm about to call for the point out the R-side reassures me he's going to make it work. He turns Aircraft Y to what I believe was 20 degrees left to vector behind Aircraft X; conflict alert starts to go off he acknowledges it. I told him 'that's really close' he again reassured me not to worry. At this point the two aircraft start flashing a second time and the R55 controller takes wind of the situation and tells the R-54 controller he should probably descend Aircraft Y. My R-side decides this is a good idea and issues an expedited descent clearance to FL340 for traffic to Aircraft Y; immediately after telling Aircraft Y to 'report leaving FL350.'At this point I tell the R-side controller that this is going to be a deal and to climb Aircraft X but he said once again 'don't worry we will have it.' I and the R-side controller both observe the two aircraft penetrate the 5 mile radius O-ring halo that was placed on Aircraft Y's primary. Aircraft Y soon after reports leaving FL350. R-side tells R55 he had the separation and he reported out of it and assures me we had it the whole time. Considering Aircraft Y reported leaving after I observed the loss of separation I deemed it to be a controller error and thus decided to file this report.After the situation Aircraft X was put back on course and the 4th line of Aircraft Y's data block was removed. The R-side thought he had issued Aircraft Y to proceed back on course but a few minutes later I observed his track was off from his route line and prompted the radar controller about it. He then asked Aircraft Y if he was still on a heading. Aircraft Y confirmed he indeed was; radar controller apologized and cleared the pilot to the next fix on his flight plan.The OAPM (Optimization of Airspace and Procedures) airspace we have established between the 54 and 55 positions continues to worry controllers on a daily basis; they literally talk about it every day for the duration of the day with nothing but complaints on how much it impacts safety and adds complexity to day to day basis to one of the busiest airspace's in the entire center. I've only been in the area for almost a year and I consider myself to be a junior personnel and just 'roll through the punches' so to speak but I'm becoming alarmed at the fact that months after the implementation there are so many seasoned controllers having issues with the airspace and the congestion the new boundaries are causing. Although this may not have had a direct impact on the safety event described in this submission; I strongly believe had the R-side controller had control of Aircraft X from the beginning he may have had more time to resolve the conflict. The majority of controllers in the area would agree this airspace design is without a doubt something that should be addressed on a continual basis.

ZLA Developmental Controller reported a loss of separation due to the Radar Controller not taking the advice of the Developmental.

1182580

201406

1801-2400

ZMA.ARTCC

FL

28500.0

Center ZMA

Government

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Oceanic

Class A ZMA

Center ZMA

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Oceanic

Class A ZMA

Facility ZMA.ARTCC

Government

Oceanic; Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1182580

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Procedure

First I would like to explain that I rated this situation as a Level 5 Complexity because it involves working with Port au Prince Center. They are nice enough people but their English is limited; their control skills very limited; and they get very testy when you are not willing to 'let them' separate the airplanes in their airspace. I often over-restrict the traffic they are giving me because they simply cannot be trusted. This is not just my ranting. I assure you that 100% of the controllers and supervisors in the Ocean area would agree. I am not exaggerating. 100%. I had just assumed the sector. Aircraft X was already an estimate passed to ZMA. I do not remember if I took the estimate on Aircraft Y or if the previous Controller had approved it. But Aircraft X was coordinated at FL340; and Aircraft Y was coordinated at FL 320. Both aircraft were departing MTPP; coming over JOSES Intersection; going to different destinations. I had tracked up the data block for Aircraft X. It is a [type specified]; so he is climbing very slowly. I get everything else finished and then I see the target for Aircraft Y; so I track him up. By the way; when we had HOST; these targets would auto acquire much earlier; because of the way the flight plans processed. But now with ERAM; it is more difficult to get flight plans into the system. And we cannot do just a 7 amendment on the MTPP departures; because ERAM allows the SID from MTPP to process into our system. But ERAM does not recognize this SID. So; we cannot just depart the proposal. We cannot do a 7 amendment on the proposal. We have to do a 6-7-10 amendment at JOSES; which means there will never; ever be any auto-acquisition prior to our boundary. Thanks ERAM. There is an international NOTAM for the aircraft to call us 10 minutes prior to the boundary. Most of them do not do it. Aircraft X did not. Thank God Aircraft Y did. When he checked in the first words out of my mouth were; 'Traffic; 12 o'clock; 17 miles; same direction; much slower; same altitude. Do you have him on your TCAS?' When he said 'no' I told him to standby. I called MTPP Center to get control. Now; please realize it sometimes takes these people 3 or 4 minutes to even pick up the phone. They work at their own pace. They picked up pretty quickly because I had I spoke very loudly and had a sense of urgency in my voice. I asked for control on Aircraft Y to separate him from Aircraft X. Their response was; 'Miami; we have issued restrictions to separate the two aircraft.' I said; 'It ain't working. They are going to hit each other. Can I have control?' They gave me control. I turned the Aircraft Y 90 degrees right to separate. I also said stop climbing. With those actions; I just barely ended up with 5 miles. I realize there is nothing that can be done about a foreign facility. We are just going to have to trust them even less; and make them more resentful about being treated like children instead of controllers. The one thing that could be done to help would be to give us more controllers in my area; so that we can staff the D-side at R43 all of the time. Often; we one man the sector; and we muddle through; even though passing a few estimates (everything is manual; no automation at all) can take several minutes. And then typing in the flight plans takes a few more minutes. All the while; airplanes are calling for whatever. The FAA does not realize how much manual coordination we do in the ocean. And they think coordinating with MTPP or SDQ or MBPV or MUHA is the same as coordinating with another FAA facility. It is not. We need more people so we can staff the D-side (and sometimes A-side) positions without getting overwhelmed with doing everything solo. I would love to see some high level FAA person come down and spend a day listening to the MTPP line and the SDQ line to witness the daily chaos we experience. The other thing that could help is Automated Data Exchange (ADE). It has helped with MUHA center. Supposedly we are going to get it with SDQ some time this year. It needs to be a priority. I realize that Haiti is too poor and too corrupt to work with effectively; but some kind of ADE with them would be huge. They still would not know how to separate airplanes; but it would free up our time to help do it for them.

ZMA controller describes problems associated with a foreign facility and ERAM/HOST issues which leads to an airborne conflict that he has to avoid a loss of separation.

1254684

201504

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

43000.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Center ZZZ

Fractional

Falcon 2000

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Door Warning System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1254684

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1254689.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy

Aircraft

At cruise at FL430 and 1:10 minutes into flight a red doors warning light illuminated. Abnormal checklist was accomplished and a diversion was conducted. While descending through FL290 the red doors light extinguished. Cabin pressurization functioned normally but passenger and Flight Attendant commented that they felt a rapid pressure change in their ears which was more than likely associated with a 4000 fpm descent rate and the cabin controller rating higher due to the descent. This is the fourth known event for the same issue. The company indicated they have an agreement with Dassault to MEL the door warning light system which is totally bogus. The system can be MEL'ed IF the doors light does not illuminate with a door open. The MEL is poorly worded and is subject to interpretation and needs to be revised. In our situation the system was functioning as designed. In the past the issue was MEL'ed; a switch cleaned signoff only for the issue to be repeated. A trend has been established here to inappropriately MEL the system solely to keep the aircraft generating revenue. I received push back from Maintenance Control as well as the Assistant Chief Pilot and was able to reach an agreement to down the aircraft.Due to the fact this was a passenger leg with a recovery aircraft enroute and a crew swap compounded by company pushback; there was unnecessary tremendous operation pressures placed on myself and my crew. This is a paramount safety issue both with maintenance and scheduling; and is an indication of the management dysfunction currently residing within our operation.The FAA needs to conduct a thorough investigation regarding the unsafe practices currently exercised within the company. Although the company boast an industry leading SMS level 4 certification the bottom line is the decisions are dictated by cost. Moral is at an all-time low; the entire company is overworked; the empowerment the employees once had has been stripped and controlled by the few that have shown a propensity to push the limits.As a crew member the operational pressures placed on me on a daily basis are extreme. Something has to give before the final link in the error chain is completed.

The day before; my crew and I picked up this aircraft from another crew who had the same issue that we were going to have the next day at FL430. The 'Doors' Master Warning light illuminated at cruise with eight passengers onboard. We followed all guidance recommended in the abnormal checklist; descended the cabin and aircraft altitude while we diverted where the warning light extinguished at FL290 and remained off through the remainder of the flight. We were unable to contact the company by phone due to Wi-Fi issues. We were successful by AFIS however too late to divert as recommended by dispatch for recovery options. That request would NOT have followed the guidance of 'land as soon as possible' directed by the abnormal checklist. The crew after shutdown walked and postflighted the aircraft to observe no damage nor ajar doors. When the PIC contacted company Maintenance to start the notification processes he was told to defer the light and warning system under 52-1-0. The crew disagreed with that statement and refused to defer the system as it worked correctly throughout the flight; landing and after shutdown. I; SIC; tested the doors listed in the MEL and found all of the doors to function normally by turning on the light when opened and off when closed. The PIC and I was briefed by the previous Captain and crew on their flight the day before when the (red) 'Doors' light illuminated inflight at FL430. The crew followed the Abnormal Checklist and made a descent as soon as possible. The Captain under order of Company Maintenance deferred the 'Doors' light under 52-1-0 of the Falcon 2000 MEL. The crew then flew the aircraft to destination where both crewmembers further discussed the MEL and determined that the MEL did not apply to that situation as the door light functioned correctly. Maintenance performed a quick repair by lubricating the baggage door switch and released the aircraft for flight after removing the write-up and maintenance action for the aircraft logbook. The Captain informed us that he had to rundown the maintenance tech to get the write-up or a copy for his records to be told that he was to remove the entry from the logbook. Unknown to the crew; this aircraft; had experienced this same issue several times prior to their flight and both of those crews argued with the Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) and maintenance on whether or not you could defer the issue under 52-1-0. The MEL only provides relief if the system is NOT working correctly and you can ensure that all of the listed doors are secured closed and 'locked'. There is no way to lock the main cabin door nor the emergency exit prior to flight. In addition our SOP's require you to abort for any 'MASTER WARNING' light prior to V1. Maintenance would say that deferring the system does allow you to take off with a (RED) Master Warning Light as nowhere in the MEL does it disable the system. Furthermore the abnormal checklist has you 'Land as soon as possible' ANYTIME the light is on. The Falcon 2000 MEL 52-1-0 needs revision to better advise the exact situation that is deferrable as well as give relief to the SOP's for departure with an illuminated or possible illuminated Master Warning light. Or guidance on how to disable the light for takeoff. Also; guidance on how to check each door prior to flight to absolutely ensure that the door switch is at fault rather than a door bowing affect that will ultimately cause metal fatigue and possible major substantial damage to the door and airframe.Also; I feel that the ACP and Maintenance are not following FOM guidance that the PIC has the ultimate determination as to the airworthiness of the aircraft. We were not as pressured to defer the system as previous crews; however; we were told that this situation was absolutely deferrable and not deferring the problem could cause the issue to be escalated upwards into management. Why is maintenance and the company continually allowing this aircraft to fly with aknown maintenance issue. Spraying only one door switch with lubrication when the light functions correctly on the ground is NOT a correct fix. After 3 events with passengers why was this aircraft not fixed per Falcon's recommended procedures or specific guidance sought from Dassault on the issue?

DA2000 flight crew reports diverting for a door warning light at FL430 in an aircraft that had a history of apparently false door warnings. The crew does not believe that MEL 52-1-0; used to defer an inoperative warning light; is applicable.

1629778

201903

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

CLR

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

A330

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

High

247.0

9.0

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Airline Total 31; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 6; Flight Attendant Total 31; Flight Attendant Type 80

Physiological - Other

1629778

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

There were issues with the APU and the batteries on the aircraft. We had already boarded and deplaned once before due to not having any power on the aircraft; no lighting; etc. We re-boarded the plane as soon as the batteries were charged and we had cabin lighting back. We finished boarding; closed the door and started the safety video. As we were starting the pushback and the safety video was still playing; several of us started smelling a strong chemical burning smell fill the cabin. Also a haze was in the cabin. We immediately contacted the flight deck. The smell and haze was throughout the entire aircraft. The Captain decided to stop pushback and return to the gate and instructed the flight attendants to perform an emergency deplaning as soon as the jetway was attached. The Captain as well as the flight attendants made several announcements instructing passengers off the aircraft. Once all passengers had deplaned; we deplaned onto the jetway. The fire department and mechanics immediately boarded the aircraft. The flight attendants then asked to be seen by the paramedics; due to eye and throat irritation. We were all dizzy and feeling nauseated. We did not wish to be taken to the emergency room.

A330 Flight Attendant reported notifying the Captain of burning smell in the cabin during pushback for departure.

998852

201203

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-100

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class D ZZZ

Y

Indicating and Warning - Landing Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 183; Flight Crew Total 20000

Troubleshooting

998852

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

On approach at about 2;000 to 1;500 FT AGL; selected gear down. After selection First Officer noticed that the right main was not indicating down. We had no other signs that the gear was not down; no warning lights or horns. I then checked the alternate gear verification lights which indicated that all three gear where down and locked. We elected to go around and make sure that everything was okay. During the go around we casually asked the Tower to take a look at the right main to see if it appeared to be down. During the go around at about the time we were flying past the Tower the normal right main (Green) indication illuminated. On the downwind leg back to landing I reviewed the Non-Normal Gear Checklist in which it states that illumination of the three alternate indication lights is a positive indication that the gear is down and locked. Since we now had two indications that the gear was down; we felt there was no problem with landing. The Tower asked if we needed any assistance and we declined. For some reason the Tower had the CFR personnel pull the trucks out of the garage anyway about 50 FT. We never declared an emergency condition. We then landed without incident. After parking at the gate and securing the aircraft I contacted Maintenance and explained what happened; we spoke for about 9 minutes. They felt that since the normal indication came on without any input from us and that checking the past history on the plane that the normal indication module had been replaced within the last month that the module for the right main may have wiggled loose. They also felt that the alternate verification lights where an acceptable means of verification of normal gear extension and that it would be okay to continue without any additional maintenance or a write up in the aircraft log book. They also stated that since the aircraft was going into maintenance that night they would put in a follow-up item in their records to look into it. We then continued with the remainder of our trip with no further incident. [We were] notified by supervisor that FAA was looking into this incident. Make sure that event is documented in aircraft log.

DHC8-100 Captain experiences a landing gear indication malfunction during approach. During the ensuing go around the faulty indicator light begins to function normally and does so throughout the landing and the remaining flights on this aircraft during the day. A discussion with Maintenance indicates that no maintenance action is required nor is a logbook entry necessary. The FAA does not see it this way.

1686319

201908

0601-1200

N90.TRACON

NY

3500.0

Daylight

TRACON N90

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZNY

Cirrus Aircraft Undifferentiated

1.0

Class E ZNY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 112; Flight Crew Type 112

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1686319

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 250; Vertical 250

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

The first leg was conducted on an IFR flight plan; we then cancelled IFR and proceeded to MJX and made a stop. The incident occurred on the return flight from MJX to ZZZ; which was done VFR. We had a VFR flight plan on file due to the presidential TFR in Bedminster; and we had VFR flight following and a squawk through McGuire Approach. While cruising straight and level at 3500 ft. MSL my Instructor and I noticed oncoming traffic several miles out at approximately the same altitude on ADS-B. I was under the hood (foggles) but my Instructor immediately began scanning in the vicinity of where traffic was expected. After a few moments and unable to locate the oncoming traffic; my Instructor told me to take off the foggles and help him look for traffic. On ADS-B the two planes continued to proceed toward each other at approximately the same altitude and almost directly head-on. I diverted our plane to the right and steadily climbed a couple hundred feet. Shortly thereafter I saw the traffic pass to our left no more than a few hundred feet away. There was never any alert from ATC. I believe the primary cause of this was that we were cruising at 3500 ft. despite traveling on a westerly course; we should have been cruising at 4500 ft.; which is what we filed. I can't remember at this point why we were at that altitude; but reviewing the track log from that flight it appears that we initially chose 3500 ft. due to an initial heading directing us east of R5001 and over NEL. We then did not change altitudes after changing course to the west; nor were we instructed to by ATC; whom we were speaking with for flight following. The appropriate altitude might further have been blurred due to the flight path being almost directly (magnetic) north and varying between east and west depending on winds aloft. Our speculation on the secondary cause is that ATC did not notice the converging traffic due to being overwhelmed by higher than average traffic caused by the Presidential TFR. Part 91 flights from NYC area airports would typically be distributed in all directions; but it's possible that the Bedminster no-fly zone pushed more traffic to the south and west. We were shocked that we received no warnings from ATC before; during; or after the incident; and our immediate thought was that they did not notice due to traffic volume. We think this was caught in time due to both pilots' incorporation of ADS-B data into their instrument scans. We responded appropriately by ceasing simulated instrument flight and having both pilots looking outside the aircraft; and also by lightly deviating the course. Additionally; on the trip down (on an IFR flight plan) our altitudes were assigned by ATC; so we may have become complacent and expected altitude instructions on our VFR flight plan with flight following. In the future I will be more cognizant of appropriate VFR (and IFR) altitudes both when on IFR and VFR flight plans with flight following.

C172 pilot reported an NMAC without any traffic calls from ATC.

1775877

202011

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other unknown

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1775877

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Other unknown

Passenger A had to be told several times to please wear his mask. The last time I asked him; he was playing with his cell phone; was NOT chewing anything and shook an empty chip bag at me; telling me twice that he was eating. Well; he was not. I learned later he had connected that day from ZZZ; a hot zone. I guess Passenger A felt that he was exempt from wearing a mask on board.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger would not comply with face mask policy.

1315992

201512

0601-1200

VGT.Airport

NV

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON L30

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Climb

SID NOTWN4

Class E L30

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 700

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1315992

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

On the VMC day; there was confusion over the SID; the verbal clearance received was the NOTWN4. The clearance showing in the ATC computer was RTTRN2 per Flightaware.com (discovered later). I noted that the RTTRN2 SID was not approved for the assigned runway. There was some confusion between LAS TRACON and VGT Tower as the release was delayed to the point that I told the Tower I was considering cancelling the IFR clearance and departing VFR west under the Bravo. They then said that the release was about ready; I waited. As soon as I departed 30L and contacted departure I received an urgent (ATC voice tension) turn 090 and expedited climb to 7;000 which was my initial altitude assigned. I was just beginning my turn to a track of 313 to RUZCO and continued the climb to 7;000 as vectored. One misjudgment on my part was that I was depending on the GPS route to RUZCO and had not set the 313 radial off LAS and the moving map display was set to a larger than optimal range so the track was not very visible. My suggestion would be to change the NOTWN4 for a straight out departure to intercept the 313 off LAS. RTTRN2 should remain unchanged unless the airspace NE of VGT could be utilized for the SID from R7; 12R and 12L.

The initial problem was a departure clearance issued not appropriate for the runway. Once that was worked out; and the departure initiated; the departure (TRACON) Controller modified the turn off the expected radial; possibly to avoid airspace or traffic for LAS.

A general aviation pilot reported ATC issues prior to release; and then after takeoff from North Las Vegas airport.

1242977

201502

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Fractional

HS 125 Series

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Parked

Wing Attachment

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1242977

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Procedure; Company Policy

Aircraft

We airlined to an airport to pick up an airplane for a reposition for a PAX [passenger] trip. On prefight readily apparent was corrosion on the majority of the screws on top of the wing; dozens if not hundreds. I have never seen corrosion this bad. On many of the screws the corrosion extended past the screw heads. After sending Maintenance Control pictures and discussing it with them I decided to have the plane evaluated for safety and regulatory compliance reasons. The next day I received a call from my Chief Pilot saying that this had turned into a big issue since this was done right before a pax trip. Not that that should matter; but it is also false. He said that I should expect to receive a request for a written report. He had seen the pictures and agreed it was horrendous. I don't know how to interpret this in any fashion other than blatant intimidation to not write up discrepancies.

An HS-125-800 Captain found and reported multiple corroded screws on his aircraft upper wing surface. His Chief pilot was unhappy with the Captain because his action affected the aircraft's availability.

1631345

201903

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

9000.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Fuel Tank

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 219; Flight Crew Total 16068

1631345

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 7654; Flight Crew Type 5485

1631357.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

During climbout of ZZZ; Flight Attendant (FA) called and said there was a fuel odor in the cabin. Shortly after that the FAs called and said a passenger had gotten sick. At that point we [notified ATC]; informed ATC that we wanted to divert to ZZZ1. We called ZZZ1 station OPS and informed them that we were diverting to ZZZ1. On approach the FAs informed us that the smell had diminished. Approach and landing (overweight) was uneventful. Emergency equipment met the aircraft as we taxied clear of [runway]. The Emergency Crew Captain wanted to deplane while the aircraft was still on the taxiway. We asked them to walk around the plane and if they saw any leak we would deplane on the taxiway. They saw no leaks so we taxied to gate and waited for marshallers to arrive to marshal us to the gate. After parking at the gate; Maintenance informed us that there was a fuel leak from the center fuel tank.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

B737 flight crew reported fuel odor in cabin and resulting passenger illness.

1735166

202003

0.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Pneumatic System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Workload

1735166

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1735163.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On departure my First Officer and I both noticed an acrid dirty sock smell. [We advised ATC]. We donned our O2 masks and executed a return to field. I transferred the controls to the First Officer; he worked the radios and flew while I ran as much of the checklist as possible prior to landing. I was unable to complete the diagnostic portion due to our proximity to the airport and needed to prepare for landing. We were fully configured 80 ft. low but due to the [situation] we elected to continue. Upon landing we removed our o2 masks noticed the smell remained. I shut the packs off and opened our windows. All in all I was fairly pleased with our performance in such a compressed time table. General observations. Communicating through the o2 mask is more difficult than anticipated. ATC obviously asks their required questions. If we have our interphone selected to facilitate coms between us; it makes it impossible to hear ATC. If we use the interphone in PTT mode it makes communication between us more difficult. The fumes were isolated to the flight deck. Suggestions: The QRH guidance for SOF event is complicated. With tons of great information for diagnosing a problem. The issue in our case was the compressed timeframe of this event. It would perhaps be wise to design a separate checklist for SOF on departure. That isolates the most important systems; and most probable failure points. Then defers to the longer checklist with time permitting. Obviously landing an airplane experiencing SOF is a higher priority than fighting the fumes. In our 11 minutes of flight time it was impossible to run the entire checklist; as well as the standard procedures; and execute a return to field. This necessitated prioritization of tasks and load shedding. In retrospect I should have completed the remaining checklist after landing. However isolating the packs and opening the windows cleared the smell. So we merely returned to gate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A321 flight crew reported that a fumes event on takeoff resulted in a return to the departure airport.

1298166

201509

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3.0

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

Climb

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 940; Flight Crew Type 110

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

1298166

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 400; Vertical 200

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Leaving ZZZ runway 22L in use. Given choice of right or left turn out by ground control. Chose right turn since it was less intrusive to the pattern of 22L. Given takeoff clearance from 22L by controller after line up and wait instruction. Advised by controller to fly straight out and right turn outside of other aircraft; which was an Archer on the departure end; in flight. Take off was uneventful initially. However the landing gear malfunctioned and would not completely raise or lower. I advised tower that I had a landing gear issue. I maintained heading for a few more seconds. On about the fourth cycle the gear lights; normal thump of gear tucking away and pump was noted. The controller asked if I wanted to return to the airport. I replied negative; since it was now functional. At this time I was rapidly closing on Class Bravo airspace. My reaction was to turn to avoid Class Bravo with purpose; since I did not have an emergency issue or clearance. I turned right; as this was my given instruction. I then realized I did not confirm visual identification of the other aircraft before turning. I started a climb and the traffic system gave me a warning. I briefly saw what I thought was the traffic after the warning. The controller asked if I had seen the traffic. I responded yes; but now am not certain that I did ever see the other airplane.This incident could have been prevented if I had asked for an amended departure after the gear problem occurred; instead of continuing to cycle the gear in a confined departure environment. I could have asked for a left turn instead of simply following the instructions with a plane on my right.

A PA-46 pilot reported a NMAC in the vicinity of the departure airport when he was distracted by a landing gear problem.

1787320

202101

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

IMC

Rain

Dawn

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Cowling/Nacelle Fasteners; Latches

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Other Exterior

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure

1787320

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Time Pressure

1787326.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

Other Post Flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

We discussed as a crew that in the future when we get pressured by time constraints and environmental pressures (i.e. raining hard during the walk around) that we won't allow ourselves to be hurried and in a rush. That is when things get missed.I missed the cowl latch key left in the Number One Engine on the preflight walk around. It was dark and raining hard and we were running a little bit late due to an excessively long line at the KCM (Known Crewmember) checkpoint.

We discussed as a crew that in the future give us more time to get to the airplane in ZZZ with the long train ride and busy departure time. And no matter never get caught rushing any procedure. Get down on your knees and check those cowl keys! Long line at KCM (Known Crewmember) Checkpoint and we were rushing to get the flight out on time. Rainy cloudy morning in ZZZ FO (First Officer) missed cowl latch key during walk around. Proper keys and pins located on the [Aircraft] during our interior cockpit preflight. Only informed of our mistake by the outbound crew in ZZZ1. Captain called Crew Scheduling to get my number.

Flight Crew reported being informed that they missed the cowling door latch key still installed in the engine cowl latch and departed.

1017052

201206

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

15.0

8500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

PA-24 Comanche

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 30

Situational Awareness

1017052

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Both the main and auxiliary tanks where topped off before departure. The incident occurred about 40 minutes into the flight at 8;500 FT over [a] freeway. Fifteen minutes prior I had switched from the right main tank to the left main tank. The incident began as followed: the engine began to sputter; then hard failed. I noticed loss in fuel pressure and instantly switched the fuel pump on; the fuel pressure remained in the red. At this point I started to divert to [a nearby airport]. Thinking it was a fuel problem I switched back to the right main tank; double checking that I didn't miss the detent; the pressure remained in the red. I also tried switching to the auxiliary tanks with no luck. I checked circuit breakers; primer; carb heat; recycled fuel pump; tried to pump the throttle and mixture; still no response. By this time I had descended to about 4;500 FT MSL and declared an emergency.Still en route to [the nearby airport] I realized I was not going to make it; so I decided to commit to [a closer airport]. The plane was still descending; and I was still trying to troubleshoot with no luck. Descending through 2;000 FT; 1;600 FT AGL; I realized I was going to fall short of [the closer airport]. There were power lines; high tension wires and homes lying before the airport; so I decided to put it down in a field just to the right of me while I still had the option. Pushing the nose down and [making a bee] line to the field I lowered the landing gear and flaps; cleared the trees and houses to the west of the field and accomplished a smooth soft field landing into the plowed empty field. Not a scratch on the plane or me; the incident was over. Fell about a mile and a half short of [the closer airport].I was still in contact with ATC and gave them my location. Looking back I can see how many pilots fall short of the field and end up in a housing tract thinking they can make it to the airport. The best decision I made was to commit to an off airport landing and not try to make the airport. I also believe that being in contact with ATC helped tremendously with airport locations and advisories as well. Thank you Approach.

PA-24 pilot reported engine failure at 8;500 FT in cruise. Pilot declared an emergency; was unable to make it to an airport; and landed in an open field with no damage or injuries.

1284429

201508

0601-1200

ZBW.ARTCC

NH

11000.0

Rain

Daylight

Center ZBW

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR ROBUC ONE

Class E ZBW

Facility ZBW.ARTCC

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Workload; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction

1284429

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Procedure; Weather; Airspace Structure

Weather

Moderate to severe precipitation were causing deviations within 50 miles of Boston airport. Arrivals were being rerouted back over KRANN intersection to fly the ROBUC 1 and the 22 L transition on a trial basis as the weather was moving out and they would be able to pick their way through. A few minutes after the first two airplanes were vectored in deviating around weather I was told to go into a hold for Boston. Approximately 4 planes were given holding instructions over PROVI. After doing one turn in holding I was told to run them radar using descend via to runway 15R which was a different runway than the originally had. The first aircraft was Aircraft X and I told him to turn right direct KRANN and descend via the ROBUC 1 15R transition. He would have not been able to make the turn to PROVI to pick up the arrival because it would have been too tight of a turn. He reads it back but tells me a few seconds later that KRANN is past the transition point and he would like to go direct JOODY. At that time I had a few BOS departures and was vectoring others out of the hold and did not have a chance to pull up the Arrival in the URET. I approved his request to go direct JOODY and descend via. I say him leave [at] 110 before he got to PROVI but assumed that BOS approach had that airspace. It was not till minutes later that the CIC (Controller in Charge) informed me that I had an airspace violation with PVD approach because there is not a crossing altitude at JOODY so he descended too early to stay out of their airspace. Because descend via is still rather new and some runways get used a lot more than others it is still confusing as to which transition and fix to go to after deviations or holding. During deviations or coming out of a hold descend via should be cancelled so that as airplanes go off course and ask to vectored back on there is no confusion over what speed and altitude to maintain from either pilot or controller.

ZBW Controller reports of deviations due to weather and precipitation with traffic inbound to BOS. Controller let aircraft descend early and assumed BOS had the airspace; but ended up violating airspace belonging to Providence Approach.

1162274

201404

0001-0600

SKBO.ARTCC

FO

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower SKBO

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class C SKBO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Confusion; Troubleshooting

1162274

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Confusion; Troubleshooting

1162278.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Ambiguous

The weight and balance uploaded gave data for a full power flaps 5 take off on Runway 31R. The aircraft required nearly all of the 12;467 FT runway. At rotation the aircraft hesitated before a reluctant lift off. The acceleration and climb were very slow and we maintained TO power beyond the NADP1 reduction altitude of 1;500 FT until 2;000 FT. The rate of climb was as slow as 300 FT per minute. The First Officer did an excellent job of flying the aircraft and responding to input. After climbing to a safe altitude and speed we checked several things and found no crew errors regarding configuration or power settings; so we began to narrow the problem down to either one of two things: Take Off Data or erroneous Cargo Data. Flaps 5 data is not the norm in Bogotá; but the acceleration on the runway took a long time. Very long.

We departed [Runway] 31R in SKBO; weight and balance was given for a flaps 5 takeoff. The weight and balance showed us with the correct ZFW compared to the flight planned weights and the aircraft was about 2;500 LBS from max takeoff weight. Upon rotation the aircraft did not perform as expected we had a rate of climb of less than 500 FPM at times. Performing a noise abatement procedure at 1;500 AGL when the power was retracted and the climb rate was reduced further the aircraft was slow to accelerate to retract the flaps. The Captain and I felt that if we had an engine failure we would not be able to climb. We otherwise had an uneventful flight.My concern is that; either; the weight and balance data was wrong and we needed a flaps 15 takeoff or flaps 5 with packs off (something different) or there was more weight in the cargo bins than reported. Reaching cruise altitude we went to review the performance data and realized our flight 5 data was missing. SKBO Operations gave us the paper work at the gate and already had it ripped into sections for us this may have been the reason we did not get that data as it may have been left behind prior to us receiving it. We sent a message to Dispatch advising them of the situation and they notified the Flight Ops Manager; Load Planning and sent all info to engineering for further review. They also had the destination airport audit all bags and cargo upon arrival.

A B757 required the entire BOG (SKBO) runway length for takeoff so the crew suspected a weight and balance error.

1112565

201308

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dawn

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

Parked

Aeroplane Flight Control

X

Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1112565

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1112566.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

Aircraft

Aircraft discovered to have a maintenance issue; upon contacting Maintenance the local contract Mechanic was called out and a procedure to correct the issue started to take place. The aircraft was experiencing issues related to the failure of ADC1 and consequently it caused multiple other failures. Maintenance Control directed the flight crew through a circuit breaker reset for one failure; the Spoileron (SPOST test) to force a fix for the issue. Flight crew attempted this and complied to no avail and circuit breakers were advised to be reset per Maintenance Control. After second attempt the Captain asked the Maintenance Controller 'how many times would you like us to do this?' to which the Maintenance Controller replied 'just put the contract Mechanic on the line and he'll do it.' Long story short the contract Mechanic tried to force the SPOST test multiple times; we stopped counting on event number 10; and we voiced our concern that this isn't good for the aircraft. Upon about the 10th reset to force the system into submission the aircraft immediately became filled with an acrid smoke of electrical fire/smoke and the Mechanic was told by the Captain to immediately shut down the aircraft. The aircraft filled with a pungent odor of acrid electrical smoke due to the multiple resets forced by Maintenance. The flight crew voiced their concern to the issue and was met with indifference due to the fact that the Mechanic at Maintenance Control wanted this aircraft back in base for the fix and was just trying to do his job. I recognize this; but we have procedures and policies that we have to follow and the flight crew did; to the best of their abilities; follow just that. We feel that the aircraft should not have been forced to do the test; so many times and it directly attributed to the smell of electrical smoke in the aircraft. A post-flight walk-around was accomplished and the source was not determined for the smoke. Crew left the aircraft secured and exited the aircraft because the Captain found the situation to be unsafe. The contract Mechanic was left to tend to the aircraft as we handed over the responsibilities to him because the Maintenance Controller advised contract Mechanic to stand by.

Arrived at aircraft and discovered an issue with the Captain's altimeter. As per Maintenance Control; several system resets were performed. On or about the 4th reset; I asked him where this was going and how many times do we have to perform the reset. He asked that I put the Mechanic on the phone to continue what turned out to be over 10 plus forced SPOST tests. I contacted base Chief Pilot to make him aware of the problem. On or about the 10th reset per Maintenance Control; a strong odor of electrical smoke was observed; the aircraft was shut down; and I ordered everyone to immediately exit the aircraft. No obvious fire or smoke was observed.

CRJ-700 flight crew reports being instructed to do the Spoileron (SPOST test) to force a fix for a problem that started with an ADC1 failure during preflight. After the fourth test the flight crew calls a timeout and a Contract Mechanic continues testing under the direction of Maintenance Control. After the tenth unsuccessful test the aircraft fills with smoke and is shut down.

1697560

201910

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

B747-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1697560

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Logbook Entry

Aircraft

I was scheduled to operate a flight from ZZZZ. I spoke with one of the inbound Captains as I was leaving the hotel. When I asked him if there were any issues with the aircraft; he reported that the aircraft had an Aft Lower Cargo Compartment Fire indication on the previous flight either going into or on the ground at their intermediate stopover location. Additionally; he stated that the aircraft had the same issue multiple times on previous flights. When I got to the aircraft; one of the [mechanics] on the previous flight verified that they had experienced the Lower Aft Cargo Compartment Fire Indication and had placed the LLCCAFR switch in AFT High and reset circuit breakers and the fire indication went out. Upon reviewing the logbook; there was no write-up or corrective action regarding this event. The [mechanic] stated that he had performed numerous system tests following this event and that he believed there may be an issue with the test system since ACMS did not indicate an actual fire had occurred. A second [mechanic] on board then pointed out that ACMS trial software had been loaded on [Day 0] and all the issues with the fire indications had commenced after that date and he speculated that the new software may be causing an issue with the false indications. The aircraft had not exhibited a history of false fire indications prior to that date. The logbook also revealed that a Lower Aft Cargo Compartment Fire indication occurred on [Day 2] while in cruise. I then reviewed and discussed the False Cargo Fire Warning Messages supplementary procedure in the FCOM with the other crew members. This SP was used for reference since it is applicable to [other aircraft] and not applicable to the aircraft we were operating. The SP addresses an issue where a humid environment could cause a false indication; however; this aircraft did not have a history of false indications prior to the new software and also the previous airfield was at a higher altitude in [another country] and therefore not necessarily a humid environment. After a lengthy discussion we did not believe that it was a safe decision to operate the aircraft with an unknown system malfunction present since all fire indications must be honored even if they were false. Knowing that even a false indication might cause a divert scenario in congested European airspace; we decided that it would be better to see if the detection system could be deactivated since there was no cargo in the lower aft compartment.Maintenance personnel reported that a write-up would have to be placed in the logbook before any corrective action could occur. I asked if the [mechanic] who had witnessed the previous event could do the write-up since he would be able to make a more accurate diagnosis having seen the issue first-hand. Maintenance Control directed that the [mechanic] would not make the write-up. After consultation with a Chief Pilot; I then put an entry in the logbook indicating what was relayed to me. The flight departed after maintenance personnel deactivated the lower aft compartment fire detection system and we arrived at our destination uneventfully.All events like this should be entered in the logbook so that troubleshooting and corrective action can be properly documented to provide an accurate aircraft history.

Captain reported that multiple false fire indications had not been recorded in the aircraft logbook and no documented corrective action taken.

1774129

202011

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

X

Malfunctioning

General Seating Area

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

1774129

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Pre-flight

General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I was the B FA (Flight Attendant) on Aircraft X. We had finished boarding. I was near the aft section of the cabin. I heard a passenger ask 'is that normal?'. There was then smoke coming from the back rows air vents. Smoke was quickly filling the cabin and the fumes were extremely strong. It was burning my nose and throat. I called the A and told him what was going on and to notify the pilots. It was getting harder to breathe and see. We decided to have passengers get off the aircraft for safety. I was getting very light headed; I went back to get the C FA and make sure no passengers were left behind. After everyone got off; the C and I did not feel well at all. We asked to have an EMT look at us. My heart rate was extremely high and blood pressure was high from my normal. We received oxygen. A supervisor met up with us and said she could smell the fumes coming off from us because it was so strong. We still felt very dizzy; lightheaded; my throat was sore and I felt pressure in the back of my head. We decided it wasn't safe for us to continue with our trip due to the exposure. I got further medical attention later at a hospital due to my throat feeling worse. Earlier our water lines were frozen. The mechanics were attempting to fix the frozen line and this all occurred.We also have a video that can prove how thick the smoke was

B737-700 Flight Attendant reported smoke emitting from air vents during boarding resulted in cabin crew experiencing health issues accompanied by passenger complaints. Passengers were deplaned and maintenance was requested.

998886

201203

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class C ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

998886

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Shortly after gear retraction the left engine began to have compressor stalls. The throttle was retarded and the stalls stopped. I informed ATC that we were returning to the field and declaring an emergency. I requested the men and equipment to standby. The First Officer and I discussed our options and possibilities. I briefed the flight attendants about our situation and made a PA to the passengers informing them we were returning to the airport due to an engine problem. The First Officer and I briefed the approach and decided to use flaps 28 in case of an engine failure. After completing checklists we landed overweight. The landing was smooth and I shut down the left engine after stopping on the runway. I elected to remain on the runway until we were inspected by the Fire Department. After we were informed of no fire or visible damage we taxied to the gate and deplaned without further incident.

An MD-83 flight crew declared an emergency and returned to their departure airport without incident after experiencing compressor stalls from the left engine shortly after takeoff.

1777385

202012

1201-1800

CRP.TRACON

TX

6500.0

TRACON CRP

Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Other unknown

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

None

Class E ZHU

TRACON CRP

King Air C90 E90

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Other unknown

GPS

Cruise

None

Class E ZHU

Facility CRP.TRACON

Government

Approach; Instructor

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1777385

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Training on North radar; Aircraft X a VFR CN35 at 065 just maneuvering about 15miles south of the CRP airport. Aircraft Y; IFR at 060 flying southbound underneath the CN35. No traffic restriction was given to the CN35 nor was traffic issued to either aircraft. About 7 minutes later the Aircraft X wants to report a near midair and says he had to respond to a TCAS hit for traffic. There was no other traffic close to the Aircraft X so it had to be the Aircraft Y at 060 who he was referencing. Too much confidence in the trainee led me to not ensure the traffic was issued. Take action and instruct trainee to issue traffic or restriction when you see the situation.

ATC Instructor reported that while giving training; a traffic call was never issued; following that one of the two aircraft reported a near miss.

1706508

201912

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 178.08; Flight Crew Total 1986.77; Flight Crew Type 1986.77

Physiological - Other

1706508

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Physiological - Other

1706498.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Taxi; In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We started both engines and turned off the APU. Upon taxi; I noticed an acrid/dirty socks/musty smell when I added power. As I backed off the power on taxi; the smell seemed to dissipate. On power up taking the Runway (XXL); the smell returned. I made the decision to continue the takeoff and said to the First Officer that if this doesn't dissipate and go away we should return and he agreed. Once airborne; it got even worse and became a significant fume event. We donned O2 masks and goggles; I [advised ATC] due to fumes in the cockpit and we returned to land on [Runway] XXL. The First Officer flew and landed. I talked to ATC and ran the Fumes/Odor/Smoke Checklist. We landed uneventfully 2;000 lbs overweight. Holding short of the runway; I called back to the Purser and asked him if he smelled anything. He said he didn't but would check in the back. I told him what we had experienced and that we would be returning if it continued. According to the flight attendants after landing; the smell was significant in the back of the plane and they said their eyes were burning as well. Upon arriving back at the gate; we were met by ARFF personnel and [Company] Maintenance. Firefighters boarded the plane and noticed the fumes as well; which were still present. The mechanic said they had done a 'compressor wash' the previous night and that it was his opinion that oil may have been freed from the compressors and entered the cabin. I was handed a Smoke/Fumes/Odor Form to fill out; which I did and returned it to Station Operations. Although some of the flight attendants complained to me about headaches and eyes burning; they declined to be checked out and told Inflight Operations they were fine and good to continue. I called the [Duty Manager] and we completed the human factors checklist. My Chief Pilot called to check on us and we said that while we may change our fit-for-duty status; for now; we were OK to continue. After talking about this more with the First Officer; we decided we were no longer fit for duty and advised the [Duty Manager].

During pushback from Gate XX at ZZZ; #2 engine was started normally; then First Officer began start of the #1 engine. After #1 engine light off; ground personnel told the Captain that an access panel had opened on the #2 engine. Upon the completion of the #1 engine start cycle; the number #2 engine was shut down; and ground personnel re-closed the panel. The number #2 engine was re-started without incident. Upon initial taxi; the Captain and First Officer smelled a strong oily; dirty socks smell. We checked with the cabin crew and nothing was noticed outside the cockpit. Fumes seemed to subside some during taxi to Runway XXL. Upon taxiing into position near the runway; with 40-45% power settings; the fumes seemed to reappear. Captain discussed the fumes with me and we decided to takeoff; and if the fumes persisted; we would [advise ATC] and return to ZZZ.Almost immediately after takeoff; the fumes became very strong. Crew immediately donned oxygen per the immediate action items and [advised ATC]. ATC provided amended clearance; and vectors to return to RWY XXL. First Officer; who was Pilot Flying; continued flight duties while Captain ran appropriate checklists; and coordinated our return with the requisite entities. First Officer executed an uneventful landing. Captain taxied back to Gate XY. Maintenance personnel boarded the aircraft along with fire crews; and said they had conducted a compressor wash prior to our event and suspect it was residual oil. After deplaning; Captain and First Officer discussed events with [Duty Manager] and Chief Pilot. Despite passing the company 'Fume Event Checklist'; Captain and First Officer declared themselves no longer fit for duty.

B737 flight crew reported a significant fume event shortly after takeoff resulting in an air return.

1414639

201603

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

36000.0

Thunderstorm; Turbulence

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1414639

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Weather

Weather

Event was caused by unexpected turbulence and inability to maintain airspeed at altitude.While enroute to ZZZ we encountered a patch of severe turbulence in an embedded storm. However very little was showing on the radar and there were no prior reports of anything more than moderate chop. Our speed slowly began dropping off; I increased power and requested a descent to FL360. We leveled off there but still could not maintain speed; I requested to descend again to FL340 and increased to Takeoff power. At some point in the descent we got the stick shaker very briefly. We executed SOP procedures and recovered uneventfully. All passengers and flight attendants were seated and no injuries were sustained. Initiate more power and quicker descent faster.

CRJ-700 First Officer reported speed dropped off enough in severe turbulence to trigger a momentary stick shaker at FL360.

1162515

201404

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

1800.0

VMC

10

Daylight

6500

Tower ZZZ

Other Flight School

DA20-C1 Eclipse

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Climb

Class D ZZZ

Powerplant Lubrication System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Other Flight School

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 51.5; Flight Crew Total 328.5; Flight Crew Type 69.4

Other / Unknown

1162515

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Other Flight School

Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 135

Other / Unknown

1162531.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Upon initial climbout from the Class D airspace we experienced engine roughness coupled with a red line oil temperature and no oil pressure indication on the engine gauges. In order to preserve the safety of flight we declared an emergency and returned the aircraft to the airport via left traffic into Runway XX. There were no issues discovered in preflight and the aircraft had just been flown prior. A run up check was done before receiving takeoff clearance and no issues were discovered. All engine instruments were in the green and the engine ran smoothly. Takeoff and initial climbout had no issues and we were cleared for an Instrument Departure from Runway XX. Once established in the climb the engine started to run rough while the temperature gauge pegged max temperature and oil pressure dropped to zero. At this time we declared an emergency and turned back to the runway for landing.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

A DA-20 began running rough after takeoff while the oil temperature increased to maximum and oil pressure decrease to zero; so an emergency was declared; a turn made to the nearest runway; and a safe landing completed.

1808816

202105

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Testing

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Door Area

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting

1808816

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

I have written the main cabin door on this airplane up four times. The Flight Attendant can't open it with anywhere close to normal force. I had the First Officer and Flight Attendant film the force required to open the door and they couldn't do it. It only opened after I put IMMENSE force on the handle. My hunch the entire time has been that the door gets stuck once we pressurize to high altitude cabin differential of around 7.5 PSID. This is a safety hazard because the door is the primary exit in the event of an emergency. Of the four times this door was forced open after it was written up; two of the write-ups were done with our own aircraft maintenance personnel on board and two I personally forced the door open with almost all of my strength and leverage.The airplane should be ferry flown to a maintenance base and undergo flight testing to determine what is causing the main cabin door to jam itself shut after flight.

Captain reported that the Flight Attendant could not open the main entry door and had written the door up four times with no corrective action.

1106551

201308

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

24000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Galley Furnishing

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1106551

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Approximately 18 minutes into the flight at around FL240; an emergency call was made by the Flight Attendant. She indicated there was a fire in the galley area and [to] immediately land the airplane. We contacted Center to declare an emergency. I commenced to execute an emergency descent and turn back. We were told there was a field by us; but the runway was considered marginal in length. The First Officer and I donned masks and had goggles ready if needed. We could smell the burning electrical wiring. The Flight Attendant contacted us again and indicated that she put the fire out with the halon but the cabin was smoky. We elected to release the passenger oxygen masks to aid in breathing if the fire returned. We were cleared to the departure airport where we made a normal approach and landed. We were able to taxi to the ramp where ARFF personnel were standing by. Evaluation of the coffee machine was made and determined the fire originated there. Initially in the descent; exceeded the speed of aircraft by excessive descent. Reduced the pitch and brought the aircraft back to satisfactory descent profile. Otherwise; I believe the crew acted quickly and effectively to capture and contain the threat. The Flight Attendant performed her job in an outstanding manner and the First Officer was effective and precise in handling the tasks needed to allow me to focus on flying the airplane and bring back to [departure airport] safely.

EMB-145 Captain is informed of a fire in the galley by the Flight Attendant during climb. An emergency descent is initiated during which an overspeed occurs and the flight returns to the departure airport after hearing that the fire is out.

1020562

201207

0601-1200

PVD.Airport

RI

3000.0

VMC

TRACON PVD

Fractional

Citation Excel (C560XL)

2.0

Part 91

Initial Approach

Class E PVD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1020562

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1020563.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Horizontal 1500

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure

While being vectored for the visual approach into EWB; we came very close to tandem parachute jumpers under canopy. We were on a vector of 090 from PVD Approach; at 3;000 FT. The Controller informed us of parachute operations in effect at the UUU airport. The non flying pilot happened to have the WAC chart book out following our progress up the coast as it was a nice VFR day. He noticed we were headed for the Newport State airport. So we asked the Controller about the progress of the jump operations. ATC then gave us a turn to 060. After completing the turn; and less than a minute later; ATC came back and said jump operations were several minutes earlier and probably concluded. Then another Controller came on the frequency and said cleared direct to BONDI (one of the fixes on the approach). So we turned back to 090; heading to BONDI. Just a few seconds after the turn; the SIC yelled; and I instantly looked where he was looking; and saw a tandem chute with two people in black suits; looking at us; at 12 o'clock and about 1;000-1;500 FT and slightly above our altitude. I quickly disconnected the autopilot and banked hard left missing the jumpers. We informed ATC about our surprise on the vector and all he said was that we were cleared direct to the airport. We landed uneventfully.I do not know of anything we could have done to prevent this from happening. I am thankful that my partner was so heads up about our location; reference to a non controlled airport with jump operations; and asking ATC about that operation even if ATC's timing was way off. Plus seeing the jumpers when he did; the credit goes to him; for the good outcome.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

A Fractional jet flight crew observed parachute jumpers near UUU and took evasive action to avoid a collision while on vectors to a visual approach at EWB.

1590810

201811

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

38000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Window Ice/Rain System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction

1590810

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Aircraft X; at cruise FL380; instantaneous very loud complete shattering of window L1 Captains forward window outer pane. I was flying and requested my First Officer to request a descent to a lower altitude. After initiating the descent; I gave the airplane to my copilot so I can perform checklists. I requested my relief officers to return to the cockpit from the bunk to help. Since the aircraft seemed to be holding pressurization; and window was not deformed or showing signs of an air leak; we leveled off at FL200. We performed the window damage FWD L checklist; and turned off the window heat for that window which had already failed. I contacted Dispatch; and [Maintenance]. We all agreed the best option was to divert since the window and pressurization were holding; maintenance was available there; and another aircraft for passengers. We performed the fuel jettison checklist; notified ATC that we were going to dump fuel; and recorded our Lat/Lon for start and end; and the amount we dumped. We dumped enough to be just below max structural landing weight at landing. We notified ATC of the position; heading; wind; ground track and GS where we were dumping the fuel. We continued to ZZZ at FL200 uneventfully; landed and taxi to the gate. The crew worked well together in managing the work load; and we were all in agreement on divert plan.

B787 Captain reported the complete failure of the outer pane of his windshield which necessitated an en route diversion.

1257575

201504

0601-1200

SCT.TRACON

CA

6000.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 209

Situational Awareness

1257575

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 500

Situational Awareness

1257503.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Vertical 400

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

While on the departure from BUR; we were given a clearance to level off at 6;000 feet due to traffic. After level off at 6;000 feet; ATC gave us a vector to a heading of 290 to avoid traffic now approaching our 12 o'clock position. As we began our turn; the TCAS system initiated a Resolution Advisory and provided descent guidance. I disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle and complied with the TCAS guidance. I initiated a descent to avoid the intruder aircraft and we notified ATC of our TCAS RA event. At an altitude of 5;700 feet; I received the 'Clear of Conflict' alert from the TCAS system. We noticed while level at 5;700 feet; the TCAS system was showing the intruder aircraft 400 feet above our aircraft. When clear of all traffic ATC provided clearance to climb and instructed us to proceed back on our filed flight plan. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.I think this event could have been avoided with better separation from the other aircraft. I am unsure if the intruder aircraft was at the proper altitude it was cleared to; or if this event was caused by lack of ATC separation.

As we reached 5;700 feet; our TCAS showed traffic 400 feet above us; and visual contact was made with the aircraft directly above us; passing overhead. I [estimate] the aircraft was also at (or very close to) 6;000 feet MSL (our clearance altitude). I informed ATC that we were descending in response to a TCAS RA and that traffic was directly above and in front of us. ATC responded that traffic was at 6;500 feet. The Captain and I agreed (as well as our TCAS information) that the aircraft was much closer than 6;500 feet and must have descended below his cleared altitude to our altitude of 6;000 feet.

B737 flight crew reported an NMAC with another aircraft during departure from BUR.

1479568

201708

1201-1800

MKT.Airport

MN

2000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

CTAF MKT

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Other RNAV Runway 15

Class E MKT

CTAF MKT

Personal

Helicopter

1.0

Part 91

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 33

Final Approach

Class E MKT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Check Pilot; Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 860; Flight Crew Type 500

Situational Awareness

1479568

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 500; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

On about a 5 NM [final to] Runway 15; a helicopter (who had made no previous calls) announced 3 NM final ILS Runway 33. I let him know our position specifically to avoid [an] incident. The helicopter said he was going to go missed and stay at 500 AGL to avoid me and the traffic in the pattern. Once I reached 2000 MSL (1000 AGL) I told my student to look up; all of the sudden I saw the helicopter climbing through our altitude within 500 ft then broke off direct IKIBY for the RNAV 22. The helicopter was over Runway 33; and we were over Taxiway A.

PA28 flight instructor reported an NMAC with a helicopter on approach to MKT airport.

1669386

201906

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Repair

Tires

X

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Confusion; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

1669386

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

The pilot reported he found an incorrect tire installed on [Aircraft X]. The findings were reported to ZZZ Maintenance on 06/XX/19 and a log page was created changing out tire and wheel assembly correcting the problem that same day. I was notified today that I may have incorrectly installed this tire on 06/XY/19 as I replaced the wheel and tire assembly due to cord showing. After looking into and researching what may have been wrong with the tire or installation I discovered that the [Aircraft X]is a [Large Transport] with carbon brakes and by closely looking at my parts tag I installed a tire and wheel assembly for a [Large Transport] Carbon. I can recall when I changed this tire I needed a carbon assembly; and also knowing that; the wheels for the [aircraft] I needed were marked with green dust covers; as mine was. I installed the wheel and tire assembly correctly but unknowingly installed the wrong part number. I recall pulling the tire and wheel assembly from the proper rack and noting the green dust covers on it. I can't recall checking for the correct part number and this is where I made my error. I do recognize my mistake and the importance of following all proper steps in part identifying and inspecting selected parts and part numbers to be installed. While I was retracing my steps trying to remember and think about what may have happened when changing this tire assembly I walked the process in terminal two of pulling a tire assembly from the tire storage area. What I found was shocking! The location where [Large Transport] carbon tires are kept I noted one in stock and it had installed on it one side dust cover yellow and the other side dust cover green. Located next to this are more stored tires with two signs on the same wall located right below each other. One reads [Large Transport] and below that sign another sign reads [Large Transport]. All the tires located in this area had yellow dust covers. All the [Large Transport] should have green covers and they did not. The terminal two tire storage area needs to be remarked and reorganized. There is room for improvement in this area and I would be more than happy to assist with making any changes to improve this process.

Maintenance Technician reports that aircraft tire storage area has signage that is confusing.

1748033

202006

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B777-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Vectors

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation; Inspection

Oxygen System/Portable

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Training / Qualification

1748033

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

Procedure

Discovered incorrect O2 walk-around bottles in OFAR Fwd S/S and OFCR S/S Aisle-side location. Found (1) 66N bottle positioned in OFAR (incorrect) and (1) 4.25 Single-Hi Flow bottle (incorrect) in OFCR S/S Aisle-side location. After discussion with Purser (and confirming aircraft compartment placards); each bottle was swapped to position correctly. Aircraft operated unknown number of revenue cycles with incorrect provisioning (thus violation of FAR 121.329) regarding supplemental O2 requirements. It is highly unlikely that a FA swapped the location of each bottle. Therefore; it is reasonable to assume this error was caused by Line Maintenance/Tech-Ops. This is a repeat write-up regarding incorrect identification and placement of 66N O2 bottles. As previously reported; Line Maintenance/Tech-op has documentation/understanding these cyl bottle are 'interchangeable'. Line Maintenance is confusing with former airline dual flow (Hi/Lo) 4.25 liter bottles. 66N bottle are *only* fitted with dual Lo flow outlets. See previous ASAP/CERS reports for additional details/suggestions.

Flight Attendant reported finding O2 bottles of different types swapped in their locations and are not interchangeable.

1453132

201705

1201-1800

EWR.Airport

NJ

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Company

Other Preflight Walk Around

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 702; Flight Crew Type 702

1453132

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Procedure

Procedure

The aircraft was parked at [the] gate. I accomplished the walk around and found an abnormally large amount of debris around the aircraft. Often times; this debris is isolated to the area in front of the right engine; near the forward cargo hold. Not today. About 2/3 of it was on the right side of the aircraft from the nose to the tail; while the other 1/3 was directly underneath or on the left side of the aircraft. [There were] metal items; many rocks; plastic debris. [A] large rectangular metal piece was located right behind the front right tire. I don't know if it was sharp enough to cut the tire; but it was a safety hazard in my opinion. Additionally; I came across an abnormal amount of safety wire. It was if maintenance actions were performed on an aircraft at the gate; and the old wire was simply discarded to the ramp. It is readily apparent that there is no culture of looking for FOD potential on the ramp at EWR. All of this debris was in plain sight. The people on the ramp simply have no understanding of the importance of picking up this debris. My guess is that they have not been educated that this is a significant issue; and that simply picking it up can prevent aircraft damage than can eat away at our profit margin or worse.

B737 First Officer reported a potential FOD problem due to debris often found in the gate area at EWR airport.

1724562

202002

1201-1800

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

N

Y

N

Scheduled Maintenance

Door Warning System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1724562

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight; Routine Inspection

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Aircraft; Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure

Procedure

After our 1st aircraft was taken to the hangar for failing its main strut repacking inspection; we deplaned and were swapped to Aircraft X which was at the hanger. When it arrived at [gate] and we found a bolt taped to the left flap track fairing during the walk-around and in the cockpit we discovered 7 or 8 open circuit breakers. I called Maintenance Control to make write ups and was told write ups would not be necessary because the plane came from Maintenance. A line mechanic would just insert the bolt and we could reset all the open CB's (Circuit Breakers). I refused and made a write ups for the bolt and the breakers; because it needed to be documented that the plane was returned to service (green) in this condition. This is not the first time I've been assigned a plane that came from the hanger and was placed online before maintenance procedures were complete. I told Maintenance Control that I was concerned this was the same case and that they should make some calls to find out if this plane's Maintenance was indeed finished or not. That idea was blown off and we were told the plane was good to go. After boarding we closed the main cabin door and got a passenger door outer handle caution message that would not clear. I wrote it up; Maintenance came out and couldn't get it to clear. After about 15 minutes; Maintenance Control called one of the line mechanics and said the plane's Maintenance from the previous night was not complete and the plane needed to go back to the hangar. We deplaned again. My concern is had that door handle worked we would have pushed and likely flown with unfinished Maintenance. It concerns me that every time I have a questionable Maintenance situation Maintenance Control always tries to say everything is fine just go. And they are often dismissive of even their most experienced pilots' concerns. Yet; we are putting more and more trust in Maintenance to track every inspection and actively trying to prevent pilots from being a potential error barrier by removing as much Maintenance related [information] from the AML as the FAA will allow. Keeping pilots out of the loop regarding the airworthiness of the aircraft they are flying is a really bad idea that reduces the level of safety passengers and crew deserve IMO. This case and other similar experiences I have had indicate that the company's policies for returning aircraft to service after Maintenance are either inadequate; improperly communicated; ineffectively trained; or simply being ignored as a plane should NEVER be returned to service (greened up) before ongoing Maintenance is complete.

Captain reported receiving an aircraft with incomplete maintenance.

1787641

202102

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

18000.0

VMC

5

Night

5000

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Climb; Initial Climb

Other On SID/STAR

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Time Pressure

1787641

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 1800

1787642.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Ground ops and takeoff were all nominal. During the climb phase passing approximately 18;000 feet MSL; we noticed a strong smoke odor with visible smoke and haze emanating from the courier area. The burning; smokey; smell was increasing. We requested priority handling with ZZZ center and stated the nature of our priority and our request to begin an immediate descent into ZZZ for Runway XXR. We ran the Smoke/Fumes checklist. The procedure cleared the smoke very quickly. An expeditious approach was conducted to ZZZ XXR. Crash/Fire/Rescue inspected the ac and followed us to parking without any further issues.

Captain was PM; First Officer was PF: Preflight; engine start; taxi and take off were all normal. Climbing through roughly FL180 I noticed a slight burning smell which seemed to be intensifying in both smell and irritation level to eyes/throat. Took a look behind me and noticed the light in the ceiling by the cockpit door shining down on a dense hazy smoke. Mentioned to the Captain to take a look behind him and he noticed it as well. We requested priority handling with ZZZ Center and requested an immediate return to ZZZ for a visual backed up by the ILS to Runway XXR. As we began the turn and descent back towards ZZZ; the Captain ran the 'Non-Alert' Smoke/Fumes Removal Checklist. At some point; approach control was notified of our intentions to be high speed below 10;000 feet. After descending below 10;000 feet; the cabin was depressurized via the QRH procedure and the smoke/smell dissipated relatively quickly. Flight Control was notified via Sat Phone of our intentions to return to ZZZ. Approach and landing went smoothly. After landing; we vacated the runway and came to a stop on the parallel taxiway so Airport Fire and Rescue services could take a look around at the exterior of the aircraft. After getting the all-clear; we taxied back to the ramp and met with maintenance and eventually with EMS to get checked out.

Air carrier flight crew reported a flight deck fumes event during departure climb resulting in a return to the departure airport.

1187487

201407

1801-2400

EGPX.ARTCC

FO

VMC

Center EGPX

Air Carrier

B777-200

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Data Transmission and Automatic Calling

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1187487

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Ambiguous

Oceanic Clearance Delivery CPDLC late logon due to equipment glitch. [We] complied with B777 Datalink Comm Guide as per reversion to voice procedures. Scottish [Control] was upset we did not obtain our oceanic crossing clearance 30 minutes prior to coast out; which is not what the 15 minutes indicated on the form states. All issues were resolved and the crossing was otherwise uneventful.ATC failure to communicated with the aircraft CPDLC systems on scheduled time.

When CPDLC communications failed a B777 crew reverted to voice comm to receive their oceanic clearance.

1454389

201706

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

41000.0

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 248; Flight Crew Type 9396

1454389

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

At FL410; with no warning; the number two engine failed. The first indication was a slight jerk to the left; as if a provisioning truck had slightly nudged the fuselage. There was no noise associated with the jerk. I immediately noticed the autothrottle annunciator flashing as well as the LOW OIL PRESSURE and ENG FAIL indications on the upper display unit. The engine had not seized. The airspeed began decreasing rapidly. I announced that we had an engine failure. The First Officer agreed and began to refer to the QRH. As he did that; I selected single engine data on the FMS and requested a descent to FL310 with Center. I told them that we had experienced an engine failure and would provide further information as we knew more. We began a controlled descent and ran the Engine Failure Checklist. The APU was available and put online for electrical power. Once the Engine Failure Checklist was complete; we discussed the possibility of restarting the engine. The failed engine indicated N1 rotation; there was never any indication of fire or vibration. Other engine parameters; according to verbiage in the QRH; indicated that an engine restart attempt was appropriate. According to the QRH; the top of the restart envelope was FL240; so we requested and were granted further descent. While we descended to FL240; I contacted the Flight Attendants and advised them that we had experienced an engine failure; were about to try to restart the engine and I would advise them of our intentions once we had tried the restart. The Flight Attendant indicated that they had noticed that we were descending early and that the passengers didn't seem to know that anything unusual was going on. I didn't specifically ask; but I recall the Flight Attendant indicating that they hadn't noticed anything unusual about the failed engine. Once in the air start envelope; we determined that we had the parameters for a windmill start. We ran the QRH procedure; but the engine would not restart. At this point; I directed the First Officer to [advise ATC] and that we would be landing at the nearest suitable airport. As we were attempting the restart; I received an ACARS message from Dispatch asking if we were having a mechanical problem. I then responded to their message stating that we had an engine failure that would not restart; and we would be diverting to the nearest suitable airport. Dispatch responded with information [on which airport] was closest; along with weather and NOTAMS. The First Officer and I concurred and informed Center that we would require an enroute descent and immediate approach. Center cleared us to the IAF and appropriate descent to cross the fix at 4000 MSL. The distance remaining allowed us just the right amount of time to brief the approach and conduct the One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist in the QRH. While the First Officer calculated the single engine landing data; I then made an announcement to the passengers to the effect that we had an engine that was 'acting up' a little and I didn't feel safe taking it all the way to [destination]; but would be making a stop. I assured them that there was absolutely nothing to worry about and we would be on the ground in a few minutes. The single engine approach and landing were uneventful. We cleared [the] taxiway and were met by the awaiting Fire Crews. The Fire Chief made an external inspection of the aircraft; then; saying that everything looked fine; cleared us to resume taxiing to parking. Company Ground Personnel were waiting for us. We parked and deplaned the passengers. A post-flight exterior inspection of the aircraft revealed a 10-20 inch gash on the interior portion of the number two cowling. A contract Mechanic arrived to remove the cowling; and discovered a chunk of metal approximately four inches long by two inches wide had ripped from the engine case and been thrown through the cowling. There was no indication of fuel or oil leak in the engine. I contacted the Operations Center and passed all this information on to Dispatch; Maintenance Control; Chief Pilot on Call and other interested parties. I made a write-up in the logbook and left the aircraft with the contract Mechanic. My only regret with the way everything played out was my decision to try to restart the engine. Until we were at the gate; I had no idea that the engine cowling showed damaged. According to the QRH; we had all the parameters to attempt the restart. The QRH says nothing about a visual inspection from inside the cabin. This damage to the cowling was visible from the cabin; but only if you looked as far down on the underside of the inboard side of the motor as possible. Because of this; and the fact that no passenger said anything to the Flight Attendants; I don't believe any of them noticed the damage. According to the cabin crew after the flight; they were also unaware of any damage and noted that the passengers remained completely calm throughout; as though they had no idea anything had occurred. I will also note that in this age of cell phone cameras and a news media hungry for any story regarding airline incidents; nothing at all surfaced from this entire situation. Taking all that into consideration; in retrospect; had I specifically asked a Flight Attendant to examine the engine from the cabin; the damage would have been discovered and I would not have tried to restart the engine.

B737 Captain reported diverting after the #2 engine failed at FL410. Post flight inspection revealed damage to the engine cowl.

1667764

201907

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload

1667764

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Procedure

Upon arrival at the aircraft; my First Officer mentioned that the log book was not signed off and associated placards [had not been] removed correctly. I began to review the log book and indeed; maintenance was done the night before but the placard was not removed correctly. So from the jet bridge I called Maintenance but was directed to call Ramp Tower. I forgot that now a-days Maintenance screens the calls. So I began to explain the situation to the man that answered the phone. He then began a step by step lecture on how I can cross check pages; log book entry items; and read the sign off. And I myself can ensure that everything was OK.He said that if I confirm that everything was done correctly; I myself can remove placard [and] toss it or take it home with me. I did none of this.Maintenance is swamped.Stop cutting corners.

B737 Captain reported that Maintenance failed to properly sign the logbook and remove a placard; and attempted to defer responsibility to the flight crew instead.

1229694

201501

1801-2400

BOS.Airport

MA

21000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZBW

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR ROBUC ONE

Class A ZBW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1229694

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 25000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1229790.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

I flew flight from ZZZ to BOS as Pilot Monitoring. We were expecting to fly the ROBUC1 to runway 27. While on BOS Center we were told to descend to FL230. Subsequently; we switched to BOS center (freq 134.0) where we were told to 'Go direct KRANN and to fly the RWY 27 transition'. Familiar with the arrival; we had not heard this phraseology. We misunderstood and thought we were cleared to descend and fly the transition and started to descend to be over KRANN between 11;000 FT and 13;000 FT and above 8;000 FT at ANSLY etc. as hard arrival published altitudes (not expects).Center observed us descending and had us level off at 21;000 FT. I inquired as to what 'cleared to fly the transition to RWY 27' means; did it mean we could fly the track and not the altitudes or the speeds? The response was that he didn't know and the controllers were waiting for training before they could give a 'Descend via' clearance; that all he could say was 'Cleared to fly the transition' and that the pilots were supposed to know what that meant. Once I realized ATC had not actually said 'Descend via' I realized we should have questioned the clearance before descending. As soon as we switched to approach we were given 'descend via the 27 transition'. Landed without incident. We expected to be cleared to 'Descend via' the approach then when we got different wording we 'Assumed' that we could fly the SID as published but obviously that wasn't what was expected. Listening more closely and question when any other words from the controller are heard. This is new to all of us; controllers and pilots alike.

I was pilot flying the ROBUC1 arrival into BOS. We were in the vicinity of JFK level at FL 230 and ATC cleared us direct Krann and fly the runway 27 transition. I misinterpreted this to mean that we were cleared to descend to meet the altitude restrictions on the arrival and began the descent. ATC noticed the descent and reassigned us FL210 and pointed out that we were not cleared to begin the descent. We were then handed off to BOS approach and then cleared to descend via the ROBUC1 and fly the runway 27 transition. We resumed the descent on the arrival and landed without further incident.Avoiding future events can be accomplished by paying closer attention to the exact ATC phraseology of these new arrival procedures.

Pilots flying into BOS were told to fly the Runway 27 transition and they misunderstood and thought they also had descent clearance on the approach.

1854411

202111

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dusk

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1854411

Aircraft X

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1854410.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Flight Crew