Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGA.Tower, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: Tower LGA
Second aircraft: Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: During approach to Runway 22 in LGA; a [company] aircraft (I believe an A320 but can't be positive) crossed Runway 22 on Taxiway G or P. The aircraft began crossing [Runway] 22 when we were below 500 ft. The First Officer and I both thought the crossing looked tight. I anticipated a go around. Somewhere between 500-300 ft.; I believe; we were issued a go around from Tower. The Tower Controller instructed us to climb to 2;000 ft. on runway heading.We initiated the go around with TOGA (Takeoff Go Around) power; following SOP. As we began climbing and brought the flaps to 2; we got an AUTOBRAKE FAIL EICAS due to an existing MEL - which has been on the aircraft for quite some time. The First Officer canceled the master caution and continued his duties as pilot monitoring. At around 800 ft.; I believe; we received a TCAS TA for an aircraft above us at 1;500 ft. and slightly off our right wing. I attempted to shallow our climb to prevent excessive closure and an RA. At that time I reduced the power by overriding the auto throttles; which resulted in a TLA NOT IN TOGA EICAS message. To reduce distractions I turned off the auto-throttles and manually reduced the thrust to prevent a flap over speed as well as assist in shallowing our climb.At that point we received an RA to descend. As I shallowed to level the aircraft off; in the maneuver to lower the nose to the green box; I noted we were only at 1;100 ft. and knew I couldn't descend much without encountering terrain warnings. It was at this moment I also noticed we were only approximately 300 ft. from the aircraft above us. While the nose was about level pitch attitude; and before I was able to pitch to match the green box commanded by the RA; the TCAS announced clear of conflict and the traffic passed behind us. At that point we continued to clean up the aircraft; turn back on automation; begin a gradual climb to our newly assigned altitude of 3;000 ft.; and notified ATC of the TCAS RA; which ATC told us was a helicopter.The entire go around and RA happened incredibly fast. Neither I nor the First Officer ever saw the traffic; and I do not recall the Tower Controller calling the traffic to us. Using TOGA; while wise in nearly all low level go a rounds; in this case contributed to the high closure rate with the traffic immediately above the airport. I'm not sure how this could be addressed; but climbing to only 2;000 ft. AGL causes very rapid sequences of events. I did not notice the helicopter on the TCAS during our approach. I hand flew the approach from at least 1;000 ft.; which may have contributed to my focus out the window and allowed me to miss seeing the traffic above the airport while we were farther out on the approach. I'm not entirely sure knowing it was there could have changed much for us since we had little time to react; considering our low altitude when we began the go around combined with the low altitude of the RA.The Tower Controller never noted the potentially conflicting traffic to us while we were on the approach or during the go around. The aircraft that crossed the runway should never have crossed the runway with an aircraft on such short final. That aircraft should not have accepted the clearance to cross; nor should a clearance have been given. Additionally; the fact that we could not hear the crossing clearance - because Ground control issues runway crossing clearances in LGA - contributed to a reduction in our situational awareness. Had we been able to hear the conversation between the controller and the crossing aircraft; we could have potentially seen an issue earlier and prepared differently - however I'm not confident that would have improved the situation since it would have probably caused us to go around earlier and put us in an even more direct path with the helicopter overhead the field at 1;500 ft.It would be good to know at what point LGA controllers should no longer issue a crossing clearance with an aircraft on final to Runway 22. The in-pavement runway status lights are inoperative in LGA because of runway construction. I don't recall if there are runway status lights where Taxiways G and P intersect with 22; but all status lights are NOTAMed out of service right now. If they don't exist; adding them should be a priority item to prevent runway incursions; considering the hot spot. The NOTAM does not indicate where the status lights are out of service. The standard go around call outs on the 190; 'Go around; TOGA; FMS NAV' can be very distracting during a go around when a heading is assigned. We weren't able to select heading until we had passed the RA. In this instance runway heading was not appreciably different from the published missed approach; but it was a step we had to delay accomplishing.I'm not sure if terrain; buildings; airspace; or traffic permits it; but the Tower Controller should have assigned us a turn right or left to help avoid the loss of separation. Runway heading was a path that put our aircraft in a very small window that was very close to the traffic above the airport. Traffic overflying LGA should be at a higher altitude. Any traffic crossing at 1;500 ft. creates impossible separation in the event of a go around. Afterward; the First Officer noted that sun glare on the guidance panel - especially while trying to find the FMS button on my side - contributed to his distraction. The Tower Controller also issued us a clearance to 3;000 ft. just after the TCAS RA ended. The high workload in addition to multiple Tower altitude heading assignments can be distracting during the go around.If I had to do it again I would have told her to stand by instead of responding while we were trying to put the automation and aircraft configuration back together. The AUTOBRAKE FAIL EICAS master caution below 1;000 ft. during the go around was also a distraction. It's a distraction on a normal takeoff and a normal landing; since you also get it at about the time you clear the runway. This aircraft has had this MEL since [date]. There's no excuse to be running a distracting MEL for such a long time.I ran into [another] Captain a day or two later. He mentioned being on the ground watching a plane which was likely us go around. He said the Ground Control frequency was very congested and there were multiple calls for an aircraft crossing the runway to stop. It sounded like there was potential for confusion. I'm not positive it was our flight; but it sounded about right since he mentioned it was a [company] aircraft. The ATC tapes might help in this piece of the puzzle. Even if this wasn't the case; Ground Control in LGA can often be very congested and difficult to get a word in edgewise. I've often thought it would be beneficial there to have a metering frequency (even if it was just to call clearance delivery; considering there's less clearance delivery usage with PDC and controller pilot datalink communications) to call ready for taxi at a spot after pushback. The metering frequency could then advise you to monitor ground (this would be similar to MSP or BOS). Ground could then call aircraft on spots in an order that would be better for the controller when the frequency isn't congested with calls. I've heard many pilots get frustrated while waiting for a response from Ground Control while waiting on a spot; which can easily create frequency congestion.


Second narrative: On short approach to Runway 22 at LGA we executed an ATC instructed go around at 300-400 ft. maintain runway heading and 2;000 ft. (3;000 ft. published). This was due to an Airbus crossing the runway late around Taxiway G and Runway 22. During the go around and approximately 1;200 ft. we experienced a traffic RA for a helicopter that showed only 300 to 400 ft. above us. We never had traffic in sight due to workload and speed at which the event occurred. The event made the Captain (Pilot Flying) respond to a descending TCAS RA at low altitude on a go around. At approximately 1;000 ft. AGL we were clear of conflict and reconfigured the aircraft for completion of the go around maintaining 3;000 ft. and runway heading. We returned for landing Runway 22 at LGA with no other issues. Other contributors to high workload of go around was the illumination of two separate master cautions during go around event. One was at approximately 400 ft. for Autobrake fail (related to active MEL). And the other was ENG TLA NOT TOGA since flying pilot was reducing thrust on TCAS RA event all while turning off autothrottle. Possible traffic separation incursions both on the ground in LGA and in flight over airport. Workload management review of procedures for both LGA ATC and E190 go around procedure coupled with TCAS RA.


Synopsis: ERJ-190 flight crew reported receiving a late go-around instruction from ATC; resulting in a TCAS RA and requiring a level-off at an unsafe altitude.