Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Aircraft: Military
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Utility / Infrastructure
Flight phase: Cruise
Second aircraft: Military
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Center coordinates of the WRA [Weather Reconnaissance Area] were coordinated with the West Side Coastal area prior to my shift beginning for Aircraft X/Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y was already airborne and Aircraft X would be departing a couple hours after the Aircraft Y working in a large amount of overlapping airspace- the WRA center coordinates were slightly different. The first issue the West Side Coastal area brought to my attention happened after one of the WSC controllers was debating with another controller about whether or not the Aircraft X and Aircraft Y can self-separate in the overlapping airspace because it is in the LOA that they are allowed to self-separate. I advised the WSC Supervisor and the two controllers that the aircraft Y had specifically said that he would work around the Aircraft X's altitude block and even if it says in the letter they can self-separate that Aircraft Y had coordinated earlier with the morning MOS [Military Operations Specialists] that he will work around the Aircraft X's altitude. I advised them to separate the two by altitude unless both pilots state on frequency they can self-separate from each other.The second issue is the WSC area lost radar on the Aircraft X; which was expected since they are flying at lower altitudes over the Gulf; and the WSC Supervisor asked that I call and make sure ZJX was blocking the airspace since they were using non-radar procedures. When I called ZJX; I believe I spoke with a CIC (Controller-in-Charge) and he sounded surprised that the flight was IFR and they were supposed to block the airspace. Later on; ZJX called and wanted to know specifically how far from Tampa approach did they need to protect for the Aircraft X/Aircraft Y aircraft. I wasn't sure of the answer to this and have only been briefed/trained that the Hurricane Hunter aircraft will coordinate and get permission from an approach control before entering their airspace; but we have not had any specifics on exactly how far away they stay from the approach control boundary. In the LOA; there are terminal maps and myself and another controller were sure the 57NM line from MCF around Tampa's airspace must show the area the Hurricane Hunters would need to request permission/coordinate before entering. We later learned that these maps are just a reference for the pilots and have no meaning for controllers. I do not know how many Tampa arrivals ZMA had and ZJX had; but the arrivals we had were descended into the protected non-radar airspace up until the time after we received that call from ZJX. After the phone call; our WSC Controller restricted the Hurricane Hunter aircraft to stay 80NM from MCF- so both the WSC controller and the ZJX controller could descend their Tampa arrivals without hitting any protected airspace.The first issue with the debate on whether or not these aircraft can self-separate is a training issue. The one controller that was pushing the self-separating between the aircraft claimed that he personally wrote the CEDAR that everyone was required to read and should be aware that this is an option. I don't know when this CEDAR came out; but no one I spoke with except for the controller that claimed he wrote it was aware of the self-separating option. This is something that should be a refresher training course on how to clear the aircraft into the airspace if they are accepting self-separation or if they would like to work at different altitudes. A CEDAR on this issue is not enough to prepare controllers for this.The second issue also needs training; but needs procedure changes as well. We are falling short in what information we need to know and coordinate. The prior briefing of the Hurricane Hunters we were all told was they will remain off the coast and outside all approach control airspace. Each area needs to know how many miles from approach they need to request the Hurricane Hunters to remain clear of to be able to descend their arrivals. We should also havea procedure in place in case the Hurricane Hunter aircraft are unable to accept the areas requested restriction/s to stay clear of descending arrivals/departures; then the area needs to coordinate this with TMU (Traffic Management Unit) and request for reroute for the arrivals or departures affected by the blocked non-radar airspace. This needs to be clear to each area of what is expected of them and what is expected of the MOS/TMCs. This all needs to be in writing; so even though the track of the storm is different each time; our procedures will remain the same and they need to eliminate the huge amount of confusion from Controllers/Supervisors/and other Centers I witnessed during this shift. It should be crystal clear what we are supposed to be protecting while these aircraft are non-radar; and it is far from that. I witnessed confusion across the board from every level during this shift and it rolled over and continued the next morning when I came in for my morning shift. This is the first time I worked the MOS position with the Hurricane Hunter aircraft; after speaking with some of my coworkers they advised that this is the same amount of confusion we have across the board every time we work these aircraft. This is not acceptable.




Synopsis: ZMA Controller reported confusion relating whether two aircraft could self-separate from each other.