elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: MEL; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: Aircraft had left ram air door placarded with MEL 21-4.  On recall after pushback; left air conditioning and pack light illuminated. Returned to gate and ZZZ Maintenance signed off logbook allowing warning lights on ground when MEL specifically only allows lights in flight. I refused aircraft.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported they refused aircraft after Maintenance misapplied an MEL to the left ram air door.
Date: 201911
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other N/A
Aircraft component: Electronic Library (other than Nav database)
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: iPad EFB (Electronic Flight Bag) is a great tool; however; the only way that it can be a safe substitute for paper documents is if the documents can be easily referenced and if changes can be easily reviewed. The new 'Content' application does neither. Its interface is confusing. Location of material (approaching 130 publications) is not obvious; even to someone who prides himself with being up to speed with most publications. Referencing material quickly has now become much more difficult. What is worse is that new material is not easily organized under a 'recent' tab as in the last app. The new 'recent' tab does not allow you to see what you have already reviewed anymore; it is simply a list; without highlight functionality. Half my job is to read and stay up to speed with the publications; mostly on my own time. That part of my job has just been rendered much more difficult by the implementation of an inferior publications tool.I feel that this is a safety issue; especially in light of the fact that since the inception of iPad EFB; average pilot knowledge of the publications has significantly declined; in my opinion and observation. This new App will further that dangerous trend. Thank you for taking this matter under consideration.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported software issues with company issued EFB could potentially result in a safety risk.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generation
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Cruise flight; FL320; left Generator failure. Performed and complied with QRH GEN OFF checklist procedures. [We were] unable to reset generator; unable to start APU at FL300; FL280 and FL260. [We] contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control via ARINC. Evaluated destination and en route weather conditions and returned to the departure airport. Prior to landing performed and complied with Landing Single Generator checklist.




Synopsis: A MD83's left generator failed in flight so the crew returned to the departure airport after evaluating enroute and destination weather because they were unable to start the APU.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZOA
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I issued an approach clearance to cross a fix at or above 11;000 ft. until established on the localizer; cleared ILS approach. The aircraft went through the localizer and was correcting back to the localizer and began a descent into a 10;900 ft. MVA. I was giving a relief briefing and looking at the checklist. When I looked back at the screen the aircraft was at approximately 10;700 ft. and already correcting back to the localizer and exiting the 10;900 ft. MVA into a 9;000 ft. MVA. No low altitude alert went off and I didn't issue a low altitude alert as it seemed unnecessary leaving the higher MVA and by the time I would have issued it the aircraft would have been in the lower MVA. My recommendation would be for the pilot to have complied with instruction to maintain 11;000 ft. until established on the localizer prior to beginning descent.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller reported an aircraft flew below MVA while correcting back to localizer course.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 J (201) / Allegro
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Special Use R-4301
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Flight planned and obtained a briefing via ForeFlight. I specifically checked airspace NOTAMs and noted that restricted area R-4301 was going to be active the next day from 0500 through 1200. It was not NOTAMed as active for the day of my flight. Departed in the afternoon VFR and was cruising at 6;500 MSL when I found myself on top of an overcast layer. I contacted Minneapolis Center and received a popup IFR clearance for my descent. After receiving my clearance from Center I was informed of a possible airspace violation and given phone [number] to call once on the ground. I talked to Mr. X at Minneapolis Center and explained to him about my checking NOTAMs. He said he had checked NOTAMs and found the same thing I did but that their facility had been informed and was treating it as active. He took my number and told me he would call back if he had any questions or found anything out. He called back about 45 minutes later and told me that in the margin of the VFR sectional it is noted as active daily for a certain time period. (I don't remember the times he said.) I explained to him that I use current charts obtained through ForeFlight and displayed on an iPad; (backed up by an iPhone.) These electronic charts do not allow me to see the margins of the charts. In the future I will avoid R-4301 unless in contact with Center and given a clearance. I would suggest that since the margins are not viewable on electronic charts that active times for special use airspace be placed on the chart in vicinity of the airspace and that airspace NOTAMs note the active times daily; as having occasional times noted as active could lead one to believe it is inactive when not NOTAMed.




Synopsis: General Aviation pilot reports entering R-4301 after finding no NOTAMs indicating an active status during preflight. ATC is contacted for an IFR clearance for descent through clouds and the reporter is informed that the area is hot. It is discovered that in the margin of the VFR sectional it is noted as active daily for a certain time period but the margin is not displayed on most electronic display devices.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PDK.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Night
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operator: Air Taxi
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Landing
Airspace: Class D PDK
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: There was no adverse event or situation on this flight. I am making this report out of concern for safety and to hopefully prevent a future accident.Flying into PDK; Peachtree Airport in Atlanta; last night was typical - IFR approach in IMC using the best low approach procedure at the airport; the ILS to 21L. On final; breaking out of the overcast; my copilot and I did not see the runway because it was not lit despite our having triggered pilot controlled lighting on 120.0. We repeated the procedure and the runway lit up. Landing was uneventful.Lighting at this airport is poor. PDK is located in an urban area and is surrounded by ground lights not associated with the airport. One pilot; reportedly told ATC that all he could see was a 'sea of lights' when asked to call the airport in sight at night. I have had the same experience on multiple occasions. The pilot controlled lighting is erratic; and it is on a different frequency than CTAF after the Tower closes. The typical visual approach we get is from the side where it is hard to see the runway lights even when they are all on; and the beacon is weak and usually obscured by surrounding obstacles at the approach altitudes we are typically given. Moreover; the PAPIs have been NOTAMed out of service for quite some time now; so there is no visual vertical guidance at night.In my opinion; this setup is an accident waiting to happen; hence this report.




Synopsis: Pilot reported airfield lighting at PDK is poor and erratic. Surrounding ground lights not associated with the airport compound the issue further.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BDR.Airport, CT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 15
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Bombardier Learjet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was climbing during a straight-out departure from runway 29 at Bridgeport Airport. I was at 2900 feet MSL; heading 290 degrees. I looked out my left window during a scan for traffic; and saw a Learjet at about 150 feet away; at my altitude; also heading in a westerly direction; in a slight left bank.I am quite certain this Learjet had also just departed Bridgeport soon after I had; because I remember seeing the aircraft on the ground at Bridgeport waiting for takeoff clearance as I was taking off. I assume; but do not know for certain; that the Lear had also requested a straight-out departure from runway 29; and had overtaken me because of his higher speed. I assume the Lear pilot may have seen me and therefore was banking left to avoid my aircraft; but I also don't know if that is true. It may have been luck that he had banked when he did; or I believe his aircraft may have collided with mine.I believe the only way to have avoided this near-miss was for the tower not to have allowed the Lear to perform a straight-out departure so soon after a slower aircraft (my aircraft) had departed on a straight-out departure. Again; I do not know for sure if the Learjet had made a straight-out departure; or if he had come so close behind me during maneuvers after some other type of departure. All I know for sure is he came from behind and was very close when I finally saw him on my left.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot reported an NMAC with a Learjet on departure from BDR.
Date: 201602
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 125
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Other Non-Flight
Aircraft component: Checklists
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: The new quick reference emergency/abnormal checklist in the [Citation] Excels have numerous errors in them. There are procedures with steps out of order; incorrect references; and even procedures that are completely missing steps. These new checklists don't help us. In fact; they actually introduce another threat into the cockpit. The responses from those I've discussed this with in management and training is 'we know about the problems. The AFM is correct. Use the AFM instead of the checklist if there is a problem. Cessna doesn't have to fix the errors right away because of their legal disclaimer on the front page.'We train like we fly and we fly like we train. Think back to all of your simulator training. When have you ever referenced the AFM instead of the quick reference checklist when practicing an emergency procedure in the simulator? In my 17 years and three different types here at [Company]; I have never done anything but use the quick reference book. So now what do you think an Excel crew is going to do when there is a major issue in the aircraft that requires use of an emergency checklist? Are they going to think in the heat of the moment to pull out the AFM; or are they going to do what they've been trained to do over their past 10-plus years of training?The checklist in the Excel sim at Flight Safety has been manually corrected to fix the errors. But the ones in our actual aircraft have not. This makes things even worse. Now we are training with a corrected version of the checklist; yet if we have to reference it while actually flying; we could be faced with a checklist that is different than what we encountered in training. This could cause further crew confusion in an emergency.The Excel pilots have not received a single communication about the erroneous checklist from anyone within [Company]. Not from our chief pilot and not from training. My first suggestion is that a safety alert be sent to immediately to all Excel pilots that mandates use of the AFM going forward until the errors are corrected. Second; cease all use of the quick reference checklists [in training] until the errors are corrected. We should be using the AFM while in training; just as we must do in the real world. Third; pressure Cessna to send out corrected checklists immediately; or at least yellow pages with the corrections.




Synopsis: Citation Excel Captain reported he has found several errors in the quick reference emergency/abnormal checklists and the company has been slow to correct the situation.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A lot happened in a short period of time. There was some convective activity in the area with lightning to the north and south but a clear shot for approach and landing. We were vectored onto 10C Approach and cleared to intercept the Localizer. As we were intercepting we got blasted with a bright laser beam from the left hand side. It was really bright and I could see it on the ground and they were aiming it towards the cockpit. I immediately pulled up my window shade and had the FO (First Officer) report it to ATC. We still had not been cleared for the approach and started getting high. We finally got a word in with ATC and they cleared us. The laser [strike] caused us to get high and we were near the tolerances for a stable approach. In normal circumstances I would have executed a go around but with the weather on both sides of us and another possible laser [strike] I felt the best decision was to continue. We landed a little high and a little fast but still made the touchdown zone and second high speed taxiway. Recommend more enforcement action and tracking to locate the people. I reported the issue but do not know that any action was taken. I did call and talk to the Tower but I got a person that had just started their shift. They asked others on shift but said nobody else was [struck]. I asked if there was anything I could/needed to do and he said no further action was necessary. Also; do not look at the laser!




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported a laser beam encountered on approach to ORD airport.
Date: 201309
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Aircraft Cooling System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: [I] worked 3 short legs on this [aircraft]. [Another Flight Attendant] and I were both extremely hot throughout the day. The APU was run on the ground on each leg; shades closed and air vents open as well. Our pilots made it as cold as possible. The [other Flight Attendant] was very ill; vomiting in the bathroom many times throughout the day from the high heat. Passengers were complaining throughout the day. I had a moderate headache and in the middle of the night began to run a high fever. I have chills; sweats; severe headache; tiredness; nausea; a rash; and fever. I spent majority of the night awake and sick. I was unable to complete my duty day the following day because of these symptoms and needed to be replaced. I worked an additional leg while feeling very ill in effort to not delay the flight or crew. I was treated in the hospital. I was diagnosed with heat exhaustion and dehydration and was given multiple bags of fluid to rehydrate. Today; I was seen for my follow up appointment with [company medical]. The Doctor was positive that I had not only been exposed to high heat conditions but to a toxic chemical/substance as well. He believes the high heat exacerbated this toxic exposure and is treating me accordingly for toxic exposure.




Synopsis: A Flight Attendant described feeling ill after several legs with the cabin temperature very hot and that other Flight Attendant was vomiting during the encounter.