elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PSP.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E PSP
ATC / advisory: TRACON PSP
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On the RNAV Visual 31 L between fixes WEMIR and CEKMA; SOCAL Approach witnessed a target (aircraft he was not talking to) pop up that was a threat to us.  He instructed us to stop descent immediately; the First Officer did a great job of arresting the descent; then Approach told us to immediately climb as TCAS instructed us to descend.  We followed TCAS and saw the single-engine turboprop pass over us by about 400 feet and in front of us by about one-half mile.  The FO re-established us on the approach and we landed without incident.The beautiful weather in Palm Springs and general aviation aircraft not talking to ATC was THE factor in this TCAS RA. ALWAYS follow TCAS.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported TCAS RA Alert on approach to PSP airport.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGB.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The 'speed restrictions' note on the TOPMM 4 RNAV Departure SID out of LGB listed in the Jeppesen charts; page 10-3C; on the Company EFB page contains confusing formatting. This needs to be corrected to avoid unnecessary violations or extra coordination between Crew Members and/or ATC to clear up possible confusion/interpretation. The note states:'Departing Runway 26R; do not exceed 210 knots until established on the 302 degree course to TOPMM.MAINTAIN at or below 250 knots unless otherwise directed by ATC.'The confusion stems from the fact that despite the line space between the first and second sentences; it is unclear if the 250 knots restriction only applies to Runway 26R departures; or departures from all runways. It would be clearer if the speed restriction included a phrase 'for all runways' or if it was stated first before the statement regarding Runway 26R.' Due to the formatting of this statement and lack of clarity; our briefing/coordination time increased due to the discussion and various interpretations that were possible. Please ask Jeppesen to fix this issue. NOTE: There was no violation and we properly adhered to the 250-knot restriction until given 'normal speed' by ATC at approximately 11;000 ft. MSL.




Synopsis: First Officer reported confusing speed restriction notes on the Jeppesen LGB TOPMM4 departure chart.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CRG.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 9
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E JAX
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were flying direct to CRG and spotted an aircraft ahead flying away from us in what appeared to be a right steep turn training maneuver. I decided to turn the aircraft to the left and realized that they were turning right into us. I made a climbing left turn to avoid conflict. Very congested area; I will use a higher altitude and or alter course to circumvent this area.




Synopsis: Two C172s experienced a close encounter in Florida.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C SJC
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The BMRNG TWO RNAV Departure (JEPP 10-3A-1 19JUN15) out of SJC is unclear whether you climb to 3;000 feet and maintain it; or continue climb past 3;000 feet while expecting vectors for the other fixes.This I believe could cause a future problem with an altitude deviationChange the wording to 'Climb and Maintain' or 'While Climbing Expect'.




Synopsis: An air carrier pilot questioned the SJC BMRNG2 RNAV Departure wording clarity about 'CLIMB TO 3;000 feet'. Should the climb continue while expecting vectors or should the statement be 'CLIMB TO AND MAINTAIN 3;000 feet EXPECT VECTORS'?
Date: 201909
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [Engineering Order] should break down task to allow less or no partial signing which creates confusion and possibly missing procedural steps.[Engineering Order] REV N OP 5 HSTA (Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator) JACKSCREW REPLACEMENT Op 5 Step 6 instructs to replace the HSTA per the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) 27-XX-XX; including Stab Clutch Friction System Test per the AMM 27-XX-XX-XXX-XXX; and lubricate it per Op 4 Step 14. There are too many tasks in Step 6 which results in numerous short signs or [unfinished write ups]. The stab clutch friction test and the lubrication per Op 4 should not be listed in Step 6. The lubrication per Op 4 is covered in the AMM Step H. (15) and in Step 14 of the [Engineering Order] Op 5. Lubrication in the [Engineering Order] needs to be relocated after Step 6. But before Functional Tests. It would be helpful if Step 6 only listed the installation of the HSTA per AMM. Step 6 also instructs to do the Stab Clutch Friction Test per the AMM. This test should be first under the Functional Tests of the [Engineering Order] Op 5 with all the other Functional Tests; starting after Step 6 of the [Engineering Order]. Also; is it possible to leave the stab trim motor out until the Stab Clutch Friction Test is performed? If so; the AMM will need to explain this. This would be Step H. (13) Stab Trim Motor Installation and Step H. (19) Stab Clutch Friction Test of the AMM 27-XX-XX. When following Trim Motor Installation before Friction Test; it is required to remove trim motor again which means removing motor not once but twice. Explain why? Keep in mind; Stab Trim Motor Installation requires an Installation Test. Op 5 Step 9 instructs to perform the HSTA Brake Servicing per AMM 12-XX-XX-XXX-XXX. Step 9 should be relocated after Step 6 of the [Engineering Order] but before Steps of Functional Tests. This brake servicing is also covered in the AMM not once but twice and listed in the [Engineering Order] Step 6. Does that mean HSTA brake requires to be serviced twice or is it a mistake in the AMM? If required twice per AMM; then have [Engineering Order] match AMM in the same sequence for brake servicing to be done twice.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reports confusion in work card instructions regarding the Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator.
Date: 201309
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit/Cabin Communication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After the flight; our flight attendants were upset with us because they claimed they had made multiple attempts to contact us on the flight deck but we never responded. Neither the First Officer nor I ever heard the flight attendant chime. At one point; a little over an hour into the flight; the First Officer noticed the blue call light and spoke with the flight attendant. I did not monitor the conversation due to high volume of ATC chatter. I did notice him adjusting the temperature and laughing during his communication with the cabin crew. At another point; I called back to the cabin crew to let them know ATC was reporting some bumps and to be cautious. After landing and opening the door; both the A and C flight attendants were very upset with us. They claimed we had ignored them. Not the case whatsoever. They claimed they even entered the 'emergency code' on the door but it didn't open. They claimed to have also 'beat' on the door. I notified Maintenance and they ran a systems check of the flight attendant call system and cockpit door. All ops checked normal except the chime in the cockpit was rather low but acceptable.Two things about this incident; the cockpit of this aircraft was very loud. Both of us have approved ANR headsets and may just not have heard the chimes. Or the system was malfunctioning. Either way; our flight attendants did not follow the proper procedures for getting the cockpit door opened if they were concerned. At no time did the alert for the door ring. We tested this as well and the volume was high and we would have CLEARLY heard that warning if the proper code had been entered. The flight attendants need to review their proper procedures for accessing the pilots if the call system malfunctions.




Synopsis: B737-300 Captain is informed after landing that the flight attendants were unable to contact the cockpit during flight and accuse the pilots of ignoring them.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climbout; First Officer's leg; at approximately FL250 the First Officer noticed that the left hydraulic quantity was decreasing. Captain accomplished QRH procedure and subsequently the hydraulic quantity fell to zero. I declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport. We landed uneventfully.




Synopsis: A MD-82's left hydraulic system developed a leak and the quantity decreased to zero during climb out so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Per usual cleared for the Instrument Approach and flying the visual profile as normal. Prior to XXXXX ATC requested we make a short approach. As we made the turn towards the runway ATC mentioned a low altitude alert and verified we had the current altimeter. The PF (Pilot Flying) arrested the descent and leveled off momentarily. After realizing our altimeter was showing the current setting we opted to continue the approach and landing as we both believed it would be accomplished safely. The momentary level off had placed us slightly high over the landmark. The PF corrected the descent profile and we landed without incident.If unsure about a procedure that ATC is requesting to mention 'unable'. I think this would prevent the second guess of if we had done something wrong.




Synopsis: EMB-170 First Officer reported during a short approach to landing that ATC issued a low altitude alert; resulting in a momentary level off and being slightly high on approach. The pilot flying corrected and continued to a landing.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Second aircraft: Medium Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was on Taxiway A in ORD abeam Taxiway A13 facing west (clockwise flow). I was instructed by Outbound Ground to pull into Taxiway A13 and cross Taxiway B behind the second Company [aircraft] and proceed to N2 then a right turn on N. While I was turning from Taxiway A onto Taxiway A13; a Company [aircraft] (the second one I was instructed to cross behind); turned into Taxiway A13 and we were nose to nose. I immediately stopped my aircraft; set the parking break and notified ATC. The Company [aircraft] proceeded at a fast taxi speed and squeezed their aircraft (I would estimate less than 10-12 feet away) between my aircraft and the edge of the taxiway; disregarding my and their own aircraft and passenger safety. Ground immediately apologized and instructed me that the aircraft was not instructed to turn at A13 but did so anyways. Ground forwarded me the aircraft flight number.Myself and my First Officer felt that [the second Company aircraft] had complete disregard for safety as they did not follow taxi instructions and made a decision to turn onto a taxiway where an aircraft was proceeding in the opposite direction. I feel that if I wouldn't have stopped my aircraft when I had there would have been a collision.In addition to their decision to turn at A13; I am not aware of what their actual taxi instructions; my tail was blocking traffic on A so A12 and A was completely clear of aircraft.Other aircraft failed to follow taxi instructions / disregard for safety.ATC advised me that the other aircraft failed to follow instructions. I had followed all ATC instructions. I filled out a report to make individuals aware of this event that could of resulted in aircraft damage and passenger injury.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 Air carrier Captain reported a ground conflict with another aircraft after the other aircraft made a wrong turn.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operator: Government
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly after touchdown; the right MLG (main landing gear) departed the aircraft. Directional control was maintained and the aircraft skidded to a stop on the runway. After documentation procedures and mission commander clearance; the aircraft and any associated debris was removed from the runway for repair. No major damage to aircraft.




Synopsis: SandShark UAS landing gear departed the aircraft after touchdown.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LPR.Airport, OH
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G LPR
ATC / advisory: UNICOM LPR
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While approaching LPR my radio was set to 121.7 the wrong Unicom frequency. It should have been set to 122.7. On final for Runway 25 the traffic on Runway 07 radio transmissions were not heard. The Runway 07 traffic was about 3000 ft from the end and appeared to be stopped when I initiated a go around to avoid a collision. I departed LPR and discovered my error and reset the radio to 122.7 and returned to land on Runway 07




Synopsis: CTLSi pilot reported having the wrong frequency set during his arrival into LPR; a non-Tower airport. After a go-around to avoid a conflict with an aircraft on the ground; the pilot set the proper frequency.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZKC.ARTCC, KS
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZKC
ATC / advisory: Center ZKC
Second aircraft: B737-900
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Returned from break; all positions advised they lost frequencies and unable to transmit or receive to aircraft. CPDLC/DATA COMM Testing was in progress. Sector 14 was combined with sector 54; no D-side. I asked if R-14 needed any help; 'YES!' was the emphatic reply; however; when I plugged into help from the D-side; the coordination lines were unusable. R-side advised VTABS in use. I have never been trained with the use of VTABS [Voice Switching and Control System Training and Backup Switch] (not that I recall); nor do I know what that is (along with anyone else trained in the building after 2007). I was unable to assist R-14; who was now desperate as [three carriers] were all converging at FL310 without communications. I moved to de-combine sector 54 from sector 14. I was unable to open the position appropriately with 'VTABS'; I still don't know what that is. R14 was able to subsequently coordinate with ZME M27 to descend Aircraft X prior to confliction. ZME later reported they had lost their frequencies as well. This was an unsafe situation on several fronts. Don't combine High and Low Altitude sector(s). Staff D-sides. Train personnel on the use of VTABS; and practice loss of frequencies in training. Discontinue CPDLC/DATA COMM Testing until adequate staffing and frequencies return. We were lucky this time!




Synopsis: Kansas City Center Controller reported losing radios during CPDLC testing and having an airborne conflict between three aircraft.
Date: 201901
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were scheduled for a MAX 8. We arrived at [the] gate and noticed from looking at aircraft from the terminal that nose gear was very extended. I walked down jetway and as I was standing in the jetway (greeting passengers as they exited the aircraft) I noticed the aircraft literally bouncing up to the point where the fuselage was hitting the cushions on the cover from the jetway that goes over the forward entry door. The First Officer got back from doing his walk around and told me the tail stand was not installed. I called Ops and asked them to install the tail stand; the response I got back was that it was not required. [Apparently] tail stands are only required on -800s. I believe this is an oversight that needs to be remedied immediately. I witnessed a very near tipping incident. Had it not been for the cover over the forward entry door holding the aircraft down; I believe the aircraft would have tipped. We have the tail stands why wouldn't we use them on the MAX 8s? Are we going to wait for a MAX 8 to tip on its tail before we change our Ground Ops procedures?




Synopsis: B737 MAX 8 Captain reported this aircraft could tip on its tail at the gate since a tail stand is not currently required to be used on the aircraft.