elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: C90.TRACON, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: A couple weird things happened during our arrival to ORD today. Descending on the VEECK 1 near HANNI; ORD TRACON told us to maintain 280 KTS. We were descending at 280 at the time; around 11;000 FT; in LNAV/VNAV. About a minute after our level off at 11;000 FT; the controller told us again; he needed us to maintain the 280 KTS. We looked down and we were at 250 KTS. The airplane had slowed itself; and we really have no idea why. To our knowledge; the automation was set up correctly; and we verified the correct settings were still in place after the Controller noticed the slowdown. We sped back up.A few minutes later the Controller told us to maintain 180 KTS. We thought this was odd; since it was a 100 KTS slowdown right after he told us to maintain 280. After we slowed down; somewhat ironically the controller came on and said he needed us to speed back up to 250 (now below 10;000); and that he had given the slowdown to the wrong airplane. We sped back up again.Finally; we were vectored to an intercept for the ILS 10R; autopilot and automation ON; Approach mode armed for the capture. The airplane flew right through the LOC without as much as a wing rock. We caught it immediately as it was happening and started a manual turn back. However; the Controller noticed too; told us we had passed through the LOC and gave us a new vector back on from the other side. He then re-cleared us to the approach. The concern here is traffic separation on the parallel runways. Again; we have no idea why the airplane did this. All correct modes were verified before and after the event.




Synopsis: An air carrier automation fully active on an ORD VEECK 1 did not appear to honor the selected modes when it failed to maintain a SPD Select during level off and then failed to capture an armed APP LOC.
Date: 202009
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Other Non-Flight
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other No Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A recent change to the B-737 Performance Manual authorizes standard (STD) thrust takeoffs with a tailwind 'provided the data in the Thrust/V speed section of the TPS (Takeoff Performance System) are based on a tailwind equal to or greater than the actual wind'. This exception is correctly explained on the takeoff card under 'Unplanned Tailwind Takeoff'. However; the SPAR matrix; (another quick reference tool in the Performance Manual) incorrectly shows that STD thrust takeoffs are permitted with a tailwind. The only exception listed in the Spar matrix for the STD thrust/tailwind combination is ball note 1 which states 'Check the list of conditions in --Use of STD thrust for takeoff is not authorized--'. This list used to include tailwind; but in accordance with the new TPS tailwind procedures referenced above it was removed with the last revision. Add the already present ball note 4 (provided the data in the Thrust/V speed section of the TPS are based on a tailwind equal to or greater than the actual wind) on the SPAR matrix to the STD thrust/tailwind combination.




Synopsis: Captain reported conflict in new aircraft performance manuals.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 2
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At approximately XA30 the Captain started both engines and gave signals to ground crew to disconnect ground power and clear the aircraft. The Captain called for the after start checklist. The First Officer read each item on the checklist and heard the correct response from the Captain for each item. On the checklist item 'Ground Equipment' the First Officer looked out the window and did not see the Ground Power Unit and tug or the ground crew members near the aircraft and announced 'clear right'. The Captain verified the call by challenging 'Ground Power clear?'. The First Officer responded 'yes; Ground Power is clear'. The First Officer then received the taxi clearance; read it to the Captain and the Captain acknowledged the clearance; completing the after start checklist. The Captain flashed the taxi lights to the ground crew signaling the aircraft was ready to taxi; the ground crew did not immediately respond. The Captain flashed the taxi lights a second time. The ground crew held light wands in a position that indicated the aircraft could taxi forward and the Captain advanced the propeller levers to begin taxiing forward. Within a few seconds; a collision between the ground power unit and the aircraft occurred. The ground crew gave signals with light wands to the pilots to stop taxiing. The Captain stopped the aircraft and shut down both engines.




Synopsis: A cargo flight Pilot reported the aircraft struck the Ground Power Unit when they began to taxi from parking. The reporter stated the First Officer and Ramp personnel reported the aircraft was clear of obstructions.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: A380
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: A320
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Busy traffic; visual approaches to both outboard and inboard runways; ZZZ 1; west traffic flow. DOWNE RADAR (DNYR) works XXL/R complex. A380 on ILS then visual to Runway XXL; A320 on ILS XXL to follow A380; CRJ-700 visual to follow A320; but land XXR. The LOA between ZZZ and ZZZ 1 states when a A380 or B747 lands XXL; provide at least 10 miles in trail to XXR; this is to allow the A380 to get clear of both runways. A320 was 7 miles behind A380; CRJ-700 was 1.5 miles behind A320; giving only 8.5 miles to the Tower to get the A380 off. The Tower calls and said he doesn't think it's going to work and to slow the CRJ-700. Meanwhile; it looks like A320 is going to lose required wake turbulence separation with A380 so the DNYR Controller cancels the approach clearance of A320 and has him track inbound. I tell DWNY; Tower doesn't think this going to work with CRJ-700; and suggested breaking A320 out since he was already too close to the A380 and moving CRJ-700 back over to XXL. The Controller waits until the A380 touches down; then asks A320 if he has the field in sight; A320 does; DNYR clears him for a visual approach and changes him to Tower frequency. CRJ-700 does end up going around because the A380 blocked XXR. After the Controller was relieved; I asked him why he still let the A320 land behind the A380 even though he was closer than 7 miles; and he responded; the A380 wasn't on his scope any more so he no longer had to provide for wake turbulence. Is there a ruling somewhere on the legality of this? It doesn't seem safe to me. He said he sees other controllers doing this (I have never witnessed this before) basically; if the in trail aircraft is closer than required wake turbulence; he thinks he can cancel his approach clearance; use normal IFR separation (1;000 FT) and once the A380 touches down it's like he never existed and the trailing aircraft is now cleared number one for the approach. I thought because the Tower had already warned us the CRJ-700 wasn't going to be able to land XXR; it would have been safer to break A320 out and let the CRJ-700 land 8 miles behind the A380 on the same runway. No gray area there. I would just like clarification on the wake turbulence behind a A380; if required separation is 7 miles; there can be no aircraft closer than 7 miles to that runway when the A380 touches down. Not this ticky-tacky cancel approach clearance/re-cleared visual when the aircraft touches down stuff.




Synopsis: Tower Supervisor described a questionable interpretation of the 'Wake Turbulence Separation' required when following an A380 on final.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BDG.Airport, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 33
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: CTAF BDG
Second aircraft: Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departed U64 runway 16 with a left crosswind departure heading 210 to vortac TBC and was communicating and monitoring 122.8 at approximately 8;200 feet MSL; half way between BDG and U64; climbing to my cruise altitude of 10500. To the best of my very short glimpse; a white Cessna in the 172 to 210 class passed under us at my estimate of less than 50 no more than 75 feet. I estimate the other aircraft's heading to be 020 to 040. VERY CLOSE! I didn't have time to react or take evasive action. I was with one passenger who was not viewing out the window; until the last minute and was FREAKED! I didn't see the aircraft either until a -second after my passenger. I was trimming the aircraft; using 122.8 the Unicom tower frequencies for both mountains to the right of us and no communications on 122.8; and at that altitude the closest center is Denver would not be able to track you and I don't think that there is radio communication possible either from Denver at that altitude. I assumed that with the mountains covering most of the right side of flight no aircraft flying from the left side directly to the mountains and no aircraft using 122.8 in the area that I was in a safe zone and could monitor the instruments and continue to trim the aircraft. The aircraft in the area and at and below the mountain range height of 11;200 would or should be on 122.8. I believe what caused the problem was the other aircrafts lack of communication on 122.8 in the close proximity of the two airports either giving or asking for traffic advisory? It is very difficult I have been told to see an aircraft heading directly at you? If I could talk to the other pilot I would ask him; why he was not on 122.8 asking for traffic advisories; at that altitude? Me I will instruct any of my passengers; (more than once); to help me scan the area and keep an eye out for other aircraft! Making it part of my check list!




Synopsis: BE33 pilot climbing out of U64 experiences a NMAC with a Cessna at 8200 feet flying in the opposite direction. The Cessna was not detected in time to take any evasive action.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 1
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We missed the intercept to the final approach course possibly due to late arming of the autopilot. I requested a vector to re-intercept. ATC said no. He would have to box us back around. He assigned a heading and altitude. The first officer was the pilot flying in the left seat. The autopilot was disconnected. In the turn we entered an unusual attitude and were descending. It took several hundred feet to recover. As captain and pilot monitoring; I should have recognized the unusual attitude sooner. It's a busy phase of flight. I constantly monitor altitude and heading. In this incident I was not monitoring for that brief moment. The weather besides being IMC had also been quite turbulent which may have played a part. Also; [we had been on duty for 8 hours; and] the turbulence may have added to normal fatigue levels. As captain I fly with First Officers with varied levels of experience. My expectation that a turn to a heading and climb are common pilot tasks. I was caught off guard for that brief moment.




Synopsis: PC-12 Captain reported an altitude deviation and recovery from an usual attitude when distracted from monitoring the flying First Officer.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We started both engines at the gate; taxied out to the runway and took off with nothing out of the ordinary happening. After the completion of the after takeoff checklist we ran the ice protection pneumatic test. During this test we had the red master warning chime; and noticed it was for the Number 1 bleed leak. We also smelled a burning scent. We turned the ice protection override knob back to auto; and closed the number 1 bleed valve. The Pilot Monitoring began to run the QRH while the Pilot Flying took the radios and the continued to fly the airplane. At this time we [Requested Priority Handling]; and began getting vectors back to the filed. By the time we finished the QRH we were able to get the bleed leak inscription to go away. We then landed without incident.


Second narrative: During the climbout we initiated the ice protection (pneumatic) test. While performing the test; we observed the 4 'open' inscriptions on the overhead panel; and then a few seconds after that an EICAS 'BLD 1 LEAK' warning message appeared on the EICAS. We also smelled fumes. We then turned the ice protection knob back to the 'auto' position and closed the Number 1 bleed valve which had a visible red 'LEAK' inscription illuminated. The Captain continued to fly the airplane; took the radios; and called for the QRH. I ran the QRH while the Captain [Requested Priority Handling] and received radar vectors back to ZZZ. While following the steps of the QRH; the 'BLD 1 LEAK' EICAS message extinguished. We landed in ZZZ without incident.


Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported a Number 1 engine bleed leak during climbout resulting in a return to departure airport.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: CPR.Tower, WY
Light: Dawn
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: The Tower is closed overnight from XA00 until XB00 time. When I opened the airport the approach lighting system was still in ground-to-ground. It should've been on pilot controlled lighting. The tower has a closing checklist specifically stating to put it in pilot control. The checklist was not followed. A few weeks prior I found the same issue with a different closing Controller In Charge. I am reporting to the Air Traffic Manager that we may have a trend of complacency on the closing checklist by CIC's. I'll encourage refresher training for all CIC's on their duties and responsibilities. Additionally; I will talk to the CIC involved with this situation.




Synopsis: The Tower supervisor reports controllers are not setting the airport lighting in the proper position when they close the Tower at night.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: A80.TRACON, GA
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E A80
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A CRJ advised A80 on initial contact he was unable to shoot a PRM approach. The PRM USERS page in the approach plate book advises crews to let the Center know AT LEAST 100 miles out in case a crew isn't able to shoot an ILS/PRM approach. The ILS/PRM approach was on the ATL ATIS. A person on the wall said this wasn't the first time a CRJ crew has stated this late. They also alleged that on occasion CRJ crews would say this simply to get the far north runway and get to parking faster. This is the only reason I share this with you. This crew would have got 27L and been at their gate probably 8-10 minutes sooner if he had shot a PRM approach. I adjusted speed on several other arrivals and probably added a couple of minutes flying time per airplane behind to accommodate this aircraft. In all; the users (including CRJ) probably added 30-40 minutes of delay because of this request. Please share with these Carriers that if this is going on and it is UNACCEPTABLE. It adds to workload at a time when we don't need it.




Synopsis: A80 Controller voiced concern regarding one airlines failure to provide timely coordination with ATC reference non participation in PRM procedures.