elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202201
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Software and Automation
Primary problem: Software and Automation

Narrative: While enroute ZZZ-ZZZ1 our center hydraulic quantity started decreasing. While reviewing the appropriate non-normal checklists in [App]; the application crashed twice. We had to close and restart it each time; which resulted in a loss of all open tabs. Essentially we had to start the checklists over from the beginning.This happens frequently (like once or twice per trip). [App] just freezes sometimes -- it doesn't matter whether you're connected to the internet or not.Flight Operations wants to remove paper QRH's from the airplanes. This absolutely cannot be allowed to happen until we have a replacement system that works 100% of the time.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported the center hydraulic quantity began decreasing while enroute.  Captain stated the app used to troubleshoot the issue kept crashing.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: RJBB.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground RJBB
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying; Airport Personnel
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I was the First Officer on this trip and for this leg.  After engine start I called for taxi.  We were pushed back to exit from taxiway S5.  Ground instructed us to 'Taxi via S5; J4; S6; J3.'  I mentioned that we weren't given any hold short instructions; but that I would clarify where ground wanted us to hold on J3 after we started taxiing.  The Captain started to taxi and verified that we were exiting at S5; I concurred as did both [First Officers].  The Captain said we would wait to configure until we were on J3 since there were three 90 degree turns in rapid succession.  As we started to complete the turn onto S5 I began scanning to the right to ensure that J4 had no traffic on it that would be a conflict.  The Captain said; 'What's that?' and I turned my attention to 12 o'clock and saw lighted cones that were on J4 and aligned with the centerline of S5.  The Captain stopped the aircraft.  We stopped well clear of the cones; however; we couldn't turn left or right without the danger of ingesting cones into an engine.  At the Captain's direction I contacted ground and described the situation.  After a ten minute delay ground had us contact maintenance.  Maintenance asked us to start the APU and shut down both engines so they could come out and tow us onto the taxiway.  After another 30 minutes an airport vehicle showed up and with the help of our maintenance; moved the cones to the far edge of the taxiway.  After that we started our engines; completed all checklists and departed RJBB without further incident.There were numerous taxiway closures that were active by NOTAM at the time of our departure.  We were aware of these closures and the Captain specifically briefed their existence.  I believe that the cones were placed in error.  The way they were placed made S5 unusable.  S4 was not available to us as it would join J4 in a section of the taxiway that was closed due to maintenance.Proper placement of the cones.  Also; we could possibly have seen the cones slightly earlier; however; we would have been in the same predicament since their placement rendered S5 unusable to join J4.  Either way; we couldn't have departed our ramp without the danger of FOD.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported cones were positioned too close to Taxiway S5 at RJBB airport which rendered it unusable. Once they were cleared the flight continued to taxi normally.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BHM.Airport, AL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E BHM
ATC / advisory: TRACON BHM
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While picking up clearance in BHM I failed to verify spelling of first fix and I failed to verify it on map; so on departure I was given direct GUMMP and I went direct GUMPE. Departure called and stated [we were] left of course; I asked for [a] vector and then asked for correct fix spelling. Afterward I requested and received direct to correct fix. In [the] future to avoid [this]; I will verify all spelling with clearance and verify on EFB that [the] route makes sense and clarify any discrepancies before taxi.




Synopsis: Light Transport aircraft pilot reported a track heading deviation during departure from BHM airport after confusing similar sounding fixes GUMMP and GUMPE.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Golden Eagle 421
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After arriving at ZZZ; I requested 50 gallon of a gas; 25 per side. On initial departure climb CHTs (Cylinder Head Temperature) on both engines spiked to red line. I verified mixtures rich; airspeed and deck angle. Immediately decided to make a left 180 and land. After landing queried lineman about fueling. He verified that aircraft had been misfueled with Jet A.




Synopsis: Pilot reported encountering engine issues during initial climb and immediately returned to the airport where it was discovered the aircraft had been mistakenly fueled with Jet-A.
Date: 201904
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Embraer Legacy 450/500
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Electrical Distribution
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We currently operate the Legacy 450/500 electrical system differently than it was designed and intended to be operated. We do this during ground operations and in flight until we accomplish our after takeoff checklist at 3000 ft MSL. During our after start checklist; we place the Bus Tie #2 Knob in the 'Open' position and leave it there until the after takeoff checklist is completed. This is done to prevent a cascade electrical fault caused by the failure of a DC electrical Hydraulic Pump that has in the past; transferred over to and completely disabled both the #1 and #2 electrical systems. Not a good situation in any airplane; especially one with a fly-by-wire flight control system. Embraer recommended opening the Bus Tie Knob as a temporary fix until new and improved DC Hydraulic pumps could be installed. The problem in this instance is that when you have the #2 Engine Generator deferred; the APU generator will not power the #2 Electrical system when the Bus Tie #2 Knob is open. Operating the aircraft on the ground; during takeoff and climb with the Bus Tie #2 Knob in 'Auto' is the only solution but is not I/A/W (in Accordance With) our current operating procedures. Operating in this manner opens us up to the possible situation described above. Opened the Bus Tie #2 Knob as per the [company] Legacy 450 After Start Normal Checklist and the entire #2 electrical system became unpowered.Utilizing an MEL listed procedure (24-XX-XX-XX) that does not take into account the abnormal electrical switch position (Bus Tie #2 Knob) OPEN vs. AUTO.Placed the #2 Bus Tie Knob to the Auto position; the #2 electrical system regained power but numerous nuisance CAS (Crew Alerting System) messages remained posted which required a complete aircraft shutdown of at least 15 minutes. Maintenance was then contacted.Do not allow the deferring of the #2 DC Generator per MEL # 24-XX-XX-XX on ALL Legacy 450/500 aircraft until Embraer and [the company] have addressed the underlying non-normal operation of the aircraft electrical system. The normal operating checklists; procedures will have to be updated as well as all crew members must be informed and trained on the new procedures.




Synopsis: EMB-545 Captain reported experiencing an electrical system failure after engine start.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: RDU.Airport, NC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In cruise flight well outside ROA we were inbound on the SBV4 arrival in RDU. ATC then issued us a vector off course about 10-15 degrees to the left. A few minutes later we were re-cleared direct to ROA via the ALDAN 1 Arrival. I loaded the arrival into the FMS and selected the ROA transition. Prior to executing the change; I verified with the First Officer and noted that ROA was in the TO line of the FMS. However for some reason the FMS did not give us a direct course but instead place the course to the right of the aircraft. In order to intercept the autopilot attempted to take a hard intercept to the right to get on course. I saw what was happening and reselected direct ROA in the FMS to correct the problem. However due to the heading change ATC did query us if we were proceeding direct ROA. ATC made no further issue or remarks and we proceeded to RDU uneventfully. Reliance to automation. Uncommanded response to input in the FMS. I would be more vigilant in ensuring the FMS is showing a direct to line to the selected fix.




Synopsis: A CRJ-200 FMS did not proceed direct ROA after ATC vectored the aircraft off the ALDAN 1 Arrival then recleared direct ROA for the transition.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During our initial approach phase into JFK and after shooting the CAMRN4 arrival we were instructed to maintain present heading after CAMRN for vectors to runway 04R. Then; we were told by the controller to descend to 7000ft; after that we were vectored to the 04L and asked us to descend to 2000ft; and since we were doing 200kts the controller decided to vector us around to position us as the last aircraft for the approach. In the meantime; we were given heading 090 to the 04L and while doing so I noticed an amber traffic off my left side on the NAV Display (same altitude) followed by a traffic Advisory (TA). The controller steps into the frequency and very agitated instruct us to 'IMMEDIATELY TURN RIGHT HEADING 360'. At this point I had to disconnect the autopilot in order to react faster to such an event. The controller continued to vector us and hand us off to tower. We finished the approach and landed successfully on runway 04R. At NO point during this approach we received a Resolution Advisory (RA) just to clarify; but an evasive maneuver by the pilots took place in order to NOT get into a more serious manner.




Synopsis: Pilot reported receiving a Traffic Advisory during vectoring to final approach.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear Indicating System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Right main landing gear light failed to illuminate during approach. Crew performed checklist; diverted to alternate and had tower confirm gear extention. Crew landed aircraft at alternate.




Synopsis: C550B Captain reported right main landing green light failed to illuminate on approach. Flight crew diverted to alternate where a visual check confirmed gear was down.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ITO.Airport, HI
Aircraft: SR20
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E HCF
ATC / advisory: TRACON HCF
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I just took over R5. There were a lot of things to be done. Right away; ITO Approach called me and told me that aircraft X; an SR20; departure from ITO; was not going to be able to make the MOCA of 6;500 FT at OKALA; can he just RADAR vector him? I asked him what his MVA is because mine is 6;000 FT. He said 5;400 FT. I told him to RADAR vector him until our boundary on a 310 heading since it's a lower MVA. When ITO called me back at the boundary; aircraft was above 6;000 FT (my MIA) I told him to switch him to me. As soon as I got him; I told him to turn left to join V22 to V2. He read it back correctly. He was less than 1 mile right of V22 when I gave him that clearance. I was busy with vectoring for practice approaches at KOA with jets; when I noticed aircraft's MSAW went off. He was left of course and I advised him. He was now in my 8;000 FT MIA. He said that he did go to V22 and now is going to V2. I restated that he was cleared via V22 to join V2 and to climb quickly. When he leveled at 8;000 FT I cleared him direct UPP. It was busy on R5. I needed to tell the Supervisor to open up my D-Side. They needed to juggle a few bodies to get me the D-Side. Another problem is with the pilot. If he knew on the ground that he was not going to make the MOCA; he should have informed us or requested a route on the ground that he could comply with. I think if I wasn't as rushed; I may have given a more thorough clearance to ITO Approach to issue to aircraft rather than tell him to switch him to me at the boundary. This worked; but I may have spent more time to give him more attention to make sure he understood his clearance. I thought he did; but he really didn't. If I had a D-Side to have dealt with that coordination with ITO; it might have been more clear and less on the fly; while trying to deal with my practice approaches and multiple air carriers flying in to KOA.




Synopsis: HCF Controller described a below MVA event resulting from an apparent aircraft performance issue. The reporter noted that this performance limitation should have been reported by the flight crew before the flight.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small UAS; Multi Rotor
Operator: Commercial Operator (UAS)
Operating under: Part 107
Flight plan: None
Mission: Photo Shoot / Video
Flight phase: Hovering (UAS)
Airspace: TFR ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS); Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)
Detector: Person UAS Crew
When detected: Other post-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Software and Automation
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I had been operating the UAS from early morning through approximately XA:00 am; providing news coverage of the tornado disaster in City; State. I had been checking periodically for TFR's using Foreflight on my cell phone and none were being imposed. I resumed flying at approximately XC:00 and again checked for TFR's using the same method.Upon returning to the hotel that evening I checked again when online as I was preparing for flights the next day and also to see if a VIP TFR may be upcoming; and saw to my surprise that a TFR had been imposed for the area that I had been flying in that took effect at XB:30 that day. I do not know why it did not appear on Foreflight other than I was in an area of poor cell coverage and perhaps the map loaded but the application was not communicating for updates. In the future when doubt is cast on the reliability of internet based mapping applications; a phone call to FSS is in order. Then there is no doubt.

Callback: Reporter had no additional information to share.



Synopsis: Part 107 UAS pilot was flying in an area of a natural disaster. Prior to the flight the UAS pilot checked for NOTAMs/TFRs and saw none. Reporter learned during post flight that they flew in a TFR that had been created after takeoff.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Overhead Bins; Latches
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Observed potential issue in aisle 'overhead bin wave.' Notified Captain upon identifying issue that overhead bin shifted at black bin dividing structure showed and showed Captain concern. Asked Flight Attendant C to guard bins; so no passenger would place items in either adjacent bins around affected area until Maintenance is able to inspect.Maintenance came onboard initially placarded bin and started process to sign off on logbook after placing a call with logbook in hand Maintenance came onboard aircraft and felt bin structure again. Stepped off aircraft and communicated with person on phone. Maintenance informed me this aircraft was dead there's a structural issue. Aircraft [was] deplaned.Proper assembly of overhead bin units. Additional training of identifying potential structural issues with [the new interior] additional inspection of overhead bin units.




Synopsis: B737 Flight Attendant reported discovering overhead bin damage prior to boarding.