elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAN.ARTCC, AK
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Fighter
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A CZEG
ATC / advisory: Center ZAN
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Before I took the D-Side on Sector 8; the R-Side being relieved had cleared two aircraft previously on an ALTRV direct to the destination; EIL. This caused one of the CPLs (Aircraft X) to reject with CZEG; requiring manual coordination. Shortly after taking the position I called CZEG to complete the coordination. The Receiving Controller in CZEG took several minutes to process the transfer I was giving; but eventually took the information and approved everything (time; alt; routing); including the fact that Aircraft X was coming NEG RVSM reference two aircraft that he showed being traffic. The Receiving Controller told me everything was approved if those two aircraft were both stopped at FL310. Both aircraft were departing ANC; one filed over JAGIT; one COHIL (NCA and CPA). I called Sector 7 and coordinated both of those aircraft should be stopped at FL310 for crossing traffic in CZEGs airspace. Another call was made from CZEG; when the Controller became concerned that we had not stopped the traffic. I told him everything was coordinated with Sector 7 and the traffic would be stopped; and also told him that Aircraft X was already entering their airspace at this time; and to confirm that they were still traffic. The CZEG Controller told me yes; he still wanted them stopped. I relayed this information to my R-Side; who became skeptical and called CZEG to ask how they were traffic. It is my understanding that my R-Side; after passing CZEG a Lat/Long; was informed that CZEG had a loss of separation in their airspace with Aircraft X and another aircraft at FL350 that we did not have information on. This information was all passed along to the FLM. Avoid rerouting aircraft when transfers have already been accepted; especially during special situations such as NEG RVSM aircraft.




Synopsis: ZAN Controller reports of a conflict that they tried to resolve but the confliction was in another Center's airspace.
Date: 201909
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Training
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was a part of an A Check and [ETOPS check]. I was under the assumption that I was ETOPS Qualified while working on this aircraft. I stamped multiple task cards including the ETOPS [check] card. I became aware I wasn't ETOPS qualified on the morning of [date] while discussing ETOPS with fellow mechanics in my [Airworthiness Release] class.When initially hired I had ETOPS awareness class and CBT's (Computer Based Training). I was under the assumption that I was ETPOS qualified. At my previous job at [company]; everyone is ETOPS qualified from the start after finishing training. So I thought that after having this ETOPS awareness class I was considered ETOPS qualified. I even went into learning hub and saw that the class was complete thinking that made me ok for ETOPS maintenance. It wasn't until I was in [Airworthiness Release] class that I overheard other mechanics talking about not being ETOPS qualified. I thought to myself that everyone was ETOPS qualified after core training. I found that to be false and immediately notified Supervisors and my union representatives.Maybe explaining that the ETOPS awareness class does not make you ETOPS qualified and that you need more training before you are considered ETOPS qualified.




Synopsis: Technician reported that confusion regarding qualifications resulted in his stamping ETOPS blocks on work cards without having an ETOPS qualification.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JCF.TRACON, CA
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy; Haze / Smoke
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON JCF
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I plugged in on ANTELOPE handoff while Aircraft X was being assisted in finding VFR weather. Heavy smoke and clouds was the predominant weather today and the pilot was above 14;000 and advised they were not IFR equipped or capable. I worked with adjacent facilities to find suitable weather conditions and got PIREPs from aircraft ZLA 17 was working. We determined DAG was their best chance to descend visually. The radar controller I worked with definitely seemed very stressed and at times the situations on sector seemed to go beyond their capability. Visibility and ceilings were poor throughout the airspace; yet visual approaches continued to be advertised. At one point an IFR aircraft who hadn't reported the airport insight was cleared for a visual approach and the pilot responded with 'uhh; we're in IMC'. That radar controller was eventually relieved and everything went smoother after that point. The aircraft was switched to ZLA 17 and safely landed.  I think it's hard to prevent a situation like that from our side since a pilot called up in an emergency status. But when it became clear the situation was too much for this particular controller; I think they should have been relieved earlier. It was good to get a handoff controller to assist. I don't believe an emergency was formally declared for this pilot and I think that should have been done.




Synopsis: JCF Controller reported assisting radar controller during an emergency situation who was unable to handle the traffic complexity.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working a B737 (FL340). The SOP gives me control to descend to FL330 from the adjacent sector (X). I cleared the B737 to FL330 and initiated a hand off to Sector Y (beneath me). After the hand off was accepted I switched communications to Sector Y. In my next scan around I saw that the B737's Data Block showing FL324. I asked the Sector Y Controller to check that altitude for me. The pilot told her that he was descending to FL230! The pilot was then assigned FL300. I can't verify the original read back; nor do I know what the pilot said when he checked on with Sector Y. No other traffic was affected by this action; however the airplane did descend below FL330 in Sector X and into Sector Y. It is interesting because I have had this problem in the past; with pilots reading back 230 instead of 320; and I'm a little bit paranoid about it. I started saying flight level three two zero; thirty two just for emphasis. I don't recall doing that this time; of course. Many times when I say it that way; the pilot reads it back so perfectly clear; like I didn't need to say the extra part and I feel like I'm just adding extra words. Perhaps that's really why it's clear. Since that method seems to work I will try to use it all the time.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described an airspace violation when the aircraft involved apparently confused FL330 with FL230; the reporter listed a phraseology modification that might prevent future altitude assignment confusion.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: YAK.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Flight plan: SVFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E YAK
ATC / advisory: FSS JNU
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Flight Service
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Safety Incident-I relieved In-flight Position and continued working In-flight 1 position for approx 4.5 hours till the end of my shift. Working the radio position on In-flight 1; I received a call from Aircraft X requesting a Special VFR Clearance into the Yakutat (YAK) service area he was 12 West inbound. I obtained the surface area from Anchorage Center and issued the clearance. A call was made at YAK on 123.6 'Any one on approach?' by an aircraft. I recognized the voice of the pilot and transmitted the following to the pilot. Aircraft Y- SVFR inbound on approach to YAK; Monitor the YAK ASOS and advise intensions. Aircraft Y reply 'RQ SVFR Clearance out of YAK to the EAST'.  Aircraft X heard Aircraft Y's request for SVFR. Aircraft X transmitted to FSS that he agreed to visual separation from Aircraft Y.  I issued the SVFR Clearance to Aircraft Y out of YAK CESA (East) as requested.Reviewing the tape recording with a supervisor; I was informed that Aircraft Y indicated he agreed to Special VFR Clearance. I took this to mean he agreed to Visual Separation with Aircraft X. I informed both aircraft of each type of aircraft required in visual separation during SVFR Clearances. Aircraft Y reported clear of YAK service area to the East. Aircraft X reported on the ground YAK 5-7 minutes later from the West.  My Supervisor tells me this could be a deviation.  This does not change the fact that I should have confirmed with Aircraft Y that his reply was to maintain visual separation from Aircraft X as well.I should have used standard phraseology and re-confirmed with Aircraft Y that he had agreed to Visual Separation from Aircraft X.




Synopsis: FSS controller approved SVFR operations for an inbound and departure simultaneously. The Controller thought he heard one of the aircraft agree to 'Maintain Visual Separation'. During a review of a tape recording of this period it was determined that the aircraft did not volunteer to maintain visual separation. Simultaneous SVFR operations as this require one of the aircraft to maintain visual separation. The Controller misunderstood one of the aircrafts' transmissions.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZSU.ARTCC, PR
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZSU
ATC / advisory: Center ZSU
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: The landlines in San Juan CERAP have been OTS for way too long.  I can't even remember how long.  Every time we get in contact with MSDS; SVMI or TNCC it is actually a success.  Aircraft X declared a medical emergency as it was approaching Santo Domingo airspace (MDSD).  A patient with a heart attack.  Luckily we got the coordination done in time.  However; later on the pilot advised that the patient had died and the pilot needed to deviate for weather.  This was the time when we could not communicate with MDSD to forward this information.  Consider the situation.  I needed to expedite the flight; but I could not accomplish the coordination.  Usually you would hold this aircraft in your airspace until coordination is done; but I will not hold the aircraft.  This almost gave me a deviation; but after many attempts; we got MSDS on the line when the aircraft was about 10 mile from their airspace.FAA needs to seriously work on these landlines.


Second narrative: Aircraft X had a medical emergency; an 85 year old man with a possible heart attack.  Due to the MEVA landline outage it took overly long time to coordinate with MDSD ARTCC the information and updated info and weather deviations for this flight.  It made for a VERY dangerous situation and we were handcuffed from providing the best possible service to this situation.  The passenger died before reaching the airport at MDSD.Get the landlines fixed before more people die!


Synopsis: Two ZSU controllers report of on going problem where they could not reach another facility via land line to advise the Controller of a medical emergency.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other push-back
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Not sure if this is indicative of other issues at ZZZ as there were two others that I am reporting.  This report is safety related as the actions of the ZZZ ground crew could have caused damage to equipment and/or injury to Ground Personnel.After being pushed back from XX and setting the brake; the ramp person in front of the airplane proceeded to give me the all clear (arms extended down at 45 degrees) while the tug was underneath the nose and still connected to the aircraft.  I asked the ramp person on the intercom why this was and asked him to tell the ramper out front what the proper procedure was.  After the tug pulled away (the person out front maintained his arms at a 45 the entire time); the tug driver tried to explain what the procedure was and it appeared the two were arguing with the person giving us incorrect instructions defending his actions.Before we taxied away; I called ZZZ Operations on the radio to inform them of the issue as well.  This was probably the most unsafe pushback/release I've seen in a very long time and could have easily gotten out of hand due to the non-SOP actions of ZZZ.  Thankfully; due to me being away for two weeks and the FO being away from flying for over five weeks; we were hyper-vigilant of what was going on around us.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported experiencing an unsafe push-back from the gate.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On arrival to ORD from ZZZZ  at approximately XA:50Z near RHIVR; 121.5 (guard) frequency became saturated with multiple [name related statement] calls.  These calls stepped on several ATC transmissions and interrupted communications with arrival control; creating a safety of flight issue.  After approximately 1-2 minutes; the calls ceased; allowing clear communication to continue. The high potential for a serious incident to occur as a result of the lack of communications discipline or crews choosing not to monitor 121.5 is alarming and requires immediate attention.




Synopsis: Air Carrier pilot reported non-emergency flight related transmissions on Guard frequency. Reporter stated this resulted in interrupted communications; creating a safety of flight issue.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MCN.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E MCN
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Second aircraft: Military Transport
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While flying in a Piper Cherokee on an instrument flight plan with two passengers; I was cleared by Approach Control to approach Runway 14 at the unattended airport MCN. ATC issued climb out instructions and approved a frequency change to advisory frequency. Upon landing; my passengers decided they wanted to switch seats. Instead of doing a touch and go; I turned off the runway and taxied back to the end of Runway 14 stopping briefly near the terminal to let my passengers readjust. While taxiing; I observed a [large transport aircraft] on final approach to WRB; but did not consider the close proximity of WRB to MCN or the overlap of my departure course with the approach course to Rwy 15 at WRB. I departed Rwy 14 as quickly as possible to best adhere to ATC instructions. During the initial climb at about 500 ft AGL; I felt the most powerful gusts of turbulence I ever had; and the plane was sent into a very steep right bank and downward pitch. I was able to identify the gusts as wake turbulence; and recover control of the plane. I turned away from the approach course of the cargo plane (which did not correspond to my assigned climb out instructions); then queried ATC for an alternative climb out heading; due to the wake turbulence encounter. My request was approved; but had it not been; I was ready to declare an emergency.The pilot factors that led to the incident include: flying to an unattended airport; performing a full stop and taxi instead of a touch and go; and not being aware of the overlap of my departure course with the approach course to the nearby airport. ATC was also a factor; as even if I had done a touch and go and turned to my assigned heading; I would have crossed the final approach course of the military cargo plane.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot reported a wake turbulence encounter with a military transport aircraft in the vicinity of MCN airport.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SPIM.Airport, FO
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I believe SPJC/LIM has a mismarked taxiway signage. It was still dark as we landed. We exited Rwy 15 at Delta taxiway and were given 'right turn onto foxtrot then foxtrot 1…'  I executed a hard right onto what I thought was taxiway F yet signage downrange said I was on F1. It wasn't until I was committed to F that we saw the F painted on the ground. [This was due to] confusion as to where taxiway F actually begins coupled with signage on taxiway F that states it F1. Yet [airport information] page distinctively shows correct taxiway. Signage displaying correct taxiway needs to display correct taxiway. Yellow pant with arrows would benefit others not familiar with LIM taxiways when exiting runway at D.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported the taxiway signage at Lima Peru does not agree with published airport information page.