elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201910
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: TCAS Software
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb out in night IMC through 10;000 ft. at 250 kts; ATC gave direct to RAYNR and mentioned precipitation ahead. While scaling out to about 40 miles and working radar and evaluating course change; got 'Traffic' followed instantly by 'maintain vertical speed' PFD had red pitch avoid areas. Within about 3 seconds command switched to descend with TCAS RA red boxes on PFD commanding a descent.  This command led me to believe TCAS was communicating and coordinating with another airplane. Seeing red I looked outside while also ranging down the scale I was on as I  had red target on our airplane apex. During climb/descent I use relative altitude setting and I was seeing 00 to +01.  Pilot Flying descended per RA which was a rapid descent below 10;000 ft. The RA would clear momentarily without 'clear of conflict' and came back on again with descend type command after a few seconds advised ATC that we had descended per an RA and asked about traffic. Said none. Stabilized at 7;000 ft. and advised and requested climb again. This was followed by the 3rd RA . With ATC saying no traffic I switched to TA only as it was seeming this was a false traffic target. Training leads you to follow your training and work with the TCAS system. In the back of my mind I did consider a random VFR aircraft could have been trying to get around weather near us; so I was trusting the TCAS system. Later during climb out switched to RT transponder and after level off checked maintenance history with Maintenance Control phone patch. I noticed during preflight RT transponder was active. I switched it to left per SOP as both were available.




Synopsis: B777 Captain reported a TCAS problem that resulted in numerous erroneous alerts.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GSP.TRACON, SC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C GSP
ATC / advisory: TRACON GSP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Relieved previous controller; and sat down to immediately begin making multiple transmissions.  Aircraft X had been turned on a downwind heading for the sequence behind another commercial air carrier prior to the previous controller being relieved. Upon sitting down; frequency congestion became an issue. The lead aircraft in the sequence had been cleared for the visual approach; and as I looked to point out the traffic for Aircraft X to follow; I noticed they were already in an obstruction MVA (2;800 ft) at 2;500 ft. Aircraft X's course was about 3 miles Northwest of the antenna. At no time was the jet pointed at the antenna; but did lose lateral separation from the antenna. Upon realizing that the Aircraft X was within the required lateral spacing for an obstruction; the aircraft saw the interval traffic; was told to follow the traffic; turned away from the obstruction; and was cleared for the visual approach.Controller preference in that area of the base turn is usually taught to descend aircraft to 3;000 ft; or 2;800 ft at the lowest due to that obstruction. Better controller judgment of using 2;800 ft; or 3;000 ft; especially during a controller relief while combined with more than one position.




Synopsis: GSP TRACON Controller reported an aircraft flew below an MVA.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: OSH.Airport, WI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D OSH
ATC / advisory: Tower OSH
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After a local flight southwest of Oshkosh; I called Oshkosh Tower and reported 'Fisk;' (VFR reporting point about 6.5 NM southwest of the field) inbound for pattern work. The pattern for [Runway] 9/27 was very busy so I requested [Runway] 18/36 for touch & goes - common practice in Oshkosh as the runways don't intersect and are in the shape of a capitol 'T.' Tower acknowledged and asked me to make right traffic for 18; remaining south of 9/27; and report 2 NM southwest. I acknowledged and proceeded to set up for a right base for 18. During this time I had a high workload watching for traffic on the busy 9/27 to my left (north) and keeping lateral separation from aircraft on final for 9 as I aligned on base for 18; while at the same time managing my own approach. About 3 NM away from the field on right base for 18; a King Air crossed in front of me at approximately my altitude; apparently on a right base for 9. I cannot accurately recall the lateral distance; but it was close enough for me to feel very uncomfortable. I would estimate 100-300 yards. There was no mention of the encounter or our positions by either of us (the planes involved) or the Controller.I can see two ways in which I may have erred: a) I was a little farther north than Tower might have expected to find me; as I was set up on more of a long base rather than a southwest approach to the airport. b) I did not look right anywhere near enough while on base. I was fixated on traffic in the pattern for 9/27 and my own approach; unaware that traffic was approaching from the south. The King Air was communicating with the Tower and I probably missed getting a good picture of where he was. Nevertheless; I feel the Controller should have called out the traffic to me and the King Air as we made our respective approaches. I will note that it was a single Controller working two runways during a particularly busy period; but the encounter was simply too close for there not to be a mention of it by ATC.




Synopsis: Pilot of a light single engine aircraft reported NMAC with a King Air in the Oshkosh pattern area. Reporter mentioned he would have appreciated a heads-up from ATC.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: P180 Avanti
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We departed and received a cabin pressure light illumination [climbing] through 12;000 FT. We put on our oxygen [masks] and requested lower immediately. We declared an emergency and squawked 7700 in order to get descent priority. Pilot flying took controls and radios I prepared the appropriate cabin pressure light checklist. As we descended to 10;000 the light extinguished and [we] continued to finish the cabin pressure checklist. The checklist led us to check the bleeds I realized they were not on and had not been on since we took off. I turned them on and the cabin pressurized normally in both auto and manual mode. Realizing my error (i.e. accidentally not turning the bleeds on allowing the cabin to pressurize) we received legal approval to continue after canceling our emergency and continued to our destination.




Synopsis: P180 Captain reported losing cabin pressure and then finding he had never turned the bleeds on.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MHLM.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower MHLM
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Cleared RNP 22 at MHLM. After landing Runway 22 and exiting at Taxiway B; Tower instructed us to taxi left (west) on Taxiway A; enter Runway 04 and backtrack down runway to Taxiway D. I advised Tower that we were entering runway at Taxiway A; whereupon tower instructed us to hold short of runway. I advised Tower that we had crossed the hold short line. Tower reiterated hold short instruction; 'For traffic.' CA (Captain) told the tower that an aircraft should not land on runway with us in our position. Tower said that aircraft was only doing a touch and go. After CA protested again; saying that it was unsafe for an aircraft to land on the runway; Tower said that aircraft would turn at the SAP VOR; which is on the approach (east) end of Runway 22. The aircraft; a yellow light twin engine; callsign Aircraft Y; completed its approach and made a low pass; flying the full length of the runway at 50 ft.; and passed in front of our nose. Tower then cleared us to backtrack on runway to Taxiway D. Remainder of flight without incident.Language; use of non-standard phraseology by ATC; lack of safety awareness (Tower).The tower seemed to think it was ok for an aircraft to land with another aircraft over the hold-short line.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported ATC violation of allowing aircraft to overfly them by 50 ft.
Date: 202107
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Headset
Component problem: Design
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Since we have taken delivery of more 737 Max aircraft; I have noticed that aircraft are coming with the aircraft headset attached to the sidewall of the aircraft.  The method this is accomplished; wires the headset wires into position near the headset jacks in such a manner that they cannot be removed.  The problem starts when pilots open the window; to talk with ground crew; ventilation; wing inspection; etc.  At this point; the wire becomes tangled; and stuck in the window mechanism.  The result is that the window is not completely closed; or that the headset cord is damaged; requiring replacement.  In addition to the costly factors above; if a crew were required to egress through the window; its possible the additional tanglements from the wire might prevent the window from opening completely.In the past month; I have personally observed two maintenance write-ups where damage occurred to the headset wire. One was on the FO (First Officer) side; one on the Captains side.  An additional write up involved a return to field; because the window wasn't properly closed despite the window handle being over center.There is no requirement to wire into position the headset (most of which are unused by pilots anyway).  Many other airlines fleet do not have the headset wired into position in this manner.




Synopsis: B737 MAX First Officer reported design of the crew headset wiring results in the wire getting tangled and stuck in window mechanism.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: 6N5.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Sikorsky Helicopter Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: UNICOM 6N5
Second aircraft: Seaplane or Amphibian
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While holding in the prescribed pattern over the East River exclusion in NYC; we joined two other helicopters who were also in the hold. The pattern is 1;000 feet AGL left hand turns from the 59th St Bridge to the Williamsburg Bridge along the banks of Manhattan; Brooklyn and Queens. A seaplane was departing the river to the north; and another seaplane was in a downwind on the Brooklyn side; southbound; opposite the helicopter holding pattern. On our second circuit; turning south from the 59th St Bridge a seaplane reported north of the bridge. We had visual contact before completing our turn; and then we lost visual contact. About midway on the south leg of our hold we were cleared to land. As I started my left descending turn the seaplane that was behind and above me was now fully in the left cockpit window and slightly lower. I jerked up on the collective to stop our descent because I thought we would collide. We had no TCAD warnings; and heard no reports from the seaplane of their intentions other than the initial report. We have made inquiries with the heliport manager; LGA Tower; and the Eastern Region Helicopter Council (ERHC) as to the procedures that the seaplanes use. Why the seaplane chose to fly below holding traffic and attempt to pass us from a blind spot without any communication is an unknown.




Synopsis: Helicopter pilot experiences a NMAC with a seaplane over the East River exclusion in NYC while turning to land at the East 34th Street Heliport.
Date: 201906
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: There was Hazmat planned for this flight; I received it plane side. I received a total of 3 foreman carts from cargo two of the carts had items that were labeled with Hazmat stickers. The other cart items were 4 boxes that were not labeled as Hazmat and were on a pallet with plastic securely wrapped around the boxes. It gave no indication that it was Hazmat.The other items that were labeled were loaded and surrounded with 19 bags. The non-labeled freight was loaded in pit 6 by itself. When I went to close the flight out; it wouldn't let me. This was because the system was indicating that that piece was also Hazmat; I called [Load Planning] and they told me that I also had Hazmat in pit 6 and it needed to be surrounded by 15 bags minimum. Unfortunately the aircraft had been dispatched and we had to bring it back to the gate to rectify the situation.




Synopsis: Ramp Agent reported Hazmat cargo errors with configuration and labeling after the  aircraft was dispatched.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Caravan Undifferentiated
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [Ops Vehicle] called with electricians to enter runway XX about 15 minutes prior to the event. When Aircraft X called for taxi I was in the tower alone. I had the strip up that [Ops Vehicle] was on the runway but did not see it. I taxied Aircraft X for an intersection departure on runway XY (reciprocal runway) and cleared them for takeoff. Ground control NIDS monitor and STARS keyboard were blocking my view of [Ops Vehicle]. I saw [Ops Vehicle] just as Aircraft X was rotating and ASDE (Airport Surface Detection Equipment) said something but did not hear what it said. [Aircraft X] did climb well and was offset to the right of [Ops Vehicle] it appeared. I really don't believe any changes need to be made. I did use the visual aid. It was slow and it is an experience that I will never forget. I spoke to Ops on the phone and he said he heard me assign runway XY but it didn't register until he saw the plane.




Synopsis: Tower Controller reported inadvertently clearing an aircraft for takeoff while an airport operations vehicle was on the runway.
Date: 201202
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground CLT
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Other Unwanted situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: This report is meant to advise the Charlotte Airport that Taxiway 'M' at the approach end of Runway 23 is badly in need of repair. General aviation aircraft departing on Runway 18L are routed to the approach end of Runway 23 and after crossing Runway 23 must use that portion of Taxiway 'M' to reach Taxiway 'D' and the departure end of Runway 18L. Taxiway 'M' from the approach end of Runway 23 up to the intersection of Taxiway 'D' is cracked and separated resulting in increased tire wear on all aircraft using that portion of the taxiway. Since aircraft are no longer allowed to use 'D' taxiway all the way to the departure end of Runway 18L; the increased traffic and use of Taxiway 'M' has resulted in significant deterioration of that portion of the taxiway.




Synopsis: A G-550 Captain reported excessively deteriorated pavement on Taxiway M at the approach end of Runway 23 in CLT.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Control Valves
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cleared to line up and wait; [then] cleared for takeoff. I transferred controls to the FO (First Officer); and we began our takeoff roll. At approx. 70 kts the yellow caution light [illuminated] and we had an EICAS message 'HS VALVE 2 FAIL'. We both called REJECT. I took control of the aircraft and brought it to a stop. We exited the runway and assessed the situation. We proceeded to the west hard stand; contacted Maintenance; and were instructed to return to the gate and deplane; that the aircraft was unairworthy. We returned to the gate without further incident.


Second narrative: I was the pilot flying and the CA (Captain) was the pilot monitoring [and on takeoff roll] a High Stage Valve Failure was indicated by the EICAS at approximately 65KIAS. The appropriate actions were taken from the CA immediately after discovery of the message. The takeoff was rejected; the CA brought the thrust levers to idle and began taking the actions to bring the aircraft to a safe speed to exit the runway to the first available taxiway. I called Tower to notify them that we were a rejected  [takeoff] aircraft.


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported rejecting the takeoff after receiving the EICAS alert High Stage Valve Failure.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: PA-18/19 Super Cub
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was holding short of Runway XX at Taxiway XX at ZZZ preparing to take off; a PA18 made one radio call that they were entering a right base for Runway XX when left traffic is standard. I continued to hold short of the runway. Aircraft landed prior to the displaced threshold and runway; taxied to the runway entryway [Taxiway] XX and stopped nose to nose with my aircraft. Pilot made a motion with his hands that he wanted me to move out of his way so he could taxi past.




Synopsis: PA28 Pilot reported holding short of runway when another aircraft landed before the displaced threshold and taxied directly nose to nose and motioned for reporter to get out of the way.