elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared via the MONAA RNAV STAR to MEM. We entered the crossing restriction altitudes as hard altitudes but failed to plan properly for the descent speeds and were unable to comply with 250 KTS at MONAA or 210 KTS at ZAMET. I had not done this arrival before and failed to plan altitude and airspeed restrictions properly. As we began the descent from FL240 past ZOKER I realized my error and we notified ATC that we would not be able to make the airspeed restrictions. Shortly after MONAA they cleared us pilot's discretion to 4;000 FT effectively taking us off the STAR and allowing us to catch up.This is very frustrating because I know how to plan a descent but these new stars seem to me to be overly complicated. I had no trouble until this one. I will be very alert to the fact that mistakes are easily possible during these arrivals and will plan accordingly.




Synopsis: An air carrier flight crew erred in their descent calculations and were unable to comply with the crossing speed restrictions on the MONAA RNAV STAR to MEM.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On ferry flight prep the fuel panel was improperly set to tank to engine with the uncommonly low fuel load. Override pumps were never turned on to allow for 'tank to engine' EICAS prompt and cross feed valves were improperly left open. This resulted in a 'fuel qty low' EICAS warning at top of descent due to low fuel in main tanks 1 and 4. Total fuel quantity was plentiful with but we declared min fuel out of an abundance of caution. Landed uneventfully with 1.5 hours of fuel.


Second narrative: During descent on the first ferry leg of a charter day; we received a low fuel warning for the number one tank. Upon observing that the fuel in number one was less than 1;500 pounds; and even though all crossfeeds were open and there was plenty of fuel in the center tanks; we declared minimum fuel as a safety precaution. The landing was executed without further incident. Upon further discussion after landing; we determined that because of the non-standard fuel load different than we are used to on the long haul flights; the fuel system logic was improperly set to manage our fuel.


Synopsis: The B747 flight crew declared 'minimum fuel' when they received a 'fuel quantity low' EICAS warning. There was more than enough fuel on board; but the fuel panel had been set incorrectly.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Strobe Light
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As previously reported; the strobes on these aircraft are positioned such that they flash brightly into the cockpit; causing pilot vertigo. As such; the pilot is forced to turn off the strobes for the entire flight to avoid vertigo; thereby creating more of a potential collision risk due to the strobes being turned off. Go fly one of these things at night with the strobes on.




Synopsis: An A320 pilot reported the sharklet equipped aircraft strobe lights are positioned such that in flight at night and in clouds they are blinding in the cockpit and cause vertigo. The reporter turned the strobes off.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: P80.TRACON, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 150
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was conducting a Private Pilot check ride. I pulled the power on the applicant and let us get low enough before I asked for a go around that apparently either a local resident filed a complaint with Approach or Approach got a low-altitude alert based on our ADS-B. I continued the descent lower than normal as the applicant was having a difficult time setting up for his landing. By the time I asked for a go-around we apparently either set of an alarm or alarmed someone on the ground. I did not note the altitude as I was focused on the applicant's effort to get into a good position to land.I will; in the future; break off the maneuver at least 5600 ft. AGL unless we are orbiting; or approaching; an airfield.




Synopsis: C150 flight instructor reported triggering a low altitude alert during a simulated engine failure maneuver.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Electrical Distribution
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Logbook Entry
Primary problem: Logbook Entry

Narrative: The station received an e-mail to correct the logbook of Aircraft X. Contract maintenance; NAME; (NUMBER); at ZZZ replaced the SPCU on DATE. He failed to enter the item in the logbook. Upon further investigation; I found NAME unqualified on Company planes and logbook in Software.DATE; TIMEUpon clarification from tech; the SPCU was documented in the logbook. However; the galley battery meter module was not documented in the logbook. We're confirming the part number and performing ops check for the module.




Synopsis: Technician reported that a records check discovered an unqualified technician had performed maintenance tasks on an aircraft and did not make the required log book entries.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were flying on the ILS Runway XXR into ZZZ. We were between waypoints ZZZZZ and ZZZZ1. I was completing the Before Landing Checklist when ATC alerted us to our altitude being 500 ft. below the FAF altitude of 2500 ft. I advised ATC that we were recovering to 2500 ft. and we climbed back to 2500 ft. There was no negative impact on the flight. I suggest a more vigilant situational awareness and adherence to SOP calls.


Second narrative: While conducting an ILS approach to Runway XXR at ZZZ; a brief loss of situational awareness occurred and the aircraft descended below the intercept altitude of 2500. It is imperative that the crew must be vigilant at critical times of the flight. The Flying Pilot must have a clear understanding of all ATC instructions.


Synopsis: Air taxi flight crew reported descending below glide slope intercept altitude due to loss of situational awareness.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: TRACON MIA
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On visual approach to Runway 9; 15 flaps were lowered below the flaps 15 limit speed and confirmed in cockpit between pilots. Near that time; the aircraft hit turbulence or the wake of the preceding B777. During extension or shortly thereafter; the aircraft speed jumped up then returned to normal deceleration of speed. This momentary speed increase lasted only a few seconds. Because the speed increase happened so fast; neither of us were certain if the flaps limitation was exceeded. After landing; we pulled up a flap report and printout showed 203 KTS for flaps 15. Flap overspeed was entered in logbook; Maintenance deferred inspection to next 100 hour check.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported encountering possible wake turbulence in trail of a B777 on approach to MIA that resulted in a flap overspeed.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Deadhead to pick up flight. Upon arrival; am informed that the last Crew assigned the aircraft refused to fly it. I told Ops 'I'd take a look' to see if it was dispatchable. Upon inspection of the logbook; I noticed that the FMS was non-operable and to put some icing on the cake; the pressurization system had failed also and was being run in manual mode. I then refused the aircraft also. Now; in all honesty; if I had to fly around Texas on a bright sunny day such that it was; this aircraft would have been workable (Notice I didn't say 'Fine'). But to go to a busy airport in the country with an aircraft that can't do LNAV or VNAV and doing it single Pilot-like because if you haven't run a pressure controller in manual; you'd quickly realize that your basically single-Piloted because it takes that much attention from the FO running that system alone. So; I utilized my judgement built on years of flying and opted not to take it.




Synopsis: Captain refused aircraft due to multiple maintenance issues.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climbout passing about FL 180 we received an aural warning and a boxed 'Cargo Fire Lower'. It lasted about two cycles and stopped. We did not see a flashing discharge switch when we looked up as the warning was gone.  This repeated about three additional times with the same result. By the time we would look up the discharge switch was no longer flashing.  We declared an emergency and [began a return to the departure airport] for a visual approach. No smoke or other indications of a fire noted. The aural warnings ceased once we began our [return]. Fire crews saw nothing obvious on the aircraft after landing. Fire trucks escorted us back to the gate and inspected the bellies and found no signs of a fire. We released the aircraft back to Maintenance.




Synopsis: A DC-10 CARGO FIRE LOWER alerted three times with the TRI tone but no flashing discharge switch so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport but no sign of fire was seen.
Date: 202110
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The abuse of the emergency radio frequency; 121.5; colloquially know as 'guard;' is getting out of hand. As professional pilots; we strive to monitor guard on our #2 radio in case we miss a frequency change on our #1 radio; or to be able to assist in case of an aircraft is in distress.  Occasionally someone will acknowledge a radio call; make a position report; or make a PA to passengers with their transmit button accidentally on the wrong radio.  The person normally recognizes the mistake quickly and sets the transmit to the correct radio.  But then comes the frequency abuse as people chime in with remarks; animal sounds; bodily function sounds and any number of various sounds from their smart phones; all on the emergency frequency.  The situation is getting worse everyday.  It is to the point where those of us who have a modicum of radio discipline are turning off our guard receivers to keep from getting distracted by the clown act that is playing out on the emergency frequency.  The emergency frequency is quickly becoming unusable as an tool in the event of an emergency. I have X years of experience as an active duty/reserve military aviator.  I have X+3 years of experience as a commercial airline pilot.  I have many times busted military flight students for lack of radio discipline.  As a first officer; I have never flown with a captain who abused the emergency frequency. As a captain; I have not flown with a first officer who abused the emergency frequency.  I believe this is a maturity problem that is being caused by a newer generation of aviators who feel at home abusing the emergency frequency while remaining anonymous.  This is way out of hand and needs to be addressed by the FAA. The problem is not going to go away until emphasis from up high comes down to primary flight schools; corporate training facilities and airline training departments. Somebody needs to step in and stop the madness.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported that guard frequency is frequently being used to transmit non-aviation related chatter and sounds; resulting in the frequency becoming unusable as a tool in the event of an emergency.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: Tower PHL
Aircraft component: Approach Coupler
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On the ILS V 9R Approach in PHL; we were cleared for the approach at 2;000 until established; 170 knots to KELEE. Inside ASOCI we descended to 1;800 to capture the GS. Aircraft was configured for landing at the FAF. As checklist was being completed; the First Officer (FO) indicated an anomaly with the approach; that something was wrong. The GS indicator was not showing and the plane was descending. The autopilot was disconnected and I called for and initiated a go-around; taking control of aircraft. As the go-around commenced; ATC advised of a low altitude alert. The go-around was executed and completed as ATC issued a clearance to climb to 3;000 feet and vectors to the southwest.  ATC then asked if we wanted to try the ILS V Runway 17 due to the more favorable winds for that runway and the possible glideslope issue on 9R. We accepted vectors for the ILS V Runway 17 and flew a standard approach to a landing; with all aircraft autoflight systems operating normally.  The FO resumed control of the aircraft after the go around was completed and flew the subsequent approach to landing. Flight crew awareness that aircraft was descending on a path outside the normal glideslope path for the approach. Not certain why event occurred. It appears the autopilot descended the aircraft on a path other than the intended glideslope for the approach. Possible glideslope failure. Not sure what anomaly occurred; but it appeared to be a one-time event as the aircraft systems operated normally for the subsequent approach.  Crew situational awareness and CRM contributed to successfully recognizing the unintended flight path and discontinuing the approach; executing a go around.




Synopsis: A Turboprop Captain reports getting below the glideslope during a night visual approach to PHL with the First Officer flying. The First Officer indicates that something is amiss with the approach and the Captain takes control and executes a go-around at the same time the Tower issues a low altitude alert.