elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working on lubing the MLG and nose landing gears. Started on the nose then I couldn't reach the 2 top grease fittings so I looked for a nearby small ladder. The other mechanics were using them so I waited until a ladder was available. After that I grabbed a small ladder and started lubing the two top fittings in the nose wheel. I finished my job and got a lead to double check my work. I then replaced 3 grounding wires. I changed a MLG one and two NLG wires. As I was changing the grounding wires I noticed a fitting that I thought could have used more grease so I greased it up further. As I was doing that the lead tapped me on my leg and I came down and he gave me some corrosion inhibiting sealant that I needed for the MLG grounding wire. Then another mechanic needed my help and I helped him out. After that I finished the two front bonding wires in the nose. I went and double checked everything after I was done with a flashlight to see if I left any rags or anything up in the wells and didn't see anything. And I thought I put the grease gun back in the kit there was 3 total. Between that and getting distracted the grease gun could have got left up in the nose landing gear door. I don't know if the tool room has responsibility to check the kit to make sure that all 3 guns have been returned but if this was the procedure it could possibly avoid any future mistakes or human error. I always try to double check my work and I know the seriousness of this mistake.




Synopsis: Air carrier Maintenance Technician reported that he may have left a grease gun in the nose landing gear door.
Date: 201206
Location: ZZZZ.TRACON, FO
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While in the descent for landing a 'LE ASSYM' message appeared on the EICAS prior to flap extension. We started the QRH procedure; notified Approach Control of the problem and declared an emergency due to a flight control malfunction. We requested a turn off the final approach course to complete the the checklist and configure for landing. When we were configured; we intercepted the approach course and made a normal landing with 20 flaps. Due to the higher speed we rolled out to the end of the landing runway. ARFF followed us to the gate where the passengers deplaned normally.




Synopsis: The flight crew of a B767-300ER abandoned their approach due to a LE ASSYM EICAS alert.  They declared an emergency; completed appropriate checklists and landed uneventfully with 20 degrees of flap.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On a reposition flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 at level off the Lav Smoke warning went off while we leveled at 6;000 feet for the really short flight to ZZZ1. Captain walked back to the lav to observe a light blue haze in the lav and the last three seat rows. There was also an electrical burning smell. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying; we switched; he was fairly new and did a great job. I then instructed him to do the Lav smoke QRH; while I advised ATC and took the radios. He pulled the respective circuit breakers and completed the checklist and then got ATIS; Landing Data; and set us up for a runway change while I flew the plane direct to ZZZ1 after advising ATC. We landed and ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) got on but no smoke was observed. I attempted to call Maintenance Control and got a message that all controllers were busy and to 'Call Back Later'. We walked into the Maintenance hanger and the awesome ZZZ1 maintenance team told me they would take care of it. Unseen threat of Lav Smoke. A few navigational errors were made and trapped. It gets really busy and when you smell electrical smoke your adrenaline starts to kick in and muscle memory takes over. I'm actually surprised that we got all the checklists ran. We did a great job dividing and concurring.Not much I can do; but my question to management is what is the company doing to be proactive and predictive with some of our own airplanes? Do we have the staffing to do the best job and is our SMS system doing its thing? I'm starting to get really scared out here flying the line. There's only so much we can control; but it feels as if we are all about spin and less about running an effective risk based airline. I might be back; I take the same aircraft to ZZZ2 and back today! I just hope Maintenance Control picks up when I call.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported smoke in the lavatory during flight that resulted in a diversion.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BFL.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: TRACON BFL
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: VMC day departure from BFL; assigned a turn to a heading of 180 and climb to 6000 feet with the takeoff clearance off 30 R. Quickly after takeoff we were handed off the BFL departure who verified the heading and altitude assigned by BFL tower. 5 miles south of the airport; climbing out of roughly 2200 feet and 200 knots; I; pilot flying; spotted a small single engine aircraft crossing from left to right (east to west); roughly 1 mile in front of us; and about 700 feet above our current altitude. I quickly made an aggressive and evasive action to stop the roughly 3500 feet per minute climb and descend to an altitude (around 2000 feet) to miss the small aircraft by around 400 feet vertically and 100 feet horizontally. The first officer; non flying pilot; reported the near miss to ATC who responded with; 'traffic 1-3 o'clock; 2400 feet'. The first officer reported him in sight as the near miss and the controller handed us off to Los Angeles center. We continued with the flight to Houston with no further events. My first officer and I agreed that had the evasive action not been taken a mid-air collision would have occurred.We never received an alert of any kind on the TCAS until after we passed the aircraft when we received only a visual advisory on our map on the MFD.I am unsure of anything the flight crew could have done anything differently or any training that could be done to prevent this type of event. Depending on the facilities available to the departure controller and the equipment of the other aircraft; it is possible that the air traffic controller may require additional training to avoid such events. However; without knowing what information is available to him I cannot suggest that he was at fault. Finally; I do not believe the other aircraft was ever in communication with BFL. Had he/she been in communication I believe this event would have been avoided.




Synopsis: On climbout from BFL; an air carrier took evasive action from a near miss at 2;200 feet which ATC did not report until after the event.
Date: 201807
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On approach to ORD 9L outside DOOGY at 4000 feet. Missed approach altitude for the 9L ILS is also 4000 feet. Intercepted the glide slope and started down; at 3700 feet; got the altitude alert but continued. The rest of the approach was uneventful. Purposely flying through an altitude alert away from a set altitude is bad SOP. I have filed multiple [reports] concerning this particular anomaly using the new SOP. As I said in my previous [reports] concerning this SOP; I believe this is a flawed SOP. We should not be flying through or away from altitude alerts.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported continuing to fly through an altitude alert per new SOP.
Date: 202003
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During the boarding process we discovered that the Customer Service Bag containing gloves; masks and sanitary wipes was not boarded. Other gloves were not boarded elsewhere. We reported the item missing to the Captain who requested it; but approximately 6 minutes before door closing we were told that; per the inflight Supervisor on duty at the time we would have to go without these vitally important PPEs. We indicated that per the Captain; the door would not be closing until the items were received. After several more minutes; the bag arrived and after all was said and done; departed on time.I am writing this report to bring this to the attention to all involved in the decision making process. This policy must be reviewed. Crews simply cannot be asked to depart without the essential PPE for a flight. Granted gloves can be found elsewhere in first aid kits; etc.; but not enough for an entire crew for an entire flight. Given the extreme danger of COVID contamination; gloves must be changed frequently between delivery and pick up services.




Synopsis: Flight crew member reported the bag containing protective gear for COVID-19 was not boarded on the aircraft; and that the on duty in-flight Supervisor directed the crew to depart without the bag.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Aircraft: Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: While using the iPad to look up answers during our Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) oral it became obvious that it has a serious shortcoming. The iPad has no compete table of contents that can be looked at once like a paper manual. If you were to look at a paper manual table of contents you would at a glance see the subject you are looking for. With an iPad you tap on the subject and then get a tab behind a tab etc. i.e. FOM - Policy>Flight>Standard Callouts. If you click on the wrong tab to find something you have to back out of 'the rabbit hole' and look elsewhere. It's very hard to find things. The Performance Manual has no index or tab to find specific airport performance and turn procedures. The only way to get to an airport is to scroll along to find it. Very hard to do in flight. The search function is almost useless. For example: type EAT in the Performance Manual to find Wenatchee and it will find many answers like great Falls etc.A simple complete table of contents and tabs for each airport in the Performance Manual will solve this problem.




Synopsis: A Captain; preparing for an Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) oral; reports on the many shortcomings of the IPad as a replacement for traditional aircraft flight manuals.
Date: 201907
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working Gate X flight XXXX to ZZZ. I was guiding the jetbridge away from the aircraft directing the tires to the yellow marker the tires begins to spin too fast. The customer service agent drove the bridge back towards the aircraft the plane turned and hits another ramp servicemen in the shoulder and head.




Synopsis: Ramp Agent reported that a CSR collided with an aircraft while operating the jet bridge; resulting in an injury to another ramp agent.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Doors were armed; the flight crew just completed safety demo; waiting to push back. Ground/CSA supervisor tried to open the forward entry door with NO warning. The 'A' FA was telling her to STOP and the sup continued to try to open the door from the outside. The 'A' disarmed the door and the 'C' contacted the flight deck to let the pilots know what was going on. The supervisor said she wanted to let more passengers come on board and that was her reason for trying to opening the door. The 'A' asked her if she was a new employee and she said no; and that she was NOT trained on operating the aircraft doors and did not understand that she was putting herself; crew members; or passengers at risk. This is a huge safety concern. The slide could have inflated.All ground personnel need to be trained on communicating effectively with the flight deck and training should be required for operating the aircraft door.




Synopsis: B737-700 Flight Attendant reported a Customer Service Agent attempted to open the main cabin door after the slide had been armed for departure. The Flight Attendant was able to disarm the slide before the door was opened.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I was giving training at R-41. Sector 40 was open. We were working approximately 4 OAK arrivals that were descending via the WINDSR (OPD) arrival. I was looking up the arrival chart to discuss published speeds; phraseology options and techniques for assigning speeds. As I was discussing this with the developmental; Aircraft X reported that they were responding to an RA. We then saw the VFR traffic and acknowledged the RA and issued the traffic advisory. The developmental advised the conflict alert had previously gone off but he evaluated and suppressed it. At the time the 1200 code was at approximately 7;000 feet and the Aircraft X was descending from 21000 feet on the WNDSR arrival. When Aircraft X responded to the RA their altitude was approximately 16;000 feet and the VFR target was approximately 15;000 feet descending.TCAS RA's happen daily at sectors 40/41. There is a high volume of VFR sightseeing traffic; VFR flight training; skydiving aircraft; and many uncontrolled airports. I had an RA last year because I was busy issuing traffic advisories to a VFR aircraft in conflict with an OAK arrival. During this time a 1200 code departed DVO and climbed into a jet at 5000 feet between SGD and STS. My recommendation at that time was to create an Alert Area for the Sonoma valley. Alert Areas are clearly depicted on sectional charts and as a pilot and flight instructor I would definitely avoid flying through one; especially if I was not talking to ATC. The 1200 code in this event was a [business jet]. I would assume a business jet pilot would also avoid flying through an Alert Area VFR without at least getting flight following. If we could remove a fraction of VFR traffic from that area it would increase safety. At the very least it would encourage VFR traffic to call for flight following.My recommendation remains the same. To help prevent safety issues like this from reoccurring create an Alert Area over Sonoma Valley. An area that encompasses the airspace south from STS to CA35; west to PYE; and east to APC.




Synopsis: ZOA Controller reported an air carrier on arrival responded to an RA of a VFR target not in communication with ATC. The Center Controller did not notice that the VFR target was a factor for the arrival.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Our plane [is a] C172 with G1000 and TIS. [An] experimental called position [inbound to the same airport]. We responded with our position. He said we will probably beat him in as he had 80 for ground speed; 29 KT wind. We began our descent to 1;100. TIS reported a target moving from east to west in front of the [experimental]. We let [him] know of the target. He said he was looking 'no joy.' TIS showed a conflict with our path. C172 pilot and passenger [were] visually looking for target; but it was pretty hazy. TIS shows no plane is moving behind or ahead on intersecting path. We decide to Vy climb at full power. [We were] still looking and still no visual contact. I was taught that the best thing to do is climb in potential conflict as the plane becomes much more visible by showing more surface area.TIS showed a -40 and target passing directly underneath. TIS changed Target to yellow and audible 'traffic' alarms trigger. At this point I noticed [I was] in Vy climb at 2;500 FT [and in Class B]. [I] began immediate descent back under the 2;000 FT [Class B] shelf and set up for entering the traffic pattern. The [applicable] FAR here is 'A pilot may deviate from the FARs as much as necessary to maintain the safety of his plane and crew.' [I] made call [at] 2 miles for mid 45 upwind for 15. Turn on the ADSB to report all the time not just when a sender lights it up.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported an NMAC with an experimental aircraft at a non-towered airport and during evasive action he entered Class B airspace.