Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; MEL; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff roll as power increased to takeoff thrust; we received a L ENG HPSOV (High Pressure Shutoff Valve) EICAS annunciation. This was accompanied by the left BLEED light on the overhead bleed air panel. I was pilot monitoring and I announced the EICAS message. The Captain verbalized the EICAS; analyzed the situation and made the decision to reject takeoff. We had reached approximately 40 knots When the EICAS came on; and the reject was initiated at 60 knots; we reached a maximum speed of 70 knots before decelerating. We performed the rejected takeoff per the flight manual and taxied clear. We did not evacuate. The EICAS L ENG HPSOV light went out when power was reduced; so we elected to review that procedure in the QRH; but did not reconfigure the bleed panel. We contacted Dispatch and [Technical Support Maintenance Control] via SATCOM and we were told we would need to return to the gate to allow Maintenance to work on the left engine HPSOV. This engine had recently been changed and this was the first flight after installation. It was an ETOPS verification flight. We had also been dispatched with a R RECIRC FAN inoperative (MEL 21-XX).After Maintenance looked at the engine; Dispatch and [Technical Support Maintenance Control] concurrently recommended operating under MEL 36-XX in addition to the previous MELs. The L ENG HPSOV was locked closed per the MEL and we were re-dispatched. We asked several questions about operating with concurrent MELs. [Technical Support Maintenance Control] informed us that operation with the right recirculating fan inoperative and the right pack in high flow was acceptable. They also informed us that the ETOPS verification under the new MEL was also acceptable as the ETOPS verification was only verifying displayed engine parameters such as EPR; N1; N2; fuel flow; and EGT. With all of the MEL requirements complied with; we pushed back approximately 3 hours late and departed normally; per SOP.


Second narrative: I was the PF (Pilot Flying). On takeoff roll; L ENG HPSOV (High Pressure Shutoff Valve) EICAS and Left BLEED light came on. FO (First Officer) called it out at about 40 knots I repeated it back to him and said 'rejecting' and rejected the takeoff; according to the procedure. The max speed reached was approximately 70 knots We cleared the runway and asked ATC for a good spot to stop and analyze. We then ran the Rejected Takeoff QRC (Quick Reference Checklist)/QRH checklist. The FO determined the time needed before another takeoff as per the Brake Cooling Table. I then spoke with the Purser; made a PA to the passengers and then called Dispatch with a patch through to [Technical Support Maintenance Control] to determine our course of action. We were advised to return to a gate so that maintenance may check the L ENG HPSOV and possibly defer it. The FO and I worked together to accomplish all checklists and communications. We taxied to Gate XXXX. The Left Engine HPSOV was deferred as per MEL 36-XX. Our flight plan indicated that our flight was an ETPOS Verification Flight and that the left engine primary instruments had to be verified as operating normally before entering ETOPS. We checked with maintenance that the left engine bleed system was not part of this certification. In addition; the right recirculation fan was deferred as per MEL 21-XX. Maintenance confirmed that these two deferrals were acceptable together. We departed the gate 3 hours late and completed the ETOPS verification as requested.


Synopsis: B767 Flight Crew reported an engine high pressure shutoff valve alert on takeoff; resulting in a rejected takeoff and return to gate.