elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Just prior to pushback on our flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1 (within five minutes or so of scheduled departure time); we received an ACARS message that Dispatch was aware of HAZMAT on board--with Zulu time and initials. This confused me because: 1) I had not seen Dispatch do this before for HAZMAT; and 2) at the time; we had seen no HAZMAT paperwork. I turned around to query the Ops Agent; and just then; she handed me the NOTAC with a single line item regarding [radioactive] HAZMAT material and told me that she had just received it. I read the paperwork; signed both copies; and indicated that I had done so in a replay message to Dispatch. We then departed. After that leg was over; now flying from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2; I found my copy of the NOTAC--and was about to throw it away--when I started to think that I may have missed something. Sure enough; on further review; the first step for this type of NOTAC; as directed at [Section] of the FOM; requires the Captain to ensure that the Dispatch Release has been amended (if needed) to include a note regarding the presence of HAZMAT cargo. Our Dispatch Release did not have any such remark. Presumably; the Zulu time and the Dispatcher's initials should be included in the note that I should have added as a pen-and-ink change.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported receiving NOTAC and a handwritten amendment to the Release just prior to departure. The handwritten release amendment was not in accordance with company policy.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HIO.Tower, OR
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D HIO
ATC / advisory: Tower HIO
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Staffing; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Local Control. The airport was in an unusual flow with Runway 13R/31L closed to aircraft less than 12;500 lbs with a strong wind from the East. As such; the airport was on a Runway 13L flow. This flow requires additional coordination with Ground Control (GC) as TWY D is the only taxi to/from Runway 13L; a coyote was wandering on and in the vicinity of Runway 13L; and when an aircraft weighing more than 12;500lbs wanted to depart; we had to coordinate with the airport operator and LC had to coordinate with GC for use of the Runway 13R/31L.Aircraft X called inbound from the North and requested to land. I gave instructions to the pilot numerous times but the pilot was unfamiliar; did not have the airport or traffic to follow in-sight and kept reading back and not complying with instructions. I finally was able to communicate to Aircraft X to enter a left downwind for Runway 13L. Shortly after; I cleared Aircraft Y for take-off from Runway 13R. As Aircraft Y was passing the departure end of the Runway; I observed Aircraft X on what appeared to be a right crosswind from Runway 13L (as no small aircraft could have departed from Runway 13R). I asked on frequency who was 'on the right crosswind' and Aircraft X reported crossing the extended center line of the Runway and entering a right downwind. It appeared Aircraft Y passed behind Aircraft X at the same altitude and just a few hundred feet. No NMAC reported by the pilots.Contributing to the situation was poor radar coverage; short staffing; poor planning on the airport operating behalf for closing Runway 13R/31L for 'sweeping'. My poor scan and being distracted by other factors.




Synopsis: HIO Tower Controller reported an airborne conflict when an arrival did not comply with instructions and came into conflict with a departure.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: 33V.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZDV
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We had planned on doing a touch and go at 33V on Runway 22. After we had touched down we raised the flaps and began to add power. While we were rolling at about 65 mph; a pickup truck with a snow plow on the front of it pulled out onto the runway; and started coming down Runway 4 head at us. I didn't believe we had enough room to stop; so I kept the throttle in for full power and tried to get airborne so we could side step the runway. The airplane was not able to break ground effect due to the high density altitude. The vehicle drove off the side of the runway and we were able to continue down the runway for takeoff. We had made standard radio calls on the CTAF frequency.




Synopsis: GA instructor pilot reported that as they started the takeoff roll a truck began driving toward them from the opposite end of the runway. Pilot elected to continue takeoff and truck drove off the runway; allowing plane to continue.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Ramp Lead for [the] flight called me after the flight had pushed out because the system wouldn't allow him to finalize. I then noticed he had Hazmat in Pit 4 but had only scanned 10 bags. The Ramp Lead then stated on a recorded call aircraft batteries are not Hazmat. I then informed him that they in fact are. He proceeded to tell me he would fix the problem and hung up the phone. I think [he] noticed that the bag count in Pit 4 suddenly changed from 10 to 15; but the scanned count which is recorded on the remarks line remained at 10. Once the Ramp Lead changed the bag count in the weight field to 15; the system allowed him to finalize. I then proceeded to inform both my Lead and Shift Manager that I believed the Ramp Lead had just falsified the [load report] because it shows he only scanned 10 bags into the pit.We asked ZZZ to audit the flight on arrival; and as it turns out there were not 15 bags in Pit 4 with the dangerous goods; and as a result of the Ramp Lead manually changing the numbers he then deleted 20 bags out of the forward pit. Once the plane arrived in ZZZ the ramp at ZZZ reported both the forward and aft cargo compartments baggage numbers were wrong. There were 20 bags missing from the [load report] that were actually in the forward compartment; and in the aft compartment there was only 10 bags.




Synopsis: Air carrier load planner reported they believed Ramp Lead falsified loading document. Destination unload audit confirmed incorrect bag count; and Hazmat incorrectly configured for air shipment.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: RHP.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; Cloudy; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Second aircraft: Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While level at 7;300 feet in cruise; I was the pilot not flying and was heads down programming the approach to Runway 8 at RHP. The pilot flying in the left seat was monitoring the aircraft [while also monitoring for traffic.] We were level at the lowest altitude that ATC could allow due to terrain in the area and we were flying in and out of the tops of a cumulus layer. Out of the corner of my eye I saw what I thought was a shadow flash by the copilot's (my) side window. I commented to the pilot flying that I thought I saw a shadow and he stated it was an aircraft. The pilot flying stated the aircraft was close enough for him to tell it was white with brown wing tips and appeared to be a Piper Cherokee and it appeared the aircraft was climbing. At the time of the near miss we were under positive radar control with Atlanta Center and were not advised of any nearby traffic. After landing a passenger advised she thought she saw an aircraft go by. Possible causes are believed to be high terrain; possible poor ATC radar coverage for primary targets; and IFR conditions at the altitude we were at which did not allow us to see an aircraft in the clouds.




Synopsis: A CE560 flight crew suffered an NMAC with what they believed to be a Piper Cherokee while being vectored for an approach at ATC's minimum vectoring altitude in hilly terrain. ATC was unaware of the other aircraft.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Aircraft component: Turbine Assembly
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During log-in procedure [for a] Low Pressure Turbine Module; I encountered new parts in damaged boxes. Upon investigating the parts inside; I found one each; Fifth (5th) Stage Shroud Seal segment with bent/damaged sealing strip. I rejected this part; on Job Planning Card (JPC) and Holding Tag. Two days later the part was shown to me. The part had been cold-worked to straighten the bent portion of the sealing strip. No one seems to know who tried to repair this part; or what repair procedures were authorized to do it. The Engine Inspection paperwork repair calls out for sending the part to Pratt-Whitney for repair.




Synopsis: An Engine Shop Inspector reports a new 5th Stage shroud seal segment with a bent/damaged sealing strip for a PW-2000 Engine Low Pressure Turbine Module had been cold worked to straighten the bent portion without authorized repair procedures.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ELP.TRACON, TX
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C ELP
ATC / advisory: TRACON ELP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X checked on at 160 for visual approach. I instructed the pilot to maintain 080 pilot readback 050 and for unknown reason [I] missed the readback. At this time; the pilot decided to descend abnormally fast and at some point during their descent; Tech Operations was on the phone with someone else and was asking for another radio check to test [the frequency] and I had looked away to inform them the standbys had also stopped working. As they asked for the radio check and I was turning back toward the scope; I began asking the aircraft for a radio check and that is when I saw their altitude was around 075. I second guessed whether or not I had cleared them on a visual approach as I was asking for a radio check and decided I had not. I thought by that point they were still above the next MVA so [I] decided to clear them on the visual rather than have them climb again. After they were cleared on the visual and switched radios; they continued to descend to 050 by which time myself and the Supervisor had given multiple low altitude alerts on all Tower and Radar frequencies; as well as Guard. The aircraft landed without further incident. I would recommend that controllers watch aircraft level out at the altitude they are instructed to be at. Also; when an aircraft is in a rapid descent; to reiterate what altitude you need them at. Also I would issue the low altitude alert and climb them before asking if they had the airport in sight.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller reported missing an incorrect readback.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During service; passengers removed their mask in order to answer what they would like; coffee orders extended length of time in aisle; passengers who asked for coffee or tea did not wear masks while waiting for beverage to cool down. Many passengers did not abide by waiting to remove mask until FA completed their row.Remove added service; keep it simple. Remove coffee and tea at the very least. Water; coke; Diet Coke should be only offerings.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported passengers taking off their face masks to order coffee or tea and then waiting for it to cool off; without face masks on.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was in level cruise flight on an IFR flight plan talking to center when I suffered a complete engine failure. All engine parameters were within normal limits prior to the failure. I immediately informed ATC of my problem. I stated my intentions was to land at a nearby airport then corrected the name to another as I descended; center handed me off to approach. I informed them of the same intentions and they then handed me off to tower. I informed tower my intentions to first assure I could make the runway environment and then choose an appropriate runway. Tower informed me I had my choice of runways and I proceeded to the airport. Once I knew I would make the airport I set up for 35. I then realized I would be too high for 35 so I informed tower I would be landing 26. I proceeded downwind; base and turned final and landed uneventfully. I rolled out onto a taxiway where I came to rest. Rescue met me and once assured there was no risk the FBO towed my plane to the tie down area.I feel fortunate that I was in glide range of an airport with multiple runways to choose from. My decision to file for 16;000 to allow me time and distance if a problem ever occurred paid off that day. ATC was helpful as well as tower and made my job less stressful. Consideration was given to the use of the ballistic parachute but I felt if I could make the field with multiple long runways I could better control my environment.




Synopsis: An SR22 engine failed in cruise at 16;000 feet and the pilot successfully glided to and landed at a nearby airport while talking with ATC.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ONT.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ONT
ATC / advisory: Tower ONT
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: On final; we were informed that a helicopter was orbiting east of the field; but he had us 'in sight.'  We saw the helicopter and it seemed very close to the airport.  At about 1200 feet; we received one 'traffic' TCAS announcement and then one 'climb' announcement.  I commenced a go-around and before the gear was up; we received a 'Clear of Conflict.'  We came around for another approach.  This time I requested the outboard runway (26L) to give us more space from the helicopter.  Even with this approach; where we were lower than the helicopter; it still showed as an amber Traffic Alert dot until we were below 500 feet.  I think that if we had attempted to land on the same runway; we would have received another Resolution Alert.  I have had this problem before in California airspace; where Controllers allow a VFR 'see and avoid' aircraft to call us 'in sight;' but they are not equipped with TCAS and get too close and penetrate the TCAS envelope.  When I spoke with the Ground Controller; he stated that this same thing had happened yesterday.  Controller education that 'see and avoid' from light aircraft/helicopters doesn't relieve airliners from TCAS Resolution Alerts and to keep airline traffic separated from VFR aircraft even if the traffic calls the airliner 'in sight.




Synopsis: B737 Captain is advised of a VFR helicopter orbiting east of the field; with each pilot having the other aircraft in sight. At 1;200 feet a TCAS RA is annunciated and the B737 goes around.
Date: 202011
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was originally told by the company none of my sick time would be used if I needed [it] due [to] contraction [of] COVID.  My sick time has not been replenished.  Due to this policy now; there has been talk in our breakroom that if someone contracts COVID [they] will not inform the company and will come to work potentially infecting coworkers.  So the possibility of our work area becoming a safety hazard is dangerously probable.  The company should do the right [thing] during this pandemic and do their part to keep employees and customers safe.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported concerns with COVID-19 sick leave related policies.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The inbound Captain told us that the high stage bleed APU and HUD were inoperative. we called Dispatch and discussed the operational limitations. This was our aircraft for the  entire day. The aircraft load was light and icing conditions were expected on our arrival at [destination]. MEL-PROCEDURES stated: 'A. Maintain a minimum of 60% N1 on the affected engine during flight in icing conditions. NOTE: Landing  weights below 145;000 lbs. may require flaps 40 to maintain minimum required N1 (60%) on approach. Landing weights below 118;000 lbs. may not be able to maintain minimum required N1 (60%) on approach.'  The captain and I both agreed that with the conditions that awaited us at [destination] and the concern for the safety of flight under all  flight and weather related conditions; it was best to not take the aircraft.... Dispatch concurred with our decision.


Second narrative: Do not Dispatch aircraft to these airports; under these conditions with these maintenance issues.... We owe it to the safety of our crews and our passengers.


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew refused to accept an aircraft for a flight into known icing conditions with engine bleed air; APU and HUD inoperative.