elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: GRR.Airport, MI
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C GRR
ATC / advisory: Tower GRR
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Working Local Control position on an 8R/17 configuration. Arrival from the southeast Aircraft Y is direct the field descending to 050 on a northwest heading inbound for the visual to 8R. Aircraft X is taxiing for takeoff on Runway 17 first fix PMM which is a southwestern heading. I call down and coordinate with the Radar Controller asking if he would like me to put Aircraft X straight out (runway heading) or turn him right direct PMM which is outside of my departure gate; he tells me to leave him straight out. I clear Aircraft X for takeoff Runway 17 climbing to 040. About 30 seconds later the Radar Controller APREQs (Approval Request) a right downwind for Aircraft Y; and I approve the request since I had just coordinated a departure rolling off of Runway 17 and he is aware of that departure climbing to 040 via the SOP. I then re-coordinate asking the Radar Controller if he would like me to put the departure on a heading (240). I am told that he will not put Aircraft Y in front of my departure. Aircraft X is in the takeoff roll and I notice on the D-BRITE (Tower radar device) that Aircraft Y is in a westbound turn now for the downwind. As soon as Aircraft X was airborne I called that traffic (Aircraft Y) and he reported the aircraft in sight. I then told Aircraft X to maintain visual separation from Aircraft Y and climb maintain 040 and contact Departure; Aircraft X read-back the clearance. After the event I learned that Aircraft Y also had Aircraft X in sight. But both aircraft responded to a TCAS RA (Resolution Advisory).More precise communication between local and radar could have been used. Also once I saw the situation developing more I could have verified previous coordination with radar.




Synopsis: Grand Rapids Tower Controller reported a loss of separation due to poor coordination.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 25
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Rapid decompression led to a rapid descent to an altitude appropriate for loss of pressurization. The landing was uneventful.


Second narrative: A loss of pressurization while in a climb required the flight crew to initiate a rapid descent to avoid the need for supplemental oxygen. The crew coordinated intentions with ZZZ Center and leveled at 12;000 ft. MSL. We proceeded to the nearest suitable airport to assess the situation and have Maintenance fix the problem. Once it was fixed; we continued to our original destination.


Synopsis: Citation flight crew reported experiencing loss of pressurization during en-route climb.
Date: 201406
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Emergency Exit Lighting
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon standing in the aisle at my demonstration (demo) position; I looked at the Exit signs as the demo played. I noticed something odd as the video stated there are Exit signs at all door and window exits. There were extra Exit signs on my airplane. At Row 11A-C side and Row 36A-C there were Overhead Exit signs. There are no exits at these rows and I have never noticed signs there before. It was written up during flight. Could I please get an explanation for these signs. In the event of an emergency I feel this would cause confusion and have passengers in rows with no exits in the event of a dark environment.

Callback: Reporter had no additional information but speculated the aircraft had just come out of a Maintenance Check where a seat plan was used which did not accurately reflect the aircraft's configuration and subsequently an incorrect maintenance procedure was completed. The signs did not have Left and Right arrows; just EXIT. This aircraft is the only one reporter has seen with this configuration.



Synopsis: A B757-200 Flight Attendant noticed Overhead Cabin EXIT signs at Row 11 A-C and 32 A-C where no exits exists and speculated Maintenance had used an incorrect seat plan while the aircraft was undergoing maintenance. Concerns also raised that passengers may pile up during a darkened environment at seat rows with incorrectly located EXIT signs.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: JVY.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 1.5
Light: Night
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion; Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Ramp
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Weather; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: After flying the approach I taxied toward the FBO. I was planning on remaining away from the fuel island. The Marshaller was standing by but on the other side of the island (other side of bright light). With nonstandard lighted wand signals and with a yellow line I elected to circle the island to the right at a controlled speed. The right main gear exited the asphalt into the grass by a distance of 5 feet. Understanding the situation; engines were shut down and passengers deplaned with the door been on the left side and over asphalt. The past days had been rainy and the wheels were deep in the grass.That morning we picked up passengers and parked facing west away from the Fuel Island. We were marshalled in that position. That evening; in darkness and rain reducing visibility; the marshaller came on the side of the FBO planning on parking the plane facing North; but the signals (lighted wand) were confusing. With a yellow line in sight; I proceeded around the Island. This line was a marking for refueling purpose. It had all the characteristic of a taxiway centerline. At no time did the Marshaller prevent us from making forward motion.A better study of the layout and briefing for the taxi portion of the flight would have alleviated the risk experienced. The yellow line was confusing. Double red line would be more appropriate for the protection of the fueling area.




Synopsis: Air Taxi Captain reported a ramp excursion due to confusing Marshaller instructions and taxiway markings.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PXR.VORTAC, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Other 107
Flight plan: None
Mission: Photo Shoot / Video
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B PHX
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The purpose of this report is to report a LAANC portal that is not operating properly which contributed to a possible airspace incursion by our UAS.At location  Number 1 (030- degrees at 2.0 NM from PXR VOR); the PIC requested a LAANC airspace waiver through the AIRMAP program. On the 'Flight Briefing' screen there was an amber banner that stated 'Authorization upon Submission' notice. The PIC then pressed the blue 'SUBMIT FLIGHT' button and a screen balloon appeared stating 'Success - Your flight plan has been submitted'. The AIRMAP program then displayed a map screen and a Flight Time banner appeared with a clock running just above a bottom blue banner labeled 'END FLIGHT'. We then flew twice at this location for a total of 23 minutes.We repeated this process at a location Number 2: Tempe Town Lake Marina located at 078 degrees at 1.9 NM from the PXR VOR. We flew at location Number 2 twice; totaling 15 minutes.While the PIC was operating the drone; I was auditing the flight by looking at AIRMAP on my phone and did not see the flight displayed.I alerted the PIC and he immediately terminated the flight. We tried several times to submit new flights on the PIC's phone; and on my phone; with the same results: AIRMAP processed the waiver requests; displayed normal indications that the waiver would be issued; and then started the flight timer. However; when selecting the flight plan details for previous flights; a red Waiver Not Approved banner became visible even though normal screens appeared when waivers were approved and the flight timer was running.At this point; I contacted a person that is involved in the local Aeroscope security network and he advised me to use a different LAANC provider.We relocated to location Number 3: 076 degrees at 1.5 NM from PXR VOR and used the Skyward portal. We immediately received authorization and a waiver number at this location; even though it was a [few] miles closer to PHX.We suspect that all four flights at locations Number 1 and Number 2 may have been flown without FAA Approval.Therefore; our UAS Operations Manual will be amended to require the FAA Waiver Authorization number be recorded on our flight manifest prior to takeoff.Additionally; we have contacted AIRMAP to repair their iPhone app.




Synopsis: UAV operator reported a possible airspace incursion occurred in the vicinity of PXR.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BFL.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During our visual approach to BFL we had to execute a go-around due to LA Center giving us information that we did not expect. It was late and the Tower was closed as well as BFL Approach Control.  On about a 10 mile final in VMC to Runway 12L; LA Center told us that we could change to advisory frequency and contact them on the ground to cancel IFR; which of course is completely normal. He then reminded us that Runway 12L-30R was closed. This caught us by surprise since there were no NOTAMs indicating this closure. I asked him to confirm which runways were closed and he again stated 12L-30R. We executed a go around to review our information. There were many NOTAMS in effect that we had already read and reviewed; but nothing about the runway closure. Runway 12R-30L was unlit and unusable. I sent an ACARS message to Dispatch asking them about any closures while ATC double checked their information. I also called BFL operations to see if they knew anything. We did another low approach this time to Runway 30R to see if there were any indications of a closure. There were none. As we were climbing out a Sheriff's helicopter was departing BFL. They spoke to us on the radio and told that they had overflown the runway and confirmed that it was open and safe. Dispatch replied to our ACARS and confirmed that there were no NOTAMs indicating that 12L-30R was closed. Operations had spoken to Airport Police and they confirmed that the runway was open and safe. Given all this information we made the decision to continue and land in BFL on 30R. An uneventful landing was made.[The cause was] conflicting information regarding NOTAMs between flight release; Dispatch and LA Center.


Second narrative: The NOTAMS said nothing about a runway closure. LA Center was the only source that indicated that 30R/12L was closed. It was after hours and we could not verify with Bakersfield Tower; but there was no mention of a closure on the recorded ASOS.


Synopsis: Flight crew reported ATC was confused about which runway was closed at BFL.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The chart for the complex special procedure for an engine failure departing [Runway] 8L on the RATPK Departure from LAS airport shows a turn at 12.7 DME LAS to the heading of 050 degrees or continuing on the SID depending on altitude. The issue here is 12.7 DME aligns with FLAAR which is a much further point on the departure.  The turn point seems to be more closely aligned with SCAAR; which is different point on the SID for departing [Runway] 8R.  I note that point to show the location difference; not to say what the point should be.  I believe the 12.7 DME is the error on the chart and should be closer to 4.9 DME. Additionally; the BLD 325 degree radial shown is incorrect as that also aligns with FLAAR and not the turn point.As charted there is no way to identify the correct Engine Out Decision point as shown. The chart appears to be way off in terms of where FLAAR; BLD Vortac and the Engine Out turn point are located.  This procedure should be removed until corrected.  Unless we are supposed to fly to 12.7 DME; then in that case; everything beyond the turn is shown incorrectly. So that makes me suspect of all terrain shown on this chart as well.




Synopsis: Pilot reported the chart for the complex special procedure for an engine failure departing Runway 8L on the RATPK Departure from LAS airport to be confusing and possibly incorrect.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As we were climbing to 34;000 we received the Right Pack off indication and the associated [alert] messages. We were right in the tops of the clouds and requested a climb to 36;000 to try and get in the clear sky. We had been flying with the Left pack in the off position; due to the cockpit noise levels. As soon as the right pack off indications happened we immediately selected the left pack back to auto. Shortly after this; but before reaching 36;000; the left pack off indications posted. Bleed pressure for both systems now read zero. At this time we began an immediate descent to 10;000 feet and continued the pack off checklist. We determined that the nearest suitable airport to us was ZZZ. There were thunderstorms in the area; which required some deviating; but the temperatures were high enough that anti-ice was not required. We set up for and briefed the ILS at ZZZ and landed without incident. We informed Center; Approach and Tower that no further assistance was required.


Second narrative: Climbing through 34;000 ft MSL; received Right Pack Off EICAS and Right Pack off Light. At 36;000 ft received Left Pack Off EICAS and Left Pack Off Light.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reported the flight diverted due to loss of both Air Conditioning and Pressurization Packs and landed without further incident.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SLC.Tower, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Tower SLC
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: Upon the arrival leg into ZZZ the TRACON controller (very good); assisted us getting around the terribly laid out SLC Bravo airspace. The Controller informed us to contact the SLC Tower upon departure for a transition through the Bravo off ZZZ.On departure; we contacted SLC ATCT. The Controller issued a beacon code. We did not receive a Bravo clearance however. We began to orbit. We experienced moderate turbulence; up/down drafts and high engine temps as we orbited and waited for clearance. It never came.The Controller who was clearly working too many frequencies combined was issuing clearances to parked aircraft on Clearance Delivery. This is completely unacceptable. Either the priority of duties is incorrect at SLC Tower or this Controller needs a refresher as airborne aircraft shouldn't be in holding because you're playing catch up on CD. After finishing a third orbit of getting my brain rattled by turbulence; I called on the frequency with just my tail number. The Controller; who'd clearly forgotten that he was also working airborne aircraft cleared me through the Bravo immediately.The Tower needs to understand that there is very little reality in the small area where the Bravo doesn't start near ZZZ. This creates terrain alerts and terrible ride conditions; especially for lighter aircraft.I understand that due to COVID-19 that Controllers are working more frequencies than usual. I get it. This can't happen though. The level of service shouldn't be sacrificed for anything and in this case; it clearly was. Please be better. Airlines not moving on the ground shouldn't have priority over general aviation in the air.




Synopsis: Pilot reported issues with the service provided by SLC Tower and cited Controller workload as a contributing factor.