elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CLT.TRACON, NC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B CLT; Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLT
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Coming in to CLT on the IVANE THREE RNAV ARRIVAL 10-2C landing north transition we were cleared to Descend VIA. If you look at the chart; IVANE is between 16;000 [and] 10;000 FT. The next fix is GIZMO at 250 between 13;000 [and] 11;000 FT. This doesn't make any sense. There are no notes anywhere stating the bottom altitude of IVANE is only for 23 or a different runway. I think this is an error on this chart and I don't know which one is correct? When you look at this chart it can lead you to bust an altitude since technically you need to climb again to make a restriction. I believe there is a miss print on the chart and that it needs to be corrected.




Synopsis: A pilot on the CLT IVANE THREE RNAV noted that a clearance to descend VIA could lead one to cross IVANE at 10;000 FT only to climb for the GIZMO 11;000 FT constraint. A chart note should be added indicating the IVANE 10;000 FT is only for Runway 23.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight pushed 19 minutes late due to being weight restricted (take-off weight) and having to leave six passengers.  The Agent was doing a great job; but was very task saturated. The original load sheet came down with 167 passengers and 600 pounds under ATOG.  FAs counted passenger count five times; and each time came up with 169.  The Agent finally determined that we actually had 169; so new load sheet was created to reflect 169 Passengers. We were now at 200 pounds under ATOG. [We] calculated that our only take-off option was Runway XX; bleeds off; and flaps 25. This gave us a 268 FT stopping margin. We had NO MEL ITEMS.  Just prior to departure; it started to lightly sprinkle. Although the runway was still DRY; we quickly ran the calculations for WET-GOOD.  Takeoff was still allowable; but the stopping margin would have been 94 FT.  Takeoff was normal. In our climb; and still below 10;000 FT; a message popped up on ACARS.  We waited until climbing out of 10;000 FT to check it. That message was soon followed by a second identical message from Dispatch.  The message stated; 'OPS CALLED AND SAID TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL 10 BAGS IN BIN C'.  We did not respond to the message.  On a 737-800; any change requires a new load sheet. We had just taken off slightly over ATOG; and potentially out of balance.  We were well below Max Gross Weight and were not landing limited. The problem was with takeoff; and we had been airborne five minutes before the first Dispatch message. We continued the flight normally.It was late at night; unhappy passengers were being told they couldn't go.  The Agent was giving 110 percent and was under pressure to minimize the delay.  I'd be surprised to find this not to be somewhat common for this flight. Too many people; too much weight; too short runways; too long a [flight] distance. Nine out of ten times; it probably all works out.  This time it didn't.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported taking off slightly over ATOG when the departure was rushed.
Date: 201205
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was informed by operations that the aircraft that I flew had the wrong database installed in the FMS. It had a B777 database instead of an MD11 database. I did check the date of the database but did not check the numbers at the top to verify correct installation. After seeing the same thing at the top of the screen I rarely verify the correct database installed! We proceeded to destination without any issues or ATC questions so I am assuming the data base was close enough to operate a MD11. Have Maintenance verify the aircraft type and database type before installation then reverify after load.




Synopsis: An MD11 Captain was informed after the fact that he flew an aircraft with a B777 data base mistakenly loaded into the FMC.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JQF.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D JQF
ATC / advisory: Tower JQF
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: During a GPS approach to Runway 2 at JQF; we were outside ECEGA at 2;500 FT and 180 KTS. Flaps were extended to 15 degrees. We just extended the landing gear. We were experiencing moderate turbulence. Just as we were flying over an obstacle at 2;000 FT on the approach we experience moderate turbulence that caused the airplane to pitch down momentarily. This caused us to receive GPWS obstacle warning with a climb indication. We complied with the warning and climbed until the warning stopped. We climbed to an altitude of 3;600 FT; completed the Go-around Checklist and returned for another approach. The following approach was completed without incident.




Synopsis: A small jet on the JQF Runway 2 GPS encountered turbulence near ECEGA at 2;500 FT which pitched the aircraft over triggering the GPWS terrain warning so a go-around climb was executed until the warning ceased.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 15
Light: Night
Aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: During a nighttime visual approach into ATL Runway 26R I noticed the pavement lights on the runway flashing on and off.  I also noted that the runway lights on the parallel Runway 26L were also flashing on and off.  I had another experienced pilot with me who saw the same thing. We discussed what was happening and thought it may be the propeller strobe effect and runway LED lighting.  So we decided to vary the RPM of the prop and when we did we could change which lights flashed on and off; either the runway or centerline on either runway.  We are wondering if any assessments of this flashing phenomena were evaluated by Human Factors for the distracting nature of landing runway lights flashing on and off during an instrument approach and landing before LED lights were installed and if either this needs to be evaluated or pilots warned of this phenomena.

Callback: The reporter states that between the two pilots aboard they were able to figure out what was happening and confirm it by varying propeller RPM. He believes that the phenomenon is very distracting and all pilots of single engine propeller aircraft should be made aware of the effect.



Synopsis: C210 pilot experiences flashing runway edge and centerline lights during a night visual approach to Runway 26R at ATL. When propeller RPM is varied the strobe effect is varied and it is decided that the effect is caused by propeller interaction with the LED lights which are apparently flashing at a high rate.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A high speed rejected take off was performed on runway. The First Officer was the flying pilot; and I might add that this was his first take off after completing training and his performance and professionalism; when thrust into a very high stress situation; is commendable. There was not a second when he did not perform exactly as expected and offered valuable input when needed. 'Text book' is how we performed this together. On the take-off roll at approximately 110 KIAS the master caution illuminated with associated 'Doors' indication. I commanded 'Continue'; and at approximately 130 KIAS the First Officer and I heard screaming from the cabin and the cockpit call chime sounded. I commanded 'Reject.' The indicated airspeed was no higher than 140 KIAS. The procedure was performed and I exited the runway. The rejected takeoff QRH check list was run. I spoke to the lead Flight Attendant and was informed every one was seated and 'OK.' She also informed me that the main cabin door had come open approximately one foot; (12 inches) and that the door seemed to be coming open more until I rejected the take off. The aircraft was equipped with carbon brakes and the reject was much smoother than I had anticipated; and many of the crew and passengers stated the same. I decided to return to a gate. Customer service and technicians were waiting; the door was thoroughly inspected; and no faults where found. There was some tire damage to the number one main landing gear tire and I had the tire replaced. The flight departed approximately 5 hours late. Of the passengers that decided to continue with us; all had compliments for me; customer service; and the crew. The aircraft weight was 175433; with 165 souls on board. Planned for flaps 5 bleeds off; improved climb take off. V1; 154 VR; 157 V2; 165.




Synopsis: A Boeing 737 Captain decided to continue the takeoff when at approximately 110 knots a door warning master caution illuminated. Shortly thereafter; at a speed reported to be no higher than 140 knots; screams were heard emanating from the cabin; the cockpit chime sounded; and the Captain elected to command an abort. Upon inspection; no faults were found other than some tire damage from the high speed rejected takeoff.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: HNL.Airport, HI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B HNL
ATC / advisory: Tower HNL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Landing on 8L via the channel. Traffic was also landing 4L (originally assigned to 4R I think) arriving from over Ford Island. They passed over the first 2;000 feet of 8L while on a downwind/base to 4L at +500 feet from us (as shown on TCAS) just as we crossed the threshold of 8L. If we'd have had to initiate a go around anywhere between 400 feet and the runway; and started climbing; we would have been in direct conflict with the aircraft landing on the 4s.ATC failed to sequence traffic to both runways. We had a hold short (of 4L clearance) so there was no issue at the other end of the runway; but ATC allowed the timing to be such that both aircraft were at the approach end of 8L at the same time.After landing; I questioned ground as to what altitude traffic should cross 8L when on a downwind/base for the 4s and he said 800 feet. This traffic was clearly lower than that as we were less than 100 feet and the TCAS target showed +500 feet.ATC needs to find a way to deconflict traffic over the approach end of 8L. As long as the traffic landing on 8L doesn't have to go around; there is no problem with the 4s traffic being there; but if the 8L traffic ever had to go around; there could potentially be a problem. I know this is normal procedure for HNL but it seems like a large safety hole.




Synopsis: First Officer reported he was concerned with an ATC procedure at HNL that he felt could lead to an unsafe conflict if a go-around was required.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were assigned to ferry an airplane. The aircraft was at the maintenance hangar and we closed the door and I armed the MCD (Main Cabin Door). When we started engine 1; we got an EICAS message that required a ground reset; which we could not clear. The message was Engine 1 short dispatch. Before maintenance came on the aircraft I disarmed the MCD. Maintenance fixed the issue but before they started the engine to troubleshoot the problem; they asked me to close the MCD. Out of habit; I armed the door and when they were done; I was sitting in 1A and one of the maintenance personnel opened the MCD as it was armed.


Second narrative: The Captain and I were assigned to ferry an Airplane which we picked from the maintenance hangar. We did our normal checks everything seemed great so we closed the door and started engine 1. After Engine 1 was started we got an EICAS message ENGINE 1 SHORT DISPATCH. We ran the [checklist] but the message didn't clear so we called dispatch and notified them then got transferred to maintenance who promptly came out to the airplane to assess the issue. Before maintenance Started to troubleshoot the engine they asked us to close the main Cabin door which the captain did and mistakenly armed the doors. I was sitting in 1B and didn't notice so I take responsibility also. One of the maintenance personnel opened the main cabin door and the slides came out due to them being armed.


Synopsis: E175 flight crew reported that; when arriving at the aircraft; maintenance failed to disarm door prior to opening it activating the slide.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: FCC (Flight Control Computer)
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: In smooth air cruising Mach .78 FL390 winds 280/90. Had checked weather en route which showed we would be going through southern tip of moderate turbulence box. Queried ATC; who reported only light chop. Started to pick up light mountain wave for ten seconds then hit a spot of moderate turbulence and moderate to severe mountain wave. I turned seatbelt sign on and made PA. Simultaneously the aircraft oversped 5 to 10 KTS. ECAM for autopilot disengage. Aircraft began rapid ascent which the Captain was able to stop at FL400. Advised ATC and returned to FL390. No injuries; no traffic separation issues. Advised company and ATC. Hard to tell how much of the altitude gain was due to the wave and how much was due to the airbus high speed protection mode. This mode; which kicks in at Mmo +.01; disengages autopilot and pitches up to slow aircraft. Between the ECAM noise; which takes a couple seconds to silence; and the altitude horn; it's a lot of distraction. The most dangerous aspect of this event is the potential for mid air collision. With the accuracy of the GPS we are often flying directly under or over other planes. With the Airbus programmed to enter steep climb; a nose to nose encounter is a real possibility. I would suggest a standard offset on domestic routes if even just .1 mile to avoid this possibility. Also the Airbus shouldn't be programmed to dump the autopilot while simultaneously taking control of the plane to deviate from the flight path. For reference; max speed for airbus is .82; maximum altitude is FL391.

Callback: The reporter did not notice the Mach number reached during the pitch up but believes that the Captain may have delayed the forward stick input between five to nine seconds and was gentle due to passenger considerations.  Autothrust remained engaged and active and the spoilers were not deployed.



Synopsis: A319 First Officer reports an altitude deviation from FL390 to FL400 due to a mountain wave induced overspeed and the aircraft overspeed protection system intervention.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Electrical Wiring & Connectors
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: [Company] Boeing 757 aircraft are in service with inappropriate repair of the standoff tray on top of the landing gear trucks. The [company document] allows the tray to be secured in place by using plastic zip ties in a high vibration; high heat area. Due to the vibration; the plates migrate aft causing the wire harness conduit to slip out of the junction box which in turn causes chafing against the sharp edges of the conduit and junction box. We as avionics technicians have replaced many harnesses due to antiskid/autobrake failures due to wires shorting or being cut/damaged. The [company document] allows this temporary repair until there is wire damage discovered at which time a permanent repair is required. Apparently there is a misinterpretation of the [company document] by some senior members of the Maintenance Department who feel that the permanent repairs are not applicable once the wires harness is replaced with new wires and the aircraft is released to airworthy condition with plastic zip ties securing the plates. These zip ties secure the plates for 1 or 2 landings at best then the plates migrate aft causing damage to the wires in the same location. I am concerned for the airworthiness and safety of the aircraft and our passengers. Management knows about this issue and mechanics have been [clearing write-ups with this company document].




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician is concerned that a company document is being exploited or misinterpreted; thus allowing continued operation without completion of a permanent repair.