elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared direct to YOSST at 7700' for the RNAV Visual to 8R. Prior to hitting YOSST we were given a traffic call to follow; when I looked back inside the flight deck the Captain; PF; was distracted with his shoulder harness and we were at 7000' outside of YOSST; we were 700' low. When I looked away the first time we were on path and had 7700' set in the MCP. Now he had 'V/S' selected and 5500' in the altitude window (I have no idea where that altitude came from or why or when he chose it). I pointed out we were low and needed to climb to 7700'; he started punching various buttons and then aircraft went into CWSP (Control Wheel Steering Pitch). I pulled up on the yoke to start a climb; set 7700' in the altitude window; reengaged VNAV and the Captain finally re-engaged and took back over flying duties. Once we are on path; I 'coached' him to set zeros. I'm not sure he ever fully understood what happened. He's very difficult to communicate with and this is the second ASAP this trip; both times; he was Pilot Flying. My monitoring skills weren't effectively keeping up. I've been actively engaged with this Captain all trip. He's very aloof and says 'yeah; yeah; yeah' constantly; but not sure he actually means yes. I pointed out the Arrival page that addressed the RNAV visual. He never once looked at it; but said 'yeah; yeah; yeah' the two times I mentioned it. So I just read it out loud. However; when ATC made traffic calls before giving clearance; he seemed confused at what they were needing; even though we spoke about it and it's clearly written in the page he never read.




Synopsis: First officer reported communications problems with the captain.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MSN.Airport, WI
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Prior to departure I loaded the FMS with the first fix on the PDC that was 'PUMKN.' I inadvertently entered the fix as 'PMPKN.' When told to go direct to 'PUMKN' we started to turn towards the wrong Pumpkin (hundreds of miles away in the wrong direction.) ATC noticed the deviation and gave us a vector towards the right Pumpkin. I entered the correct identifier and started tracking. ATC had no further comment. I think 'my' pumpkin spelling seemed more logical to me. I somehow changed the spelling from the PDC because I was not attentive to the PDC spelling. Be more attentive to similar sounding fixes.




Synopsis: After being cleared direct to 'PUMKN' crew incorrectly typed 'PMPKN' resulting in aircraft track error.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MSY.Airport, LA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Physiological - Other; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We arrived at ten minutes past the hour (21 minutes early). Rampers met the aircraft at the gate and marshalled us in. Rampers then opened the bag door (I assume; so they'd trigger an on time arrival) and then left to go service other aircraft; but didn't actually offload any bags. I called operations on the radio to ask if they had a jetway driver coming and they advised that four aircraft had all arrived at the same time and they were doing the best they could. We were sitting at the gate with no jetbridge; engines shut down; APU running; and main cabin door closed. About five minutes later we noticed the fuel panel opened. The Captain called ops to remind them that we are not allowed to fuel with the cabin door closed. Several minutes went by and the fueler began fueling. The Captain asked a flight attendant to open the main cabin door and block the aisle (since the jetbridge was still not attached.) The Captain called ops again and told them to immediately stop the fueling; the person on ops said that no one was around so she went on the ramp herself to tell the fueler to stop. Fueling stopped after about 500 pounds had been pumped. About twenty minutes after we blocked a jetway driver finally arrived and we deplaned at deplaned the passengers.We were unable to communicate with the fueler. The station seemed understaffed.We need to ensure ground crews/fuelers know proper fueling procedures.




Synopsis: When the EMB-145 flight blocked in early there were insufficient ground personal do deplane the passenger and they remained on board. The flight crew had to remind operations personal that their attempt to fuel the airplane was inappropriate with the doors closed and no egress available in the event of an emergency.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Ice/Rain Protection System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Routine Inspection; Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon holding short of the runway in ZZZ; we experienced a burning odor in the cockpit during the pneumatic ice protection test. We contacted Maintenance and began troubleshooting. Both packs were individually giving us a burning odor. The flight attendant had called us to let us know that he smelled it too. We then returned to the gate. Once at the gate; we submitted 2 write-ups; one for the burning odor and one for a flickering Multi-Function Flight Displays screen that was progressively getting worse. I was informed later that this plane had the same issue the month prior. After our write up; maintenance could not reproduce the problem and signed the aircraft off. I later learned; from my flight attendant who was now with the new crew on the same plane; upon engine startup; they immediately began to smell burning fumes. This was following the sign-off from maintenance. Flight crew shut down packs and taxi back to the gate.Captain recommended replacing all duct work and packs as burning odor/fumes seems to be a common issue; or find out what is causing so many similar problems.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported a ground gate return due to a fume event during Pneumatic Ice Test while holding for departure.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On approach a 'TE DISAGREE' EICAS illuminated. We executed a go-around and completed the appropriate TE DISAGREE checklist. We were vectored for another approach and landed uneventfully.


Second narrative: During approach the 'TE Flaps disagree' EICAS illuminated. We executed a missed approach (no flap overspeed) and flew a vectored pattern to return for another approach. We completed the appropriate checklist and flew a flaps 20 with ref for 20 approach to an uneventful landing. Aircraft traffic was light and delay was not an issue. An emergency was not declared and a cabin prep was not initiated. At the gate we debriefed with Maintenance and entered the fault in the logbook.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reports a TE FLAPS DISAGREE EICAS during approach and goes around. QRH procedures are complied with resulting in a flaps 20 approach and landing.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Other unwanted situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The IVANE TWO RNAV ARRIVAL is an accident waiting to happen. The A321 CANNOT MAKE THE RESTRICTIONS and results in excessive workload and task saturation.The Airbus 321; using the auto flight system in Managed Mode; CANNOT MAKE THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE IVANE TWO RNAV ARRIVAL! Example: AMOBE to PELOY is 5.3 mi. The A321 CANNOT descend 1000 FT and slow from 250 to 210 KTS in 5.3 mi!!! IT CAN'T BE DONE in Managed mode; especially if there is a tailwind. The only way to comply with this restriction is to come out of managed speed; select a slower speed approaching AMOBE and then use FULL SPEEDBRAKES and extend flaps to make the restiction at PELOY. This is a poorly designed STAR -- no wonder there are so many problems with it.Get rid of it.




Synopsis: An A321 Captain expressed his displeasure with the demands of the IVANE RNAV STAR to CLT; citing the inability of the autoflight system to comply with crossing restrictions in Managed Descent mode.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FLL.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground FLL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Our flight release included an operational message advising FLL is undergoing a long term construction project including the re-designation of Runway 27L to 28L. The message said 'Currently; the primary Runway is 9L/27R and Runway 13/31 is an alternate.' The FLL NOTAMS included only one RUNWAY NOTAM; indicating that Runway 10L/28R had ungrooved pavement between Taxiway E and Runway 13/31. We had received an EDCT and expected to need to wait a while before taking off. Ground told us to taxi down B for departure on the newly-renamed 28L and to expect to hold in the run up area until our time came up. I repeated the instructions; but asked for confirmation we were cleared to cross Runway 13/31. I was surprised to hear the Ground Controller then tell me that; no; 13/31 had been decommissioned and was closed. I acknowledged that and we taxied towards Runway 28L on B. Shortly; we discovered that; not only was the runway closed; but Taxiway B was also barricaded where it crossed the old 13/31. We asked ground about that; and he had us join C at D to continue taxiing toward the runway after some other traffic on D passed. While I am concerned that the Ground Controller apparently was unaware of the status of B Taxiway; I am much more concerned that crews are not being made aware that FLL is currently operating in a single runway configuration. A pilot may think that; although FLL is a fairly busy airport; at least it has multiple runways available in the event something closes his primary planned runway. That is not the case; however; and certainly was a great surprise to us. Apparently the Dispatcher was aware as he said 'they have been working for months now' when I asked via ACARS if he was aware they only had one runway. This was our first visit to FLL in a long time; however; and despite reviewing our paperwork; we were not aware 13/31 was closed. We were fully aware there was construction (closing 27R) and changes to the magnetic variation (renaming 27R to 28R); but not that 13/31 was also closed.




Synopsis: An air carrier flight crew flying out of FLL was surprised to learn that Runway 13/31 had been decommissioned and the new East West runway was not yet open; making it a one runway airport.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: RJBB.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Other UAV
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Due to unauthorized drone activity at RJBB; RJBBG was closed. Flight held for 21 minutes; the diverted to ZZZZ.




Synopsis: A Dispatcher reported a flight was delayed when an airport was closed due to an unauthorized drone in the area.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: VNC.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF VNC
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Both aircraft came to a stop with approximately 200 feet separation at the intersection of the (different) Runways (05 & 13) they used for landing at VNC (busy; uncontrolled airport with extensive flight training).My assumption that the transport aircraft was also using Runway 5 since the last time I listened to AWOS the wind was 060 and other traffic was also using Runway 5 (filtering out that the crew did a call-out for final Runway 13)- I was too much focused on training my student for the landing/traffic pattern. The air carrier crew did only ONE call-out for 5 Mile final (not recommended); did not call-out his aircraft type (I wouldn't have turned final if I would have known his type/speed) and didn't use recommended traffic pattern/entry.Recommend to make published operations at uncontrolled airports in AIM and AC's mandatory. I have too many examples of pilots going straight into the downwind crossing traffic on the upwind or crosswind. Or people overflying the field at 1;000 for an immediate turn into the downwind. Straight in approaches should only be allowed if sufficient call-outs from at least 10 miles out are given. Most commercial operated airplanes do a good job by even calling out 30 miles out so that other traffic can anticipate.




Synopsis: An instructor pilot reported he stopped his aircraft on CTAF airport VNC Runway 5 about 200 feet from an air carrier twin which landed on Runway 13. The air carrier crew apparently made only one position call out on final which failed to mentally register with the task saturated instructor.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZSU.ARTCC, PR
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D TISX
ATC / advisory: Center ZSU
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Aircraft X was a student pilot on a practice ILS approach at TISX. The pilot was requesting one ILS approach at with a missed approach. I had coordinated with tower the missed approach instructions heading 045 as per the letter of agreement for props and turboprops departing to the northwest and climbing to 6000 feet. The tower controller acknowledged this instruction. I cleared Aircraft X for the ILS approach; gave the tower the position report (12 miles west) and switched Aircraft X to tower. I was expecting the aircraft to continue on a low approach to the departure end before turning to a heading of 045 when all of the sudden the aircraft is on the approach end and calls me back that is climbing out of 1000 feet to 6000 feet on the missed approach heading 045. The MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) in that area is 2400 feet due to mountainous terrain on the north side of the airport. I asked the pilot if he could maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance up to 2400 feet and the pilot stated that on a heading 050 he could avoid terrain. I then stated to the pilot to maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance and leaving 2400 feet fly heading 300. Aircraft X acknowledged and when he left 2400 feet; he joined his route without any problem.It was my understanding that the tower controller at TISX has to be aware that by turning Aircraft X on the approach end instead of the departure end is going to put the aircraft in the proximity of terrain; especially a slow climbing and slow moving aircraft. I do not know if there was expectation bias on my part regarding what I expected from the tower controller and missed approach instructions regarding practice approaches. In the future I would be more specific with the tower regarding missed approach instructions when working practice approaches. I also should have issued Aircraft X a safety alert (low altitude alert).




Synopsis: ZSU Controller reported an aircraft initiated their go-around instructions from the approach end of the runway at TISX instead of the departure end which placed the aircraft below the MVA.