elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Second aircraft: Light Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: New York Center told us to descend to 17;000 feet (from FL180) and turn 10 degrees left. He told us we had VFR (Visual Flight Rules) traffic at our 10 o'clock and 500 feet below us (16;500 feet). As we leveled at 17;000 feet and about 3 miles away from the VFR traffic we received a TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) RA (Resolution Advisory) to maintain our altitude. At this time; we noticed the light twin bank hard right away from us. Even though we were level and the light aircraft appeared level both visually and on TCAS; I suspect the VFR light aircraft did not like the sight of a 767 heading at him and banked hard to get a better angle away from us. I suspect that during this maneuver the light aircraft could have climbed slightly - causing our TCAS RA. Note: We never deviated from 17;000 feet during the RA. Also; we received a TCAS TA (Traffic Advisory) prior to the RA.Close proximity (500 feet) to VFR aircraft. Not sure why ATC (Air Traffic Control) turned us into the VFR aircraft - probably for spacing or other traffic.




Synopsis: B767-300 Captain reported a Resolution Advisory on approach to land.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel Control
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X experienced and rollback and unresponsive throttle immediately after takeoff. It was found that the rib of the thrust reverser cowl had rubbed through the CDP line going to the fuel control. This lead to an engineering order to set up all of the same series motors on the 767 fleet to be inspected for the same problem. I was sent with another technician to ZZZ to inspect Aircraft X. On inspection of both engines we determined that both lines had slight wear and out of caution both should be replaced. We addressed the clearance issue and replaced both lines. The Engineering Revision Authorization (ERA) stated that ETOPS would not be affected. So we signed off the work and released the aircraft. The aircraft made two flights before this was found and had a re-inspection in ZZZ1 to verify that the repair was good. Looking back being that both technicians were ETOPS qualified we should have made a call to [Maintenance] to verify what we were reading to be correct.




Synopsis: An ETOPS qualified Maintenance Technician signed off work and released a Boeing 767 for service not realizing that it required an inspection sign off also.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X had a lightning strike pilot write up going into ZZZ. The contract mechanic performed a 'walk around inspection including looking for lightning strikes per standard inspection procedure'. The aircraft was then released for a ferry flight to ZZZ1. Upon arrival our mechanic did a lightning strike inspection that is required per maintenance and aircraft manuals. Aircraft damage was found. The aircraft was not given a proper inspection and flew with undocumented damage. Maintenance Manual requires all lightning strike documentation to be sent to maintenance control for review before being released for flight. The logbook documentation was not correct. After the damage was found; an Engineering Authorization had to be written for an interim repair before the aircraft could fly.I think as just a simple safety factor the company would want (per the Maintenance Manual) only a [company] mechanic to perform a lightning strike inspection over the whole aircraft before it is released for a ferry flight. What if several rivets on the top of leading edge of horizontal stabilizer were blown out. Now the leading edge departs the aircraft? Now what? Using contract maintenance to just do a visual walk around when a known aircraft damage inspection is required doesn't save that much time and money for a downline. Now we are finding more aircraft are being flown from outstations to maintenance following this same procedure.Adhere to the Maintenance Manual and Aircraft Maintenance Manual policies and procedures when an aircraft has a damage event. Follow the Maintenance Manual lightning strike inspection policy and don't fly an aircraft with possible damage putting lives at risk. Stop trying to save money by not sending [company] mechanics downline to perform these safety inspections.




Synopsis: A Lead Technician reported that a B737 did not have the proper inspection performed after a lightning strike.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While flying at FL410; we got a left Bleed Trip indication. Not long after; the Altitude Warning horn sounded due to a loss of pressurization from a right Bleed Trip. I was the Pilot Flying. We completed the necessary checklists and regained pressurization during the descent. After coordinating with Dispatch; we continued to destination and turned the aircraft over to Maintenance. As known from previous events I have read about; communication was a challenge at first due to wearing masks. The Flight Attendants were curious at first since we were descending steeper and unexpectedly; but we quickly explained to them about our situation. This report is written to present an abnormal situation we have seen more of lately that presents challenges in communication between pilots. The crew worked well together and the passengers were kept informed. I believe this scenario has been run in training and should be continued since it is odd to communicate with the masks on. 'Chair flying' the steps help to make it more familiar in the event of a loss of pressurization and use of masks.


Second narrative: At FL410; the number one engine bleed tripped off. Pressurization remained stable and checklist procedures were accomplished. About 10 to 15 minutes later; the number two engine bleed air tripped. The Cabin Altitude Warning horn sounded and cabin pressure started to climb. We put our oxygen masks on; declared an emergency with Center and started an emergency descent. During the descent; we were able to regain pressurization. The flight attendants said the passengers were fine and not aware there was a pressurization problem. We coordinated with Center and Dispatch and continued onto our destination.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew experiences a bleed trip at FL410 that cannot be reset. Ten minutes later the second bleed trips and the cabin altitude warning sounds. An emergency is declared and descent initiated; with a successful reset during the descent allowing the flight to continue to destination.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was PNF (Pilot Not Flying). We were slowed to 210 kts. My F/O (First Officer) called for flaps 1 and we got the siren; EICAS message TE (Trailing Edge) Flap Disagree; and annunciator light. I told ATC that our flaps were stuck and that we need time to work on the issue. ATC said they would vector us around.  I told the F/O to fly and talk while I ran the QRH.I ran the TE Flap Disagree checklist which directed us to the TE Flap Asymmetry checklist. There was some confusion when the 1st checklist transitioned to the 2nd because it seemed that we were going to land with 20 flaps ref +20 then the 2nd checklist directed us to land only with the LE (Leading Edge) Slats out and 30 ref +40. We held to run the checklists; determined bingo fuel of 7.0; had a major discussion about the checklist ambiguity; and after speaking with maintenance; determined that our TE flaps were not going to extend so we set 30 ref +40. We [advised ATC] and went direct and vectors to the runway.I set auto brakes at 4; slowed to 170 kts; and extended the gear. The approach was uneventful and we turned off at mid field. We terminated the [flight]; clearing the runway; but CFR (Crash Fire Rescue); wanted to image the brakes when we arrived at the gate. Our brake temperatures never exceeded 4 on #3 forward brake; the others were 2 or less. We secured the airplane.




Synopsis: A B757 Captain reported a flap anomaly during approach. Checklists to apply were reported to have been somewhat ambiguous but the flight landed uneventfully.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Aircraft: Bonanza 36
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A BE36/G was flashing at me Sector 32/31 from Sector 22/21. Routing SHR.V86.RAP..FSD. The aircraft was level at 9;000 FT. I called the Sector 22 Controller before taking the handoff requesting the BE36 climb to 11;000 FT to comply with the MEA on V86. The MEA on V86 went to 11;100 FT/10;000 FT GPS/*9;300 MOCA. The BE36 was a /G aircraft. The Sector 22 Controller agreed to accomplish this so I took the handoff. The pilot never came over on the radio because he was too low to reach me. I then noticed that the aircraft was not climbing fast enough for me to ensure the MEA on the airway and he was more than 22 miles from the RAP NAVAID so the MOCA was not applicable. I then called the Controller back and requested that he send the BE36 direct to RAP because the MIA was only 9;300 FT along his route of flight. The Controller was agitated that I made the request and then decided to argue the need of the new routing. The BE36 was in my airspace; not on my frequency; and popping in and out of RADAR. I then proceeded to tell the Sector 22/21 Controller that he could deal with it and he needed to ship him to RCA Approach when they took the handoff and then I hung up the line. Recommendation; there needs to be several things done to resolve this situation and to help prevent another one. There needs to be better RADAR and radio communications west and northwest of RAP. It is a bad area for both and makes our job increasingly difficult. There needs to be some clarification as to what is the correct way to handle the situation via altitude and routing. There needs to be some clarity on the definitions of MIA and the use of the MOCA; no point did I feel that the BE36 and its passengers were in danger of running into the hills but this is an issue of protecting my ticket.




Synopsis: ZDV Controller described a below MIA/MVA event and the disagreement between controllers involved with regard to routing and procedure; the reporter suggesting that improved Radio/RADAR coverage would help prevent future events.
Date: 202105
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch; Landing; Initial Approach; Final Approach
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the last 15 months of the pandemic; with greatly reduced traffic volumes; Newark Tower has used the primary tower frequency for the VFR traffic traversing the Class B airspace (helicopters and VFR sight-seers) which used to be on a discreet frequency with their own controller. Now that airliner traffic is returning to normal volumes at Newark; the Tower needs to go back to a dedicated control station and frequency for the helicopter an VFR traffic in their airspace. There is just too much workload and frequency congestion; especially in the early am and afternoon rush hours.




Synopsis: Air Carrier pilot reported excessive frequency congestion at EWR airport due to VFR transitioning aircraft using the same Tower frequency as arrival and departure traffic. The reporter stated these operations used to have separate frequencies to alleviate the congestion.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB-505 / Phenom 300
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Passengers arrived with two electric powered skateboards. Although unable to identify one; the other was confirmed to be a 'One Wheel XR.' This One Wheel XR contains a large lithium based battery capable of carrying the rider about 18 miles on a single charge. I denied the passengers the ability to place these powered skateboards in the baggage compartment. The passengers in turn requested the skateboards be carried in the cabin. Based on the length of time to remove the batteries to isolate them; should there be a fire; I denied this request. I consulted the FOM to support my decision and discovered there was no guidance on these types of batteries. Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide batteries.With the amount of stored energy in these batteries; it is my opinion they should not be aboard an aircraft. I recommend more detailed information and or guidance be released to the pilot group to clarify what types of electric vehicles can or cannot be carried. The popularity of these types of vehicles is on the rise and the technology is continually advancing.




Synopsis: EMB-505 Captain reported denying Lithium Battery powered skateboards to be boarded due to insufficient FOM HAZMAT guidance.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: J3 Cub
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Post Maintenance test flight on J3 Cub with newly overhauled engine.After takeoff; engine oil pressure dropped to 0. Knowing the oil pressure probe was working and calibrated; I knew the engine actually had dropped oil pressure. I shut down the engine for fear of engine seizure and performed an uneventful engine-out landing at ZZZ.It was found that two of the components in the engine were out of tolerance and not overhauled.




Synopsis: J3 Cub pilot reported a loss of oil pressure that resulted in an engine-out landing.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Failed; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: About an hour into our flight near ZZZZZ Intersection we received a Degraded message on our Honeywell FMS.  This was followed by a DR or dead reckoning annunciation.  The Honeywell FMS manual defines DR mode as follows: 'DR mode is defined as the loss of radio updating and all other position sensors (IRS and GPS).'  When we looked at our GPS sensor page which normally shows the coordinates; the GPS sensor coordinates were blank.  We then asked ATC if they showed us on course and they informed us that we were off by 5 NM.  We then got vectors until we could pick up the ZZZ VOR with short range needles.  The rest of the flight was flown using short range NAV.  After approximately 30 minutes after the FMS issue we powered the FMS down and powered it back up but still had the same problem for 20 minutes or; so then the previous annunciations went away.  We monitored the FMS and at times it appeared to be off course when comparing it to our VOR course.  We landed uneventfully and wrote up the FMS.Suggestions: A dual FMS configuration would have given us a backup other than short range nav.




Synopsis: CE-560XL Captain reported a loss of all GPS/IRS input to the aircraft's FMS during cruise.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was cleared for takeoff on Runway XX in ZZZ.  Around 600 ft I noticed another aircraft 300 ft above and coming straight towards me on the GPS.  I looked outside for the aircraft and once I spotted it I looked back inside where I received a traffic alert from the GPS.  I immediately turned to the right and temporarily leveled off before continuing my climb and beginning my turn towards ZZZ1.  The helicopter was going for a straight-in Runway XY.  I called [fellow pilots] after I landed in ZZZ1 who informed me I needed to file a near-miss report with Tower.  When I called up Tower later that evening to file the report; he informed me that the helicopter was over a mile from where he was supposed to be.  I listened to liveatc.net to make sure I hadn't missed any traffic notification calls but there was none that I heard.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Pilots reported reported an NMAC with a helicopter.