elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201809
Location: LPPT.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: When briefing the ILS Rwy 03 approach into LPPT; we noticed that the briefing strip frequency did not match the plan view frequency. For the approach we initially set 109.5 but on base determined that the LOC/GS was not identifying nor present on our Electronic Attitude Director Indicator. After switching to the plan view frequency of 109.1 the LOC/GS appeared and it properly identified.

Callback: Reporter stated that the LPPT ILS Rwy 03 Approach in the company's Jepp FD Pro (iPad) subscription contained '(Airline)' in the title and had 109.5 listed in the briefing strip as the ILS frequency. Reporter accessed that chart during CALLBACK phone conversation and stated that; at this time; it still lists 109.5 as the ILS frequency. Reporter then accessed company's Ops Alerts and found a correction to the Rwy 03 ILS frequency; dated 17 Sep 2018; that changes it to 109.1 and which will be published at their next Jepp FD Pro release. Current Jepp FD Pro LPPT ILS Rwy 03 Approach Chart for the reporter's subscription was dated 7 Sep 18; effective 13 Sep.



Synopsis: B757 Captain reported ILS frequency error on approach chart briefing strip.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Wheels/Tires/Brakes
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aircraft arrived with an inbound [log write-up] for a brake issue that required a brake change. The tire in question had been written up as low pressure in flight. Found valve core loose and serviced. No leaks noted. The Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) limits for tire pressure low were not read because all available manpower was at the aircraft; and there was no access to them outside the shop. AMM requires tire change and mate on axle changed when taxied with low pressure. This is what was overlooked. The brake change required all available manpower. The tire pressure item was lower on the priority list; as the brake was causing a delay and taking all the attention. There were no obvious defects to the low pressure tire other than the valve core being loose; it did not leak after being serviced. This would be alleviated if we had more manpower; more ground time than 1:50 to perform ETOPS checks; and portable AMM access. The brake on this aircraft is heavy; and was very hot from landing. It could have been deferred per MEL but the outbound weight of the aircraft precluded this option; dispatcher would not allow.




Synopsis: The maintenance technicians did not recognize that a tire that was operated with low pressure required a replacement along with the adjacent tire. This is due to the loads imposed upon the tires while operated in this condition.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: Altitude Hold/Capture
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Captain was pilot flying and was cleared to 'descend via the Korry 3 arrival' into LGA. All crossing restrictions were programmed in the MCDU and verified. Captain had planned for a high speed descent as there was no speed restrictions assigned. During descent; ATC adjusted our clearance to include '270 KTS at BRAND.' Speed brakes were extended to help meet this assignment and aircraft was in managed speed and managed descent. The aircraft was programmed to cross DAVYS at or above 13;000 FT and the MCDU indicated that this restriction would be met. At approximately 13;300 FT I noticed that with the current descent rate; it did not appear that the level off would occur by 13;000 FT at DAVYS. The vertical speed level-off button was pushed and even then; the descent rate was such that the aircraft was going to descend below 13;000 FT 2-3 miles prior to DAVYS. Just below 13;000 FT; the Captain disengaged the autopilot and leveled off around 12;200 FT followed by a return to 13;000 FT and then the KORRY 3 arrival without further complications. There was no alert or indication by ATC that a crossing restriction had not been met. It appears that on the A320 aircraft specifically; using speed brakes at higher speeds on descent will induce descent rates that will not be able to be overcome to meet some crossing restrictions while using the autopilot. In this circumstance; the A319 aircraft probably would not have had a problem; and this event serves to remind that the A320 aircraft are slower to respond while on autopilot to changes in pitch. In any regard; when ATC changes an airspeed clearance on an arrival; in the descent; to something less manageable; it may be prudent to say 'unable' next time.




Synopsis: During a high speed descent on the LGA KORRY 3 arrival; ATC issued a 270 KTS BRAND constraint which caused an A320 to go below the DAVYS 13;000 FT constraint by 750 FT.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning Distribution System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Avionics
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals; MEL
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: An Airbus aircraft had Vent Blower Extract Fan Circuit Breaker popped. Circuit breaker that was popping was for Hi-Speed Fan; troubleshot to Fan Blower. So we had one and Removed and Replaced (R/R) Fan Blower. Performed Operational Check and got all indications in cockpit which are Flow Bars that switch from inboard to overboard when you pull circuit breaker for Flight/Ground; which tells you which fan is working; Hi or Low speed. Since I got the flow bars I assumed both [fans] were working and I was done. Had I waited at least two minutes between checking the Hi and Low Speed Fan I would have got the warning. It takes a few minutes to get the warning. Maintenance Manual tells you the fan will go to Low-speed; but hard to hear in the cockpit so you look for flow bars. What happened is that I assumed that both fans were working because [of] the indications and I did not reversed the MEL process [procedure] and double check myself. We decided in our Shop that a second person will check the reversal of the MEL. Avionics cooling. Gate turnback.




Synopsis: A Line Technician reports that an Airbus aircraft returned to gate after he had replaced hi-speed fan blower for popping the vent blower extract fan circuit breaker. The vent blower fan had been on MEL deferral.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aircraft was in cruise flight at 10;000FT. When we were cleared to 8;000FT; I had the speed set in Manual; but at 290kts. At approximately 9;500FT; I noticed the error. I leveled the aircraft; set 250kts; and deployed the speed brakes. As I did this; ATC queried our speed and the FO responded that we were slowing to 250kts. ATC later vectored us around traffic; but made no further comments regarding our speed. I do not know if the vector was related to our speed.Approach duties such as the briefing; speed setting; and landing assessment are typically complete by this point in the flight. However; on this flight we were still performing these tasks; creating a higher than normal workload for this phase of flight.Perhaps training could be made available regarding workload management with new First Officers. This was the second leg off IOE for the FO. I was entirely unprepared for how much my workload as a Captain would increase with a new FO. If someone had told me to mentally prepare myself for flying with an incapacitated pilot; I think I would have avoided the speed deviation.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain describes exceeding 250 knots below 10;000 FT while on descent. He mentions a new First Officer as a contributing factor for not noticing their speed.
Date: 202202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Arrived at ZZZ maintenance facility to reposition aircraft to ZZZ1. Accomplished full originating/acceptance checklists. Completed fully all normal checklists prior to takeoff. No unresolved discrepancies. Normal takeoff with flex power. (However; we did not shut down APU until just prior to take off; thus PACKS were on APU till that point). Immediately after 'Positive rate; gear up; speed mode' the cockpit filled suddenly with smoke of moderate density. The smoke had a distinct smell that comes only from the PACKS and definitely NOT electrical or fuel. We discussed and shut off PACKS and dumped cabin to clear smoke as we were at low altitude. While climbing we advised Tower of the smoke and requested remain in the pattern for return to field. He asked if we were declaring an emergency and we replied NO; NOT AT PRESENT. ( the same reply we gave to all subsequent questions ). We referenced EPC and QRH. On downwind we got a SMOKE FWD LAV warning and audio. First Officer got up to inspect lav and found it was only from the residual cockpit smoke and no fire was present. Also checked aft lav. Warning indication on EICAS went away. Returned to cockpit discussed all relevant circumstances and determined the threat was managed and ZZZ1 (10 minutes away) offered better maintenance and rescue and fire facilities. Made low approach to runway and coordinated with ATC and proceeded to ZZZ1 uneventfully. (PACKS remained OFF).




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a fume/smoke event after takeoff. After troubleshooting flight crew executed a safe air return.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Aircraft in Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Aircraft X had two aircraft vibration write ups. Rudder and elevator hinge line inspections were accomplished. Both elevators were removed; reinstalled; and adjusted; changing all 10 hinge fittings. The rudder also had 7 worn hinges replaced.I generated a card for a Functional Check Flight per GPM (General Procedures Manual) 10.XX.X. It was signed off by management stating a FCF (Functional Check Flight) was not required.Retrain everyone on the GPM procedures for a FCF.




Synopsis: Aircraft Mechanic reported that management stated that a Functional Flight Check was not required after working on flight control components.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SAN.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SAN
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Distraction
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: SCT Approach vectored us from a base leg onto final within 1.5 miles of a heavy B777. We got cleared for the visual approach and started to maneuver for spacing by slowing with flaps 10 and s-turns. Not long after turning onto final; we got into the wake turbulence. The aircraft banked both left and right as we fought to get out of the turbulence. ATC sent us to Tower. I put in the frequency and believed to have switched to Tower. We maneuvered the aircraft upwind and high just as we started to feel the burble of more turbulence. The sun was low in the sky directly in our line of sight. This made the runway and the preceding aircraft difficult to see. We continued down the flight path fully configured and with the checklist complete. As we got below 1;000 FT; we viewed a green light from the Tower and questioned whether we were cleared to land. I thought we had been but; as we started to feel possible turbulence again; we continued to focus our efforts to landing the aircraft as we were close to the ground. Once we landed; we turned off and contacted Ground. They queried us as to whether we saw the green light and we confirmed that we had seen it. We then taxied to the gate for parking. ATC should have let us know that the heavy was already at approach speed at 15 miles out as he positioned us behind him. ATC vectored us to final too early and put us too close to a heavy aircraft. As a crew; we should have gotten vectored back around instead of continuing on the approach. The distraction of the wake turbulence; low sun; and maneuvering kept our focus from verifying the communication with Tower.


Second narrative: [Narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported wake vortex encounter that provided enough distraction Tower was not called for landing clearance.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: NFFF.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: B787-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center NFFF
Aircraft component: Engine Vibration Indication
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At 39;000 feet enroute cruising IMC; icing conditions; the left engine vibration reached 7.0. The intensity of the vibration was felt in the airframe throughout the cabin; audible in the flight deck; and shaking the glareshield. In accordance with the Flight Manual; we reduced power on the left engine to 60% N1 and the vibration level dropped below 4.0. After various power setting tests; we determined 60% N1 was the maximum power setting to keep vibration level below 4.0. This power setting was inadequate to maintain altitude and airspeed. Since we were still left of course on a weather deviation; ATC was unable to approve our request to descend until we reported back on route. The Captain was notified and returned to the flight deck. At that point; we sent a CPDLC message with a request to descend. We were cleared and descended to 33;000 feet. At this altitude; the aircraft was able to maintain 250 knots in level flight. After some discussion with Maintenance Control and Dispatch; the degraded engine performance condition required landing at the nearest suitable airport. Dispatch coordinated the ground response and ATC issued a divert clearance. The descent; arrival; approach; and landing were conducted as if we were a single engine aircraft; with the exception of starting the APU.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B787 flight crew reported excessive vibration from the left engine resulted in a diversion.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Aircraft: Learjet 31
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While I was working the ZAU sector; I was reviewing my routes to ensure correctness. I also read what was in the remarks. I noticed that Aircraft X had written negative RVSM; but he was filed RVSM capable; non-rnav. I called back to ZMP so that they could check with the pilot to see if he meant Non Rnav; not Non RVSM. He told them that he in fact was negative RVSM; and it was filed wrong. ZMP fixed it in their computer. Aircraft X was above RVSM altitudes at the time; however he flew for quite sometime outside my airspace at 41000B43000 feet and many other altitudes to get there. I am unaware if there was ever a loss of RVSM separation; however I feel I should fill this out because I was aware of this. I told my Quality Control local department of this event. I then coordinated appropriately with all adjacent sectors for any new clearances and point outs needed.I believe airlines and companies need to have some type of fail safe system in place to not allow an aircraft who is Negative RVSM capable file as RVSM capable based upon their tail number.


Second narrative: I was on the sector for 7 minutes when ZAU called and asked to confirm if Aircraft X was indeed negative RVSM. Negative RVSM was in the remarks of the flight plan; but the equipment suffix/W was not in agreement. The remarks had already been checked when I assumed the position so I had no reason to check them. I asked the pilot if he was RVSM capable and RNAV capable thinking the remarks section was incorrect. The pilot confirmed that he was negative RVSM and RNAV capable. I asked what his equipment suffix was to which he indicated/G.My hat is off to the ZAU controller for catching what could have been a separation problem down the line. Negative RVSM pilots need to make sure that the proper equipment suffix is filed and also be sure to communicated on the first transmission to ATC that they are indeed negative RVSM even if the are above RVSM airspace. As controllers we do rely heavily on the coral box as an indicator. One can see how the remarks section of a flight plan can slip through the cracks especially during position relief. We don't tend to redo work that has already been indicated complete.


Synopsis: Center Controllers reported an aircraft in RVSM airspace that was not RVSM capable.