elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The airport manager at [our destination] brought to my attention that the previous day's [load planning on a charter flight] had given us the incorrect number of loaded bags in the aft cargo. They told us (the crew) they had loaded 89 bags aft with 160 people on board. That bag count seemed low to us as a crew and we questioned two ground crew members if that was in fact correct and they confirmed the correct bag count aft. The airport manager informed us the crew today that there were approximately 50 additional bags aft that were not accounted for.The station should be trained on the proper bag loading procedure. There should also be a [company] ground supervisor to be able to possibly ride along on these charter flights to supervise the ground personnel that are not accustomed to [company] flights.


Second narrative: The ground handlers in [this airport] are horrible. We cringe every time we see [this airport] on our schedule. They are disorganized; an embarrassment to [company]; and after this flight; [I believe] they are unsafe. Any time we have a complaint about the ground handlers on these charter flights we are told; 'well they are the cheapest so we are not going to switch ground handlers'. Every other airline operates out of [this airport]; there has to be a better and safer option than [the company] that we are currently contracted with at that airport.


Synopsis: MD-83 flight crew reported they were told after completion of a charter flight that the contract ground operations company at the departure airport gave them incorrect information on their weight manifest.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BFM.Airport, AL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp BFM
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Airport
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The Captain and I were unfamiliar with this airfield so we reviewed the Jeppesen charts and NOTAM's in detail prior to departing. After landing and then turning into the Mobile Downtown ramp on Taxiway H; we noticed several GA aircraft and barriers in the area where the chart shows a left turn in the ramp. In addition; there is a taxi line that continues straight where the chart depicts the left turn. This taxi line is not depicted on the Jeppsen chart so we assumed it was the temporary taxi line mentioned in the Company NOTAM. After proceeding on that taxi line; we questioned whether this was correct and the Captain stopped aircraft. We called the company ramp and the individual said he would call the contractor. Ground personnel drove out to the aircraft; placed chocks under the wheels; and we shut down. After deplaning; we asked the Contractors if we were supposed to turn left earlier and they said yes. They also said this has happened numerous times previously.Unfamiliarity with the ramp combined with the construction; barriers in the area the chart depicts a left turn; and an actual taxi line that is not depicted on our charts led to our mistaking that taxi line for the one mentioned in the NOTAMS.


Second narrative: We had reviewed everything thoroughly. Upon entering the ramp; we noticed small airplanes and construction barriers in the area where a left turn is shown on the chart. There is an actual taxiline that proceeds straight and we followed that line; believing it was the temp taxilane from the NOTAMS. I stopped the aircraft when I questioned if this was the correct route. The First Officer contacted the ramp and they called the contractor who chocked the wheels. I shutdown and they brought stairs over. After leaving the aircraft; we asked if we should have turned and the contractor said yes; but this has happened many times before.A lot of construction combined with incorrect chart depiction and confusing NOTAMS.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported BFM airport has temporary taxiway lines that do not match the Jeppesen Chart or NOTAMs.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 3
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: IAI1124/1124A Westwind
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR; Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As we were holding short for departure Runway 24 after completing the required check lists the co-Captain briefed our clearance including the RUUDY4 departure procedure. We use our FMS for flight guidance; pre-loaded with our assigned departure procedure and flight plan received from TEB clearance delivery. We had the flight director in heading mode for 240 degrees and 1;500 FT set in the altitude window.We were cleared into position on Runway 24; awaiting traffic landing Runway 19 and completed the Line Up Checklist prior to Tower clearing us for takeoff. Our SOP is to hand fly the take off until at a safe altitude for autopilot operations; 500 AGL as long as all systems are functioning properly. The co-Captain was performing the after take off climb check when TEB Tower switched us to Departure as we climbed through 400 MSL. I asked the co-Captain to confirm the turn towards WENTZ while he was calling NY Departure. However; he did not hear my intercom communication since his push to talk button was depressed calling Departure. After asking a second time to confirm the right turn to 260 degree confusion of RUDDY 4 departure procedure and TEB8 departure procedure co-Captain says to climb to 1;500 MSL and then turn right 280 degrees.  Finally ATC contact was established only after we missed the turn to WENTZ. ATC cleared us to turn right to a heading around 300 degrees and advised that we had missed our 260 degree intercept heading. We got out of our routine and we missed the autopilot command to turn towards the departure route since we were still in heading mode on the autopilot.We could have avoided missing our turn if we had had better communication between us on conducting the departure procedure and should not have gotten fixated on contacting ATC during a critical phase of flight.




Synopsis: A corporate jet flight crew failed to comply with the RUUDY SID from TEB.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Aircraft X was originally a DYAMD3 arrival into SFO. Sector 33 was told to put the aircraft on the YOSEM3 arrival and that meant the aircraft would go to 28L. Once Sector 34 accepted the hand off there was discussion of the 5 metering number on the aircraft. The number was ignored as the operation board showing SFO DYAMD3 (TBM) or metering and the YOSEM3 (Off). Since the Board we follow showed YOSEM as off (in the past we ignore the meter number as the computer thinks the aircraft is on the DYAMD3 we did not slow or turn Aircraft X to bleed the number to a 1 or 0. As the aircraft approached the point for the descend via; the CIC advised that the flow control unit called and said the '5' is real and we need to bleed it. I immediately called Cedar sector at NorCal and explained the situation and asking if she could take the aircraft at 250 knots and work accordingly. She agreed and the R controller followed the CIC persistence to spin the aircraft and Aircraft X did a 360 at FL340. Fortunately; the sector was not too busy and it worked out but for crying out loud this was a major gaff and we need some direction in the future and not 'last second.' Number one; if I coordinate with the sector (Cedar at NorCal) that should be good and the CIC not question me and believing me to ignore their instructions or flow. Secondly; the Supervisor needed to pass onto the CIC or the Sector 33 controller to bleed the 5 off and turn the overhead board on to show YOSEM (TBM)! Finally; flow control in our center knows that sector 33 takes care of all the spacing and should have made a more timely call to the CIC when sector 34 took the Hand off and not so late that the aircraft was getting ready for final descent into SFO. We never ever wait that long to bleed a 5!




Synopsis: ZOA Center Controller reported confusion relating to an aircraft on a non-metered route that had a 5 minute loss time.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Narrative: I had track control of Aircraft X but the aircraft was still 20 miles outside of my airspace. I was also working Aircraft Y a departure who was in my airspace and climbing along the SID. Aircraft X said 'Center; Aircraft X'. I said 'go ahead' with no callsign. Aircraft X says 'we need to divert' with no callsign. I am looking at Aircraft Y the whole time and think that is who I am talking to. I cleared Aircraft Y 'via right hand turn to ZZZ...' and gave him a descent. Aircraft X read it back with no callsign. After a minute I notice Aircraft Y had not made a turn which I thought was strange. I verified with Aircraft Y that they were the [the aircraft in distress] and Aircraft X answers 'affirmative' which further diluted the situation. Shortly after Aircraft Y questions 'if they are still with me'. At this point I realized they were not the [the aircraft in distress] and scanned and saw Aircraft X in a right turn and in a descent. My radar Assist and I quickly coordinated with the involved sectors the emergency aircraft and what they were doing. I learned that by me saying 'go ahead' instead of using Aircraft Y's callsign from the beginning may have contributed to the situation. However; when I subsequently used correct callsigns Aircraft X answered for Aircraft Y anyway which is an example of how workload and emergency's have a tendency to add risk.




Synopsis: A Center Controller reported he misidentified an aircraft when the plane did not use their call sign when responding to instructions.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After completing the climb checklist; the First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) pointed out that the two FMS's were not aligned and that hers showed us left of course. Given that information; I failed to tell TRACON that we were unsure of the accuracy of our navigation instruments. First Officer monitored the #2 FMS and emphasized that it was continuing to show off course; with the course deviating to the east. Just at the point that I was going to heading mode to turn in a more westerly direction and let ATC know that we were concerned about our navigation instruments; the Controller gave us a turn to the west and told us we had been .10 off course and then drifted to approximately .20 off course to the east. The responsibility for this deviation rests solely with me. I was given excellent information by the First Officer and failed to act upon it when it was first offered. I do not know why the course diverged from that of the NELYN 3 departure course. Q parameters were met and both FMS's were GPS. If there is a .1 variation in course deviation on an RNAV departure (or arrival) immediately ask ATC for heading information as navigation capabilities are suspect.

Callback: The reporter could offer no explanation for the discrepancy between the two FMS's but indicates that it does occasionally happen in this aircraft.



Synopsis: Embraer Captain experiences a track deviation departing DFW on the NELYN 3 departure. A slight discrepancy existed between the Captain's and First Officer's display with the First Officer's apparently correct; according to ATC.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climb out left engine failed. We were climbing through 17;000 feet when failure occurred. [Advised ATC] and we diverted to [nearby airport]. All QRC checklists were complied with. Landing was uneventful. No passengers on board.When we checked the oil sight gauge after landing it was showing approximately 1/3 quart low. The engine was absolutely covered in oil on the outside of the cowling; inside of the cowling; and it was actively dripping from the engine. The FBO placed several buckets under the engine to catch the oil. There was clearly more than 1/3 of a quart of oil in the buckets and the 1/3 quart low indication was what was indicated before departure. I would suggest an investigation to see if there is a problem with the sight gauges.


Second narrative: The engine failure occurred during a ferry flight. Captain was acting as the PIC/pilot monitoring and I was acting as the SIC/pilot flying. The event occurred during initial climb between 17;000 and 17;500 feet. The number 1 engine made a mechanical squeal; rolled back and seized. This was during the span of several seconds. Autopilot was disengaged; the pilot monitoring [advised ATC]; and the engine failure QRC was run. We were cleared to level at 17;000 feet. ATC advised that [nearby] airport had VFR clear weather and 20-30 miles away. We accepted this as a suitable airport and we're cleared at pilot's discretion to 3;000 feet while being vectored for a visual approach. We were then cleared to 2;300 feet. We accomplished the single engine approach and landing checklists. After approach and landing to runway we taxied; parked and contacted the necessary parties.During inspection of the aircraft we observed that a large quantity of oil was leaking from the cowling of the affected engine. However; the oil sight gauge was showing a half quart of oil low. We both found this did not reflect the amount of oil that had been lost.


Synopsis: A Citation jet flight crew reported the failure of an engine due to an oil system malfunction. The engine was secured; and a successful diversion to a suitable airport was accomplished.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing through approximately 1;000 FT AGL the TAIL COMPARTMENT OVERHEAT warning illuminated. While continuing the initial climb and receiving vectors for the departure the memory items were completed. The warning did not extinguish and we continued with the QRH checklist. The warning did not extinguish until the right engine throttle was retarded to idle. We stopped the climb at 11;000 FT; declared an emergency; and told ATC we needed to return to the departure airport. We also got vectors to delay in the vicinity; to comply with checklists and to contact company etc. We also needed to prepare for an overweight landing which included performance data; missed approach flap settings etc. The First Officer was the pilot flying and I asked him if he was comfortable flying the approach and he said yes. He continued and flew a nice approach. (Senior FO) After landing the emergency equipment followed us to the gate and saw no smoke coming from the aircraft confirmed by ground control. We deplaned the passengers with no incident; contacted Maintenance; Dispatch and the Duty Pilot; and filled out the aircraft log book. The flight attendants were kept informed through the PA and interphone. They reported a calm cabin during the event. A tail compartment overheat is not an unusual event in an MD80 on hot days and would normally extinguish after the memory items are completed. In our case the day was not very hot 82F and the warning did not extinguish after the memory items. Unless Maintenance can inspect the aircraft in a different way I am not sure if this event could be avoided. The one suggestion I have is to give references at the end of the checklist on overweight landings. This event seems to occur on climb outs requiring an overweight return. In our case we would have had to burn off fuel for one hour to get us down to our max landing weight. With one engine at idle and a overheat situation the overweight landing was completed.




Synopsis: A MD-80 TAIL COMPARTMENT OVERHEAT warning alerted after takeoff but after the memory items were complete; the light did not extinguish until the right thrust lever was retarded per the QRH. An emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.