elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HIO.Tower, OR
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D HIO
ATC / advisory: Tower HIO
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X checked in on the ILS approach. I issued him a landing clearance; requested current flight conditions; and issued the RVR. A couple minutes later on the approach I received a Low Altitude Warning. I immediately issued the Low Altitude Warning and the altimeter. Aircraft X responded with roger. I noticed that Aircraft X continued to descend and upon reaching 600 ft at about 4.5 miles out on the ILS approach; I suggested that he climb and begin the missed approach. The pilot responded in the affirmative but still continued to display on the radar that he was descending and then hit 500 ft at about 4 mile final. I double checked again that he was flying the missed and received an affirmative response. It was then that the pilot again responded that he was going missed approach. I immediately coordinated with Approach that I advised the pilot to fly the missed approach; received instructions from them to use the published missed approach and for Aircraft X to maintain 4000 ft. I issued the instructions and shipped Aircraft X back to Approach.I have no idea what the pilot was doing or what he was looking at on his equipment to create this situation. I am not sure what I could have done differently. I am pretty sure I saved this dudes life!




Synopsis: HIO Tower Controller reported issuing Low Altitude Warning to an aircraft on the ILS descended below the glideslope.
Date: 201409
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As I was assisting with the pneumatic air start I noticed engine one was running with aircraft [pneumatic] hose underneath the engine. I pointed my finger towards the Lead to let him know about the engine. The lead waved both his hands in the air as if don't worry. As I disconnected the pneumatic air start; the Lead walked over to disconnect the aircraft hose. Within seconds; engine one ingested the aircraft hose.




Synopsis: During a pneumatic air start; a Ramp employee alerts his Ramp Lead that the air hose was lying under Number 1 Engine.  Air hose was ingested by Number 1 Engine after Lead attempted to disconnect the pneumatic hose after the air start was completed.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
Second aircraft: UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While taxing to parking on NOTAM closed runway UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) operator was flying UAV RC (radio controlled) aircraft over parked aircraft just beyond person directing parking.  My passenger also stated UAV was too close for safety.I stopped aircraft waiting for UAV to be moved but person directing parking was not observing conflict.Called on UNICOM to have something done but no response.  After UAV was further away; parked aircraft and commented to person directing parking about danger of proximity with UAV but he stated he didn't see UAV as he was watching my aircraft.Pilot of aircraft behind my aircraft acknowledged that UAV was too close for safety.UAV pilot stated that the runway was closed and that they were given permission to fly by airport authority but denied flying over parked aircraft.Airport manager stated that RC group all stated that the model was not flown over aircraft.Friends in main hangar stated that they witnessed aircraft over parked aircraft also.Airport manager stated that he talked with RC group and discussed incident but believed that parallax view was involved.

Callback: Reporter stated aircraft were being parked on a runway which was closed per published NOTAM for an event. A fixed wing RC aircraft was conducting aerobatics while flying in the vicinity of the closed runway as well as parked and taxing aircraft.



Synopsis: General aviation pilot reported a UAS flying overhead while parking their aircraft. Reporter was concerned with the proximity of the UAS to aircraft.
Date: 201504
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Somehow the FMS kicked out several fixes that were previously in the flight plan route as both the Captain and I checked the route and all fixes on the ground before the flight. All fixes were there before we departed. As we were climbing we were assigned a new ATC frequency and the controller said he was showing us 2 miles off of our filed course; that's all he said then he passed us over to another controller and he said that he was showing us 3 miles off course; we then asked for Direct to STL as that was the fix we were going to on J134; that was approved with no issues. We got out the paper chart to verify proper course and fixes along with the filed flight plan and legs on Flight release. It seems that the FMS somehow kicked out several fixes on J134. Both the Captain and I checked all of the fixes in the FMS with the flight release and PDC on the ground before the flight and all fixes were in the FMS.




Synopsis: The crew verified all FMS fixes in the flight plan route prior to departure. During the climb out ATC advised the crew of a track deviation. The crew requested and received a new clearance for direct routing.
Date: 202010
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Dangerous Goods was tendered by Cargo Operations and was planned for passenger flight. Load Crew rejected shipment as it was found to be labeled for cargo only aircraft.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Ground Personnel reported rejecting DG cargo assigned to passenger flight with labeled for 'cargo only aircraft'.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B Y
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Other passenger
Reporter function: Passenger
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Passenger came to the flight deck after we landed. Said he worked for the FAA and said that he saw a drone pass on the right side of the aircraft.  Said it was about 3 feet wide and a quadcopter. From the description from the passenger of where we were when he saw it I am guessing that it was before the approach. I am guessing we were between 5000-3000 feet. I informed the flight duty officer and base manager who were going to tell act.None




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported a passenger informed the flight crew of a airborne conflict with a UAV during the arrival phase of the flight.
Date: 201907
Location: MPTO.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower MPTO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I checked in with Tower on the ILS 03R. They said 'Continue 03R'. I had trouble understanding the Controller and said 'Understand cleared to land 3R?' They said 'Negative; continue for 3R'. I acknowledged the 'continue.' There was a lot of communications in two different languages and the English was challenging to understand. Approaching 1000 feet we were fully configured; landing checklist complete. I had not heard a landing clearance; and had not acknowledged a landing clearance. I noticed the preceding aircraft had cleared the runway. During the 1000 foot call we set missed approach altitude and emphasized internally we hadn't thought we'd received a landing clearance. I tried several times to attempt to get clearance but could not get a response from Tower as there was continuous communications on the frequency. Other aircraft were cleared to land on 03L and there was a long clearance given to another aircraft. Passing 500 feet we were stable and still on autopilot. I tried to break in on the frequency again but they cleared another aircraft into line up and wait after the 737 (us) landed on 3R. The Captain directed me to try again around 100 feet but the frequency was in use. There is certainly a chance in there I stepped on the actual landing clearance. The Captain ascertained that we were most likely cleared to land and that to go around at that point with it being night time; terrain at the departure end; and the issues we were having understanding the Controllers that the safest course of action was to flare and land. We landed normally and taxied uneventfully to the gate. I understand the Captain's thought process and decision; I will say it still surprised me as I was in a go-around mindset at the time.




Synopsis: B737NG First Officer reported landing without a clearance in MPTO after experiencing communication difficulties with the Tower.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On arrival on the TELLR2 Arrival; 10 miles prior to CRAGG ATC requested us to slow to 210 KTS and then expedite to 10;000. The Captain slowed to 210 and then expedited to 10;000 by switching from VNAV to LVL CHG. Shortly after we were cleared for the approach. I put 7;000 in the MCP for the FAF altitude at CORDE. At approximately 9;700 feet I noticed we were below the published minimum altitude of 10;000 and advised the Captain. At 9;300 feet he started a climb back to 10;000. The error we made was not going back into VNAV after being cleared for the approach.


Second narrative: Neither of us noticed being out of VNAV and we descended to 9;300 feet before we changed the altitude back to 10;000 which was the minimum altitude prior to our next fix.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew descended below a STAR published minimum altitude due to being in FMC LVL CHG rather than VNAV mode.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MDPP.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower MDPP
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While on the RNAV (GNSS) RWY 08 at MDPP; just prior to KELSO FAF we received a terrain; terrain; pull up pull up warning.  An escape maneuver was executed and the aircraft leveled off at approximately 4;000 on the RNAV (LNAV) approach path to the runway.  A missed approach was declared to Santo Domingo Control.  The aircraft broke out into VFR conditions over the airfield; called the field in sight and entered a downwind to land visually.  	The MDPP Briefing Page provides a caution to B757/767 aircraft regarding 'nuisance GPWS warnings;' and suggests that the aircraft 'must be configured for landing no later than the PP351;' the turn to final.  This note should be made more forceful.  Terrain terrain; pull up; pull up is hardly a 'nuisance' warning when IMC.  It is a life saving warning that cannot be ignored.  If it were made clear that the warning would be terrain terrain; or more forceful in its language to dictate non-standard approach procedures we may have fully complied with the Briefing Page notes.  Instead we intercepted the RNAV approach course at 180 knots; flaps 15.  Although we were stable with the auto-pilot/LNAV/VNAV our terrain closure rate still triggered the warning.  If the tolerance on this approach is so tight that the approach speed of the aircraft determines the safety margin then I argue the tolerances are unacceptably tight.  This approach procedure should be removed from the authorized [approach procedures]. Either way; I will personally never attempt that approach again; fully configured or not. The VOR 26 with a circle to land is 1;000 times safer.  [The RNAV] is an unsafe procedure.




Synopsis: B757 First Officer experiences a terrain warning approaching KELSO during the RNAV Runway 08 approach to MDPP and takes evasive action.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BDR.Airport, CT
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D BDR
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was released off BDR RWY 6 (BridgeHaven6 SID); Tower assigns 2;000 feet on departure.  A VFR helicopter on a discrete code was east of BDR by approximately 5 miles; heading approximately 060; indicating 3;000 feet when I released Aircraft X.  At approx XX00Z; without coordination or warning; the VFR helicopter suddenly turned to a heading of approximately 330; towards JSD; and began descending.   While this heading was sufficient to keep the helicopter out of BDR's Class D airspace; it would put the helicopter only approximately 0.1 NM outside of it.  More importantly; the helicopter was descending into the BDR departure corridor; just as Aircraft X was becoming airborne.  When Aircraft X checked in on the frequency; I instructed him to maintain 2;000 feet and indent; at this point the helicopter was indicating approximately 2;500 feet just east of the departure corridor for BDR RWY 6; and I was expecting JSD Tower to instruct the helicopter to maintain that altitude until west of the departure corridor.  Instead; the helicopter continued descending; again; no coordination; no point-out; and no communication from JSD Tower; towards the departing Aircraft X.  I had to issue an evasive turn to the southeast (heading 120) to Aircraft X and issue a Safety Alert.  Targets merged 5 NM northeast of BDR (MILUM intersection); both aircraft indicating 2;000 feet.  This is an on-going problem with JSD Tower; whereby N90 controllers have to give evasive maneuvers to IFR aircraft under our control to avoid VFR helicopters under JSD Tower's control.  Recommend that JSD Tower keep their traffic clear of arrival and/or departure corridors of the adjacent area airports (BDR; HVN; and OXC); and give vectors and/or altitudes to its helicopters to stay out of the way of N90 traffic.  When either of these options are not possible or practical; JSD needs to coordinate with N90 ISP Sector (they can reach us on the land line) when they have to maneuver there helicopter traffic around or across arrival or departure corridors of the adjacent airports (BDR; HVN; and OXC) or when they become aware that one of their helicopters is in conflict with N90 traffic; in accordance with FAAO 7110.65 procedures.




Synopsis: N90 Controller reports of a NMAC due to a helicopter that isn't coordinated that descends through the departure corridor of a close proximity airport.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This [report] has nothing to do with this particular flight. It has to do with every flight in which the FAA (as I understand it) requires the landing pilot to take the last break. I fly mostly [relief pilot position]; but on occasion fly as [flying First Officer]. There is one CA [I fly with] that requires the First Officer if he is to land; to take the last break. He is not popular. The vast majority of landing pilots take the second break; because for most pilots; coming to the cockpit on an all-night flight with sleep inertia prior to landing is unsafe. Beyond that; there is no pilot I know who does not think this FAA directive intrusive and silly. How can anyone external to the person in question know when and how that pilot needs rest to be best prepared for landing during an all-nighter; or any flight? This rule is a perfect example of the tail wagging the dog; and is corrosive because it pits pilots' good judgment against a regulation. Thank heavens most pilots opt to do what is right and reasonable for their bodies and passenger safety.The FAA directive needs to be rescinded.




Synopsis: B777 First Officer reported concern with the FAR requiring the landing pilot to take the last break due to sleep inertia.