elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201902
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The mandate for Ground Ops to utilize three Marshallers for gate departure and arrival operations should be applauded. However; I have noticed on a routine (albeit anecdotal) basis that most Guide Agents and Lead Marshallers do not raise their hands away from the bodies far enough when giving their signals. In fact; the pictures in the FOM; which show the proper signaling procedures; are not routinely followed. Most Marshallers and Guide Agents keep the wands at chest or waist level. The problem with this is the wands are the same color as the Marshallers' reflective vest. As a result; the wands and vests blend together; making it difficult (really impossible in low light or low visibility) to discern any signals being given. However; there is one exception--International Stations. Almost without fail; international station Marshallers display the signals as per our FOM and have wands that are a different color from their reflective vests. A second concern is the additional Marshallers are typically only standing by the elongated yellow cones on the edge of the safety area during arrival; with one exception; [station code]. At the latter station; the extra Marshallers are able to stop crossing traffic from entering the parking/safety zone. When standing by the aforementioned cones; traffic is not stopped. This is a much greater hazard/threat at our larger stations.




Synopsis: 737 Captain reported a problem with marshaling techniques making parking and push backs more difficult and unsafe.
Date: 202105
Aircraft: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: It has been brought to my attention that the 737-MAX aircraft at times sits extremely tail heavy while being loaded and/or unloaded at the gate. I'm not sure of all the details with this specific aircraft; but it is a situation that is happening often according to the line technicians working the gates. According to ramp personnel that have been asked; they have stated that their operating manual does not state that the tail stand needs to be installed. The Aircraft Maintenance Manual states at the very beginning of AMM task 07-10-08-800-801 item 1. A. 'The primary function of the tail stand is to support the airplane tail in an aft CG condition during loading and/or unloading of passengers and cargo'.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported that the procedure manual does not call out for the use of a tail stand when loading and unloading passengers and cargo from a 737 MAX aircraft.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On short final Flight Attendant called cockpit notifying crew that Flight Attendant jump seat was stuck in the locked and stowed position. Jump seat Flight Attendant sat in the lavatory for landing.Short final; sterile cockpit; high workload.Debrief with crew the importance of making cockpit crew aware of any malfunction in the cabin.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported the Flight Attendant called them during sterile cockpit on short final stating the jump seat became inoperative. Flight Attendant sat in lavatory during landing.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZFW.ARTCC, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: ATC gave us a block altitude between 8;000 FT MSL and 12;000 FT MSL between two radials northwest of TXK VOR. We were asked by Center to remain within 25 miles of the TXK VOR. We then set up; on the pilot's EFIS display; a visual picture of this area using the Navigational equipment on board. These instructions defined an area in which we could perform the required maneuvers for an FAA Type Rating Test. About 5 minutes later; the Controller angrily told us we were 31 miles from the TXK VOR and were guilty of drifting outside of the assigned area. Our onboard display showed our position well within the required 25 miles. We finished our training and returned to TKI without any further discussion with the Controller about distance from the TXK VOR.




Synopsis: DA2000 Captain is informed by ATC that he has drifted outside the designated airspace while doing maneuvers for a checkride. The on board display; which had been programed by the crew to remain withing the designated area; indicated that they had not drifted out.
Date: 202111
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: FBO
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aircraft Logbook(s)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Owner
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Other Preparing for Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: An A&P or IA who changed out the tail-boom on Helicopter X in 1995 made an arithmetic error when he calculated the number of hours until the tail-boom needed to be replaced again. AFTT = 2385.6; Retire Hours = 2100; 2385.6 + 2100 = 4485.6. His entry was 4685.6. This went undetected for over 25 years until it was time in November of 2021 to change it out again. The error was noticed by the owner but not until he was going over the number of hours remaining until it needed to be changed out. By the time the error was found; it was 156.3 hour past the retire time of 4485.6. A ferry permit was obtained; an IA inspected and signed off the permit; an entry was made in the logbook and the helicopter was successfully ferried to ZZZ on Date.




Synopsis: Helicopter owner reported during an inspection of the aircraft's maintenance records an arithmetic error was found concerning the replacement of the Tail-Boom.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was picking up trash in the main cabin. The C [Flight Attendant] came to me and asked to verify the presence of a suspicious odor in the aft cabin. I followed her back and once I got to row 30; there was a very intense smell of burning electrical / hot plastic. I called the flight deck and relayed what we were smelling; and they asked us to locate a source if possible. I went back to the aft cabin and asked how the B [Flight Attendant] and C [Flight Attendant] how they were feeling. They were lightheaded and feeling 'woozy.' We began a search for the source. We suspected a device was going into thermal runaway; so we began asking passengers if they had any laptops; iPads; etc. Some passengers were asking if we were investigating the burning plastic smell. After checking devices and in-flight players in the area; we noticed no smell in overhead bins; and the odor was strongest on aircraft left; rows 29-33; coming out of PSU air. The same smell was also coming out of the aft galley; a/c right; [and] vent. I called the flight deck back and they began working checklists. The B [Flight Attendant] and C [Flight Attendant] at this point were getting more lightheaded; and developing headaches; and I could tell I was becoming lightheaded the longer I was in the affected area. I called the flight decks to relay symptom development with the B [Flight Attendant]; C [Flight Attendant]; and myself. At this point; the Captain said they could smell it in the flight deck and decided to [advise ATC]; diverting to ZZZ. We closed affected areas' PSU air vents and began preparing the cabin for arrival. I informed passengers of our diversion on our final sweep of the cabin. When we landed; the smell was still strong; and the pilots began isolating systems until we were cleared to taxi to the gate. Two passengers were treated by medical personnel at the gate (one for an anxiety attack and another for chest pain). In flight Supervisor met the aircraft and assisted us through the evening. We (flight attendants and pilots) requested medical evaluation and were transferred to hospital for further evaluation and testing.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported electrical burning fumes in the cabin; followed shortly by cockpit crew also reporting. Flight diverted and requested medical assistance at gate.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: D10.TRACON, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: When established on the BONHAM 6 arrival and landing north; if given a runway change; the selected runway defaults to the entire arrival west of BYP. This creates a discontinuity on your route flown and will disengage LNAV. This anomaly creates a navigational interruption and is compounded when you receive frequent runway changes. While on the arrival; we were assigned Runway 35C then 35R then back to 35C all west of KARLA intersection. Fortunately; we stayed on the arrival using heading.I believe this discontinuity anomaly when you select a runway should be addressed and revised. But I also suggest in the reduction of runway changes while close to the Airport.


Second narrative: When established on the BONHAM 6 Arrival (BYP.BYP6) and landing North if you put in a runway change it will default to the arrival West of BYP regardless of your position on the arrival. This will create a discontinuity. We were originally assigned ILS 35C by ATC. Within a few minutes they assigned us ILS 35R. A few minutes later they again assigned us ILS 35C. The last two runway assignments were given West KARLA on the arrival. Each time we put the new runway assignment in the FMS it created a discontinuity west on BYP during a critical phase of flight.I would suggest that the arrivals be put in the FMS with the option of a North or South landing. This would allow the arrival to be clean with all points needed to fly the arrival. These points are not associated with any runway assignment. This would allow pilots to make the changes in the box in regard to ATC runway assignment without changing arrival routing.


Synopsis: ATC issued a B737-800 three BONHAM 6 North Arrival runway changes and with each runway change LNAV disengaged and the arrival defaulted to west of BYP which required a complete arrival rebuild for the new Runway 35.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff from ZZZ; I went to pull the power back into climb power. Upon doing so I noticed severe engine roughness with the left engine; and the throttles were split several inches. I applied full power as I thought the left engine was going to quit. When I contacted departure; they advised that an Airport Operations vehicle witnessed billowing black smoke from the left engine as I entered the clouds. I left the power full as any time I brought the power back it felt like the left engine was going to quit. I notified ATC. They vectored me for the ILS XX; when i did bring the power back to fly the approach and land; the engine was smooth and did not quit. As a precaution I had the airport fire trucks come over and make sure there was no sign of fire or further smoke upon landing. They advised they didnt see anything unusual. I then taxied to the gate and wrote the airplane up.




Synopsis: Light Twin Cessna Captain reported an uneventful air return due to left engine severe engine roughness during initial climb.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We flew the ZZZ RNAV Y Runway XX approach twice and went missed approach both times due to weather. After the second missed approach Approach Control did not have a clear plan to start using the ILS Runway X and we did not have enough fuel to wait any longer; so we diverted to ZZZ1; which was listed as our first alternate on the Dispatch release.ZZZ-ZZZ1 is a very short flight in busy airspace; requiring a lot of attention and setup in the FMS. After a few minutes I sent a text message to Dispatch notifying them that we were diverting to ZZZ1. We then received several text messages from Dispatch regarding the need to discuss and agree to a diversion airport; amend the release; fuel remaining; and contacting ZZZ1 station.Our text-based communication system is slow; tedious; and simply takes too much time and attention away from higher priority tasks of flying and navigating the airplane during a very busy time. It was extremely frustrating that Dispatch seems to think we should just drop everything we are doing and engage in a text conversation with them; hunting and pecking on a keyboard; instead of getting set up for an approach and flying the airplane in a busy terminal area.We landed in ZZZ1 and parked at the gate and I spoke to Dispatch on the phone. We were not able to communicate with Dispatch in a timely manner to discuss our diversion and amend the Dispatch release.Dispatchers rarely get to witness from the jumpseat missed approaches and diversions in busy airspace; so I don't think they realize how slow and impractical it is for pilots to text with them during very busy situations. Dispatchers should recognize that some diversion situations are much busier than others and limit their communication to simple messages such as 'We see that you are diverting; contact us when you can.'




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported that a text conversation with Dispatch resulted in a high workload during a diversion.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Staffing; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Advised via ACARS of potential tail tip condition on arrival in DEN. Advised flight attendants of possible delay of jet bridge for offloading paxs and we would leave the seatbelt sign on until safe to deplane. On parking at [the] gate; First Officer saw the tail stand off the right side of the aircraft. Jet bridge approached as soon as ground power was established and engines shut down. It seemed too quick for my comfort; so I kept the seat belt sign on; and went to talk to the gate agent. Gate agent was unaware of tail tip situation; so I went outside and down the jet bridge to visually confirm the tail stand. I did not see it in place yet; so spoke with ramp person. He said they were moving it in place at that time. When it was in place I went back to flight deck and turned off seat belt sign. Maybe ramp procedures allow the jet bridge to come up to the aircraft as the stand is being positioned. I was cautious wanting to make sure it was in place; as the procedures have changed a few times recently.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A Boeing 737 flight crew reported that a tail stand; used to protect against a tail-tip situation; was not installed by the ground crew in a timely fashion.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dash 8-100
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Rejected takeoff due to failure to rotate at 105 kts (after V1). No amount of pressure on the yoke would cause the nose to lift.  The flight control check was done before and after the event. Was satisfactory both times. Trim was set. Notified company and write up was completed. This is a high cycle airplane which may have been a factor.

Callback: Reporter stated that the control problem was found to have been caused by tape that was left on the Inner Spring mechanism of the elevator trim system. Reporter said that the tape was in place because the aircraft had been in long term storage and that tape removal was on the maintenance job card; but had been overlooked. Reporter stated that the restriction on the Inner Springs could not be felt during the ground checks; but definitely affected the elevator control at speed.

Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Dash 8-100 flight crew reported executing a high speed rejected takeoff after being unable to rotate. Satisfactory flight control checks were reported to have been accomplished before and after the event.