elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Taxing after landing. During after landing taxi; while attempting to turn right on to a taxiway a wind gust lifted my right wing and caused the plane to plant its left wing tip on the ground and make a 180 degree turn damaging the left wing and the propeller. Winds were reported as 190 at 22 gusting 32. Every attempt was made to taxi with proper aileron correction and to maintain speed at or below a brisk walk. I immediately turned off the engine and requested assistance from them ground controller. Airport personnel and fire department officials assisted in holding the wings down and walk it into the FBO.




Synopsis: Light Sport Aircraft pilot reported that a gust of wind during taxi resulted in a loss of control and damage to the aircraft.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: OJC.Airport, KS
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 99
Light: Night
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF OJC
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: For such a nice daytime airport Johnson County Executive - OLATHE; KS OJC has terrible airport markings and signage for night operations. Surface markings need reflectant added to striping. It would be great if modern ICAO/FAA compliant hold bar signage and surface red rectangles could be added. It is very difficult to be sure where the taxiway exits from the runway are located. How about using some Airport Trust Fund Money to improve the signage; lighting and hold bar markings at OJC?  How about some improved high contrast taxiway markings?  How about some runway lead off lighting and runway centerline lighting?? How about some yellow lighted taxiway markers?  Surely in the wealthiest county in Kansas the county government can provide first class aviation facilities - Even if you operate [at OJC] frequently it is very easy to mistake a grass infield area for a taxiway with the way that the taxiway lighting is arranged - especially on the south end of the runway. This is not a up-to-date state of the art marked airport. Could use some big improvements that would add dramatically to the usefulness and safety of night operations.




Synopsis: C172 Instructor believes that signage; markings and lighting at OJC are not up to current standards.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: P50.TRACON, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B PHX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P50
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During route verification; neither I nor the FO noticed the change in departure from SNOBL3 to YOTES3. Tower cleared us for takeoff and to maintain sight of [Company] who was still rolling down the runway. At GOALY; where the SNOBL3 and YOTES3 diverge; we were given direct to MRBIL; which we said was not on our flight plan. Got a heading from Departure as we figured out how to get back on the correct departure. Everything normal after that. ATC did not tell us of any conflicts with other aircraft. Our ground track should have been close to our cleared ground track as we notice the discrepancy at GOALY.First flight ever with ZZZ based flight attendants which put me in an unfamiliar environment. Also; had a [Company2] aircraft which has numerous differences from the [Company1] aircraft. Had several maintenance and customer service issues to deal with that caused numerous distractions to my cockpit preparation. These pressures made me rush some items to free up time to deal with the other non-routine items.Just need to slow down and try to limit distractions; but with merger and constantly changing procedures within the company and the ATC environment; everything needs attention which makes it hard to focus on one item at a time. Also; why are so many arrivals and departures being published with so many restrictions? It seems every airport is building their own special procedures; which takes additional time away from our normal procedures as we try to find any restrictions for a particular airport. I know that I spent a lot of time reviewing the departure as it had an altitude restriction; unfortunately it was the wrong departure.


Second narrative: Captain loaded the box and I watched him verifying the fixes by scrolling through fixes. We never cross-verified the departure off of the PDC paper that was lying right in front of the thrust lever quadrant the whole time; in plain view.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew attributed departure on wrong SID to distractions caused by maintenance issues; customer service issues; new company procedures and aircraft differences.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During my preflight inspection; while setting the landing altitude in the pressurization panel; I set what I thought was 20 feet for landing. I noticed something looked odd; but couldn't really identify what was out of place. As far as I knew; there are only 4 available digits; so I set 0020.After leveling off and cruising at FL370 for 11 minutes we got a cabin pressure warning. After donning the O2 mask; we started to diagnose the problem. The cabin altitude was steady at 10;000. Shortly after that it finally dawned on me what had previously looked odd about the landing altitude selector. There are not 4 digits; but rather 5 on the selector. The first rotating digit is significantly wider than the following 4 (about 1 inch wide vs an 1/8 of an inch). I had assumed it was stationary; but it's not. When I started the preflight the 10;000 digit was already displayed. So as I rotated the elevation down; I unknowingly stopped at 10;020 feet instead of 0020 feet.Needless to say the pressurization panel worked as advertised. We set 0020 and the pressurization returned to normal. As a precaution we requested clearance to descend to FL330 while the pressurization stabilized. After coordination with Dispatch and Maintenance; we returned to FL370 and continued to destination.My failure to originally trap the error during the preflight cannot be overstated. I take full responsibility for the error and it certainly is a lesson learned. My only questions and concerns for future crews is; why was the controller set above 10;000 feet in the first place? There's no operational reason to do so; since the highest fleet wide landing limitation is 9;500 feet. Is there some maintenance check that requires it? If not; why is there even a 10;000 digit; if it can't be used? Lastly; since there obviously is a 10;000 digit; why is it not consistently labeled as the following digits? The 10;000 digit is either blank or 1. In other words; to set 20 feet you currently set (blank;0;0;2;0). If it were consistent; you would set (0;0;0;2;0).Bottom line; lesson learned; won't happen again.




Synopsis: B757 First Officer reported incorrectly setting the landing altitude in the pressurization panel; resulting in a cabin pressure warning which was rectified after the correct landing altitude was entered.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D APA
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Second aircraft: Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was a departure off of APA who I got on a 320 heading climbing to FL120. I then got another aircraft who departed APA also on a 320 climbing to FL120 (Aircraft Y). I climbed Aircraft Y to FL230 and was climbing through an arrival descending into DEN. I was watching his climb rate to ensure separation there; and sent Aircraft X direct to Baylor thinking I had already climbed him to FL230. As I was watching Aircraft Y climb; Aircraft X asked for higher. I saw he was level at FL120 and issued a climb to FL230 and a turn to 320 [heading] to avoid the 13;500 MVA.He didn't do either of those things quickly; so I issued a turn to 330 [heading] and then further right to 350 [heading]. Aircraft X entered the 13;500 MVA approximately 3/4 of a mile climbing out of FL132 before exiting into lower MVA again. I didn't issue a safety alert because I didn't feel that he was in unsafe proximity to the terrain and was doing all the maneuvers he could do to climb as per the situation. I feel like a complete idiot letting this happen with just two aircraft on frequency. Don't get complacent!




Synopsis: D01 TRACON reported an aircraft not following directions and entering a lower Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) for a short while.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Aircraft component: Altitude Hold/Capture
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Event occurred on SHEAD RNAV Departure from Runway 25R at LAS. We had selected LNAV before takeoff roll and 7;000 FT selected in altitude window. Clearance limit was FL190 with all the depicted altitude restrictions. Just leaving ROPPR at 7;000 FT (Altitude Hold); Departure told us to delete the ROPPR restriction (we'd already met) and the MDDOG restriction at 9;000 FT. We deleted the MDDOG altitude on the CDU and selected FL190 in the altitude window. We then selected VNAV and VNAV speed was on the scoreboard. The next fix; TARRK; was a magenta BOLD 11;000 FT. Neither one of us caught the aircraft climb through until about 11.4K; at which time ATC asked why we weren't complying with the TAARK restriction. We descended from approximately 11.6K to 11;000 FT. Both of us didn't understand why the aircraft did not level at 11;000 FT. Again; you can't monitor enough in dynamic flight. We could have selected 11K in the altitude window; but we felt we made no system errors. [Should have had] more intensive monitoring of NAV and autopilot systems during dynamic flight by both crew members.


Second narrative: Do not trust the autopilot to level off as commanded. Be careful to only put the most next restrictive altitude in the MCP.


Synopsis: A B737-700 autopilot failed to capture the SNEAD 7 11;000 FT TARRK constraint event though it was in the FMS with FL190 in the MCP.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Flight & Navigation Systems
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff. We ran the Before Takeoff Checklist and taxied into position for takeoff. As I advanced the thrust levers to takeoff thrust; we got the aural warning 'TAKEOFF BRAKE' and the associated EICAS warning message. I aborted the takeoff at very low speed; contacted the Tower Controller and advised them of the abort. We taxied off of the Runway at B4; made the turn onto B; stopped the airplane on B and ran the Aborted Takeoff Checklist. After we had finished the checklist(s); we verified that the brake had indeed been released and that there was no indication of the brake being on. We also noted that we had pressed the TAKEOFF CONFIGURATION button just prior to takeoff; and that we had heard the 'TAKEOFF OK' aural message. The Captain then called Maintenance. The Captain filled out the logbook; and reset the brake system in accordance with Maintenance guidance. Once we had complied with maintenance procedures; Maintenance cleared the airplane and we got ready for another takeoff. We re-ran the Taxi Checklist and the Before Takeoff Checklist. We then completed a successful takeoff and proceeded to destination. There was no indication of the brake system being engaged prior to thrust lever advancement. I think we responded appropriately and effectively to the situation.




Synopsis: EMB145 First Officer reports a takeoff warning when power is advanced for takeoff and the takeoff is immediately rejected. The Takeoff Configuration Test button had been pushed prior to taking the runway with Takeoff OK enunciated. Nothing can be found out of position and the second attempt is successful.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Student Pilot on Final Approach was on approach ATC informed Mooney if they had me in sight. Mooney answer he did not; until I was over the numbers in a stable configuration to land. Mooney acknowledges he has visual on me; as I am about to flare to touch wheels down ATC calls in to Go around if able. Thinking the faster more powerful Mooney is barreling down behind me; I acknowledged the Go Around. As I am climbing out; I noticed a shadow beside mine very close and realized the Mooney was also climbing beside me. ATC advised me to steer right and money to steer left I called in on the climb to ATC to advice what turn to make and was advised to make a right downwind after entering traffic pattern right. I also overheard ATC instruct Mooney to enter Left Down wind. As I made my right crosswind turn; I observed Mooney also turning right and about to face my general direction so I called back into tower and advised I will be making a left turn instead. Now facing the southeast; ATC called in to ask if I were flying South East and Why; Advised ATC that I was Avoiding traffic from MOONEY to maintain separation. ATC advised to go to left downwind after instruction the Mooney to do the same again but this time cross-field and was given the instruction to land on Runway 31 and hold short of runway 27. I continued to identify to ATC that I am a student Pilot on a solo but was confident I could pull the crosswind landing and hold short as the distance to 27 was at the top of my cleared runway assignment. I felt; as a student Pilot; ATC should have instructed the Mooney to go around or do a 360 on approach to same given runway to gain more separation.




Synopsis: C172 student pilot reported a near midair collision with a Mooney while on final approach and go-around.
Date: 201503
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The Company's refusal to cater the aircraft with crew meals; or provide a mechanism for Pilots to easily obtain food on international 'turn' pairings is a huge safety issue. The duty days on these pairings are long to start with; and with delays; can easily result in a duty day of 12 hours or more with the pilots having no easy access to food.  This is a problem in two ways.  First; because the Company has made no easy access to food possible; Crew Members spend the time in between flights jumping through all the customs hoops; etc. to get food.  This; combined with the natural time pressure of airline ops; presents a distraction from properly preparing for the flight.  Secondly; if a Crew Member decides to not go through the hassle of the customs process; he may go hours on end without eating resulting in a situation where he is actually unfit for duty without realizing it. Low blood sugar is an insidious problem; much like fatigue.  The Company's answer to the problem is for the pilots to always pack their own food before the trip.  This is simply not possible in many cases due to the realities of airline operations.  Secondly; the Company provides no cold storage to safely store the food.  This can lead to airborne food poisoning of pilots.Company must arrange for industry standard practice of ensuring suitable; nutritious food is provisioned on the aircraft and stored safely so as to prevent food-borne illness.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot stated he felt his company's refusal to board crew meals on international turn flights poses a safety risk.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B DFW
ATC / advisory: Tower DFW
Second aircraft: A321
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I had just opened Local East 1 at the start of the day shift. I was briefed on closures which included taxiways M3; M4; M5; EL between RWY 17R and RWY 17C and M between M3 and M5. I cleared Aircraft X to land on Runway 17C and advised him of the taxiway closures and asked that he plan to exit at M6. I then cleared Aircraft Y to land and advised them to plan the same exit. On landing; Aircraft X advised that M6 was coned off and not usable. I sent Aircraft Y around ; but noticing that they may have touched down and seeing that enough of Aircraft X appeared to be on the un-coned portion of M6; advised Aircraft Y to disregard. Aircraft Y did go around. DFW Airport Authority said that M6 was closed and they just forgot to tell us.




Synopsis: DFW Tower Controller reported a runway incursion with two arrivals on the same runway.