elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-31 Navajo/Chieftan/Mojave/T1040
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying from home at FL220. I was given a pilot descend to 10;000 feet. I was on the autopilot and I began the descent with a couple of down pitch trims on the trim wheel. I turned on the overhead dome light and opened my flight bag to get my iPad out. Soon after; the controller told me to contact Center. My eyes came back over to the control wheel and instruments. At that point; I saw that the attitude indicator showed an extreme downward unusual attitude. I immediately brought my power to idle and I believe started initiating the recovery at that point. I did not understand how it happened because the autopilot had been on and there was no aural tone that went off saying it had disconnected. The next thing that happened was that I began using the co-pilot attitude indicator to complete the recovery. When I was recovered; I was at least 90 degrees off course pointed to the east and at a rough altitude of 17;000 feet. I canceled IFR shortly after that. I believe that the auto pilot began a descending right turn without me knowing. I also believe that the combination of having the dome light on; and turning toward a darker section of terrain led to not catching the autopilot going off course. It was my first full blown unusual attitude recovery. It was a very large eye opener. More vigilance to autopilot monitoring may have caught it a slight bit sooner.




Synopsis: The pilot of a PA31 was surprised by an unusual attitude while on an IFR flight plan when the autopilot became unexpectedly disconnected.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff. It was my First Officer's (FOs) leg. The takeoff power was set and all engine parameters looked normal; and the plane began to roll down the runway. Around 70 kts; I heard 3-4 dings; from the cabin; (my flight interphone also happened to be on) and I heard 'there are flames/ fire out of the left engine' from one of the flight attendants. We did not have any cockpit fire warnings nor any caution indications at the time.I decided to make a low speed abort on the runway. I made a PA and told the Passengers; 'This is the Captain; remain seated; remain seated; remain seated'. We then turned off to the right on the first available exit and I requested Tower to send the fire trucks out to inspect the engines and aircraft. There were still no engine fire indications.The Fire trucks inspected the engines and airplane and notified us they did not see any fire or damage to the aircraft. We were then eventually towed back to the gate. My FO did also do an aborted [takeoff] brake temp chart calculation; as required. I did keep the passengers informed status and that we were going to be towed back to the gate. I did send an ACARS message to dispatch with the main takeoff abort details that had just occurred.After reviewing this aborted takeoff event; I did not declare an emergency with the Tower - but I probably should have.




Synopsis: At the start of the takeoff roll flight attendants witnessed flames coming out of one engine and informed the Captain. The Captain elected to do an immediate abort at low speed. The flight returned to the gate.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Other fatigue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Over a ten day period
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [I] worked four on; one off; five on. On the fifth day--at the end of pairing--Scheduling tried to reassign me. It was already a 12 hour duty day with a three hour sit included. [I] had to fly with new first officers which made my work load much higher. I didn't get much sleep the night before either (Day 4). Fell asleep late and woke up twice from passing noises. I was burnt out and was not going to operate any airplane when that exhausted.Long duty day; new first officers making work load higher; numerous MEL's on planes; not a good night's sleep all contributed to me being fatigued. Just part of the job.




Synopsis: An E-145 Captain refused a reassignment to additional flying following a ten day period that included only a single day off.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Spoiler System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: With all checklists completed; we took runway for takeoff after receiving takeoff clearance. I was the monitoring pilot and the FO was the flying pilot. On takeoff roll at a speed close to V1; we received a CASS message 'SPOILER FAIL' followed by a 'SPLRS OPN' indication. I called 'ABORT; ABORT; ABORT'. We followed aborted takeoff procedures- stopping the aircraft safely within the remaining runway distance and advising ATC off the abort. We informed ATC that we did not require assistance. We exited the runway.We advised the FA of the aborted takeoff and confirmed that she and all passengers were belted and unharmed. After talking to the FA; we completed an 'After Landing' checklist. The FO coordinated with Operations for a gate return; and I contacted Maintenance Control to report the abort. Maintenance Control requested the aircraft weight at time of abort and the brake temp indications. The weight was 44;200 lbs and the brake temps were well in the green range. The SPLRS OPN indication remained on the taxi in. After gate return and the 'Parking Checklist' completed; we found circuit breaker 'SPOILER-IND' had popped. All circuit breakers were pushed in during the preflight inspection. The speed brake lever was in the closed position from initial scan to parking check list. We checked the takeoff configuration prior to departure during the 'Before Takeoff Checklist' and the test indicated that the airplane was correctly configured for takeoff. During preflight we observed in the AML look back that there was a previous entry pertaining to an inadvertent spoiler deploy in flight. This previous spoiler write up was written on a previous AML page and was signed off by maintenance with a good ops check. I made an AML entry about our spoiler irregularity and then we deplaned the passengers at the gate and swapped aircraft. The flight resumed with the swapped aircraft and we departed with no further occurrences.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew received a 'SPOILER FAIL' followed by a 'SPLRS OPN' indication during the takeoff roll prior to V1. The crew initiated a successful rejected takeoff.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: [We were on the] SADDE Arrival to LAX descending from approximately 12;000 FT to 10;000 FT approaching BAYST Intersection; encountered moderate and greater wake turbulence. The Captain (pilot flying) took the aircraft out of LNAV and used HDG SEL to offset from procedure track. This resulted in a late turn to the west at BAYST. Due to frequency congestion and cockpit workload; this happened before I could coordinate with ATC. Controller said we were behind an EMB-170 but the wake was intense. I suspect it was from an A-340 that was ahead of the EMB-170.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported 'moderate and greater' wake turbulence in trail of an EMB-170 and an A340. Captain turned off course to minimize the wake effect and they deviated from the assigned track.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I would like to share my concern about our current -800 loading procedures and how they result in nose heavy flight characteristics during takeoff. I was dispatched in [this] aircraft. The Agent input all 120 Passengers into Zone 1 as per our current procedures. We had 4;000 pounds of freight in the forward hold. The load sheet predicted trim 5.6; but the performance computer generated 6.1. The aircraft required an unusual amount of back pressure during takeoff. I began nose-up trim shortly after liftoff requiring a setting of about 7.5 to achieve acceptable performance. I had the Flight Attendants acquire a zone count during the flight. During ground operations had the Agent rerun the loading with the zone count (49/46/25). The predicted trim was 6.7. I do not know what the performance computer would have generated; but given that it generally adds about .3-.5 units; it may have given me 7.0-7.2 - much closer to normal aircraft performance. Note: Landing trip was 10.5. We departed with 84 Passengers using a zone count of 36/33/15 computation and 1;200 pounds of cargo/bags. The loadsheet predicted a trim of 6.0 and the [flight computer] gave us 6.3. The flight performance was normal during takeoff. The concern is that the policy of placing the Passenger load into a single Zone 1 on the loading schedule is generating routinely nose-heavy performance. Not only are we decreasing the fuel efficiency of the aircraft; but we are not compensating with a realistic trim setting. Please review the software assumptions of this operation.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain experienced conflicting loading procedures and calculations of weight and balance and takeoff performance data. Captain reported that the load planning assumptions in the weight and balance computer and the station lading procedures results in nose-heavy flight characteristics on takeoff and recommends a review of those assumptions and procedures.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Transport
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was descended to 4;100 feet in a 4;700 MVA. I had a lot going on at the time with weather deviations and aircraft repositioning between airports.




Synopsis: NCT Controller reported they descended an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201808
Location: BVI.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Unknown
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Dispatch Dispatcher; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: The tower at BVI continues to improperly send METAR report via Aeronautical Information System Replacement (AISR) as required. This is the only way the weather report for this training airport gets into the system for preflight planning applications and sites. The AWOS 3P is not connected for auto processing. Therefore when the tower is closed or the weather is not processed correctly by the tower it affects TAF forecasting. This has resulted in two of our students encountering unforecasted weather. One student pilot came up on IMC weather; landed at another airport [which is] a serious safety issue; but the right choice. Discussions with both the tower manager about the processing issue when the tower is open and with the airport manager about AWOS 3P connectivity have not improved or corrected the problem. I discussed with the local NWS office the effect of not having the current METAR on the TAF amendments. They stated it resulted in limited forecasting and delayed amendments. This is a serious safety hazard for this airport and training environment.




Synopsis: GA instructor reported improper BVI METAR weather dissemination via AISR. Instructor reported AWOS 3P is not auto processing and measures to correct this have not resolved the issue.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGAV.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower LGAV
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After doing a crew swap into an airplane with an MEL'd right Thrust Reverser; we were notified of the MEL and saw the sign off on the sheet. Everything seemed to be fine and the captain taxied out to the runway where we were cleared for takeoff. On the takeoff roll we got a right reverser unlock light and the corresponding red CAS message. The takeoff was aborted and as soon as we taxied off the runway we contacted maintenance who advised us that a circuit breaker for the MEL'd reverser had been neglected to be pulled. They advised us to pull the circuit breaker and try again. On the second take off attempt the reverser unlock light illuminated again along with the corresponding red CAS message. We aborted the takeoff and taxied back to parking; where we contacted maintenance again and they said they were sending out the local maintenance guys who had worked on it that morning. We went to the hotel and a few hours later were contacted by maintenance to go out to the airplane and do a test run up. I went to the airport and conducted the run up and all checkouts that maintenance asked me to run; all successful. When I pulled the MEL to do the MEL to our write up I noticed that the previous MEL was not signed off correctly. It was signed off by a pilot; but had an (M) procedure requirement. The mechanics there advised me that they had not performed the maintenance functions required by the MEL prior to our attempted departure; and that is why there was no sign off by them. There was obviously a breakdown of communication between maintenance and the previous crew; combined with our failure to reference the MEL to compare what was signed off to the requirement of said MEL entry. In the future I will very closely inspect any MEL's and make sure that all maintenance actions required of them have been performed.




Synopsis: GIV First Officer reported they attempted several takeoffs that were rejected when a reverser light illuminated. Confusion over applicability of MEL was contributory.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Second aircraft: B737-800
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight; Routine Inspection
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The Denver Sector 9 Controller handed two aircraft off on collision courses at the same altitude. We had to call them and ask them to turn one of the aircraft to keep them from losing separation one minute inside our boundary. Hold Controllers and Supervisors accountable for ensuring separation.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported that the adjacent Center handed them off two aircraft on converging headings at the same altitude; causing an airborne conflict.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: New York (N90) TRACON consistently asks for aircraft to maintain above 200 knots below the shelf of the New York Class B. In this case we were asked to maintain 250 knots. I have also been asked to maintain 210 knots or greater below the Class B. This creates a conflict between violating 14 CFR 91.117 or telling ATC you are unable; which will most likely upset the controller; jam up the frequency; and create bigger issues.




Synopsis: Corporate Captain reported that New York (N90) TRACON instructed the crew to maintain 250 knots below the shelf of New York Class B airspace. The reporter stated N90 controllers consistently ask aircraft to maintain greater than 200 knots below the shelf.