elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: S46.TRACON, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Second aircraft: B737-800
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: The SOP allows Tower to launch successive departures utilizing pilot provided visual separation. The ATCT must modify the secondary scratchpad in the STARS data-tag to advise the TRACON that pilot provided visual separation is being used. However; in this case the first aircraft is an [Airbus] and that type of aircraft is notorious for climbing out much slower than most other aircraft. According to the FALCON replay the trailing B738 is 1.55 miles behind the [Airbus] with a 60 knot overtake. I restricted the B738 to 230 knots and requested the [Airbus] increase to 250 knots as soon as possible. Despite those efforts the situation continued to compress. While I was aware pilot provided visual separation was being utilized; in my judgment the situation had become unsafe and I decided to break our noise abatement procedures and initiate an early eastbound turn for the B738. After initiating the turn I made the supervisor aware of the situation. Both aircraft subsequently continued their departures without further incident.This is a common problem that we experience with [this type of Airbus departure]. I do not know why this specific aircraft type climbs out so differently; but it is common knowledge at the TRACON. I would propose that this situation could be corrected by changing the Letter of Agreement to exclude [this Airbus aircraft type departure] from the provision allowing the use of pilot provided visual separation between successive departures. If Tower had utilized the standard 3-5 mile in-trail spacing that would have been required during IMC; this event would have been completely avoided.




Synopsis: S46 TRACON Controller stated Airbus type departing aircraft routinely climb at much slower airspeeds than similar size type aircraft.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower SJC
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On above time and date at SJC I taxied from FBO to 30L at intersection C for departure.  Upon completing the run up at about a 45 degree angle to runway facing departure end; I switched frequency to Tower frequency and immediately heard tower call me asking if I was ready.  I responded in the affirmative.  Tower's response was partially stepped on but I thought I was given take off clearance with an advisory of traffic on 2 1/2 mile final.  Since with Tower's initial call to me asking if I was ready I sensed possible urgency and in my attempt to assist in that perceived urgency I quickly ran through pre take off flow and turned aircraft perpendicular to runway which placed the aircraft partially over the hold short line.  Upon becoming perpendicular to runway I looked for the said traffic on final and saw the traffic not on 2 1/2 mile final but on short final.  I immediately stopped the aircraft at which time Tower urgently advised me to hold short.  I believe the tail of the aircraft was approximately at the hold short line with of course the rest of the aircraft beyond the hold short line.  The Tower did advise the landing traffic to go around.  After take off I was given a phone number to call.  Immediately upon landing I called said phone number as requested and discussed occurrence with Tower.




Synopsis: Pilot reported communications issues with ATC led to a runway incursion and the tower directing the other aircraft to go around.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared to descend via the RNAV Arrival into ZZZ. While at FL270; ATC stated 'Do me a favor and cross ZZZZZ intersection at FL190.' The FMC wouldn't initially take FL190 at ZZZZZ intersection because the following waypoint (ZZZZZ1) had a restriction of FL200A. While working with the FMC to correct this problem; we failed to clarify if ATC wanted us to 'descend via; except cross ZZZZZ at FL190'; so with the ZZZZZ2 crossing restriction of FL240A (which is only 7.5 miles west of ZZZZZ) it left an extremely steep descent after the ZZZZZ2 intersection. Passing ZZZZZ2 Pilot Flying (PF) intervened with Vertical Speed and increased the rate of descent to make the crossing restriction. PF failed to immediately reset the MCP altitude to FL190 for the degrade in automation. Passing FL197; at a high rate of descent; the altitude window was reset to FL190; but further intervention and automation degradation was required to keep from busting through FL190. During this intervention; neither the PF nor the Pilot Monitoring (PM) noticed that the autopilot had disengaged. As a result the aircraft leveled initially at FL190 and then continued to descend to FL183. The next waypoint [after ZZZZZ1] on the arrival is ZZZZZ3; which has an altitude restriction of FL190. We descended to FL183 ft before correcting back up to FL190. The rest of the arrival and landing were uneventful. There were a number of things we could have done to prevent this event from occurring: Clarify the clearance with ATC. The removal of the FL240A restriction just prior to the ZZZZZ intersection would have allowed us to remain in the highest level of automation and allowed the FMC to correctly program a descent formula. If we had immediately reset the MCP altitude to FL190; the autopilot could have assisted in leveling off at the proper altitude. Proper phraseology by ATC could have mitigated the problem. Both Pilots should have been more vigilant in monitoring the aircraft to detect that the autopilot had disengaged.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 Flight Crew reported the aircraft overshot the altitude restriction because the autopilot disconnected.
Date: 202111
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Cruise; Descent
Airspace: Class A ZNY; Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Crew both inbound to EWR and outbound had to switch off guard frequency (121.5) with distraction of frequent inappropriate transmissions taking place (meowing sounds; political utterances; etc). Transmissions occurred throughout New York airspace. Safety was obviously diminished with the inability of crew to monitor frequency for potential safety related information. Absent switching off frequency; crew was unable to appropriately hear and monitor primary ATC frequencies.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported inappropriate radio transmissions on guard frequency interfered with their ability to hear ZNY ATC instructions.
Date: 202201
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flying Left patterns for Runway XX into ZZZ with a new student; we were on left downwind with one airplane ahead of us on base turning final. Was also aware of traffic from the east coming in. Standard call outs at this field are on base when flying patterns; also wasn't told to report anything. Pattern prior I called on left downwind. Still on downwind I became aware of the traffic coming in flying almost parallel to our course. At this time a Aircraft Y calls in; ATC misses the call; so Aircraft Y has to repeat. Unable to report downwind due to this and plan on reporting base. Still on downwind/extended downwind at this point with traffic we are following on final not yet abeam and another airplane parallel to our course at the same altitude. Before we are able to turn base due to the traffic on final an ADS-B traffic warning goes off for the traffic inbound and parallel. At this time; I believe the traffic is either on final or entering a close left base to final. With incoming traffic and another plane on final to my left practicing touch and goes. I notify ATC of the alert and using my captain's authority; execute the standard right turn for head-on traffic avoidance; believing that will take me well clear of the traffic. Traffic then mirrors my turn to the left; following my course. I begin executing a climb with the traffic nearing as I noticed I was higher; and we pass within 200 ft. of each other. I notify ATC again of what happened. Not sure if opposing traffic ever realized I was there; aircraft was ADS-B equipped; but didn't respond at all to my call nor acknowledge it. May have also been making a left turn to intercept the extended base he was initially given; as what he was flying before his correction was more of a final or shallow base entry. Afterwards; a little shaken; I may have misheard a call telling me to enter a right downwind for Runway XX. I ask for clarification; stating we are to the south of the field and a left downwind would be best for Runway XX. Get told to enter left downwind for XX and proceed to follow Aircraft Y in who called earlier in.




Synopsis: Instructor pilot reported a NMAC with an aircraft while in the airport traffic pattern.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: I worked a job task card on 2 aircraft about 6 months ago. On page 2 step 5 it read; route the following wires per Figure 2 with 'SPECIAL ATTENTION' given to Figure 2 sheet 3 of 4; which provided unique wire bundle routing for the wire bundle W0054 due to Fuel Quantity Indicating Systems (FQIS) requirements. W0054 must be sleeved with connector ring and grommet from the upper a Reference Figure 2 sheet 2 of 4; to connector D46061 POS23; reference Figures 3; 4 and 5. The paperwork [had been modified to read]: To be sleeved from the upper Z Reference. So that would make the 2 planes I did had about a 1 1/2 foot of extra sleeving on it.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician reported that long after he worked a task card that had been updated with a change to the instructions he determined that the amount of protective sleeve that he used was incorrect.
Date: 201807
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Generator Drive
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While cruising at FL340 we received an ECAM indicating IDG 1 Oil Low Pressure. We complied with the non-normal procedure and disconnected IDG 1. After approximately 5 minutes; we received an ECAM indicating APU Auto Shutdown. We [advised ATC] and diverted to [a suitable alternate] where we executed a normal landing and taxied to the gate.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported a malfunctioning Integrated Drive Generator and subsequent auto shutdown of the APU; necessitating an immediate diversion to a suitable alternate airport.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Human factors: Workload; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The TAF for ZZZ is NOT done by the NWS but contracted to [a company] to issue an Enhanced Weather Information System (EWINS) TAF. This shows up in our [dispatch computer] and is emailed to a conference where I can find it. The TAF does not automatically go into our airline planning tools or the flight crew packet but must be copied and pasted into our weather system in order to be easily seen by the dispatcher and for the crew to have it.An old EWINS TAF from 3 days earlier was still in the system and I failed to notice the date was incorrect. After the flight was airborne to ZZZ I noticed that an amended TAF had popped into my [dispatch computer]. I then went to compare the new TAF to the one in the system and then noticed the date was wrong on the one which I used to dispatch the flight. I also checked the flight paperwork packet that the crew used and it contained the TAF from 3 days earlier.FAR 121.601(b) before beginning a flight; the aircraft dispatcher shall provide the pilot in command with all available weather reports and forecasts of weather phenomena that may affect the safety of flight.I failed to provide the crew with the current EWINS TAF for ZZZ before departure.I sent the flight crew the current ZZZ TAF via ACARs and they acknowledged receiving it.We should have an automated system to have EWINS TAFs entered into our primary dispatch tools. TAFs should be deleted from our primary system when they are no longer valid. I would have noticed if there was no TAF in the system.I have added a [dispatch] Pop Up Alert to check that a valid TAF is in the system for ZZZ as a double check.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported dispatching a flight with an old Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) that was still in the system from days earlier and not noticing it was out of date until an amended TAF popped up; with the aircraft already in flight.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On a flight out of ORD I noticed a dark colored drone flying off the right side of the aircraft after departing Runway 9R. It was shortly after takeoff and I noticed while we were climbing through about 2500 MSL. It looked strange and out of place so it really caught my attention. It was not moving fast if at all and passed several hundred yards off the right side of the aircraft.I notified departure control and they followed up with several questions. I told them the color and altitude and fix off of a ground location for them. I said that it was over the Des Plains River near some forest preserve area. We continued our flight without incident.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported sighting a UAV at 2;500 ft during climbout from ORD Runway 9R.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ROC.Airport, NY
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ROC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: NOTAMs described all taxi surfaces as poor braking. The runway was 4/4/4 with 25% ice. When taxing out of the Rochester ramp; after crossing Runway 28 on Taxiway F; we got into an area of nil braking and the aircraft skidded for about 50 feet. I was only taxing about 3 mph so I stopped the aircraft and called for a tug. The county came and spread sand over the bad areas and the tug subsequently pulled us to the departure end of the takeoff runway and the rest of the flight was uneventful.With rapidly changing weather conditions; the county should err on the conservative side and call the braking action Nil if there is any doubt. As I was listening to ground control prior to taxi; I heard a commuter airline call the airline ramp nil for taxi. This gave me an early indication of possible rapidly changing conditions.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported skidding 50 feet on ice on Taxiway F past Runway 28 at ROC. The aircraft was subsequently towed to the runway for a normal departure.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TWF.Tower, ID
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D TWF
ATC / advisory: Tower TWF
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft X; a VFR aircraft inbound from the South; was informed of the local UAS field that is located 3 miles south of the Twin Falls airport. The UAS field was operational at or below 800 AGL. Aircraft X was level at 5500 when he reported a remote controlled aircraft that he estimated to be 200 feet above his altitude and about 3/4 to 1 mile north to his location. The pilot of the UAS was contacted and told of the error. In addition this is the second time; within a week that the UAS operators have been too high. Twin Falls is a location with lots of land and open spaces; I recommend that the UAS Field be relocated to a different area that is not within TWF class delta airspace. In my opinion; it is only a matter of time before we have an accident due to operation of remote control aircraft within controlled airspace. I have spoken to UAS operators and they don't have accurate equipment that displays altitude information in real time. To my understanding they can attach equipment that will tell them what altitude they flew at; however; that is only after they have landed. The UAS within Class Delta airspace introduces unnecessary risk into the NAS. Please look into this issue.




Synopsis: TWF Tower Controller reported of a pilot that reported a UAV was 200 feet above the pilot's aircraft at 5500 feet MSL. Controller reported there is a UAS field 3 miles south of the airport and this was the second time this has happened.