elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Compressor
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff on climb out started getting a #3 engine vibration. Watched engine indications up to cruise vibration worsened. We received an Engine Vibration Monitoring (EVM) amber boxed indication on the # 3 engine it stabilized around 4.2. Complied with QRH checklist contacted maintaince control and decided to return. Engine indications on #3 were lower N1 and Higher N2 along with 60-70 degrees higher EGT.


Second narrative: Climbing out after takeoff; I noticed that the N1 on #3 Engine was lower than #1 & #2. As I attempted to advance throttle; I noticed that N2 was already up to the limit at 110%. We continued to monitor the #3 N1 and N2 until cruise. The First Officer (FO); as the Pilot Flying (PF) also noted a a very slight vibration during climbout that disapated during level off. After level we observed the #3 EVM COMP with an amber box indicating 4.0-4.6; with a peak at 5.1. We also observed; at cruise power that #3 N1 was slightly lower than #1 and #2; EGT was 70 degrees higher than #1 and #2; N2 was 5-8% higher than #1 and #2 and Fuel Flow (FF) was was 1;000-2;000 lbs. higher than #1 and #2. After consulting the QRH and Maintenance Control; we opted to return. We briefed precautionarly shutdown if we observed the indications worsening. We auto landed and shutdown #3 engine during taxi to our gate. After block in; maintenance informed us that the compressor section was trashed; will definitely be an engine change.


Synopsis: MD-11 Captain notes N1; N2; EGT and vibration anomalies on engine number three during climb out. Fuel flow was also higher and after consulting with maintenance Control; the crew elects to return to the departure airport.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BFD.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: A near-miss with a landing aircraft occurred at Bradford Regional Airport during takeoff. Wind was calm and there is no preferred runway at BFD. I had taxied to Runway 32 and completed my pre-takeoff checklist. After scanning the airport pattern and announcing my intentions to depart the airport to the north on Runway 32; I performed my final takeoff checks and took the runway. During rotation; my passenger called out conflicting traffic on Runway 23; and I sighted the aircraft slowing and approaching the runway crossing; about 1000 - 2000 feet in front of us. I elected to continue the takeoff instead of trying to brake; and we passed over the aircraft by about 200 feet with about 100 feet horizontal from directly beneath us.After finishing the departure; my passenger and I immediately troubleshooted the situation; verifying that the radio volume was turned up because we had not heard any radio calls from the conflicting aircraft. We found that the radio has been in a lower position; but did not verify the exact level in our haste to ensure radio communication. We did not hear any radio calls post-incident from the conflicting aircraft; but did hear other traffic at BFD later in our flight. It is a distinct possibility that the conflicting aircraft had no radio or did not make position calls; but cannot be said conclusively due to the uncertainty of our radio volume level.After reviewing the situation; I have determined that the root cause was the failure of the crew to ensure that the radio was at an appropriate volume prior to departing the airport. As an environmental contributing factor; it is not possible to see the end of Runway 23 from Runway 32's hold short line; as well as the end of the downwind; base; and final leg. This is due to high-density; tall trees surrounding the airport. If I or the other pilot had been flying a no-radio aircraft; it would be unlikely that this incident would have been avoided as I would have not seen the landing aircraft.As a pilot; my corrective action is to add squelch checks prior to every departure at an uncontrolled field and build a habit of verifying my radio volume level regularly. I also recommend that it be considered to remove trees near the end of Runway 32 to allow proper scanning of the airport pattern on the crossing runway.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported a conflict with another aircraft on takeoff at BFD. Reporter cited poor radio procedures and trees on the airport property as contributing factors.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Air Taxi
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This was only the latest example of S56/ZLC not giving priority handling to a Medevac aircraft. I was told by my Supervisor the aircraft must go over FFU (30 miles south of SLC) and make the subsequent 90 degree turn to the north for 'sequencing.' I called S56 Jordan Sector as he approached asking for more direct routing to the airport. I was again told no; he must go over FFU for sequencing. Other aircraft were a factor but I would have been happy to sequence them behind the Medevac aircraft but; as usual; S56 and our TMU and Management have a different take on what priority handling means. This happens all the time! Medevac aircraft familiar with the practice are often forced to cancel IFR in questionable conditions to get their patients to the SLC airport faster. I recommend we follow the regulations and give Medevacs priority handling all the time; not just when convenient.




Synopsis: A ZLC Controller reported the lack of priority given to Medevac aircraft within the ZLC/S56 airspace system; giving examples of the non-adherence to existing regulations.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 100
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR20
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Other Part 141
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach; Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was on an Instrument flight with my instructor when we decided to fly the RNAV XX at ZZZ which is an uncontrolled airport. My instructor was making final calls for runway XX on the CTAF while we were descending towards the runway; we hear no response so we continue with our descent. On final my instructor tells me to take off my foggles and go visual; at that point he asks me if what he's seeing on the runway is another plane or not. I looked and sure enough it was coming straight for us departing on runway YY. We were at around 1300 ft. when we noticed and decided to bank right where we missed him by what I would assume was less than 200 ft.[No one] was injured in this but my instructor and I were pretty shaken up. I think this problem arose from the lack of communication from the departing aircraft. If they had said their intentions then we would have known they were departing and would have made proper actions to get very clear out of their way. I also believe that it was in part that the AWOS was reading calm winds. This ends up making it so that the runway does not have a predominant headwind causing pilots to just 'pick a runway'. These I believe are very dangerous and could result; and have resulted in accidents before.I think one way to mitigate this would be to have something in the chart supplements; or making a regulation that forces a directional runway to be used at a non-towered airport when winds are reading calm which makes it so everyone is using the same direction (like what we do with VFR magnetic heading altitudes). Or I believe that you should have to use comms while at non-towered airports as well. I believe that these being implemented would make aviation much safer and I wouldn't have to worry about someone crashing head on into me at my local non-towered airport.




Synopsis: SR-20 pilot reported an NMAC event during final approach to a non-towered airport. All required radio position reports were completed with no traffic responses received. On final; fight crew made visual contact with an opposite direction departure and executed an evasive maneuver.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While preparing for departure on my third leg of IOE; we had a crew consisting of myself; the Captain and two RFO's (Relief First Officers). (One additional; since I had not met the requirements to be an independent crew member). The Captain and I were in the seats having completed the pre-flight items; up to the before start checklist to the line; and were waiting for the Final Weight and Balance data.  A few moments later we received the chime for the Final Weight and Balance data; and began to review it. The Captain heard the door being closed and told the second RFO; who was in the cockpit; that he didn't want the doors closed yet. The second RFO asked if the Captain wanted him to go back and stop the RFO who was closing up. The Captain said yes. As the second RFO went back; I heard him say 'hold up.' The Captain and I went back to looking at the final when the second RFO stuck his head in the cockpit and said 'we just blew a slide'.A few moments later the RFO who was in the supernumerary compartment came up and said 'I can't believe I just did that.' He proceeded to say that it was totally his fault; there was no malfunction and he just made a mental error.At that point the Captain began contacting the appropriate people to start working the problem.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported an inadvertent slide deployment of a door during preflight procedures.
Date: 201502
Location: ZBW.ARTCC, NH
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While flying the QUABN3 STAR; ATC gave us a hold at ONDEC Intersection (Intersection on the QUABN3 BOS STAR) due to the fact that a snow plow had gotten stuck on the runway in BOS during the snow removal process.  When we left the hold; ATC cleared us direct to UROWT and the QUABN3; and we continued on to BOS.  Nothing happened during the flight; no FAR's or SOP's were broken; and no speed or altitudes were busted.  The flight was uneventful.However; my issue is with the name of the UROWT intersection and possible hear back/read back issues. When spoken; this intersection; UROWT; can be also be heard as 'Your Route'; as in Cleared direct XYZ; the rest of YOUR ROUTE is unchanged.....instead of UROWT; (Spoken as 'YOUR OUT).....particularly with a Boston Controller's accent. So; UROWT and YOUR ROUTE; are very similar; in fact; so similar that it could create hear back/read back issues.  Since neither ONDEC nor UROWT were not on our original flight plan; we did have a little misunderstanding between pilots as to the ATC clearance.  However; we did rectify the situation and the flight continued uneventfully to Boston. Therefore; to prevent any hear back/read back errors; may I suggest that the name of this intersection; UROWT; be changed to prevent any possible hear back/read back errors.




Synopsis: B757 First Officer reports being cleared direct to UROWT on the QUABN3 arrival to BOS which causes confusion in the cockpit due to the way UROWT is pronounced by the ZBW Controller (your route) and believes it should be changed.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: A380
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I received notification of an event. When reviewing the playback with management none of us could determine the loss of separation when the event occurred. An A380 departed SFO Runway 28 routed to LIN VOR. The A380 was initially climbed to 10;000 and vectored northbound offshore in accordance with noise abatement. The A380 was then turned direct LIN VOR and climbed to 15;000. The B737-800 departed SFO Runway 01 routed over LIN; initially climbing to 10;000. The B737-800 was issued another altitude of 8;000. The B737-800 was vectored to a H350 for in trail spacing behind the A380 and climbed to 9;000. When the A380 left 11;000; the B737-800 was climbed to 1;000. The playback reported 4.8 miles and 800 FT 'wake remnants' of the A380 were speculated to be the cause of the separation alert. Controllers have no tools; nor during busy times should be required to know; when and what altitude the aircraft were all along the route. We have no tools that are used to determine any type of wake remnants; nor do we have the ability to remember the altitudes. I challenge any one to work a busy session and remember the altitudes of all aircraft 10 miles prior and all along the route. We work with real time altitudes and real time position of the aircraft.




Synopsis: NCT Controller was questioned regarding an alledged 'wake remant' separation loss; the Controller claiming no tools are avaialble to controllers to identify these types of occurrences.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passenger neglected to comply with airline's mask policy; resulting in passenger being removed from the aircraft. The aircraft was still at the gate when this event took place and after the passenger was removed; the flight departed to its destination without further incident.Forward FA asked me (CA) to speak with non-complying passenger about our mask-policy. After speaking with the passenger; the passenger complied and agreed to properly wear the mask. After a few minutes; the FA complained again that the passenger was not complying with the policy and that the passenger was getting aggressive towards the FA. The station manager was involved in this incident and a decision was determined to remove the passenger from the flight.




Synopsis: Captain reported a passenger was not complying with face mask policy and was eventually removed from the flight.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp DEN
Second aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Reporter qualification: Other Ramp Controller
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was training a new Ramp controller. I had an incident where a B737 turning out of a gate hit their brakes and requested to return to the gate due to an injured flight attendant. We gave clearance to a RJ to taxi to the gate. The RJ was moving at a good rate of speed. The B737 called for taxi from their gate. The taxi instruction were issued. The pilots read back was correct. As the RJ approached the B737 still hadn't moved. I then instructed the trainee to tell the RJ to give way as it got closer and then changed my mind because the B737 still did not move. The B737 then started to rollout quickly. I then instructed the B737 to give way. The B737 did not read back the instruction. At that moment the aircraft stopped quickly as the RJ approached.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: DEN Ramp controllers reported they allowed an aircraft to taxi behind an aircraft which they allowed to pushback.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working sector 19 and had a CRJ descending into the El Paso terminal area. The CRJ was on the star at this time. A VFR BE20 called for VFR flight following the aircraft was leaving El Paso Approach's airspace climbing. So to understand the picture the CRJ was just about head on with the BE20. The BE20 was going to pass maybe a 1/4 mile north of the CRJ. El Paso Approach called me and said to stop the CRJ at 14;000 FT and told me nothing about the BE20; I then told him I had already shipped him and proceed to give El Paso control. At this point I was gathering all the BE20's info to put in the computer as well as verifying the mode C; radar identification; type and route. By this point the CRJ and the rebel were in very close proximity. At this point I was unaware of the altitude the BE20 was climbing to. Then when I saw the BE20 climbing thru 13;500; I asked him what he was climbing to he said 16;500. I issued vectors to the BE20 to clear the CRJ. Both aircraft got within .25 mile or less at the same altitude. After the situation I asked the BE20; was El Paso Approach proving you flight following? He replied yes; but they canceled my flight following and had me contact you. All this could have been avoided if he was not terminated. In my opinion El Paso Approach was not providing any service to this VFR aircraft. I noticed the situation late on my end; and I should have caught it quicker; but my question is who terminates flight following on an aircraft with IFR traffic descending thru his flight path. My opinion El Paso Approach was using careless Air Traffic Control and was not providing safety. If they would have flashed me the BE20 data block this would not of happened. I spent precious seconds gathering all the info on the BE20 when he came over putting me way behind that is why my response was late. We need to work better as a team.




Synopsis: ZAB Controller describes a conflict between a VFR BE20 departing El Paso eastbound and a CRJ arriving from the east. The BE20 was receiving flight following from El Paso Departure but was canceled before being switched to ZAB; wasting precious seconds.