elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E M03
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was the pilot flying the MASHH RNAV arrival into MEM. Approaching MASHH Intersection I realized the automation was not sufficiently slowing the aircraft for the published speed of 230 KTS at FASOP Intersection. I believe I may have overridden my speeds at the fixes with an earlier tactical speed adjustment. I deselected profile mode and extended the speed brake and slowed the descent to reduce the speed. In doing so I also reduced my rate of descent and was approximately 300 feet high crossing FASOP and about 18 knots fast. I kept the speed brake extended and met both speed and altitude constraints approximately 1.5 to two miles past FASOP.There was no loss of separation vertically or horizontally with any other traffic that we were aware of. These were the circumstances to the best of my knowledge and recall. My primary focus was getting the aircraft on altitude and speed not focusing on the distances once I saw the need to make a correction. Earlier intervention with the automation [might have helped]. Also; I could have adjusted the altitudes and speeds more conservatively in the FMS to ensure the parameters of these new arrivals are met.




Synopsis: An A300 flight crew was unable to comply with the crossing speed and altitude restrictions at MASHH Intersection on the MASHH RNAV STAR at MEM.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RVJ.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Windshear; 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 33
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G RVJ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Workload; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Airport; Weather
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I was enroute; VFR 8500 feet [and] entered pattern for runway 28 at my planned destination. Below 1000 feet; the winds were substantial and variable; gusting to 30kts. Although I am proficient and comfortable with crosswind/gusts; the conditions were outside my personal safety limits. I immediately went missed when it was clear that I would not be able to land there. I went direct to KRVJ; an airport I am familiar with and comfortable landing from prior arrivals. Due to the turbulence at enroute altitude (approximately 1500 feet); I was unable to check NOTAMS at RVJ. Due to turbulence; I could not devote full attention to ForeFlight to verify NOTAMS; as I was trying to safely fly the plane in the aggressive winds.On short final; approximately 200 feet AGL; I noticed a VERY SMALL 'X' in the runoff area. I believe it meant that the run off was closed; not the airport or the runway. I have seen the 'X' actually on the runway; blocking the runway at other airports; indicating a closed runway. After landing safely; I noticed the NOTAM in ForeFlight. I believe that the severe low-level turbulence and strong winds prevented me from checking NOTAMS in an airport that I did not intend on landing. On short final; had the 'X' (runway closed) been more prominent; I would have recognized it as the runway closed; rather than the overrun closed. I had not intended to land at RVJ; it was an in-flight safety decision due to the extreme winds at intended destination.




Synopsis: Beechcraft Bonanza pilot reported landing on closed runway in turbulent; gusty conditions. Runway closure marking was incorrect and unclear. Pilot exercised Part 91.3 authority safety decision.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Aircraft component: Nosewheel Steering
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: FO iPad mount was situated by fo nosewheel steering tiller... as captain I tried to exit rwy but tiller was jammed by FO iPad mount.




Synopsis: B777 Captain reports being unable to turn off the runway after landing due to the tiller being jammed on the First Officer's side by the unused iPad mount.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Vectored onto the [Runway] 16R ILS at 2;100 [feet] due to a medical situation aircraft behind us; putting us lower and about 3 miles from a 737 ahead of us and a little above. We hit some wake turbulence putting us into a slight bank and then again pushing us to about 10 to 15 degrees of bank. The First Officer immediately took control and climbed and stayed high on the glide slope for the approach and landed with no further problems.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to SEA in trail of a B737.
Date: 202202
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While in cruise; both the First Officer (FO) and I smelled what appeared to be an electrical odor. I called back to the Flight Attedent's (FA) to ask if they had any unusual odor in the cabin. They said that they did with a very light haze in the cabin. The FO and I accomplished the QRC for SMOKE; FIRE or FUMES which then lead us to QRH Chapter 8 SMOKE; FIRE or FUMES Checklist. We accomplished steps 1-12. I read step 12 as we had extinguished the source through previous steps. The smell had dissipated as did the haze in the cabin; which in my opinion confirmed that the situation was contained. We then moved to item 13. At that point I contacted Dispatch and informed them of the entire event and discussed with them our options and their preference. I conferred with the FO and all FAs and apprised them that it was my intent to continue on to our destination; but if anyone did not feel comfortable with this decision; that we would divert into ZZZ. At that time we were about 30 minutes east of ZZZ. Dispatch had also said that based on the information that we gave them; and having spoken with Maintenance; asked if we were comfortable to continue to destination. I informed them that we would continue on and would divert to ZZZ if the fumes returned. As I sit and spend more time reading this QRH out of the Cockpit; I could see how maybe we should have have diverted as the smoke; fire or fumes were not 'obvious' although it was obvious through the absence of smell and haze the source was 'isolated and extinguished.'




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported a fume event during cruise. After completing the appropriate QRH procedure and  conferring with Maintenance the flight continued to a safe landing at destination.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp TEB
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Observer
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: As we were taxiing the airplane into the FBO ramp in Teterboro; we noticed it [seemed] narrow with airplanes parked on both sides of us; but plenty wide enough for our G-V. We were met by 3 marshalers; one in front and one on each side. They guided us down the right side of the alley. We thought they were going to 'nose us in' and use a tug to turn us around to face the exit. As we got closer to the end of the alley; the marshalers had us make a small turn to the right to get us closer to the airplanes on the right side of us with still plenty of room between us. They then had us make a hard left 180 degree turn to face the exit. I remember seeing the pilot flying use very little power on the right engine (less then a knob up) while the left engine remained at idle to keep the airplane very slow due to the proximity of the parked aircraft. After engine shut down; the pilots from a nearby corporate jet came over to inform us that our turn had caused their gust lock to disengage and they could not re-engage it. They were concerned there could be some damage. They also said another corporate jet had been 'knocked around' as well. I told them I was shocked because we had used such little power due to our light weight. They told us they thought the marshalers had us too close to the parked aircraft and should have never had us do a 180 degree turn that close. When the turn was made; I did not think our exhaust would be an issue because we were light and used so little power. A gusty 28 KT wind directly on their tail did not help our cause either. They informed the FBO Ramp Agents and their Supervisors of the event. In retrospect; it would have been better for all involved if we would have stopped the airplane straight ahead and been tugged into place instead of following the marshaler's directions. I have made this same turn many times in my career with no problems. I will think twice before doing another turn in close proximity to other aircraft.




Synopsis: A TEB FBO marshaling crew guided a G-V into a tight ramp area and directed a 180 degree turn between aircraft which may have allowed their jet blast to damage nearby aircraft.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZBW.ARTCC, NH
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Physiological - Other; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Had just relieved another controller. Aircraft X was descending via JFUND2 STAR and (I think) flashing to Approach Control. I signed in with my settings and went on to help an aircraft at a different airport up north with a practice approach and subsequent missed into another. This may have distracted me enough so that I didn't become aware that approach hadn't taken the hand off on Aircraft X. However; when I looked back down; Aircraft X was around 3NM into Approach airspace and I still had track control. I could've sworn Approach already had the hand off but when I looked back it wasn't even flashing to them anymore.I accept I may be in error. Fatigue was definitely a factor and it was the end of my week. That being said; when I called my Supervisor over; I noted to him that the auto-hand off function was still active on the data block. At a minimum; this means that even if I'd forgotten Aircraft X; the function should have activated and worked as designed to initiate a hand off to approach when I hadn't done it myself in a timely manner.I'm uncertain; but believe that when I signed in with my settings the hand off that the previous controller had already initiated for Aircraft X ceased. I am certain that the auto hand off function was not suppressed when I noticed Aircraft X was 3NM into approach airspace. Look into the auto-hand off function behavior.




Synopsis: ZBW Center Controller reported an airspace violation that may have been either human or equipment failure.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: On the HAROB6 Departure we early turned the point RENBE to make our turn west to next point RICHR as prescribed by a fly-by waypoint. Our turn started approximately 2.5 miles prior to RENBE as our speed was 250 kts by then. The Departure Controller was surprised by our early turn and gave us a vector 220.  He said he thought we turned too early and thought RENBE was a fly-over point. We double checked our Jepps charts and it is clearly marked as a fly-by point.  Next Controller said same to us about it being a fly-over point.  This discrepancy needs to be sorted out. Please address discrepancy with SEA Departure Control and correct our Jepp charts as necessary.


Second narrative: We were assigned and flew the HAROB6 Departure. Prior to reaching the second point on the departure; RENBE; we started a turn to the west as depicted on the chart. The Controller then asked us to fly a heading; stating that it looked like we turned early. Since RENBE is clearly shown as a fly by point and not a fly over point; we were confused as to why he stated we turned early. After asking the Controller if he showed RENBE as a fly by and not fly over; he stated that he was not able to check the chart himself at that point; said 'You're ok' and switched us to Seattle Center. A minute or so after switching; Seattle center told us they got a call from Departure to let us know that they showed RENBE as a flyover. This was in direct conflict with what was on our chart and in the FMS.The purpose of this report is to ensure that our Jepp charts and the charts that Seattle Departure are looking at show the same thing. There seems to be a conflict with RENBE on the HAROB6.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported a track deviation while on the SEA HAROB6 departure due to a charting discrepancy.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying; FBO Personnel
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: We arrived at the airplane from layover; and preformed our preflight duties. When I checked the O2; the pressure dropped approx. 400 lbs. and stayed there - recovering after the test. I asked the F/O (First Officer) to test; and got the same result. We then tested at the same time; and the pressure dropped about 850 lbs. I called local ops for the mechanic; wrote it up in the maintenance (MX) log book; and sent an ACARS message to MX. When the contract mechanic showed up and I demonstrated the problem; he called MX control. They told him it was within limits. I requested to speak to the MX controller; who said to me that nothing was wrong since the pressure while testing; was still above allowable (approx. 950lbs). I explained that it was definitely NOT normal. That I've flown 737s for 10 years; and this has never happened before. I got the run around that it was a contract MX base and no parts; and who knows how long it would be before it could be corrected to my satisfaction. I indicated that the mechanic was here; and could inspect the system. I was particularly concerned that the valve was only partially open (Bernoulli's principle). MX control spoke again to the contract mechanic; who went below and inspected the system. He returned 5 minutes later - problem solved: The valve was less than one full turn open; and safety wired. He clipped the wire; turned the valve about 7 turns to full open; and reinstalled the safety wire. The system then tested normally.Whomever worked on the O2 system did not follow procedure - possible catastrophe. The pilots who brought the plane in (and all those who flew it after the O2 was improperly worked on); either did not preflight the O2 system; or did not investigate a non-normal indication - possible catastrophe. I felt pressured by the MX control that I was writing up a nonissue - With a new captain; or weak personality - possible catastrophe.




Synopsis: The shut-off valve on the Crew O2 Bottle was only open a small amount; therefore the O2 pressure would not recover in a timely manner.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: ATC directed go-around on short final. Inside the final approach fix; the Tower Controller instructed an aircraft to 'line up and wait;' adding that an aircraft will cross down field. After the aircraft accepted the clearance to line up and wait; Tower issued instructions for another aircraft to cross the runway at Taxiway N. The aircraft that was crossing the runway took his time; delaying the takeoff clearance to the point that spacing became an issue. It was my observation that the aircraft on the takeoff roll might lift off; allowing us to continue the approach to a landing. The go-around was initiated prior to 120 FT; however; that was the lowest RA observed after the application of TOGA thrust. Tower issued a climbing left turn to 4;000 FT; heading 270 degrees. My concern during the latter portion of the approach was that a go-around initiated on our part would create a conflict with the aircraft on takeoff roll; (overtaking) and/or a possible conflict with a go-around or takeoff on the parallel runways. In my opinion it was safer to continue the approach than to initiate a go-around on our own. As a result; the go-around was initiated after Tower issued the go-around instructions. As our aircraft passed over the numbers on the go-around; the aircraft on the runway rotated. Inexperienced Tower Controller who attempted to 'keep the operation moving' complicated by slower than normal taxi speed of aircraft crossing the runway.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reports being issued a go around on very short final due to the departing aircraft not being airborne. The reporter had determined that a go around would be necessary but elected to wait for the ATC instructions due to possible conflict with the departing traffic ahead and off parallel runways.