elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 MAX 8
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were making a visual approach to Runway XXR in ZZZ. The airport was is sight; while the downwind leg and convective activity was present south and west of the airport. After receiving landing clearance from Tower; a wind check was issued and landing speeds adjusted accordingly. The First Officer (FO) was flying and called for landing Flaps 30. The Before Landing Checklist was accomplished and I did a second wind check. We discussed the new speeds and continued the approach. Shortly thereafter; we received a Too Low Flaps Warning. Upon inspection I discovered that the flaps were in the 25 detention. The flaps were moved to position 30. I considered a go-around; but elected to continue the approach as we were on speed and path and a go-around would have been into the convective activity.Obviously; this was a failure to read and verify the checklist items. While debriefing the event with the FO; we both agreed that the monitoring of the wind/ weather was a factor as we considered our performance on final. Also being in a MAX 8 was a factor as the location of the flap gauge is different than the NG; possibly affecting the visual flow of the checklist items. Other factors were the weather deviations on arrival and non-standard arrival into a visual from the north side of the airport and terrain monitoring. Passenger issues requiring Dispatch coordination and the aircraft being met by Law Enforcement at the gate. It was a very busy flight at the end of a long day.




Synopsis: B737 MAX8 Captain cited fleet differences; and checklist compliance contributing to a Too Low Flaps warning during a visual approach with convective weather also being a distraction.  Procedural deviation was corrected; stability evaluated and approach and landing completed.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: N14.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G N14
ATC / advisory: CTAF N14
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was planning to land at VAY to meet some friends.  I was navigating VFR; and used radar services ('flight following') for part of the 15 nm flight.As I was turning from right downwind to right base for runway 26 at VAY; my plane lined up with runway 19 of airport N14; which is only about a mile away.  I lost situational awareness and mistakenly thought I had just turned final and was therefore lined up with runway 26 of VAY.  I landed at N14 and didn't realize my mistake until I saw another aircraft at the far end of the runway I had just landed on.On the CTAF -- which is the same frequency for both VAY and N14 -- I heard someone say something like; 'Isn't runway 1 the active?;' implying correctly that I had landed in the wrong direction for the winds.  I don't know whether the opposing plane on the runway was preparing to take off or had just landed.  We both veered left and passed by each other on the runway at low speed without contact.Once I realized my error; I continued to taxi to the far end of the runway; did a 180; and -- compounding my stupidity by not exiting the runway and regrouping -- took off from runway 1 for the one-minute flight to my correct airport; VAY.I quickly realized that I had made a number of dangerous errors.  Because 99 percent of my flights are IFR; I know that I was rusty on VFR navigation and procedures.  IFR is; most times; easier than VFR!  Since I was already aware of the proximity of the two airports; I should have been vigilant for a possible identification error.  I also should have verified the numbers on the landing runway (although the numbers at N14 are fairly well faded) and with my heading indicator.  Plus; since I had onboard GPS WAAS; I could have dialed in an approach for my intended destination and used the guidance to verify I was landing in the correct place.  Also; once I landed at N14; I should have exited the runway; shut down; and planned my next hop rather than just taking off immediately.




Synopsis: A general aviation pilot reported confusion that led to landing at the wrong non-towered airport; resulting in a ground conflict with another aircraft.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: RJAA.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower RJAA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: On approach to RJAA for ILS34L; ATIS reported surface winds (approximately) 310/24G28. Earlier; aircraft on both 34L and 34R had reported wind shear with +/- 10 and +/- 15 knots; respectively. This information was also on the arrival ATIS. We had an approach speed for Flaps 30 of 147 with a wind correction of +15 for a reference speed of 162. Passing approximately 500 AGL; a performance increasing wind shear occurred with the IAS noted at 175; right at the flap limit speed for Flaps 30. Throttles were reduced to correct the deviation; but at no time was idle thrust selected. By 300 feet AGL; speed was approximately 165-170 and fluctuating. Passing 200 feet AGL; we were on Glideslope with PAPIs showing one white and three red. We were within speed parameters for a stabilized approach and in a safe position to land. At this time the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) gave several warnings of 'Too low; terrain'. At this time; we verified our configuration and noted the Flaps indicated 25 degrees; but the handle was in the 30 degree detent. Without delay; we executed a go around.The go around was uneventful and we were sequenced back to final with minimal delay after declaring 'minimum fuel' with approach control. Passengers were put at ease with a reassuring PA. The following approach had similar conditions; but reactions to the expected performance-increasing wind shear resulted in airspeed deviations of no greater than 10 IAS. The resulting approach and landing were uneventful.I would have expected 'Too Low Flaps' for this condition. I am not sure why we got 'Too Low Terrain'. Either warning would have given the same result; but we would have had more clarity on our issue with the more appropriate warning.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported experiencing gusty wind conditions which necessitated a go-around followed by a successful second approach and landing.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After touchdown the aircraft bounced once about a foot and settled back to the runway with the right main gear touching first; followed by the left main gear about 2 seconds later; then nose wheel. The aircraft was heading to the left side of the runway and this point I over corrected to the right which caused the aircraft to veer to the right and go off the right edge of the 30 feet wide runway. The aircraft traveled approximately 100 feet and I corrected back onto the runway with the aircraft under control. I slowed the aircraft and taxied to the end of the runway; back taxied to the turnoff normally. The edges of the runway have a gravel strip about 2 ft wide and then mowed grass. The runway itself is asphalt. There are no runway lights at this airport. There was no damage of any kind to the aircraft or the runway.To the best of my recollection my approach speed was around 75 knots with 30 degree flaps. Touchdown was just past the numbers on center line. Wind was reported just prior to landing as 160 at 8 knots.My conclusion to this incident was excessive speed on landing and failure to control the aircraft on roll out. Contributing to it possibly was the fact this was the 4th landing I had ever made in this aircraft which we had recently purchased. Each preceding landing; the control of the aircraft on roll out seemed to be degrading. An inspection of the steerable nose gear has been scheduled. Also to the best of my knowledge; my feet were not on the brakes during the roll out.




Synopsis: C182 pilot reported loss of directional control after touchdown resulting in a runway excursion.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Thunderstorm; Windshear
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Physiological - Other; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: During approach ILS/30L had thunderstorms and rain in the area; but no negative PIREPS or SIGMETS. Noted 10 KT tailwind on final with Tower calling 15 KT quartering headwind. Discussed go-around possibility with First Officer; at 500 FT - with runway insight - Tower called with 'Wind Shear Alert for Runway 30L.' We executed a go-around and were directed to turn 170 degrees and climb to 4;000 FT. During the turn; we saw the aircraft 18 degrees nose up; full go-around power with 0 VSI for approximately 5 seconds at 1;800 FT MSL. The First Officer started the 'Wind Shear Chant' with VSI; Radio Altimeter and Airspeed Callouts. As we passed through this area; we entered an updraft and the aircraft started to climb quickly. Passing 3;500 FT MSL; the First Officer called out 3;000+ VSI and I noted that 'ALT CAP' was illuminated on the FMA and the yoke was pushed all the way forward by the autopilot. As we passed 4;000 FT MSL with about 2;000+ VSI; I disconnected the autopilot and exerted more forward force to stop the climb at approximately 4;400 FT MSL and return to assigned altitude. ATC was notified and said 'no problem; no traffic in your area.' We proceeded to a holding pattern and waited for that rain area to clear before completing a successful approach about 40 minutes later.


Second narrative: [Narative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A MD-82 Captain executed a go-around at 500 FT after Tower alerted WINDSHEAR ALERT and during the climb experienced a zero VSI with 18 degrees nose up; followed by a 3;000 FT plus FPM climb with nose down.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Second aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were told to line up and wait. [A] 757 took off in front of us. We were then cleared for takeoff within approximately 1 minute behind the 757 and given an assigned heading. We were approximately 500 feet; but less than a thousand and encountered wake turbulence. The Captain had full left aileron to counteract the roll and we were unable to turn to the assigned heading until we were out of the wake. We advised ATC that we were in the preceding aircraft wake turbulence. We were then advised by ATC to contact Departure.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence shortly after takeoff from LAX behind a B757 that required full aileron deflection.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Speedbrake/Spoiler
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a nice initial very light touchdown in the first 3000 feet of the runway; the speedbrakes did not auto deploy and it took me a couple seconds to realize that I had to manually deploy them. This meant that I was delayed getting reverse thrust and manual braking; resulting in me using more than typical braking energy. This was a hot day; 91 degrees; and a high altitude airport. By the time we got to the ramp we had hot brakes of 6 on the left side of the aircraft.We had briefed a higher than normal descent on the approach 3.1 degrees and knew that speed control was very important on final. I had to use speedbrakes several times during the approach to help control speed and I had placed them back in armed. However; after we lowered the gear approximately 10 miles from the airport; the FO had started the landing checklist and they were armed at that time. Then I used the speedbrakes one last time to slow for final flap extension. I am convinced that I failed to return them to armed after this last extension in flight. The result was that it took me a couple of seconds after initial touchdown to manually deploy them and I wasn't able to get into reverse thrust and braking until further down the runway than I would have liked. I also thought I had to exit abeam the landing threshold for another runway; but I could have rolled down to the end (approximately 1000 feet) and used a little less braking than I did.I believe that we should have restarted the landing checklist after I used the speedbrakes; so as to ensure that they were returned to armed. I also think that this shows why it is a good practice to fail the speedbrakes in the sim for annual training; so that we realize quickly that they have not auto-deployed. The Airbus incident in the Philippines is proof of how important this confirmation is!


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B767-300 flight crew reported the speedbrakes did not automatically deploy on touchdown at a hot; high altitude airport which resulted in a longer rollout; heavier braking; and hot brakes.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Distribution Busbar
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately ten minutes after take off; we got a master warning light and an emergency DC bus failure indication. The Captain declared an emergency and we completed the appropriate QRH checklist. The Captain elected to return; and we were cleared for a visual approach. Shortly after; we noticed that we also had a total anti skid braking system failure as well. We requested to side step to the 13;000 foot runway due to the anti skid failure. The Captain landed the plane approximately 1;000 pounds overweight and taxied to the gate uneventfully.


Second narrative: Approximately ten minutes after takeoff; we saw the 'DC EMER BUS OFF' warning light illuminate. We then completed the 'DC EMER BUS OFF Light' emergency checklist. We selected the Emergency Power Switch to 'on' to reinstate emergency DC power to the Captain's instruments and radios. We declared an emergency with Departure Control and immediately returned for an uneventful overweight landing (131;900 pounds landing weight). After landing; we taxied to the gate.


Synopsis: MD83 flight crew experiences a 'DC EMER BUS OFF Light' during climb out. The Emergency Power Switch is selected to on to reinstate emergency DC power and the flight returns to the departure airport.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We were on day 3 of pairing. It was scheduled for 7:42 minutes. Leg one took us over-block by nearly 45 minutes prompting us to keep an eye on our max flight time of 9 hours. Next leg we were over by :14 minutes. Upon arrival; we checked our schedule and the block time was changed from 1:41 to 1:30; a difference of 11 minutes. We sent an ACARS message to our Dispatcher asking why it was different and he had no idea why. He said 'I have not touched a thing' I then asked 'So Scheduling lowered our block time without talking to our Dispatcher?' and his reply was 'no one has told me anything honestly.' It seemed very fishy that our block time was changing the closer we got to our 9 hours scheduled block time. I find it very hard to believe that the block time for that leg should have been lowered in the conditions we had. There were EDCT programs and delays up and down the northeast and deicing conditions in the Northeast as well. How could that warrant a lower block time? I didn't complain about it then because I knew our block time was going to be over that and it would have been changed back to the actual time anyway. They then changed our block time on the next leg from 2:54 to 2:52. We blocked 2:59. If we had any extra delays on the ground on our final leg we would have timed out. To us it looked like Scheduling was changing our block times to look legal. I have heard that the schedulers could adjust the times after talking to our Dispatcher and finding actual winds and conditions for that flight; but our Dispatcher did not talk to them. The conditions in no way warranted under blocking anything. I am glad we made it in the MAX 9 hours but as you see it was close. If there is to be a change in our scheduled block time; we need to see proof from our dispatchers so we know what was done was legal. I have heard of schedulers reducing flights by up to 25% in the past keeping people legal by 1 minute. I hope the FAA can review this matter and make the right decision. If this is legal; we as the PIC; need more information so we know where they came up with their information




Synopsis: An ERJ-175 Captain reported that Scheduling change the actual flight time on this day with adverse weather at nearly all stations so as to keep the crew below 9 hours.