elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I landed on Runway XXR at ZZZ. The ZZZ Tower was extremely busy with the [military tanker] that landed just before me and at least two; perhaps more planes in the pattern. ZZZ is my home airport and by my estimates 75% of the time when I land there Tower tells me to 'taxi to parking; remain this frequency'. I had just landed; the Tower was super busy / occupied; I slowed to a near stop on runway XXR; I wanted to take taxiway D and A to nearby parking where I rent the plane. It was only a short distance. I opted (mistakenly in hindsight) to take taxiway D and a short hop on A taxiway to get off the non-movement area and nearby parking. I honestly thought I was doing the Tower a favor by getting off the runway quickly to make room for pattern traffic. I did not switch to ground because I mistakenly assumed Tower had to order me to switch to ground (I mistakenly thought I had to be instructed by the Tower to switch to Ground; I've now learned that is not true). Upon exiting 34R on D and turning left (north) on taxiway A I came face/face with the [military tanker] that had landed before me. The [military tanker] was about 100 yards (300 feet) in front of me. I instinctively turned right to parking and got out of the non-movement area and got out of the way of the [military tanker]. I never did switch to ground (my mistake). Afterwards the [military] Pilot came over and chatted with me about the incident (in a very courteous and professional manner; for which I am grateful) and that's how I learned I was in the wrong. I learned my lesson; ground has primacy and control over all aircraft once past the runway hold markings.




Synopsis: C182 pilot reported a communication breakdown with ATC led to a taxiway incursion and ground conflict.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: VNY.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D VNY
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT; Tower VNY
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I frequently use the Coastal Route to transition LAX Bravo headed North from Avalon (AVX) to Whiteman (WHP).  Typically; ATC handles the VNY transition just before WHP. On one recent occasion; I asked if I needed clearance through the VNY Class Delta; and the controller said no; that he could get me into Whiteman.Today; however; the controller vectored me out away from VNY due to traffic.  I continued to descend; as I always do.  Several minutes later; the controller (still on 134.2) said that I had entered or was about to VNY Class D airspace. I told him I thought he had cleared me and was vectoring me. He released me and told me to contact Van Nuys tower to transition. I did so and was granted a transition.It is possible I entered the Class D airspace while still with So. Cal; prior to talking with Van Nuys. Though I was always talking to someone; it is possible I was in Van Nuys airspace prior to two way contact.This was a lesson learned for me; that just because I'm with flight following being vectored; I still must get clearance on the way down or stay above airport airspace. This was not my understanding previously.




Synopsis: Pilot reports of flying VFR to WHP under flight following with SCT. SCT Controller advises pilot that Controller will help him all the way to WHP; then vectors the aircraft around VNY due to traffic. Pilot continues descent and then Controller advises pilot that aircraft entered the VNY class D airspace. Pilot was under the assumption that he had approval to descend into Class D as long as he told ATC about it and AATC would take care of the point out to VNY Tower.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 F Executive 21
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departed on Runway 27; climbed to approximately 1;400 FT and then engine developed popping noise. Upon hearing this noise; made a 180 degree turn and lined myself up with Runway 09. Airspeed was in excess for landing at that time. Reduced RPM's and lowered flaps and corrected for crosswind from the north. [We] neglected to lower landing gear. Aircraft skidded to a stop on Runway 09. [We] notified the FBO that my airplane was extending well into the runway so that they could warn any additional landing aircraft. Then proceeded to help FBO to lift plane up on gear and tow back to hangar.




Synopsis: M20 pilot experiences a popping noise shortly after takeoff and turns back to land opposite direction on the departure runway. The landing gear is not extended and a gear up landing ensues.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Learjet 75
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During a routine training flight in the traffic pattern at ZZZ; I was flying with a student in the traffic pattern. I had just turned downwind when Tower called out to make a sudden left turn. When I did so I saw a Learjet that had just turned crosswind from Runway X in my line of sight. I pulled power back and pushed the nose down. The Learjet was in a hard climb and we missed each other with no problem. It was unnerving and if either myself or the Learjet pilot had erred in evasive action; there was a very real possibility of a midair collision.


Second narrative: We were cleared for takeoff Runway X by ZZZ Tower and assigned a heading of 340. After takeoff and passing 700 feet AGL; we were established on the 340 heading. TCAS alerted us to a possible conflict at 12 o'clock. We increased climb rate and passed above the conflicting traffic that appeared to be on downwind for Runway X. No TCAS RA was received.


Synopsis: PA28 and LR75 flight crews reported ATC error resulted in an NMAC.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: On a recent trip the first officer and I attempted to use the new LIDO chart system.  The first officer was pilot flying and attempted to setup and brief the departures and approaches using the new LIDO chats.  I also had the LIDO charts out and I was backing it up with my Jeppesen charts.  Several times during the first officer's briefings I noticed that he had omitted critical pieces of information.  We both had to refer to the Jeppesen charts to ensure the proper information was inputted and correctly briefed.  We also had instances where information was not included at all.  The idea that we will solely be relying on the LIDO charts in the future is a great concern of mine.  [Our company] has been presented with many challenging variables in a short amount of time; new first officers; new captains; new cities; new main line procedures.  I feel that making this change now presents a level of risk to the operation that is unacceptable.  I encourage the FAA and management to take action and abandon the move to the LIDO chart system before we are listing it as a major contributing factor to an incident or accident.  Thank you for taking the time to review my concern.  My hope is that we can work together to fix this problem before we put passengers; crews; and equipment at risk.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain expressed concern with his company's decision to transition to LIDO charts.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: RIC.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 8
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C RIC
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During approach to RIC; we requested the ILS Runway 02. The winds were reported as calm. Runways 16/34 were under construction so there was no ILS to those runways. Potomac Approach would not approve the ILS Runway 02. We were vectored to the visual approach to Runway 20. We were able to back up the visual approach with the GPS Runway 20.  If winds are not a factor; there should be no reason not to utilize runways with precision approach guidance. Especially when flights are operating at night. A freight carrier just had an incident in BHM where ATC closed the main precision approach runway and vectored the flight to an unfamiliar short runway with no precision approach guidance. ATC seems to believe there is no difference between flying at night versus during the day. Crews flying at night need all the technology available to operate safely.




Synopsis: PCT vectored an air carrier for a night visual to RIC Runway 20 with no precision approach back up. Runway 2 with a precision approach was available but a request for that approach was denied.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Second aircraft: Medium Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were being vectored onto a visual approach for Runway 35 at 3000 ft in VMC conditions. We were never assigned a speed; so I was flying at 240 knots until we were about 3 miles from crossing over the final approach course for Runway 35. The FO (First Officer) and I had noted that the Controller working Approach was 'behind the curve;' sounding frazzled and rushed over the radio. He had not given us any new instructions for several minutes; and we were about to cross the final approach course; so we asked to make sure he wanted us to go through the course. He responded with a heading that'd put us on a nice course towards the runway's final approach. However; we soon noticed that our TCAS was showing us less than 6 miles from a plane at about the 1 o'clock position; so we asked about it. We were told to turn right to a heading of 090 'now'; which would point us towards the airplane for a time during our turn. I went ahead and complied; but asked about turning left; away from the aircraft. They stuck with their initial instruction; so I kept turning in HDG mode with the autopilot. Soon; the FO visually spotted the plane and it was on a collision course with us. When I saw it a couple of seconds later; I turned off the autopilot; banked to 45 degrees in the right turn; started a slow climb; and chopped the power to make the turn tighter. We never got an RA; but we did receive the 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC' caution from the TCAS. The cause was probably a lack of experience from the ATC controller; putting him behind the aircraft he was controlling. I questioned ATC; turned off automation; and took corrective action to avoid getting closer to the conflicting aircraft.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer attributed a traffic conflict on approach to PHL to apparent controller inexperience.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Clearance: TECKY two departure EBAYE transition (tecky2.ebaye) maintain 5;000 feet. MLPTS is the first waypoint with two restrictions at or above 900 feet and speed at or below 230kts.  Departed runway 30R maintained 200 KIAS until clear of the KSJC class C airspace.  After MLPTS turned right on the departure toward SPTNS accelerating to 230 KIAS.  ATC advised us that we are still below the SFO class B airspace.  Immediately reduced power to maintain 200 KIAS.  ATC cleared us to fl190 (top altitude on the departure).  Maintained 200 KIAS until clear of the SFO class B Airspace.  ATC cleared us to maintain at or above 270 KIAS.Change chart speed restriction to at or below 200 KIAS until SPTNS.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: The SJC TECKY TWO Departure has a speed restriction of at or below 230 KIAS; which is misleading as it is below the SFO Class B Airspace with a limit of 200 KIAS.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft; MEL
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At around F230 we [encountered] icing [so] I turned on wing and cowl anti ice. Moments later received L BLEED DUCT warning. Captain ran QRH. QRH requires operating pack off and Isolation (ISOL) valve closed. It doesn't account for our MEL Ram Air Shutoff Valve which requires right pack OFF. Now without pressurization cabin altitude was climbing around 1;000 feet per minute. Which until we got our descent going and changed ISOL back opened and turned left pack back on cabin climbed to around 9;200 feet. We descended out of icing to around 12;000 feet. Captain had [advised ATC of] the descent and notified inflight crew which we had asked for 10;000 I believe; but after we realized we would get back in icing we decided to stay where we were to stay between layers and at around Total Air Temperature (TAT) 22 C. We asked ATC and they gave us 14;000 feet [because] of no anti icing equipment. Somewhere in the descent I asked the Captain to start the APU which could have also covered our pressurization but we elected to use the right bleed source instead; but had as a backup. The Captain had notified dispatcher via ACARS. We had plenty of fuel to stay at lower altitude.Company could fix airplanes in a more timely matter instead of sending aircraft into icing conditions with this deferral.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 FO reported loss of L BLEED DUCT which; when combined with an existing MEL; resulted in loss of cabin pressure. Flight descended out of icing conditions and continued to destination.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Control
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: While on descent; passing 12;000' at night windshield shattered. Ran QRH in compliance with all Company policies. While I was putting away the QRH under the trim wheel shortly thereafter; Captain disengaged autopilot and instinctively activated trim while my hand was still near trim wheel. RESULT: Fractured left hand of First Officer.FACTORS: I don't think he saw my hand down there. I had just said 'checklist complete;' and I can't remember if he said 'autopilot off' or not. Both of those statements could have triggered an extra level of caution; but honestly; it has never held that meaning for me before in this context. Fairly busy in approach stage of flight (radios; configuration; running checklists).




Synopsis: A B737 NG Captain manually activated the elevator trim and broke the First Officer's hand as the trim wheel turned while he stowed the QRH checklist away under the wheel following its use for a shattered windshield.
Date: 202005
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: As part of the preflight procedure; the cockpit was disinfected with the large isopropyl alcohol based wipes/ Lysol type wipes for the common touch points during preflight and post flight. As part of this cleaning; the headsets are cleaned with the wipes and dwelling or the boom is wetted. This created a situation where when the pushback crew called for pushback; the boom mike on the headset did not work. The handset was used. After a period of time before takeoff; the boom was tested again; leading to the possibility that the alcohol solution may have entered inside the boom mike and not dried thoroughly as part of the dwelling process. The same hazard occurred on the previous leg to the FO; and normal operation was restored after a period of time.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported alcohol from cleaning products may be entering the boom mike causing the equipment to malfunction.