elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Other
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The first two days of the trip were reasonable. However on day 3 there is a significant PM to AM swap. In addition we had weather challenges due to rapidly changing conditions. As a result; I did not get to sleep until after XA00. By day four we had a XE:45 bus scheduled. This night was also scheduled as a minimum rest; less than 12 hours. While this was adequate rest for a couple legs; I felt that continuing on the trip would not be prudent.With minimum rest periods; there is no down time to recover nor opportunity for exercise and eating without cutting out sleep. The frequent swapping of flight attendants adds to the fatigue element. It wreaks havoc on Crew Resource Management. It seems as if crews are in a constant state of flux and uncertainty. Debriefing rarely happens. This current practice seems needlessly disruptive especially in the Q400. With 4 to 5 legs a day; it pushes a difficult trip dangerously close to an unsafe trip. While the swapping of pilots to aircraft has improved; the swapping of a FA (Flight Attendants) is still an issue. We had to perform a missed approach in ZZZ due to rapidly deteriorating conditions. This was challenging enough with adequate rest and four legs. From my experience; the effects of fatigue are most dangerous when they are masked by an adrenaline rush. This is not a time when one wants the margins of safety to be significantly reduced.Maximum of 3 legs to follow rest of less than 12 hours. Reduce number of FA crew swaps in Q400.




Synopsis: Q400 Captain reported safety concerns regarding crew rest and crew swaps following a challenging 4 day trip.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was on the RNAV XX approach into ZZZ. At ZZZZZ; I did my in-range flow and reduced power to 21 inches of manifold power; turned the aux pumps to low; and went through the rest of the flow. Shortly after that I started to notice vibration; though initially; I wasn't sure whether it was vibration or just a continuance of the moderate to severe turbulence we had experienced over the mountains. Then I saw that the fuel flow on the right engine had gone up to about 150 while the left engine was at around 100. Also the rpm and manifold pressure indications on the two engines had diverged. I also saw that I wasn't holding speed at this power setting even though I was descending; so I pushed both throttles up to maintain 120 knots. I wasn't sure which engine was the problem initially - we are trained to look for deficient fuel flow and by that measure the right engine seemed to be working overtime while the left engine was deficient. I then noticed that I had drifted right of course. That indication; along with the fact that the left engine rpm; manifold pressure and fuel flow seemed to be normal; suggested that the right engine was the problem; though it still seemed to be making some power. I corrected the course deviation; got back on course; maintained speed; delayed deploying full flaps until I was absolutely sure that I had the runway made and then landed. Once I pulled the power back to idle and landed; the right engine quit completely. I taxied to the gate on one engine. I was confident that it was safe to do so as the pavement was completely dry and there was no ice.




Synopsis: C402C Captain reported vibration and engine failure on approach.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise; Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Just prior to departure; we were informed that ground personnel had loaded two aircraft batteries in the proper containers. Captain was given the HAZMAT form; which he endorsed; then push back to fly the leg. After airborne; the Captain realized that there was a required dispatch amendment; so he immediately notified Dispatch to get the proper amendment. The flight continued to destination without any further issue related to this COMAT.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported flight release missing required HazMat amendment during cruise.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B777-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Returned to [departure airport] as a result of passenger disturbance. Evaluated climb limit weight; runway length limit and elected to land overweight. Declared emergency with ATC. Notified company; requested police and medical. Completed normal and overweight checklists. Elected to land on longest runway. I was PM; FO was PF. Ref speed was rather high on final due to overweight condition. On approach in VMC FO was slightly high on glideslope and slightly fast. In an effort to reduce altitude and airspeed autopilot and auto throttles were disconnected. I was unaware of this. Speed brakes deployed. Speed rapidly decayed; and stick shaker activated. I pushed up the throttles as FO retracted the speed brake. Stick shaker stopped; remainder of approach was stable. I failed to observe the rapidly decaying airspeed due to a minor distraction from ATC.Suggestions: Never a reason to disconnect [autoflight resources]; which if engaged provides protection against low speed excursions. A greater degree of monitoring by PM must occur. Avoid distractions; particularly during an overweight landing. Contributing factor on my behalf was that having VMC with runway in sight; and the situation very much under control lulled me into monitoring at a lower level than I otherwise would have. An awareness of how speed can rapidly decay with speed brakes deployed.




Synopsis: B777-300 Captain reported airspeed became low enough on a hand-flown visual approach to trigger a stick shaker.
Date: 201406
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: Seat Belt Sign
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The GIBBZ arrival is a very busy arrival and it was even busier than usual that day. I got distracted both by the approach and the added distractions of two close encounters with VFR traffic and many turns and descents from ATC at a busy time of the arrival. We landed with the seat belt sign off. Passing through FL180 we were distracted by the busy GIBBZ arrival. Just as we were passing through 10;000; where I would usually check the seatbelt sign; we were given our runway assignment and it was not what we had expected (we were given [Runway] 19R) and we were given what sounded like an urgent traffic alert with a turn off the arrival to avoid VFR traffic. We also had to call the Flight Attendant; because we didn't have a sterile light. Then; as we were trying to prepare for the approach to Runway 19R we were given another turn back towards the airport; then a frequency change. On checking in we were given another traffic alert of a VFR target less than 2 miles and 500 FT above our assigned altitude. We picked up this traffic visually just as the resolution advisory was being enunciated. We called and kept the traffic in sight visually until we were clear of conflict; then finished the prep for the approach; transferred controls; did a quick brief; and switched controls back. I think I called for the in-range; but we were now less than 5 miles from the final approach fix and were given more vectors and a frequency change to Tower. Now I began configuring for the approach as Tower asked us to keep our speed up to the marker. Unfamiliar with [Runway] 19R; I spent a little time reviewing the distance to the runway and altitude of the FAF to figure out what a safe speed to the marker would be since I know that we have a lot of configuration issues with IAD approaches. Once we were completely configured; I called for the 'Before Landing' Checklist and we must have skipped the In-Range Checklist; because the Flight Attendant called us once we were stopped on the taxiway and informed us that the seatbelt sign was still off. I've been told that we are trying to stop doing the GIBBZ; I think that's a great way to reduce distractions during the arrival phase into a busy airport.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reports forgetting to turn on the seatbelt sign prior to landing at IAD due to the extremely busy arrival and approach phase. Vectors to avoid VFR traffic and the GIBBZ arrival were cited as the major distractors.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: WI14.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class G WI14
ATC / advisory: UNICOM WI14
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Recently the power company has installed new power-line poles in close proximity to the drop zone. The new poles are taller and pose a great safety risk to landing and departing air traffic at the airport as well as skydivers. They are maybe 200 feet off the threshold and are extremely dangerous on hot days as well as all approaches. The power line company said they had notified the proper people at the FAA and the FAA deemed it not necessary to notify the drop zone/airport management.




Synopsis: Pilot reported recently installed taller power-line poles located near WI14 airport and drop zone pose a safety threat to aircraft and skydivers.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DAL.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground DAL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Crew cleared 13R at DAL on C3; and called Ground for taxi instructions. PNF (Pilot Not Flying) did not catch the entire clearance due to a given taxi way (M5) not being on the current chart. PNF then responded with the first taxiway (D); and asked for a repeat of the remainder of the taxi clearance. After holding short of D1 on D we were given the clearance D; D3; E; M5; cross 13L; A5 to the ramp. We started to taxi; slowly; and were immediately instructed to expedite our taxi by the Controller; we assume because another corporate jet was waiting to taxi opposite direction. PNF then informed the ground Controller that our previous confusion was due to M5 not being on the current chart. GC (Ground Control); with an irritated; demeaning and obstructive attitude informed us that it was not on the chart because it just opened; and that we should 'familiarize ourselves with it'. Another exchange occurred; initiated by the GC; and PNF repeated instructions to the ramp. In summary; the crew felt the Ground Controller's attitude; combined with unnecessary 'suggestions'; after the crew informed him of their issues with the clearance led to a decrease in safety operating margins. Contributing factors were that the current chart did not show two of the taxiways (M5; A5) given in the clearance by the Ground Controller; and we were not informed of their location; except when GC stated 'you'll see them when you get down there'; again with an obstructive and demeaning attitude. Additionally; M5 and A5 are not on the FAA construction plan for DAL; listed on the FAA website. NOTAMs for DAL show both taxiways' commission and dimensions; but not their location.NOTAMs for new taxiways need to include their approximate location on the airfield; as the current NOTAMs only give their dimensions and date of commission. When controllers are aware that those taxiways are not on a current chart; because of their recent commissioning; they need to inform crews as part of the taxi clearance. Crew needs to ask for a progressive taxi instruction when unclear of location of taxiways.




Synopsis: Captain reported communication breakdown with Ground Control and changes to taxiways that were not on available charts or NOTAMs.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, IL
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Wing Skin
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Reviewing my flight plan I noticed in the MEL item info on first page of flight plan an MEL item referring only to a 'root fillet fairing' and no other items.  Researching the item listed I came across another MEL item of far worse consequences; stating the flight control position indicator in the cockpit was unreliable and contained a long and potentially dangerous preflight check for the flight crew to perform.  This plane should not have been in service for 3 days with this problem.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reports being dispatched with an MEL for a root fillet fairing which states the flight control position indicator in the cockpit was unreliable and contained a long and potentially dangerous preflight check.
Date: 201908
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: My flight diverted to ZZZZ due to persistent unidentifiable odor in the cockpit extending into most of the business class cabin. [Advised ATC]; decided not to delay landing; and landed overweight. Landing was uneventful. ZZZZ emergency crews inspected aircraft; and determined it was safe to taxi to gate. Cockpit access system electronics overheated. Maintenance found system circuit breaker open.




Synopsis: B777-200 Captain reported a divert due to smoke in the cockpit and business class cabin area.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Mustang (P51)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Generator failed enroute. An unknown battery charge was remaining. I contacted Tower for landing and requested an overhead approach. Tower was busy and told me to expect the straight-in approach. I repeated I needed the overhead and Tower told me I had to do a straight-in. I told the Tower I would have to [request priority handling] to get the overhead.The overhead in this type aircraft is standard operating procedure for safety reasons. Rarely; I will accept a standard pattern; but only if everything is working properly. In this case I already had a failure and did not want to compound the situation. Given an electrical failure the following systems are impacted. Fuel boost pump; emergency fuel system (in the event of a carburetor failure); all coolant and oil temperature readings; coolant and oil door actuators; all warning lights in the cockpit; all avionics including radios. Given I already had one failure and not knowing when the battery may fail; a straight-in approach is a high-power; low-energy approach; meaning any hiccup in another system would most likely result in an off-field landing with potential property damage and possible injury to persons on the ground. The overhead provides an additional measure of safety by ensuring a higher energy state over the field. The overhead also is the fastest way to get on the ground; thus eliminating traffic delays in most any environment. I should have been able to work into the traffic pattern and do the overhead; but the controller's lack of knowledge of the safety aspect of the overhead pattern required me to [request priority handling] to deviate from his instruction to ensure as much of a safety margin as possible. The controller overreacted to the situation; which should have been a non-event.




Synopsis: P51 pilot reported a generator failure enroute that required him to request priority handling and make a precautionary landing.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: VPS.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 100
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D VPS
ATC / advisory: TRACON VPS
Second aircraft: Cessna 340/340A
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We departed Eglin AFB; Runway 19; on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight clearance. Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) existed on departure and throughout the flight. Our departure instructions were to fly the runway heading and climb to 3;000 FT. Immediately after departure; Eglin Tower reported VFR traffic at our 1 o'clock position descending into Destin. We were then instructed to contact Eglin Departure. The situation rapidly deteriorated to the point that the aircraft's Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) issued a Resolution Advisory (RA); which; per the FAR's (91.123(a)); we complied with. The TCAS RA Commanded an increased climb rate which we accomplished. We did not see the traffic until it passed just beneath our nose. Tower issued a departure clearance while the other aircraft was descending across our planned departure path. The other aircraft was under control of the TRACON and operating under VFR conditions at the time; in Part 93 airspace. The TRACON Controller failed to adequately control the other aircraft once it cancelled its IFR flight plan and reported us in sight. The other aircraft reported us in sight; while we were rolling down the runway for departure. I don't believe the other aircraft fully realized the performance capabilities of the B737 aircraft on departure; nor did the Departure Controller.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer experiences a TCAS RA departing VPS Runway 19 with an aircraft landing at DTS. The arriving aircraft had reported the B737 in sight during the takeoff roll but apparently failed to take the climb rate into account.