elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LHM.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E LHM
ATC / advisory: CTAF LHM
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying to Lincoln; California (LHM) to practice touch and goes in a PA28R 180. I entered the traffic pattern for Runway 15 on a 45-degree entrance; calls previously had been done at approximately 5 miles and 2 miles out. I entered the downwind; completed my GUMPS check and proceeded to base. A single engine Cessna took off from Runway 15 while I was on final. I completed the touch and go and climbed out to enter the crosswind; call made; at approximately 500 feet above ground level. The Cessna in the pattern flew an exaggerated upwind pattern; apparently he had made a crosswind call; and a downwind call and I crossed in front of his line of flight. I was notified by the pilot of the Cessna of the error; and apologized for the intrusion. I noticed his aircraft to my left hand side; approximately 300 feet to the inside of the pattern 50 feet lower. I exited the parallel downwind and flew a right hand one-eighty turn out and reentered the downwind leg. The contributing factors to the intrusion was my low time in a PA28R with fixation on the departure processes; likely not hearing and registering mentally the crosswind and downwind calls by the Cessna. An additional error was not announcing my intention to fly a touch and go for Runway 15.




Synopsis: PA28R pilot reported a NMAC in the pattern at LHM airport.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Lancair ES
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the flight portion of a flight review/IPC; we experienced a taxiway excursion due to a total loss of brake pressure.After landing and taxing back to runway XX; in ZZZ; the brakes lost pressure while entering the runway. We decided not to takeoff. I checked my brakes and they did not work either.Exiting on taxiway; the aircraft seemed under control and we were discussing shutting down the engine once we made it to the ramp area.The aircraft started veering to the left. I joined on the pedals; full right rudder and full brake; no change; still veering. I told pilot to shut it down. He pulled the mixture to cutoff. The aircraft then went off the side of the taxiway; the propeller struck two taxiway lights and the right main ran over one light before the plane came to a stop. The engine seemed slow to shut down while at mixture cutoff. Pilot said that the boost pump was on and that was most likely the reason for the delayed shutdown. The engine was shut down; however; the propeller continued to windmill.Two of the propeller blades were damaged and there was a scratch on the side of the wheel fairing. No other damage to the aircraft. Neither of us were injured.




Synopsis: Lancair ESP Flight Instructor reported a taxiway excursion due to a total loss of brake system.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZHU.ARTCC, TX
Light: Night
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: While doing a self awareness scan of my flight following computer I noticed that one of my flights appeared to have either accepted or requested a direct routing direct to CRAMM Intersection from their present position. At that time it appeared that they could drift outside of 50 NM from the shoreline so I attempted to contact unsuccessfully on ACARS. When I did re-establish communications I asked if they were direct CRAMM and why? They replied 'COMPLIED WITH PREV MESSAGE IN ROUTE TO CRAMM'. When I looked for this 'previous message' in ACARS review I could not find it logged. I finally found the message in [the provider] server stating: **** CREW ADVISORY **** DIRECT-TO ADVISORY FOR [your flight] RECOMMEND REQUEST DIRECT-TO CRAMM FPR. I explained to the crew that this message was not generated by me and that [I was concerned] they may have gone more than 50 NM from the shoreline. They responded: 'IT WAS A ***CREW ALERT* WE CHECKED IT DID NOT TAKE US FARTHER OUT WE JUST WENT DOWN THE COAST'. They further stated: 'THE ONLY INFO COMING INTO MY PLANE SHOULD BE FROM MY DISPATCHER NOT JUNK MAIL.'I got no warning or alert that this message was sent. I simply reacted to the potential issue of the flight going beyond 50 NM from the shoreline in violation of the FARs because this aircraft had no life rafts installed.This 'system' sends recommendations to the aircraft under the guise that the Dispatcher is the one generating the recommendations. These recommendations should go to the Dispatcher first to suggest any amendment to a release. If the Dispatcher concurs with the suggestion he should be the one to uplink them to the flight crew. Further; the system only looks for traffic and winds. What's going to happen when it directs one of my crews to take a shortcut through a line of severe thunderstorms?




Synopsis: A Dispatcher took exception to the unilateral routing recommendations sent by a new 'computer system' to flight crews rather than to the flight Dispatcher for his/her review before transmission at his discretion.
Date: 201902
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This is a diesel powered air compressor booked on Aircraft X and then to ZZZ1 on a truck. As per the letter attached to the freight; it was drained of fuel and oil; but when you open the fuel cap and inspect; there is a great deal of residual diesel still in the unit. In my opinion; this should have been tendered as Class 9; UN3530; Engine; Internal Combustion.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported Hazmat cargo improperly configured as well as incorrectly classified for air transport.
Date: 201602
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Load planner is having hazardous material surrounded by passenger's bags to keep it secure. This poses a serious threat if we are unaware of the materials in the passenger's luggage and it ends up being incompatible materials. Please review this situation. My pilot wanted to know what aminoproplytrethoxysilane was.




Synopsis: Ramp Agent reported passenger bags were being used to surround hazardous material to keep it secure in the cargo compartment.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Planned flight. Weather for ZZZZ: ZZZZ 18/24-hour Forecast 32006KT CAVOK (Ceiling and Visibility Okay) PROB40 4000 BR using alternate ZZZZ1 weather ZZZZ1 18/24-hour Forecast VRB03KT CAVOK. Just after departure checked weather again. ZZZZ 18/24-hour Forecast VRB03KT CAVOK no longer required alternate. Checked ZZZZ1 in Lido and then company dashboard: VALID FOR ETD/ETA. VRB03KT 9999 FEW002. Then noticed an alert on company dashboard and found illegal forecast for ZZZZ1 National Weather Service and company: TAF ZZZZ1 VRB03KT 9999 SCT002 PROB40 FZFG VV001. METAR also showed ZZZZ1 600 meters and reporting RVR. Zero notification from Lido for either leg because Lido didn't even have correct ZZZZ TAF. Deleted alternate for ZZZZ. Reworked second leg and added alternate for ZZZZ1.Used to Lido not alerting properly for changes of weather if station is already below what Lido considers below minimums. However ZZZZ1 was CAVOK at planning. Flight Planning Support speculated that it was a time stamp issue (Even though there are similar events happening that is now called overwritten/corrupt TAF). Apparently there are again Lido weather issues.Suggest Lido begin a process similar to the one for SIGMETS not ingested correctly no matter what the root cause. Any weather data should be handled with redundancy in the process. Also alarming is the lack of communication about these ongoing problems in Lido. I double checked my email for anything about Lido weather; nothing from Flight Planning Support and nothing from Flight Control Standards. So how is a dispatcher coming on shift supposed to even be aware that these issue exist? I already know the responses of access Lido trouble tickets and other sources of weather. Not good enough. These issues should be 'pushed' out to flight control floor not something I have to hunt. Out of ordinary functions of any system used by Dispatch should require notification of the floor.




Synopsis: A Dispatcher reported the Lido weather forecast process apparently does not update to current conditions if an airport is already below Lido minimums during the dispatch process. A destination change to below minimums was discovered on a National Weather Service forecast.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Challenger 350
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other approach
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We received a vectoring delay arriving at ZZZ due to traffic. We arrived from the north then overhead the airport we were vectored back north for about 15 miles. When we were about eleven miles NW of the airport inbound; the Controller cleared us for a visual approach to Runway XX and asked that we track the centerline of the runway towards the airport. At that point I was tracking what looked like a proper and safe descent path to the runway and our speed was under control. Due to the extreme VFR conditions my sight picture for the descent looked safe and the PAPI was between white/white to white/red. As we approached the last mountain ridge; we received a CAUTION TERRAIN advisory. I still felt our glide path was going to clear the mountain ridge; however; due to the steep vertical slope of the mountain ridge the GPWS within seconds called out TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP. Again; I still felt we were okay; but the radar altimeter quickly showed a decreasing AGL from 1;500 - 700 feet. I shallowed the descent rate until we were past the mountain ridge. One factor was it had been over XX years since I last landed at ZZZ. We were vectored to the airport and were not on a published approach. I had previously landed at ZZZ about fifteen times many years ago and I remembered that it is easy to end up high and fast trying to land at ZZZ; which I was trying to avoid from happening. My over confidence that my sight picture and descent rate looked like we were going to clear the terrain safely. We had the LOC DME approach loaded in the FMS; but I never fully crossed referenced the charted crossing altitudes because we were vectored to the airport. The extreme VFR conditions and smooth air lulled me into thinking nothing could go wrong with this approach.Strictly adhere to charted altitudes on a published approach plate for the airport even though we are cleared for a visual approach and it will cause our descent angle to be between 6.49 to 9.61 degrees until short final.




Synopsis: CL-350 flight crew reported aircraft encountered terrain alert during approach.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MIA.Tower, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: Tower MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the arrival phase to MIA; (First Officer flying) we were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 9. We lost contact with the runway due to hazy conditions and the position of the early morning sun. This condition complicated the workload which degraded our situational awareness. We found ourselves high and fast.  While correcting for this condition; our terrain closure rate caused the GPWS system to activate. The Pilot Flying corrected this condition and we continued to landing.I should have anticipated the restriction to visibility and required the First Officer to more closely adhere to procedures for using the ILS for this arrival. Also; when the GPWS activated; I should have called for a go-around be performed.




Synopsis: During a visual approach to MIA Runway 9; an International Crew distracted by the rising sun in the early morning haze; activated the EGPWS terrain closure rate warning as they corrected for a high fast approach.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LNP.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter function: Observer
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Observer
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: [There is] minimal to no fencing around the airport property of at least 10 feet tall to keep deer off airport property to mitigate someone impacting deer while in the phases of landing and takeoff into Lonesome Pine Regional Airport (LNP). The majority of the airport has no fencing. The only fencing at the airport is that around the terminal and areas of vehicle access to the airport. The height of the fence varies between 4 feet to 6 feet tall. The rest of the airport has no fencing at all.




Synopsis: Reporter stated there is minimal to no fencing at LNP airport to keep wildlife out.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C MRY
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 28L at MRY; runway heading to 7;000 FT. After takeoff the Tower advised us of traffic at 12 to 1 o'clock and stated traffic had us in sight. PNF stated negative contact. Neither of us could see the traffic. Tower switched us to NORCAL Departure. At approximately 3;000 FT a yellow TCAS target appeared to the right showing +1;000 and then we had an immediate 'descend' RA with the green box showing a steep pitch down. I pitched the aircraft forward putting the command bars in the green box. The RA cleared and we immediately had a secondary and steeper 'descend' RA which required a very steep descent and negative g to comply with the RA. As soon as the RA cleared we had a TAWS 'terrain....pull up' command. I immediately made a smooth pitch up recovering at approximately 1;700 FT; advised ATC of the RA and climbed to 7;000 FT with no further conflict. The pitch over to comply with the RA was dramatic and required an aggressive and deliberate response which frightened the passengers. The TCAS worked as it should and must be complied with; but it is unnerving pitching over at a low altitude. It would be helpful to practice low altitude/descend RA's during recurrent training.




Synopsis: G IV Captain experiences a TCAS RA at low altitude departing MRY requiring an aggressive pitch over followed by a terrain warning.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: New departure procedure out of Fort Lauderdale VACAY 1 - Runway 10L. Departure is standard RNAV until AGERS.  Following AGERS; both the text and the plan view show vectors to FEMTO. The text for the departure states 'Track 307 for radar vectors to FEMTO...' Flying the departure; we continued on the 307 heading and never cleared to FEMTO or given vectors. We were handed off to Miami Center. We flew past FEMTO. After asking Miami Center for directions; they said they expected us to proceed to FEMTO on the departure; as depicted.  Miami Center stated that this was not the first time it happened; and that there was confusion within the Center regarding the procedures that should be followed. This new procedure needs to be corrected so that this type of procedural error does not occur.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation during departure from FLL on the VACAY 1.  The Captain stated they missed going to FEMTO during the departure as expected by ATC. Reporter also stated the Controller mentioned there is confusion with the procedure and that this was not the first time it happened.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked; Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff Roll
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During takeoff on runway XYL; I performed an aborted takeoff due to engine 1 N1 rollback of approximately 10% at 70 KTS. All engine parameters were normal at our 'set thrust' call; then the EICAS; we noted that engine 1 N1 was indicating about 75%; initially set at 85.9%. The throttles were still in TOGA position; and the thrust command arc was still set to N1 target. No 'ENG TLA NOT TOGA' was present. Upon abort call and throttle reduction to idle was the 'ENG TLA NOT TOGA' CAS message and master caution. Normal abort sequence and QRH 'Mechanical Irregularity Action Chart' for Aborted Takeoff was performed. Dispatch; Chief Pilot; and Maintenance were notified. Deplaned passengers and flight was eventually cancelled.We had contract maintenance come out to resolve our engine 1 N1 rollback resulting in an aborted takeoff. It became apparent that one of the technicians smelled like alcohol. I asked the others on my crew to confirm my suspicion; and all three agreed.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported an aborted takeoff due to an engine roll-back.