elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Pulled into gate shut down engines and aircraft went dark. The front and back totally due to the APU not being started. Also no dome light; no VHF #1 and APU would not start! Only battery off light came on #1 battery when both batteries were switched off then on! Alarm went off below in nose wheel well. The only light was IRS on battery light. Ground power was connected in about two to three minutes. The APU started normally and power was normal on the aircraft again. About an hour later the Captain called Maintenance Duty Manager and asked for tech support on the Airbus 330. They were advised of all of the above. He said would go back to the aircraft and write it up if they thought it needed to be done. He was put on hold and told aircraft had no history of electrical problems; no aircraft alerts or notifications and that a write up was not necessary. He said I am good with it if you are. He just wanted Maintenance to know if they thought it was a valid write-up. Maybe batteries never connected back to battery bus? Check electrical switching for faults.




Synopsis: An A330 lost all electrical power; including items that should operate on battery power only; when the engines were shut down without APU or ground power available. After ground power was connected and all electrical systems return to normal.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: IAD.Tower, DC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: Tower IAD
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This is a known event reported by the Tower Front Line Manager (FLM) using an internal worksheet for aircraft identification problems (attached). In this instance; two aircraft with identical call signs (Aircraft X); one an arrival and one a departure were airborne at the same time.This is the third such occurrence this month by [airline name removed] at IAD (in addition to 8 others since [date removed]). Each has been reported to FSDO; The airline. Feedback from the Principle Operations Inspector (POI) is that there is a difficult relationship between the FAA and this airline and since no regulation has been violated; the FAA cannot do an enforcement action against them.  Meanwhile; this unsafe situation continues.Please review the attachments.  You have my permission to share this report.1)  Airlines must be held accountable for educating their dispatchers to change call signs of the outbound leg if the inbound has not yet arrived. We don't see duplicate call signs with the major air carriers. Why can't the dispatchers for the regional carriers perform to the same standards? A simple fix; change the outbound flight's call sign to Aircraft X-A. If a regulation needs to be made; then let's write one.2) Another FSDO's APOI for [different airline] has had success in getting that airline to modifiy their procedures to prevent duplicate IDs.  [This other] Dispatch manager has offered to help Aircraft X's Airline with the issue. The Other FSDO APOI is also pursuing other avenues with his airline contacts.  Even as I write this; I've just heard where reporting FSDO had a telcon with [airline of Aircraft X] on this issue yesterday.  Aircraft X Airline is reaching out to [the other airline] to see if their procedure will work for them.3) Both TWR and RDR teams handled this situation very well; pre-empting a stop on departures.




Synopsis: IAD support specialist reports of a flight inbound and outbound to/from IAD that is using the same call sign at the same time. He reports this has been happening for over 7 months and nothing has been done about it.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PHL.TRACON, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Aircraft X was departing an uncontrolled airport. There were several VFR aircraft flying in the vicinity. Ceilings were approximately 2;500 ft. Winds were 130/09. All of our airports were operating in an east configuration. Aircraft X was departing and climbing out. I noticed what appeared to be an unidentified VFR aircraft established on the ILS for the opposite direction runway. I called traffic to the departing aircraft. They did not see the opposite direction inbound. I turned the departure to a 180 heading below the MVA to avoid a mid-air collision as the climb and descent rates of both aircraft were comparable and would have both been at approximately 1;500 ft. at the same place and time. The departure turned and continued to climb without incident. I questioned the pilot on whether the VFR aircraft had made any announcement of their position and intentions on the UNICOM frequency. The pilot stated he heard no announcements. The VFR aircraft never changed course which led me to believe he was not aware of the departure. I tried to raise the VFR aircraft on the guard frequency as it continued practice approaches; but was unsuccessful.




Synopsis: TRACON controller reported vectoring an aircraft below MVA to avoid conflict with a VFR aircraft not on frequency.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PNE.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Fog; 2
Aircraft: Citation III; VI; VII (C650)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D PNE
ATC / advisory: Tower PNE
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to PNE using the RNAV (GPS) Runway 6 approach we mistakenly started descent from WAMCA instead of JUNIA which was the final approach fix. The Controller issued a low altitude alert and that was followed by the GPWS terrain warning. The pilot not flying called out that we have not reached JUNIA yet and I initiated a climb. Upon reaching JUNIA we descended to the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) and continued the approach. Upon seeing the airport visually we were too high to execute a safe landing and went missed approach. On the return we executed the ILS Runway 24 approach and landed.


Second narrative: On the RNAV (GPS) Runway 6 approach at PNE we descended to the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) prior to the FAF. Human factors issues to include; lack of awareness; distraction; and lack of assertiveness played a role. ATC was queried and the approach continued to a missed approach. Factors affecting quality of human performance included lack of proficiency; knowledge; and stress.


Synopsis: CE-650 flight crew reported they received a low altitude alert from ATC and a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) terrain warning when they descended below charted altitude on the RNAV GPS approach to PNE.
Date: 201705
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: In reference to the company alert regarding Denver simultaneous RNAV (RNP) approaches; has there been any discussion addressing the threat that current RNAV (RNP) approaches to parallel runways in Denver share many of the same fixes? Please reference the FRNCH3 RNAV STAR as well as the RNAV Z approaches for 34L and 34R. Both approaches share HIMOM; MCMUL; and KUGLN; not to mention the 'Z' approach designation.  Although it's indisputably the crew's responsibility to load and fly the correct approach; there seems a real possibility; following a change in plan from 34L to 34R; the crew could have the wrong approach in the FMC and not realize it since the next several LEGS page fixes would match the desired procedure.  If only the LEGS page were looked at; both pilots might mistakenly assume the necessary change had been made. Neither the Approach Checklist nor its expanded Flight Manual text would save the crew.  It seems to me we have designed our Before Takeoff Checklist to verify the runway and SID; so why not require; on RNAV approaches; the route page match the desired approach and runway? In the case of Denver; with so much attention being given to loss of aircraft separation; this could be a real contributor. Lastly; although this example references approaches to 34L and 34R transitioning from the FRNCH3 RNAV Arrival; the same error potential exists when transitioning to the RNAV Z approaches to 16L and 16R from the ZPLYN3 RNAV Arrival.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported potential flight crew confusion with DEN RNAV arrivals since they share many of the same fixes.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TPA.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We use headsets for all ground crew to push back our aircraft from gates daily to ensure safe and effective communications between ground crew and the flight crew. My suggestion is that the ground crew use headsets also during taxi into the gate before and during aircraft movements in the Safety Zone. I find during taxi in; the nose Marshaller at some point transitions from a view of the wing walkers to total concentration on the aircraft's nose and its position relevant to the J-line; thereby missing any signal from the wing walkers. Change Ground Ops standard operating procedures to require headset communication use during aircraft approaching and taxi in Safety Zone to gate.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported safety concern with ground crew operations during taxi.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Aircraft X was climbing to FL350; I had to stop the aircraft at FL330 for incoming flights descending to FL340. I used an auto 'A' to handoff Aircraft X to ZAB; and it auto handed off the plane to ZAB65 (owns FL340 and above). I had weather deviations going into PHX and recently had combined up with another sector (ZLA12) with sector 31. Traffic Management Unit (TMU) had re-routed several LAX landing planes into my sky for thunderstorms elsewhere. I switched the plane to ZAB65; and when I went to take the aircraft off my scope I realized it was in ZAB 91's sky. ZLA12 had to be re-opened for volume/complexity in ZLA31 sky.The reasoning for the combination was for training at ZLA09 D-side (which is where ZLA12 is normally combined). While staffing was on the low side; ZLA09 had zero planes when I was asked to combine ZLA12 at ZLA31. Training should not dictate taking safety risks. If the training is that important; then overtime should've been authorized.The auto hand off when a plane is temped at FL330 should go to the controller who owns FL330; not the controller who at some distant time in the future may or may not climb the aircraft into their sky. This would be like the approach auto directing to a high altitude sector in the center? Safety should be to protect the aircrafts current altitude; not to expedite a planes potential to climb at the risk violating airspace.




Synopsis: ZLA Controller hands off an aircraft to another sector. The handoff; because of a Temporary Altitude in the scratch pad area; goes to another sector. The handoff should have went to the sector that the aircraft was 'temped' at; not one that is possibly a future scope.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Descent; Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Our pilots called shortly after departure; around 10;000 ft. They asked if we could smell anything out of the ordinary. I could not identify any smell in the forward part of the cabin. I asked B FA (Flight Attendant) if she could identify anything towards the back of the aircraft. She could not. The pilots informed B FA that they had donned their oxygen masks as part of their procedure to identify and try to eliminate the cause. Captain and First Officer (FO) think they eliminated it by switching off pack one. We continued. During flight; just after reaching cruise altitude; we gave the pilots a break. When I went into the flight deck; I could clearly smell something chemically; wet sock smell. C FA was guarding and said he could smell something off next to the Flight Deck. Our Captain and our FO said the smell had dissipated but was still there. Just prior to decent; we (B FA and I) gave the pilots another break. The smell seemed to still be there but less than before. Upon landing; the pilots informed us the smell returned about 5 min before landing and continued through taxi in. The Captain opened his window for fresh air during taxi in. We were only on PACK 2 at this point. Maintenance came on board after deplaning passengers and ran the APU and the whole AC immediately had the chemical wet sock smell. Maintenance then went through their procedures and cleared the aircraft to go. B FA and I both experienced stomach discomfort and itchy eyes; and B FA and C FA experienced headaches. Mostly dissipated by the time we spent off the aircraft.Maintenance cleared the aircraft; they frequently cannot duplicate. Maintenance personnel should ride the jump seat after these events for takeoffs and landing to as close as possible recreate the same circumstances.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Flight attendants reported a fumes event after takeoff resulting in health issues.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Carb heat was pulled on and power reduced to idle by the instructor for a simulated engine failure for training around 4;000 feet MSL. After the student ran through the checklist for the practice maneuver; the Instructor told the student to clear the engine. Upon attempted clearing of the engine; it sputtered and the instructor took control. Full power was not restored. The pilot called Tower and advised of a possible [priority] landing. The Instructor completed a safe and controlled landing in a field. There was no visible damage to the airplane and no injuries.




Synopsis: C172 Instructor Pilot reported while on a training flight the aircraft engine malfunctioned.
Date: 201909
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: During pre-boarding of Aircraft X a pre-boarding passenger had a roller bag that they told me was '80 pounds and filled with lithium batteries for her mobility scooter'. I informed the operations agent that the bag was filled with lithium batteries and that it was too heavy for me to lift alone. The operations agent called a supervisor who informed me that there was no limit to the number of lithium batteries allowed in a carry on for medical purposes as long as they're not attached to anything and they found someone to assist with stowing the bag in an overhead bin. This concerned me because if the lithium batteries were to catch on fire; because of the number of them there would be no way to contain them in the containment bags that we have available. I was also concerned because I couldn't find anything in the [manual] about weight restrictions on carry-on items; both for the safety of the employees assisting with carry-on items that are too heavy and for the weight limits on the overhead bins I found it concerning that I was unable to find any weight restrictions for carry-on items in my manual. This was a difficult situation to address because it was; I felt; too heavy to be a carry-on item but because of the presence of lithium ion batteries we were unable to check the bag either. A set limit for carry-on weight and number of lithium ion batteries allowed onboard.




Synopsis: B737-800 Flight Attendant reported passenger carry-on bag containing 80 lbs of Lithium Ion batteries caused concern due to weight and insufficient containment bags available to extinguish a Lithium Ion battery fire in the event of an in flight fire. Reporter further stated there is no guidance in Flight Attendant Manuel regarding weight/quantity restrictions.