Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing; Weather
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: One of the most important details of this report is that in the North Area we have 5 radar sectors. There is DBQ (63); LNR (64); BAE (60); HOR (61); and Harly (62). On this shift; we had 6 CPCs scheduled to work 5 radar sectors. Many times on shifts; traffic is fairly slow so we are able to combine positions. Sometimes we combine all of the low altitude sectors together which is a very risky move in my opinion; as Harly is an ORD and MKE departure sector. The main issue that arises here is that we are forced to work all the low altitude sectors combined on a 125 mile range as well as have our altitude limits set to the ground (as we own from the surface to FL230 in DBQ sector); when you have 6+ ORD departure 5 MIT and 3-4 MKE departures and several overflights in Harly alone; it is much more difficult to accurately determine separation at such close distances. Also; as ORD is one of the busiest airports in the world; the limited datablocks around ORD and MDW make it so that it is very difficult to see actual data blocks that you are in control of at times. One more issue that arises here is that you have 5 frequencies: 133.3; 132.1; 135.55; 125.05; and 133.95. This makes it extremely easy for miscommunication between pilots and controllers; especially when busy. To put it simply; the agency is staffing our area with the least amount of controllers possible; and it is creating unsafe working situations; putting many CPC's and the flying public in extremely vulnerable and compromising positions. I signed into the LNR radar sector position. At the time it was LNR and DBQ combined. There was a massive line of moderate; heavy; and some extreme precipitation that extended from CID to DBQ to JVL and all the way to ORD. At this time there were numerous ORD and MDW ground stops; which resulted in my holding of numerous aircraft over the DBQ VORTAC. I should also mention that something that complicated my sector is that I had the VOK E; S; W and WIANG ABC MOAs and ATCAAs active. After about an hour and a half of working here; I start to see that numerous ORD arrivals started being handed off to me. At no point was any type of plan communicated to me; but I did notice that the route was going to be a huge issue for the area as the Harly controller seemed extremely busy already; and all of these ORD inbounds that we normally do not work would now be cruising through his departure sector. A notable point is that our 6th CPC had now been allowed to go home at this time; and as you will see we desperately needed the extra body; in fact; probably could have used a few more.In order to give the Harly controller a fighting shot at getting on top of the ORD inbounds; my plan was to expedite all of the aircraft to 170. At this time; numerous aircraft expressed to me that they were minimum fuel or could not fly the entire route. Due to the traffic and frequency congestion; I was unable to answer each one of their calls; most of the time I had to specify that if they needed to divert; they should do so and to not expect any short cuts. I must reemphasize that during no time during this huge push was any semblance of a plan expressed to the controllers on the floor. Numerous times I heard shouting across the room that the BAE..MKG..RHIVR routing was not good; then contradicting reports that it was good; etc. During all of this; we had a code floating towards our airspace that I noticed at 170. I immediately recognized that it looked very similar to an ORD arrival. Sector P04 at ZMP started calling us for coordination and my trainee d-side answered the call. What my d-side trainee eventually communicated to me was that for whatever reason; ZMP could not get the aircraft to flash at me and so I immediately put in a 'vp' flight plan; to get something in the machine. I changed the aircraft's callsign to Aircraft X; and gave him routing which I thought was good: FAH.ERNNY2.KORD. Time passed; and I initiated an AIT (Automated Information Transfer) to the Harly sector. Harly informed me while the aircraft was over the CHDRR intersection (normally when MKE approach has the handoff); that he could not get the aircraft to handoff to MKE; so my trainee D-side initiated a manual handoff. MKE approach then informed us that they would not accept the aircraft as the pilot would not be able to fly that route in weather. I didn't really know what to do at this time as I had no idea what route to give the aircraft so; unfortunately for the aircraft; I put him on a series of vectors in Harly's airspace and finally pawned him off on the Northeast area; sector 27; as they were already working ORD arrivals. This entire situation was extremely dangerous and the most frustrating thing; apart from the lack of staffing in the area at the time; was that no plan was ever communicated to us controllers. Several things could have alleviated the dangers of this event immensely.1. Needed 4 more CPCS on the shift at the time of the event. This would have brought us from 5 to 9 CPCs.2. Extra staffing would allow us to open up positions and have more than one d-side in the area. I would recommend opening up DBQ; and putting a d-side at LNR; BAE; and Harly.3. Have our floundering TMU formulate and communicate a plan with our supervisor.4. Give us a supervisor that is familiar with our area and airspace. The supervisor at the time; due to no fault of his own; seemed to be totally clueless and had no insight or direction to provide to us. He was put in a situation where he was set up to fail. 5. Cancel the military airspace as our IFR operations were highly impacted and made more complex due to the existence of the cumbersome VOK E/S/W + WIANG A/B/C.




Synopsis: ZAU Controller describes a shift where aircraft area deviating and the sectors that he is working have been combined. Aircraft are not flying as instructed because of weather and one aircraft is not accepted by the facility he would normally hand it off to. Controller reported that this was a staffing issue.