elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pressurization Outflow Valve
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: On [date] I arrived at work at the ZZZ base hangar. Aircraft X was out of service for a pressurization problem. I was told the outflow safety valves were cleaned and the aircraft was taken on a maintenance check flight and pressurization was working.In further discussions with Air Methods and Management teams the decision was made to change both outflow/safety valves. I was told they had already been ordered and would arrive the morning of [date].On the morning of [date] Technician brought the new valves into the hangar. I installed both outflow safety valves. Aircraft was flown on a maintenance check flight and operated normally.I had problems getting [Maintenance Software] part change accomplished. On [date] I sent an email to Service Engineering in accordance with [Maintenance Software] trouble shooting guide. I was informed that the removed valve part numbers were not in [Maintenance Software] and that is why I could not get the parts change accomplished. [Maintenance Software] part change was completed [date].On [date] I read the follow-up email from Service Engineering and their finding of the part number was not on the effectivity list for aircraft serial number. I got together with Technician; who had ordered the parts and we confirmed the wrong part number had been ordered and subsequently installed.I notified Lead Mechanic and Regional Maintenance Director of the problem and removed the aircraft from service.The parts were ordered by other people. Technician is new to Aircraft X and he was helped by a more experienced mechanic on Aircraft X in entering the order in [Maintenance Software]. The more experienced mechanic could have been more involved in identifying the correct part and effectivity. I could have double checked the effectivity of the part but had thought that had already been accomplished during ordering.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported installing incorrect parts that another Technician had ordered and failed to verify correct part numbers.
Date: 201810
Location: PIT.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B PIT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PIT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Conducting the visual approach; RNAV back up Runway 28C in PIT. ATC instructed maintain 3;500 feet until established on final. Crossed FAF about 500 feet high to comply. As I was making a positive correction to get the aircraft on vertical profile; received a 'Terrain; Terrain'. This occurred above 2;000 feet. Made slight correction; warning ceased and landed uneventfully.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported being high crossing FAF then receiving 'terrain; terrain' warning from aircraft.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During takeoff we had good airspeed at 80 Kts and we both confirmed; but at approximately 100 Kts the First Officer called Airspeed Discrepancy with his airspeed being very erratic and it dropped to approximately 60 Kts while my airspeed was at 100 Kts and increasing normally. I called reject and we aborted the takeoff doing all the appropriate rejected takeoff procedures which included a manual spoiler deployment due to it being MEL. The First Officer advised the Tower that we were rejecting and once slowed to a safe taxi speed; we cleared the runway. After clearing; we ran the After Landing Checklist; the Rejected Takeoff QRH Checklist; and the Brake Overheat QRH checklists to a completion. The brakes number 1; 3; 4; and 5 were all rising to a high temp so we contacted Ground to find a safe spot to taxi to avoid people and equipment. We got cleared to taxi off of [the runway] to avoid possible hazards and contacted Maintenance to confirm our plan of attack and see if they had any other ideas to help us. They agreed with our plan to not set the parking brake and allow the brakes to cool to below 500 temp before going to a parking spot. We had another MD-11 qualified pilot on the jumpseat so we used his help to contact Operations and confirm our thoughts and procedures. The First Officer expertly ran all the checklists and helped tremendously throughout the whole situation. Kudos to both of these crewmember for a job well done. After the brakes which peaked at 571 degrees cooled below 500; we contacted Ground to taxi to our ramp coordinated parking spot. Upon reaching the parking spot; we completed our shut down Checklists and wrote up the appropriate Maintenance write-ups for the hot brakes and the airspeed problem. We also debriefed the maintenance team on all the write-ups and details.I don't believe you can prevent these types of maintenance problems from occurring. We just have to be ready for them and do the appropriate procedures safely.


Second narrative: [Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]


Synopsis: MD-11 flight crew reported rejecting their takeoff at about 110 kts when the First Officer airspeed indicator became unreliable.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Immediately after takeoff; we received a master caution with the following EICAS messages: Hydraulic pump fail A; hydraulic fluid low A; hydraulic PTU fail. At the same time; we noticed that the main gear had retracted; but the nose wheel was extended with a green light. We executed the checklist for the Hydraulic Pump Fail A and diverted to [nearest suitable airport]. We notified company. We asked for crash equipment to stand by. After using the emergency gear extension per the checklist; we executed the ILS and stopped on the runway using the emergency brake. [We were] towed to the service center where they found a ruptured hydraulic line in the nose wheel bay. One important problem to note is the difficulty that we had getting in touch with the company. When we first notified company it was via the [VHF] frequency. We were asked to call in on the satellite phone; so that the Flight District's Officer could be conferenced in. On my first call; I dialed the Dispatch hotline via the number on the sticker on the phone. I called this number twice and did not get an answer (phone rang). Second; I tried the normal number on the phone sticker. I dialed this number twice and got a recording both times that said that the number was out of service. At this point; I told the First Officer what was happening and he dialed the 800 number to Dispatch from memory and was able to get through. Suggestions: Thorough inspection of hydraulic lines. A Cessna Mechanic said that this was the 'weak link' in the system. Perhaps these lines should be replaced more often. Check of phone system at Dispatch. Stickers in airplanes with phone numbers might need to be replaced.




Synopsis: CE-750 First Officer reported loss of hydraulic system A. They declared an emergency and diverted to the nearest suitable airport; where a hydraulic line failure was diagnosed.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: Airliner 99
Operator: Air Taxi
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Fatigue; Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was just doing my normal thing once I was unloaded at ZZZ. On my way to ZZZ1 taxiing via [Taxiway] A for departure and was transmitting my intentions. For example; taxiing for departure Runway 35; it will be a north bound departure; ZZZ traffic. I heard nothing on frequency which is pretty common and not unusual. Setting torque once lined up on Runway 35; I initiated my takeoff roll only to see another aircraft landing or departing (couldn't tell) Runway 30. What the heck! Why weren't they on frequency? It was smaller GA traffic though; so I was not surprised. I had to delay my rotation just to ensure I would not take off into their belly. I would call this a near miss. Once on the ground at ZZZ1 a local airport man rode up to my plane on a tractor looking thing while loaders were offloading. He asked what frequency I was on. I said [frequency]. He said frequency is [frequency]. I was appalled at what had happened and extremely embarrassed. I later apologized to the other aircraft doing pattern work there on the correct frequency. Always double check frequencies. If you don't hear anything check your frequency or talk to the previous approach frequency to try to get traffic advisories.




Synopsis: Beech 99 Captain reported that selecting the incorrect CTAF frequency resulted in a critical ground conflict.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Robinson R44
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During a pleasure flight; the low fuel light came on in the Robinson R44. Upon noticing; I immediately reduced collective and slowed to 80 knots to preserve fuel and began considering the nearest appropriate place to land. Being close to ZZZ; I headed directly there to land while keeping an eye out open areas to auto rotate to in the case of engine loss. After landing; I sent my passengers into the FBO; refueled the helicopter; and sent my passengers onto dinner. I called a friend and previous Flight Instructor to discuss what happened. I then flew the helicopter back to ZZZ1 alone.The issue began during the preflight. A friend and our significant others joined me for a sightseeing tour. During the preflight; the friend kept asking questions and pulling away my attention. When I first checked the fuel gauges; I misread them as being mostly full when they were mostly empty. I even quickly redid the weight and balance in my head to confirm we were under maximum weight. I have no idea how I made the mistake other than I was simply going through the motions while distracted. I then missed when I did the physical check of the fuel tanks as the hangar was dim and I did not affirmatively see the fuel level. Again; I allowed myself to be distracted and just go through the motions of unscrewing the fuel cap and looking into the tank. As I finished the preflight; I mentioned to my friend how important the preflight was and asked him to be quiet while I did a second preflight. Unfortunately this time; I simply confirmed the gauges showed the same fuel level as before and did not check the tanks; but was thorough for the rest of the preflight. The startup of the helicopter took longer than usual with several attempts due to the cold weather. During my takeoff check; I repeated out loud that gauges were green and we had fuel - again just confirming the gauges were in the same position and not really looking at what they read.I was excited and nervous for the flight. I allowed myself to be distracted and go through some of the motions. I have now placed an emphasis on each and every step of the preflight. I will no longer allow distractions to be present while I am doing important safety work.




Synopsis: R44 pilot reported diverting due to a low fuel indication attributed to distraction during the preflight check.
Date: 201408
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working LC2.  Rwy 26R is closed and I am shooting gaps on Rwy 26L.  Let me start by saying that I have worked at PHL; CLE and CVG where we landed and departed the same runway all day long.  So with my 23 yrs of ATC experience I feel that I am qualified.  Since 26R has been closed; the FLM's like to stand right behind LC2 and offer 'suggestions' on how many departures to get out in each gap.  The FLM behind me was vibrating like a tuning fork because the TRACON was giving me 5 miles at 170...more than enough room to get out 1 maybe 2 departures.  [Certain air carriers] typically take their time rolling; but you can usually get out 2 crjs if they are not the same RNAV.  The supervisor ordered me to get two out in the next gap.  Both departures were back to back westbound departures; and it's likely separation would not have existed; let alone the minimum spacing required by Atlanta Tracon on back to back departures.  I was angry that the supervisor was setting me up to have an operational error (it's not the first time this supervisor has set me or other controllers up to have an error; and NONE of us appreciate that)  and I let him know that; I refused to roll the second aircraft and asked him to step away from me.   A newer controller would have taken the bait and had an error.  And I watched this same supervisor sit behind 3 different LC2 controllers and tell them how many to get out in each gap.  Talk about micro management.  The FLM's love to force the new people to roll fast and possibly have errors.  It is NOT about SAFETY; it is all about the departure rate....always.  Management will of course deny this; but the controllers know it to be true.Just now; I was working LC3 and the FLM told me to roll 6 departures before I crossed any arrivals and STOOD right behind me breathing down my neck until I did what he told me to do.  This has to stop immediately.  It is creating an UNSAFE working condition in the tower. Tell the FLM' s to back up and let the controllers work and not try to talk them into rolling too fast and possibly having an error.




Synopsis: Local Controller voiced concern regarding supervisory oversight and separation judgments.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff; when 'Gear Up' was selected; the left Main Landing Gear (MLG) indicated an unsafe 'Up' position. The appropriate check was executed; which also concluded that the left Main Gear Door was in an unsafe position. We advised ATC; declared an emergency; and contacted Flight Control for an aircraft return to ZZZZ. The landing was uneventful. After landing; the mechanics found a broken bracket on the [Main] Gear door; had been the cause of the problem. EFIS; FMS/FMC.




Synopsis: An MD-11 Captain reports that after takeoff; when 'Gear Up' was selected; the left Main Landing Gear (MLG) indicated an unsafe 'Up' position. Emergency declared; aircraft returned to field.
Date: 202011
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Our release for this flight included the following under the MEL Item Info 'Treated Fuel'.  A search of the MEL manual and the FOM revealed no information to further describe what this means.  The Captain called Dispatch who had to conference in maintenance to inform us of the meaning.  Maintenance said the plane had been in storage and was only on its second leg after coming out of storage.  A review of all the maintenance paperwork provided to the pilots did not communicate this information.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported not being able to find information on a treated fuel related MEL. First Officer stated the aircraft had just come out of storage.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: VUO.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 26
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF VUO
Second aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was ready [to] depart VFR from VUO. I contacted Pearson Advisory on 119.0 and advised I was departing Runway 26 with a Class C cutout departure. Pearson Advisory acknowledged; advised that PDX was departing to the west and cautioned for wake turbulence. I looked to the east and did not see any aircraft. I announced on the CTAF that I was departing Runway 26 with a Vancouver Lake departure. As I moved forward across the runway hold short line I again looked east and saw a small Cessna on short final. I immediately stopped before turning onto the runway. At that time I heard the Cessna pilot say she was going around. I had not seen her before that. I asked her if she had announced she was on final and she said she had. I did not hear that. My passenger who is experienced with airport operations did not hear any position reports from the aircraft. This was not a near collision. The evasive actions taken were that I stopped just beyond the hold short line and the other airplane initiated a go-around.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a critical ground conflict while taking runway for departure with aircraft on final approach.