elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: During cruise flight attendants were seated by Captain due to continuous light chop with reports of moderate chop ahead. After close to an hour of flight attendants being seated; we experienced a momentary encounter with moderate mountain wave turbulence where the aircraft banked about 20 degrees and airspeed increased 10 to 15 kts. Event lasted about 10 seconds. Pilot spoke with FAs (Flight Attendants) and they all said they were fine as well as all passengers. Everyone was seated during the turbulence encounter. Later in the flight a FA said her neck had some pain and she thought it was due to the turbulence encounter earlier. She said she was ok to perform her duties for the remainder of the flight and for her return flight. Dispatch and the station were notified; and a FA supervisor met the aircraft to discuss the incident/injury with the flight attendant.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported that an encounter with mountain wave turbulence cause a brief loss of control and resulted in a Flight Attendant injury.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MYNN.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground MYNN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: We received taxi instruction to taxi to Runway 32 via H from apron. We taxied per instruction. The captain and I visually verified via the Jeppesen chart that taxiway H does not cross Runway 27. There were no messages; NOTAMs; or any special considerations in the iPad advisory pages. The flight taxied to Runway 32 without problem. This report is written due to crew confusion regarding nonstandard markings on taxiway H and Runway 27 approach. Taxiway H and the intersecting taxiway that leads to Runway 27 clearly indicate taxiways on the Jeppesen chart. This lead to crew confusion on Taxiway H in the vicinity or Runway 27 approach. The 27 approach hold short markings were well worn and badly chipped. The markings were very difficult to see until aircraft was within a few feet of them. We don't believe any error took place. This report was created due to crew confusion of that potential hot spot of Taxiway H and intersection of the taxiway leading to Runway 27. We would have verified crossing of Runway 27 approach to eliminate unexpected confusion.


Second narrative: Cleared to taxi to runway 32 via taxiway H. No mention of any hold short. (I have been flying into Nassau [for many years] and have never used Rwy 32; but due to winds behind a tropical storm). My review of the taxi diagram showed that taxiway H does not cross a runway. It does however cross a taxiway that becomes runway 27. There are no pavement markings at the intersection. I taxied all the way to 32. There were no runway 27 approaches in progress; and no remarks or questions from ATC; no traffic conflicts. I was sure of the clearance; but retrospectively I wish I would have verified before crossing. Vague taxi diagram and pavement markings. Perhaps a clearer taxi instruction; clearer taxi diagram; and pavement markings if this is indeed a runway crossing.


Synopsis: A319 flight crew reported the hold short markings for Runway 27 on Taxiway H at MYNN (Nassau) are badly worn and hard to see.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Weather
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This report is not intended to be specific to this particular flight; but to our operations in general.  I believe the company's continuous and increasing use of ACARS to report system anomalies not related to flying the aircraft is causing a safety hazard.  It began with the first flight of the day aircraft condition reports that are now mandatory via ACARS; and has now become a major distraction with delay reports.  It is unreasonable for the company to insist that pilots report delays; especially when they are well known; while in flight.  Yesterday was a prime example: we were ground stopped due to TSTMS and were given a 2 hour delay EDCT.  The flight back was very challenging with an amended RNAV departure in mountainous terrain; a radical ATC change to our flight plan; and a lot of weather to deviate around for the last half of the flight.  The ACARS was continuously chirping (making loud ACARS noise) enroute while we were busy trying to manage our fuel and deviate around weather.  It wanted to know why we were 2 hours late.  This requirement; combined with the other non-flight related ACARS prompts are causing distraction and are increasing pilot workload.  Considering that our workload has already dramatically increased of late due to all the various and ever-changing RNAV arrivals; these non flight related ACARS functions should be immediately discontinued.




Synopsis: An EMB-145 Captain described the safety hazards; distractions and increased flight crew workload because of the Company requirement to ACARS non flight related anomalies even when the causes are well known.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BJC.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower BJC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A small training helicopter departed Runway 2 without a clearance. Most fixed wing traffic use our parallel Runway 29 or 11. Runway 2/20 is a short runway; 3;600 FT at an airport with a field elevation of 5;673 FT. It is used primarily when we have strong sustained winds out of the North/South. Both helicopter schools are physically located on the north end of the airport. Our standard procedures devote the northern most 800 FT of Runway 2/20 for helicopter use. It is a system that works well; keeping the helicopter students away from most fixed wing movements; both airborne and on the ground. When the helicopters depart Runway 20 they make a 90 degree turn well north of the parallel runways. When they depart the northern most part of Runway 2 they are already well north of the parallel runways. When they depart Runway 2 there is considerable lag time between the clearance being issued and the helicopter actually getting airborne. It can; and usually does; take a couple; maybe a few; minutes to enter the runway; hover taxi south several hundred feet; turn around; and actually start departure roll. From past experience; I have learned that a significant time delay between the issuance of a clearance; and its actual implementation; can be hazardous. In several past errors the notable time delay between the clearance being given and its actual impact was a major factor. Though infrequent; both helicopter schools have departed without clearance before. ATC should provide a briefing that explains the difference between a controller movement area and an uncontrolled area. From a controlled area; the pilot must await the word 'cleared'. No other word authorizes and actual arrival or departure.




Synopsis: A BJC Controller described an unsafe condition with regard to the time delays utilized by helicopters to cross runways and/or depart via a runway.
Date: 201909
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon completing a preflight walk around; my First Officer informed me that there was a hydraulic leak in the Right Wheel well; and 'puddle' underneath. He was trying to count the drips to quantify the extent of the leak; but I felt it was important to have Maintenance evaluate to see if it was within any limit. We contacted Station Maintenance and filled out an ELB write-up. This was 27-25 minutes prior to scheduled push. Approx. 10 minutes after push; without ANY contact by Maintenance personnel; I received an MRD that said that there was 'water' coming from the air conditioning; and the HYDRAULIC leak was cleared. This created confusion; as the First Officer; who is approx. 6 months on the line was sure it was hydraulic. I went down and inspected the area and there was a puddle of hydraulic fluid with a leaking component above it. I contacted Station Maintenance and asked for the mechanic to return to the aircraft where I pointed out the HYDRAULIC leak. Subsequently; fittings were tightened and we were on our way. Had we given in to operational pressures to minimize the delay and trust the erroneous MRD we would have flown over 5 hours overwater with a known hydraulic leak. While mistakes happen to everyone; had the mechanic attempted to resolve the discrepancy in the write up; as we did; we could have resolved it as a team.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported Maintenance incorrectly identified leak resulting in Captain recalling maintenance to return to fix hydraulics.
Date: 202007
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch; Person Maintenance
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Received call from [Maintenance] stating that they had received a SATCOM call from Aircraft X regarding their left IDG (Integrated Drive Generator) not working. Crew spoke to [Maintenance] directly; I was not involved in the conversation; though I should have been. This flight was still in an ETOPS area of operation; and IDG problems have an ETOPS impact and if the crew was required to start the APU; would have a fuel impact. Because [the crew] spoke to [Maintenance] without Dispatch on the line; no position report was obtained; either. After the fact; [I] figured out that a SATCOM call which came in earlier at another desk was the airborne Aircraft X. However; at that time; there was another flight of a different flight date on the ground and it was thought that was the flight calling; not the one in the air. In any case; the airborne Aircraft X crew apparently was offered to be transferred to their Dispatcher (which would have been me) but insisted on being transferred directly to [Maintenance] instead. I didn't realize what had transpired until after [Maintenance] contacted me.Not sure what happened or why crew did not involve dispatch in their communication with Maintenance. Fortunately; there was no operational impact and flight continued uneventfully to ZZZ. Remind crews that when they have an issue enroute; unless an immediate emergency or something else that doesn't permit; they need to keep their dispatcher in the loop and involved in order to ensure proper operational control is maintained.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported flight crew neglected to notify Dispatcher of an engine component failure during flight. Flight crew contacted Maintenance directly.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuselage Skin
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: When considering damage (dents) within the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) area of a Boeing aircraft the following references are used; Structural Repair Manual (SRM) 53-00-01-1A-1 Allowable Damage; SRM 51-10-03 RVSM Skin Waviness Inspection and SRM 51-10-01 Aerodynamic Smoothness Requirements. A review of the requirements for RVSM flight based on SRM 51-10 requires a repair to be accomplished whenever the damage (dent) is outside SRM 53-00-01 Allowable Limits (reference Paragraph-3; B; 'NOTE'). SRM 53-00-01 Detail III requires a dent to be 10' inches or more from a cutout and 3' inches or more from a skin splice; as measured from the nearest fastener hole centerline to the edge of the dent periphery. If you layout the allowable areas within the RVSM that meet this requirement without requiring a repair; it's a very small area at the front end of the RVSM box. This whole process of RVSM determination for flight is very complicated and easy for anyone to make a mistake due to the process of qualifying a dent.  The requirements for other types of damage (NICKS; GOUGES; CORROSION; SCRATCHES and SCRIBE LINES) do not have the 10' inch rule described in SRM 53-00-01. This is just an informational statement for the purpose of making aware the potential for error. No known event has occurred; but a review of aircraft RVSM deferrals should be accomplished. [Recommend] Training; Training; Training. The RVSM area is very misunderstood due to the number of references required to determine the condition.




Synopsis: A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes the difficulty involved when considering damage (dents) that lie within the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) areas of an aircraft's fuselage; prior to continued flight. AMT notes that references involving Structural Repair Manuals (SRM) 51-10-01 and SRM 53-00-01 can be misunderstood; more training is necessary.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Inverter
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: We departed for an empty reposition leg from ZZZ - ZZZ1. Climbing through approximately 10;000 feet we began to experience compounding failures. First; our 60 Hz Converter failed; our left and right packs turned off; [and] our cabin pressure controller defaulted to manual control and would not reset back to auto. Our cabin began to climb excessively; cabin pressure low illuminated; cabin oxygen on - I immediately initiated a turnaround back to ZZZ and began a descent. We advised ATC and landed back at ZZZ. After several days of maintenance; it was discovered that the Mechanic assigned to fix our aircraft installed an unapproved E-INVERTER which was not listed in the IPC (Illustrated Parts Catalog) for a GIV and did not properly secure a cannon plug. These issues were later fixed by the Gulfstream FAST.From a pilot perspective this was unavoidable. The errors that occurred here are solely on the maintenance side. The IPC should have been consulted prior to ordering and installing any part on any aircraft. This did not happen.




Synopsis: GIV Captain reported an air turnback after multiple electrical failures that were caused by a Mechanic installing an unapproved inverter in the aircraft.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SAN.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Using CPDLC to receive clearance from SAN. Filed clearance was POGGI5.JLI. Received via CPDLC: 'POGGI5.IPL. THIS IS A REVEISED CLEARANCE..AFTER PXV CLEARED AS FILED.' We then accepted the clearance using the ACCEPT prompt and the clearance downloaded to the FMS. However what downloaded was POGGI5.JLI.IPL.J18...etc. This was what we flew on departure and approximately 1 1/2 hours later were given a number to call by ABQ center.I contacted LA ATC upon arrival and was told that we were not supposed to have flown to JLI; but POGGI5 to IPL. According to the LA OPS Supervisor this same error had been made by another aircraft within the previous 2 weeks. Upon additional contact; she stated that they believed that SAN tower had erred in providing our clearance and that they were continuing to investigate.This was my first time using the CPDLC for a clearance. Following the provided guidance step by step; we believed that the proper clearance had downloaded as there were no prompts to change any portion. We both commented on the fact that there was no way to print out the clearance and therefore have a hard copy available. The ACARS ATC page breaks it up onto 3 pages adding to possible confusion. In addition; the previous ACARS clearance format of: FILED CLEARANCE followed by REVISED CLEARANCE... was much clearer on where changes were made. With the new CPDLC of automatically downloading and accepting makes possibility of errors greater as we observed. My technique for avoiding recurrence will be to verbally confirm any revised clearance with ATC in the future; negating the intent of CPDLC/ frequency congestion; as my first use of CPDLC has resulted in my filing this report.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported receiving a revised route clearance from SAN Clearance Delivery via CPDLC. The clearance was accepted via the accept prompt and was automatically downloaded to the FMC. The route downloaded was the original route which the crew does not detect until ATC pointed out the error 90 minutes into the flight.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: I was discussing changing the active runway with the Local Controller because of wind conditions; 020 at 15g20. We had a few larger aircraft inbound and they all like to use the longer runway so we stayed on Runway XX for the time being. A VFR aircraft entered the VFR traffic pattern to land and full stop left traffic Runway XX. We were wondering why the RADAR Controller did not give him Runway YY for the winds. I observed the aircraft on final with the binoculars to check gear down; next I hear the Local Controller tell the aircraft to enter left downwind for Runway YY. The PA32 apparently slid off the runway and took out a light on his go around. I do not believe there were any reports of Low Level Wind Sheer (LLWS). This happened while we discussing changing the runway.




Synopsis: A Tower Controller described a runway excursion that occurred when traffic made a touch and go exiting the runway and hitting a light.