elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202003
Location: ZZZ.Airport, NM
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
Aircraft component: Reciprocating Engine Assembly
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Attempted (most time loss of power) off airport landing on county/ranch road 2 miles north of ZZZ. On left base as I raised the nose to reduce airspeed; engine surged to near full power and I overshot the road. Made a 180 degree turn to return to the road; but altitude not sufficient. If engine power is available only part time throttle to idle or ignition off.




Synopsis: Pilot reported complications when attempting an off airfield emergency landing due to engine failure.
Date: 201908
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Dispatch
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We received the preliminary dangerous good report for dry ice to be boarded. Prior to push back; we received the final dangerous goods summary XA:21Z. We pushed backed; started the engines and taxied. Nothing was said to us by Operations or Ramp Tower Personnel. When we were number one at [spot]; the Ground Controller said to us; 'I understand you have to go back to the gate; make a right turn and contact Ramp Tower.' We replied that we had not heard we needed to go back to the gate but that we would contact Operations. Upon contacting Operations; we were told that the dangerous goods were loaded incorrectly and that we needed to return to the gate. We taxied back to gate and shut down the engines. I contacted Operations to try to gain insight into what exactly was wrong with the way the dangerous goods were loaded. I was told that the dry ice was loaded but [Company] policy states that bags must be surrounding the dangerous goods and the bags were never placed around the dangerous goods. About that time ANOTHER final dangerous goods report appeared on the ACARS printer. The same employee (number XXXXXX) certified that the HAZMAT was loaded correctly. Odd that the same employee certified the HAZMAT was loaded properly the first time; when it was obviously not but again certified that it was loaded correctly the second time. The cargo doors were closed; we started engines and departed without further incident.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported gate return to correct configuration Dangerous Good loading errors.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SVZM.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center SVZM
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Enroute from SAEZ north bound at FL340. Contacted MAIQETA SVZM FIR controller for authorization to climb to FL380. Told to stand by. Controller called back and said to climb to FL380. I read back clearance. FO (First Officer) selected 380 in MCP. I looked at map display on my panel and saw a TCAS target 900 feet above me approximately 20 miles out. I told the FO not to climb and reset 340 in window. I contacted MAIQUETA and told them in no uncertain terms that I am not climbing and will maintain FL340 due to traffic ahead. Controller responded back stand by. I put all my landing lights on to illuminate my aircraft as did the opposing aircraft. The aircraft at 350 was Aircraft Y south bound on airway. I think I heard Aircraft Y come on guard and say 'Aircraft X; this is Aircraft Y' on front of you. In a moment Aircraft Y passed directly over top of us as the controller in what seemed to be a panic voice said 'AIRCRAFT X MAINTAINTAIN FL340 DO NOT CLIMB!' I responded back calmly that we did not climb and are level at FL340. A few minutes later he re-cleared us to climb to FL380. I can only assume that the controller was not aware of our position relative to the opposing aircraft 1000 feet above us; coming directly at us. Communications is so poor in those sectors that instructions often get misinterpreted from both the controller and the pilots. When I asked if we were radar contact I never got a response. I can't exactly answer why this occurred but I can tell you 100% why a mid-air collision did not occur. Proper SA (Situational Awareness) and using the tools and training provided to our pilots contributed to the safe outcome of this flight. Offsetting from the airway would definitely add another layer of protection. Using max external illumination for climbs and descents in South American airspace where communications is marginal at best.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported ATC error when issued a climb clearance; into opposite direction traffic 900 feet above; and stayed at present altitude to avoid conflict.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While trying to clear Runway XL; the Tower Controller told us which taxiway to take. I could not understand him and asked again. I understood the second transmission; and we cleared the runway. Once clear I asked him where he wanted us to go. He gave instructions and then tried to explain why he gave a specific taxiway. We could not understand that transmission nearly at all. I then said; 'Sir; I can't understand what you're saying; your transmission is very muffled.' He then came through perfectly clear and then said; 'it's the mask;' or something to that effect.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported communication difficulties with the Tower Controller due to the Controller wearing a mask which possibly muffled the transmission.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Normal preflight duties were completed. Upon notification through ACARS that performance weight and balance loading data was available; I tried to load the data into the FMC. Only part of the data would load. Incorrect cruise altitude data loaded; and no temperature data; nor N1 data; nor V Speed data; nor flap setting data would load. We attempted to reload it several times. I noticed that the enroute cruise altitude was incorrect; and given that; I looked at the entire flight plan route. We were filed on the with an enroute altitude of FL220. This was all loaded correctly into the FMS; but the first altitude on this STAR at point of ZZZZZ intersection has a published crossing altitude of FL240 to FL300. I recall that Dispatch filed us at FL220 for a cursing altitude; and that is what was entered into the system. Since the minimum crossing altitude on the STAR at ZZZZZ intersection was FL240 to FL300; the performance weight and balance system would not load or take our cruise data into the FMC. When I deleted the first crossing altitude restriction on the STAR at ZZZZZ intersection (FL240 to 300) on the LEGS page; then and only then would the performance weight and balance system load into the FMC. This is not really in accordance with procedures; and not something we normally would know or even be trained to know. Bottom line; if the filed cruising altitude is below any altitude restriction on the field and loaded STAR; performance weight and balance DATA WILL NOT LOAD INTO THE FMC.   This performance weight and balance system limitation needs to be examined; addressed; and or corrected; and the information distributed throughout Flight Ops. I am sure I am not the first one who has stumbled across this; but probably the first one who has written in about it.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported being unable to load some data into the FMC which was caused by the cruising altitude being below the minimum crossing altitude of one of the arrival fixes.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Rejected Takeoff
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Rejected takeoff at 110 kts due to loss of #1 engine instruments caused by a DAU (Digital Acquisition Unit) 1A failure. Once clear of the runway we ran the QRH and then called Dispatch and Maintenance. While on the phone with Maintenance the DAU 1A failure EICAS message went away for less than 5 minutes and then returned for a short time and once again went away. We taxied back to the gate and deplaned. I wrote the aircraft up for a rejected takeoff due DAU 1A failure EICAS message. The aircraft has a previous history of this problem with the associated DAU. The first failure was [about 10 days ago] which was then repaired and working until [four days ago] where the 2nd failure occurred and was fixed. This was the third time in less than 10 days [where] it caused a rejected takeoff or a return to the field. Contract Maintenance came out to the aircraft and reset the breakers for both IC600 computers and during the 2 hours we were at the gate the EICAS message DID NOT return. My crew and I then agreed to ferry the aircraft as long as the EICAS message stayed away. While doing my scan I noticed all #1 engine instruments [were] amber colored with dashed lines and rejected the takeoff. DAU 1A Failure EICAS message. Rejected takeoff followed by a return to the gate. My only suggestion would be that everything associated with the DAU 1 be replaced. They already replaced the DAU and the IC600; so whatever is next will hopefully fix it for GOOD!




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff at 110 kts after receiving an EICAS message for DAU 1A failure.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MMPR.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON MMPR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was the pilot not flying and the First Officer was the pilot flying. He was hand flying the airplane when we were vectored by ATC to a heading over the terrain north of the MMPR airport to descend in visual conditions for the visual approach to Runway 22. There was a brief discussion on the altitude to be set in the altitude window but I eventually set the final approach fix altitude (roughly 2;000 FT) as the First Officer stated to me he would watch his descent over the terrain. While crossing the terrain in day VMC conditions; as the terrain was in sight the entire time and the First Officer continued a shallow descent over the terrain; the EGPWS warning of 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up; Pull Up' was triggered. The First Officer took corrective action; arrested the descent and after the EGPWS warning subsided; we proceeded to turn onto final; completed the VFR approach and landed uneventfully. The First Officer and I had both flown into MMPR many times and were familiar with the airport surroundings and the terrain.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported receiving an EGPWS 'Terrain' warning on visual approach to MMPR Runway 22.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Cleared for takeoff on RWY 28R at SFO; we could see and hear a helicopter hovering at approximately 150 feet on the northwest corner of the intersection of the runways; although the Tower did not notify us of the traffic. The helicopter was questioning the Tower about where he should go - although I'm a bit unclear on the questions.  We were busy with a takeoff at the time. With the acceleration of the plane and the changing point of view it is difficult to tell; but after consideration I believe the helicopter was drifting south towards our runway. After takeoff; as best we can tell; we passed within about 500 feet laterally and 200 feet vertically from the helicopter. I do not know the standards for a near mid-air in this portion of the flight and airspace; and the Tower did not mention anything. However; I have flagged this as a near mid-air on the report due to my discomfort with the event. I do not want this to happen again; it was too close for my comfort.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports a possible NMAC with a helicopter during takeoff from runway 28R at SFO. The helicopter was north of Runway 28R hovering; and apparently drifting south.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Ice/Rain Protection System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On descent into ZZZ at approximately 21;000 while in moderate icing conditions (wing and cowls on); we received a Wing Anti-Ice Duct warning message. We ran the QRH which instructs to leave icing conditions. We contacted [ATC] and said we need a lower altitude to leave icing conditions. [After coordinating with ATC; we] received a descent to 11;000. At approximately 17;000; icing conditions were cleared. We elected to divert due to ZZZ1 entering indefinite holds. We landed without further incident.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported receiving a Wing Anti-Ice Duct warning before descending out of icing conditions.
Date: 201904
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: MEL; Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: On [date] I went out on a last minute gate call with several technicians about a panel missing on the left wing. The number 2 slat inboard slat tab cover was missing. I don't remember if I found CDL (Configuration Deviation List) card number [XXXXXX] or Maintenance Control directed us to the card. I made an entry into ELB (Electronic Log Book) stating the location of the missing tab. The chart on the CDL card [XXXXXX] lists 12 tabs in a table with a different CDL number for each tab under a heading of deferred position. The number 2 slat inboard tab would be position 4. That is why I applied or was directed by [Maintenance Control] to apply CDL XXXX. I don't remember if I or [Maintenance Control] came up with the CDL number. I see now that there is a note on the CDL card stating deferred position above refers to the quantity of the slat skin tabs missing; not the slat number. I don't see why the chart on the CDL card says deferred position and not something like number of tabs missing. This card has been revised during the last MEL (Minimum Equipment List) update and I don't know if this was current CDL card was the one I was using or the previous version. I would like to know when it was revised; when it was downloaded to the Ipads and what were the changes made to it. Unfortunately I don't remember many of the details of this gate call. Recommend changing the CDL card chart from deferred position to number of tabs missing.




Synopsis: Aircraft Technician was confused by 737 Configuration Deviation List (CDL) table for Slat Tab Covers.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Parts / Stores Personnel; Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I received 3 pick slips from my coworker; with 3 parts left on a table. He told me that these parts needed to be sent to ZZZ. I proceeded to look at the pick slips for any kind of Hazmat tag; and none of them had Hazmat written on the pick slip. I packed the 3 parts into a box; created an [order] and left the box for the next shift because the flight was later that day. I covered this in my turn over and told my coworker to send the box to ZZZ on [flight]. One of those pick-slipped parts that I placed in the box was a portable fire extinguisher; a HAZMAT component. I know we need to be careful with all parts we send to avoid sending hazmat on an airplane. But for me; what I think we should be careful too with the information on pick slips we get from other bases. Normally; Hazmat pick slips have in the remark: 'HAZMAT;' so we are reminded that it can't be sent as COMAT (Company Material). And this pick slip only had a remark saying 'This is needed for tonight;' and that's why I thought this was a regular part. Another thing we need to be careful of is where we get the part from. We have a special section for Hazmat parts in the stockroom; but this time the part was handed to me outside of that section. I packed the part in the box without looking for where the part came from.




Synopsis: Maintenance technician reported that an incorrectly labeled package resulted in a Hazmat shipping violation.