elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At cruise B System Engine Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure light illuminated. We ran QRH. Approximately 30 minutes later; the B hydraulic fluid started to decrease; and then the B System Electric Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure light illuminated. We ran the QRH then ran Loss of System B. Shortly after B hydraulic quantity went to zero. After loss of B System we [advised ATC]; planning on landing at ZZZ. Approximately 30 minutes later the A System Engine Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure light illuminated. We ran the QRH  again. So now all that is operating is the A System electric hydraulic pump. A hydraulic quantity decreased to 74 percent from approximately 90 percent; so as a precaution we reviewed the 'Manual Reversion or Loss of System A and System B.' We flew a long final to altitude; extended the flaps and put the gear out early in case of Loss of System A. The A hydraulic quantity remained stable and we landed Runway XX; flaps 15 and taxied clear of the runway. We left the flaps at 15 and taxied to the charter pad.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported the loss of multiple hydraulic systems.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Robinson R44
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was operating an R44 and was picking up two friends for a trip.  There was a rain storm just south of the airport at this time and I was in a hurry to depart with my two friends to avoid the rain storm.  My friends went to get in and could not get their luggage under the seat.  I locked the controls and helped get the baggage in and left.  I understand that it was wrong to leave the controls while the helicopter was running and it was pilot error to do so.  It won't happen again.




Synopsis: On the ramp with the engine running; an R44 pilot left the controls unattended to assist a passenger in stowing luggage.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GRR.Airport, MI
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
ATC / advisory: Tower GRR
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: GRR has been in ATC ALERT for about a week now. Our Management and our Technology Operations know about it and nothing is getting done. All that is told to the controllers is that due to budget issues they are not able to order parts for Channel A until Channel B goes out which means we then go ATC Zero until we can get CENRAP up and running.  With more and more nicer days it means more and more VFRs are out flying and doing practice approaches and we still have all of our scheduled flights in and out. I just can't believe that we are sitting down in the RADAR room just waiting for a scope full of planes to fail and go blank putting not only the pilots and the passengers at risk; but the controllers who once CENRAP is enabled and notice they have planes to close and no time to separate them. I don't know what or how much is being done about this issue; or if it is happening at other facilities; but the answer of it being a budget thing is just not sitting well with me or any of my other fellow controllers. Not sure what I can recommend because again not sure what is being done; but when we (the controllers) just don't get answers to questions and are told that it's a budget issue and CENRAP is being sent; that is just not an acceptable answer. It does not give you a good feeling sitting in the RADAR room working planes to the best of your ability and knowing that it could go out at any time. My biggest concern is that this is happening at very few facilities and the controllers there are being told the same thing we are and are doing nothing about it. I understand there are budget issues; but when it comes to the RADAR this is not a place to implement cuts.




Synopsis: GRR Controller voiced concern regarding the single RADAR channel limitation currently be experienced; noting budgetary limitations should not govern ATC equipment availability.
Date: 202007
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: A passenger refused to wear her mask. The aft Flight Attendant asked the customer to wear her mask; customer refused. The aft Flight Attendant was communicating via her electronic device to operations in ZZZ. A Supervisor came to the plane. Customer initially claimed to have a medical condition; customer then said; she purchased the ticket prior to our mandatory mask policy was put in place therefore she was exempt. The customer service Supervisor never communicated with the cockpit. We had to ask the gate agent what happened after the Supervisor left. The Supervisor decided to let the customer fly without wearing a mask.Other customers were not pleased. I feel this set a terrible example to the other customers onboard and did not support us.




Synopsis: First Officer reported a passenger was not complying with wearing a face mask pre-departure and was ultimately allowed to fly without having to wear it.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SJC
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Parked on the southeast end of the ramp at [FBO] in San Jose (SJC). We were assigned taxi instructions to taxi Runway 30L via Golf; Whiskey; Bravo. We noted the route; and noted that we would exit the ramp via G; across V; W1; right on W. The taxi was at night; at first we did not notice that Taxiway G is actually (2) taxiways; with a turn to the right on Taxiway V when taxiing eastbound. So in my mind and my briefing; we would join Taxiway G exiting the ramp; and taxi straight across to Taxiway W. We taxied to the intersection of G and V. I (taxiing pilot) am looking outside the aircraft; but focused in the distance at the signs that denote the intersections of W1 and G; as well as W and G; which we could see clearly; but they were at about 1 o'clock; which didn't seem right. At that moment I notice in the (rather poor) lighting of the aircraft taxi lights that I don't see a taxiway in front of me as I expect to. At that same instant my First Officer commanded 'STOP; STOP; STOP' which I immediately did. We were stopped in the middle of Taxiway V; and I am momentarily confused. It is then that I realize we are not seeing tarmac or taxiway in front of us; but mowed grass of the same color as the ramp in the aircraft lighting. We then expand the 10-9 chart as large as we can and realize that there is a small 'white' island to our right; that Taxiway G is actually (2) taxiways; and that we must; in fact; turn right on V; then left on G. This was not part of our clearance. The taxiway designation at this point are very misleading and - at night or in poor visibility - confusing. The taxiway G leaving the [FBO] ramp should not have the same designation as the Taxiway G that is to the southeast of it; for the very reason described above. This is confusing during the day - especially when the taxi clearance does not mention Taxiway V - can be quite disorienting and confusing at night or in low light/visibility conditions. The ramp exit should be designated Taxiway H (or something similar.) The taxi clearance should have thus been 'taxi via H; V; G W; B Runway 30L. This would have been much clearer and would alert crews to this taxiway layout in night/poor visibility operations.




Synopsis: Air Taxi Captain reported a taxiway incursion at SJC citing signage and lighting issues as contributing factors.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [We] received final weights showing passenger load 21/73 did not agree with planned load of 24/129. Checked with Lead Flight Attendant and sent message to Load Planning. [We were] delayed 10 minutes to get new weights with proper load. Unsafe due to large change in weight had we used the first weight manifest and adjusted takeoff speeds.


Second narrative: When we got our final weights they were 18;000 LBS less than planned. Investigation showed passenger count was way below planned (21/73). We had the flight attendants do a head count and the count was close to what we had planned and what the gate agent gave us (23/127). Load planning was contacted and we provided the count from the flight attendants. New final weights were issued. My concern is that our new procedures may have errors that if not caught; may result in incorrect takeoff data planning and or incorrect loading resulting unsafe takeoff or flight conditions.


Synopsis: A B757 crew reported that new Company procedures allowed the weight and balance to in error by 18;000 LBS which the crew caught because of a large passenger count discrepancy.
Date: 201901
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: There is an overabundance of phone usage and ear buds in co-workers ears while working in the warehouse. The majority of the equipment that is used within our warehouse area is electric with minimal sound emitting from it except for when the horn is used to make people aware it is in use. I am seeing people walking around using video chat which means your vision is not in front of you while you are walking. You are also distracted from everything going on around you. The ear bud usage is steadily increasing ranging from the wireless which are difficult to see to the old fashioned wire hanging from your ear plain as day. There is also equipment being used while the ear buds are in the operator's ear. I have told people that this is a safety hazard and can result in a serious injury or death when you get hit by a piece of the equipment in use. Our Management has briefed this item in the past and the usage of phones and ear buds is not as frequent; but it never completely stops. We also drive on the AOA (Airport Operations Area) and people come in from driving with the ear buds in which is even more unsafe considering you are in control vehicle.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported over-usage of ear buds during warehouse and ground operations; posing a safety hazard.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HNL.Airport, HI
Aircraft: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 7/8
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower HCF
Second aircraft: Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I cleared a Aircraft Y for take off on Runway 8L. I then instructed a C208 to cross Runway 4R/L at Taxiway E and hold short of Runway 8L at Taxiway G. For added emphasis; I then told the C208 to turn left on Taxiway B after crossing Runway 4L. The ASDE-X sounded and said that Runway 8L was occupied. The C208 had crossed the hold short line at the intersection of Runway 8L and Taxiway E as the Aircraft Y was rotating off of Runway 8L. This event happened at night and the pilot may have missed the markings and signage that indicated that was approaching Runway 8L. Maybe better signage to help pilots find Taxiway B or better signage that would alert them that they are approaching a runway.




Synopsis: HCF Local Controller described a ASDE-X alarm event when traffic taxiing for departure crossed the Runway 8L hold lines; the reporter suggesting improved signage.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: COS.Airport, CO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Tower COS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The EFP (Engine Fail Procedure) for Runway 31 out of COS is very confusing and or incomplete. It states 'Reaching BRK R-218 (All Eng-delay turn until 7200 ft. Eng Fail After 7200 ft. Right Turn H125) or D5.6 ILPI LEFT turn H125. Min Cleanup 7187 ft.' We were cleared the SPRINGS 6 Departure; which calls for a RIGHT turn to H050. It does not say to wait until 7;200 ft. until turning to heading 050. If we lost an engine below 7;200 ft. in the turn to heading 050 what is the appropriate EFP path to follow? My F/O and I discussed at length but came to no clear answer. It needs to be more clearly written with appropriate 'EFP decision points' if needed.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported the Engine Fail Procedure for Runway 31 out of COS may be incomplete.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Aircraft component: Aileron Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The other pilot and I performed a Flight Control Functional (FCF) check after an aileron change. During his walkaroud; the other pilot confirmed that the ailerons were bussed together. During a subsequent inspection of the new (right) aileron; although not specifically checking for proper bussing of the ailerons; I am convinced that the ailerons were in fact bussed together. All required flight checks were performed enroute. No deviations were noted. The aircraft was signed off and returned to service. At some point in time after return to service; the ailerons became 'unbussed.'




Synopsis: The Captain of a Boeing 717-200 reports that after an aileron change the aircraft was given a pre-flight inspection; a flight control functional check; and a flight check. No deviations were noted; and the aircraft was signed off and returned to service. Reporter stated the ailerons became 'unbussed' at some point during the flight.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Close to top of climb a BLEED 2 LEAK EICAS annunciation occurred. An emergency was declared with Center and an emergency descent to 10;000 feet was accomplished. The cabin altitude climbed about 700 - 900 FPM to just over 9;000 feet during the event. A leak was detected in the No. 2 bleed air system while the No. 1 system was on MEL. Maintenance reports that a crack was subsequently found in the No. 2 bleed precooler.I personally have declared an emergency twice in my career; and both events were due to bleed leaks on this aircraft. (About two years ago; I experienced a BLEED 1 LEAK followed by a BLEED 2 LEAK a few minutes later. Cracks were found in both precoolers after that event.) The bleed air system on the E190 has design and engineering issues. Our company's Maintenance department has attempted to address these issues with Embraer without success. Absent Airworthiness Directives from the FAA; I would expect these issues to continue unresolved. I also would like to suggest that our QRH BLEED LEAK procedure be amended to give specific procedures for a bleed leak with only one operative bleed system. This scenario may have seemed remote at the time the QRH was written; but it has happened to me twice.




Synopsis: An ERJ-190 Captain's second depressurization experience due to bleed leaks triggered the report which concludes with the suggestion that the aircraft's bleed system has endemic problems that need to be addressed by regulatory agencies and the manufacturer.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RSW.TRACON, FL
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E RSW
ATC / advisory: TRACON RSW
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working East radar and took a handoff on Aircraft X. This was immediately followed up by a call from the sector advising me of traffic 20 miles ahead at 10300 ft. about 3 miles East of LBV. This traffic was NW-bound and would not be a factor. The sector advised me that Aircraft X was released for lower. After I got off the line; LBV sector called me to coordinate with an arrival that was going south of a prohibited area and coming towards my airspace. We had a back and forth on the line when I suddenly realized that Aircraft X and the VFR traffic were a factor. I immediately hung up and issued a traffic alert with a left turn. Aircraft X advised that they responded with a turn and descent. I was able to review the tapes and the VFR aircraft flew passed LBV at 10300 ft. made a left 360 degree turn back into Aircraft X; causing a NMAC.1) I should have told the Center to descend Aircraft X to 8000 instead of taking the information that he was my control. I also; should not have gotten distracted with a pointless coordination of an aircraft that never got in my airspace.




Synopsis: RSW TRACON Controller reported NMAC with an airliner and a VFR aircraft due in part to being distracted.