elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LBB.Airport, TX
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower LBB
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Number 2 engine had no throttle response when powering up for takeoff. Never rolled. Exited runway.Under investigation; may be throttle cable.




Synopsis: Widebody Airbus Captain reported Number 2 engine failed to spool up when throttle was advanced for takeoff.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGB.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D LGB
ATC / advisory: Tower LGB
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Staffing; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: LGB tower had cleared us for landing on RWY 30. There was no mention of a helicopter on the RWY. At approximately 1500 MSL; I asked the FO (First Officer) if it looked like there was something on the RWY around the numbers. It looked like a black spot in the vicinity of the RWY numbers. The FO said it looked like a rubber mark to him. I concurred. At approximately 600 feet MSL; we saw a helicopter rapidly exiting the runway from the RWY number area towards the adjacent TWY D3. He was clear of RWY at 500 feet MSL. We landed. The FO and I discussed afterwards that we BOTH never saw the helicopter! Tower NEVER said anything either! I called the tower manager to discuss. He told me that the controller on duty was working two helicopters mid field; and four other aircraft in the pattern; excluding us. He said that the helicopter was previously cleared to land on the numbers (30). This implied that he was to exit the runway ASAP afterwards to the nearest taxiway as per the AIM. He never did. He said that the controller assumed he had exited. He said he believed the controller was task saturated. Interestingly; the top of the helicopter was painted black. For some reason it completely blended into the runway environment. The tower manager agreed.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier Captain reported that while on short final; a helicopter was observed sitting on the end of the same runway. The conflict was resolved in time for the aircraft to land safely.
Date: 201808
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B SAN
ATC / advisory: Tower SAN
Second aircraft: Light Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While on final approach segment of RNAV 27 Approach; in VMC conditions; we were given clearance to land with what we believe was inside the three mile wake turbulence buffer between a 'small' aircraft. At one and a half miles from landing; the departing aircraft; cleared for takeoff; had not begun takeoff roll. ATC told the departing aircraft; 'Landing traffic; one and a half miles out.' At approximately one-half mile; the departing aircraft lifted off the runway. We decided landing was safer than executing a missed approach by possibly creating a less safe situation of climbing through the previous aircraft's wake turbulence. We encountered wake turbulence prior to touchdown; thereby requiring Pilot Flying to maintain thrust on engines so as not to lose critical airspeed at touchdown. These actions resulted in a longer than normal landing.I believe more familiarity with possible RECAT separation practices at participating airports; in this case; SAN. We should be better prepared to execute a missed approach during these situations.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported encountering jet blast effects from the preceding departure while on short final at SAN.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Light: Night
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight [in] question is [an A319]. MELs are Center Tank Pump; Auto Fuel Feed System and Clock GPS mode. The problem was with MEL [on] Center Tank Pump. Since the center tank pump is inoperative; 1640lbs of fuel is stuck in the center tank. I planned the flight with the wing tanks only which came out to 16700lbs. The MEL manual stated that the dispatcher was to 'notify load planner that any fuel in center tank is considered unusable ballast; must be counted in payload (part of ZFW) and accounted for during weight and balance computations.'After finding that 1640lbs of fuel was in the center tank; I called [load planner] and asked him to adjust the ZFW. His reply was; according to their RF file; they were to use the airplane's standard envelope and no action was required on his part. This not sitting well with me; I called the Loads Supervisor. I explained that we needed to adjust the ZFW by the amount trapped in the center tank and he informed me that he would look into it. A few minutes later; [he] called me back and also stated that CLP was unable to do anything because their RF file stated no action was required. I conferred with other dispatchers and [another manager] who all agreed that some action needed to be taken. The [other manager] and I spoke with [the load supervisor]; who informed us that he would not adjust anything with the ZFW. I advised [load supervisor] that if no action was taken; I would not accept this airplane to fly its mission. During this time; I reached out to [the] Captain and informed him of what was going on. I asked him to please stay at the gate until this situation was resolved. He was okay with that decision. A few minutes later; a [different] load supervisor got involved and shared with everyone that the ZFW is adjusted as ballast weight; as described in the MEL manual; and was able to adjust the weight to reflect 1640lbs of unusable ballast in the center tank. [Flight] pushed 19 minutes late. [Load planners] choosing to not follow the MEL manual directly violated Airline's policies and procedures and potentially FAA regulations.




Synopsis: Air carrier Dispatcher reported some load planners were not aware of all the implications of the MELs on the subject aircraft.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZGHA.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 9999
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZGHA
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After landing at ZGHA; crew exited C7 and were cleared Taxiway C; C4 then cleared to cross Runway 36L at B4 then handed over from Tower to Ground frequency for onward taxi. Ground ATC cleared crew to Taxi 'B; B2 stand 123 follow follow me' which was read back verbatim. At A3; an Air Carrier Y entered the Bravo taxiway right in front of the crew. The traffic wasn't holding at A3 but was on a continuous relatively quick taxi through the holding point. Crew were given no warning or instructions by Ground Controller and due to the local language (Mandarin) crew were unaware of any taxi clearance given to any other aircraft. Crew slowed down with medium braking and taxied to the stand uneventfully.




Synopsis: Safety Officer reported they experienced a ground conflict at ZGHA airport and referenced language barrier with Tower was a contributing factor.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Other VFR Traffic Pattern
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working multiple positions when I heard local 1 instruct Aircraft X to make a right 360. I looked at Aircraft X and observed aircraft turn right in to Aircraft Y. It appeared that Aircraft Y had to take evasive action to avoid Aircraft X. To my knowledge neither aircraft made a statement on the frequency. It appeared that the aircraft came within 300 to 400 feet of each other.I believe a complete review by outside sources of this event is warranted. This is not the first issue for this individual recently. The controller has made statements of problems at home and fatigue.




Synopsis: A Tower Controller reported of an NMAC. Local Controller turned one aircraft towards another aircraft making the second aircraft take evasive actions to avoid turning aircraft. Reporter wanted this to be looked at and stated it was due to the Local Controller having issues relating to home and fatigue.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Software and Automation
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Just received a message stating I did not complete [the] COVID assessment for yesterday.  I believe I just forgot to send it due to flight deck distraction with maintenance in there.I arrived at the aircraft and Maintenance was still on it completing their First Flight of the Day (FFOD) check so I had to wait and work around them in the flight deck. I did pre-flight the thermometer and take my temperature and all was OK. But with the mechanic in the flight deck and the FO and Forward FA it was a little busy. I thought I had submitted on the COVID digital assessment; but I must have forgotten and when I got it my seat I continued with my set up believing I had done it. I must have forgotten to submit.For now add it onto the checklist as a FFOD item.  Or send us an ACARS message on our first flight. Maybe just have us when we check in on every leg to attest our fitness for duty that that counts as a COVID check.   I think there are solutions to this COVID affirmation than just pulling up the COVID assessment.   If we are not fit for duty for these reasons we should not be reporting to work anyway.  I think scanning the barcode every leg is a much better way for pilots to confirm COVID compliance without adding an extra step which can; by accident; be forgotten to [be] taken.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported forgetting to complete the COVID-19 assessment before the flight due to a distraction.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Laptop Computer (performance; planning; etc.)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I received my departure clearance over the phone with Approach prior to takeoff. I was released to depart Runway XX and climb to 5;000 ft.  Upon contacting Departure on climb out and giving my position and altitude the Controller asked me what airport I departed.  I told him ZZZ. The Controller then informed me that my filed flight plan was for ZZZ1.  I'm not sure how ZZZ1 got into my flight plan but it appears he was correct.  I was given a phone number and called it as soon as I landed. Later in the day when I landed back home in ZZZ; I got a call from ForeFlight and they told me another person's info had somehow be entered into my iPad and was causing some problems.  I'm not sure if that was the cause of the wrong airport or unrelated.  My ForeFlight account was fixed and seems to now be working ok.




Synopsis: Pilot reported departure airport error due to ForeFlight airport information being incorrect.
Date: 201911
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuselage Nose Cone
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft was sent to Contract Maintenance Facility X for accomplishing repairs to the windshield center post that had been found damaged. After the permanent repair was accomplished; the aircraft had a chronic airframe vibration that had been going on for quite some time. It was found that the area of concern was from the center windshield lower area extending down the front bulkhead/radome. ZZZ Maintenance discovered that the radome upper seal had been installed facing down instead of facing upward and sealing airflow out from the radome area. It was also discovered during inspection that the repair for the windshield center post had not secure hardware; was leaking water and had to be re-addressed before further flight. After all repairs were done according to proper references; the aircraft has been put back in service after a successful test flight.Contract Maintenance Facility X failed to do a proper SRM repair and follow [aircraft Maintenance manual] procedures on installation of windshield framing fasteners and radome seal. We have had a few of these repairs come from Contract Maintenance Facility X with poor workmanship. Contract Maintenance Facility X has been known on the floor to do poor work and aircraft have come back from their MRO (Maintenance; Repair; Overhaul) needing repairs. Historically a lot of aircraft come back in rough shape and require immediate repairs upon return to service. My suggestion is to audit Contract Maintenance Facility X and maybe suggest looking for a new vendor.




Synopsis: Technician reported a third party maintenance contractor failed to make correct repairs on an A319; resulting in a recurring airframe vibration in flight.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LIT.Airport, AR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C LIT
ATC / advisory: TRACON LIT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: We were in VFR conditions and were able to visually see that the aircraft locked onto something other than Little Rock Airport 22 R frequency. We disconnected automation and visual hand-flew to the correct runway. My major concern is what would have happened in IMC. The Approach Controller was busy and gave us a heading of 190 to intercept 22 R LOC. We were descending and once we corrected the flight path we got a little high. Once cleared for the visual and handed over to Tower we asked for an S-turn to the west. We reported to the Tower and I called the approach facility and told them about the navigational error on 22R localizer frequency.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a Runway 22 localizer anomaly at LIT airport.
Date: 201704
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I am writing to express my concerns over the removal of 1 copy of the QRH from the flight deck. In my opinion; this practice may compromise safety. My concern primarily pertains to a situation in which the non-flying pilot must utilize the QRH but it's located next to the flying pilot. There are non-normals that arise and the flying pilot may be able to hand off the QRH to the non-flying pilot; but as you know; there are many non-normals in which it would not be prudent for the flying pilot to attempt to hand off the QRH to the non-flying pilot. An argument could be made that the QRH should be switched from side to side and should at all times be next to the non-flying pilot. But; during an abnormal; the role of non-flying pilot may change with the circumstances. Of course the electronic version of the QRH may also be utilized. Though to me; using the iPad to simultaneously run a QRH checklist; and utilize it for Jepp charts may expose pilots to unnecessary risk. A paper QRH allows pilots to physically hold their finger next to items yet to be completed while at the same time use the iPad to reference a Jepp chart. In sum; it seems that if we are still going to provide the aircraft with one copy of the QRH; there is little to be saved by not providing two.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported his concern with his airline's decision to remove one of the hard copy QRHs from the cockpit; leaving one hard copy and the iPad as source material for QRH procedures.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E M03
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: We were returning to MEM with the FNCHR RNAV STAR and the landing north transition inserted into the FMS (long downwind legs included). This was loaded in flight after takeoff and since we had been landing north in Memphis for the entire trip and my entire trip before this one; I did not expect much of a change. We started the descent on profile; but we did not realize that a change had been made to the flow of traffic in Memphis to a landing south transition until it was too late to make all of the speed restrictions on the arrival and we ended up being high on one of the restrictions (although not by much and ATC did not make any sort of comment on our descent.) Once we got below 10;000 FT; we were in a normal position to continue the arrival. Runway flow change; if one is expecting an RNAV arrival with a long leisurely downwind and all of a sudden a new transition arrival is inserted; one has to quickly verify the FMS altitude and speed restrictions on the FMC with the ones on the chart. The information on many of the Memphis RNAV arrival charts are not presented in an easy to read format and they take much time to read; understand; and interpret compared to the arrivals that we are commonly given in Atlanta. [I am concerned that] any sort of additional distraction or system failure is going to make it very difficult to follow these procedures.We need simpler RNAV arrival procedures in the Memphis area and less of them. We do not need all of these RNAV arrivals into an airport that has lost a great deal of its traffic.




Synopsis: A CRJ had pre-programmed the 'landing north' transition on the FNCHR RNAV STAR to MEM and realized too late that the airport had switched to landing to the south; eliminating the long downwind track and lowering the appropriate crossing altitudes on the arrival. A modest failure to cross at the required altitude at one waypoint resulted.