elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Dash 8-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Taxi
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon pushing back from the gate; I noticed that hydraulic system number one was slightly lower than number two so I told the First Officer that I was going to transfer some hydraulic fluid from the number 2 system to the number 1 system. Once completed; both systems were at 50% (40% is required). Considering that the fluid was above the minimum level and for fear of being scolded or getting into trouble for returning to the gate; I decided to proceed with the flight. We landed in our filed destination without incident and didn't see any noticeable change in hydraulic fluid levels. I told the Captain receiving the aircraft to watch the hydraulic system because there was something strange about it (just a feeling but nothing that I could prove or show). Both systems were at the same levels as they were when we departed but; again; I simply had an odd feeling about them. There are a few ways that I think this safety issue could have been avoided. Firstly; I have called Maintenance previously when the hydraulic levels were not balanced and they told me to just balance it. By doing so; any slow leak would not be noticed. Due to the nature of the operation and the need to continuously swap aircraft such small leaks could also go unnoticed. Additionally; I personally believe; and I'm not an engineer; that a 40% minimum level of hydraulic pressure is too low for operation (but again I'm not an engineer and don't have the necessary knowledge to determine what is a safe amount). Also; I believe that by fostering a culture where a pilot could freely express his/her feelings may have made me less apprehensive about calling Maintenance about an intuitive feeling even though the numbers were at or above the required levels.




Synopsis: A Q400 crew detected a hydraulic system quantity below 40% and transfered fluid to equalize both systems at 50% then learned later in the day the aircraft suffered a hydraulic system failure.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: Tower CLT
Second aircraft: A321
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Shortly after departure (below 1;000 feet AGL) while hand flying; encountered the wake turbulence of the A321 that departed ahead of us. Aircraft rolled left; then right. Did not lose control or have to deviate. I did advise ATC of the encounter. Continued flight without further incident. I did a flex takeoff and didn't recognize the A321 ahead and connect the dots. I should have done a no flex takeoff.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing CLT from the preceding A321.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ELP.TRACON, TX
Light: Night
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Tech Ops coordinated a radar outage on the Airfield Surveillance Radar (ASR)-9. I approved and released the radar. I coordinated a 30 minute recall time. The return time approached and five minutes before the scheduled return; Tech Ops requested additional time. I already was direct about the return time because of staffing and the overall operation for the evening. I denied the extension request and said I need the radar back in 30 minutes. Tech Ops called Maintenance Operations Command Center (MOCC) who called me. I denied MOCC request for the radar outage and MOCC said tough luck it is down!Tech ops needs to keep up on scheduled time for planned maintenance. Coordinate additional time in a timely manner for Air Traffic to plan ahead.




Synopsis: ELP TRACON FLM reported that he approved a radar outage request from maintenance with a 30 minute recall. As time came close to the end of the requested time the FLM checked with maintenance and the operator requested more time. FLM denied request and said he needed radar back in 30 minutes. He then contacted Maintenance and they told him tough luck it is down.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The passengers wanted to leave early. I had to contact Operations to give them the arrival time and information on the pilots and passengers. I felt rushed. I did my final walk around and pulled the chocks from the nose wheel. As I started to walk away; the aircraft started to roll forward slowly. Not wanting to jerk the aircraft to a stop by using the chocks (since the passengers were already on board); I communicated to the First Officer to use the brakes. He was briefing the passengers at that time. He did so and stopped the aircraft. I ought to have made sure that the First Officer was in his seat in the cockpit before pulling the chocks as per SOP. I did not do so in my rush. In the future; I intend to slow down and to comply with SOPs even if need to delay the flight.




Synopsis: A CE-560XL Captain pulled the chocks while the First Officer briefed the passengers and had to hurriedly call the First Officer to set the brakes as the aircraft rolled slowly forward.
Date: 201501
Location: UES.Airport, WI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON MKE
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During clearance I was given climb via the UECKR1 RNAV except maintain 3000 [feet]. Departure told us to climb to 13000 [feet.] Did the expect altitude of 8000 [feet] apply? Thus the [safety report] form; one of many; dealing with SIDS and STARS. SIDS and STARS work until the controller modifies them. Rant over.




Synopsis: CE525 Captain expresses confusion over RNAV SID's STAR's after modification by ATC; in general and the UECKR1 specifically.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CTY.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Other Part 91 - for hire
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E ZJX
ATC / advisory: CTAF CTY
Second aircraft: Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Other Rotorcraft - Helicopter
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After lifting from fuel pump area located midfield west side making a 90 degree clearing turn; and hover taxiing toward my departure point; a grass area just west of the runway's parallel taxi way; I announced my location and departure intentions on Unicom frequency. Just before my departure radio call we heard radio chatter by an aircraft in the pattern whose transmission/intentions were garbled and unclear. It is important to note that upon our initial arrival; a few minutes prior the favored runway was the one I was using. With that in mind; I started my northwest departure takeoff run parallel and adjacent to the runway. The west side of taxi way crossing the extended center line f an intersecting runway displaced threshold. At that moment my rear crew member alerted me that a Piper Twin was very close and approaching off our left side which I did not observe until it had passed over and just behind us and was about to touch down on the intersecting runway which we had just crossed the extended centerline of during our departure.From my observation as well as my 2 crew members; it appeared the Piper Twin landed without incident and made no evasive actions. No evasive action was taken by either aircraft and we observed the Piper Twin landing normally. Radio calls on Unicom were made between us immediately after the occurrence; recognizing the miscommunication and confusion of our positions and intentions; we then continued on to our next destination. Contributing factors were an uncontrolled airport with no declared active runway based on current wind direction. Garbled radio calls from aircraft in the pattern. Radio and intercom chatter in and out of our cockpit. Helicopter line of sight to the west southwest during clearing turn and initial takeoff run was blocked by fuel tanks; Fixed Base Operator building and distant tree line; therefore was not able to see the approaching Piper Twin. I was not aware which runway was currently the favored runway.




Synopsis: A helicopter pilot departing a non towered airport reported a NMAC with an arriving aircraft.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BUR.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared via radar vectors off airway to 4;000 feet. IAF altitude was 3800 feet. FO was descending in Level Change from 6;000 feet. Just didn't look right out the window; so I told the FO to come out of Level Change and level off (around 5;000 feet.) I was crosschecking the terrain display and toggling my EFB to the Approach page from the Arrival page. Terrain display showed terrain OK; but still didn't look right. FO descended to approximately 4700 feet when ATC gave us a terrain alert and told us to climb back to 5000 feet. FO stated he was sure that we were given 4000 feet but I responded that I didn't feel comfortable flying into the terrain just because we were cleared to do so.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported becoming uncomfortable during descent on arrival into BUR about the time ATC issued a low altitude alert. No GPWS warning was received.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch; Parked
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Repairman
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; MEL; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: Mechanic Y reinstalled a First Officer's Pitch Trim switch on a EMB-145 aircraft; which I inspected and back-signed.  I did not notice it was installed 180-degrees from the proper position.  We then made a Logcan discrepancy [write-up] for an Operational Check for the replacement of the switch.  At the time we could not apply power to the aircraft to perform the Operational Check; so it was turned over to the night shift.   When the Operational Check was complied with; it was not caught that the Horizontal Stabilizer was moving in the wrong direction.  I have completed and submitted an inspection manual discrepancy report. Due to the severity of this incident; the manual in question needs to have a warning and possibly an illustration of the proper orientation of the Pitch Trim switch.




Synopsis: Mechanic reports he inspected; but did not notice a Horizontal Stabilizer (H/S) Pitch Trim switch had been installed 180-degrees from the proper position on an EMB-145 aircraft. An Operational Check of the Pitch Trim by another shift failed to notice the H/S moving in the opposite direction contributing to an inflight incident.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground BWI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: While cleared to taxi out by ATC for departure on Runway 28; we took a wrong turn to enter Taxiway U. BWI Ground cleared us to taxi via Taxiways A; P1; and U. Instead we joined U from P taxiing via A; E; P; and U. Departing from the X Gate alleyway at night; contributing factors included an absence of taxiway signage; multiple illuminated construction barriers; and an aircraft on Taxiway P. When questioned by Ground about the incorrect turn; we acknowledged the mistake and no further discussion occurred. The remainder of the flight was conducted uneventfully. Taxiway signage could be improved coming out the alleyway of the X gates. Aircrews should not taxi their aircraft until ATC routing instructions are mutually understood and verified.




Synopsis: An air carrier pilot reported they were given taxi clearance via Taxiways A; P1; U to Runway 28; but because of night conditions; construction barrier lights and poor signage transitioned to U at P. ATC alerted about the error.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SNA.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower SNA
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon completing a short field landing on runway 20R at SNA I cleared the runway at taxiway J eastbound.  I thought the tower controller had instructed us to cross 20L and call ground.  Just as soon as I had crossed the hold short bars for 20L I saw a Cessna 172 rolling out on runway 20L and came to an immediate stop.  We were approximately at the western edge strip when this happened.  He veered off the runway and exited the runway diagonally onto taxiway J and C.  I contacted Ground and we returned to parking.  No damage to either aircraft resulted.




Synopsis: BE-20 Captain reported a runway incursion and ground conflict that resulted in the other aircraft veering off the runway to avoid a collision.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CYHZ.Airport, NS
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Windshear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower CYHZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon approach in CYHZ we encountered decreasing performance windshear. Turbulence went from moderate to severe. After windshear guidance was complete we failed to retract the gear below VLO; and also failed to turn off the wipers before 170 KTS. VLO exceedance was 10-30 KTS. Wiper exceedance was 10-30 KTS. It was hard to read instruments.Threat of windshear was known. Error was improperly cleaning up the aircraft in accordance with its limitations. It was a very challenging event. Maintenance was contacted after diversion.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: EMB-145XR flight crew reported diverting to an alternate after encountering wind shear on approach to CYHZ. Landing gear and windshield wiper limits were exceeded on go-around.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Emergency Exit
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was advised by the 'gate keeper' after the fact that we had flown an Airbus aircraft from a Maintenance facility with the overwing exits not armed.  I do not recall anything abnormal on that flight. There was no indication of an unarmed door. There was no ECAM alerts. It was a busy flight with last minute calls for catering and two jump seaters. We were concerned that the tug; without chains; would be able to push us on a solid sheet of ice. Planned; briefed; and executed De/Anti Ice.  Since Maintenance had worked on the overwing exits; it would be nice to know that procedure had been done. Sort of like gear pin write ups. You don't rely on the writeup to check for gear pins; but you do double check that the gear pins have been removed!  Maintenance did some work on the overwing exits but failed to re-arm the exits. As pilots we have learned to look primarily for ECAMs and pulsating amber indications. It is easy to overlook something that is just not where it usually is; that is part of human nature. Similar to a pilot doing a gear check and thinking he is seeing three green lights; when in fact he only sees two greens. He has seen and said; 'Down and three green' for so many times he says; 'Down and three green' again. We did not see anything to draw our attention to the lack of an armed slide; and we proceeded to fly the flight.     I suggest three things; all are barrier builders: First; if an over wing exit is going to be disarmed and then rearmed by maintenance; then; before the fact; a log book entry is made; similar to Gear pins installed; that an overwing exit is being disarmed. Followed by a log book entry; that the overwing exit is confirmed rearmed. The second thing that can be done; if Maintenance does not want to do the above; Maintenance should confirm on the Doors Page that the overwing exit is showing armed after they worked on it. The third thing; suggest to Airbus that an amber indication shows on the doors page that an over wing exit is NOT ARMED when it should be. Now; we only get an amber indication if the over wing is actually opened.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 had no additional information]


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported departing on a ferry flight with the overwing emergency exits not armed by Maintenance personnel prior to flight.