elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Other reposition
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground MIA
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Due to heavy traffic volume at the MIA FBO; remote parking operations were in effect. This required all large corporate jet operators to use the Northeast cargo base area. Upon repositioning from the Northeast cargo area to the FBO for passenger pick up; we were instructed by Ground Control to taxi on Lima to Zulu and hold short of [Runway] 8L. As we pulled out of the Northeast cargo area the flow of traffic (yellow painted lines) [taxiway lines] has you heading south to exit the area. This lined us up directly for Taxiway L11. As the non-flying pilot I was heads down running the Taxi Checklist. Almost directly after exiting the Northeast cargo area; Ground Control gave us an immediate clearance to stop and hold position. When I looked up I noticed that we were on Taxiway L11 heading for the Runway 8R (an active runway at the time). At no point did we violate the safety area of Runway 8L. Without Ground Control's call to stop and hold position I can see a potential situation develop where a pilot would taxi across an active runway (8L). Upon further examination we did not notice any taxiway markings or signage that would help anyone avoid this in the future.




Synopsis: GLF5 Captain describes a near runway incursion at L11 and Runway 8R. The clearance from Ground Control was to exit the Northeast cargo area and taxi via Taxiway L. Ground Control caught the error in time to prevent the incursion.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SAN.Airport, CA
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Near GRIDR intersection; ATC called other traffic at 13;500 feet; we were at 13;000 feet climbing. [We] got the RA; descended initially; then climbed; had the other aircraft in sight when we were instructed to climb again; [and] notified ATC.Controller did his best to keep us clear. We were in an Airbus 321; 186;000 lbs; were vectored off the ZZOOO2 because we could not make the climb restriction.In conjunction with ATC; construct STARs [that] a heavy Airbus 321 can make.


Second narrative: Climbing out of SAN on the ZZOOO2 RNAV departure; we were given headings after ZZOOO because we could not make the crossing at JORRJ at 14;000 feet. After gaining enough altitude we were sent direct GRIDR. ATC gave us a traffic alert of small aircraft at 11 o'clock. Had them on TCAS at 500 feet above; [and] as Pilot Flying; I increased climb rate per the Captain's suggestion to avoid a conflict. When the traffic was 100 feet above the TCAS triggered a descending RA; so I applied the required maneuver since we did not have a visual (weather was CAVU); then RA reversed to a climb RA so I complied with that. At that point; we had a visual on the aircraft and we resumed our climb as they passed off the wing. Notified ATC of RA. Two aircraft going over the same point in tight airspace.


Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported the aircraft's poor climb performance led to a vector off course and an airborne conflict. Captain suggested designing STAR procedures that heavy A321 aircraft could comply with.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ1
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Dirty sock smell on descent passing 6;000 ft.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported a fume event during descent for destination airport.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SAN.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SAN
ATC / advisory: Tower SAN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on the LOC 27 Approach into San Diego; the Tower told us that we would break out right at minimums. Concerned about getting down; I left REEBO at 800 to 1;000 FPM descent to the Derived Decision Altitude (DDA). The base of the layer was ragged and just prior to the DDA I saw the PAPI appear; disappear; and reappear. At DDA; I had the PAPI and immediately noticed an area of lower visibility north of the runway. I called 'landing'. Concerned that the area of lower visibility may move over the runway; I allowed the aircraft to descend at the higher rate of descent than I had started from the FAF. With it being daylight and the terrain and obstacles insight; I was lulled into focusing on the area of low visibility. This was apparent when the First Officer correctly called 'airspeed' when I allowed the airspeed to drop more than five knots below target. I corrected; but was still focused on the area of low visibility. Then we received the alert 'Terrain Too Low'. That got my attention and I corrected immediately. At the same moment of the alert; I saw the PAPI had turned four red. I brought the aircraft up to the PAPI glide path and the rest of the approach and landing was uneventful. The area of lower visibility stayed to the north of the runway and never became a factor. The first thing I did wrong was forgetting my first priority to fly the aircraft. The second thing I did wrong was [that I was] too lulled into a sense of security by having the terrain in sight. The third thing I did wrong was to focus on the area of low visibility which caused me to lose focus on the first two priorities. I allowed myself to be distracted. Ironically this area of focus; the low visibility never became a factor; yet it brought other more serious factors into play. Fly the airplane!


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 had no additional information]


Synopsis: A B737-300 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS alert for terrain on approach to SAN.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
When detected: Other ASI
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: Upon taking my Oral and Practical exams for my Powerplant certificate; both of which I passed; I forfeited my permanent Airframe certificate to my DME (Designated Mechanic Examiner) and received my temporary Airframe and Powerplant certificate.I noticed an email addressed from an Aviation Safety Inspector from the Salt Lake City FSDO; in regards to my new Airframe and Powerplant certificate application that he received from the DME. Concerning evidently that my permanent Airframe certificate did not have a signature on the back. Honestly I do not remember if the back of my certificate was signed or not; nor with what it could have been signed with. Perhaps done with pencil or a poor ball point pen to which later was rubbed off with dirty mechanic hands dealing with greases and solvents throughout the work day.I am not sure I was aware that the signature was required or that there was even a location for one on my certificate. I later noticed that none of my credit or debit cards are signed and neither was any of my other airmen certificates.If this is important I have had a lapse in instruction and was unaware of the necessity and importance. Perhaps an advisory circular would be helpful to the aviation community. If the lack of a signature on the back of airmen certificates could completely invalidate the credentials of the holder it seems like an important topic.




Synopsis: A&P mechanic reported failing to sign the back of his previous certificate; resulting in an email from the FAA.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: STL.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B STL
ATC / advisory: Tower STL
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: At 500 FT AGL on final to Runway 12L in STL; we received a PWS warning (GO AROUND...WINDSHEAR AHEAD). The weather at the time was partly cloudy with no convective activity in the area. Approximately five seconds after receiving the PWS warning; the weather radar went into test mode. The pilot not flying and I briefly discussed the situation and I made the decision to land with no objection from the pilot not flying. After parking at the gate; I called for the Maintenance person at STL and described to him what had happened. He stated that this was a common occurrence at STL and there was nothing wrong with the aircraft so no logbook entry was made. The Maintenance person stated this was a known problem and 'they' (I don't know who 'they' are) recently flew an aircraft around STL to try and isolate the cause of the erroneous PWS warnings; but were unable to find the cause.

Callback: The reporter stated that he has not personally seen or heard of this type anomaly occurring before it happened on this flight. The PWS warning symbol identifying the supposed weather event was at the aircraft's eleven o'clock about five miles. The reporter did not see anything which would cause that warning to activate.

Second narrative: At 500 AGL on final approach; we got a windshear go-around warning. There was no convective activity in the area and no windshear warning. The Captain and I talked about it and he elected to continue the approach and landing without incident. Five seconds after the initial warning; the radar went into test mode automatically. After the landing; the Captain contacted STL Maintenance to check out the radar and he was told that erroneous windshear warning has happened multiple times before.


Synopsis: A B737-700 flight crew reported an EGPWS Predictive Windshear Warning (PWS) while on short final for STL Runway 12L; but because daylight VMC conditions existed without convective activity; the approach was continued.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SBD.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D SBD
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were assigned the obstacle departure Rwy 24 SBD. The departure reads 'Rwy 24 climbing left turn. All aircraft climb direct PDZ VOR.' After discussion we understood the departure to be a climbing left turn while climbing for terrain clearance then after the turn direct PDZ. After departure (while in a left turn) departure control queried us about our heading. We stated we were in a left turn per the obstacle departure. He said we had overshot the direct turn to PDZ it didn't require a full circle then direct. We were given a heading for PDZ and proceeded as directed. The rest of the departure was uneventful. There was no traffic conflict or terrain warnings. A note in the guide describing the procedure might make it more clear. From Rwy 24 it's really not a climbing left turn rather a left turn DIRECT to PDZ. It's not a complicated procedure however the high terrain near the airport led us to make more of the turn requirement than was needed.


Second narrative: Our clearance was to depart runway 24 via the Obstacle DP out of KSBD. We both looked over the Obstacle DP and agreed we were to make a climbing 360-degree left turn to PDZ. On TO; the controller informed us that we should have just made a slight left turn and gave us a right turn heading back towards PDZ. When I made the turn; I received a 'bank angle' which I immediately corrected. No other problems were encountered.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reported a heading deviation due to confusion flying the SBD Obstacle Departure.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pilot Seat
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the takeoff roll at approximately 100kts my seat; FO (First Officer) seat; slid all the way back. The Captain called for the reject and we performed a rejected takeoff. FO seat slid back beyond ability to reach controls.Seat not secured in place properly.It was an abnormal situation; both pilots deemed it unsafe for flight; and rejecting the takeoff was the safest action.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information]


Synopsis: EMB145 flight crew reported rejected takeoff when First Officer's seat slid back.
Date: 201809
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy; Airport
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: We had a group traveling and we were missing 3 of them. I told the group that the three that are missing will be rebooked on the next flight. We went down to close the aircraft door and as I was walking up 3 customers opened the door from gate room to jetway and started running down. I stopped the passengers and escorted them up to the gate room and assisted the customers. The issues here are NOT with the customers. As they should have not have opened the door the bigger issue is that the jetway door opened for them. I don't feel safe with these doors on the jetways. If these customers were irate and difficult this could have turned very poor with me. I have called building and maintenance and they have been to numerous gates and never finding a problem. [This gate] continually has problems with the jetway door. [The gate] jetway auto leveler used to go off continuously and called building and maintenance many times for that issue. I am writing this [report] because these are small problems that can potentially lead to much bigger problems. If I enter a door I have the expectation that it will be closed and locked behind me. [Company] is taking this issue to upper management but we really need the doors fixed on the pier.




Synopsis: Air carrier Customer Service Representative reported passengers were able to open the door from the terminal to the jetway; and that other doors at the airport have similar problems.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: P180 Avanti
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After an uneventful flight while on base leg for a visual approach the First Officer called for flaps down.Shortly thereafter an asymmetry became apparent and the flap sync caution light illuminated and the outboard flaps indicated stuck at approximately 3/4 deflection. We abandoned the approach; ran the checklist and attempted; unsuccessfully; to restore flaps to the mid position. After doing so failed to solve the problem we declared an emergency and asked for a diversion to a more suitable airport. After contacting Approach we started setting up for the approach. At this point we began getting concerned about our fuel state and asked Approach to expedite and eventually called minimum fuel. Upon receiving a wind update we decided to change runways to one which had almost a direct headwind of 14 KTS. At this time we cycled through the flaps again and were able to obtain the must symmetric position possible which indicated from the cockpit as forward flaps mid; inboards mid; and outboards at about 3/4. From the cockpit we could see that the right outboard flap was mostly retracted (could only see outer portion) and the left outboard appeared mid. We flew final at 145-150 IAS to touchdown. Fuel on touchdown was approximately 570 LBS. After landing the flaps were left in their last position and the trim was returned to neutral. Post flight inspection revealed damage to the right outboard flap and a very asymmetric deployment of that flap.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A P180 flight crew abandoned their approach; declared and emergency and diverted to an airport with more suitable runways when they suffered and extreme flap asymmetry condition requiring full aileron trim and deflection to control roll and heading. The approach and landing were made at an increased speed commensurate with their ability to maintain control.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BUR.Airport, CA
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C BUR
ATC / advisory: Tower BUR
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was on a Visual Approach to Runway 33 and cleared to land. On short final; pilot executed a go-around due to wind shear. Due to the lack of a Diverse Vector Area (DVA) at BUR; the only instruction that we are allowed to give an aircraft in this situation is to make left traffic back to Runway 33. The instruction forced the aircraft to violate the Class D airspace at both WHP and VNY airports; and there was no positive separation with the VFR aircraft within those Class D areas.We need DVAs at BUR so that we can vector IFR aircraft who are on missed approaches and have a procedure for getting them back to TRACON. This situation is dangerous. Before it was deemed illegal due to not having a DVA; this procedure would have been handled by issuing the go-around aircraft a 270 heading and a climb to 4;000 (SID instructions). This flight path keeps the aircraft away from all Class D airspace and allows the aircraft to be handed off back to TRACON; allowing the aircraft to be safely re-sequenced into an appropriate spot. We need to be able to do this again.




Synopsis: BUR Tower Controller reports of lack of procedures for go-around aircraft which often leads to airspace violations and possible losses of separation.