elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EGGX.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center EGGX
Aircraft component: Data Transmission and Automatic Calling
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Slightly late Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) logon. Shortly after passing the coast out fix DOGAL on an RLAT shoulder NAT track we realized CPDLC was not logged on with EGGX. We logged on successfully as soon as it was realized. Shanwick later asked us for our DOGAL position report on the HF which was given. After passing 20W we confirmed that Shanwick had received our 20W position report via CPDLC which they did.Contributing factors. CPDLC normally transfers automatically from sector to sector. CPDLC did not auto transfer after logging on with EDYY. Also Shannon ATC was looking for a lost comm aircraft for quite some time which was distracting. A CPDLC check box would be useful on the Class II nav checklist in the FM and also on the flight plan.


Second narrative: DOGAL was the designated coast out fix. We were cleared RLAT shoulder track; F360 mach .84. We passed DOGAL and realized that CPDLC was not logged on. We logged on with EGGX. Shanwick made a cell call request for a position report for position DOGAL. The report was sent. We contacted Shanwick to confirm a position report at 20W. The report was received by Shanwick. No further action was necessary. CPDLC continued to work throughout the flight.


Synopsis: B777 Captain reported failure of Controller Pilot Data Link Communication to log on with EGGX from EDYY during coast out. The log on was accomplished manually but not in time to send the position report for the coast out fix. EGGX made contact on HF to get the missing report.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PIL.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E PIL
ATC / advisory: CTAF PIL
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X entered the left traffic pattern. Two [Small Transports] were in the pattern. Aircraft X announced downwind airspeed of 80 Knots. Twice during multiple approaches Aircraft Y initiated right traffic patterns. Aircraft X did announce 'Standard Pattern to Left;' with no response. Once Aircraft Z was on a right base almost at the same time Aircraft X was about to make a left base. AC-90-66B clearly states left hand traffic pattern is standard. This is the second time this conflict has happened. I understand [these aircraft] have a training requirement for right patterns. Training requirements do not trump FARs at non-government airports. A NASA ASR was submitted about a year ago for the same conflict. A nearby airport has two runways that require right traffic patterns. The event noted resulted in head-on situations resulting from non-standard pattern and standard left pattern operations.




Synopsis: Small aircraft pilot at a non towered airport reported two other aircraft were making non standard right traffic patterns and not communicating on the appropriate frequency.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Once cleared for take off; I began to add thrust and line up with centerline on the runway. I applied take off power once aligned with the runway and dropped my heels to the floor while on the rudder pedals; as I do for every takeoff. We began to accelerate down the runway; after the '70 knots cross check' call; and before the V1 call made by the Pilot Not Flying ; the aircraft began to pull to the left of centerline. As I began to apply more and more right rudder; I realized that I was losing directional control of the aircraft. I then began to apply brakes and reduce the power to initiate an aborted take off.At the same time all of this was happening; the Pilot Not Flying was calling V1. I did not rotate because I had already stepped on the brakes and began to pull the power back. Once the Pilot Not Flying called V1 and looked up; she questioned what was happening. I told her that I couldn't maintain directional control. She then took the controls and brought the plane to a stop on the runway. When she took the controls; I heard a loud pop shortly after. As we rolled to a stop; Tower called us and advised us that our aircraft was on fire and to evacuate immediately if able. The Pilot Not Flying and I then began the evacuation checklist; and I jumped out of my seat to open the passenger door. I opened the door and the Pilot Not Flying and I exited the aircraft.I learned that I must be quicker and more deliberate when it comes to a rejected take-off. The fact that my abort was a little slow and unclear caused some confusion in between the Pilot Flying and Pilot Not Flying.




Synopsis: Cessna 525 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff after experiencing directional control difficulties on the takeoff roll. Crew evacuated the aircraft after the Tower advised aircraft was on fire.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZJX
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Weather; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X checked onto my frequency requesting a right deviation for weather that was impacting my sector further north. I went ahead and approved the right deviation. Approximately 3 to 4 minutes prior to Aircraft X checking on frequency I had Aircraft Y check on as well flying a similar route that of Aircraft X; that had also requested right deviations for weather. Both aircraft at the time were at interim altitudes. My plan was to climb Aircraft Y to 35000 feet and to hand that aircraft off to the next sector. Instead; I inadvertently climbed Aircraft X to 35000 feet updating the data block for Aircraft Y to FL350. Within 15 to 20 seconds of issuing the climb Aircraft X reported an RA with Aircraft Z southbound descending to 34000 feet. It caught me completely off guard for I still showed the interim of FL330 in the data block of Aircraft X. Aircraft X proceeded to level off below the other Aircraft Z. When Aircraft X was clear of that aircraft I descended Aircraft X back down to 33000 feet.I have played this event over and over again in my head as to what and why this situation occurred. I knew all about the traffic; as well as the weather conditions during that session. It was just like any other day here at the Center during the summer period. You must be extremely vigilant when you have periods like this. As I look back; and as focused/aware of the situation I felt that I was in; I got into a hurry to climb Aircraft Y to his requested altitude of 35000 feet; as well as handing the aircraft off to the next sector. This lead to the transposing of the call signs of Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. This simply comes down to being a bit more patient therefore maintaining a better focus of the situation at hand.




Synopsis: ZJX Center Controller inadvertently climbed the wrong aircraft into conflict with a descending traffic.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BKX.Airport, SD
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Airspace: Class E ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC; Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: The DOD was doing radar testing reference windmill interference. They scheduled this testing during the sectors busiest time of the year. During this time of year we have AFPs in place to control the level of traffic in and out of the sector; we also will decline equipment outages for the volume. As an FLM; I was told about the testing a week in advance and told the Airspace and Procedures office this was the worst possible time; my OM also told them this. The response we got was there was a lot of planning and coordination done prior to the event and we weren't allowed to say no. To summarize; the test involved several VFR aircraft around the BKX airport one above 10000 [feet] without transponders or Mode C. They were also planning an aircraft without transponder and Mode C to fly in the flight levels. The day that I worked R33; I was an FLM as well. The NOM (National Operations Manager) requested radar search for the test. I denied it based on traffic. I was told by my OMIC (Operations Manager In Charge) that I couldn't as it was owned by the DOD and it was their equipment and don't worry about it the search out is transparent. Later; I worked the sector and the DOD did something with the radar that created false targets; target jumps and a loss of radar. It happened probably 5 or 6 times within 20 minutes with a return to normal after approximately 30 seconds to 2 minutes. I was busy at the low altitude sector and so was our high altitude sector. I am not aware of any other days during this test that this happened.If we as a facility find a need to incorporate an AFP for a large traffic volume event; we should be able to decline equipment outages and experiments. I have attached a briefing sheet from a different day then the one I am referring just to assist with information.




Synopsis: ZMP FLM reports of a shift where the DOD was testing a radar system reference windmill interference. The radar system created false targets; target jumping; and a loss of radar.
Date: 201406
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Over a Period of Time.
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The NOTAMs in some cities have become so erroneous that I am concerned they are being neglected as a whole by many crewmembers. It is rare that I will fly with a pilot who reads the NOTAMs for our flight. When I read them; I frequently hear the comment; 'You actually read that stuff.'  When reading the NOTAMs; I can understand why they are being neglected by so many of my fellow crewmembers as a large number of them are outdated or unnecessary at many of the airports we fly to. IAH is an excellent example.I had a [single leg] flight from IAH two weeks ago with over 80 pages of NOTAMs. The IAH NOTAMs still include NOTAMs for arrival procedures that no longer exist; such as the TXMEX arrival. That TXMEX NOTAM was in our paperwork for years; to cross TXMEX at 12;000 FT; instead of the altitude on the chart. This chart could have simply been revised to reflect the proper altitude and the NOTAM eliminated. There are numerous similar NOTAMs for current procedures that should result in chart changes; so as to eliminate the NOTAM and reflect the proper procedure on the chart. Instead; these NOTAMs have effective dates on them through 2015; such as the arrivals into IAH instructing you to descend at 280 KTS in the transition. Why would this remain a NOTAM through 2015; instead of being revised on the chart?There are also duplicate NOTAMs; such as FDC 04/6220 and FDC 04/5737; both instructing the same changes in altitudes to the same procedure.The examples above merely scratch the surface. In total; I found 64 NOTAMs in IAH alone that either contain duplicate information; information that has already been corrected on the chart; information that simply should be revised on the chart so the NOTAM can be eliminated; or information for procedures that no longer exist. Eliminating these would get rid of roughly half of the pages of NOTAMs for IAH.




Synopsis: A B737 First Officer addressed the excessive proliferation and validity of NOTAMs; citing; among others: redundancy; outdated; excessive numbers and long term dependence on NOTAM changes to procedures instead of revising charts in a timely fashion.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On the KARLB2 arrival into ONT; we received a clearance to cross COAZT at 16;000 feet. Read back clearance. Was queried by Controller if we would make the restriction. We had just started our descent to make the restriction in PROF. Shortly thereafter; we received a heading 90 degrees left of course; then another heading 90 left. We asked the Controller as to the nature of the headings; and Controller replied 'for traffic.' Then informed us that the restriction was for GOATZ; not COAZT. These points are very close together on the STAR; and sound very similar.


Second narrative: I was up securing the aircraft; using the restroom and making sure the jumpseater (mechanic) put away the bunk. As I returned to the cockpit I heard the FO answering a radio call. He answered cleared to cross COAZT (KARLB2 arrival) at 16;000. FO reiterated to me we're cleared to cross COAZT at 16;000. Just as we started our descent the Controller (next Controller; not the issuing Controller); asked if we were going to make our restriction. I assured him [we] would. As we approached GOATZ the Controller gave us a vector to help us lose altitude. I inquired about this as we were on a normal vertical profile to make our restriction. The Controller responded we were to cross GOATZ (not COAZT) at 16;000. At that point we realized the mistake made with the previous Controller.  In my opinion; the names of these 2 fixes are way too similar to be on the same arrival. The name of the 2 fixes sound identical. After a long flight; this mistake I feel is too easy to make especially when there is only one person monitoring the radio for physiological (restroom) or any other reason.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported confusion while on KARLB2 STAR due the similar sounding fixes; GOATZ and COAZT.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We climbed to our final altitude of FL250 and leveled off. Sometime after level off we noted a faint smell of smoke in the cockpit. We were then called by the Flight Attendant who informed us there was smoke in the cabin. We executed our emergency procedures which included donning our oxygen masks and decided to divert to [a nearby alternate]. I [advised] ATC and informed them of our intentions. Further contact with the Flight Attendant informed us that he couldn't locate the source of the smoke and that it was subsiding. We kept our O2 masks on and executed a normal landing and taxied to the gate where ramp personnel promptly parked us and we deplaned without incident. After deplaning I entered the discrepancy in the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log). We the secured the aircraft.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported diverting to a nearby alternate after smelling smoke in the cockpit and cabin.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff right after a 757 was rotating off of 26L. The winds were 310/17G30KT and there were windshear advisories in effect. We elected to perform a full rate takeoff. After being cleared for takeoff we intentionally delayed our takeoff roll for a few seconds because of our close proximity to the preceding 757. Right after takeoff as we were bringing the landing gear up; we received a windshear warning message. We promptly executed the windshear escape procedure by checking max power; checking the spoilers were in; and following the windshear (WS)/go-around (GA) flight director commands. We experienced a slight decrease in airspeed and there was minimal roll caused by the windshear (or most likely wake turbulence). The windshear warning extinguished after several seconds and we quickly executed a right turn to intercept the RNAV course on the SID. We managed to turn the aircraft on to the SID before any lateral deviations occurred; even though the flight director stayed in WS/GA mode. Once we re-selected the appropriate flight director commands the autopilot was engaged; and we commenced the flap retraction sequence. We reported the event to ATC.No aircraft or engine limitations were exceeded; so we continued the flight without any further incident.Threat of gusty winds; and the lack of separation between a 757 and our aircraft on takeoff.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on takeoff from ATL in trail of a B757.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PUB.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D PUB
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Aircraft component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: We diverted to PUB due to weather in DEN. We prepared for an approach to the active Runway 26L. Approach changed the active runway to 8R approximately five miles from the field. We reviewed the numbers in the performance computer for the new runway and landed without event. After arrival while preparing for departure; we noticed Runway 8R was labeled as 8L in the performance computer. Departure was conducted on Runway 35; which is properly labeled. Correct the PUB performance data. Crews should double check for the correct runway in the performance computer.

Callback: The reporter stated that PUB was an off-line weather diversion with fuel considerations because of previous holding at the destination airport. The crew was concerned about the legality of the diversion because of the airport data error but made Dispatch aware of the errors.



Synopsis: An air carrier flight crew diverted to PUB and discovered after landing that the on board computer database incorrectly labeled Runway 8R data as 8L.