Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A visual approach backed up with the ILS. I was on final approach; configured for landing; on visual glidepath according to the PAPI; I was chasing my airspeed a little bit but seemed to be getting it corrected. Shortly after the RA called 500; the Captain made note of a windshear caution I didn't fully hear/understand what he said; when I looked in to scan the PFD the caution was already gone. Shortly thereafter as we approached the runway; I got fast and high on the visual glidepath. I seemed to be pushing quite a lot to get the nose down; the Captain mentioned I needed to push the nose over; I pushed the yolk and pulled back the power levers. The Captain then told me to add power; as I started to push the thrust levers forward; the RA called 100; at that point the Captain called; 'I have the controls.' I let go of the yolk and repeated; 'You have the controls.' We started to round out; the stick shaker went off and the aircraft rolled to the right as the Captain fought it back to the left. We landed pretty hard right wing low. We taxied off the runway; verified everyone was ok and followed normal after landing and taxi procedures back to the gate; I remember asking what I had done to get off the glidepath; I thought I had it stabilized; we discussed vigilance during taxi to prevent any further mistakes and that we would discuss what happened after the aircraft was parked; the Captain mentioned he thought he felt the right wing hit so we would go look at it as soon as we were parked and shutdown at the gate. Upon shutting down at the gate; someone from Maintenance knocked and entered the flight deck as passengers were deplaning and exclaimed; 'Y'all know about the severe damage to the right side; right?' We let him know we were on our way to inspect it. We filled out the maintenance can and went to inspect the damage. Post flight inspection revealed damage to the right wing tip; right flap and flap fairings. The Maintenance person told us not to worry about reporting it to Maintenance Control; that he had called it in on the radio. The Captain told me to take a break; and then head to the next gate while he called his Supervisor and the Chief Pilot's office and he would call me with an update. While enroute to the gate after a brief break in the crew lounge the Captain and I met and he told me we needed to proceed to the Chief Pilot's office; we had been pulled off the trip as a precaution to make sure we were not too shaken up. When we arrived at the Chief Pilot's office he had a couple forms for each of us to sign and then we headed over to complete a drug and alcohol screening. My low experience level with transport category/jet aircraft training taking place Winds Caution message not fully understood Critical Phase of flight. Once losing the glidepath I should have executed a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the landing flare causing wing contact with the runway. If the approach becomes unstable especially that close to the ground execute a go-around; don't try to stick with the landing.  If a non-standard call is made and I am not sure what is said; verify if there is time or discontinue the approach if I'm not completely comfortable.  Better manage the aircraft energy; and stay ahead of glidepath deviations to prevent having to correct the approach at the last minute.  More experience will help my skills and figuring out the 'feel' of the airplane especially as it differs from the simulator to more correctly make corrections during all phases of flight.


Second narrative: Conducting IOE for a new hire First Officer; second day of his first trip. This was his fifth approach. He had been demonstrating typical progress; very rough glidepath control in the beginning; but making steady and obvious progress with each experience. His airspeed control was good. He was well above average in all other areas. On this approach I had decided it was time to back off on the volume of verbal coaching; keeping my mouth shut as much as possible to allow him to concentrate. He did very well; until about 200 feet AGL where he began to deviate high. I made a comment; at which point he reacted by pitching down; but it wasn't enough; and I took the controls. At this point I was in a relatively familiar situation; one in which I have; in the past; continued to achieve a good landing without undue effort. I pitched down and added power; and began the flare for the landing. In the flare we experienced stick shaker; and the landing was hard. I heard and felt unusual contact; which turned out to be the right wing contacting the runway. Overall training environment threat; last-minute control swap; expectations due to previous similar experiences which had always resulted in good outcomes. The primary error was my decision not to opt for a go-around. I would have been plenty justified in doing so. Low energy during flare; resulting in possible accelerated stall just before touchdown.I think the company is already doing quite a bit to spread the word about our no-fault go-around policy and the need for most of us; including me obviously; to work harder to achieve a fundamental; philosophical change in our individual mindset. Maybe more communication on the subject would help; possibly including praise for specific good examples. If my bad example can be used to help in this effort; then at least some good will have come from my experience. Sometimes the time available for making the go-around decision is effectively zero; therefore at least some of one's thinking; in general terms at least; needs to be done ahead of time. I have been regularly preaching this myself; this personal experience will; among other things; result in my becoming much more of a 'born again' preacher on the subject. The lesson I learned here is priceless. Sometimes one truly doesn't know exactly where a certain line is until one blunders across it. In the future my personal trigger points 'my own comfort level' will be far more conservative. I must also remind myself that demonstrating a go-around to an IOE trainee in such a situation is a good thing in itself. It's a prime time for setting the right example; one that will then get relayed to many of his future crewmates over the years.


Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew describes the events leading up to a hard landing with the right wing contacting the runway.