elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the initial climb of the flight we experience 6 events of strong radio interference due to ACARS transmissions/crosstalk. These events caused both discomfort due to the very loud volume of the interfering transmissions and difficulty in understanding ATC communication. The interference partially masked ATC transmissions between ATC and other airplanes.  Additional interference events occurred during the flight for a total of 10 events.  During the last six weeks many crews have been experiencing frequent events of radio interference due to ACARS transmissions/crosstalk. These interference events should be a safety concern. They caused in more than one occasion to miss/misunderstand critical ATC communications and instructions during the departure phase of the flight.Something changed since December 2013. The interference could be caused by changes in the ACARS communication software; protocols; procedures; equipment.  Usually after Weight Off Wheel both the FMS and the EICAS show an 'ACARS NO COMM' message; shortly after that a very loud burst of digital communication is heard into the pilot headsets. In the worse cases the interfering signal is repeated multiple times during the first few minutes after take off. There should be an investigation of these events. In the meantime pilots should be provided temporary procedures (like disabling the ACARS system) to be used during the departure phase of the flight. As today; six weeks after the beginning of the interference problems the airline has not provided pilots with any kind of information; recommendation or addressed this safety issue in any noticeable way.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 First Officer experiences communication radio interference caused by ACARS data transmissions right after takeoff; resulting in missed ATC communications.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fan Case
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; MEL; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: On ETOPS Pre-departure Check; noticed # 1 and # 2 Engine Outlet Guide Vanes (OGVs) all had metallic tape installed; reference Maintenance Manual (M/M) 72-33-00-6. No logbook documentation; no tracking document for a temporary repair item. I referred to company Procedures Manual which clearly states that all instances of metallic tape require a Technical Document; even if the repair is considered permanent. [I] notified Supervisor and Manager. Told that Mr. X in Maintenance Control said no Technical Document required. [I] went off shift before I contacted him. Called back; and Mr. X indicated no applicable Technical Document for ATA Chapter-72; so could not provide Technical Document Number to Manager. After much discussion; [he] signed-off item in violation of directive stated in our company Procedures Manual; even after I explained there was no Procedures Manual relief for what he was doing.Part of problem is Engineering revised same Maintenance Manual on September 2012; renaming 'Speed Tape' to 'Vibration Damping Tape'. Engineering appeared to be trying to circumvent Procedures Manual mandate on [use of] metallic tape (my point of view). Perceived attitude from local Manager was that this is a normal fix; and not a big deal. Create metallic tape tracking document for all Engine ATA Chapters as well. Train all Aircraft Maintenance [personnel] that there are no exceptions for metallic tape. Tracking Document was not applied.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports about the lack of proper documentation and deferral tracking of metallic type Speed Tape applied to the # 1 and # 2 Engine Outlet Guide Vanes (OGVs) on their B767-300 ETOPS aircraft.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: Tower SEA
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to 16R at SEA; clear; VMC; just prior to 1;000 feet AGL; we received a TCAS TA; then a momentary RA. This was caused by a single engine prop departing BFI. They made right downwind departure; which I think is not normal. This caused them to be closer to the arrival path into SEA. I saw the traffic at our 7-8 o'clock position before the RA. Traffic was well behind us and proceeding behind our path. We got the RA for about 5 seconds to monitor vertical speed. The First Officer; pilot flying; followed the RA. After; we were able to continue the approach on Glide Slope with no issues. Reported the event to SEA Tower on approach. Right downwind departure from BFI should not be allowed when aircraft are landing 16's to SEA. Even if they remain low; the rate of climb will trigger an RA possible with traffic on approach to 16; as [it] did to us.




Synopsis: EMB-170 Captain reported an RA with traffic on a nonstandard departure from BFI.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on arrival to ZZZ; I started making radio calls about 12 minutes out. After my 3rd call to ZZZ traffic; a helicopter reported doing hover work on the runway; mid field and requested any traffic to report. I immediately responded; 'We were on final for RWY 3.' We received no response; but as we got closer. Both the First Officer and I visually cleared the runway and proceeded to land. It wasn't until we were touching down that I noticed a helicopter on the runway. We had no time to go around and was committed to landing.  It was at this time I applied max braking and try to anticipate the helicopters intended movement as its motion was subtle but erratic. It wasn't until the last few seconds I made a radio call ordering the R-22 to clear the runway. Which he started to comply with as we were coming to a stop just short of Taxiway A5 on the runway. We came to a stop approximately 10 feet from the R-22 rotor disc. The aircraft color was green and I could not make out a tail number. We spoke with the gate agents at ZZZ to try and determine the aircrafts FBO in order to have a discussion with the pilot. It was determined the aircraft was the property of a flight school at a nearby airfield. Both the First Officer and I also left statements with the Fire Department on ZZZ.' With increased commercial traffic; ZZZ needs to have a control tower.




Synopsis: Flight Crew flying CRJ-900 had a ground conflict with a helicopter during landing.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Preflighted aircraft at gate in SEA during light drizzle and 4C OAT.  I inspected the wing for possible clear ice after fueling.  I did not detect any ice; and passengers were boarded.  Take off and climb out were normal with anti-ice on.  In flight; cabin crew called us to inform us that they saw ice formations on the top of the right wing.  The formations were streaked in the slipstream like rivers of ice.  There were no unusual airframe or aerodynamic vibrations.  Flight was continued with no further problem.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reports inspecting the wings for ice formation after refueling during light drizzle and finds no ice. The Flight Attendant's believe they see ice  on the wings during flight but no abnormal flying qualities are noted.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: Tower DCA
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working the Local and Helicopter positions combined at DCA ATC. I have been CPC/FPL for [a short time].I accepted a handoff from Potomac TRACON on Aircraft X 2 miles west of ZZZ. Aircraft X contacted DCA Tower and requested to fly Route 1-Route 4 -ZZZ1 and then to ZZZ2. I radar contacted Aircraft X; approved the request and issued the altimeter.Aircraft Y called on a seven mile final to DCA and requested to land on Runway XX. I then I cleared Aircraft Y to land.Note. My standard practice for helicopters flying the DCA helicopter route is to issue any pertinent landing traffic by the time the helicopters pass over the South Capitol Street Bridge.Aircraft X asked if I had issued traffic on the aircraft landing Runway XX. I thought I had applied my standard practice of issuing traffic to the helicopters over the bridge so I informed Aircraft X that I had issued the traffic.Once Aircraft Y landed; he asked about the flight of three helicopters off his right. I informed him I had issued traffic to Aircraft X.Neither aircraft declared a near miss on frequency. At all times I had maintained Tower applied visual separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.I recommend recurrent helicopter training for the facility to prevent this incident from occurring in the future with other controllers.




Synopsis: DCA Controller reported they failed to issue traffic information to multiple VFR flights on approach.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PVD.Airport, RI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C PVD
ATC / advisory: Tower PVD
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Ground Event / Encounter FOD
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approaching PVD on radar vectors for the visual approach Runway 23. Small GA aircraft on VFR and not in contact with ATC got into close proximity of our flight path. We reacted with an RA and maneuvered on a climb per TCAS instructions to clear conflict. GA aircraft was believed to be within 300 ft of vertical separation. On final approach the runway had a trash bag and other FOD; so the ground crew failed to clear the FOD from the runway causing a go around instructed by ATC. Go around executed around 700 ft AGL. [Caused by] aircraft flying VFR near complex airspace. And trash bag on runway. Followed per [company] procedures in both cases. Encourage VFR traffic to be in radar contact if flying near complex airspace.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported reacting to an RA triggered by a light aircraft during their arrival into PVD; and then executing a go-around after noticing FOD on the runway.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 4
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying from ZZZ - ZZZ1. I was Pilot Monitoring and my First Officer was Pilot Flying. The weather at the time was heavy rain; 4 sm visibility; and overcast at 2;200 ft. At the time ZZZ was in a south flow and we were set up for Runway XXR. After we pushed back; ran the after start checklist and were ready to taxi; ground informed us that they were switching to a north flow and to expect Runway XYR; and stated the winds were '300 at 14 kts.' I stopped; re-entered the numbers in ACARS and the new numbers for Runway XYR were flaps 20 instead of flaps 8; which I promptly read out and pointed at. Somehow; however; the new flap position did not get selected. I then called for the runway change checklist; ran it; and began our taxi. Upon commencing the takeoff roll and passing through 80 knots; I was doing my scan of the instruments and noticed the flaps were still at 8 and not 20; so I selected 20. We got a 'config flaps' warning which promptly went away as soon as the flaps reached their newly commanded position so I continued the takeoff roll and lifted off without any issues.The reason I elected not to abort the takeoff was because we were in heavy rain and the aircraft only had one operable thrust reverser. Adding a 'flaps __' item in the before takeoff above the line checklist but the barriers that are currently in place have been sufficient numerous times before. I simply made a mistake that I have learned from and that will make me more vigilant and observant in my duties.




Synopsis: CRJ Captain reported that distraction and a runway change resulted in takeoff with an incorrect flap setting.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Light
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We took-off in daylight and landed in darkness. Enroute; I noticed that the landing lights seamed dim and it was difficult to tell if we were in a cloud or not with the retractable underwing lights. I didn't think much of it; and assumed that the clouds weren't thick. Turning the cockpit illumination way down would allow me to see that there were lights going on and off; but in a very dim method; similar to what I am used to seeing when the lights are turned on NOT in a cloud.After landing; the tower commented that we did not have our landing lights on for landing. This was NOT true. I had the lights on for landing. As I was taxiing around I started playing with the various lights on the aircraft and while ALL lights on the aircraft cast SOME very little illumination only the taxi light and the runway turnoff lights cast some useable light that could illuminate something before I would have it at taxi speed. The underwing landing lights and the Nose wheel landing light cast no useable illumination. They did create a little bit of a glow but literally the light did not reach forward of the cockpit.I have a suspicion that these are LED bulbs. They cast a very different light; and [have a] focus different from normal LANDING lights. I have a further suspicion that they are meant to be a taxi lights; but that they have been used as main landing lights; and do not cast the adequate light for the purposes of flight. As they do not cast the EXPECTED amount of light; not only are they unusable as an illumination device for the cockpit flight crew flying the aircraft; but as a safety issue do NOT allow OTHER aircraft to see our aircraft and judge its relative position in darkness.I did not write up these lights at the time. As every light switch had some sort of functional bulb attached to it; at the time it did not occur to me. I should have written them up; and will going forward. Tower's comment to us on landing at makes that abundantly clear as I ponder it away from the aircraft.[My] suggestions is to verify the lights are correct in the aircraft in question. They do NOT even provide enough illumination to allow the aircraft to be seen in flight by another aircraft and are completely useless for illuminating a landing at night.




Synopsis: An Airbus 321 Captain reported that the landing lights were very dim. The Captain alluded to the possibility that the wrong bulbs had been installed.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: SKC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Practicing aborted take offs on runway. The student failed to correct for the simulated aborted takeoff; the student froze and applied rudder only; as the aircraft  began yawing towards the grass area the IP took the mixtures and cut both engines and attempted to maintain directional control. The aircraft came to a full stop in the grass area. No damage or injuries noted to the aircraft or the field.




Synopsis: During practice aborted takeoff; aircraft departed the hard surface of the runway and came to a stop in the grass.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ1
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Military
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was climbing out of about 20;000 feet when I switched him to the High Altitude sector. He was handed off to ZZZ1 Center High altitude sectors. A little while later the low altitude sector pointed out an aircraft at 23;000 feet going eastbound. I was thinking that they were showing it to me because the same guy was working both planes but that was not the case. I got so use to ZZZ1 Center sectors being combined down there that I didn't put together that I hadn't pointed out the Aircraft X in the climbout to the low side and he didn't know anything about him pointed right at the other aircraft. ZZZ1 Center had to turn both planes last minute to avoid and situation. I ended up violating a sector in ZZZ1 Center and cause a unsafe situation with two aircraft they were forced to turn. I am trying to adjust back to a normal schedule and this is the first day shift I have worked since last month so my sleep schedule is a little chaotic as I am trying to adjust.Not sure anything is needed to be recommended it should have been obvious on my first day shift back in normal operations that things would not be the same as they have been because of the pandemic.




Synopsis: A Center Controller reported they assumed adjacent sectors were combined but they were not; which resulted in an airspace violation and two aircraft on conflicting routes entering the next facility sector.