elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Aircraft component: Fuselage Bulkhead
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was complying with a functional check of the aileron cable tension in the forward cargo area. With this task you must remove the forward bulk head right hand panel and cargo area floor boards. After the aileron cable tension checks; I completed the job card signing off all the tasks including the completion of the bulk head blow out panel and floor boards. I failed to secure the floor boards and the bulk head panel resulting in the aircraft flying in an unsafe condition in which could of resulted in a catastrophic result. As a maintainer it is my responsibility to make the sure any and all aircraft is it a 100% airworthy. In the future; any task that is not completed will not be signed to make sure it is completed to ensure the aircraft is airworthy.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported failing to secure the floor boards and bulkhead panel after completing a functional check.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: WIII.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Rejected takeoff prior to setting standard power; at about 25 knots. Held at arrival end of runway to complete paperwork for maintenance after block out. When we called ready; Ground Control did not direct a frequency change; and cleared us to line up and wait; then cleared us for take off before we had occupied the runway. When queried; Ground switched us to Tower frequency.We switched freqs and checked in; and were advancing power prior to transfering aircraft control for take off when Tower controller cancelled our takeoff clearance due to spacing with an arriving aircraft. Reject performed between 25 and 30 knots; little braking and no reversers required; exited at first taxiway. Consulted QRH; calculated brake energy; documented the rejected takeoff; and returned for an uneventful takeoff.




Synopsis: A B757 Captain reported that Ground Control cleared them for takeoff prior to sending them to the Tower. When checking in; the Tower cancelled the takeoff clearance as the aircraft started the takeoff roll.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B DCA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Our flight became unstabilized below 50 feet during the landing phase and we executed a textbook balked landing on runway 33. The main tires did touch the runway; as expected.Unfortunately during the go-around phase; comm 1 radio flip-flop button got pushed. Once we returned to the right frequency; we received vectors back around for another VMC approach to runway 1. On the downwind I did quickly call the Flight Attendant (FA) and make a quick PA announcement about the go-around and gusting winds. We landed on runway 1 without further gusting wind issues. During the taxi in; tower asked us to give them a call; which I did after we parked at the gate and deplaned. Tower asked me why we went around. I explained that the winds had gusted and we became unstabilized during the flare. Next they asked why I did not stay on the tower frequency. I said; I was sorry; but during the balked landing things got very busy; and somehow the radio flip-flop button got pushed back to approach control. Who ever I was talking to the tower seemed very busy; and basically said don't do it again and make sure you stay on the tower frequency. During deplaning no passengers expressed any concerns to me or my crew. In fact; a few did say good job as they meet back up with us on our next flight.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew reported a sidestep maneuver to another runway and with gusty conditions the approach became unstable. The flight crew executed a go-around and circle back for a normal landing.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise [at] FL390; Captains outer windshield shattered. Crew declared an emergency; descended when clear of thunderstorms; and diverted to [nearest suitable airport].


Second narrative: QRH did not direct us to land; but with ice and snow in [destination] it sure seemed like the safest action to take. Our safety margin into icing conditions had been severely reduced. Captains visibility was severely reduced.


Synopsis: MD-11 flight crew reported Captain's window outer pane shattered. An emergency was declared; and the flight diverted to a nearby suitable airport.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I took off from ZZZ using Runway 18 with my destination to the north. I turned left crosswind then downwind; intending to depart from the area by maintaining a downwind heading until clear of the traffic pattern. During downwind abeam the runway; I continued to climb above traffic pattern altitude but did not announce the climb over CTAF.During upwind or crosswind; a Cessna (Aircraft Y) announced he was west of the airport and would be crossing midfield and entering into a downwind for [Runway] 18. He did not announce his altitude. I assumed he was at traffic pattern altitude and would be turning left and entering into the downwind. By midfield in the downwind myself; I was at about 1;800 ft. AGL and climbing. I did not see the Cessna until he was approximately 300 ft. directly ahead of me and 200 ft. above. I nosed over briefly to arrest my climb.I have since reviewed the AIM and AC 90-66B. I believe the Cessna intended to perform a descending teardrop turn to enter the downwind. This is a standard pattern entry. My own departure was nonstandard.I will use this experience to better judge traffic conflict and miscommunication risks.




Synopsis: Pilot flying PA28 aircraft reports NMAC in airport traffic pattern.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Altitude
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Paperwork Audit
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals; Logbook Entry
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I received an ACARS transmission stating that Aircraft X; a B717; was experiencing an Altitude problem with its Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS). I searched the Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) for a procedure which mirrored the discrepancy described in the transmission. In my search I found FIM 34-11; Task 801; Attitude Problems-Fault Isolation which I inadvertently read as Altitude Problem. After reviewing the FIM Task; I did not feel the procedure included sufficient steps to perform a complete check of the system. Given that; I took an additional step and consulted the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) looking for a procedure that would perform a more thorough Check. I used Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) reference XX-XX-XX; sub-task XX-XX-XX-XXX-XXX; Operational Test of the ISIS because it provided a more comprehensive system test than FIM 34-11; Task 801. I contacted the Mechanic on site and discussed the problem Aircraft X was experiencing. I faxed him the paperwork which included the FIM reference along with the AMM reference. In an effort to avoid confusion on page two of the AMM; I marked through the Functional Test procedures with an 'X' indicating that these steps will not be performed. When the Mechanic received the paperwork; he called and we discussed the current status and the [Flight] crew comments that the system was now functioning normally. I gave verbal instruction to the Mechanic on how to test the system even though it was reportedly not in working order. The Mechanic performed the test and reported that the system checked out and was operational; at which time we signed-off the discrepancy together. One week later; it was brought to my attention that some questions had been raised surrounding the incident; I was confident that the system was properly checked and felt the inquiry would be dismissed without merit. It was not until I looked more closely at the title of the [Test] procedure that I realized; to my dismay; it read Attitude and not Altitude.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Controller reports he inadvertently misread a Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) Chapter 34-11 AttitudeFault Isolation Problem as reading Altitude Problems; while researching a Test procedure he later used to sign-off a B717 aircraft with an Altitude discrepancy in the Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS).
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 1.5
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We had just finished pushing from the gate. We were about to taxi out when a Ramp Agent knocked on the nose of the aircraft and motioned us not to taxi. We had no idea what the issue was and watched as he brought a tug back to the aircraft and plugged in a headset. He told us that he was passing by on another tug and saw us getting pushed back into the blast fence. Our own push crew didn't even notice it. We pulled back into the gate and had the aircraft inspected. Maintenance and ground crews noticed a dent in the APU exhaust.


Second narrative: It was a normal three-person ground crew with wireless headsets push from Gate XX. The pushback seemed normal. The ground crew had cleared away from the aircraft as normal. The engines had been started and all checklist run. Just as we were about to release brakes for taxi; we heard a hand rap on the aircraft nose. I looked out to see a totally different Ramp Agent that had not been part of pushback crew; standing giving me a 'do not taxi' hand signal. I held my position. He ran over and got another Ramp Agent; the tow bar; a headset and the pushback tug. When he plugged in the headset; I asked what was going on.That's when he told me that he had been driving by on his luggage tug and noticed the aircraft tail was rapidly approaching the blast fence. He had attempted to get the Wing Walker's attention but to no avail. He saw the tail impact the blast fence. Apparently; the pushback crew never saw him or the tail on the blast fence. He had run forward and luckily intercepted us before releasing brakes. After shutting down the engines and being pulled back to Gate XY; Maintenance inspected the tail area. The shroud around the APU exhaust was indeed bent and showed signs of impact with the blast fence. I wrote up the defect in the logbook and handed over the aircraft to Maintenance.


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported Ramp Agent alerted them that they struck a jet blast fence during pushback.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZSE.ARTCC, WA
Aircraft: Globemaster (C-17)
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZSE
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: A C17 was on IR326. Shortly after point 'D'; the PUW280016; the flight plan was dropped from ERAM. I noticed the lack of a Data Block fairly quickly but there was only about 15 miles from where the route enters Chinook Approach's airspace. As this flight is in RADAR coverage continuously; there is no requirement to post a flight strip. The flight plan information had also dropped out of the EDST so it was quite a scramble to coordinate with Chinook Approach and get the flight plan back into the system. When I reported the incident to the ERAM Subject Matter Expert I was informed this was the third time this route had been dropped by ERAM that he was aware of. The most recent was on another aircraft with in the last two weeks. The possibility that this flight plan could be dropped by ERAM has not been briefed to the work force. Do not let aircraft fly this route until the software has been fixed to prevent this from happening.




Synopsis: ZSE Controller described an unsafe condition report involving ERAM and dropping of flight plan data.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cargo/Baggage
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: FA3 identified a bag being brought on board as carry on which exceeded the allowed size for carry-on baggage. FA's 1 and 3 asked the passenger to allow us to check the bag to final destination. A member of management who was on the jet bridge ordered us to allow the bag to remain in the cabin despite its size; stating 'this is a leisure market; we don't need to check that bag. Sometimes we need to do what's more convenient for the customer.' He further stated 'the agent allowed it so we have to allow it' Both myself and FA 3 related flight service manual policy regarding carry-on bag surveillance being joint responsibility between agents and cabin crew. This member of management continued to argue that we were wrong; even after being shown the rule in the in-flight manual.The event occurred because a member of management was more concerned with customer service than FAA regulations regarding carry-on baggage. Management needs to trust that their flight attendants are trained properly and not second guess them in front of passengers. Management should not attempt to bully cabin crewmembers into violating FAR's.




Synopsis: A Flight Attendant reported a Company Manager ordered that an oversized carry on be allowed in the cabin even after company policy and FAR were directly identified.
Date: 201309
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: APU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: B737-800 APU Fuel Inlet Line; [electrical] wire bundle too close to [fuel] line per Standard Wiring Practices Manual Chapter 20; minimum of 2' inch [clearance] cannot be met.




Synopsis: Reporter notes the inability to maintain a 2' inch clearance of an electrical wire bundle from an APU Fuel Inlet line on a B737-800 aircraft; as required by their Standard Wiring Practices Manual Chapter 20.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZBW.ARTCC, NH
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I accepted the handoff on Aircraft X descending to 27000 feet. I noticed the aircraft in a right turn and was called by ZNY N56 stating that they are going to spin Aircraft X because of Aircraft Y. I said roger but did not see the aircraft they were referring to. This was because this aircraft; Aircraft Y was still at 36000 feet landing BOS. This aircraft should have been at 27000 feet. Nothing was coordinated with this descent from N56. What made this scenario dangerous was the N56 controller spun Aircraft X into the rest of their line of BOS arrivals that were at 27000 feet.The conflict alert was going off constantly during this time with no coordination from N56 controller as to what the plan was for this aircraft that I had the handoff on. I was pointing out Aircraft Y to other sectors down the line and N56 ran another aicraft into my airspace at 27000 feet without a handoff. I do not know if point-outs were made to other appropriate sectors from N56 but given their lack of coordination; I would assume other sectors were not coordinated with as well.  This problem seemed like it was a typical issue. Either Aircraft Y went NORDO; controller didn't realize Aircraft Y was landing BOS or Aircraft Y did not start his/her descent. The part that makes this dangerous is the lack of coordination from N56. I have been at ZBW for just under 10 years and it seems like myself and the rest of the controllers here at ZBW have just accepted that ZNY does not like to use landlines and are very hard to get on the landline. This culture is the same with N90. I don't know how to fix this long-standing issue. But this lack of coordination and communication to other controllers as to what N56's plan was for this BOS scenario is what made this scenario reportable and dangerous. I could not help to solve the problem because I could not find out what the controllers plan was. From my end of the scenario; it appears that if the N56 controller spun Aircraft Y who was too high anyway; this would have been a lot less dangerous.




Synopsis: ZBW Center Controller reported communication issues with ZNY leading to an aircraft entering his sector without coordination.
Date: 201503
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Flap
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; MEL
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Following an MEL on leading edge flaps; received a Takeoff Configuration Warning Horn on takeoff roll below 100 knots. Rejected takeoff and returned to gate. No emergency equipment required.




Synopsis: After the leading edge flaps had been MELd; a B737 Flight Crew rejected a takeoff below 100 knots due to a Takeoff Configuration Warning.