elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On the ZZZ Arrival; we were told 'maintain 250 knots;' then it was reduced to 230 knots. This resulted in us being slightly high on the arrival and approach. All altitude restrictions were at or above. As the Pilot Monitoring (PM); I acknowledged another speed assignment of maintain 180 knots until ZZZZZ fix; cleared for the approach. The Pilot Flying (PF); two miles from the fix; slowed to 145 knots to prevent being high and fast. So; he chose to slow then descend fully configured to correct to glidepath. We did not inform the Tower of the speed deviation. Tower called out traffic just prior to the fix and then asked our speed. Due to the traffic call just ahead; we had thought he was going to say we needed to slow but when I told him we were at 145 he told us we were in non-compliance of the speed restriction. Due to safety reasons; we slowed to comply with our stabilized approach criteria but we did not coordinate that with Tower.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Without informing ATC; B737-700 flight crew slowed below last assigned speed in order to descend fully configured in a stabilized approach.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Pushed back from gate onto taxiway. No marshaller just single tug driver. After brakes set and cleared to start never received 'Aircraft disconnected; by-pass pin removed' from tug driver. Engines were started; flaps set to 15; APU shut down; controls checked and before taxi checklist accomplished. Got clearance to taxi; turned on taxi light; released parking break; throttled up slightly for taxi. Almost immediately felt a shudder; quickly applied break and reset parking break. Realized at that point what had happened (attempted aircraft movement with tug still attached) and confirmed tug driver uninjured. Ground control cleared us to remain in position until a maintenance inspection confirmed nose gear safe to taxi back to gate. Back at gate; nose gear inspected and eventually flight continued.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B777 flight crew reported they began to taxi before the tow bar was disconnected.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: T45 (or T2C) Goshawk
Operator: Military
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Military
Reporter function: Captain; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On an ILS approach to Runway XX we were cleared for a touch and go. We received no further warnings about traffic overhead the field; but I did hear tower talking to traffic south of the field and giving them our position. Tower cleared them to enter left downwind and I assumed it was for Runway XX as well. We opted to take a low approach only and go missed at 200 ft. AGL because my student was flying the aircraft from the aft cockpit. On the climbout Tower said 'I cleared you for a touch and go for traffic.' As the IP (Instructor Pilot); I looked out and saw a light civil passing left to right directly overhead at 2-300 ft. above us in the downwind for Runway XY. I took the controls from the student leveled the jet and proceeded upwind before executing climbout instructions. The Tower called me once on the ground to discuss what evolved and I explained to him that I would have still had a 500 ft. pass with the traffic given the jets typical climbout performance. I also was unaware that the traffic would be overhead and he needed me to remain clear of traffic.




Synopsis: Military flight crew flying a T-45 aircraft reported an NMAC during approach to landing.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Elevator Tab
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Routine Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Reference Non-Routine Work Card (NRWC) C13XXX.  Both the left and right Elevator Gear Tab outboard crank fitting to pushrod bolt heads installed [facing] inboard. I Removed and Reinstalled (R/R) both the left and right outboard gear tab bolts with the heads facing outboard. I generated this NRWC because of the problem that I had with Aircraft Y; Reference NRWC C12XXX; and I was still under the impression that the bolt head should be installed facing outboard which I was incorrect. Improper installation. Hangar: Routine Overnight Maintenance (RON).


Second narrative: Reference Non-Routine Work Card (NRWC) C12XXX. Both the left and right Elevator Gear Tab crank fittings to pushrod outboard bolt heads installed [facing] inboard. I generated this NRWC because on the right hand outboard gear tab to crank fitting to pushrod cotter pin was rubbing against the outboard fairing of the aircraft. To correct the problem I turned the bolt around so that the bolt head was outboard on both gear tabs which I now believe to be incorrect. [Need to] pay attention to detail. Hangar: Routine Overnight Check (RON).


Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) removed and re-positioned the attach bolt on the left and right elevators at the Elevator Gear Tab outboard crank fitting to pushrod connection on a B717 aircraft; to correct for the bolt end cotter pin rubbing against the aircraft fairing.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SBBR.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center SBBR
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On [our] flight to SBBR during the descent into SBBR Brasilia Approach Control assigned the flight to execute the IRULI1 arrival to ILS Runway 11L. When accessing the FMC to load the ILS 11L approach and arrival; the ILS 11L could be selected; but no IRULI1 arrival can be attached to the ILS 11L. Our EFBs were then checked and found no IRULI1 arrival exists for Runways 11L/R either. The IRULI1 arrival does exist only for Runways 29L/R in both the FMC and EFB. The FMCs and both Captain's and First Officer's EFBs were up to date and current. We advised ATC (Brasilia APC) that we did not have the IRULI1 arrival data to Runway 11L and requested vectors for the ILS 11L approach. ATC advised us that the IRULI1 for Runways 11L/R does exist and we should have it. Both the FMC and EFB did not contain an IRULI1 arrival to SBBR Runways 11L/R. We received radar vectors for ILS 11L and landed uneventfully.




Synopsis: An air carrier flight crew was issued the SBBR IRULI 1 Arrival to Runway 11; but no transition from the arrival to the Runway 11 was listed in either the FMS or EFB; so a radar vector was provided.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: JVW.Airport, MS
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E JVW
ATC / advisory: CTAF JVW
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After preflight; run-up; ATC 'cleared Aircraft X for departure; then turn right on course; wind 220 at 6 kts; altimeter 30.11. Do you need radar flight following?' My radio reply; 'Roger; flight following is not required.' Turned right on course at 800 feet Indicated Altitude (500 AGL) and descended to 3;000 feet. At 3.9 nm East of JVW; descended to 1;500; switched frequency to JVW UNICOM frequency of 123.0 and made radio call 'Raymond-Williams; Aircraft X; 3 miles east entering a 45 degree into a left downwind for runway 12.' Observed another aircraft departing runway 12 turning left cross-wind. I did not hear any radio calls from the other aircraft with normal airport ID; aircraft ID or pattern positions. Immediately received a radio call from the Aircraft Y pilot 'Aircraft X; did you know that was a near miss of 50 feet?' My radio reply 'no; I will extend my left downwind.' Altitude was increased to 1;500 feet IA (1;200 feet AGL) on downwind course 30. After clearing the pattern on my downwind leg; I received a second radio call from the other aircraft pilot 'Aircraft X; where are you going?' My radio reply 'extending my left downwind to clear the pattern.' After 1 mile west of the runway end; made a 180 degree turn; clear of the traffic pattern and back to enter a left crosswind for runway 12. Made normal pattern radio calls 'Raymond-Williams; Aircraft X; left cross-wind for runway 12; left down-wind for runway 12; left base for runway 12 and final for runway 12' for three takeoffs and landings with no other aircraft in the pattern. After completion; departed the pattern to the North making radio call 'Raymond-Williams Aircraft X departing the pattern to the North.'




Synopsis: GA pilot reported a NMAC while entering the traffic pattern at JVW with another GA aircraft that turned crosswind.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Parked; Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aircraft Cooling System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight; Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When the flight attendants first boarded the aircraft; in ZZZ; there was a strong musty odor. FA1 told the Captain; who said it was not something to be concerned. The odor persisted until we reached cruising altitude then went away. It returned when we started descending in ZZZ1. When we arrived at the gate; the smell was very strong: musty; like when you first turn on an oxygen bottle; but much more pungent. When we arrived at the gate; it was really strong. FA1 went outside of the jetway; to get some air. The ZZZ1 cleaners said they smelled the smoke when they first entered the jetway. The gate agent said she smelled it; too. To her; it smelled like a crayon which was burning. The Captain smelled and thought it might have been coming from the air conditioner. He said to tell him if it persisted. The odor lingered after take off; until after we reached 10;000 feet; then it dissipated. It returned again; as we started descending in PHL. The Captain wrote it up. FA1 felt a little lightheaded.Fixing the air conditioner or ventilation system before putting the aircraft back in service.




Synopsis: A319 Flight Attendant reported an intermittent strong musty odor;" fumes event which lasted throughout two legs flown."
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DAY.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C DAY
ATC / advisory: Tower DAY
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was working Local Control; the Controller in Charge (CIC) took a phone call on recorded line. The person on the line asked if he was [our Air Traffic Manager (ATM)]. The CIC stated 'no'. The caller then stated that the ATM had told him to call this number prior to departing his drone. There was zero prior coordination with the controllers. The caller stated he would remain north of a particular road and be below 300 feet. The CIC asked them to notify us after they were complete with their operations. We found a binder in the tower; in the back of the cab; that has the drone procedures. We found the drone pilots Authorization Request that was denied. He was then issued a waiver that stated he was to remain below 75 feet. Based on our grid and how close to our airport this was going to take place; he should not have been granted approval in the first place.There was also an email between the pilot and the ATM where the pilot stated he would be climbing to at least 100 feet and up to 300 feet on one. This is completely against the waiver the pilot received. The ATM would've known about this. The flight path of the drone put them in direct conflict with departures and was especially a conflict for two aircraft I had doing pattern traffic. This was very unsafe. It would have been nice to know about a drone that's in direct conflict with aircraft in my airspace. There should have been notification that this was going to take place. There should also have been someone instructing the drone pilot to adhere to his 75 foot restriction.




Synopsis: DAY Controller reported a drone pilot operated a drone in violation of their Authorization Request.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I had an aircraft depart southeast bound from the airport. I knew the pilot was a new pilot and let the Radar Controller know that the pilot may be returning after departure. The clouds were scattered at 1;400 feet; but got pretty thick and hazy and eventually went broken or overcast at those same altitudes. I instructed the pilot to fly a heading to avoid an arrival and later issued another heading thinking this would convince the new pilot to return for landing. Once the pilot indicated they wanted to maintain an altitude below the clouds I let them go to Departure Control on course thinking they were happy with the weather. A few minutes after around five or six miles east of the airport; the same pilot requested an IFR clearance to go above the clouds. The Departure Controller didn't ask if they could 'maintain terrain or obstruction clearance' or maybe if they were IFR equipped and capable. The controller issued the clearance and to climb. The aircraft was at 1;600 feet and the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) for that area was 2;200 feet with a 3;000 feet. MVA nearby. That said; the conditions of the day were changing rapidly and might have been ok but in my opinion; the clouds were growing thick. Reasonable assurance for a climb to the MVA probably wasn't an option for the pilot.Controllers should take care with aircraft that literally say; 'I want to climb above these clouds; can I get an IFR clearance?' and then immediately clear them without asking some questions first. This same person wouldn't have done any such thing if there was another IFR aircraft around or if they were in the MVA. I think they were caught off guard. Maybe just some training on MVA and IFR separation or something new for us Midwestern controllers would be simulations in mountainous terrain to get out mind thinking about the MVAs.




Synopsis: Tower Controller reported an IFR clearance was issued by Departure Control to an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to the Localizer 26R First Officer (FO) hand flying; intercepted final on a dog leg slightly high with flaps 15 selected. Captain recommended getting the gear down. FO called gear down; flaps 20.  FO called for flaps 25 set speed. Captain was calling tower. The 1;000 foot call by FO; stable. 1;000 feet per minute rate of decent. On landing; FO had to brake hard to bring aircraft to a stop. After turning off runway; FO began cleanup and as flaps were selected up; FO noticed that the before landing checklist had not been completed and the flap handle was at 20. The landing was done with flaps 20. The Captain; FO or relief pilot did not notice that the checklist was not completed or the final flaps 25 had not been selected.Possibly adding to the 1;000ft 'stable' required call; that the checklist is complete.


Second narrative: First Officer (FO) hand flown visual approach to 26R was controlled and normal till the last segment; although we were generally high and fast; which is also normal for a this airport's approach set up. We should not have delayed gear extension and were rushed to make a stable window at 1;000 ft. The captain was focused on being stable at that point and completely missed a more important verification of landing configuration. The captain called unstable with corrections in process and at 500ft noticed a short deviation sink rate below 1;000 ft. Either pilot should have called for a go around; but we continued to a controlled; safe landing in clear conditions instead. After landing; the FO noticed the flap handle in the 20 degree slot instead of the briefed 25 slot.Although it is very difficult to do; I should be more geared towards calling go around even though I trust experienced FO's with more time in aircraft than myself. I know better than to get target 'fixated'. This experience for me is not likely to happen again.


Synopsis: All three B777 pilots failed to notice Flap 20 set for landing even though the First Officer; flying pilot; call Flaps 25. The Captain missed the earlier Flaps 25 call but a 1;000 feet stabilized approach call is no longer required.