elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Tires
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I assigned Mechanics to change tires on 737 aircraft. I called to delay loading bags/cargo and boarding passengers. Management wanted to load passengers & cargo during tire change process; with aircraft on axle jacks.I expressed concern; referencing clear WARNING in AMM 7-11-03 for 737/757/767 &777; AMM 07-12-00 for S80 & A3XX. AMM says to not load cargo; management wanted to board passengers on aircraft. I explained that passengers are usually much heavier; and move for/aft changing weight/balance and center of gravity as they walk; increasing risk of damage or injury as expressed in AMM. Manufacturer and AMM clearly see a serious shifting weight hazard of loading Cargo and boarding passengers during aircraft on axle-jack operations.General Procedures Manual (GPM) 4.05 clearly states for other than axle jack process; don't perform cabin movement functions (clean; cushion change-out; catering; etc.); but is unclear with GPM 4.05.1.C exclusion what the safety requirements are with an axle jack.[Suggest] Remove seeming contradiction/exclusion in GPM; as it places employees; passengers and aircraft in unacceptably (per Boeing) risky situation. Update and clearly state in GPM 4.05 that no loading of cargo; passengers or catering is allowed during axle-jack process; to ensure; as GPM 4.05.2 states; 'the highest level of safety to preclude any damage or injury'; as described by Boeing.




Synopsis: Maintenance reported that Management wanted to load passengers and cargo on a B737 while at the same time the tires were being replaced.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuselage Panel
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The Captain determined that post-flight; a panel was missing from the bottom of the aircraft. The preflight of the exterior of the aircraft was not my responsibility; therefore I was unaware of the aircraft's condition. That is the standard operating procedure.




Synopsis: CE560XLS First Officer reported an exterior panel missing post flight.
Date: 201505
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: In my company's fatigue program it states that there will be PROACTIVE risk assessments of flight duty and rest requirements utilized by the company to avoid pilot fatigue. It also states that predictive assessments will use fatigue modeling software to verify alertness levels during trips and scheduling construction. Under the program the pilot's schedule leading up to the event; rest periods; work schedule; sleep opportunities and city pairs are a few of the factors to be considered to help avoid fatigue. In the above pairing I find it hard to believe that a trip that reports for duty [early] on day one would follow smart fatigue avoiding practices if no more than 42 hours later you report for duty [early] pilot domicile time. Stated another way in home domicile times. I wake up at 0430 to get to work on Wednesday; the next day I arrive on the West coast at 1300 I'm expected to sleep DURING THE DAY when I'm normally awake; and then report for duty at 0200 right in the middle of my normal sleep cycle. How can this pass any reasonable scrutiny; either human or software based?Per the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the company [Union] is responsible for ongoing discussions of fatigue events; or possible events. What is being done about these onerous two duty periods in one day trips? It's one thing to have a double duty day when the 'all nighters' is [Airport 1-Airport 2]; approximately two hour flight. But when the trip is a true all night flight it makes no sense. These trips should be eliminated in the line building stage and never make it into our bidding. It is very difficult for pilots; being highly motivated goal oriented people; to call in fatigued at the departure time. We have managed our naps during the day and generally feel fine at departure time. But the real question is whether we will still be alert at top of descent through landing. This is something we can only guess at when we are still 4 to 5 hours from landing. But you can be certain that with this type of trip we will definitely not be at the top of our game during a demanding time.




Synopsis: A-320 captain points out potential fatigue issues with certain flight pairings.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Passing 10;500 feet on the arrival; slats were extended causing a pronounced roll.  The right hydraulic system quantity decreased to almost zero.  Pilot Flying continued to fly and talk to ATC; while Pilot Monitoring ran the R HYD Quantity low checklist.  Emergency was declared while running checklist.  We  were able to configure the aircraft to gear down and flaps 40.  An uneventful landing ensued.  Safety vehicles followed our aircraft to the gate.  A safety inspection was done by Safety Crew and Maintenance.   Emergency was terminated.




Synopsis: MD-82 pilot reports a pronounced roll when slats are extended; followed by the right hydraulic quantity going to zero.  An emergency is declared and the crew is able to land normally with full flaps and slats.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Immediately after takeoff rotation; aircraft experienced a major electrical failure. We lost 5 of the 6 DUs; so I transferred control to the FO who had a working display. In addition; we had numerous alerts for many malfunctioning systems. During climbout to 10000 ft; we also experienced a flight control malfunction. Between 7000 ft and 8000 ft while retracting the slats and accelerating from 220 to 250 knots; the aircraft rolled to the left; requiring a 1/2 to 3/4 yoke input to maintain wings level. We leveled off at 10000 ft; tried to determine what was functioning and what wasn't; and [advised ATC]. QRH consulted. Then we were vectored by ATC for an ILS to landing.This aircraft has a long history of electrical malfunctions; including two MELs this morning before we took off. Maintenance also fixed a hydraulic leak last night after we brought the aircraft in.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: MD-11 flight crew reported they had an electrical failure shortly after takeoff followed by a slat malfunction. Crew returned to departure airport.
Date: 201209
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [We were] cleared direct to MOD (or OAL) for SFO arrival. We were either in descent or temporarily level preparing for descent. At some point TCAS displayed 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC' and yellow TCAS showing target 300 FT above our altitude and descending; from right to left; nearly directly above us and moving VERY quickly. TCAS showed approximately 2 dot (target) movements (thereby giving indication of FAST movement) before disappearing from scope and never reappearing. Crew immediately looked for traffic visually but saw nothing. No RA. Crew assumed it was a spurious TCAS error and continued arrival. After landing; a passenger asked the Captain if we experienced a near midair collision since he visually saw an aircraft out his window VERY close and rapidly heading away to left at about the same time we had our incident.

Callback: The Reporter stated that after the fact the crew assumed a military aircraft was involved because they were near the Sierra Nevada Range and at times there are military aircraft in that operate VFR in that area. He emphasized this was a guess on his part.



Synopsis: A First Officer reported a TCAS TRAFFIC alert and near miss at FL200 while direct to MOD for a SFO arrival but the crew assumed a TCAS error until a passenger later reported seeing traffic pass nearby.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Cheetah; Tiger; Traveler AA5 Series
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ; Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on the inbound leg of the procedure turn for the VOR-B Practice approach; a fuel imbalance was noted. The instructor made the decision to switch fuel tanks; and notified the student that this should be done. This action was not observed due to scanning outside for traffic as the student was under the foggles. After approximately 30 seconds; the engine failed due to fuel starvation; as the fuel selector was placed into the off position inadvertently by the student who was task saturated and had initially trained on a 172; where tank imbalances were rarely a problem. After unpowered flight for approximately 30 seconds; the instructor realized the problem; and put the fuel selector onto the left tank. Afterwards; the aircraft was then flown to it's home airport after an assessment of the situation revealed no further issues with the engine.This could have been prevented in a number of ways; namely that the fuel tank switch should have been observed by the instructor; the student should have been briefed on this topic specifically; and the tank switch could have been done in a non-critical phase of flight. These items should be at least brought up in future instructor training; as it could easily happen across aircraft types; and can lead to significant issues.




Synopsis: A Flight Instructor reported his instrument student moved the fuel tank selector to the OFF position while attempting to change engine fuel sources. The Instructor determined the engine failure cause and restarted the engine.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working two low positions combined. Traffic and workload became so busy the sectors needed to be split. Multiple military aircraft were requesting clearance into a Military Operation Area (MOA); VFR aircraft looking for flight following; IFR aircraft looking for clearance off the ground; lifeguard aircraft looking for IFR clearance; coordination needing to be done with other facilities; and other duty requirements needing to be done. The Supervisor never came over to the sector to see if the time was appropriate to be split; or to see if a D-Side was needed. The Supervisor just split the sector. I told the Controller splitting the sector from me that traffic and workload was too busy to be split and to tell the Supervisor that I could not split the sectors at this time. The Supervisor went ahead and split the sectors; creating an even larger workload for me all at once. I started the recorded position briefing with the statement 'it is too busy to open this sector.' after several minutes of attempting to complete the split; I was able to finish the briefing and split off the sectors.After the sectors were split; I asked the Supervisor to come over to me; so I could speak to him as I was still on position. I told the Supervisor that he waited too late to split the sectors and that it was the worst possible time to split them; when he did. The Supervisor then told me that he would have me relieved and to meet him in the supervisors office to talk about my sub par performance; as I did not answer land-lines during the busy period/splitting of the sectors. I recommend that the Supervisor comes over to the actual sectors before splitting them and gets a first hand look of the situation before automatically splitting the sectors based on what the Traffic Situation Display (TSD) System is telling. The TSD could indicate that a sector (especially a low altitude sector) is busy; when in fact it is very slow; and vice versa; the TSD could show low numbers when in fact the sector(s) could be overloaded with aircraft/workload. The Supervisor could also have put a D-Side on position to help me split the sector; which would have allowed for the land lines to have been answered; eliminating me receiving a performance discussion because I did not answer the land-lines in a 'timely' manner.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described a very busy session on combined positions when a Supervisor directed the positions be split without observing the sector and/or exploring other alternatives; i.e. first providing a D-Side.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Being involved with pilot safety I have noticed a placement marking appearing underneath the 1L passenger doors on our Airbus aircraft. Not really sure if this is showing up on the other aircraft fleets. In talking with an agent I was informed the marking represented a placement of the loading bridge. The problem here is in 3 days I saw absolutely no consistency in the placement of the jetways. Some seem to have a one inch or so step down; some four to five inches. Some jetways were against the aircraft some had a couple inch gap. I suspect we have set up a scenario where someone is going to fall flat on their face or a young child is going to catch a foot or some such thing and break a limb.  Can't imagine where this idea came from. Can't see where any SMS was applied. Would question what kind of training was involved with the agents; or was there just a note to use this marking. Seems like an idea without any other thought process. Someone needs to talk to Ground Operations Management and also Station Managers or hub VPs and see where this came from and what is the process involved with the jetway placement. If Airbus fleet only should the Fleet Captain or designated Senior be brought in for SME.




Synopsis: An Airbus Captain reported a fuselage marker beneath door 1L for Ramp Agent jetway parking guidance but continued inconsistent jetway parking adjacent the aircraft may lead to passenger injury during loading and deplaning.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: After pushing back and ready to taxi; informed by ground that Tower wanted us to call them. Tower was concerned that we may have pushed back onto the taxiway from [gate] without clearance. We had followed procedures outlined on MIA JEP CO Airport Info. In brief; procedures indicate to call 'Miami Gates' for pushback from [parking] then contact ground for taxi. At this time; I can specifically recall what Gates said. I do know there was nothing out of the ordinary; and nothing said seemed different than expected. We pushed onto taxiway; started engines without incident. Upon requesting taxi clearance we were asked to contact Tower by phone. The conversation was informative. We were told we should have obtained clearance from Ground for push; Miami Gates was not authorized to issue push clearance. I explained that I believed we were clear to push; but that I may have been in error. Tower said that there was no issue. The identified JEP CO page is misleading. Even though [the gate] isn't specifically identified; [other spots] are. [The other spots] are located in the same general area; so I used those procedures. The procedures seem unambiguous and nowhere indicate to call Ground for pushback clearance. The note to view positive apron control and pushbacks doesn't give any further guidance for [these] spots. Update identified CO page to reflect proper procedure.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported no published procedure for pushback from gate.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight was uneventful until we had been at cruise; FL380; for about 40 minutes. Number 2 engine vibrations had been at .4 and vibration went to 1.7 accompanied by a slight grinding type noise from Number 2 engine. After about 45 seconds the noise stopped; vibrations stayed at 1.7; and all indications remained normal until about 180 miles east of our destination. ATC gave us a descent to FL360. When power was retarded; the vibrations went to 3.5 accompanied by a grinding noise from Number 2 engine. Shortly thereafter; the Number 2 engine oil filter bypass light illuminated. Per the QRH; we retarded the power slowly. The oil filter bypass light remained on even after power had been at idle for a short time. We shut down the engine and diverted to a nearby airport. An emergency was declared and the divert and landing were uneventful. After exiting the runway; CFR personnel examined the exterior of the Number 2 engine and the aircraft in general and advised there was no visible damage. We taxied to the gate and deplaned the passengers. A subsequent inspection discovered obvious internal engine damage.




Synopsis: A B737-700 experienced significant vibration in the right engine which became excessive and illuminated the oil filter bypass light when thrust was reduced to idle per the vibration checklist. The flight crew declared an emergency; shut down the engine and diverted to a nearby airport.