elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZOB.ARTCC, OH
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Other on shift
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: ZZZ approach needed to close for COVID cleaning. ZOB assumes control of approach airspace as part of the contingency plan. There are 2 major problems with the current contingency plan that could result in unsafe situations when this occurs. First and foremost; ZOB Controllers do not have enough training on the rules and procedures for vectoring for instrument approaches; especially ILS approaches. Yes this info is available in the 7110; but when you are working traffic it is not the right time to be constantly referencing the information. As a former Approach Controller; I trained for a long time; between classroom; lab and OJTI before I was certified to work a radar sector where I vectored for approaches. At the very least; Area X controllers without approach control experience need classroom training and several lab problems to be proficient enough to work ZZZ or ZZZ1 approach airspace.My second concern is the potential for sector overload when approach airspace is combined with ZOB airspace. Approach control service require a level of attention that cannot be maintained if higher altitude ZOB traffic is even moderately busy. The contingency plan should be rewritten to allow the Controller working the approach airspace to be a separate sector from ZOB's ZZZ (Y) and ZZZ1 (Z) sectors.Area X controllers without approach control experience need classroom training and several lab problems to be proficient enough to work ZZZ or ZZZ1 approach airspace. The contingency plan should be rewritten to allow the controller working approach airspace to be a separate sector from ZOB's ZZZ (Y) and ZZZ1 (Z) sectors.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported issues with another ATC facility; COVID cleaning; ATC Zero; and the contingency plan.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Indications
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: High Speed Reject at 130-135 knots due to engine failure indication.  Aircraft yawed to the right with the illumination of the Engine Fail Light. Exited runway; ran all checklists.  All engines were still running within normal parameters.  Contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control.  They asked us if we wanted to try another takeoff.  We declined.  (This was a CA upgrade IOE flight.) Directed to Maintenance pad where line Maintenance downed the aircraft.[Reporter stated being] unsure [of the cause].  After reject; all engine parameters were normal.




Synopsis: MD-11 Captain reported engine failure indication accompanied by aircraft yaw during takeoff roll. Captain executed a safe rejected takeoff and returned to maintenance pad where aircraft was removed from service.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: ATR 72
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the takeoff roll (at about 75 KTS); the Number 1 Engine ITT rose to 766 C exceeding the ITT limitation of 765 C for takeoffs. I noticed the temperature exceedance and called for the abort. We executed the aborted takeoff procedure as per Company procedures; taxied clear of Runway; and proceeded to the gate without any further incidents. Dispatch; Maintenance and Operations were all notified of the return to gate and the Captain entered the discrepancy in the logbook.




Synopsis: ATR 72 flight crew reported that at about 75 KTS on takeoff the Number 1 Engine ITT rose to 766 C exceeding the ITT limitation of 765 C for takeoffs so they aborted; completed the abort procedure and taxied to the gate.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FXE.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Challenger 605
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: In cruise Miami Center cleared us direct to ILM. It was not on our route of flight. Cleared by FXE tower as follows: FLL6 Departure; Zappa Transition; PERMT; as filed. Filed to JORAY; CLB; LORAA; [and then the arrival]. We reported our filed flight plan; Miami later asked us to call the center. Upon calling; I was told Miami had issued an amended clearance for us: PERMT; ILM; LORAA. We never received this amendment from FXE tower. They cleared us AS FILED after PERMT; and cleared us to taxi and takeoff. No other communications from FXE.




Synopsis: CL-605 Captain reported that FXE Tower did not notify them of an amended clearance.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was PIC and pilot flying and executed a low speed (<40 KTS) aborted takeoff after illumination of RUDDER SYS 1-2 INOP CAUTION MESSAGE on EICAS on the runway. [I] performed aborted takeoff and abnormal procedures as specified by EMB AOM. Contacted Dispatch referred to Maintenance Control then returned to gate. Contract Maintenance performed Rudder System Check at the direction of Maintenance Control; noted no system defects or associated messages logged in the aircraft maintenance computer and returned the aircraft to service following normal maintenance procedures. [I] departed with no further incident.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 had no additonal information.]


Synopsis: An EMB-145 had an EICAS warning for RUDDER SYS 1-2 INOP on takeoff roll. Takeoff was aborted and flight returned to gate for maintenance.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ1.ARTCC, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ1
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Took responsibility for ZZZ's airspace at XA:00 Z. Aircraft X originally requested an ILS to a runway that was unavailable after the tower closed. I was R side with no D side controlling a mid configuration scope. Aircraft X set up for ILS Z runway XX ZZZ. Crossing restriction for the IAP (Initial Approach Point) was 1;700 ft. I issued my MVA of 'cross IAP at or above 020; cleared approach...' ZZZ's airspace is unfamiliar due to the little amount of time ZZZ1 is responsible for it; however; the knowledge and rules are still understood. An MSA of 030 was located between the aircraft and the IAP at the time of the clearance. Once the target flashed MSAW; I climbed Aircraft X to 030 for a minimum safe altitude and restated clearance to now 'cross IAP at and maintain 030...' Aircraft X continued the approach; reported inbound on approach; and canceled IFR in the air after ZZZ was reported in site. Continued experience with approaches involving unfamiliar airspace ownership.


Second narrative: We were getting ready to combine sectors to the Mid configuration. I was sitting at the scope where the positions would be combined so I called the supervisor to make the combination entry. As I began to look at the traffic I would be getting from the other sector I saw that and MSAW warning was flashing on Aircraft X. It seemed odd to me so I asked the other controller if Aircraft X was on an approach. They said Aircraft X had been cleared so I asked if Aircraft X had passed the IAF. Aircraft X had not so I told the other controller to climb the aircraft; which they did. I took track control of Aircraft X when he reached 030 and we continued the sector combination.I can not make any recommendations because I only noticed the situation and do not know any of the events that led up to the event.


Synopsis: Controllers reported while accepting airspace of a closing facility; an aircraft entered a higher MVA.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We deiced and taxied to the runway for departure. We were advised by an offline pilot (via the purser) that there was snow on the left wing. I went to the cabin to do a wing check and found snow to be adhering to the inboard flap and wing. I advised the Captain and we concluded a return for additional deicing was necessary. As a courtesy (while waiting for taxi instructions) I called de-ice and advised them we would need to be deiced again due to snow on the left wing. The de-ice Coordinator told me we would be OK to go because the snow on the wing will shear off because of the Type IV fluid ahead of it on the wing. I advised him we determined it necessary to de-ice again. To make sure FAR 121.629 is complied with; FOM states 'If any frozen contaminants are trailing edge of the wing.'  I can only conclude that this step was omitted.  I am concerned that the de-ice personnel are either unaware of the de-ice requirements in the FOM or they are disregarding them.  I would like to add that I feel removing the required wing inspection and replacing it with the nose check is a mistake.  'Adhering to the aircraft; the aircraft MUST return for additional deicing.' FOM also states 'After de icing; the critical aircraft surfaces are checked by qualified personnel to ensure they are free of contaminants.' Since no more than 10 minutes had elapsed from de-icing to being alerted to snow on the wing and the fact that I found no evidence of de-ice fluid on the wing I can only conclude that the clean surface check was not accomplished properly. I am concerned that our de-ice personnel are either unaware of the requirements in our FOM or are disregarding them. I also feel like replacing the required wing inspection with the 'nose check' is a mistake.




Synopsis: B757 First Officer reports being informed by the Purser that a deadheading pilot has noticed ice on the wing after de-icing has been completed. The flight returns to the de-ice pad where the crew does not believe that more de-icing is necessary.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Learjet 40
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Following an uneventful preflight and flight; while landing at Airport ZZZ we experienced a loss of brakes and thrust reversers resulting in an over run of runway X.  The plane departed the departure end of the pavement into the dirt with no known damage or injury. In hindsight I believe that I was focused on why the brakes were not actuating and continuing to attempt to deploy the thrust reversers; I failed to revert to emergency braking handle.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: LR-40 flight crew reported running off the end of the runway when they experienced failure of brakes; thrust reversers; and autospoilers after touchdown.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: MEL; Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: We were assigned Aircraft X. Upon reviewing the maintenance sheet I became confused regarding MEL #XX-XX. The original entry in the logbook and the description on the sheet were not easily understood so I elected to contact maintenance. After having a ten minute conversation with the technician about the complexities of the MEL; we both agreed that we were good to go. However; he stated that he was slightly concerned with the legality of the MEL; would look into it further and contact me before departure (we still had approximately 30 minutes before push) if he determined it was not legal. We did not hear back from him until we had pushed and had begun engine start. At this time; he informed us that it was indeed not a valid MEL. We then returned to the gate and the airplane was taken out of service. To the best of my knowledge; the airplane had flown for four days in this condition. Simplify the wording on the maintenance sheet and have a more direct description of this item in the MEL.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported discussing the validity of an MEL with maintenance resulting in an invalid MEL in the logbooks.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Engine Air Anti-Ice
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Taxiing for takeoff; ECAM alerted us that #1 engine anti-ice nacelle valve had failed open.  Anti-ice off for takeoff.  Contacted ATC for taxi instructions to a remote location to work the problem. Received instructions to taxi across duty runway and hold short on the opposite side. Ran ECAM and consulted QRH which directed that a thrust limit penalty is reflected on TRP (Thrust Rating Panel). ATC cleared us to 'line up and wait'.  Replied to ATC that we were still working our problem and needed more time.  ATC reminded us of our slot time; directed us to hold short and advise them when ready.  Recomputed Takeoff data with 'engine anti-ice valve not closed' selected.  We re-briefed our takeoff performance; and told ATC that we were ready for takeoff. Received takeoff clearance; completed the takeoff checklist and made eventful takeoff.  While conducting in-range checklist; check of ECAM Recall reminded me our malfunction and made me realize that we had not consulted the MEL prior to departure.  I referenced the MEL 30-21-01-B Engine Anti Ice Nacelle Valves; which was a Flagged item MEL; requiring maintenance prior to takeoff.  Upon landing; wrote up discrepancy in AML and briefed maintenance personnel.While I do not believe we were rushing in the traditional sense; I think our knowledge of; and desire to takeoff at our assigned slot time; interfered with and broke our normal habit patterns associated with dealing with a relatively simple malfunction after block out.  I failed to recognize this break in my habit pattern; causing me to forget to reference the MEL on the ground prior to departure.I believe this type of event can be prevented if the crew will stop once more; and ask themselves if ALL required cockpit / crew actions have been completed prior to moving the aircraft.  We asked each other if we were 'ready to go'; but didn't really stop and think clearly about whether all required procedures relating the system malfunction had been completed.




Synopsis: The flight crew encountered an Anti-Ice system malfunction while taxiing for takeoff. After completing the appropriate checklists and re-computing the performance data; they accomplished an uneventful takeoff. However; due to pressure to meet an expiring takeoff slot time; they failed to address some MEL implications.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch; Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were pushing back at that time when I should have been putting the flaps down. I was asked by my Captain if I could see the push crew to see if it was ok to start engines. At that time I thought I had put the flaps down. So I did my after engine start flow. After engines were started. We did the taxi check then flaps 20 taxi check neither one of us verified the actual flap setting. So we taxied out of the alley and taxied to the runway. I read before takeoff checklist to the line and again distracted by instructions by the checklist was interrupted and takeoff Config message not verified.The root cause of the situation was rushing and breaking up of checklists by distractions as well as complacency. I suggest stop; take the time to do the checklist properly as well as not rush through. And if reading of a checklist is interrupted by distraction; start it again.




Synopsis: A distracted CRJ-200 First Officer failed to set takeoff flaps before taxi and complacently completed the remaining checklists so that a rejected takeoff followed the Takeoff CONFIG WARNING.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: During routine inspection noted nose strut leaking hydraulic fluid. Once Nose Landing Gear [NLG] Oleo [strut] was removed for a rebuild we noticed that the repack kit only contained two set screws of a different size. The upper bearing that was installed had four set screws. Upon researching the Component Maintenance Manual Illustrated Parts Catalogue for the correct part number installed NLG we found that the bearing installed was not the correct part number. Take enough time to do proper part number research.




Synopsis: Maintenance reported that the Nose Landing strut on a Cessna 560 was leaking hydraulic fluid.