Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PVD.Tower, RI
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower PVD
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground; Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Staffing; Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I worked Aircraft X for a few hours on the night of the occurrence. When Aircraft X was still on the ramp de-icing I asked Operations to say conditions of the first 100 feet of the runway. Earlier OPS had advised me to caution aircraft when they back taxi to use caution during their turn around on the runway; that the first 100 feet of the runway was sloppy. OPS responded that it had been adjusted a little bit and to change the caution to the first 50 feet of the runway. I then asked what the condition of the taxiway run up pad is; would that be a better place for the aircraft to turn around? OPS responded if the aircraft could shorten their runway use by a hundred feet or so that would work or the run up pad would be a good option.Aircraft X requested taxi with current ATIS information. I instructed Aircraft X to taxi. I then advised Aircraft X of their two options for turnaround:  the runway was available using caution for the first 50 feet of or the option to taxi off the runway and turn around in the run up pad. Aircraft X responded that he would use the run up pad. An UNKN tag appears on a taxiway and the runway. OPS calls on frequency at the taxiway. I was recording the appended NOTAM portion for the overnight ASOS broadcast and did not respond to OPS right away. OPS calls again. I acknowledge the vehicle. I ask Aircraft X if he will be ready upon reaching the runway. He responds yes; he'll need about 10 seconds. I try to initiate a silent release and get an error message about the flight not stored. I full route the clearance to make sure the flight plan has not timed out and make sure it is still active in the system. OPS calls on taxiway requesting to cross the intersecting runway. I scan out the window to verify the OPS vehicle position and then instruct him to cross. A controller in the TRACON calls upstairs to ask about if Aircraft X is using a closed taxiway. I look out the window and check the ASD-X and Aircraft X is in the run up area. I said I did not instruct Aircraft X to taxi onto the closed taxiway and did not see him turn onto that taxiway. The controller inquired if OPS said anything? I said I have OPS headed towards the approach end of the runway and he did not question the aircraft's movements. The controller says Aircraft X is released. Aircraft X calls ready for departure and I instruct him to standby. I read the 5 minute prior to closing announcement on frequency.  Maintenance vehicle calls and I ask him to say again. Maintenance vehicle on taxiway requesting to cross the approach end of an intersecting runway. I issue Aircraft X his takeoff clearance. Aircraft X taxis onto the runway for departure. Aircraft X tags up off the departure end and I switch him to departure frequency.  Aircraft X thanks me for all the help and leaves my frequency. In reviewing the recordings and ASD-X I found that when OPS is requesting to cross a runway it is the same time that Aircraft X appears to turn onto the closed taxiway. This short taxiway leads directly to the run up pad.  It is also within a few hundred feet of the beginning of the runway; which operations had advised I instruct aircraft on their back taxi to use caution because of the still sloppy conditions.Aircraft X had the current ATIS information. I reviewed the ATIS broadcast. I made a correction to a different taxiway closure. Listening for this correction I did not catch that the taxiway closure for this aircraft was not on the ATIS at the time. I did catch the mistake when I was reviewing the tapes. I listened to most of the ATIS broadcasts from the day; including a special information broadcast when the closures first appear; and taxiway is not listed as being closed on any of the ATIS broadcasts from the day that I reviewed. The Field Condition Report shows the taxiway closed.   I recommend a reminder to review ATIS broadcasts; especially during an event that has multiple closures like winter weather. Having another person besides the controller working the position review it will double the chances of catching a mistake. This is a responsibility of the Controller in Charge position and is especially important during the initial closures to ensure that many ATIS broadcasts to follow have complete and correct information. Input into the digital ATIS has to be precise to assure the correct phrase is being transmitted by the computer.  For example if you want the digital ATIS to broadcast plural taxiways you must spell out 'taxiways' and not use an abbreviation (TWYS).  For runway condition code descriptors you have to spell out the word 'percent'.  It helps that there is a section for Taxiway Outages; where you can select individual taxiways.  Another recommendation to enhance safety and ensure limited distractions while working aircraft would be to extend the closing shift hours by 10 minutes. Currently the tower closes at midnight and this is when the closing shift ends too. You have to perform closing duty paperwork and review your checklists while the tower is open. Extending just 10 minutes would give ample time to shut down the tower and various equipment; review checklists and do the necessary paperwork without performing these duties while working live traffic. The opening shift begins 15 minutes prior to the tower/TRACON opening. The closing shift should do the same.


Second narrative: We departed three hours late due to inclement weather. The Operations crew was worked hard to clear the runways to reduce the contamination to allow us to takeoff; since the winds were out of limits for a contaminated runway. There was constant communication between us and Ground Control/Tower; as well as ground operations on the constantly changing runway conditions and wind. Once the runway was cleared to 20% snow; we pushed back and deiced; which took nearly an hour. Ground cleared us to taxi; and apparently cleared us to taxi on a closed runway. I don't specifically remember the taxi directions; but with the amount of snowfall that day; there weren't many options; and so I didn't question ground control's directions and thought they had the best situational awareness of the airport. We also took off about 5 minutes before the tower closed; so I'm not sure if this was a factor in the route they gave us or not; but given the field conditions; the route seemed logical. Most of the taxiways were closed due to deep snow. I was notified by the safety review committee that we taxied on a closed runway.With the constantly changing airport conditions; and the operations crew working to clear up the airport; the fact that runway had not been opened was missed. I assumed that ground control had the most up to date picture of the airfield; and didn't question their taxi instructions. We followed the directions we were given. In the future; I will double check with ground control that the current taxi directions are valid; since there had been a previous closure; regardless of the changing conditions. I also won't take for granted that ground control has given valid instructions; despite the fact that they rarely make mistakes.


Synopsis: PVD Tower Controller and the flight crew involved reported the crew was approved to use a closed taxiway that was not listed as closed on the ATIS.