elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 6
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Other instruction
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Other instruction
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other post flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Due to time constraints trying to get a final flight in before the check ride; the student rushed his pre-flight and forgot to remove the tow bar on the front of the plane. I failed to notice it. We did an hour and a half of flight to work on is instrument rating. We landed and parked before we noticed the tow bar was still attached. Thankfully there was no damage to the plane or propeller. Contributing factors included early morning flight. Perceived time constraints and the fact that usually the plane is on the line before we fly.




Synopsis: C172 Instructor reported the tow bar still attached to the aircraft nose during the post-flight inspection.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Landing practice at ZZZ. All applicable aircraft lighting was on. Level at 1;100 feet in the right downwind. Just after calling position in the downwind a Cessna crossed left to right in front of us at the same altitude overflying the airfield. Aircraft gave a radio call asking if we had a radio. We replied affirmative and that we had been making all applicable radio calls for an untowered airport. Radio was functional as confirmed with a radio check and the fact that we had been sequencing with other traffic at the field for an hour prior to that.




Synopsis: C172 instructor pilot providing training at a non-towered airport reported an NMAC.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Light: Night
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During a very busy and complex traffic period I issued an air carrier a descent clearance to get below traffic and land at ZZZ. At the time that I issued the clearance it appeared that I had lateral separation and that there was enough room for the air carrier to descend from FL370 through a business jet at FL360. The sector was too busy for me to go back and reassess the descent rate and the lateral separation. My D-side and I were extremely busy and did not use these tools; the polygon/Halo. The frequency was extremely congested with two sectors being combined. My D-side was extremely busy keeping up with manual coordination and hand-offs to and from a foreign facility; dealing with ADE and verifying all the redundant information with multiple duplicated information. I was busy separating and controlling numerous other situations and missed this one conflict. The Center NAS Monitors displayed the Traffic Flow Management System (TFMS) was red for at least 30 minutes and I had over 21 Data blocks and over 25 aircraft on frequency. My D-side had a page and half on the En Route Information Display System (ERIDS) and a bay full of strips as well as a stack on the printer.I would recommend;A. Improve Automated Data Exchange (ADE) and ICAO flight plan filing to reduce the workload of sectors dealing with ADE. Having to verify numerous accounts of inaccurate; duplicate or erroneous information during peak traffic; put an insurmountable amount of extra workload on sectors dealing with ADE.B. The Supervisor should walk around the sectors and observe the volume on the ERIDS; the number of strips in the bay and coming off the printer and not just rely on the Center NAS Monitors; and Traffic Flow Management System (TFMS) displays. The sectors should be split early enough to reduce frequency congestion during peak traffic which allows for a smaller range on the radar display; so you can see closely all traffic situations.C. Distribute the workload and complexity.D. Reduce the coordination for the D-side. Assign an A-side assistant to help the D-side so the D-side can assist the R-side and not have all the down time coordinating and stuffing strips; and dealing with ADE issues. Assign a tracker to assist the R-side.




Synopsis: ZMA Center Controller descended aircraft in too close proximity of another aircraft due to the fact that he thought he would have lateral separation. Sector was busy and Controller did not have time to re-check the separation.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A Certified Professional Controller (CPC) was relieving another CPC in Local Control 1 position. Position was briefed and completed. The new CPC told the C172 to exit the runway and contact Ground Control point 3. The pilot was clearly unfamiliar with both the area and airport; which was relayed to the CPC outside of the relief briefing however; was clearly evident from the pilot's remarks on frequency. The CPC reiterated that the C172 contact Ground Control. The Local Control CPC then told the PA28 to LUAW (Line up and Wait). The C172 stopped well short of the hold lines. The Local Control was told by me and the other CPC (during the 2-minute overlap) that her runway was fouled. I'm pretty sure; but not certain; the Ground Control CPC also told Local Control that the runway was also fouled. I turned my attention to Ground Control and the C172 to get the runway clear; so the Local Control could get the aircraft rolling because there was another airborne aircraft on base. Next thing I saw was the PA28 rolling about 1;000 FT down the runway. I immediately told the Local Control that the runway was fouled; the Local Control said it's too late now. The other CPC was still plugged in with the CPC on Local Control 1. Why didn't they stop the take off clearance? I asked if Ground Control had established 2-way with the C172 yet; the answer was negative! As the PA28 was departing abeam the C172; called Local Control and started asking questions. Local Control 1 told the C172 to cross the hold line because the runway was not usable; yet the CPC cleared the Cessna anyway. Not get distracted when this CPC is working Local Control; or any position in fact. This CPC has a history. Even the other CPCs are feed up with his/her antics. There seems to be little regard for quality of service by this CPC. I realize I'm just venting right now; but I take pride in the job I've done for so long and this CPC is not only undermining the position but the profession!




Synopsis: Tower CIC described a runway conflict event when the Local Controller failed to respond to the cautions being given by other controllers on duty. The reporter noted a lack of quality service provided by this individual.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Flight attendant complained about access to door L2 for egress and could not get clear view from window on door due to headrest. Also could not access door assist handle for opening due to seat position.Right start wake up check was being accomplished when crew questioned the L2 door emergency egress.Suggest access to emergency door L2 be re-evaluated due to obstruction from seat forward of door. This is not the first time concerns raised by crew.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported concern from Flight Attendants of Cabin Seat installation blocking emergency egress.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream II (G1159)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly after departing the Captain (PM) selected ECS [Environmental Control System] to Hi-Flow due to a warm cockpit; which is fairly normal for hot weather. At FL180; climb checks were completed with normal pressurization. Just prior to entering Oceanic Airspace; at approximately FL270; the Captain deselected ECS Hi-Flow to allow for a normal in-flight airflow to cockpit and cabin. Very shortly after this deselecting; the crew noticed that ECS airflow was nill and that the cabin was climbing above a normal schedule. A very brief discussion was had about the abnormal cabin pressure and rate of climb; which was approximately 1;000 to 1;300 fpm with the cabin now climbing through 8;000 feet and the cabin altitude display in amber. ATC was contacted and advised that we had lost our cabin. They promptly cleared us for an immediate descent and turn us towards our planned Depressurization Alternate. The aircraft reached approximately FL300 prior to initiating the descent. The cabin continued to climb; peaking at slightly over 14;000 feet as we descended to 7;000 MSL. The rate of cabin climb was somewhat erratic; but not excessive at about 1;000 to 1;300 fpm. When level at 7;000 we discussed about burning fuel prior to landing since the situation was stabilized and no urgency was felt to land immediately. The First Officer maintained the radios and flew while I contacted the company to advise them of the situation. They asked if we could safely divert to another nearby station since they were working another G-200 at that location. The crew agreed and we changed our destination with ATC; proceeded directly there and landed without incident.Maintenance found a clamp on the ECS line was NOT installed as required. I suggest we inspect other G200 aircraft which have had ECS maintenance at that facility as well as other G200s with suspect airflow.




Synopsis: A GLF-2 flight crew suffered loss of pressurization as they approached cruise altitude. They descended promptly and diverted to a nearby airport where maintenance crews were available. Maintenance determined an ECS clamp had been improperly installed.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class E ZZZ1
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Stall Warning System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other after flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I went flying with a fellow pilot in our club airplane.  During the preflight inspection we observed that the stall warning was not working.  We consulted both FAR 91.213 and 91.205. There is no minimum equipment list for this airplane.  We determined that the stall warning was not required equipment.  We continued our flight and we made an entry in the club's squawk reporting system.  Later; another club member informed us that we should have grounded the airplane. He pointed out that indeed the stall warning is required equipment according to the POH.  It is not listed under any section labeled 'required equipment'.  It was listed in Section 6 weight and balance. In this weight and balance section there are coded letters next to equipment that have particular meanings.  The stall warning is listed with the letter code that indicates it is required equipment.Well; I learn or re-learn something new every day. This indeed is a learning experience. Doing research I learned a few other sources - in addition to the POH W&B section - that need to be consulted for required equipment.  Type certificate data sheet at www.rgl.faa.gov; and any STC's for the aircraft.




Synopsis: PA-28 pilot reported operating the aircraft with the stall warning inoperative contrary to the required equipment list.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft called an adjacent Controller having encountered IMC conditions VFR at 700 MSL. He was incapable of IFR flight. At the time I was an over-overlap on another position and was told to go assist this adjacent Controller and did not complete overlap with required two minutes because they had an emergency. The aircraft was vectored to a nearby airport which was BKN007 at the time with two miles visibility. With no other choice to ensure safety; the aircraft was told to proceed visually into the airport; and was switched to the Tower; despite it being solid IMC; eventually landing safely. Providing clarification as to what should be done in these situations. Basically he received an emergency SVFR clearance that the pilot never requested. Compounding the issue was a language barrier with the pilot which is a common occurrence with training aircraft in the area.




Synopsis: A VFR aircraft encountering IMC conditions was directed to a near by airport without the issuance of a legal clearance given the current weather conditions. The reporter suggested increased controller training.
Date: 202003
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon initial departure from EWR; Aircraft X was forced to return to gate due to a cargo loading issue. During the taxi out we knew we had DG (Dangerous Goods); but could not ever get confirmation from the station. They ultimately blamed their technology. Ultimately cargo was verified and the close out was completed. Departure from the gate was accomplished with the confirmation that no DG was loaded. Final weights were delayed due to a computer issue on the second departure (block in one day; block out the 2nd day). Once final weights were delivered; the flight departed. The First Officer requested a final weights manifest for the flight for comparison purposes against the original (which was never delivered). Only after the First Officer made this request did the final DG summary print out. This results in a situation where the flight crew is not accurately informed of actual cargo loaded; and more importantly; we had no idea we had DG on board.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reported that inaccurate Hazmat cargo loading information resulted in a return to the gate.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAX; Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On the HLYWD1 arrival to LAX we encountered turbulence; shortly after the aircraft began a roll to left more than 30 degrees of bank. I disconnected the autopilot upon realizing that we were likely experiencing wake and getting worse. I stayed above the glide path of the aircraft in front of us. The pilot monitoring inquired with ATC to see what type of aircraft we were following. Confirmation from ATC that we were following a Boeing 777 approximately 8-8.5 miles ahead; the pilot monitoring asked if we can stay higher on the arrival due to a wake event with that aircraft. ATC gave us step down altitudes and eventually a runway change to remain clear of further wake. During the descent contact was made with both Flight Attendants and one Flight Attendant said she was injured. No passengers were injured; the Captain handled further actions with coordination of the Flight attendant injury and crew scheduling.




Synopsis: EMB-170 First Officer reported a Flight Attendant was injured during a wake turbulence encounter 8 miles in trail of a B777 on arrival into LAX.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.TRACON, PA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Second aircraft: Fighter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X departed PHL 27L. I radar identified aircraft and climbed to 12000. Aircraft Y was 20 southeast of PHL eastbound at 11500. Traffic was issued between both aircraft. Aircraft X responded to RA and climbed 300 feet.Once again; TCAS issues instructions to aircraft established in standard VFR/IFR separation and creates an UNSAFE situation. Separation standards for ATC and TCAS must be the same!! How many times must this be reported before somebody does something? If this report program cannot solve this problem; then what is the point of reporting it? I don't want to hear that the airlines want their own standards. The FAA's mission is to provide safe air-travel for millions upon millions of passengers.




Synopsis: PHL TRACON Controller reported an unsafe event that was caused by a TCAS Resolution. Controller wants standards looked at and possibly changed.