Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: My Front Line Manager came back from the watch desk with a plan that I draw a line with the draw feature from the southeastern shelf of the [Restricted Area Airspace] to the Approach Sector boundary. This new 'airspace' was given to my sector from 11000 feet to 23000 feet not by me but commanded by my supervisor. I didn't agree to it; since my knowledge of ERAM (ARTCC Computer Software) is that it is illegal to just draw lines on our scope to give airspace to another sector. This is because of lack of the 'autopop' feature because ERAM wouldn't know of the airspace change. I wished to take point outs like we do every day in the control room. I said I didn't want to draw the line but was forced to draw the line by my Front Line Manager. I then said I wanted to be relieved because I think this procedure is illegal. I was relieved shortly afterwards. [Adjacent sectors] whose airspace adjoins were not told about the 'airspace change.' Flow Control Reroutes were not utilized when it should have been for these situations if management thought that point outs were too much workload; which in my opinion; they were not. Or maybe it was because [TRACON] didn't want to point out or hand off the deviating aircraft.Do not have the Operation Managers and Front Line Manager's making plans behind the scenes that completely disregard safety and the mandates of the FAAH 7110.65. I felt like 'what is wrong with point outs?' From what I know; we are not allowed to draw lines on the scope for airspace changes. It goes against the safety culture we are trying to create. Why force two controllers from different sectors to work differently than the norm? First; to take care of point outs Radar Assists should have been in place if this was a problem. This was not done. Furthermore; if it was deemed Radar Assists wouldn't be enough to mitigate the perceived problem; then Trackers can be brought in. When other sectors that surround the 'new drawn airspace' are not told about it this creates a safety issue. For example; another sector may point out an aircraft to my sector but if they are not aware all of my airspace is not mine; then they would violate the newly acquired airspace. Let's say an arrival was deviating east and another sector was working the aircraft northwest bound. Am I supposed to explain every detail of the new airspace configuration? I might say 'point out approved' thinking they knew about the airspace deal but in reality they might not know. They would descend the arrival; unknowingly putting the aircraft in conflict with departures that are transitioning Northwest bound through my old airspace; not knowing that my sector had aircraft climbing through there. I would not be required to have data block on my scope if I gave that new airspace away. The aircraft would automatically appear on my scope because that's the way ERAM is designed. They would turn into nuisance data blocks; therefore creating workload. I'd rather have the point outs. The other controllers were still pointing out the aircraft to me because they felt the same way. They also filled out an ATSAP report.




Synopsis: A Controller was told by his supervisor to temporarily change his airspace and create the boundary on his radar display with the draw feature. The Reporter felt this was a violation of rules and unsafe as there was no coordination for an airspace change and the radar software was not adapted to accommodate the supervisor's airspace change plan.