elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B DFW
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While climbing through 8000 feet ATC issued a traffic advisory for aircraft that would be leveling at 11;000; 1;000 feet above our assigned altitude. I looked at VSI and noticed that we were climbing at about 2600 feet/min and advised the First Officer (FO) that he need to reduce the climb rate.At 8700 feet EGPWS issued a traffic TA. At 8;900 feet I told the FO that he needed to level off at 10;000 and that there was 1;000 feet left to climb. Aircraft was climbing at 2;000 feet/min. FO acknowledged callout.At about 9;500 EGPWS issued an RA for 'Monitor Vertical Speed.' FO put the aircraft flight director into the green bars and held the aircraft steady reducing climb rate to about 1;000 feet/min. At 9;900 feet told the FO he need to level off now as his climb rate was increasing. At 10;050 aircraft was still climbing with VS increasing. Verified the FO's altimeter was indicating the same at which point I told the FO was flying through his assigned altitude and needed to stop the climb.At 10;100 I took positive action on the flight controls and pushed the nose of the aircraft down to arrest the climb and return to the assigned altitude. Aircraft reached a max altitude of 10;200 feet.FO stated that he was solely focused on the RA advisory command bars and maintaining the flight director in the correct portion.Fixation on RA commands and loss of awareness of current altitude by the FO. Lack of First Officers total time in High Performance Aircraft.More complicated TA/RA simulator training for new hires that simulate actual conditions of flight with assigned level offs. Current training focuses on other aircraft making the mistake and does not address how a crew member may put the aircraft into this situation.




Synopsis: EMB175 Captain reported he had to take control of the aircraft during climb out when the First Officer failed to level off for traffic above their altitude.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly after main gear touchdown; nose gear touchdown was made where upon the nose gear leg broke and departed airplane. Touchdown on both mains and nose was normal. Aircraft slid on its nose to a stop on the runway. Engine shutdown and pilot and passenger exited airplane. No injuries. Local people on airport arrived within 5 minutes and assisted pilot with towing airplane to parking area on ramp. Nose tire; fork; and partial leg were intact and retrieved from runway approximately 500 feet from where the airplane stopped.




Synopsis: During what appeared to be a normal landing; after the main and nose landing gear touchdown; the nose gear collapsed and detached from the aircraft.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuselage Skin
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft was hit by a runaway baggage cart and ferried to ZZZ1. The special flight permit was written to operate unpressurized and in non RVSM airspace but the aircraft was never downgraded to NON-RVSM.GMM X.XX.X under the Maintenance Control department; Note: If discrepancy prevents CAT II or RVSM operation; apply the applicable [autoland minimum] and/or RVSM MELs.I talked to the mechanics who returned from the road trip about why the aircraft wasn't downgraded to NON-RVSM and they told me Maintenance Control didn't say anything about that.Just to be clear; the aircraft did not operate in RVSM airspace; it was just never downgraded to NON-RVSM. The MELs should have been issued by Maintenance Control and told the mechanics to enter it in the log book and downgrade the aircraft.




Synopsis: EMB-175 pilot reported that aircraft was not downgraded correctly after ground damage to the RVSM area.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ANC.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 35
Light: Night
Aircraft: Learjet 35
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ANC
ATC / advisory: Tower ANC
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: ATIS called wind 330 at 3 KTS. We were landing on Runway 7R trailing a B737 (unknown which model i.e.: 700; 800) that was landing on Runway 7L. I would say we were about 1 mile in trail. At around 700 FT MSL we started to encounter what we are fairly certain was wake turbulence from the B737. We changed our approach path to fly higher; and we were clear of the turbulence until around 50 FT above touchdown; within the first 1/4 of Runway 7R. At that point we encountered fairly strong wake and almost elected to go around. I believe that we were allowed to trail too close to the B737; on the parallel runway with the light winds blowing the wake towards us. Prevention: possibly look into the amount of wake the newer larger models of B737 are creating; and of course increase the space between aircraft of our class and those.




Synopsis: LJ35 Captain reported wake vortex encounter in trail of a B737 on arrival to ANC;and suggested that more in trail spacing was a good idea.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Flap Fairing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: CDL procedure requires right-hand #4 flap track fairing has proper lubrication and re-lubricate as required. Maintenance Supervisor was notified at XA:00 by Maintenance Control to have an AMT accomplish this task. The task of re-inspection of flap track lubrication was not accomplished. Captain did not notice in his AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) review that the CDL follow-up procedure was not complied with and did not notify Dispatch of the noncompliance. I had this follow up tracker turned over to me at shift change I noticed the departure station did not call or enter the item into the database. The aircraft was in flight by the time I noticed. I called Maintenance [at the arrival airport] to accomplish the procedure accomplished for the next flight. I also had Maintenance check the AML to see if the departure station did an AML entry which they did not. Maintenance did not comply with CDL follow up procedures. Flight crew did not review AML prior to departure. Suggest flight crews review the AML prior to departure they are the last link in the chain before flight.




Synopsis: Maintenance Controller reported that maintenance personnel did not comply with a CDL follow up procedure on an A321.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During crew bathroom break at FL390; I attempted to put on my oxygen mask as the F/O (First Officer) was leaving the flight deck. One of the red quick don toggles broke as I was putting on the mask. Oxygen was continuously flowing out of the broken area where the toggle use to be. I was able to stop the flow by closing the mask door and pressing the reset. I took the second observer mask to use while the F/O was out. The mask barely reached the Captains seat and also didn't allow for establishing communications in the event of a pressurization issue. I contacted Dispatch and Chief Pilot Operations Center to discuss the issue and decided the safest course of action was to descend and divert. Dispatch recommended [an alternate] and FL 190 so we would be below landing weight. Upon further consideration the safest course would have been to descend directly to 10;000 ft. We accomplished the divert and landing with no further issues.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported an inflight failure of the oxygen mask toggle switch; necessitating a descent and diversion to a suitable airport.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We did not notice until airborne that we took off with a 2;000 LB main tank fuel imbalance. While hand flying the departure as the pilot flying; I made a comment about the aircraft requiring a lot of left trim. The pilot not flying looked down to see an amber FUEL IMBALANCE indication and the left fuel tank showing 2;000 LBS less than the right. TOT: 20.0 LEFT: 6.5 RIGHT: 8.5 CTR: 5.0. All fuel pumps verified on. Crossfeed verified closed. I engaged the autopilot and we ran the QRH fuel imbalance checklist. Imbalance corrected.When checking fuel quantity on the ground; double check each fuel tank; not just the total fuel on board which agreed with our required fuel. The amber light does NOT illuminate until airborne; so we can't rely on it to detect a main tank imbalance on the ground.




Synopsis: A B737-800 Left Fuel tank contained 2;000 LBS less than the Right Tank at takeoff. The FUEL IMBALANCE annunciator does not illuminate unless the aircraft is airborne; the crew missed the imbalance during preflight.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Upon arriving to the aircraft a note was in the remarks section to call Maintenance. Upon calling I was told; and this was confirmed via the previous day logbook; that the inbound flight experienced a 'number two Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) Oil and Fail' caution message along with the oil temperature/pressure yellow light lighting up several times in flight. The previous crew had written it up; but not carried out the MEL; so it was an open write up. Maintenance wanted me to defer this write up with a MEL; since the previous crew did not wish to complete this action the prior day. I inquired as to why no Maintenance had come to fix it overnight; Maintenance responded that there was no sense in paying for contract Maintenance to come out when it is a crew reset action. Maintenance also said that contract Maintenance is not certified to run our aircraft engines. I reluctantly agreed to do the O item on the MEL.I feel in reflection; that I should not have conducted this MEL. I came to an aircraft not knowing the full story. There is no reason why local Maintenance could not have been called to fix this. There might have been further issues no one knew off. Cutting economical corners can lead to errors beyond just economics. What if for various reasons; including fatigue; the prior Captain had written down the wrong IDG and so I by just following his write up; might have disconnected the wrong IDG. I from this point on will be insistent that Maintenance be sent to the aircraft instead of me fixing an ambiguous and open problem that has not been looked at. This is in the interest of safety.




Synopsis: ERJ-170 Captain reported he was asked to depart with a maintenance item that was carried over from the previous night because of a contract Maintenance cost issue.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp; Safety Analyst
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Dangerous Goods cargo not secured in Cargo compartment 5. Two packs of flammable liquid stacked on top of each other. This is a serious fire hazard!




Synopsis: Air Carrier Ramp Personnel reported Hazmat cargo transported and improperly configured for air transport.
Date: 201708
Location: SKBO.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SKBO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: The taxi signage at BOG (SKBO) airport is not coincident with our taxi diagrams. The airport is under plenty of construction and there is both incorrect and no taxiway signage. Even with up-to-date Jepps and a review of NOTAMS; the taxi diagram labeling is useless. Taxiways are either renamed or covered in black tarp; making it impossible to determine which taxiway is which. ATC gives you taxi instructions which include a hold-short somewhere prior to the runway. Without any relevant guidance or diagrams we had to ask for progressive taxi at every intersection. An operations alert should be included to all pilots operating to/from SKBO to warn of no taxiway guidance.

Callback: The reporter stated that the airport is fairly large with two long runways. When taxiing at night it's difficult because the taxiways are not lit and many of the signs are covered. The reporter also stated that when you ask for progressive with the language barrier it becomes difficult to understand the instructions especially when the taxiways do not match the charts. The reporter stated that even during the day; after the controller gives you which taxiways to take; it is difficult to figure out which way to go because the charts do not match the airport taxiways. The reporter also stated that there was construction at the time of the report so perhaps many of the issues have been resolved.

Second narrative: None of the taxi signs in Bogota (SKBO) are represented on our 10-9 taxi chart. Some signage is blacked out. Both our Jeppesen plates were up to date. The few NOTAMs that were issued are very confusing and difficult to read and understand. It's impossible to decipher the NOTAMs while a taxi operation is taking place. We actually taxied by another aircraft that we were supposedly to give way to. Never got the clearance. Extremely dangerous to operate in Bogota. Had the same problem when we arrived. Exited the runway and was given taxi instructions. We had no clue where to go because the signage was not correct. Asked for progressive taxi instructions to the gate. What a disaster.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported there is both incorrect and no taxiway signage at SKBO. None of the taxi signs are represented on the taxi diagrams.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SEE.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D SEE
ATC / advisory: Tower SEE
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I am writing this report to report a near miss situation in the standard traffic pattern for Runway 27L at Gillespie Field. My student and I were practicing traffic pattern operations at SEE. After checking upwind ; crosswind; downwind; clear we made a left turn into the pattern for Runway 27L. When my student looked to check the distance from aircraft to [the] runway; he also looked back and noticed that there was another aircraft right on our tail - same altitude; less than 100 feet behind us - same altitude. Tower advised that [he] was too close to us and told them to offset to the south for spacing. Aircraft Y offset to the south towards our 5 o'clock position and we got cleared to land #2 for Runway 27L.




Synopsis: Instructor pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at SEE airport.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: RJBB.TRACON, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON RJBB
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue; Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We requested the Continuous Descent Operation (CDO) 1 Arrival to Runway 24R. ATC cleared CDO-1 Arrival descend to 4;000 FT. Contacted Arrival advised on CDO 1 Arrival and she didn't change anything. Changed to next Controller. Just inside EVIAN; Controller asked if we were going to TOMO with 080 heading. Flew the 080 and was told to fly the TOMO arrival. Could not get the arrival in quick enough then asked to fly 360 heading. Then direct to MAYAH. Cross MAYAH at 4;000 FT. After landing and debrief realized that the confusion was how the CDO-1 is written in one area of the plates and the BECKY Arrival is written in the arrival plates. What we read and briefed was strictly what was written in the box notes for the CDO-1. KARIN-BECKY-EVIAN-MAYAH and the altitude requirements. After EVIAN we were proceeding direct to MAYAH and the BECKY DELTA Arrival was expected. ATC never mentioned fly the CDO-1 for the BECKY DELTA Arrival. Both of us had developed the start of a cold while on the trip and both had terrible sleep periods. Having the procedures in two different places in the charts. A very poor explanation of these procedures. This is kind of a cut and paste method for a CDO [Continuous Descent Operation] arrival and should be listed on one page and used in the FMC as a database arrival. I have flown this CDO before; but did not notice the page being written like this. This page was changed in MARCH 1; 2013. Do not accept this arrival unless it is written and put in the FMC database like every other arrival.




Synopsis: B777 Captain reports confusion attempting to fly the CDO 1 route to Runway 24R at RJBB. The altitude restrictions and the fixes listed for the CDO 1 are interpreted as the route instead of flying the CDO 1 route (SUC Y53 to BECKY) then the BECKY DELTA arrival. Fatigue and a developing cold were cited as factors.