elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HPN.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Embraer Legacy 600 (EMB135BJ)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D HPN
ATC / advisory: Tower HPN
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared for a visual approach to runway 34 in HPN. While on the base leg; tower cleared a cirrus on downwind to make a short approach to the same runway. As we rolled onto final; the cirrus was still on his base leg. We queried the tower as to the spacing and if they needed s-turns. Tower asked us to do an s-turn and I commenced the maneuver. This gave the cirrus enough time to land and as he was exiting the runway to the left side; tower again came on and told him to stay on the runway and make the next right turn available. We were approximately a half mile final at about 500 ft at this point. The cirrus swerved back onto the runway and started to head for the next taxiway on the right. At this point the other pilot came on the radio and said they had stalled their engine. I immediately initiated a go-around and entered right closed traffic upon tower instruction. We came back around and were able to make another visual approach to a successful landing.ATC was hurrying to close their facility for the night. They should have let the cirrus stay in the pattern behind us in the first place and make us number 1 to the runway. After they had cleared the cirrus she should have let the pilot of the cirrus exit the runway as he had originally intended and we would have been able to land safely. The cirrus pilot shouldn't have accepted the new clearance to go to another taxiway and should have continued his exit.




Synopsis: Legacy 600 Captain reported they had to go-around because the aircraft landing ahead of them was still on the runway.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Second aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Handoff / Assist
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A small twin was enroute to MYLS descending from FL210 to FL190. When the small twin was leaving FL198 or FL199; a medium transport was cleared to from FL210 to FL200. At this time the medium transport was overtaking the small twin about 7 miles behind. I had just received a briefing and I was D61. During this event; there was OJTI going on at R61 and the clearance was issued by the Developmental. The R44 Controller mentioned to the R61 team 'watch out for the little guy' in reference to the small twin when he heard the clearance for the medium transport. That was discussed briefly and the R61 Controller conducting the training mentioned that the small twin had left FL200 and he considered it so the altitude was available for the medium transport. Like I mentioned above; I was the D-Side during this time and although I saw and heard the clearance after I heard the Controller conducting the OJT say that he was looking at it and the small twin was out of FL200; I moved on with other D-Side duties.This event highlights the confusion surrounding vertical separation procedures described in 7110.65 paragraph 5-5-5. The rule is vague and it even states that standard separation might not be maintained at all times while using this rule. Further more the CBI [Computer Based Instruction] that we complete about radar separation gives a bad example on the application of this rule. The example is about a F18 requesting a climb after a prop reports leaving the altitude. According to the CBI; that altitude is available and ok to assign as long as you consider aircraft performance. In my opinion; that is an example of when not to use the rule; but the CBI teaches that it is ok to do so. The event between the small twin and the medium transport can be thought of as similar to the F18 and prop example. The point is that the 5-5-5 Paragraph B rule is vague and a more clear description of its application is needed in order to avoid misapplying it. Also the CBI should be consistent with the interpretation of the rule.




Synopsis: ZMA Controller describes situation related to vacated altitude separation and his concern that the application of this rule needs a more clear description.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Took off from Runway XXR at ZZZ. During climbout; passing approximately 4;000 feet; the Number 2 engine power reduced to approximately 35% N1. Tried closing and advancing the Number 2 power lever with no effect. Advised ATC and requested priority handling. Turning right to the west; realized that we were in a good position for an almost straight in approach to Runway XYR. Wind was light and almost a direct crosswind to the parallel runways at ZZZ; so I requested landing on XYR. No unusual engine indications were noted other than the lack of thrust. Left the engine running to maintain electrical and hydraulic systems. Landed normally with 15 degrees of flaps.CRFF (Crash Rescue Fire Fighting) inspection showed no leaks or other problems so we taxied to the gate. The landing was made at less than the max landing weight. On the ground; the engine idle remained at 30% N1. Probably could have slowed down and more thoroughly run the checklists but position and conditions were conducive to an immediate landing. Other than the lack of thrust the aircraft operated normally.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported the engine rollbacked to approximately 35% N1 during the initial climb; resulting in an immediate return to the departure airport.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On approach; the First Officer asked for gear down and I complied. After positioning the gear handle in the down position; I noticed that we did not get any of the 3 green lights. There were no red disagree lights indicated. The alternate gear position indicators were showing 3 green. We elected to break off the approach about 2000 FT AGL and work through the issue. After looking at the QRH for a possible checklist and not finding one; we [advised ATC of our situation]. We noticed that other lights were inoperative also which led us to start looking at circuit breakers. We found the Section 5 circuit breaker popped and elected to exercise emergency authority and reset the Circuit Breaker. There was no time to communicate with Maintenance Control as we were circling the airport at 2000 FT and had 5.9 fuel left on board. This procedure was successful and we got the 3 green indication on the gear. I informed the flight attendants of our situation and because of time constraints; let them inform the passengers that they would be seeing airport fire trucks as we landed as a precaution only. We landed uneventfully.




Synopsis: A B737NG's Section Five Circuit Breaker opened in flight which prevented both the green and red landing gear indications with the gear handle down but after locating and resetting the circuit breaker all indications were normal.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: External Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Avionics
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I replaced a previously broken External Power receptacle pin per the Maintenance Manual (M/M). This pin was subsequently broken again several days later (please see aircraft history). These pins break frequently due to their design. They are mounted by a small diameter threaded area which is a weak spot relative to the diameter of the pin. Also the External Power cord receptacle housing is shallow and does not support the Power Cord well when it is connected.

Callback: Reporter stated the External Power Panel (P19) receptacle electrical pins can be removed and replaced from outside of the B737-800s; using an Allen wrench (key) that is inserted into the center; at the end of each exposed pin; and back-screwing the pin out. He suspects the same design exists on the  B737-700/-900 NexGen aircraft. The copper pins are machined down to be narrower (smaller diameter) at the end that screws into the receptacle base.  That design is different than the older series B737s that required a Technician to open-up a panel in the Nose wheel well; right; forward sidewall tunnel in order to access the larger; thicker diameter pins that are secured with a locking nut. Reporter stated connecting and disconnecting the External Power cords contributes to the newer designed pins breaking frequently and generally at the same lower aft pin location; which is one of the larger diameter pins. Sometimes a pin breaks off just above the threaded section that screws into the receptacle base. When that happens; Technicians have to use a flat-head screwdriver and hopefully push in and twist the remaining piece of copper pin out. Because the External Power Panel receptacle housing is also rather shallow; the weight of the External Power cord can put a stress load on the pins. Broken pins cause electrical power drop-offs requiring APU operation to supply electrical power for the aircraft at the gate; using more fuel.



Synopsis: A Line Avionics Technician reports their B737-800 NexGen aircraft External Power Panel (P19) receptacle has redesigned electrical pins that break more frequently; causing External Power drop-offs; increase use of their APUs and fuel burn to supply electrical power for their aircraft at the gates.
Date: 202112
Aircraft: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I got distracted with the airplane being a MAX which caused me to forget to [ensure] I received the pink form Battery Powered Wheelchair or Mobility Device Form. I had discussed the form initially with the First Officer at the gate because I saw the customer in the wheel chair. Also the Flight Attendant asked me to make sure that the wheelchair was boarded and I made the comment 'I will know when it's boarded because I'll get the pink form.' However because I was getting reacquainted with the MAX I forgot to ask the agent for it. Also I would like to note that the Release may have the incorrect code for the wheelchair. The better code for the wheelchair should have been [a more appropriate code]. At least one of the wheelchairs had a battery because I saw the wheelchair at the gate and the customer sitting in it. I will make a notation on a paper to remind me in the future. It will also be helpful to remind the gate agents / ramp personnel we need the form. Unless we see the person in the wheelchair or the wheelchair itself we may not be aware we need the form.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported undeclared Hazmat transported due to a communications breakdown between flight crew and Dispatch. The required NOTAC was not provided to the flight crew prior gate departure.
Date: 201902
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was climbing through Flight Level 180 and was given a clearance to descend and maintain FL180 while the local altimeter setting was 29.77. This conflicted with FAR 91.121. The Captain queried the clearance and was told again FL180. ATC responded affirmative. The Captain states this was not a legal clearance and ATC responded it was for traffic avoidance. We were unsure if separation had been lost but there was no TCAS TA or RA and we proceeded normally after descending to FL180.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported ATC assigned them FL180 when the altimeter setting was below 29.92.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Inbound to ZZZ 10 miles out I call my location and intent for left traffic for runway XX at ZZZ airport. I make my traffic pattern calls and as I call on final I hear a static on the radio and assume it is traffic at another airport on [the same frequency.] It was not till my landing flare that I see Aircraft Y rotating opposite direction on the runway approximately 2000 FT in front of me. The aircraft sidesteps to my right and over flies my right wing at approximately 75 FT. I query the aircraft and he makes a statement that they called a right base to land XY (opposite direction) but that I decided to land anyways. Assistant airport manager at ZZZ overheard the radio calls and stated to me he heard my radio calls; but none from Aircraft Y until I queried him. At no time did I hear any radio calls from Aircraft Y until I queried him. The lack of radio calls from Aircraft Y; and decision to land opposite runway after hearing my radio call on final.




Synopsis: C402 pilot reported a near mid-air collision while landing with an aircraft that was departing opposite direction at a non-towered airport.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Other Fire Extinguishing System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [Maintenance Control] called to ask if there was any Hazmat onboard. I asked my Service Recovery Specialist; who confirmed that there was a SAX onboard with HAZ. The [Operations Control] called next and said that the Fire Suppression System had been deactivated and that Maintenance had not hooked up the halon cans to the hoses. I sent an ACARS to the crew to let them know the situation and asked them if they would divert to ZZZ1 or ZZZ. Both airports were equal distance from their current position. [Operations Control] came back and asked to put them on the ground in ZZZ if the crew was OK with that. The flight diverted to ZZZ.When I've called ramp agents in the past about a fire suppression system being inoperative or deactivated; it's either been an MEL or a restrictive [Deferred Item]. After I got word of this issue; I went back through my MELs and [Deferred Items] and saw 'FSS (Fire Suppression System) SYSTEM' on a non-restrictive [Deferred Item]. Throughout our training; my class was told repeatedly that we do not need to read the non-restrictive [Deferred Items]. If important systems like these are going to be non-restrictive [Deferred Items]; I would suggest training new dispatchers to read them. I will be reading through them from now on.




Synopsis: Cargo Operations Dispatcher reported becoming aware of Cargo Fire Suppression System being deactivated with Hazmat on board. Flight crew executed a precautionary diversion.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Captain called me and said it looks like we're going to encounter the light chop earlier than we expected. Just a heads up. I called the back and Number 2 answered and I relayed message. [Flight Attendant] Number 2 said we're almost.I go back to serving breads at and that's when we felt like we were rocking. I went up to ceiling and just started to grab anything to hang onto. Then went down to floor. I heard people scream. Then I started getting calls. 1st one was Captain checking on us. Then the back where they said we have 3 flight attendants down. Only 2 passengers got hurt. The seatbelt sign was on. Both refused paramedics assistance.




Synopsis: B777 Flight Attendant in-charge reported an inflight turbulence encounter that injured flight attendants and passengers.