elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Other unknown
Operating under: Other unknown
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Other unknown
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Aircraft X was released IFR off UDD; which off of RWY (Runway) 28 would be an immediate left turn (Southeast) to TRM; climbing to 4;000 feet. When they were released; there was no immediate traffic threat for the departure. By the time Aircraft X departed there was a target flying westbound (opposite direction) at 2;500 feet. On initial contact with Aircraft X; I told them about the traffic and asked if they could stop their climb at 2;000 feet (MVA in the area is 4;000 feet). They questioned the altitude initially; and I explained the situation to them. They agreed to stop at 2;000 feet. I issued a traffic alert; and Aircraft X eventually said they had to turn to avoid the traffic.I am recommending that there be some sort of real controlled airspace in the Palm Springs valley. The TRSA is not mandatory; and there are frequently aircraft (many high performance) that choose not to call the approach controllers and just go straight to the tower. The airspace in the months between September and May is extremely busy at times; and the controllers/pilots have no safe space in which to operate. It is called 'The Wild West' over there for a reason. Everything is shoot from the hip; because you have no idea what is about to happen next. We can not plan on anything; we can never assume anything. The most controlled airspace in the valley is the PSP Delta; which requires participation; while the approach controllers work 20x the traffic and have no 'safe space'.I ask that the airspace be reviewed and considered for a Class Bravo/Charlie airspace to avoid future NMACs or worse.




Synopsis: ATC Tracon Controller reported this airspace needs a review and possible reclassification.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the PF on a maintenance ferry flight.  When I talked to maintenance control; I was instructed to maintain a cabin differential pressure of 4.0 or less; with no speed restrictions. I then spoke multiple times with dispatch and the Chief Pilot on Call about flight procedures; and again was instructed to not to exceed 4.0 PSID and not exceed FL220. There were no other instructions to reference MELs to follow or pressurization procedures to follow. We set the Flight Altitude pressurization controller at FL220 and the Land Alt controller at 1150 feet for [destination]. Climbing thru 13;000 feet the PSID was rising rapidly approaching 4.0 PSID; and it peaked at approximately  5.0 PSID. We asked ATC for a leveloff; and ended up descending all the way back down to 10;000 feet to control the differential pressure. We had to get new routing from ATC to comply with their MSA enroute to [destination]. We landed without further event.We were not instructed to follow special cabin pressurization procedures by maintenance; dispatch; or the Chief Pilot on Call.  We did not have an MEL on the aircraft which would have directed us to follow unusual cabin pressurization procedures for the Flt Alt controller and the Land Alt controller. I had never flown a maintenance ferry flight; and my unfamiliarity with the requirements for the flight caused us to mis-set the pressurization panel. Not one of us in the loop thought to look at abnormal pressurization procedures; because the reason we were ferrying the aircraft was for a previous lightning strike; not a pressurization problem.  This was a very frustrating and unique event. I don't know how this could have been prevented on the pilot's part.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported they were not properly briefed on how to fly a maintenance ferry. During the flight they failed to comply with the special procedures.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: 07FA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: While eating lunch in between [flights] we were sitting at a table outside the fbo facing the rwy. In front of us was a facility van parked parallel to the rwy approximately 10 -15 ft. Outside the rwy edge line  Just north of the van was a station wagon parked perpendicular to the rwy. A C560XL was back taxing for departure. As the excel spooled up we noticed a woman get in the station wagon.  At the same time as the excel started rolling for takeoff the woman started the vehicle and began backing up. She stopped the vehicle around 5 ft from the rwy edge as the excel went by at approximately 90 knots. She whipped her head around and mouthed something; obviously startled at how close she had come to the excel.  She left in the vehicle and then showed up to our location a short time later. I asked if she had noticed the excel and she responded with 'I did not go over the white rwy line did I?' The close proximity to the rwy that vehicles are allowed to move about unsupervised is a serious safety concern in my opinion  Another crew witnessed the event with us and had the same opinion that it is an accident waiting to happen and added that if the vehicle had clipped the wing the excel could of wound up veering into the fuel farm and we all would of been in the blast area. They also added that due to the power brokers that use ocean reef regularly they didn't see anything changing anytime soon. I feel that the area in front of the fbo is too narrow for vehicles to be moving unsupervised while aircraft are landing or departing. Especially passengers who are not trained or aware of the dangerous surroundings. If the van was not parked in its location the driver might have been aware of the departing aircraft. As it unfolded she didn't see the excel till she was right on rwy edge line due to her line of sight backing out. Since this is a private airport; normal safety policies are not adhered to that apply to even the smallest muni airports that we go into. It is my opinion that not much can be done at this location to correct this problem except extreme vigilance while operating in and out of ocean reef. A simple spotter in front of the fbo to ensure vehicle traffic is clear of the rwy environment during operations could go a long way.




Synopsis: ASRS has received reports concerning the relaxed standards at Ocean Reef Airport previously. Pilots who use this airport should be extra vigilant.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PDK.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Other 107
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D PDK
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying a drone over my house and realized I was technically flying in Class D with no permission to fly there.  Drones create a new and unknown area of operations as this case demonstrates.  I was well far from the airport (almost at the lateral Class D limits); and I was flying very low; so I was not endangering any traffic.  However; it has been bugging me that I did fly in Class D without permission.  I have been thinking about what I would do differently.  For example; perhaps I would try to contact the tower with my hand-held radio.  This would be difficult because I am not high enough to get a good signal to the airport.  Should I have given them a call to let them know?  Would they think I was nuts if I called them about a little drone that would not have an effect on their operations?  These questions do need to be answered; and it is not clear to me where the line is drawn.  For example; it would be too conservative to suggest that I could not fly the drone 4 feet above the ground; or even up to roof top level.  I felt compelled to write this not only to admit I may have done something I should not have; but also to spur the conversation of what should and should not be done with drones in technically controlled airspace.Note: this was the third or so occurrence of this operation in the past couple weeks; and the reported date only reflects the most recent occurrence.




Synopsis: A UAS pilot flying his aircraft low near his home realized it was in PDK Class D airspace. He was uncertain what action he should take to notify ATC about his intended flight.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DAB.Tower, FL
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Other VFR Traffic Pattern
Airspace: Class C DAB
ATC / advisory: Tower DAB
Second aircraft: Decathlon 8KCAB
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Aircraft X was making right closed traffic to Runway 7R. He disappeared from the scope somewhere near the crosswind to downwind turn then re-appeared on base. Aircraft Y did the same thing. This has been a problem for a long time. I have been at DAB for a long time and it has been a carryover in the log since before then. I've also been told our ASR-9 hasn't been optimized in 18+ years. We had a safety meeting not long ago and we came up with a plan of action to get this issue resolved and as far as I know; no steps have been taken to fix this particular safety problem. We've been having problems with FUSION since we got it and we have a Band-Aid on it for now but the RADAR coverage for the 7R/25L traffic pattern is still unacceptable. Fix our equipment whether the problem lies with our ASR-9 or STARS in general. This kind of presentation is UNACCEPTABLE AND DANGEROUS.




Synopsis: DAB Controller voiced concern regarding the on going lost target issue on the Tower RADAR when traffic is near crosswind to downwind; the reporter unsure if the problem resides in the ASR-9 and/or STARS equipment.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing; Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We smelled odor on takeoff and persevered through it. While unpleasant; we did not even discuss diverting. This is odd now; because we had our scarves over our noses. We (me [Flight Attendant] Number 4 and Number 2) just waited until smell abated and continued to get up; work; and serve. Then on landing; the smell returned even stronger. The front Number 1 [Flight Attendant] called and we confirmed we had smelled the same thing at that time. The Number 2 [Flight Attendant] had tremors and expressed illness. I felt very light headed and foggy; but not as bad as her. She proceeded to throw up after departing the concourse outside and had to run inside to continue emptying her stomach. We went to the clinic; but no blood was taken.




Synopsis: B737-800 Flight Attendant reported odor on takeoff which dissipated and returned even stronger on landing. Two flight attendants reported physiological issues and received medical evaluation at clinic.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Engine Exhaust System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I received a phone call from Captain X on a Cessna C560 aircraft in the afternoon January 2014. He stated that there was a dime size chip in the #1 Engine Exhaust Cone. I advised him that we have had the coating come off in the past but it was a non-issue and I was going to contact Pratt-Whitney to verify. I spoke with the Engine Manufacturer Representative and he requested pictures. I called Captain X back and he advised he would send a picture to Maintenance Control. I told him [Captain X] the Pratt Representative didn't think it would be an issue; but wanted to see a picture first and we would call him back after the Engine Manufacturer Representative looked at the picture. Captain X sent the picture around twenty minutes later and I forwarded the picture to the Engine Rep. I went to a meeting; but advised the [Control] Desk that the Engine Rep had been forwarded the picture and they should contact the [flight] crew after he calls Maintenance Control to advise if the exhaust cone was good; or needed to be evaluated. After returning from the meeting about ninety minutes later; the Desk advised the Engine Rep [had to] defer the judgment on the exhaust to Cessna. Another [Controller] was going to call the [flight] crew and advise them but they were already airborne. Maintenance Engineering had an AFIS sent to the crew and had the aircraft diverted for the exhaust to be evaluated. I believe there was a disconnect on both sides in this instance. Maintenance Control; I; should not suggest to the flight crews that something may be 'OK' until the evaluation has been made by the proper technical group. Also the flight crew should have contacted Maintenance Control back to verify that the exhaust was a non-issue before lift-off. I believe it is important on issues like these that Maintenance Control stay in constant contact with the crews so they are aware that a suspect problem is under review; so they do not take the aircraft without the proper approvals.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Controller describes how a lack of adequate communications between Maintenance Control and a Cessna 560 flight crew allowed the aircraft to depart while a chip on the # 1 Engine Exhaust Cone was still being evaluated. Aircraft had to divert for additional evaluation of the exhaust cone.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Golden Eagle 421
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nosewheel Steering
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During taxi the aircraft experienced a loss of nose wheel steering and the aircraft began to veer to the right. Left rudder input and left differential braking were unable to overcome the right hand turn and prevent the aircraft from exiting the taxiway. The use of differential power on the right engine to attempt to control the right turn was also unsuccessful in turning the aircraft. The right main gear departed the taxiway and entered into soft mud which pulled the aircraft to the right and caused the aircraft to come to a stop with the nose wheel approximately 10 FT off the taxiway. There were no injuries to report and all passengers exited the aircraft once the engines were secured.




Synopsis: A C421 pilot reported losing nose wheel steering on taxi out; resulting in an excursion into the mud.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Heads-Up Display
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was not fully configured and about 10 KTS fast at the thousand foot call and elected to continue the approach; subsequently unstable. The First Officer made the correct call-outs 'NOT STABLE; GO-AROUND.' On approach to 17R at Pudong 1;500 feet to glideslope (G/S) intercept; 160 KTS. I planned to call Flaps 20; Gear Down at intercept but Tower interrupted with RVR reports and clearance to land. (I was still trying to get my seat adjusted and HUD display set since it was my first landing certified to use the HUD which added to my loss of situational awareness momentarily.) All I got out was Flaps 20 call before the PNF responded to the Tower. By now we're 1;300 feet AGL when I call for Gear Down/Flaps 30 with 15 KTS to lose. PNF commented at about 1;200 feet we weren't going to be stable at 1;000 feet. Flaps and speed both reached at 1;000 feet AGL at the same time but the Before Landing Checklist was not complete therefore it should have been a go-around. If I had it do over I would have gone around; and I will next time! And I would most definitely have been fully configured at 'G/S ALIVE;' call instead of waiting. Not good CRM along with poor leadership which; I'm sure frustrated the PNF to no end. I took full responsibility and we debriefed it thoroughly. Please see above comments but basically allowed the HUD to become a distraction rather than a landing aid.Comply with standard operating procedures at all times.




Synopsis: A widebody Captain flying his first approach utilizing HUD failed to achieve stabilized approach criteria until right at 1;000 AGL at which time the First Officer advised a go-around was appropriate per SOP. The Captain opted to continue the approach and landed safely. A complete debrief of the event ensued after parking.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ATC ordered go-around on Runway 27R due to traffic conflict. Traffic entered the landing runway.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported ATC instructed them to go-around due to a traffic conflict.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BUF.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 0.5
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C BUF
ATC / advisory: TRACON BUF
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Manuals; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: BUF ILS 05. Note 1 at the bottom of the page states 'RVR (Runway Visual Range) 18 with Flight Directors and Autopilot......'. Note 3 in the briefing strip note section states 'Autopilot coupled approach not authorized.' Remove the 'Flight Directors and Autopilot' from Note 1.  While a fresh crew might be expected to catch this; at the end of a long day; a tired crew might not; so why not make it easier for them.




Synopsis: Reporter reported conflicting guidance on the BUF ILS 05 instrument approach chart referencing autopilot use.