elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Pushback of a B787. The crew has little experience pushing from this gate. The area [we were] pushing back [from] has a confusing amount of lines with no written detail. Push out driver pushed according to the guide in line the approaches the outer taxi and continues on the zipper line causing him to encroach on a live taxiway. When he realized that on coming traffic was approaching he did not hesitate to stop. He immediately brought the aircraft back in to the safe area. A near collision almost occurred. Two  aircraft almost hit wings. The only reason the push out driver realized that he was doing something wrong was due to the B737 heading was at about 30 mph. And to avoid a accident he rushed the aircraft back to the safe area.The gate mentioned has dashed line from the taxiway leading into the gate. The push out driver assumed that was the correct line for push out. If one views the diagram from above; you can see the confusion of lines with little explanation or definition. The push out driver did not understand why or what happened until he was shown and explained. We showed him the pictures and what  the correct push should have been. His comments were it is so different and difficult to what is what. At some gates and areas of push out; we have no clue of what some lines mean. Yes training is provided by the county but it's mainly about encroachments on to taxiways. There is no good detailed class with instructions of how of each gate works. This does not have a push out card with details. In many cases the tower just says clear to push with no instructions. This dynamic manning is not helping the cause . It's really making the crews unaware of specific gate pushes. Also another recommendation is a blue line on where to turn during a push.




Synopsis: Push Back crew member reported the tug driver was pushing the aircraft when they observed a conflicting aircraft taxiing and immediately towed the aircraft back to parking to avoid collision. The reporter stated he crew had little experience at this gate; the ramp markings are confusing and they receive insufficient training..
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Aircraft: Military
Operator: Military
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZOA; Class E ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Two different things happened. The first was a low altitude alert below the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA). The second thing was a pilot deviation in the formation flight.  The wingman climbed 700 feet higher than assigned altitude. Flight X was leaving TRACON airspace immediately following an intercept exercise to go to a restricted area. The controlling facility approach called and said that Flight X was not on the schedule and are not allowed to enter the restricted area.The aircraft was notified and they wanted to verify if they were on the schedule and that they should be able to enter. Flight X was told to expedite climb and told low altitude alert and the MIA is 10;900 feet. The aircraft entered the area lower than the MIA. The aircraft was then given another low altitude alert because he was about to penetrate another higher terrain area. Then the wingman climbed above the assigned altitude of 20;000 feet; he climbed to 20;700 feet. I asked the flight led to have the wingman maintain 20;000 feet.We had to vector the flight out of restricted facilities airspace because of a non-important reason and we put the flight crew at risk. They were concerned with getting access to the restricted area and busted the altitude for the MIA and the assigned altitude. These are single piloted fighter aircraft that are being denied entry into an area for fighter aircraft and in a high terrain area with additional civilian aircraft.




Synopsis: A Center Controller reported a flight of two military aircraft entered their sector below the Minimum IFR Altitude while climbing to an altitude to enter an adjacent Restricted Area. The reporter stated the Restricted Area controlling facility would not permit the aircraft to enter the airspace due to a change of procedures. While vectoring the flight clear of the airspace the wingman in the flight climbed above their assigned altitude.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were planning on and had briefed the ILS Runway 6; Circle to Land Runway 1 approach as indicated by the last ATIS we had received. We briefed the requirement to cross DANDY at 1;500 feet per the approach procedure. When we contacted New York Approach; we were told there was a new ATIS and that the only change was the landing runway was now Runway 6; and that we could plan on a straight-in ILS approach to Runway 6. We re-briefed the new approach landing minimums and missed approach procedure; but failed to re-brief the altitude restriction at DANDY. Approach descended us to 2;000 feet and told us to 'maintain 2;000 feet until established;' and cleared us for the ILS Runway 6 approach and then switched us to Teterboro Tower. There was a slight bit of confusion in the cockpit about how to arm the approach mode on the flight director; but that was quickly remedied and the approach was armed from 2;000 feet MSL. We captured the glideslope as normal; and began our approach. We crossed DANDY somewhere around 1;850 feet MSL; rather than the required 1;500 feet and as we did so; Teterboro Tower asked us to 'begin (our) descent.' I explained that we were descending on glideslope; and as I said it; I immediately realized that we had failed to comply with the DANDY altitude restriction.After landing; Tower explained that approach had a Newark departure off to our right; and was concerned about a potential conflict; but then went on to say that all was well. At no time did I observe or did TCAS call out any traffic in our immediate vicinity. As a crew; we need to make sure that any time something in our briefed plan of action is changed; we stop and take the time to carefully and thoroughly re-brief the new plan in its entirety. That was a breakdown in CRM and communication on our part; and the lesson has definitely been learned and de-briefed thoroughly.  It would also be helpful if ATC was able to descend us to 1;500 feet prior to issuing the approach clearance; or at least change the verbiage to 'Maintain 2;000 feet until established; cleared for the ILS Runway 6; except cross DANDY at 1;500 feet.'




Synopsis: Pilot reported crossing DANDY 400 feet above the required altitude after briefing a last minute runway change during approach to TEB airport.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: En route at FL350 number one engine N1 vibration increased to as much as 8.1 units.  Reduced thrust turned on engine anti-ice (temperature -44) and complied with the checklists. Called Dispatch; patch to Maintenance Control. Says no relation to leak deferred before flight. After a discussion with all parties [we] agreed to continue to destination. As we descended to landing vibration was reduced; landed uneventfully.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain experiences excessive N1 vibration at FL350. After a discussion with Maintenance Control the Captain elects to continue to destination. The vibration diminishes as the aircraft descends for approach.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: Tower MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: MIA turned us just outside of INESS about 1.5 mi and cleared us for the visual. Captain was flying as I was trying to complete the checklist. Captain set 1;000 feet in ALT window and descended to just above 1;000 feet. Trying to complete my tasks; I looked up and noticed what I thought was over INESS and level 1;000 feet; VASI on left side of Runway was RED. I advised Captain not to descend any lower [and] at that time we received a below glideslope warning. Captain flew the aircraft back into glideslope and landed normally. At the gate; I asked if the Captain was going to file form; he thought it may not be required since it was a visual approach.I suggest be completely configured before turning on base this close in? Use combo G/S/VTI to landing.




Synopsis: MIA TRACON turned an Air Carrier to a MIA Runway 9 visual final about 4NM from the runway. The Captain set 1;000 feet in the MCP and descended too low but returned to the glideslope following an EGPWS Glideslope warning.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aileron Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the flight control check; I noted that the left aileron lacked resistance and feel. All other axis had the correct feel. I asked the FO if he noticed anything and he stated that the right aileron lacked resistance Parked on taxiway; set the brakes; and called Maintenance Control. We assisted in resetting the ELAC 1 (Elevator Aileron Computer) and ELAC 2 per recommendation. We still had the lack of resistance during the flight control check. We returned to the gate; mechanics were prompt and immediately started to diagnose the issue.The plane was yanked out of service. Apparently; two rods had worn down below the joysticks that provided the artificial feel. The plane theoretically could have flown; but it was determined by the flight crew and maintenance that the plane was not airworthy.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported the aileron control lacked feel and resistance.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I got a message on [the system] that showed a filed route and a cleared route for this flight. I looked in Dispatch Monitor and I had not even worked up a release or sent a flight plan for the flight. I figured it was just a glitch or that it was showing me what route ATC wanted me to file (like a Reroute alert) so I called [Center] Flight Data to see if they actually showed a flight plan on file. They said they did. I told them to remove the strips then later I worked up the release and filed the flight plan for the flight. I do not know who sent the first strip or when. There was no plane swap; it wasn't delayed from yesterday into today; it didn't show filed in Dispatch Monitor; it was a strange route that was filed; the proposed time on the strip was not the regularly scheduled departure time of the flight; but a much later time even though the strip was filed hours ahead of scheduled time. I immediately sent an email to duty managers; IT; and all dispatchers alerting them of the issue and suggested that they look in [the system] to see if anything was showing filed that shouldn't have been. The 2 dispatchers next to me both found they had flights that showed on file of which they had not yet filed. It's 19 hours after I sent the email and I have not received a response from IT or management to even say they are looking into it. I would not have even known there was already a strip filed if I hadn't gotten an alert that ATC changed the route that I supposedly filed so there could have been more. I think we need to investigate how these strips are being filed without our knowledge. I feel it's a safety issue that could lead to confusion with ATC and in the worst case; the flight could depart over a fix other than the one ATC is expecting them to.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported an existing flight plan for a flight that dispatcher had not filed.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DJI Mavic 2 Zoom
Operator: Commercial Operator (UAS)
Operating under: Part 107
Flight plan: None
Mission: Surveying / Mapping (UAS)
Flight phase: Cruise; Landing; Takeoff / Launch; Hovering (UAS)
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
Reporter organization: Commercial Operator (UAS)
Reporter function: Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other post-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I received an invite to fly my drone over the residential property to determine damage to the roof of the detached garage. I normally check Airmap in order to determine airspace before flying.  I did not check airspace before this flight. My Manager upon doing reviews; determined that I flew in a Class D of ZZZ Airport without prior authorization.  Future flights; I shall check airspace before flying my drone and obtain authorization prior to flying in controlled airspace.




Synopsis: Part 107 UAS pilot conducted an inspection over private property. After the flight; ground staff learned the flight took place within Class D airspace.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-31 Navajo/Chieftan/Mojave/T1040
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: In cruise; I began accumulating ice. I activated all anti and de-icing systems and monitored the situation by watching the wing leading edge via the wing ice light. Additionally; I was monitoring the OAT probe for accumulation. What I failed to notice initially was the ice building aft of the boot. Once I noticed; I requested an immediate climb; thinking that perhaps I was encountering freezing precipitation and/or SLD. In the climb; the airspeed decayed to the point where I determined that my only option was to level off and build up some speed for the wing deice boots (and for minimum icing speed considerations) and failing that; I would have to descend and potentially divert. I leveled at an intermediate altitude for several minutes while I activated the deice boots. The airframe cleared of much of the ice and I was able to climb to my assigned altitude. I informed ATC of the reason for stopping my climb and that I was continuing to climb to 8;000 FT. The Controller seemed disinterested; so I felt that there was no potential loss of separation. I continued and landed at the destination. On the approach; the stall warning device activated at approximately 125 KTS; though physical cues (I was hand-flying) of an impending stall were absent. I was able to land without incident. When I inspected the aircraft after landing there was as much as 1-1/2' of ice on certain unprotected parts and approximately 3/4' on the stall warning device. I should have monitored the area aft of the boots when I began accumulating ice. I believe that the ice accumulating on unprotected surfaces caused my climb airspeed to be too low and that caused the intermediate level-off. From now on; I will monitor unprotected surfaces.




Synopsis: A PA31 encountered icing conditions that the aircraft deice systems initially were unable to handle. After leveling off; much of the ice successfully shed and a climb to 8;000 FT and slower ice accumulation was made.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Weather elements / visibility: Fog
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We departed SAN runway 27. Normal take off to a heading of 290 for noise abatement. Upon reaching 7000 ft MSL; we received the instructions to fly direct to PGY VOR via the left turn (almost a 180 degree turn). We set PGY VOR on top in the FMC and upon reaching 90 degree intercept executed and confirmed that NAV function is 'tracking' inbound direct to PGY VOR; in both NAV and VOR function. At approximately 2.9 DME to PGY VOR; aircraft made a slight left turn at about 10 degrees off course indicated; which from what we were seeing on our MFD's didn't make any sense. At the same time the controller said 'I see you in a left turn direct to PGY VOR'. This caused confusion on the flight deck; as well as prompted the controller to ask us if our equipment is operational. There was no abnormal or caution messages displayed. As soon as we situated ourselves; we started troubleshooting and couldn't find the issue. We also checked with center controller and as it was a clear night confirmed we are on the cleared route. We continued flying now in VOR mode as when the problem occurred it happened in NAV.Upon descent to [our destination] our FMS displayed 'FMS NAV DR' 'NAV BUS FAIL' and 'XFEED INOP'.Upon landing we recycled power to the FMC and the fault messages cleared. I made an entry in the logbook describing the erroneous indication as well as the annunciators observed. I believe that we have experienced NAV failure without any indications which caused us to deviate slightly right of the PGY VOR. Either way DME indicated 2.9 NM TO PGY VOR when the turn started. Paying closer attention and flying in both NAV and VOR modes simultaneously monitoring both 'pictures' --not only selecting it--would of prevented the initial confusion and possible deviation.




Synopsis: An MD-83 flight crew got confusing NAV information between their FMS and VOR based systems. They opted to continue to destination utilizing the VOR. Approaching their destination they received CAS messages reflecting FMS and NAV buss problems. Upon recycling power to the FMC post landing the fault messages cleared. They wrote up the event in the logbook.