elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B IAD
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Climb out from IAD with a step-up level off of 10;000. Auto throttles engaged but hand flying the aircraft. Lightweight aircraft. After receiving clearance from ATC; I dialed in 10;000 feet on the MCP; but failed to realize that upon reaching that altitude the auto throttles will push up the throttles to accelerate; not bring the throttles back as normal. Due to the aircraft being lightweight; the throttles increasing power rather than decreasing power; and lack of a faster instrument scan; I ballooned through the assigned altitude (approximately 550 feet). The aircraft was descended as quickly as possible. While recovering to 10;000 feet; the controller stated 'Aircraft X; say altitude.' The aircraft was already descending through approximately 10;200 feet and leveling; and my response was 'leveling one zero thousand feet.' The controller responded 'Roger'; but made no other comments. The rest of the flight was uneventful.Lack of awareness of what the auto throttles would do on a level off at exactly 10;000 feet. Slow instrument scan. Some fatigue; after a 12 hour period; flying at night.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reported an overshoot on level off at 10000 feet with the autothrottle engaged and hand flying due to the power levers advancing to increase speed.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Wheels/Tires/Brakes
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was assigned to work task by a crew chief. The task was for #3 brake is worn I pulled the paperwork left the ready room and arrived to the Aircraft (AC) to find the jet bridge pulled and the ground crew pushing off the gate. I'm just concerned about on time departures only aircraft maintenance is just an afterthought. I returned to the crew chief and informed him but he mentions nothing in the log book don't worry this is a very common. If you compared Task (Assignments to an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT)) numbers to the AC you would find a difference between task and log book items generated by the task that the AMT was given.Example # 1: You get a gate call for cargo damage the Flight crew has no idea it was called in from another department the AMT goes out looks maybe tapes it up and never documents it because the crew never mentioned it and time restraints.Example #2 : AMT gets a gate call reading light out nothing in the book gets a part out of free stock replaces it and lets it go at that because he might take a delay writing it up.Example # 3: AMT is working a Flight orders parts for the AC changes them but since the crew never put it in the book it's good to go.If you also compared parts ordered for an AC and items written up you will find disparity also. With free stock there is a problem with accountability I have no way of knowing how many times something has been changed as in example # 2 the light bulb how many times was it changed? And if there is an underlying problem with the item like a bad socket short in the wiring behind a wall etc. Maybe tie the task to a logbook and generate a record would be a good idea.




Synopsis: Due to concerns and pressure for 'ON TIME' departures many minor maintenance items were not being worked or in many cases worked but not recorded.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I stopped my one aircraft at 040 by cancelling his approach clearance. This was because the controller next to me had an aircraft that was going through his and my final and was conflicting with him. Due to a big tailwind; the trailing aircraft was given a late speed reduction and eventually was broken out to be re-sequenced. I then gave aircraft one an approach clearance once the conflict was resolved. I had the turboprop on a 330 degree heading (on base) to follow aircraft one. I then made a couple transmissions to other aircraft on frequency. I glanced down at the turboprop and the ATPA was displaying a red bat pointed at the aircraft I was re-sequencing passing off the turboprop's left. This confused me and I thought I had already turned the turboprop onto final. I realized that he was still on a 330 heading when the CA alerted me. I then took corrective action and the turboprop told me he was responding to his TCAS. A B737 was the aircraft he was responding to. The B737 was on the other final and had the turboprop in sight maintaining visual separation. I think in this situation; ATPA was a distraction more than a helpful tool. In the past I have used the 'cones' or 'bats' to show an aircraft's heading. At a glance when the ATPA showed the turboprop's proximity to the aircraft passing off his left the 'bat' pointed in a direction towards his 'turn on' heading to final.




Synopsis: Conflict developed between two air carriers conducting parallel approach procedures. The Automated Terminal Proximity Alerts (ATPA) tool introduced a measure of confusion contributing to the event.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream G100/G150 (IAI 1125 Astra)
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Pitch trim inop above 250 kts. Returned to departure airport.


Second narrative: Pitch trim inop above 250 kts. Returned to departure airport


Synopsis: Flight Crew reported inoperative pitch trim over 205 kts. and returned to the departure airport.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was deadheading in the cabin when I was asked by the Captain to come to the flight deck due to an [urgent situation]. By time I reached the flight deck the number two engine was already shut down. I assisted the primary crew anyway possible to lessen the workload and stress. I assisted with cabin and airport operations communication; checklist completion; and any other tasks the crew needed help with. The primary crew did a fantastic job and needed very little assistance.




Synopsis: Deadheading Pilot reported being asked to come to the Flight Deck and act as an ACM (Additional Crew Member) during an inflight event.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: VNY.Airport, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D VNY
ATC / advisory: Tower VNY
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A trainee was training on LC1 with a supervisor.  LA1 was staffed with a local safety council member which is why I do not want them to be a de-identified version because both of the controllers suggested that the following situation was not a safety issue nor involved them breaking any rules when I brought it up to them before they departed both aircraft.  Aircraft X departed rwy16R on an IFR departure to take them southwest-bound.  A few seconds later; the trainee departed the much faster Aircraft Y on rwy16L southeast bound.  I had brought to their attention that Aircraft Y will catch up to the Aircraft X before the point where both aircraft are to make their turns per the SID (the VNY 2.2DME @ 1750 MSL).  Despite this; the IFR Aircraft Y was only issued traffic later once airborne and still drifted close to and overtook the other Aircraft X that had departed off the parallel.  Neither the supervisor training; CPC-DEV; or LA1 (LSC member) seemed to care and only watched it play out to a very unsafe situation.  The only way to prevent a collision would have been to take one aircraft off of the SID because they failed to consider aircraft performance with the IFR departures.  All three of the people working the runways thought they could use visual separation (controller applied) as a way to provide separation before the SID turn. My role was me working ground control and watching this scenario.  I tried to advise the locals of the performance situation that would lead to the extremely close call for traffic.  It was poor management of traffic when the only two operations pending was the departure of those two IFR aircraft.Two small IFR propeller aircraft departing separate runways to different directions (that will not cross flight paths) does not guarantee separation.  Controllers should be taught to launch successive IFRS with spacing that does not involve both reaching the VNY 2.2DME simultaneously and then turning different directions.




Synopsis: VNY Ground Controller describes a loss of separation with a faster aircraft over taking a slower aircraft on departure.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On short final to land Runway XXR we heard a 'too low; flaps' audible warning. As the PM; I saw we were at flaps 25 with a planned flaps 30. I called this out to the First Officer who was the flying pilot as I selected flaps 25 and performed the landing check which we had apparently missed on approach. We made a normal landing. This was our second day in a row of very early flights with wake up calls and 3 time zone changes. While I didn't feel fatigued; I suspect I was more tired than I realized. We had just flown a nearly 5 hour cross country flight with a breakfast of a couple spoonfuls of granola; a couple spoonfuls of yogurt; and a few grapes. This was our company provided meal for the flight. While I normally take responsibility for providing my own food; this is not always possible in the current COVID environment. I believe this was a significant contributing factor. In hindsight; the proper response would have been to perform a go around and set up for another approach. While I don't feel my handling of the situation was unsafe; it was not consistent with company procedures. With reasonable sleep and nutrition I'd like to think I would have made a different decision.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported receiving a flap aural warning message due to having an incorrect flap setting on final approach.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft was written up on the previous leg for inoperative Vertical Speed mode during autopilot use. On departure this leg; Tower advised to stay with them for numerous heading changes. Climbing through 1;000 feet AGL; Tower advised new heading which we turned to; still in Takeoff Go Around (TOGA) mode manually flying with autothrottles on; we cleaned aircraft up; continued climb toward 3;000 feet MSL. There were moderate turbulence encounters from there until cruise altitude. Passing 2;500 feet MSL; Tower advised us of a new heading which Pilot Flying (PF) turned to; passing 2;700 feet; Tower advised yet another heading and gave new frequency. Passing 2;900 feet; the autothrottles started to retard for the TOGA speed and Altitude Acquire Que. At 2;950 feet the flight directors started to direct a descent and I noted PF following them I advised 'you are sinking start a climb'. At 2;800 feet we again were in a climb toward 3;000 feet.  At 2;900 feet PF engaged autopilot; I noted Altitude Acquire; CMD B presented autopilot engaged; autothrottles engaged; aircraft overshot 3;000 feet passing 3;100 feet and continued to climb.  I advise PF to correct.  PF disengaged autopilot and corrected back but not before we reached about 3;275 feet MSL. Back at 3;000 feet; autopilot was engaged with no further issue. ATC did not mention altitude deviation. We both thought this might be related to the previous Vertical Speed failure writeup; but that was not verified and it appeared the winds there were causing issues with the autothrottles input and FD commands during Altitude Acquire.




Synopsis: A B737 Captain reported flight director and autopilot anomalies during altitude capture with an inoperative autoflight mode.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While in cruise; the cabin altitude began climbing at an uncontrollable rate. The 'Emergency Descent' checklist appeared on the Crew Alert System. We donned our masks; advised ATC and followed the 'Emergency Descent' checklist. The cabin regained pressurization and we leveled off at FL240. The QRH led us to check the bleed air pressures from both engines. We noted that the left bleed air valve had shut off. We completed the 'Bleed Air System Failure' checklist. Normal flight was then continued to our destination.




Synopsis: A G-IV flight crew initiated and emergency descent when the cabin altitude began to climb uncontrollably. Upon stabilizing the cabin while maintaining FL240 they determined the cause to be the left engine pneumatic bleed valve that had shut off.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: I90.TRACON, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B IAH
Second aircraft: UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flying westbound about 6 to 7NM north of ZZZ at 2;500 ft MSL squawking 1200 under the Houston Class B airspace. My plan was to fly at that altitude until clear of the Bravo outer ring and then climb to a higher altitude. With about 1.5 NM before clearing the outer ring of the Bravo; I noticed what appeared to be a drone or possibly a larger bird ahead of me at my 11 o'clock; slightly lower than me and climbing. I started my climb a little earlier than planned thinking I wouldn't climb into the Bravo. The distraction prevented me from adequately monitoring my position and I was in the Bravo for about 1 NM up to about 3;300 ft MSL. Looking back; I could have reset the autopilot target altitude to 2;900 ft instead of the 8;500 ft I had previously set it to as I was preparing to climb in a few moments. A turn would have been an option as well; but there was a Class D to my left so a right turn was the only option. If I were to have made that right turn; I would have lost visual with the potential threat.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported seeing a UAS close by at 2;500 feet. The pilot climbed to avoid the UAS and flew into Class B airspace without clearance.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CGE.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying a light sport aircraft on an instructional flight. Approaching Cambridge-Dorchester County Airport; I announced my location and intentions on the 45 for left downwind Runway 16. I heard a Piper Cherokee announce its intentions as it entered the crosswind for Runway 16. I had the Cherokee in sight on the crosswind when I turned downwind and announced my position on downwind. As I was completing my downwind; I heard the Cherokee announce its position behind me on downwind. I turned base leg and announced my position. Just as I was about to turn final I heard the Cherokee announce its position on base leg and ask my intentions. At that time I observed the Cherokee pass over me approximately 100 feet above my altitude. I told the Cherokee that it had just passed over me and that it should land and I would land after it landed. The Cherokee did a touch-and-go and remained in the pattern.The Cherokee failed to monitor CTAF transmissions; and failed to make an adequate visual scan for other aircraft in the landing pattern. I failed to confirm on CTAF that the Cherokee behind me on downwind had my aircraft in sight.




Synopsis: Light Sport Aircraft (LSA) pilot reports being overtaken on the base leg of the VFR traffic pattern by a PA-28 that had reported entering on the crosswind but apparently never understood the location or the speed of the LSA.